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Through the better part of 1971 India was confronted with the
December 1971. The Bangladesh crisis was perhaps one of the most
with Pakistan - one in 1948 and the other in 1965 - the 1971 war
the event of Pakistan’s war with India the U.S. could not have come to
maker. China too evolved into a more self-confident actor after the
194
leadership in such circumstances. This chapter is organized into four
sections: the first looks at the context of the crisis, the second and
third tiy to understand Mrs. Gandhi’s perception of the crisis and her
handling of it and the last section analyses the aftermath of the war
of power to East Pakistan after the December 1970 elections, the roots
particularly after the Indo-Pak war of 1965. The war exposed to the
former was cut off from the world during most of the war and saw
1 M. Rafiqul Islam, The Bangladesh Liberation Movement (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1987),
20-25. Ian Talbott, Pakistan: A Modem History (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 1988), 188-189. Also
see, Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “National Integration and Political Development in Pakistan,” in Asian
Survey (December, 1967), 884-885.
195
of deep discontent amongst Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan were
impoverishment.2
during the first two decades after 1947 that precipitated the
in 1971.
(1958-1969) and the Yahya Khan period (1969- 1971). The Ayub
regime had substantial support from the rural landed elite in the
Punjab and the eastern NWFP districts that provided most of the
officer corps, but it was endured rather than supported by the more
2 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dhaka: The University Press
Limited, 1980), 19-33. Also see Anthony Mascarenhas, The Rape of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Vikas
Publications, 1971), 14. W. H. Morris Jones, “Pakistan Post-mortem and die Roots of Bangladesh” in
Political Quarterly, 43, No. 2 (April-June, 1971), 187-200.
196
But ever since President Ayub Khan seized power in October
growth. Ayub Khan justified his moves by pointing out that there was
political parties may compete against each other for winning political
3 Khalid B. Sayeed, “Pakistan: New Challenges to the Political System” in Asian Survey (February,
1968), 97-104.
4 Ibid, 98. For a detailed analysis of “constitutional autocracy” see Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political
System ofPakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), 101-126.
197
from the outset. There were protests in both East and West Pakistan
The end of the Indo-Pak war of 1965 brought home more starkly
Pakistan. The economic impact of the 1965 war was far more serious.
centre. The war fully underscored the demand for autonomy and it
took shape immediately after the war in the form of the Six-Point
Rahman.
Pakistan, which would become the political battle cry of the Awami
198
allocation and taxation power to the states so that no province could
constitutional order did not take off in the wake of massive anti-
regime movements that emerged in both the wings. In both the wings
5 Bangladesh Documents, Vol 1 (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
1971), 13-14.
The six points are:-
(1) Establishment of a federation “on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and the parliamentary
framework of government with supremacy of legislature directly elected on the basis of adult
franchise.”
(2) Federal government shall deal with only two subjects, that is defense and foreign affairs and
all other residuary subjects should rest in the federating states.
(3) There should be either two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings or one
currency for the whole country provided that effective constitutional provisions were made to
stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan .There should be separate banking
reserves and a separate fiscal and monetary policy for East Pakistan.
(4) Denial to central government of the right of taxation, vesting of tax provisions in the hands of
foe federating states with foe Central Government receiving fixed share.
(5) Foreign trade: Five steps shall be taken :-
(a) There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings.
(b) Earnings of East Pakistan shall be under foe control of East Pakistan and the same
for West Pakistan.
(c) Foreign exchange requirements of a federal government shall be met by foe two
wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed.
(d) Indigenous products shall move free of duty within foe two wings.
(e) The Constitution shall empower foe unit government to establish trade and
commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter into agreements with
foreign countries.
(6) Set up a militia or para-military force by East Pakistan.
6 Cited in Talukdar Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath, 24.
199
movements were spearheaded by students and a young urban middle
like Z.A. Bhutto in the western wing and Sheikh Mujib in the eastern
that had been bypassed by the “economic miracle” in the west during
sharper in the West than in the East. The people and the areas
7 Shahid Javed Burki, “Ayub’s Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation” in Asian Survey (March, 1972X
201-212. Also Rounaq Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues (Dhaka: University Press
Limited, 1980), 1-26.
