For our class on Friday, we will do only Chapter 3.

But here are the additional readings/cases:

1)Registration of Voters

a)1. RA No. 8189

b)Panlaqui v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188671, [February 24, 2010], 627 PHIL 389-398

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 188671 : February 24, 2010]

MOZART P. PANLAQUI, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

AND NARDO M. VELASCO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present petition is one for certiorari.

Petitioner Mozart Panlaqui (Panlaqui) assails the Commission on Elections

(Comelec) En Banc Resolution of June 17, 2009 denying his motion for
proclamation, which he filed after this Court affirmed in G.R. No. 180051 [1] the
nullification of the proclamation of private respondent Nardo Velasco
(Velasco) as mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga.

Velasco was born in Sasmuan on June 22, 1952 to Filipino parents. He married
Evelyn Castillo on June 29, 1975. In 1983, he moved to the United States
where he subsequently became a citizen.

Upon Velasco's application for dual citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225[2] was approved on July 31, 2006, he took on even date his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and returned to the Philippines on
September 14, 2006.

On October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for registration as a voter of

Sasmuan, which application was denied by the Election Registration
Board (ERB). He thus filed a petition for the inclusion of his name in the
list of voters before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sasmuan which,
by Decision of February 9, 2007, reversed the ERB's decision and ordered
his inclusion in the list of voters of Sasmuan.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, by

Decision of March 1, 2007, reversed[3] the MTC Decision, drawing Velasco to
elevate the matter via Rule 42 to the Court of Appeals which, by
Amended Decision[4] of August 19, 2008, dismissed the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction.

MTC-RTC- file COC- CA

In the meantime, Velasco filed on March 28, 2007 his Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for mayor of Sasmuan, therein claiming his status as a registered
voter. Panlaqui, who vied for the same position, thereupon filed before the
Comelec a Petition to Deny Due Course To and/or To Cancel Velasco's COC
based on gross material misrepresentation as to his residency and,
consequently, his qualification to vote.

In the electoral bout of May 2007, Velasco won over Panlaqui as mayor of
Sasmuan. As the Comelec failed to resolve Panlaqui's petition prior to the
elections, Velasco took his oath of office and assumed the duties of
the office.

Finding material misrepresentation on the part of Velasco, the Comelec

cancelled his COC and nullified his proclamation, by Resolutions of July
6, 2007 and October 15, 2007, which this Court affirmed in G.R. No. 180051.

Panlaqui thereafter filed a motion for proclamation which the Comelec denied
by the assailed Resolution, pointing out that the rule on succession does
not operate in favor of Panlaqui as the second placer because Velasco
was not disqualified by final judgment before election day.

Hence, the present petition which imputes grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Comelec for not regarding the RTC March 1, 2007 Decision
as the final judgment of disqualification against Velasco prior to the
elections, so as to fall within the ambit of Cayat v. Commission on
Elections[5] on the exception to the doctrine on the rejection of the second
placer.

Velasco filed his Comment of September 18, 2009 with motion to consolidate
the present case with G.R. No. 189336, his petition challenging the Comelec's
September 8, 2009 Order which directed him to vacate his mayoralty post for
the incumbent vice-mayor to assume office as mayor. A perusal of the records
of the petition shows, however, that it had already been dismissed by the
Court by Resolution of October 6, 2009.[6]

In his present petition, Panlaqui implores this Court to apply in his favor the
case of Cayat  where the Court affirmed, inter alia, the Comelec Order
directing the proclamation of the second placer as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet
in this wise:

There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palileng's

proclamation for two basic reasons.

First, the COMELEC First Division's Resolution of 12

April 2004 cancelling Cayat's certificate of candidacy
due to disqualification became final and executory on 17
April 2004 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed
filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for
Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections.
Twenty-three days before election day, Cayat was
already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor
in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the only candidate,
Palileng was not a second placer. On the contrary,
Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none.
 The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which
triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the
present case because Palileng is not a second-placer but
the only placer. Consequently, Palileng's proclamation as
Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.

Second, there are specific requirements for the

application of the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan's
favor, regardless of his intervention in the present
case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on
Cayat's disqualification remained pending on election
day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two
mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the
elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat's
disqualification became final only after the elections.
[7]
 (emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring
supplied)
Repackaging the present petition in Cayat's fashion, Panlaqui asserts that the
RTC March 1, 2007 Decision in the voter's inclusion proceedings must
be considered as the final judgment of disqualification against
Velasco, which decision was issued more than two months prior to the
elections. Panlaqui posits that when Velasco's petition for inclusion was
denied, he was also declared as disqualified to run for public office.

Unwrapping the present petition, the Court finds that the true color of the
issue of distinction between a petition for inclusion of voters in the
list and a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy has already been defined in Velasco v. Commission on
Elections[8] where the Court held that the two proceedings may ultimately
have common factual bases but they are poles apart in terms of the
issues, reliefs and remedies involved, thus:

In terms of purpose, voters' inclusion/exclusion and COC

denial/cancellation are different proceedings; one refers
to the application to be registered as a voter to be
eligible to vote, while the other refers to
the application to be a candidate. Because of their
differing purposes, they also involve different issues
and entail different reliefs, although the facts on which
they rest may have commonalities where they may be said
to converge or interface. x x x[9] (underscoring
supplied)
Voters' inclusion/exclusion proceedings, on the one hand, essentially involve
the issue of whether a petitioner shall be included in or excluded from the list
of voters based on the qualifications required by law and the facts presented
to show possession of these qualifications.[10]

On the other hand, COC denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of

whether there is a false representation of a material fact. The false
representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous mistake but
to a material fact or those that refer to a candidate's qualifications for elective
office. Apart from the requirement of materiality, the false representation
must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible or, otherwise stated, with
the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's
qualifications for public office.[11]

In Velasco, the Court rejected Velasco's contention that the Comelec

improperly ruled on the right to vote when it cancelled his COC. The Court
stated that the Comelec merely relied on or recognized the RTC's final and
executory decision on the matter of the right to vote in the precinct within its
territorial jurisdiction.

In the present petition, it is Panlaqui's turn to proffer the novel interpretation

that the RTC properly cancelled Velasco's COC when it ruled on his right to
vote. The Court rejects the same.

It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter's inclusion/exclusion

proceedings to take cognizance of and determine the presence of a
false representation of a material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the
issues of whether the misrepresentation relates to material fact and
whether there was an intention to deceive the electorate in terms of
one's qualifications for public office. The finding that Velasco was not
qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement does not translate into
a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render him ineligible.

Assuming arguendo the plausibility of Panlaqui's theory, the Comelec

correctly observed that when the RTC issued its March 1, 2007 Decision,
there was yet no COC to cancel because Velasco's COC was filed only
on March 28, 2007. Indeed, not only would it be in excess of jurisdiction but
also beyond the realm of possibility for the RTC to rule that there was
deliberate concealment on the part of Velasco when he stated under oath in
his COC that he is a registered voter of Sasmuan despite his knowledge of the
RTC decision which was yet forthcoming.

IN FINE, the Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion when it denied
Panlaqui's motion for proclamation. Since Velasco's disqualification
as a candidate had not become final before the elections, the
Comelec properly applied the rule on succession.

x x x To simplistically assume that the second placer

would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The
second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first
among qualified candidates because in a field which
excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would
have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under such circumstances.

To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take

over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the
electorate is to disenfranchise them through no fault on
 their part, and to undermine the importance and the
meaning of democracy and the right of the people to elect
officials of their choice.

Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one

vote. In such a case, it would be absurd to proclaim the
totally repudiated candidate as the voters' choice. x x
x[12]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed June 17, 2009
Resolution of the Commission on Elections is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro,

Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

c)Sarangani vs. Commission on Elections, 334 SCRA 379

G.R. No. 135927              June 26, 2000

SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI

NOR HASSAN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI ABOLAIS R. OMAR, MANAN
OSOP and ATTY. NASIB D. YASSIN, respondents.

BUENA, J.:

Way back in the 1950's and during the martial law era, it has been said that
even the dead, the birds and the bees voted in Lanao. This petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to nullify the
Order issued by the Commission on Elections [COMELEC, for brevity] dated
June 29, 1998, finding Padian Torogan in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur as
"ghost precinct," is an illustrative case.

The facts are as follows:

On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and

annulment of book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with
the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji Oblais R. Omar thru counsel Atty.
Nasib D. Yasin, herein private respondents. Among the precincts sought to be
annulled was Padian Torogan, subject matter of the present petition
for certiorari. 1

On September 18, 1997, the COMELEC, thru the Clerk of the Commission sent
telegrams to the respective Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of the questioned
precincts in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, including Padian Torogan, to file their answer to
the petition for abolition of precincts and annulment of book of voters.
2
On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T.
Sarangani, herein petitioner, together with other oppositors who were allegedly barangay
chairmen of the twenty three (23) barangays the "Books of Voters" and precincts of which
were sought to be annulled and abolished, respectively, filed an "Answer in
Opposition" which included the affidavits of the barangay chairmen of the affected
3 

precincts attesting to the fact that the move to annul the book of voters and abolish
the questioned election precincts were for the purpose of diminishing the
bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur.  4

After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda by the parties,
the COMELEC issued an Order  dated February 11, 1998, referring the case to its Law
5 

Department for appropriate investigation. The COMELEC Law Department conformably

issued a memorandum dated April 29, 1998 directing Atty. Muslemin Tahir, the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur "to conduct a rigorous incisive
investigation on the alleged ghost precincts and thereafter submit a report on the
investigation conducted." Consequently, Atty. Tahir created a TASK FORCE
6 

INVESTIGATION TEAM by virtue of a memorandum dated June 13, 1998 directing

Election Officers Casan Macadato, Sacrain Guro and Anuar Datudacula "to conduct
ocular inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost barangays in the Municipality of
Madalum, Lanao Del Sur."  7

On June 18, 1998, an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged ghost precincts
yielding the following results —

At 12:10 pm, the Task Force Investigation Team from the COMELEC accompanied by
traditional leaders, political leaders, many concerned residents of this town, a
representative from the Lanao del Sur Provincial Statistics Office, Mr. Lacson Abdullah,
and a Team from the DILG-ARMM, Lanao del Sur, arrived in the area supposedly
Barangay Padian Torogan with these comments and observations:

It appears that in this area there are only two structures: One is a concrete house with no
roof, and the other is a wooden structure without walls and roof. This obviously mean that
no single human being could possibly reside in these two structures.

