G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the
Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
-elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of
a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to
an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio
St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law
or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
 engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and
he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term
"practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of
the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from
the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of
the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that
as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective
work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to
take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as
regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal
work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit.
And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of
the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing
practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis
supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today,
although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private
practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called
"sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either
case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced
salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful
defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.:
Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly
understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as
an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend
their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall
that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor
in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in
most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in
law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full
range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly
lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by
the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law
practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature
and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly
"model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses
of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of
the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law,
the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research
has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved
through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is
the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business
and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate
lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms.
Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His
areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including
the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding
how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to
see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more
closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working
in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-
educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking
of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights
into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise
known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities
but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within
the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the
groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics
principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In
the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational
fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of
"law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last
decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for
 key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating
new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very
least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p.
4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial
law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-
55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years
in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of
its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and
public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet
the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an
official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
 After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and
(5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the
tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States
Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan
World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973).
( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise
in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation . Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement.
Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either
party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to
that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule
of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are
not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p.
265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's
past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
— that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by
the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and
(4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales,
Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a
definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people
ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my
statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of
the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should
not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for
over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the
ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition
be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained
since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave
abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

 We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's
beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three
inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved,
Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word.
The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was
clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria
Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232;
521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the
law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as
a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his
petition as hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that
it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de
Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes
note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the
subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e.,
"legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are
essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering,
assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports,
local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the
view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a
"legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed.4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes
the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for
medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case,
appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated
by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear
with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically
removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it,
or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals,
public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to
inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to
Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance
when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman

entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.  It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution  whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of
the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and
seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of
the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code
describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral
publication of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above
impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that
criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute
legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals,
good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage
and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will
greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the
conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be
no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in
other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively
to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a
typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law
in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the
protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if
such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then
be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further
proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such
as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise
illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating
information regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer
that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law,
that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before
deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar,
with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation,
and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a
corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such
practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each
and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court.5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of
holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for
its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers
of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch
credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to
be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is
offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering
opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to
look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be
evaded by a corporation  employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment
of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate
any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to
persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court)
is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business
name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not
a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It
is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical
law practice.6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral;
and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal
support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose
Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised
services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice,
albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of
the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall
squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who
may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-
year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a
lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice,
there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to
deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses
of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the
meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being
exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without
being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought
about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present
Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are
being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being
qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not
help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to
them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading
impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical
clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article."9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in
that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret
marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to
said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the
Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency
for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of
the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The
law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are
possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage
here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country
there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good
morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws
cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent
elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or
travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful
practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless

he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a
course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law — accurate
or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when
we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is
required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the
legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to
advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect
who performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-
empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel
man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts
are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers.
Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to
delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or
lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very
cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a
 certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our
schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged
primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide
his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law.
This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case
before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The
law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the
kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal
advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing
law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the

adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is
not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select
an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is
free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however,
there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real
estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess
the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of
a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations
Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by
the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State
of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the
National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice
of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making
arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as
complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-
Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as
the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and
visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law.
The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and
determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would
constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text
which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the
principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution
to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact
or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence
and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general
advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and
sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law .
. . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of
selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any
printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the
memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however,
the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice
in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in
the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action
or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of
law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry
may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong
notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of
marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
 2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not
necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or
"legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the
issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of
judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning
and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or
skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation
of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of
documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before
public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in
order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who
confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to
look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights
of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129
Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
 general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices
[Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139,
144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to
the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the
activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and
lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and
modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of
information and communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating
parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or
business registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that they
may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering
legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow,
such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will
simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him
or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation
does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal
advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh
floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even
if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These
specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem.
That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the
problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal
Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of
loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take
care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich
relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we
would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need
to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and
only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is
engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of
the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the
main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail
of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law
cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis.
The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been
admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business
except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only
those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and
study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise,
counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to
the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised
and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise
little control.27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as
an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent
cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption
as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities
there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of
the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the
general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify
legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics,
such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal
service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent
by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a
person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be
hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy
should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement
of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something
of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior
to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is
engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics
of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles
the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
 Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to
the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of
two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the
restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include
only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates
of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and,
with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer
may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the
name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name
or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed
in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task,
which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so
hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements
by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein
are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that
an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the
canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of
the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with
respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in
general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to
adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services
except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in
this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc.
was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that
aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in
nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum,
since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by
employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General
who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis
for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar
matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing
or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and
purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.