200
bypassed by economic growth grew increasingly resentful. Ayub
unable to quieten the unrest and the military, referring to the broad-
martial law regime under the commanding general, Yahya Khan, with
introduced the “one man one vote” principle thus allocating a majority
this, Yahya Khan had addressed the chief grievance of the East
8 Ibid. Also, Pran Chopra (Ed.), The Challenge ofBangladesh (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971),
2-3.
9 Mohammad Ayoob and CMhers, Bangladesh: A Struggle for Nationhood (New Delhi: Vikas
Publications, 1971), 29-30.
201
Pakistanis that is the principle of inter-wing parity had been
162 that were reserved for East Pakistan in the National Assembly. By
virtue of this massive victory in East Pakistan, the Awami League had
had 300 elected seats. Its tally of 160 seats gave the Awami League
10 Ibid. Also Anthony Mascarenhas, The Rape of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971)
Chapter 3,25-33.
11 The Statesman, New Delhi, December 9,1970.
202
constitution post December 1970 elections. Z.A. Bhutto, the leader of
the Pakistan People’s Party, which controlled only about one - third of
the seats in the National Assembly, was not prepared to accept the
rejected by the Awami League and the stage was set for a momentous
and the Pakistani Government ordered the army to reassert its control
With the military crackdown civil war in the eastern wing of Pakistan
was a reality and this crisis was to eventually culminate in the third
LEADERSHIP
(April - November 1971), we have divided the span of the crisis into
two principal phases: (a) April-July 1971: from initial reaction to the
crisis up to the eve of the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty and (b)
12 Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman, the Awami League leader had appealed to die U.N. Secretary General, U.
Thant to heed the crying human need of 75 million people of East Pakistan and declared that the
struggle in East Pakistan would continue until such time as “the people of Bangladesh get their rights
and can live as free citizens of a free country”. The Times ofIndia, New Delhi, March 12,1971; March
15,1971; March 27, 1971.
203
August-November 1971: from the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty to
the civil war in the west was an internal affair of Pakistan. The
the people of India with the victims of the Pakistan army’s brutalities
led by Yahya Khan. The resolution moved on March 31, 1971 while
expressing its “profound sympathy for and solidarity with the people
of East Bengal, in their struggle for democratic way of life” also “called
upon all peoples and governments of the world to take urgent and
Bengal will triumph. The House wished the East Bengal people that
their struggle and sacrifices will receive the whole hearted sympathy
204
and support to the people of India."13 The resolution carefully avoided
East Pakistan or suggesting in any way what that settlement could be:
phase, India expressed its solidarity with the people of East Bengal
and about 60,000 refuges were entering India eveiy day since June
13 Selected Speeches and Writings ofIndira Gandhi: August1969-August1972: The Years ofEndeavour
(New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India),
524-525.
14 This Parliamentary Resolution, according to Robert Jackson, was the foundation of a new East
Bengal Policy. It implied a “reversal of the doctrine upon which Indian policy towards East Pakistan
had been based since 1947: that the defense of Indian unity against fissiparousness implied that India
should herself respect the unity of Pakistan. By arguing that the secession of East Bengal was now
inevitable, the Indian Government was by implication asserting that whatever the political
consequences for die unity of India, ha efforts to respect Pakistani unity could no longer be sustained.”
See Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: A Political and Historical
Analysis of the 1971 War (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 36-37.
1J Surjit Mansingh, India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policyl966-1982 (New Delhi:
Sage Publications, 1984), 215-218. Also, Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan,
India and the Creation ofBangladesh (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1990), 142-144.
205
1971.16 The Indian strategy in the light of what was perceived as an
unless some hard measures were taken, the political situation could
move out of control in the east, given its vital security interest. In the
said “we are proud of our tradition of tolerance... our nation; our
people are dedicated to peace and are not given to talking in terms of
war or threat of war. But I should like to caution our people that we
was for the first time referring to an entity called Bangladesh which
was still juridically very much East Pakistan.19 She began her
statement in Lok Sabha on May 24, 1971 thus, “In the seven weeks
16 Satish Kumar, “The Evolution of India’s Policy towards Bangladesh in 1971” in Asian Survey (June,
1975) 490. Also The Times of India, New Delhi, May 18,1971; The UNHCR Deputy High
Commissioner Mr. Charles Mace had accepted the Indian Government’s assessment that there were 2.8
million refugees from East Pakistan by that time.