Also, it came out that the name Padian-Torogan means a cemetery not a residential
place. So this contradicts the records being brought by the COMELEC Team from the
Census saying that the area has 45 households with a total population of 285. (Ref.
Municipal census Report as of September 1, 1995).

Besides, no less than the Chairman of the COMELEC Investigating Team asked the
people around who among them is a resident or a registered voter in the so-called
Barangay Padian-Torogan, and no one answered affirmatively.

Then at 12:50 PM, the COMELEC Investigating Team still with the people mentioned
above are in Barangay Lumbac to look for the other supposed Barangay named
Rakutan, and found this observations.

x x x           x x x          x x x

By the way, unfortunately, at the peak of this ocular inspection, the Madalum Municipal
Chief of Police Mahdi Mindalano, armed with UZI pistolized Machine Gun, arrived at the
scene at exactly 12:55 pm boarding an orange Mitsubishi car with four armed
bodyguards, the (sic) confronted the Team Leader of the COMELEC Investigating
Group and angrily insisted to stop the ocular inspection.
This STACOM Mindalano, in warning a photographer not to take a shot on him, pointed
his pistolized Rifle to this man when the photographer positioned his camera to take a
picture of him while he is arguing with the investigating leader, Mr. CASAN
MACADATO.

Moving camera film and several pictures are added hereto for further information and as
exhibits. Also attached hereof are the names and signatures of among the more-or-less
one hundred people who observed the conduct of this ocular inspection.

(NOTE: This writer, Mr. Khalil Y. Alawi, is a member of the five (5) man Committee from
the DILG-ARMM, Lanao del Sur created in respect to the Memo/Invitation from the
COMELEC Provincial Office of Lanao del Sur dated June 15, 1998 signed by Mr. CASAN
MACADATO, EO II, Chief Investigation Team. Mr. Macadato designated verbally and in
public Mr. ALAWI to be his Secretary during this investigation, and of course, the (sic)
with the consent of the DILG Team). 1âwphi1.nêt

I hereby certify that the foregoing are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Prepared by: (sgd) Khalil Y. Alawi

Member, DILG Team

Submitted by: (sgd) Casan Macadato

Election Officer II

Chairman, Task Force Investigation Team 8

On the basis of the foregoing, Election Officer Casan Macadato submitted to the
Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC in Marawi City its 1st Indorsement dated
June 19, 1998 reporting the results of the ocular inspection that Padian Torogan and
Rakutan were uninhabited. 9

On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding "Padian Torogan
as ghost precinct." The dispositive portion of the COMELEC Order reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc:

(1) resolves to GRANT the request and hereby:

(a) DIRECTS the Task Force Investigating Team created pursuant to the Order of the
Commission en banc dated February 11, 1998, to continue the conduct of ocular
inspection and investigation as contained in the original directive of the Law Department
dated April 29, 1998;

(b) RECOMMENDS to the PNP Director and the Regional Director of the Philippine
National police, (1) to immediately relieve and transfer Chief of Police Mahdi
Mindalano of Madalum, Lanao del Sur and transfer him to an area where it will be
extremely difficult for him to return to Mandalum and do further damage to effort of the
Commission to investigate ghost precincts in said area considering the urgency of said
investigation. (2) to look into the possibility of involvement of other policement (sic) in
Madalum in the aforestated criminal mischief of the Police Station Commander or their
possible partisanship.
(c) RECOMMENDS to AFP Regional Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
immediately assign sufficient number of men to maintain peace and order in the
Municipality of Madalum, Lanao del Sur, and to escort and secure the safety of the
COMELEC Investigating Team during the conduct of ocular inspections and
investigations.

(2) finds Padain Togoran as ghost precinct and shall be excluded from the special
election to be conducted in Madalum.

(3) Order the Investigating Team, thru Madatu, to immediately resume the investigation,
the remaining ghost precincts in Madalum and to submit its findings to the
Commission with dispatch, allowing it to submit partial findings if necessary.

The Law Department of this Commission is hereby directed to implement this order.

SO ORDERED. (emphasis supplied)  10

On November 3, 1998, Sultan Usman Sarangani, Soraida M. Sarangani and Hadji Nor
Hassan, in their respective capacity as former Municipal Mayor, incumbent Mayor
and Vice-Mayor of Madalum filed the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus urging us to nullify the Order issued by the COMELEC,
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Likewise, petitioners moved to
consolidate this case with G.R. No. 134456 entitled "Sultan Sarangani, et. al vs.
COMELEC, et. al" alleging that G.R. No. 134456 also involves a COMELEC decision
declaring the precinct corresponding to eight (8) barangays in Madalum, Lanao del Sur
as ghosts precincts.

In a resolution  issued by this Court on January 19, 1999, we denied the motion to
11 

consolidate, considering that G.R. No. 134456 had already been dismissed in our
resolutions of August 4, 1998 and August 18, 1998.

The basic issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the respondent
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as
ghost precinct.  12

On a preliminary matter, though not clear, it appears from the records that Padian
Torogan is a barangay in Madalum, Lanao del Sur and it was erroneous for the
COMELEC to consider Padian-Torogan as a ghost precinct. In any case, the court is
not tasked to determine whether the so-called Padian Torogan is a barangay or a mere
election. The petition states that precinct No. 27A located in Barangay Padian Torogan
was the one declared as a ghost precinct by the COMELEC although the assailed Order
did not mention any specific precinct but simply declared "Padian Torogan as ghost
precinct." To be clear, what was necessarily contemplated by the assailed Order would
be the election precinct in the said place.

It must be noted that under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be at least one
precinct per barangay. 1 In designating election precincts, the COMELEC usually refers
to them by number. Nevertheless, the determination of whether a certain election
precinct actually exists or not and whether the voters registered in said precinct
are real voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that
factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by
evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated
attack on the validity of the same.  Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the
14 

COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were
no public or private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there
were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered
voters, or the registered voters may have left the place. It is not impossible for a certain
barangay not to actually have inhabitants considering that people migrate. A barangay
may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in the place does not result
in its automatic cessation as a unit of local government. Under the Local Government
Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU) may be done by
Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political
subdivision.  In the case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in
15 

cultural communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang

Panglunsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite  16 

conducted for the purpose in the political units affected. 1awphil

The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal

or certiorari particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to
have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have
substantially affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it.  The assailed order
17 

having been issued pursuant to COMELEC's administrative powers and in the absence
of any finding of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent,
said order shall stand. Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for.  No voter
18 

is disenfranchised because no such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage

guaranteed by the Constitution  is not tampered when a list of fictitious voters is
19 

excluded from an electoral exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only

on citizens who are qualified to vote and are not otherwise disqualified by law. On
the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all the more protects the validity and
credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of suffrage because the "electoral
will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost votes. Election laws
should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people.  20

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed Order dated June
29, 1998 of the Commission on Elections is UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., on official business.
Pardo, J., no part, was COMELEC Chairman at the time.

2)Certificate of Candidacy

a)BP 880, Omnibus Election Code

b)Republic Act No. 7166

c)Republic Act No. 9369

d)Talaga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 196804 & 197015, [October 9, 2012], 696 PHIL 786-
918

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197015

PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA RUBY TALAGA and RODERICK
A. ALCALA, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a

substitute who was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election; and the
ascertainment of who should assume the office following the substitute’s
disqualification.

The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul and set aside the En
Banc Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 in SPC No. 10-024 by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the
Second Division;

2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of Roderick A. Alcala;

3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of respondent Barbara C. Talaga

as mayor of Lucena City and CANCELLING the Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation issued therefor;

4. Ordering respondent Barbara Ruby Talaga to cease and desist from

discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor;

5. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Lucena

City, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor as provided
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code;

6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this

Resolution to the Office of the President of the Philippines, the Department of
Interior and Local Government, the Department of Finance and the Secretary
of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Lucena City.

Let the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Regional
Election Director of Region IV of COMELEC implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED. 1

Antecedents
On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M.
Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position
of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and
local elections. 2

Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-CMD, declared in his CoC that he
3 

was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to.

Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition
denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served
Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena, which was docketed as SPA
09-029 (DC). He alleged
4 

therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three
consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in
the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.