EN BANC

B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is
a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the
bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission
to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and
grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001
at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled
date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel
for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from
signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He
explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11
May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of
Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed
to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001
Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he
was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
motivated mainly by political vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The
minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found
that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC
believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC
also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The
OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel
for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor  dated 19 May 2001, respondent
signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was
the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN . Bunan himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the
MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date,
14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as
the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the
MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.3cräläwvirtualibräry

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession
of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.5cräläwvirtualibräry

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing
law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in
the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.7cräläwvirtualibräry

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll
of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. 8 Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this
Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9cräläwvirtualibräry

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a
private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your
acceptance.10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. 11 Thus, the evidence does not
support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. NO. 5377 : June 15, 2006]

VICTOR LINGAN, Complainant, v. ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Victor Lingan against Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga on
November 16, 2000. Complainant alleged that respondents, both notaries public, falsified certain public documents.

The case has its roots in a complaint for annulment of title with damages 2 filed by Isaac Villegas against complainant with
the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 5036. Respondent Calubaquib signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping3 of the complaint as notary public and entered the same as Doc. No.
182; Page No. 38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of 1996. Complainant alleges that this document was falsified because
according to the records of the National Archives, the document entered as Doc. No. 182; Page 38; Book No. CLXXII;
Series of 1996 in respondent Calubaquib's notarial register was an affidavit of one Daniel Malayao.4

The trial court decided Civil Case No. 5036 in favor of complainant 5 and, as a result, the plaintiff there, through respondent
Calubaquib, appealed it to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 55837.

On file with the records of this case is a special power of attorney 6 dated September 10, 1996 executed by Isaac Villegas
appointing respondent Calubaquib as his attorney-in-fact to "enter into a compromise agreement under such terms and
conditions acceptable to him" which was notarized by respondent Baliga and entered as Doc. No. 548, Page No. 110;
Book No. VIII; Series of 1996.7 Complainant alleged that this special power of attorney was also falsified because,
according to respondent Baliga's notarial register, Doc. No. 548; Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996 pertains to
an affidavit of loss of one Pedro Telan,8 dated August 26, 1996.

In addition, on January 2, 1995, respondent Baliga filed a petition for reappointment as notary public for and in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, which was notarized by respondent Calubaquib and entered in his notarial register as Doc. No.
31, Page No. 08, Book No. CXXX, Series of 1995. However, Notarial Register Book No. CXXX was for the year 1996 and
entered there as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08 was a cancellation of real estate mortgage dated January 11, 1996.

In his answer,9 respondent Baliga admitted the incorrectness of the entries and simply attributed them to the inadvertence
in good faith of his secretary to whom he had left the task of entering all his notarial documents.

Respondent Calubaquib's comment,10 however, contained a much lengthier account of the alleged events leading up to
this case, the bulk of which was meant to cast complainant and his motives in a sinister light. In a nutshell, he made it
appear that the reason for the complaint was that he (respondent) thwarted a fraudulent attempt by complainant to grab a
parcel of land. He also stated that complainant had filed a case for falsification of documents against him with the
Ombudsman but it was dismissed.

In the end, however, he (like his co-respondent Baliga) admitted to the mistaken entries and also ascribed the same to his
"legal assistants." Similarly, by way of defense, he pointed out that the Notarial Law "provides that only contracts need to
have their copies included in the notarial records. It does not require affidavits, verifications or subscriptions of petitions
which are mere allegations of facts to be entered in the Notarial Register, despite widespread practice to the contrary."