17 Selected Speeches and Writings ofIndira Gandhi: August 1969 - August 1972, 525-528.
18 Ibid, 527.
19 Ibid, 525.
206
since Parliament recessed, the attention of the entire country has
threat of war that, “we are convinced that there can be no military
those who have the power to do so. The great powers have a special
then only we can look forward to durable peace. But if they fail - and I
sincerely hope they will not -then this suppression of human rights,
in East Pakistan. Second, the flow of refugees into India from East
normalcy. Finally, the present situation was grave and fraught with
20 Ibid, 528.
207
serious dangers for the peace and security of the region. Mrs. Gandhi
problem Mrs. Gandhi had already stated her stand. Her decision of
appropriate.21 It was felt that the Indian army was neither prepared for
in East Pakistan as the political and military basis for direct Indian
the return of the refugees. It was clear that Mrs. Gandhi wanted to
internationalise the East Pakistani crisis but she was realistic enough
Moreover she had to take into account the unpleasant fact that in
view of the long history of Indo-Pakistani conflict, a bold Indian
208
initiative to internationalise the problem could appear to many to be
pressure on Pakistan and (b) the military regime’s ability to defy them
India to organise her expectations about the possible roles of USA and
China.
which to a large extent, could explain the courses of action that Mrs.
system in 1971 was marked by bipolarity, with the United States and
209
relaxation of tensions between the USA and USSR, but not altogether
The U.S. policy during the 1971 crisis was to safeguard the
American strategic interests. Pakistan was an ally and the U.S. was
chapter. So during the crisis, the U.S. under the Nixon-Kissinger geo
China. By 1971 China and Pakistan had developed a very close and
22 Shibashis Chatterjee, “The Role of Structure and Agency in Indian Foreign Policy. Some Case
Studies” Unpublished PhD Dissertation (Kolkata: Jadavpur University, 2006), 253.
23 Abdul Kalam, “War of Liberation: Great Power Response,” in Sirajul Islam (Ed.), History of
Bangladesh: 1704-1971, Vol.l (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1987), 684-686.
24 Christopher Van Hollen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geo-politics and South Asia”
in Asian Survey (April, 1980), 347. Also Bangladesh Documents, Vol. H (New Delhi: Ministry of
External Affairs, Government of India, 1971), 5.
210
strategic relationship. For most of the 1960s, China had nursed a
its stand on the issue and as in the case of the Indo-Pakistani war of
1965 the PRC had once again come forth in support of the Pakistani
position.
position on the 1971 crisis was Premier Chou En-lai’s message to the
25 Mohammad Habib Sidky, “Chinese World Strategy and South Asia: The China Factor in Indo-
Pakistani Relations” in Asian Survey (October, 1976), 965.
26 Ibid, 968. Also Robert La Porte Jr., “Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation” in Asian
Survey (February, 1972) 103. The Times ofIndia, New Delhi, April 12, 1971.
211
war with China broke out.27 Though the U.S. had placed an embargo
regarding the arms supplies and the public posture it adopted in June
to endorse the World Bank view that Islamabad would not get fresh
aid till Yahya Khan arrived at a credible political solution with the
deliver the expected result and there was plea for a more activist
policy. The logic was that if USA found nothing wrong in continuing to
supply arms to the Islamabad junta, then India at the very least was i
Kumar, “So far the thought that India might have to defend itself
primary question was how to stop military action and find a political
27 Robert H. Donaldson, “India: The Soviet Stake in Stability” in Asian Survey (June, 1972) 483.
Kissinger reportedly warned Mrs. Gandhi in the summer of 1971 that China might not remain aloof
from a war in the sub-continent and the U.S. might not give its support as it had in 1962, The New York
Times, November 30,1971.
