BEFORE THE HONORABLE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

IN THE MATTER OF:

SRI MAHADEVNNAIKA S/O SANNANAIKA …………………PETITIONER

VS

SHIVAKUMAR S/O GOPAMMA ………………RESPONDENT

ACTS: FAMILY COURT ACT 1984-SECTION 19(4); CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(CrPC) – SECTION 125

REPORTED IN: 2007KARLJ, 2007DMC1 590,2006IJR KAR4647,2006 SCC ONLINE KAR 644,
2007 KANLJ 1 117, 2007AIR KANT R 1 172, 2007 AIC 50 942

CASE NO: RP(FC) NO 68/2002

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INDEX

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Introduction

This is a revision petition under section 19(4) of family courts act 1984is directed against the order dated
24.04.2002 passed by the learned judge family court, mysore in civil miscellaneous no. 185/1998
originally numbered as 113/1998.2civil miscellaneous …. Appearing for the respondents submits that
the petitioner has not paid entire arrears as had been awarded by learned trial judge of family court , sri
shivanand learned counsel for the petitioner could not deposite entire arrears only in the view of the
later…. But notwithstanding the present revision petitioner undertakes to keep paying the maintenance
amount as had been awarded by learned judges of family court in crl. mis. petition during the minority
of the present respondents in present revision petition; that such an order will not … for respondent
submit that the revision petition can be disposed of with the observationthat the finding recorded by the
learned judge of the family court with regard to the relationship amongst the appealant and respondent.

Law points

1 Section 19 in The Family Courts Act, 1984

19. Appeal.-

(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law,
an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory

order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. -(1) Save as provided in sub-section
(2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every
judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts
and on law."

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(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties
1[or from an order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending before a High Court or any
order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974) before the
commencement of the Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 1991].

(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the
judgment or order of a Family Court. 1[(4) The High Court may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for
and examine the record of any proceeding in which the Family Court situate within its jurisdiction
passed an order under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for the purpose
of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order, not being an interlocutory
order, and, as to the regularity of such proceeding.] 2[(4) The High Court may, of its own motion or
otherwise, call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which the Family Court situate within its
jurisdiction passed an order under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for
the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order, not being an
interlocutory order, and, as to the regularity of such proceeding.]" 2[(5)] Except as aforesaid, no appeal
or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court. 2[(6)] An appeal

Preferred under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench consisting of two or more Judges. 3[(6)] An
appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench consisting of two or more Judges."

2 Sections 125 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973

125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.

(1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain-

(a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or

(b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or

1. Subs. by Act 45 of 1978, s. 12, for" Chief Judicial Magistrate" (w. e. f, 18- 12- 1978 ).

(c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where
such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or

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(d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon
proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of
his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the
whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time
to time direct: Provided that the Magistrate may order

the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her
majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not
possessed of sufficient means. Explanation.- For the purposes of this Chapter,-

(a) " minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875 ); is
deemed not to have attained his majority;

(b) " wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband
and has not remarried.

(2) Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the
application for maintenance.

(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate
may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided
for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month' s allowances
remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to
one month or until payment if sooner made: Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of
any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a
period of one year from the date on which it became due: Provided further that if such person offers to
maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such

Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section
notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. Explanation.- If a
husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be
just ground for his wife' s refusal to live with him.

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(4) No Wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living
in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living
separately by mutual consent.

(5) On proof that any wife in whose favor an order has been made under this section is living in
adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living
separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order.

STATMENT OF FACTS:

BACKGROUND:

Civil Miscellaneous petition was by the wife and children of the present revision petitioner claiming a
monthly maintenance of Rs. 2,000/- per month against the salary of Rs. 6,000/- per month which the
revision petitioner was drawing by working as a cashier at K.E.B, Kollegal. The revision petitioner
contested the claim disputing the very relationship and accordingly pleaded he is not liable to pay any
amount by way of maintenance in favor of 1st petitioner therein the wife 2nd and 3rd petitioners / minor
sons.

1. This revision petition under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, (for short the 'Act') is
directed against the order dated 24.4.2002 passed by the learned Judge Family Court, Mysore in Civil
Miscellaneous No. 185/1998 originally numbered as 113/1998.