Upon receipt of respondents' comments, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

In the course of the proceedings before the IBP, complainant alleged that respondent Calubaquib, with the help of
respondent Baliga and several other persons, was trying to deprive him (complainant) of a parcel of land he had bought
from Isaac Villegas' mother-in-law. According to complainant, respondent impersonated Villegas, who was in hiding due to
several civil and criminal cases pending against him, by forging his signature in all documents and pleadings related to the
civil case filed against him (complainant). He pointed to the incorrect notarial entries as proof of this falsification.

He presented in evidence a motion for withdrawal 11 filed in the Court of Appeals, apparently by Villegas, disavowing any
involvement in the case filed by respondent Calubaquib.
To further buttress his allegations of falsification, complainant pointed out that respondent Calubaquib seemed unable to
physically produce Villegas. For example, when the Ombudsman ordered him to produce Villegas, respondent
Calubaquib merely presented an affidavit12 supposedly executed by Villegas and sworn to before a "highly regarded
[Department of Justice] official."

In the IBP's report and recommendation,13 dated December 7, 2001, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found
respondents "liable for inexcusable negligence" and recommended the revocation of the commission of respondents
Calubaquib and Baliga as notaries public for two years from receipt of the final decision. Commissioner Maala's report did
not touch on complainant's allegations of forgery.

When the IBP resolved14 to adopt Commissioner Maala's report and recommendation, both complainant 15 and respondent
Baliga16 filed motions for reconsideration17 with this Court. Respondent Calubaquib opposed18 complainant's motion for
reconsideration.

In his motion for reconsideration, complainant assailed the penalty recommended by the IBP as grossly inadequate.
Reiterating his allegation of forgery, he attached documents bearing Villegas' allegedly forged signature as well as
documents with his supposed real signature19 for comparison.

In his opposition/comment, respondent Calubaquib refuted complainant's scathing accusations of fraud and abuse of his
public position, and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. In his motion for reconsideration, respondent Baliga decried
the penalty imposed as disproportionate to the infraction he had committed.

The respondents having admitted responsibility for the notarial entries, the question now is whether these were the
product of a mere mistake or evidence of larger scheme to defraud complainant whose allegations, if true, are serious
enough to merit the disbarment of both respondents.

The missing link, as it were, between the admitted infractions of respondents and the nefarious machinations alleged by
complainant is whether or not the latter was able to prove that Villegas' signature on the documents notarized by
respondents was in fact forged.

Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation thereof is not
evidence.20 One who alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same.21 We find that complainant failed to discharge
this burden.

Complainant alleged mainly that Villegas could not possibly have signed the documents in question because he was a
fugitive from justice, with "several civil and criminal cases pending against him." Assuming this allegation to be true, it
proved nothing. The mere fact that Villegas was a fugitive from justice did not preclude the possibility that he might have
secretly met with his lawyer for purposes of filing a suit. It would have been different had complainant presented evidence
that Villegas was, at the time the questioned documents were executed, definitely somewhere else. But the bare
argument that Villegas' being a fugitive rendered it impossible for him to sign some documents was simply too nebulous to
inspire belief.

As additional evidence, complainant presented, as attachments to his motion for reconsideration, a number of documents
purportedly bearing Villegas' real signature, the latest of which was the motion to withdraw allegedly filed by Villegas
himself. However, the veracity of the last of those documents was vigorously contested by an affidavit also purportedly
filed by Villegas. The two documents, both notarized, effectively cancelled each other out, absent some other credible
proof.

It is true that there were dissimilarities between the signatures purportedly belonging to Villegas and his genuine signature
on the conforme of the general power of attorney22 executed by his wife in favor of his mother-in-law. However, the fact of
forgery cannot be presumed simply because there are dissimilarities between the standard and the questioned
signatures.23 If complainant was so sure the signatures were fake, he should have submitted them for expert analysis to
the National Bureau of Investigation, the Philippine National Police or some other handwriting expert. The records are
bereft of any such analysis or even any attempt to have the signatures examined.

Furthermore, all the documents on which the contested signature appeared were notarized. Notarial documents carry the
presumption of regularity. To contradict them, the evidence presented must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.24 Complainant's uncorroborated theory of an entire conspiracy of lawyers and government officials
beholden to respondent Calubaquib did not constitute such evidence.
The forgery of Villegas' signature having remained unproven, we can only hold respondents liable for their omissions that
have actually been proved.