28 Satish Kumar, “The Evolution of India’s Policy towards Bangladesh in 1971,” in Asian Survey (June,
1975), 491.
29 The Times of India, New Delhi, July 13, 1971. The importance of the report lies in the feet that this
was the first completely objective finding submitted by a team of experts who made extensive on-the-
spot in queries in twelve districts of East Pakistan.
3° Satish Kumar, “The Evolution of India’s Policy towards Bangladesh in 1971,” 491.
212
believed that the emergence of Bangladesh as a separate state as a
consequence of the struggle going on at that time had not yet been
in the first week of July 1971 was the visit to India of Heniy A.
U.S. and China. This was a crucial development and one that was to
support of one of the great power was now clear to Mrs. Gandhi. While
more decisively was mounting every day, but Mrs. Gandhi refused to
213
Moreover throughout July 1971, the activities of the U.N. in
met with negative Indian response. The Indian Foreign Office had
rejected the proposal on the ground that it could not create the
isolation, anxiety and uncertainty over the extension of the U.N. role
prompted Mrs. Gandhi to review her options. It was here that Mrs.
affairs and urged for a political settlement of the crisis but when the
214
perpetuating “the systematic decimation of people which amounts to
We are convinced that this would meet the interest of the entire people
area” showed that Soviet Union felt that strife within Pakistan could
had flown secretly to China to meet Chinese leaders for laying the
ground work for a presidential visit the following year. USSR saw in
counterforce, that is, the Soviet Union. Thus it was primarily this
33 Bangladesh Documents Vol. /(New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1971),
672.
34 Soviet President Podgomy’s Message to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan, April 2, 1971 in R. K.
Jain (Ed.), Soviet-South Asian Relations, 1947-1978, Vol.I (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1978), 105.
35 V. S. Budhraj, “Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh,” 484.
215
revert to the policy of the 1950s when Moscow saw a friendly India as
Peking during July 9-11, 1971. The timing and the effect of the
co-operation in Asia.
treaty covered obvious ground, putting India and the Soviet Union in
key clause was, however, Article 9, which as the operative part of the
36 S. P. Seth, “Russia’s Role in Indo-Pak Politics” in Asian Survey (August, 1969), 614-624. Also R. C.
Horn, Soviet India Relations: Issues and Influence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 64-66.
37 The Text the Treaty can be found in R. K. Jain (Ed.), Soviet -South Asian Relations: 1947-1978, Vol.
I, 113-116. Two view's on the Treaty can be found in G. P. Deshpande, “The Indo-Soviet Treaty” in
Economic and Political Weekly (August 21, 1971), 1802-1803, and Mohit Sen, “The Indo-Soviet
Teaty,” in Economic and Political Weekly (September 25, 1971), 2047-2048.
216
treaty, stipulated that the “two sides will abstain from providing any
assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the
their countries.”38 From the Soviet point of view, the treaty’s main
For Mrs. Gandhi the treaty with Soviet Union constituted a very
Gandhi did have some presentiment that a war with Pakistan may
event of the U.S. taking sides in favour of Pakistan and China, it was
38 Ibid. Also Ashok K. Kapur, “Indo-Soviet Treaty and die Emerging Asian Balance” in Asian Survey
(June, 1972), 463-468.
39 Robert H. Donaldson, “India: The Soviet Stake in stability” in Asian Survey (June, 1972), 483-484.
Also Ashok Kr. Kapur, “Indo-Soviet Treaty and die Emerging Asian Balance,” in Asian Survey (June,
1972),465-474. See Shirin Tahir-Kheli, “Chinese Objectives in South Asia: ‘Anti-hegemony’ vs.
‘Collective Security” in Asian Survey (October, 1978), 996-1012.
40 Selected Speeches and Writing ofIndira Gandhi: August 1969- August 1972, 525.
217
imperative for India to strengthen her strategic position. It was here
noted, “Although the Russians thus indicated that they now accepted
the Indian view that the crisis in Pakistan could not be resolved
Soviet Treaty did not mean a total commitment by the Soviet Union to
peaceful solution.”42
in the ensuing crisis, Mrs. Gandhi sought to delink her Soviet policy
from that of the Chinese. She tried to dispel the notion of an overt
41 LokSabha Debates, Second Session of Fifth Lok Sabha, Vols.2-3, I4.06.’71. Also Richard Sisson
and Leo Rose, War and Secession, 200.