The pertinent portions of Castillo’s petition follow:

1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of Barangay Mayao

Crossing, Lucena City but may be served with summons and other processes of this
Commission at the address of his counsel at 624 Aurora Blvd., Lucena City 4301;

2. Respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is likewise of legal age, married, and a resident of
Barangay Ibabang Iyam, Lucena City and with postal address at the Office of the City
Mayor, City Hall, Lucena City, where he may be served with summons and other
processes of this Commission;

3. Petitioner, the incumbent city vice-mayor of Lucena having been elected during the
2007 local elections, is running for city mayor of Lucena under the Liberal party this
coming 10 May 2010 local elections and has filed his certificate of candidacy for city
mayor of Lucena;

4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and 2007
local elections based on the records of the Commission on Elections of Lucena City and
had fully served the aforesaid three (3) terms without any voluntary and involuntary
interruption;

5. Except the preventive suspension imposed upon him from 13 October 2005 to 14
November 2005 and from 4 September 2009 to 30 October 2009 pursuant to
Sandiganbayan 4th Division Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27738 dated 3 October
2005, the public service as city mayor of the respondent is continuous and uninterrupted
under the existing laws and jurisprudence;

6. There is no law nor jurisprudence to justify the filing of the certificate of candidacy of
the respondent, hence, such act is outrightly unconstitutional, illegal, and highly immoral;

7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected for and had fully served three (3)
consecutive terms as a city mayor of Lucena, he still filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
City Mayor of Lucena for this coming 10 May 2010 national and local elections;

8. Under the Constitution and existing Election Laws, New Local Government Code of
the Philippines, and jurisprudence the respondent is no longer entitled and is already
disqualified to be a city mayor for the fourth consecutive term;
9. The filing of the respondent for the position of city mayor is highly improper, unlawful
and is potentially injurious and prejudicial to taxpayers of the City of Lucena; and

10. It is most respectfully prayed by the petitioner that the respondent be declared
disqualified and no longer entitled to run in public office as city mayor of Lucena City
based on the existing law and jurisprudence. 5

The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of

Candidacy filed by the respondent be denied due course to or cancel the same and that
he be declared as a disqualified candidate under the existing Election Laws and by the
provisions of the New Local Government Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
6 

Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him
from office during his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did
not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence to the effect that an
7 

involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of

service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule.

In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections, holding that preventive suspension, being a mere
8 

temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the three-
term limit rule. Thus, on December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a
Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking into account the intervening ruling in
Aldovino. Relevant portions of his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve are quoted
herein, viz:

4. When respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of

Mayor of Lucena City, the rule that ‘where the separation from office is
caused by reasons beyond the control of the officer – i.e. involuntary –
the service of term is deemed interrupted’ has not yet been overturned
by the new ruling of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, the
prevailing rule then of the Honorable Commission in [sic] respect of the
three (3)-term limitation was its decision in the case of Aldovino, et al. vs.
Asilo where it stated:

"Thus, even if respondent was elected during the 2004 elections, which
was supposedly his third and final term as city councilor, the same cannot
be treated as a complete service or full term in office since the same was
interrupted when he was suspended by the Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division. And the respondent actually heeded the suspension order since
he did not receive his salary during the period October 16-31 and
November 1-15 by reason of his actual suspension from office. And this
was further bolstered by the fact that the DILG issued a

Memorandum directing him, among others, to reassume his position."

(Emphasis supplied.)

5. Clearly, there was no misrepresentation on the part of respondent as

would constitute a ground for the denial of due course to and/or the
cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy at the time he
filed the same. Petitioner’s ground for the denial of due course to and/or
the cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy thus has no
basis, in fact and in law, as there is no ground to warrant such relief under
the Omnibus Election Code and/or its implementing laws.
 6. Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the Supreme Court in respect
of the issue on the three (3)-term limitation, respondent acknowledges
that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena
City having served three (3) (albeit interrupted) terms as Mayor of Lucena
City prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the 2010 elections.

7. In view of the foregoing premises and new jurisprudence on the matter,

respondent respectfully submits the present case for decision declaring
him as DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City. 9

Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena

City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his
CoC.

Acting on Ramon’s Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, the COMELEC First Division
issued a Resolution on April 19, 2010, disposing as follows:
10 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to run for
Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.

SO ORDERED.

Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of
11 

May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for

Reconsideration. At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC
12 

for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had
nominated Ramon. 13

On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramon’s Ex parte Manifestation of

Withdrawal, declared the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated April 19, 2010 final
and executory. 14

On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the
ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his
substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099
votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes. 15

Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking
the suspension of Barbara Ruby’s proclamation. 16

It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation of
its Law Department, gave due course to Barbara Ruby’s CoC and CONA through
17 

Resolution No. 8917, thereby including her in the certified list of candidates. 18 

Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of

Lucena City. 19

On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the
COMELEC, docketed as SPC 10-024. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not
20 

substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course;
and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc
had approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for
Ramon should be considered stray.
In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation, Barbara Ruby 21 

maintained the validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En
Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramon’s COC, despite a declaration of his
disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed
misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his
COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No.
9006 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in
22 

her favor.

On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena
City, sought to intervene, positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because
23 

Barbara Ruby’s substitution had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.

On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillo’s petition
and Alcala’s petition-in-intervention, holding:
24 

In the present case, Castillo was notified of Resolution 8917 on May 13, 2010 as it was
the basis for the proclamation of Ruby on that date. He, however, failed to file any
action within the prescribed period either in the Commission or the Supreme Court
assailing the said resolution. Thus, the said resolution has become final and
executory. It cannot anymore be altered or reversed.

xxxx

x x x. A close perusal of the petition filed by Castillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that it was
actually for the disqualification of Ramon for having served three consecutive terms,
which is a ground for his disqualification under the Constitution in relation to Section
4(b)3 of Resolution 8696. There was no mention therein that Ramon has committed
material representation that would be a ground for the cancellation or denial of due
course to the CoC of Ramon under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The First
Division, in fact, treated the petition as one for disqualification as gleaned from the body
of the resolution and its dispositive portion quoted above. This treatment of the First
Division of the petition as one for disqualification only is affirmed by the fact that its
members signed Resolution No. 8917 where it was clearly stated that the First Division
only disqualified Ramon.

Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in Miranda v. Abaya is not
applicable. Ramon was rightly substituted by Ruby. As such, the votes for Ramon
cannot be considered as stray votes but should be counted in favor of Ruby since the
substituted and the substitute carry the same surname – Talaga, as provided in
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006.

xxxx

Moreover, there is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code or any election laws for
that matter which requires that the substitution and the Certificate of Candidacy of
the substitute should be approved and given due course first by the Commission
or the Law Department before it can be considered as effective. All that Section 77
of the Omnibus Election Code as implemented by Section 13 of Resolution No. 8678
requires is that it should be filed with the proper office. The respondent is correct when
she argued that in fact even the BEI can receive a CoC of a substitute candidate in case
the cause for the substitution happened between the day before the election and mid-day
of election day. Thus, even if the approval of the substitution was made after the
election, the substitution became effective on the date of the filing of the CoC with
the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance.
There being no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon as candidate for mayor
of Lucena City, the counting of the votes of Ramon in favor of Ruby is proper. The
proclamation, thus, of Ruby as mayor elect of Lucena City is in order. Hence, we find no
cogent reason to annul the proclamation of respondent Barbara Ruby C. Talaga as the
duly elected Mayor of the City of Lucena after the elections conducted on May 10, 2010. 25

Acting on Castillo and Alcala’s respective motions for reconsideration, the COMELEC En
Banc issued the assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2011 reversing the COMELEC
Second Division’s ruling. 26

Pointing out that: (a) Resolution No. 8917 did not attain finality for being issued
without a hearing as a mere incident of the COMELEC’s ministerial duty to receive the
COCs of substitute candidates; (b) Resolution No. 8917 was based on the wrong facts;
and (c) Ramon’s disqualification was resolved with finality only on May 5, 2010, the
COMELEC En Banc concluded that Barbara Ruby could not have properly
substituted Ramon but had simply become an additional candidate who had filed
her COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should succeed to the
position pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code (LGC). 27

Issues

The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for
the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.

Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending parties
should assume the contested elective position.

Ruling

The petitions lack merit.

1.

Existence of a valid CoC is a condition

sine qua non for a valid substitution

The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any
person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the contents of a COC, viz:

Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall state

that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. x x x

The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit
for filing them are, namely: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to the
regular election, the candidates from among whom they are to make the choice; and (b)
to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. If the law does
not confine to the duly-registered candidates the choice by the voters, there may be as
many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes may be cast even for unknown or
fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office
in the same election. Moreover, according to Sinaca v. Mula, the CoC is:
28  29 

x x x in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political
creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public
office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is
eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to
any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.

Accordingly, a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his
affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume,
followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the
person making the declaration a valid or official candidate.

There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral
race. One is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court differentiated the
two remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, thuswise:
30 

x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or

68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the
other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded
on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68
is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled
or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she
never filed a CoC. 31

Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus

Election Code (i.e., prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact of a candidate’s
permanent residency in another country when that fact affects the residency requirement
of a candidate) are separate and distinct from the grounds for the cancellation of or
denying due course to a COC (i.e., nuisance candidates under Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code; and material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code), the Court has recognized in Miranda v. Abaya that the 32 

following circumstances may result from the granting of the petitions, to wit:

(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid CoC;

(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have filed a valid
CoC; and

(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due course or cancelled.

In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or
withdraws his CoC before the elections, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides the option of substitution, to wit:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. — If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a
person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate
of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later
than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification
should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification

of a candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that
only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can 33 

be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election

Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be
validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a
candidate. 34

Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73
of the Omnibus Election Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can
only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to the election a
sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. 35

2.

Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification

rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not
a valid candidate to be properly substituted

In the light of the foregoing rules on the CoC, the Court concurs with the conclusion of
the COMELEC En Banc that the Castillo petition in SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of
a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v. Commission
on Elections: 36

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not
based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public
office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that
he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be
read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility
for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the
CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to
or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under
Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both
deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact
that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto
is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
Castillo’s petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition,
namely: (a) Ramon made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false
representation referred to a material matter that would affect the substantive right of
Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed his
certificate); and (c) Ramon made the false representation with the intention to deceive
the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible. The petition
37 

expressly challenged Ramon’s eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated
in the Constitution and the Local Government Code against any person serving three
consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that "the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the
respondent Ramon be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared
as a disqualified candidate."38

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78
involves a finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made
a material representation that is false. A petition for the denial of due course to or
39 

cancellation of CoC that is short of the requirements will not be granted. In Mitra v.
Commission on Elections, the Court stressed that there must also be a deliberate
40 

attempt to mislead, thus:

The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to

mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the
electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the
misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous
mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or
where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the
misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any
material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is
elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election
laws.

It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or

confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are
different, for they are based on different grounds, and can result in different
eventualities. A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as
41 

a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under
Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a
person who has not filed a CoC. Miranda v. Abaya has clarified that a candidate who
42  43 

is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77

because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been
denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because
he is not considered a candidate. 1âwphi1

To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced
both by the Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution
provides:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for
all elective local officials, to wit:
Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)

The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of
a prolonged stay in the same office." The Court underscored this objective in Aldovino,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections, stating:
44 

x x x The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s

freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of
a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of
city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he
be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner
would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely
precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth
consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for
containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to
run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation even worse than that of a
nuisance candidate because the nuisance candidate may remain eligible despite
cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of due course to the CoC pursuant to
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. 45

Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with
Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC. That sufficed to render his
46 

CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of
his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.

We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As
Miranda v. Abaya aptly put it:

Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the
concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted,
for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never
was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy
seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of
candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid
and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all.
If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code.
Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original"
certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline
case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution. (Emphasis
47 

supplied)
3.

Granting without any qualification of petition in

SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELEC’s intention to
declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC

That the COMELEC made no express finding that Ramon committed any deliberate
misrepresentation in his CoC was of little consequence in the determination of whether
his CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.

In Miranda v. Abaya, the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be
48 

not given due course and/or cancelled." The COMELEC categorically granted "the
petition" and then pronounced — in apparent contradiction — that Joel Pempe Miranda
was "disqualified." The

Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification,
disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Miranda’s
CoC. The Court explained:

The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being
disqualified by the Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had
likewise been denied due course and cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by

respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course
and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the
Comelec ruled favorably in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS

the Petition. Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from
running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national
and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998
in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly
sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter
whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the
specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. x
x x. 49

xxxx
x x x. There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA
No. 98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose
"Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no question that the said petition
was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that
whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying
the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate
of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. x x x. 50

The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the
particular relief of cancelling or denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition
by not subjecting that relief to any qualification.

Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although Castillo’s petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC)
specifically sought both the disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or
cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC categorically stated in the Resolution dated April
19, 2010 that it was granting the petition. Despite the COMELEC making no finding of
material misrepresentation on the part of Ramon, its granting of Castillo’s petition
without express qualifications manifested that the COMELEC had cancelled
Ramon’s CoC based on his apparent ineligibility. The Resolution dated April 19, 2010
became final and executory because Castillo did not move for its reconsideration, and
because Ramon later withdrew his motion for reconsideration filed in relation to it.

4.

Elected Vice Mayor must succeed

and assume the position of Mayor
due to a permanent vacancy in the office

On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo
submits that the doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections should not apply to him because Ramon’s disqualification
51 

became final prior to the elections. Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on

52 

Elections, where the Court said:

53 

x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The
doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other
cases because the judgment declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and
the other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the
other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one
common essential condition — the disqualification of the candidate had not become final
before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.

Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after
the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In
the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May
2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In
short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent in the
10 May 2004 elections.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before
an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is
a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987, states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when
the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered
in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes
final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of
Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law
governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment
before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The
Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May
2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was
never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng’s proclamation is proper
because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none. 54

Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that he was entitled to

assume the position of Mayor of Lucena City for having obtained the highest
number of votes among the remaining qualified candidates.

It would seem, then, that the date of the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring
Ramon disqualified is decisive. According to Section 10, Rule 19 of the COMELEC’s
Resolution No. 8804, a decision or resolution of a Division becomes final and executory
55 

after the lapse of five days following its promulgation unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. Under Section 8, Rule 20 of Resolution No. 8804, the
decision of the COMELEC En Banc becomes final and executory five days after its
promulgation and receipt of notice by the parties.

The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its Resolution dated
April 19, 2010, the copy of which Ramon received on the same date. Ramon filed a
56 

motion for reconsideration on April 21, 2010 in accordance with Section 7 of COMELEC
57 

Resolution No. 8696, but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010, ostensibly to allow his
58  59 

substitution by Barbara Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any motion for
reconsideration. Such circumstances indicated that there was no more pending matter
that could have effectively suspended the finality of the ruling in due course. Hence, the
Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have attained finality upon the
lapse of five days from its promulgation and receipt of it by the parties. This
happened probably on April 24, 2010. Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc
continued to act on the withdrawal by Ramon of his motion for reconsideration
through the May 5, 2010 Resolution declaring the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division final and executory.

Yet, we cannot agree with Castillo’s assertion that with Ramon’s disqualification
becoming final prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the ruling in Cayat was applicable
in his favor. Barbara Ruby’s filing of her CoC in substitution of Ramon significantly
differentiated this case from the factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat. Rev. Fr. Nardo
B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April 17, 2004, and his
disqualification became final before the May 10, 2004 elections. Considering that no
substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his rival, remained the only
candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast, after Barbara Ruby
substituted Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded
by the electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she
became a contender for the same position vied for by Castillo, such that she stood on the
same footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillo’s claim of being
the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being consequently
entitled to assume the office of Mayor.

Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer.  Labo, Jr.
1âwphi1

should be applied. There, the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second
highest number of votes for the contested office could not assume the office
despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was "not
the choice of the sovereign will." Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated
60 

candidate could not be deemed elected to the office. There was to be no question that
61 

the second placer lost in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could not
assume the vacated position. No law imposed upon and compelled the people of
62 

Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative.

63

The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified
winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully
aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of
the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Under this sole exception, the electorate
64 

may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously
misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible
candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected. But the 65 

exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second element
was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact of
Barbara Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the
Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the
decisions.

On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from
assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid
candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not
voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section 73 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the
period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate.66

A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such
vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the
LGC, to wit:
67

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
and Vice-Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor,
the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases;

AFFIRMS the Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 by the COMELEC En Banc; and
ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
e)Chua v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216607, [April 5, 2016]

April 5, 2016

G.R. No. 216607

ARLENE LLENA EMPAYNADO CHUA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, IMELDA E. FRAGATA, and KRYSTLE MARIE C. BACANI, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Dual citizens are disqualified from running for any elective local position. They cannot successfully run
and assume office because their ineligibility is inherent in them, existing prior to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy. Their certificates of candidacy are void ab initio, and votes cast for them will
be disregarded. Consequently, whoever garners the next highest number of votes among the
eligible candidates is the person legally entitled to the position.

This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1 assailing the Commission on Elections
Resolutions dated October 17, 20132 and January 30, 2015.3 The Commission on Elections annulled
the "proclamation of . . . Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua as Councilor for the Fourth District of
Manila[,]"4 and directed the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim Krystle Marie C. Bacani
(Bacani) as Councilor for having garnered the next highest number of votes.5

On October 3, 2012, Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua (Chua) filed her Certificate of Candidacy6 for
Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila during the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. The
Fourth District of Manila is entitled to six (6) seats in the Sangguniang Panlungsod.7

After the conduct of elections, Chua garnered the sixth highest number of votes.8 She was
proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers on May 15, 2013.9

On the date of Chua’s proclamation, however, Imelda E. Fragata (Fragata) filed a Petition10
captioned as a "petition to declare [Chua] as a nuisance candidate"11 and "to deny due course and/or
cancel [Chua’s] Certificate of Candidacy."12 Fragata was allegedly a registered voter in the Fourth
District13 who claimed that Chua was unqualified to run for Councilor on two grounds: Chua was
not a Filipino citizen, and she was a permanent resident of the United States of America.14 Fragata
specifically alleged the following in her Petition:

3. [Chua] is not a Filipino Citizen.

4. Prior to the filing of her candidacy, [Chua] has been living in the United States of America (USA) for
at least 33 years.

5. [Chua] is an immigrant and was validly issued a Green Card by the Government of the USA.

6. She resided and continues to reside [in Georgia, USA].

7. [Chua] has been a Registered Professional Nurse in the State of Georgia, USA since November 17,
1990.

8. . . . [Chua’s] Professional License in the USA is still to expire in 31 January 2014.15

The last paragraph of the Petition prayed that Chua "be disqualified as a candidate for the position of
councilor in the Fourth District of the City of Manila[.]"16
Answering the Petition, Chua contended that she was a natural-born Filipino, born to Filipino parents
in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.17 With respect to her residency, Chua alleged that she had been
residing in Sampaloc, Manila since 200818 and had more than complied with the one-year period
required to run for Councilor.19

According to Chua, Fragata’s Petition was belatedly filed,20 whether it was treated as one for
declaration of a nuisance candidate21 or for denial of due course or cancellation of certificate of
candidacy.22 Fragata filed her Petition on May 15, 2013, which was beyond five (5) days from October
5, 2012, the last day of the filing of certificates of candidacy.23 The Petition was also filed beyond 25
days from October 3, 2012,24 the date Chua filed her Certificate of Candidacy.25

Chua stressed that she had already been proclaimed on May 15, 2013, the same date that Fragata
filed her Petition; hence, Fragata’s proper remedy was to file a petition for quo warranto26 under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Chua prayed that the Commission dismiss Fragata’s
Petition.27

On June 19, 2013, Bacani filed a Motion to Intervene with Manifestation and Motion to Annul
Proclamation.28 Bacani alleged that she likewise ran for Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila,
and that after the canvassing of votes, she ranked seventh among all the candidates, next to Chua.29
Should Chua be disqualified, Bacani claimed that she should be proclaimed Councilor30 following this
Court’s ruling in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections.31

Bacani argued that Chua, being a dual citizen, was unqualified to run for Councilor.32 Based on an
Order of the Bureau of Immigration, Chua was allegedly naturalized as an American citizen on
December 7, 1977.33 She was issued an American passport34 on July 14, 2006.