In this respect, we find that the recommendations of IBP Commissioner Maala adopted by the IBP were supported by the
evidence on record, particularly the documents themselves as well as the respondents' own admission.

In response, on the other hand, to respondents' feeble attempts to deflect the blame from themselves and onto their staff,
we call their attention to Sections 245, 246 and 249(b) of the Notarial Law.25

Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:

SEC. 245. Notarial Register. ― Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the notarial register, wherein
record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any part
thereof, to any person applying for it and paying the legal fees therefore. (emphasis supplied)

xxx

SEC. 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature
of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging
the instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument,
the fees collected by him for his services as notary in connection therewith, and, when the instrument is a contract, he
shall keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of the
substance thereof and shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar year.
The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the
one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded.
No blank line shall be left between entries.

xxx

In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:

SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in
the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:

xxx

(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the
manner required by law.

xxx

From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally accountable for all entries
in his notarial register. Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by
passing the buck to their secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our open
condemnation.26 Respondents, especially Calubaquib, a self-proclaimed "prominent legal practitioner," should have known
better than to give us such a simple-minded excuse.

We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act but one invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized to do so may act as notaries public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
inflicting themselves upon the public, the courts and the administrative offices in general.27

Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity.28 Notaries public must therefore observe utmost care with respect to the basic
requirements of their duties.29

Being not only lawyers but also public officers, respondents should have been acutely aware of their responsibilities.
Respondents' acts did not amount to mere simple and excusable negligence. Having failed to perform their sworn duty,
respondents were squarely in violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 30 and Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondents Atty. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga are hereby
found guilty of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of their lawyer's oath. They
are both ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately, with a warning that another
infraction shall be dealt with more severely.

Their present commissions as notaries public, if any, are hereby REVOKED, with DISQUALIFICATION from

reappointment as notaries public for a period of two years.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga,
and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator and Office of the Bar
Confidant for dissemination to all courts nationwide.

This Resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015

ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano (complainant) against respondent
Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled “Bobie Rose V. Frias vs.
Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada”3 suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals.
She is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Office
of the Bar Confidant, for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for reconsideration. 5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07 entitled “Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et
al.,” where complainant was one of the respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the
plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted certified true copies of the
minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as
one of the counsels,6 as well as the transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct
examination and cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial proceedings. 7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended from the practice of law
constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended her from the practice of law for two (2)
years.

On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on the complaint against
him.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances and her desire
to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that
her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending
her husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are
at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal assistance. 10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.

On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of
law for three (3) months.
RULING

We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.

Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this Court orders a lawyer
suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring
the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill.”14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's
actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering
stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the
findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in June-
July 2007 were done within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended from the
practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot practice law
from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No.
101-V-07 and actively participated in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-year suspension,
she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she represented her husband,
she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any
clearance or clarification from the Court if she can represent her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire
to defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and
foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture
that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case,
to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in
essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her
penalty.

Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga,16 citing Molina v. Atty.
Magat,17 where this Court suspended further respondents from the practice of law for six (6) months for practicing their
profession despite this court's previous order of suspension, we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada for
representing her husband as counsel despite lack of authority to practice law.

Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is
intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to
discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its
preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe
punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of violating Section 27,19 Rule

138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to
respondent’s record as member of the Bar.

Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, so that we can determine the
reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, Complainant, v. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M.

MARTIJA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, National Grievance
Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and
Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might
obtain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal Case No. 7635-55, for
estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she
was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal
and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of
the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a sum of money
based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio
Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file
the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default
rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously
attached by complainant was levied upon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty.
Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent Light
Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-
88.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the
Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No.
56934.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and recommendations:

Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT No.
38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears
under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband
was registered and annotated in said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18,
1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said registered
property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel
spouses) has no leg to stand on.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP
No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his negligence, the
IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office,
Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No.
2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated
March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the
appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer,
deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP
membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M.
Martija.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4, Resolution)

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not
a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of
honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason,
he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath
and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of
a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the
Bar Confidant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.
[Bar Matter No. 712. July 13, 1995.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, Petitioner.