42 Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 72. The Soviet Union opposed a Security Council meeting on
Indo-Pak tensions. The rejection of U. Thant’s proposal by Soviet Union meant some kind of a triumph
for India. The Statesman, New Delhi, August 20,1971.
218
The New York Times reported on August 8, 1971 that diplomatic
was a different matter that the Chinese Premier had not replied to
sought to explain that it was a crisis with which India had nothing to
do; it was a crisis which had spilled over into India in the shape of
victory by presenting the issue to the West and the U.N. as an Indo-
Pak problem.
phase in the evolution of the crisis. What was significant about the
pact was its timing and the psychological impact on an Indian public
aroused against Pakistan. The treaty conveyed to the Western powers
43 The Statesman, New Delhi, September 2,1971. At a much later date the Chinese Premier confirmed
his position. In an interview on December 5,1971 he said, ‘You know; what our attitude will be if a war
breaks out between India and Pakistan. We firmly support Pakistan against India’s subversive and
aggressive activities.’ Cited in RJLJain (Ed.), China-South Asian Relations: 1947-1980, Vol.l: India
(New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1981), 417-418.
219
Pakistan.44 It conveyed to the Indian public that India was after all not
alone in a hostile world and they were ready to give Mrs. Gandhi the
sole credit for this. She, however, did not give up exploring
her efforts to create world opinion. From August 1971 onwards she
implication that the Indo-Soviet treaty posed for great power politics in
By and large, till the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty, the U.S.
giving sizable relief aid for the East Bengali refugees in India but at
44 David H. Bailey, “War and Political Assertion,” in Asian Survey (February, 1972) 87-96. Also
Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 273. In an
interview on B. B. C., on November 1,1971, Mrs. Gandhi, on being asked why India would not accept
U.N. presence in the refugee camps as Pakistan had suggested, had categorically replied, “It is only a
device of Pakistan to show that India and Pakistan are on the same level. This is what we resent ....
What we resent is the two countries being put on par” See Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira
Gandhi: August 1969 - August 1972, 539. Also, Bangladesh Documents, VoL U (New Delhi: Ministry
of External Affairs, Government of India, 1971), 4-5.
45 The Statesman, New Delhi, August 19,1971.
46 The New York Times, August 10, 1971. Also The Times ofIndia, ‘The Old Nixon’, New Delhi, July
12, 1971.There was no doubt that Nixon was too deeply committed to the Cold War cliches and there
was no way he could extricate himself from it Despite ddtente with Soviet Union he could not come
around to accept India’s strategic dependence on Moscow.
220
Washington that an isolated Pakistan would be a war-like Pakistan.47
strike against India was unknown at that point of time. What seemed
Pakistan into a situation where war should seem the only course.
the leaders of the major external powers with interest in the region.
sharper. The focus of her objectives also shifted from the refugee issue
47 The New York Times, September 6, 1971. Initially, the Indo-Soviet Treaty was regarded, publicly at
least, as an attempt to maintain peace in tbe sub-continent This was the opinion of the Secretary of
State, William P. Rodgers.
48 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicoison and Michael Joseph,
1979), 866-867; 874.