Chua took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 21, 2011.35
Nonetheless, Chua allegedly continued on using her American passport, specifically on the following
dates:

October 16, 2012 Departure for the United States

December 11, 2012 Arrival in the Philippines

May 30, 2013 Departure for the United States36

Moreover, Chua did not execute an oath of renunciation of her American citizenship.37

With Chua being a dual citizen at the time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy, Bacani prayed that
the Commission on Elections annul Chua’s proclamation.38

In her Comment/Opposition (to the Motion to Intervene of Krystle Marie Bacani),39 Chua argued that
the Motion was a belatedly filed petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy,
having been filed after the day of the elections.40 According to Chua, the Motion should not even be
considered since she was already proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers.41 Thus, Chua prayed that
the Motion to Intervene be denied and expunged from the records of the case.42

The Commission on Elections then ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda.43

In her Memorandum,44 Chua maintained that Fragata’s Petition was filed out of time and should
have been outright dismissed.45 Reiterating that she had already been proclaimed, Chua argued that
Fragata’s proper remedy was a petition for quo warranto.46

Countering Chua’s claims, Fragata and Bacani restated in their Joint Memorandum47 that Chua was a
dual citizen disqualified from running for any elective local position.
The Commission on Elections Second Division resolved Fragata’s Petition. Ruling that Bacani had a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, it allowed Bacani’s Motion to Intervene.48 The Commission
said that should Fragata’s Petition be granted, the votes for Chua would not be counted.49 In effect,
Bacani would garner the sixth highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, which
would earn her a seat in the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila.50

With respect to the nature of Fragata’s Petition, the Commission on Elections held that it was one for
disqualification, regardless of the caption stating that it was a petition to declare Chua a nuisance
candidate.51 The Petition alleged a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code,52 specifically, that Chua was a permanent resident in the United States.

Since Fragata filed a petition for disqualification, Rule 25, Section 3 of the Commission on Elections
Rules of Procedure governed the period for its filing.53 Under the Rules, a petition for
disqualification should be filed "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but
not later than the date of the proclamation." Fragata filed the Petition within this period, having filed
it on the date of Chua’s proclamation on May 15, 2013.54

The Commission no longer discussed whether Chua was a permanent resident of the United States.
Instead, it found that Chua was a dual citizen when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy.55
Although she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in 2011 by taking an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner failed to take a sworn and personal renunciation of her
American citizenship required under Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003.56

Considering that Chua is a dual citizen, the Commission held that Chua was disqualified to run for
Councilor pursuant to Section 40 of the Local Government Code.57 Consequently, Chua’s Certificate
of Candidacy was void ab initio, and all votes casted for her were stray.58 Chua’s proclamation was
likewise voided, and per Maquiling, Bacani was declared to have garnered the sixth highest number
of votes.59

Thus, in the Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Commission on Elections Second Division ruled in
favor of Fragata and Bacani.60 The dispositive portion of the October 17, 2013 Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES, as it hereby

RESOLVED:

1. To ANNUL the proclamation of respondent Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua as Councilor for the
Fourth District of Manila;

2. To DIRECT the Board of Canvassers of the City of Manila to CONVENE and PROCLAIM Intervenor
Krystle Marie C. Bacani as the duly elected Councilor of the Fourth District of the City of Manila,
having obtained the sixth highest number of votes for said position.

Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations implement this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.61

Chua moved for reconsideration,62 but the Commission on Elections En Banc denied the Motion in
the Resolution dated January 30, 2015.

Arguing that the Commission issued its October 17, 2013 and January 30, 2015 Resolutions with grave
abuse of discretion, Chua filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer
for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.63 Fragata and
Bacani jointly filed their Comment,64 while the Commission on Elections filed its Comment65
through the Office of the Solicitor General.

Chua emphasizes that she was already proclaimed as a duly elected Councilor.66 Assuming that she
was ineligible to run for office, this created a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
which was to be filled according to the rule on succession under Section 45 of the Local Government
Code, and not by proclamation of the candidate who garnered the next highest number of votes.67

Chua maintains that Fragata belatedly filed her Petition before the Commission on Elections.68 Since
Fragata filed a Petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy, it should have been filed
within five (5) days from the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than 25 days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy assailed.69 Fragata filed the Petition on May
15, 2013, more than 25 days after Chua filed her Certificate of Candidacy on October 3, 2012.70 The
Commission on Elections, therefore, should have outright dismissed Fragata’s Petition.71

With her already proclaimed, Chua argues that the Commission on Elections should have respected
the voice of the people.72 Chua prays that the Resolutions annulling her proclamation and
subsequently proclaiming Bacani be set aside.73

As for Fragata and Bacani as well as the Commission on Elections, all maintain that Fragata’s Petition
was a petition for disqualification assailing Chua’s citizenship and status as a permanent resident in
the United States.74 The Petition, which Fragata filed on the date of Chua’s proclamation, was filed
within the reglementary period.75

The Commission on Elections stresses that Chua was a dual citizen at the time she filed her Certificate
of Candidacy.76 Consequently, she was ineligible to run for Councilor and was correctly considered a
non-candidate. 77 All the votes casted in Chua’s favor were correctly disregarded, resulting in Bacani
garnering the next highest number of votes.78 Following Maquiling, the Commission argues that
Bacani was validly proclaimed as Councilor, and, contrary to Chua’s claim, the rule on succession
under Section 45 of the Local Government Code did not apply, with the disqualifying circumstance
existing prior to the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy.79

Although Chua was already proclaimed, the Commission on Elections argues that "[t]he will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified."80 Fragata, Bacani, and the Commission on
Elections pray that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition be dismissed.81

The issues for this Court’s resolution are the following:

First, whether private respondent Imelda E. Fragata filed a petition for disqualification or a petition
to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy; and

Second, whether the rule on succession under Section 45 of the Local Government Code applies to
this case.

We dismiss the Petition. The allegations of private respondent Fragata’s Petition before the
Commission on Elections show that it was a timely filed petition for disqualification. Moreover, the
Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion in disqualifying petitioner Arlene Llena
Empaynado Chua, annulling her proclamation, and subsequently proclaiming private respondent
Krystle Marie C. Bacani, the candidate who garnered the sixth highest number of votes among the
qualified candidates.

As this Court has earlier observed in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,82 members of the bench and
the bar have "indiscriminately interchanged"83 the remedies of a petition to deny due course or
cancel certificate of candidacy and a petition for disqualification, thus "adding confusion to the
already difficult state of our jurisprudence on election laws."84

The remedies, however, have different grounds and periods for their filing. The remedies have
different legal consequences.
A person files a certificate of candidacy to announce his or her candidacy and to declare his or her
eligibility for the elective office indicated in the certificate.85 Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code
on the contents of a certificate of candidacy states:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if
for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized
city or district or section which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil
status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country;
that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.

Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding, a candidate
shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, or if has not been
baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any
other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name
after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are two or more
candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each candidate, upon being made aware
of such fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue
to use the name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also
include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality.

The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a
statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding one
hundred words, if he so desires.

The Commission on Elections has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of
certificates of candidacy.86 However, under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,87 the
Commission may deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy through a verified petition
filed exclusively on the ground that "any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false." The "material representation" referred to in Section 78 is that
which involves the eligibility or qualification for the office sought by the person who filed the
certificate.88 Section 78 must, therefore, be read "in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office."89 Moreover, the false representation
"must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible."90

A person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required qualifications for the
position for which he or she intends to run. The candidate must also possess none of the grounds for
disqualification under the law. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his Dissenting Opinion in
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections,91 "that an individual possesses the qualifications for
a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a
candidate for a public office and vice-versa."92

Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for grounds in filing a petition for disqualification:

Sec. 68 Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party is declared
by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given
money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.

Apart from the grounds provided in Section 68, any of the grounds in Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code as well as in Section 40 of the Local Government Code may likewise be raised in a
petition for disqualification. Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code states:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless
he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he
again becomes disqualified.

Disqualifications specifically applicable to those running for local elective positions are found in
Section 40 of the Local Government Code:

SECTION 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad
and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Private respondent Fragata alleges in her Petition that petitioner is a permanent resident in the
United States, a green card holder who, prior to the filing of her Certificate of Candidacy for Councilor,
has resided in the State of Georgia for 33 years. She anchors her Petition on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, which disqualifies permanent residents of a foreign country from running for any
elective local position.

It is true that under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, persons who file their certificates of
candidacy declare that they are not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country.
Therefore, a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy may likewise be filed
against a permanent resident of a foreign country seeking an elective post in the Philippines on the
ground of material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy.93

What remedy to avail himself or herself of, however, depends on the petitioner. If the false material
representation in the certificate of candidacy relates to a ground for disqualification, the petitioner
may choose whether to file a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy or a
petition for disqualification, so long as the petition filed complies with the requirements under the
law.94

Before the Commission on Elections, private respondent Fragata had a choice of filing either a petition
to deny due course or cancel petitioner’s certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification. In
her Petition, private respondent Fragata did not argue that petitioner made a false material
representation in her Certificate of Candidacy; she asserted that petitioner was a permanent
resident disqualified to run for Councilor under Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Private
respondent Fragata’s Petition, therefore, was a petition for disqualification.