2. Civil Miscellaneous petition was by the wife and children of the present revision petitioner claiming a
monthly maintenance of Rs. 2,000/- per month against the salary of Rs. 6,000/- per month which the
revision petitioner was drawing by working as a cashier at K.E.B, Kollegal.

3. The revision petitioner contested the claim disputing the very relationship and accordingly pleaded he
is not liable to pay any amount by way of maintenance in favor of 1st petitioner therein the wife 2nd and
3rd petitioners / minor sons.

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 STATMENT OF ISSUES:

ISSUE 1: Whether the 1st petitioner is legally wedded wife of respondent and petitioners 2 and 3 are his
children?

ISSUE 2: Whether the respondent has neglected to maintain the petitioners and that the petitioners are
unable to maintain themselves?

ISSUE3: Whether petitioners are entitled to maintenance? and if so, at what rate?

ISSUE 4: Wheather petitioner is entitled to what order?

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE PETITIONER

 Whether the 1st respondent is legally wedded wife of the petitioner

Firstly the 1st respondent Ms. Gopamma was not legally wife and also that the 2nd and 3rd
respondent who figure as respondent in this revision petition are children of the petitioner and
therefore it is not binding on the petitioner. The recording of such finding may be 1st aside and
will be open to assert and prove such version as they plead in any independent proceeding that
may crop up later.
For this I Rely on
Case1: Savitaben Vs State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 636
Appellant claims that she was married to respondent No.2 some time in 1994 according to the
customary rites and rituals of their caste. Though initially, the respondent No.2 treated her nicely,
thereafter he started ill-treating her and she was subjected to mental and physical torture. On
enquiry about the reason for such a sudden change in his behaviour, the appellant came to know
that respondent No.2 had developed illicit relationship with a lady named Veenaben. During the
period the appellant stayed with the respondent, she became pregnant and subsequently, a child
was born. As respondent No.2 neglected the appellant and the child born, an application in terms

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 of Section 125 of the Code was filed claiming maintenance. The application was filed before the
learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class (hereinafter referred to as the 'JMFC') Himmatnagar.
Respondent No.2 opposed the application by filing written statements taking the stand that the
appellant was not his legally married wife and the child (respondent No.3) was not his son. He
also denied having developed illicit relationship with Veenaben. He claimed that actually she
was married to him more than 22 years back and two children were born. Their son Hament had
died in the road accident in July 1990. In the Claim Petition name of Veenaben was mentioned as
the legal heir and in the Voters List, Ration Card and Provident Fund records, Veenaben was
shown as the wife of respondent No.2. On 23.6.1998 learned JMFC allowed the Claim Petition
and granted maintenance. A criminal revision was filed by respondent No.2 before learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Sabaakatha, Dist. Himmatnagar, who by his order dated 26.11.1998
set aside the judgment dated 23.6.1998 as passed by the learned JMFC and remanded the matter
to the trial Court for adjudication afresh after affording an opportunity to respondent No.2 to
cross examine the witnesses of the appellant. By order dated 31.7.1999, learned JMFC after
considering the matter afresh awarded maintenance to both the appellant and the child.

case2: Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav vs Anantrao Shivram Adhav And ... on 22 April, 1982

The basic question before us, therefore, is whether the term 'wife' used in Section 125 of the Code was to
mean only a legally wedded wife, as held by this Court earlier in Bajirao's case or whether it was to be
given an extended meaning, as suggested in the Referring Order ?

In fact, the only contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner before us was that looking to the
object of Section 125 of the Code, which was to prevent vagrancy, the term 'wife' in Section 125 of the
Code should be given a wider or extended meaning so as to include therein not only a 'de jure'
or legally wedded wife, but also a 'de facto' wife such as in this case where all the marriage rites
prescribed under Hindu Law, by which the parties were governed, were performed, the marriage was
registered and the parties had lived as husband and wife, though for one week only after the marriage.
The very same contention which was also raised before the Division Bench in Bajirao's case (1980 Cri
LJ 473) was negatived by the court.

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The only controversy, therefore, that survived was as regards the import of the term 'wife' in Section
125(1) of the Code.