49 The New York Times, September 6,1971.
221
became “supportive” of Bangladesh nationalism. Continuing threats to
India’s security posed by the crisis in Pakistan gave New Delhi the
indicated the basic problem and then justified the massing of troops
along her borders. She wrote, “The root problem is the fate of the 75
million people of East Bengal and their inalienable rights ... This is
what must be kept in mind instead of the present attempt to save the
settle the refugee issue, she could bring about a shift in Moscow’s
position on Bangladesh even while the Soviets preferred a policy of
222
1971: “The two sides expressed their concern over the grave situation
making the Soviets recognize that the only political solution to the
crisis would be one that paid “regard to the wishes, the inalienable
rights and lawful interests of the people of East Bengal.”53 By the time
Mrs. Gandhi left Moscow the Soviet Government had concluded that
even at that stage were non-committal over any military support for
between the Indian interpretation of the case and its desire to keep
223
experience of the failure of the Big Powers in compelling the Pakistan
on October 19, 1971 when Mrs. Gandhi was asked about the urgings
of the great powers for restraint, she said, “It seems very simple and
plausible to say Pakistan troops will withdraw, but Pakistan has been
escalating the situation by putting troops all along the border, by their
hate- India campaign and by their call for a jihad. This is not a one
sided matter. You cannot shake hands with a clenched first.”56 Mrs.
crisis as an Indo-Pak one despite all the restraint and moderation that
India had been showing under her leadership. Mrs. Gandhi had earlier
further added that India reserved the right to devise ways and means
224
unfavorable situation to her advantage and put Pakistan on the
defensive.
tour of major western capitals at the end of October 1971. Her tour to
of the Indian policy and (c) to demonstrate that the Indo-Soviet Treaty
would not necessarily jeopardize India’s relation with the West. She
Mrs. Gandhi had been able to clarify the purpose of her visit to
political realities of East Bengal, the visit fell far short of her own
anger at the inertia of will on the part of the great powers to end the
225
face of such tremendous provocation and threat to our safety and to
our stability. But where has the restraint taken us? With all our
getting worse. People have asked me how long can India manage?
Actually that date has long since passed. I feel I am sitting on the top
Mrs. Gandhi’s Washington trip was a disaster for there she had
fact that although Mrs. Gandhi professed her devotion to peace, she
would not make any concrete offers for de-escalating the tension.
Yahya Khan had agreed to move his troops away from the border if
226
India would do the same, but she would not make a similar
commitment.”63
it would not be possible to avert war. President Nixon had failed to see
global plans for improving relations with China. Baldev Raj Nayar and
side in the conflict was that, its credibility was at stake, with China
essential to the larger U.S. strategic design for the containment of the
Soviet Union. That the U.S. chose to side with the military
Indian interests.”64
after this encounter, most Indian observers regarded her three week
63 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs ofRichard Nixon, VoLl (New York: Warner Books, 1978), 651.
64 Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status
(U.K.:Cambridge University Press, 2003), 178.
” S. Viswam, “Political Commentary” in The Statesman New Delhi, November 12, 1971. Also Aswini
K. Ray, “Indira’s Ostopolitik and Brandt’s,” in Economic and Political Weekly (November 27, 1971),
2384-2385. There was general acceptance of Mrs. Gandhi’s stand vis-i-vis the current crisis in the
House. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Session of Fifth Lok Sabha, Vols.2-3, 18.11.’71.
227
outspokenness. It helped her to project India as a victim of U.S.
spotlight on the crisis in a way that had not been attempted before.
she invested her time and political energies to stating India’s case on
persuasive. She had been able to emphasise the view that to dismiss
that she had a responsibility to look after the country’s security and at
under Mrs. Gandhi’s steely resolve and resilience, took the decision
228
powers thought or did about it. Mrs. Gandhi’s disillusionment with
conflict could not but be resolved by war, since Yahya’s regime was
the area.
identified for such a change. One was the visit by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
China. The Chinese assurance to Pakistan forced the issue with the
A Tass Statement spelt out the changed Soviet position: “Since the
229
against India, the Soviet Union informed President Yahya Khan that
and sacrifice to her emotionally aroused 550 million people for the
1971 Mrs. Gandhi had said, “It is time for alertness not only for our
defense forces but for all our people. In the last few months the world
69 Tass Statement cited in R.K. Jain (Ed.), Soviet-South Asian Relations: 1947-1978, Vol. I, 133-134.
70 The Times of India, New Delhi, November 24, 1971. The Statesman, New Delhi, November 25,
1971.
71 The Statesman, New Delhi, November, 1971.
230
have faced this challenge. I am sure that you will meet future dangers
military intervention into the crisis. The outcome of the war resulted
16, 1971. The end of the war came surprisingly quickly. Pakistan’s
December 17, 1971 with the support of all political parties, Mrs.