It follows that private respondent Fragata timely filed her Petition before the Commission on
Elections. Under Rule 25, Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, a petition for
disqualification "shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not
later that the date of proclamation." Private respondent Fragata filed her Petition on the date of
petitioner’s proclamation on May 15, 2013. The Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its
discretion in taking cognizance of private respondent Fragata’s Petition.

In addition, the Commission on Elections correctly admitted private respondent Bacani’s pleading-in-
intervention.

An adverse decision against petitioner would require a pronouncement as to who should assume the
position of Councilor. Hence, those who believe that they are entitled to the position may prove their
legal interest in the matter in litigation95 and may properly intervene for a complete disposition of
the case.

Private respondent Bacani claims that she is entitled to the position of Councilor. In her Motion to
Intervene, she argues for petitioner’s disqualification and alleges the circumstances surrounding
petitioner’s dual citizenship. She then cites Maquiling, arguing that she should be proclaimed in lieu of
petitioner because she obtained the sixth highest number of votes among the qualified candidates.
Private respondent Bacani’s intervention was, therefore, proper.

II

The Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion in disqualifying petitioner,
annulling her proclamation, and subsequently proclaiming private respondent Bacani as the duly
elected Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila.

Petitioner was born to Filipino parents in 1967, which makes her a natural-born Filipino under the
1935 Constitution.96 Ten years later, on December 7, 1977, petitioner became a naturalized
American. Hence, she lost her Filipino citizenship pursuant to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
63.97

It was on September 21, 2011 when petitioner took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, thus reacquiring her Filipino citizenship.98 From September 21, 2011 up to the present,
however, petitioner failed to execute a sworn and personal renunciation of her foreign citizenship
particularly required of those seeking elective public office. Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003

provides:

SECTION 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

....

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath[.]

Petitioner cannot claim that she has renounced her American citizenship by taking the Oath of
Allegiance. The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are
separate requirements, the latter being an additional requirement for qualification to run for public
office. In Jacot v. Dal:99

[T]he oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the
one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn
renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said
oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine
elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who
have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective
public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.100

With petitioner’s failure to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship,
petitioner was a dual citizen at the time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy on October 3, 2012.
Under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, she was disqualified to run for Councilor in the
Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and Local Elections.

Petitioner, however, argues that the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in
proclaiming private respondent Bacani, the mere seventh placer among the candidates for Councilor
and, therefore, not the electorate’s choice. Petitioner maintains that the vacancy left by her
disqualification should be filled according to the rule on succession under Section 45(a)(1) of the Local
Government Code, which provides:

SECTION 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. – (a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian
where automatic successions provided above do not apply shall be filled by appointment in the
following manner:

(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities[.]

The permanent vacancies referred to in Section 45 are those arising "when an elective local official
fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office."101 In these situations, the vacancies were caused by those whose certificates of candidacy
were valid at the time of the filing "but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of
law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy."102

The rule on succession under Section 45, however, would not apply if the permanent vacancy was
caused by one whose certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. Specifically with respect to dual
citizens, their certificates of candidacy are void ab initio because they possess "a substantive
[disqualifying circumstance] . . . [existing] prior to the filing of their certificate of candidacy."103
Legally, they should not even be considered candidates. The votes casted for them should be
considered stray and should not be counted.104

In cases of vacancies caused by those with void ab initio certificates of candidacy, the person legally
entitled to the vacant position would be the candidate who garnered the next highest number of
votes among those eligible.105 In this case, it is private respondent Bacani who is legally entitled to
the position of Councilor, having garnered the sixth highest number of votes among the eligible
candidates. The Commission on Elections correctly proclaimed private respondent Bacani in lieu of
petitioner.
Petitioner may have garnered more votes than private respondent Bacani. She may have already been
proclaimed. Nevertheless, elections are more than a numbers game. Hence, in Maquiling:

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials,
those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.
To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the
electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.

....

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who
turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible
as candidates. 106

All told, petitioner Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua is a dual citizen correctly disqualified from running
for the position of Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and Local
elections. With her dual citizenship existing prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy, her
Certificate of Candidacy was void ab initio. She was correctly considered a non-candidate. All votes
casted for her were stray, and the person legally entitled to the position is private respondent Krystle
Marie C. Bacani, the candidate with the next highest number of votes among the eligible candidates.
The Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion in annulling Chua's proclamation and
subsequently proclaiming private respondent Bacani.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED. This Decision is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

f)Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206698, [February 25, 2014]

G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014 - LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE , Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND MIGUEL R. VILLAFUERTE, Respondents.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed via petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order is the Resolution1 dated April 1, 2013 issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc, which affirmed the Resolution2 dated January 15, 2013
of its First Division dismissing petitioner Luis R. Villafuerte’s verified petition to deny due course to or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Miguel R. Villafuerte (respondent).
Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the Province of
Camarines Sur in the May 13, 2013 local and national elections. On October 25, 2012, petitioner filed
with the COMELEC a Verified Petition3 to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy
(COC) of respondent, alleging that respondent intentionally and materially misrepresented a false and
deceptive name/nickname that would mislead the voters when he declared under oath in his COC
that “L–RAY JR.–MIGZ” was his nickname or stagename and that the name he intended to appear on
the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L–RAY JR.–MIGZ NP; that respondent deliberately omitted his
first name “MIGUEL” and inserted, instead “LRAY JR.,” which is the nickname of his father, the
incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur, “LRay Villafuerte, Jr.”

In his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses,4 respondent denied the commission of any
material misrepresentation and asserted, among others, that he had been using the nickname “LRAY
JR. MIGZ” and not only “MIGZ”; that the choice of name/word to appear on the ballot was solely his
choice or preference; and that the presumption that the voters would be confused on the simple fact
that his name would be placed first in the ballot was misplaced.

On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC’s First Division denied the petition for lack of merit and disposed
as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x no compelling reason why the COC of respondent should be denied due course to or cancelled
on the sole basis of an alleged irregularity in his name/nickname. Laws and jurisprudence on the
matter are clear that material misrepresentation in the COC pertains only to qualifications of a
candidate, such as citizenship, residency, registration as a voter, age, etc. Nothing has been
mentioned about a candidate’s name/nickname as a ground to deny due course or cancel his/her
COC. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only
application.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which denied the same in a
Resolution dated April 1, 2013.

The COMELEC found that its First Division did not err in denying the petition as existing law and
jurisprudence are clear in providing that a misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material
when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate’s eligibility; and that a
misrepresentation of a non–material fact is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. It found that petitioner’s allegations did
not pertain to respondent’s qualifications or eligibility for the office to which he sought to be elected.
The candidate’s use of a name or nickname is a not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging the following
issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I

Respondent COMELEC palpably and seriously committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
and/or in excess of jurisdiction when it whimsically and capriciously limited the grounds provided in
Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code to a candidate’s qualifications only
and excluding as a ground a candidate’s material representation that is false on his identity which
renders him ineligible to be voted for as a candidate, because a false representation of ones’ true
name/nickname as a candidate is a deliberate attempt to misinform, mislead, and deceive the
electorate and notwithstanding that Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code expressly states that
“any” material misrepresentation in violation of Section 74 of the same Code is a ground for
cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy.

II

Respondent COMELEC committed serious errors and patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack and/or in excess of jurisdiction in failing or refusing to apply prevailing jurisprudence and law,
wherein it was held: that cancellation of COC is not based on the lack of qualification although it may
relate to qualification based on a “finding that a candidate made a material representation that is
false”; thereby disregarding the well–entrenched rulings of this Honorable Court that material
misrepresentation may also include ineligibilities to run for office or to assume office and is not
limited to qualifications; utterly ignoring the ruling of this Honorable Court that votes cast in favor of a
candidate using a nickname in violation of Section 74 are stray votes, and in turning a blind eye to its
constitutional and statutory duty and responsibility to protect the rights of the voters and the
integrity of the electoral processes in our country, among others.

III

Respondent COMELEC whimsically, capriciously and despotically allowed herein respondent MIGUEL
to use “LRAY JR.–MIGZ” and thereby illegally disregarded the effects of R.A. 8436 as amended by R.A.
9369 or the Automation Law and the requirement therein for the alphabetical arrangement of the
names of the candidates and for allowing respondent Miguel to deliberately and misleadingly omit his
baptismal first name MIGUEL which is mandatorily required by Section 74 to be included in his COC
and for respondent Miguel to use more than one nickname for which he is not generally or popularly
known in Camarines Sur.

IV

Material misrepresentation as contemplated by law is not to protect respondent as a candidate, but

MORESO, to protect the right of other candidates under the Automation Law, and more importantly
to protect the electorate from being misinformed, misled and deceived.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The main issue for resolution is whether respondent committed a material misrepresentation under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of his COC.

Petitioner filed the petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code claiming that respondent
committed material misrepresentation when the latter declared in his COC that his name/nickname to
be printed in the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.–MIGZ instead of his baptismal name,
VILLAFUERTE, MIGUEL–MIGZ; that such declaration made under oath constitutes material
misrepresentation even if the material misrepresentation did not refer to his qualifications but
referred to his eligibility to be validly voted for as a candidate and, consequently, to his eligibility to
assume office.

We find no merit in the argument.

Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code states that n o person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn COC within the period fixed herein. Section 74 thereof enumerates the
contents of the COC, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if
for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized
city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil
status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country;
that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.

Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding, a certificate
shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, or if has not been
baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any
other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name
after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are two or more
candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each candidate, upon being made aware
or such fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue
to use the name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also
include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality.

The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a
statement in duplicate containing his bio–data and program of government not exceeding one
hundred words, if he so desires.
And the proper procedure to be taken if a misrepresentation is committed by a candidate in his COC is
to question the same by filing a verified petition pursuant to Section 78,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.– A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on
the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty–five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.
Clearly, Section 78 states that the false representation in the contents of the COC required under
Section 74 must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. What then
constitutes a material misrepresentation?

In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,7 petitioner Victorino Salcedo II filed with the COMELEC a
petition seeking cancellation of respondent Ermelita Salcedo’s (Ermelita) COC on the ground that she
had made material misrepresentation by stating her surname as Salcedo. Petitioner claimed that
Ermelita had no right to use the surname Salcedo, since her marriage to Neptali Salcedo was void. The
COMELEC En Banc found that Ermelita did not commit any misrepresentation nor usurp another’s
name since she had the right to use her husband’s surname for being married to him, and thus,
validated her proclamation as Mayor of Sara, Iloilo. Salcedo appealed the COMELEC’s resolution, and
we held:

In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is authorized
to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to
Section 78 x x x
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section
78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for
the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right
to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not
specify what would be considered as a “material representation,” the Court has interpreted this
phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of the Code.8cralawlawlibrary

xxx

Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of

the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the
consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate
of candidacy are grave — to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to
prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to
deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just
any innocuous mistake.

xxx

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a
“deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s
qualifications for public office. The use of surname, when not intended to mislead, or deceive the
public as to one’s identity is not within the scope of the provision.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Aratea v. Commission on Elections,10 we proclaimed Estela D. Antipolo, the alleged second placer,
as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, being the one who remained as the sole qualified candidate for
the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, since the COC of Romeo D. Lonzanida,
the first placer, was declared void ab initio. We find that violation of the three–term limit is an
eligibility affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office and the misrepresentation of such
is a ground to grant the petition to deny due course or cancel a COC. We said
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election.
Thus, Section 74 states that “the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is
eligible for said office.” The three–term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties and to enhance the electorate’s freedom of choice, is found both in the Constitution and
the law. After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election because he is ineligible.
One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not “eligible for [the] office.” As used in
Section 74, the word “eligible” means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having
all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.11cralawred

xxx

In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility, and thus
qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even though the certificate of candidacy does not
specifically ask the candidate for the number of terms elected and served in an elective position, such
fact is material in determining a candidate’s eligibility, and thus qualification for the office. Election to
and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a candidate
ineligible from running for the same position in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida misrepresented
his eligibility because he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was eligible to
run for mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanida’s representation that he was eligible for
the office that he sought election constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or
eligibility for the office.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections,13 where petitioner therein claimed that respondent

committed material misrepresentation when he stated his name in the COC as Rustico Besa Balderian
instead of Chu Teck Siao, we found that it had been established that in all of respondent’s school
records, he had been using Rustico Besa Balderian, the name under which he was baptized and known
since he can remember. He never used the name Chu Teck Siao by which he was registered. It was
also established that he had filed a petition for change of name to avoid any confusion and which the
RTC had granted. We then said, that —
AT ALL EVENTS, the use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material
misrepresentation, as “material misrepresentation” under the earlier–quoted Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code refers to “qualifications for elective office.” It need not be emphasized that
there is no showing that there was an intent to deceive the electorate as to private respondent’s
identity, nor that by using his Filipino name the voting public was thereby
deceived.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Clearly, from the foregoing, for the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to
prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility or
qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship
or any other legal qualification necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the Local
Government Code.15 Hence, petitioner’s allegation that respondent’s nickname “LRAY JR. MIGZ”
written in his COC is a material misrepresentation is devoid of merit. Respondent’s nickname written
in the COC cannot be considered a material fact which pertains to his eligibility and thus qualification
to run for public office.

Moreover, the false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. As we said,
respondent’s nickname is not considered a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence
showing that in writing the nickname “LRAY JR. MIGZ” in his COC, respondent had the intention to
deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on his eligibility or qualification for the office
he seeks to assume.

Notably, respondent is known to the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur as the son of the then
incumbent Governor of the province, popularly known as “LRay.” Their relationship is shown by the
posters, streamers and billboards displayed in the province with the faces of both the father and son
on them. Thus, the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur know who respondent is. Moreover, it
was established by the affidavits of respondent’s witnesses that as the father and son have striking
similarities, such as their looks and mannerisms, which remained unrebutted, the appellation of LRAY
JR. has been used to refer to respondent. Hence, the appellation LRAY JR., accompanied by the name
MIGZ16 written as respondent’s nickname in his COC, is not at all misleading to the voters, as in
fact, such name distinguishes respondent from his father, the then incumbent “Governor LRAY,”
who was running for a Congressional seat in the 2nd District of Camarines Sur. As we ruled in Salcedo
II v. COMELEC,17 the use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to
one’s identity, is not within the scope of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, respondent’s
nickname written in his COC, without intending to mislead the voters as to his identity, cannot be
canceled. We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC En Banc in finding that
respondent did not commit material misrepresentation in his COC.

P etitioner relies on Villarosa v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal18 to justify the

annulment of respondent’s COC. In Villarosa, which involves the counting of ballots under the manual
elections, respondent Quintos filed an election protest relating to the proclamation of Amelita
Villarosa (Villarosa) alleging that the “JTV” votes should not be counted in the latter’s favor. We then
held that Villarosa’s use of “JTV” as her nickname was a clever ploy to make a mockery of the election
process; thus, votes of “JTV” were considered stray votes. In so ruling, we found that “JTV” is the
nickname of Villarosa’s husband, who was then the incumbent representative of Occidental Mindoro;
that when Villarosa’s husband ran and campaigned for as representative in both the 1992 and 1995
elections in the same legislative district where Villarosa ran in the May 1998 elections, he was
generally known as “JTV.” We thus ruled that the voters who wrote “JTV” in the ballots had no other
person in mind except then incumbent representative Jose Tapales Villarosa, or the same person
whom they have known for a long time as “JTV.” We also took into consideration Villarosa’s
statement in her affidavit admitting that she was generally and popularly known in every barangay in
Occidental Mindoro as “GIRLIE” before and after she filed her COC; and even her counsel asserted
during the oral argument that her other nickname before she filed her COC was “Mrs. JTV” and not
“JTV.” We also found that since the name “GIRLIE” written on the space for representative was in fact
claimed by petitioner Villarosa and credited in her favor, then the “JTV” votes under the idem sonans
rule cannot be counted for Villarosa, because only one nickname or stagename is allowed; and that
Rule 13 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, which allows the use of a nickname and
appellation of affection and friendship, provided that it is accompanied by the first name or surname
of the candidate, was not applied since the “JTV” votes were unaccompanied by her first name or
surname. Thus, we found that malice and bad faith on the part of Villarosa was evident when, in her
COC and campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or nickname of her husband, the
incumbent representative of the district in question.

Villarosa is not on all fours with this case. T his case is a petition to deny due course and to cancel COC
on the ground of a statement of a material representation that is false; to be material, such must
refer to an eligibility or qualification for the elective office the candidate seeks to hold. Here,
respondent’s nickname is not a qualification for a public office which affects his eligibility. Notably,
respondent’s father, who won 3 consecutive terms as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, is
popularly known as “LRAY,” so when respondent wrote in his COC, “LRAY JR. MIGZ” as his nickname,
he differentiated himself from Governor “LRAY,” which negates any intention to mislead or misinform
or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible. Also, the appellation LRAY JR. was
accompanied by the name MIGZ which was not so in the Villarosa case.

It bears stressing that Section 74 requires, among others, that a candidate shall use in a COC the name
by which he has been baptized, unless the candidate has changed his name through court–approved
proceedings, and that he may include one nickname or stagename by which he is generally or
popularly known in the locality, which respondent did. As we have discussed, the name which
respondent wrote in his COC to appear in the ballot, is not considered a material misrepresentation
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as it does not pertain to his qualification or eligibility
to run for an elective public office. By invoking the case of Villarosa which is in the nature of an
election protest relating to the proclamation of Villarosa, petitioner should have instead filed an
election protest and prayed that the votes for respondent be declared as stray votes, and not a
petition to deny due course or cancel the COC.

Finally, petitioner claims that the false representation of respondent’s nickname written on the COC is
meant to undermine the statutory requirement regarding the alphabetical listing/arrangement of
names of the candidate as provided under Section 1319 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9369 amending RA
8436, the automated election system; that he would be put to a great and undue disadvantage as he
became no. 5, while respondent was in no. 4 in the list of candidates for Governor of Camarines Sur.

We are not persuaded.

Considering that respondent’s name is VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.– MIGZ, his name would indeed be
ahead of petitioner’s name, VILLAFUERTE, LUIS, in the official ballot which contains the alphabetical
listing of the candidates for the gubernatorial position of the Province of Camarines Sur. However,
petitioner’s claim that such listing would lead to confusion as to put him to undue disadvantage is
merely speculative and without basis as the voters can identify the candidate they want to vote for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013, of the Commission on
Elections En Banc, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

g)Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698 (Resolution), [February 22, 2010], 627 PHIL
193-283

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, C.J.:

Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the respondent Commission on
Elections’ (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and the movants-intervenors’ motions for
reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision (Decision).1

The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and
Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,2 Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code3 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,4 mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public
appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions of their office
notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.
In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and movants-
intervenors submit the following arguments:

(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional proscription against the
participation of public appointive officials and members of the military in partisan political activity;

(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord differential
treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such differential treatment rests on material
and substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and

(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest demand
such reversal.