As mentioned above, a Division Bench of the Court has earlier in its decision in Bajirao's case (1979
Mah LJ 693) : (1980 Cri LJ 473) held that the term 'wife' in Section 125 only meant
a legallywedded wife. In doing so the Court observed :-

"A woman whose marriage is invalid, cannot get the status of a wife and, therefore, if the marriage of
the parties is void by reason of contravention of Section 5(i), (iv) and (v) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the
woman is not competent to apply for maintenance under section 125, Criminal Procedure Code, which
merely speaks of a 'wife'. The second wife whose marriage is void in view of Section 5(i) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, cannot thus apply for maintenance under section 125 of the Code. The meaning of 'wife'
cannot be extended to the case of a void marriage. In the absence of a clear intention in the provisions
itself and having regard to the background in which the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. 1973, were
enacted, a woman cannot claim maintenance under the section unless she proves that she is
the legally wedded wife of defendant against whom she brings the action."

This position in law was supported also by the other provisions in the section itself. Firstly, while
specifically providing for both legitimate and illegitimate children it restricts the Magistrate's power to
make order for maintenance in favour of a 'wife' only and does not extend it in favour of any other
woman though not legally and validly married to the respondent. Secondly, explanation (b) to Section
125(1) expressly, includes in the terms 'wife' appearing in the section, also a divorced woman. A
divorced woman cannot exist unless initially she was legally wedded wife, for under the provisions
of Hindu Marriage Act by which the parties in this case are governed or under any other personal law a
question of divorce either by a decree or otherwise would not arise unless initially the marriage
was legal and valid. The question of a divorced woman would never arise in cases where the decree of
nullity is passed for either the marriage being null and void or voidable. This specific inclusion of a
divorced woman in the term 'wife' which was not there before, would clearly show that the term 'wife'
would only mean legally wedded wife.

On the basis of the said observations of the Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant has
contended that it was permissible to give to the term 'wife' in Section 125(1) a still wider connotation so

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as to include therein not only a divorced woman, as specifically mentioned in the Explanation, but also a
woman who although not a legally wedded wife under the personal law governing her had undergone
marriage ceremony and lived with the man as husband and wife.

In our view, the said observations of the Supreme Court cannot be read out of context, as suggested by
the learned counsel, as indicating that the term wife could also mean and include even a woman who
was not legally wedded and therefore not a wife. The observations were to be read as restricted to the
wording of Clause (b) including in the term 'wife' a 'divorced woman'. The Court made the said
observations as it found that before the said explanation was introduced neither the Mohammedan Law
by which the parties were governed, nor Section 488 permitted maintenance on the cessation of conjugal
relations on divorce, and to that extent only explanation made departure from the earlier law. On the
other hand, the fact that under Clause (b) of the Explanation a divorced woman was specifically
included in the term 'wife' to give her a right of maintenance, would show that the term 'wife' would
mean only a legally wedded wife, but for which there would not exist a divorced woman. In our view,
therefore, there was nothing in the above quoted observations of the Supreme Court to support the said
contention of the learned counsel for the appellant.

 Secondly the 1st respondent is not the legally wedded wife therefore the marriage is void ab initio
and section 125 Cr.Pc does not apply to a de facto wife. A women not lawfully married is not
entitled to maintenance
A woman whose marriage is invalid cannot get the status of a wife and therefore if marriage of
the parties is void under the Hindu Marriage Act the woman is not competent to apply for
maintenance under section 125 Cr.PC
Under section 125 Cr.Pc the order for maintenance of wives and children and parents section 1(b)
“wife” includes a woman who has been divorced by or has obtained a divorce from her husband and has
not been remarried
A woman whose marriage is invalid cannot get the status of a wife and therefore if the marriage
of the parties is void under the Hindu marriage Act the woman is not competent to apply for
maintenance.
In this capacity “Wife includes a woman who has been divorced by or has been obtained from
her husband and has been remarried

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 The division bench appears to have felt that the term wife as appearing in section 125 Cr.Pc of
the code should be broadly constructed and not merely restricted to a legally wedded wife for the
purpose of claiming maintenance it should be proved that the marriage was solemnized
according to the Hindu law by which the parties are governed to constitute a valid marriage.
Accordingly the 2nd and the 3rd respondent were not his legal children and hence he is not liable
to pay any amount by way of maintenance
A revision petition has been filed under section 19(4) so that the honourable high court may call
for and examine the records of the proceeding within its jurisdiction has passed an order under
chapter IX of the code of criminal procedure 1973(2 of 1974) for the purpose of satisfying itself
as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order
The petitioner has deposited 50% of the maintenance amount including the arrears.
Case 1 :Bajirao Raghoba Tambre vs Tolanbai (Miss) D/O Bhagwan Toge ... on 1 March, 1979