BANGLADESH CRISIS
politics can sometimes blind the historian about the complexity and
the hesitancies and uncertainties with which one had to proceed and
the ambiguities in distinguishing the friend from the foe that one had
to suffer. Instead, the historian may be led to believe the outcome to
72 Cited in Satish Kumar, “The Evolution of Indian’s Policy towards Bangladesh in 1971”, 496. The
Statesman, New Delhi, October 24,1971.
73 The Times ofIndia, New Delhi, December 17,1971.
231
A close analysis of the leader’s expressions over time might help
the crisis and the solutions to the crisis. As the crisis unfolded Mrs.
us indicate why she had responded in the way that she did and how
from (a) those that are grouped under “Events on the Sub-continent”
Gandhi: (August 1969 - August 1972\ and (b)those that are grouped
232
latter collection consists of speeches delivered during her trip to the
when she felt the crisis had become serious enough and she owed the
leader not only by spelling out the problem but also by diagnosing it
1971 were almost entirely on foreign soil where her audience included
233
TABLES
MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
No. of 2 _ 2 1 - 1 2 4 8 7
speeches
Source:
(a) From March to August 1971: Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi: August
in the Rajya Sabha. On May 24, Mrs. Gandhi made a statement in the
was set up in Calcutta on April 14, 1971. On May 26, Mrs. Gandhi
from across the border. On August 9, Mrs. Gandhi made her first
234
explained the nature of the crisis, its long-term implications and
cautioned the people regarding their duty and the hardship that may
235
g. ii. m in u i i— i
DOMESTIC/INDIAN SOUTH-ASIAN INTERNATIONAL
1) We have been ensrulfed bv a new and 1) It is a problem th at threatens the 1) Indeed the basic Droblem is an
gigantic Droblem not of our making .... I visited Deace and security of India and indeed international one.
Assam, Tripura and West Bengal to share the of South-East Asia.
suffering of the refugees from Bangladesh to 2 ) .... It is a world wide a Droblem.
convey to them the sympathy and support of The international community m ust
this House and the people of India. appreciate the very character of the
situation th at h as now developed.
.... W hat was claimed to be an internal
problem of Pakistan baa also become an 3) This not an Indo-Pak dispute. The
internal nroblem for India. We are therefore Droblem is an international one.
entitled to ask Pakistan to desist immediately
from all activities which it is taking in the 4) The events, which were an “internal
nam e of domestic jurisdiction and which vitally problem* of a neighbouring country,
affect the nee or and well-being of millions of have become very m uch “our
our own citizens. Droblem.* infact an “international
SaONVXSNI
oroblem."
21 It is an Indian Droblem.
5) This a very grave problem for us. It
3) .... (the problem) is a real threat to our does not concern merely India - it
independence, to our stability, to our integrity. concerns Asia and it concerns the
So India is facing a real threat. world-
1) Statem ent in Lok Sabha on May 24, 1971. 1) Discussion in Lok Sabha on May 26, 1) Statem ent in Lok Sabha on May
1971. 24, 1971.
2) Discussion in Lok Sabha on May 26, 1971.
2) Discussion in Lok Sabha on May
3) Address a t Columbia University, New York 26, 1971.
5Q
s
on November 6, 1971
3) Speech at luncheon given by
Chairm an Kosygin in Moscow on
September 28, 1971.
4) Speech a t dinner to Soviet leaders
in Moscow, on September 28, 1971.
5) Address to the India League,
London, on October 31, 1971.
ANALYSIS OF FIGURE 2
solidarity for the East Pakistan people in their struggle for democracy,
and leader of the nation, in her statement in the Lok Sabha on May
24, 1971 for the first time, spelt out her perception of the East
refugees had propelled India into the picture. The refugee influx
health care facilities. This is what she meant when she described the
237
communal violence between Hindus and Muslims and the simmering
regions of India: West Bengal, Assam and the ‘tribal’ hill area of north
Bengal had just gone through several years of political upheaval and
rule” in a span of four years during November 1967 to June 1971. The
growing controversy in the state over the refugees and the Indian
the former’s disadvantage and in the process raising new issues and
problem.”