Benedicto Malcontento for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW; A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE LIMITED TO CITIZENS OF GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER. — The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INQUIRY AS TO THE MORAL CHARACTER IS BROADER IN SCOPE THAN IN A DISBARMENT
PROCEEDING. — It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of
legal learning. All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to
the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer
in proceedings for disbarment.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals
with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our
people’s confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging
Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one
Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical
injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his
co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T.
Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer’s initial report to the probation
officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations.
In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take
the;1993 Bar Examinations in this Court’s En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination.
He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer’s oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office and to admit
him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order
dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten.(10) months from the time of the
Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions
for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is
a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the
following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

In Re Farmer: 3

"x       x       x

This ‘upright character’ prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant’s right to receive a license to
practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the
elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good
name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he
must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character
expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

x           x          x

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a
lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man’s fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to
aid the administration of justice. . . .

x       x       x" 4

In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW
710:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path
than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring
an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board
of bar examiners, as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of
each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission
to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once
been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is
presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his
license."cralaw virtua1aw library

In Re Keenan: 6

"The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or
business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who
pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in
it."cralaw virtua1aw library

Re Rouss: 7

"Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional character is one of
them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character,
like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness."cralaw virtua1aw library

Cobb v. Judge of Superior Court: 8

"Attorney’s are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and interests of
their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could
such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which
they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that
both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not
be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice."cralaw virtua1aw library

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal
learning:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

‘The-public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright
moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will
become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk,
a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.’ 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar, The
scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in
proceedings for disbarment:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Re Stepsay: 10

"The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in scope than
in a disbarment proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library

Re Wells: 11

". . . that an applicant’s contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him for
want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or
suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the
court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant’s character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to
be causes for disbarment."cralaw virtua1aw library

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity
be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to
prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications.
The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people’s confidence in their courts of law
and in our legal system as we know it. 12

Mr. Argosino’s participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good
moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which
proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of
those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the
life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence
in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection
of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo
the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred
to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the
time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at-the time of application
for admission to the bar and to take the attorney’s oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the
judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino
must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit
for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and
addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten.(10)
days from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.
[B.M. NO. 1370 : May 9, 2005]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty.
Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of
P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed
IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice
of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in
the USA.

On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment 3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the
actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a
member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP
Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the
Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of
an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is
but an implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the
bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that
what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have
done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of
Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if
approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual
dues.

In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy
of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged
in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership
dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits
that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he
has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from
nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly,
he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to
fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.

Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that
he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad
from 1986-2003?cralawlibrary

We rule in the negative.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the
Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for
the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing,
a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.5

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of
his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers.7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar8 - which
power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,9 thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the
judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership
fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses.
The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience
to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means
that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of
the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly
observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he
left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued.

As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the
situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime,
petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property without
due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.

This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State,
and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be
avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, 11 one of which
is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00,
the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
[B.M. NO. 1678 : December 17, 2007]

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December
1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's
free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law
practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar
when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to
Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant for admission as a member of the
bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in
2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer's
oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the
rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes
him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted
as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements
and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the
bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and
other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer's oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means
continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the annual
professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful observance of the
rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in
cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss
of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh
the applicant/petitioner's knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as
an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his
oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 154207 : April 27, 2007]

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA

LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC's Order
dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases
of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz,
Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor
on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set
the case for continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1,
2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section
34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to
deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No.
00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere
does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730
dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent
or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion
for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said
court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration and his
Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner
before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the
herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;

II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW,
WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO
HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED
TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR
MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS
(MTC'S).4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may
take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court,
and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits
the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the
criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved
by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings,
motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the
legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of a
municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party
may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000.
No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in
these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance
of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions
when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by
the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been
used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that
Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner's appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether
or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student
may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of
Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the
injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for
damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner's
appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in
instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy
country, and crime against popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action,
and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,
Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to
ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct
control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.