Mr. Sawant, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner husband raised only one contention. He
submitted that the marriage of the respondent with the petitioner is null and void in view of the
provisions of section 5 read with section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and such a marriage, therefore,
cannot confer the status of wife on the respondent which would entitle her to make an application for
maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He submitted that in order that a
woman may be entitled to claim maintenance under the said provisions, she must satisfy the conditions
laid down in that section, one of the conditions being that she is the wife of the person against whom
maintenance is claimed. According to him, the word "wife" in section 125 must mean, and has all along
been construed to mean under section 488 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure,
"a legallywedded wife", and as such a woman whose marriage contravenes the provisions of section
5 read with section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act being void cannot claim the status of a wife. The mere
fact that the necessary ceremonies of a marriage under the customary Hindu Law have been gone into
cannot confer on her the status of "a legally wedded wife' which is a condition precedent for claiming
maintenance under section 125 of the Code.

For this I rely on

Conclusion:

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Hence from above all my arguments we can come to the conclusion that the 1st respondent Gopamma is
not the legally wedded wife of the petitioners and the 2nd and 3rd respondent are therefore not his children
under section 125 the grounds for granting the revision petition are satisfied and the present case is to be
admitted and granted relief
Prayer : Wherefore in the light of facts presented, issued raised arguments advanced and authorities
cited the petitioner humbly prayer before the honourable court that it may be pleased to adjudge and
declare the petition to be admitted and relief be granted without any cost to bear.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE RESPONDENT

 Whether the 1st respondent is legally wedded wife of the petitioner

Firstly the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized according to the Hindu
marriage Act. The marriage between the parties was performed as per the Hindu rites with the full
consent of both the parties.
Secondly a valid marriage is valid for claiming maintenance and the 2nd and 3rd respondent are the
legitimate minor children of the petitioner and therefore they too were liable for maintenance from
their father under section 125 Cr.Pc.
The division bench court had granted maintenance to the minor children a sum of Rs 250/- per
month to each of the two sons from the date of filing of the petition till they attained majority.
The petitioner who is economically in much better position is taking advantage. The petitioner is
working as a cashier at K.E.B College drawing a salary of Rs. 6000/- per month and can easily pay
the maintenance granted by the court.
The petitioner has filed a revised petition under section 19(4) of the family court in the honourable
high court.
The matter has been presented by the petitioner in a very tardy manner even after the case has been
dismissed for non-prosecution of the initial interim order passed by the court for admitting the
petition on 20.11.2002 staying the recovery of the balance of the amount only if 50% of the amount
Awarded under the impugned order is deposited within the pursued time.
The petitioner has not paid the entire arrears and has been awarded by the trial judge of the family
court. The petitioner has never deposited either the original maintenance amount or any part of it

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and the only amount that has been paid is Rs. 1000/- that has been awarded as cost in the present
proceeding and that too has been paid only after great persuation.
The petitioner has never complied with the condition and neither any material has been placed
before the court about such deposit nor had the petitioner asserted about the deposit been made at
any point.
 Whether the respondent are entitled to maintenance, if so at what rate and to what order?
The petitioner salary being quiet substantial at this point of time definitely exceeding Rs 10000/- per
month then at the relevant point of time in the year 1998 being around Rs 6000/- per month.
The petitioner has been tormenting the respondent without any bonafide purpose and depriving the
respondent of even the basic livelihood. Even though the order is passed under section 125 Cr.Pc
the maintenance awarded under the impugned order is a meagre sum in favour of the 1 st and 2nd
respondent.
The petitioner has used the judicial process of this court only ass a ruse to avoid the payment of
maintenance amount. The petitioner who is economically in much better position is taking
advantage of his better economic conditions to harass and deprive the respondent of even a meagre
sustenance that they have derived under the impugned order
 practically all the claimants of maintenance in the land of ours where despite they being
awarded maintenance by the Court, either under the Cri. Pro. Code or some other relevant statutes,
do not get the same and are found to be in not better position than where they were just before
the maintenance proceedings came to be initiated. The very fact that the, petitioner and such other
similarly placed discarded, disabled dependent has to approach for 'begging the maintenance'
that by itself is the ,fact indicative enough to what an utterly intolerable, desparate and helpless
situation it must have been created for the said needy sections that they are constrained to knock
doors of the Court to eke out some amount for maintaining their breathing existence, against their
own family member-father or husband; as the case may be ! ! Such helpless persons, first of all with
very great reluctance, muster some courage and thereafter with still greater personal difficulties,
approach the Court praying for maintenance. Here also, after filing maintenance application before
the Court, their miseries do not come to an end immediately. Rather the same lingers on and on,
painfully persisting and pastering them further testing the qualities of their patience and
perseverance as the path of the 'speedy, justice' these days is not as easy and free as the same is beset
with two major stumbling-blocks in its way, namely; (i) easy on asking and free-of. -cost