238
perusal of the table, it would appear that there was an ambiguity on
the part of Mrs. Gandhi regarding how to view or make others view the
problem. In the same time frame, (e.g. May end), the problem was
the fact that the issue was not an Indo-Pak one but a problem that
trying to draw the attention of both the U.S. and Soviet Russia to the
Gandhi tried to convey that what was going on was not at all an Indo-
Pak dispute but a severe global, political and human crisis for which
239
FIGURE 3: SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
I
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have the power to do with each passing day,
SI
this possibility has become 2) .... Certainly India will do nothing
remote. 21 .... this is an international to provoke a weir or conflict. But
responsibility and we are not coiner to India is determined to safeguard her
21 It is essential that the let the international community to get 1national interest. 1
1
basic cause of the crisis be awav with it. They cannot avoid their
1
immediately removed bv a responsibility. 3) I m ust make it clear that we
1 political solution cannot depend on the international
S a O N
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concerned. to trv to remove the root cause of the visited, to solve our problems for us.
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trouble.
31 Obviouslv the best wav. concerned, we m ust be prepared -
1 the most humane way is to 41 The world should take interest to trv and we are prepared to the last man
have a political settlement. and see that a political settlement is and woman to safeguard our freedom
and that a political reached which will be lasting and and territorial integrity.
r ^L S N I
settlement can only be nothing will be lasting unless it is
with the elected leader of accepted by the people of East Bengal 4) We may have to take steps which
the people of Bangladesh and their elected representatives. are necessary to safeguard our
and with the elected and freedom and our stability.
accepted representatives of
that country.
'
1) Statement in Lok 1) Discussion in the Rajya 1) Statement in Lok Sabha on May 24, 1) Speech at a banquet by President
Sabha on May 24, Sabha on June 15, 1971. 1971. Nixon in Washington, November 4,
1971. 1971.
2) Address at the Moscow 2) Discussion in the Rajya Sabha on
University on September June 15, 1971. 2) Address at Columbia University,
DATES 29, 1971. New York, November 6, 1971.
3) Speech at a banquet by President
3) Address to the India Nixon at Washington on November 4, 3) Address at Columbia University,
League, London on 1971. New York, November 6, 1971.
October 31, 1971.
4) Speech at Beethoven Hall, Bonn, 4) Speechat Beethoven Hall, Bonn,
November 11, 1971. November 11, 1971.
240
ANALYSIS OF FIGURE 3
which India was not involved at all. But the massive refugee influx
unwittingly made India a party to the crisis - and this was the
May 24, 1971 would appear inconsistent, for she spoke of a solution
East Pakistan on March 25, 1971. In these two months she had
do so. The refugee influx to India, which was almost 3 million by this
the Pak framework was no longer possible: she seemed to have sensed
241
course of action that was reprehensible and hence wholly unsuitable
evident in the statement of May 24, 1971 she held that the great
1971, intense political activity took place around this crisis. The U.S.-
She had already made her stand clear that a political settlement
problem, but at the same time, had hinted at a veiled threat of a war.
242
Dining November 1971 all her pronouncements were addressed
taken - that is she reserved the right to use the military option of
going to war.
CONCLUSION
243
manoeuverability at the operational level.74 By adroitly playing the
Soviet card Mrs. Gandhi had proved to be more than a match to the
Soviet Union. As Nayar and Paul observed, “India refused to have any
external power, whether the U.S. or Soviet Union, preside again over
should be allowed to cross the crest of the Himalayas, and India would
74 The Statesman, Non-alignment in a melting pot', August 10, 1971. Also Ashok K. Kapur, ‘Indo-
Soviet Treaty and die Emerging Asian Balance,” 465-466.
75 Balder Raj Nayar and T.V Paul, India in the World Order, 180.
244
consider the presence or influence of an external power in the region
achieving all this, in a way that no other leader before her had.
may have lacked Nehru’s moral or intellectual stature but the power
and prestige she enjoyed at the end of 1971 was remarkable. If the
national leader, then her victory in the Bangladesh crisis made her the
245