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'adjournments' and (ii) some sudden 'strike calls' by the learned Advocates deciding to refrain from
attending the Court work. Incidentally enough, when the issue of delay in justice perpetrating
miseries of the dependent claimants is under discussion, it would be indeed quite relevant to also
reflect upon the said two major factors contributing to protracting the proceedings in the Court.
Accordingly, indiscreet adjournments and irresponsible strike calls, over and above other reasons
very much come in the way of the litigating public more particularly of two classes, namely the
needy weaker sections of the society who are hand-to-mouth and, some falsely implicated innocent
undertrial prisoners languishing in the Jail, These two aliments/problems of the Court proceedings
are indeed terrible and upsetting enough to any human being worth the name, any lover of the
justice.

1 Miss Shilpa Bansilal Shah vs Bansilal K. Shah on 8 September, 1992

 the maintenance proceedings at this juncture are pending in City Civil Court at Ahmedabad since
1989, and therefore, with a view to see that petitioner is not made to chase the respondent
and go to the Court every month, begging for maintenanceamount, we in the light of
directions given above would like to direct the Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad or
whosoever other responsible officer under him is in-charge of disbursement of salary, firstly
to directly deduct the amount of Rs. 500/- every month from the salary of the respondent
and, either pay the same to petitioner or deposit the same in City Civil Court, and thereafter,
pay the balance amount to the respondent. At this juncture, we are told that the respondent is
to retire from services w.e.f. first January, 1993. In that case, we hereby further direct the
concerned authorities disbursing the pension amount to first deduct amount of Rs. 500/-
every month towards satisfaction of the maintenance amount and either pay the same to the
petitioner directly or deposit the same in the City Civil Court, and thereafter, to pay the
balance of the said amount to the respondent. This direction of ours shall have to be carried
out till further orders by this Court, by all concerned, and we make it absolutely clear that not
to comply with these directions, under any pretext, will amount to the Contempt of this
Court. Secondly, we further direct the Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad that as and
when the respondent retires from his services, he shall forward a copy of this judgment
underlining the directions, alongwith pension papers to the Pension Disbursing Authorities
Thirdly, the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad is directed to decide and dispose of the pending

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 Civil Suit between the parties as expeditiously as possible, preferably within six months from
the date of receipt of this order. Fourthly, over and above, the present proceedings, all the
concerned Courts with which the maintenance proceedings are pending, are directed to give
TOP MOST PRIORITY to decide and dispose them of as expeditiously as possible, by
avoiding unjust and indiscreet adjournments, even by awarding ad interim relief, cost or
exemplary cost, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case.
2 Nanhi Bai And Ors. vs Netram on 31 March, 2001
The learned Magistrate dismissed the application on 20-8-95 and fixed the case for evidence of the
respondent on his application under Section 125(4) Cr.PC. This order passed by the learned
Magistrate on 16-9-94 was challenged in the Criminal Revision No. 126/94. The Revisional
Court on 17-11-94 stayed the recovery of maintenance amount due from December, 1992
to February, 1994. The Revision No. 126/94 was finally decided on 26-4-95 by the learned
First Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar who came to the conclusion that since in the original
application filed by the petitioners i.e., wife and two minor children, the prayer was confined
to the recovery of maintenance amount for the period from November, 1991 to November,
1992, separate applications Ought to have been filed for the recovery of amount falling due
for subsequent period. 

Conclusion:
Hence from the above all my arguments we can come to an conclusion that my 1 st respondent
is the legally wedded wife of the petitioner and the 2nd and 3rd respondent are his legitimate children
under section 125 Cr.Pc and the ground for granting the revision petition are not satisfied. So the
petition should be dismissed with exemplary cost

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