We find the foregoing arguments meritorious.

I.

Procedural Issues

First, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELEC’s motion for
reconsideration which was filed on December 15, 2009, as well as the propriety of the motions for
reconsideration-in-intervention which were filed after the Court had rendered its December 1, 2009
Decision.

i. Timeliness of COMELEC’s Motion for Reconsideration

Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court,5 in relation to Section 1, Rule 52 of the
same rules,6 COMELEC had a period of fifteen days from receipt of notice of the assailed Decision
within which to move for its reconsideration. COMELEC received notice of the assailed Decision on
December 2, 2009, hence, had until December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.

The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on December 14, 2009. The
corresponding Affidavit of Service (in substitution of the one originally submitted on December 14,
2009) was subsequently filed on December 17, 2009 – still within the reglementary period.

ii. Propriety of the Motions for Reconsideration-in-Intervention

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:

A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for intervention shall be entertained
when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor shows that he has a
substantial right or interest in the case; and (2) such right or interest cannot be adequately pursued
and protected in another proceeding.7

Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within which a
motion for intervention may be filed, viz.:

SECTION 2. Time to intervene.– The motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition
of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion
and served on the original parties. (italics supplied)

This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period
prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been
granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even
after a decision has been rendered by the trial court,8 when the petition for review of the judgment
has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court,9 and even where the assailed
order has already become final and executory.10 In Lim v. Pacquing,11 the motion for intervention
filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury
and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of
the court12 after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.13 We stress again that Rule 19 of
the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice.14 Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice.15

We rule that, with the exception of the IBP – Cebu City Chapter, all the movants-intervenors may
properly intervene in the case at bar.

First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a substantial right or interest in the
case.

As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge the December 1, 2009
Decision, which nullifies a long established law; as a voter, he has a right to intervene in a matter that
involves the electoral process; and as a public officer, he has a personal interest in maintaining the
trust and confidence of the public in its system of government.

On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are candidates in the May
2010 elections running against appointive officials who, in view of the December 1, 2009 Decision,
have not yet resigned from their posts and are not likely to resign from their posts. They stand to be
directly injured by the assailed Decision, unless it is reversed.

Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be adequately pursued and
protected in another proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be foreclosed if this Court’s Decision attains
finality and forms part of the laws of the land.

With regard to the IBP – Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the assertion that "this case
involves the constitutionality of elections laws for this coming 2010 National Elections," and that
"there is a need for it to be allowed to intervene xxx so that the voice of its members in the legal
profession would also be heard before this Highest Tribunal as it resolves issues of transcendental
importance."16

Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City Chapter has failed to
present a specific and substantial interest sufficient to clothe it with standing to intervene in the case
at bar. Its invoked interest is, in character, too indistinguishable to justify its intervention.

We now turn to the substantive issues.

II.

Substantive Issues

The assailed Decision struck down Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, on
the following grounds:
(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the differential treatment
of persons holding appointive offices and those holding elective positions;

(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive
posts: (a) without distinction as to whether or not they occupy high/influential positions in the
government, and (b) they limit these civil servants’ activity regardless of whether they be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level; and

(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right of these
public appointive officials.

We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA
9369 are not unconstitutional, and accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.

III.

Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law

Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:

Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned
or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.

Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair
Election Act,17 which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code18 and rendered ineffective
Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of
the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running,19 an elected official
is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the
same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position
without forfeiting his seat.

These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which
prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign.

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees
in partisan political campaigns is unmistakable. The exchange between Commissioner Quesada and
Commissioner Foz during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:

MS. QUESADA.

xxxx

Secondly, I would like to address the issue here as provided in Section 1 (4), line 12, and I quote: "No
officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political
activity." This is almost the same provision as in the 1973 Constitution. However, we in the
government service have actually experienced how this provision has been violated by the direct or
indirect partisan political activities of many government officials.

So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would make this provision more strict, and
which would deter its violation?
MR. FOZ. Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and the implementing rules on the matter
are more than exhaustive enough to really prevent officers and employees in the public service from
engaging in any form of partisan political activity. But the problem really lies in implementation
because, if the head of a ministry, and even the superior officers of offices and agencies of
government will themselves violate the constitutional injunction against partisan political activity,
then no string of words that we may add to what is now here in this draft will really implement the
constitutional intent against partisan political activity. x x x20 (italics supplied)

To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers and employees is
presently reflected and implemented by a number of statutes. Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and
Section 55, Chapter 8 – both of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 –
respectively provide in relevant part:

Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:

xxxx

(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:

xxxx

(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding a non-political office.

xxxx

Section 55. Political Activity. — No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the
Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any
election except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity
of any other person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or
employee from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the
names of his candidates for public office whom he supports: Provided, That public officers and
employees holding political offices may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall be
unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts
involving subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.

Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further makes intervention by
civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities an election offense, viz.:

SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxxx

(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. — Any officer or employee in the civil service, except
those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and
all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or
indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to
vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.

The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of civil
service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken.

But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to
civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover
elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters."21 This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of
their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign
period.22 Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions
included.23

The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to vote, as well as
express their views on political issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for public office
whom they support. This is crystal clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz.:

MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is on page 2, Section 1, subparagraph 4,
lines 13 and 14. On line 13, between the words "any" and "partisan," add the phrase ELECTIONEERING
AND OTHER; and on line 14, delete the word "activity" and in lieu thereof substitute the word
CAMPAIGN.

May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Commissioner Aquino may proceed.

MS. AQUINO: The draft as presented by the Committee deleted the phrase "except to vote" which
was adopted in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The phrase "except to vote" was not intended
as a guarantee to the right to vote but as a qualification of the general prohibition against taking part
in elections.

Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided for as an exception to this
prohibition, it will amount to disenfranchisement. We know that suffrage, although plenary, is not an
unconditional right. In other words, the Legislature can always pass a statute which can withhold from
any class the right to vote in an election, if public interest so required. I would only like to reinstate
the qualification by specifying the prohibited acts so that those who may want to vote but who are
likewise prohibited from participating in partisan political campaigns or electioneering may vote.

MR. FOZ: There is really no quarrel over this point, but please understand that there was no intention
on the part of the Committee to disenfranchise any government official or employee. The elimination
of the last clause of this provision was precisely intended to protect the members of the civil service
in the sense that they are not being deprived of the freedom of expression in a political contest. The
last phrase or clause might have given the impression that a government employee or worker has no
right whatsoever in an election campaign except to vote, which is not the case. They are still free to
express their views although the intention is not really to allow them to take part actively in a political
campaign.24

IV.

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause

We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

i. Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling

In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned provisions
challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution in Fariñas, et al. v.
Executive Secretary, et al.25

In Fariñas, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67
of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates
against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in
respect of elected officials) of the Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered
ipso facto resigned from their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy. In
contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive officials continues to be
operative – they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section 14, with the end
in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions "apply equally" to both elected and appointive
officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable
classification, as there are material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials.
Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67
of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the Constitution, failed
muster. We ruled:

The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the
equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature
of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does
not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8,
Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to
vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are
obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed
it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in
the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by
them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis
appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.26

The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our assailed Decision
gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This
doctrine, which is really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one
way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same
manner.27 This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability
of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the
Judicial Process:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way
between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision.
It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided
against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am
plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be
an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule
rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in
the courts.28

Our Fariñas ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned provisions cannot be
minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an adjudication on any point within the
issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum.29 This rule applies to all
pertinent questions that are presented and resolved in the regular course of the consideration of the
case and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on which the decision
is predicated.30 For that reason, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent
because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground; or even
though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the
court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did.31 As we held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals, et al.:32

… A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because,
owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can an
additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one ground,
be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is
sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case as an
authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having
the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because another point
was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition
make statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta.33 (italics supplied)

ii. Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law

The Fariñas ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if reexamined.

To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction.34 What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification.35 The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness,36 which has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.37

Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first,
third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the
differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of
the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain," viz.:

… For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield
the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the
recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare
development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head
executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their
[Certificates of Candidacy] for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in
the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election
period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.38

Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to remedy an injustice,
the Legislature need not address every manifestation of the evil at once; it may proceed "one step at
a time."39 In addressing a societal concern, it must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby
creating some inequity as to those included or excluded.40 Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds of
reasonable choice" are not exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative judgment.41 We may
not strike down a law merely because the legislative aim would have been more fully achieved by
expanding the class.42 Stated differently, the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is
underinclusive will not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious.43 There is no constitutional
requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it might be applied;44 that the
Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.

Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the law
creates a classification that is "palpably arbitrary or capricious."45 He must refute all possible rational
bases for the differing treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the
enactment,46 such that the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness
of the classification is "fairly debatable."47 In the case at bar, the petitioners failed – and in fact did
not even attempt – to discharge this heavy burden. Our assailed Decision was likewise silent as a
sphinx on this point even while we submitted the following thesis:

... [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that the statute’s distinction is unfair,
underinclusive, unwise, or not the best solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find
that there is no reasonably rational reason for the differing treatment.48

In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of
the deemed resigned provisions? I submit that there is.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign
power of the people.49 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular
vote.50 Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it
may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in
utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded
to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which
they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes
of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the
public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it
wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign
will.51 (emphasis in the original)

In fine, the assailed Decision would have us "equalize the playing field" by invalidating provisions of
law that seek to restrain the evils from running riot. Under the pretext of equal protection, it would
favor a situation in which the evils are unconfined and vagrant, existing at the behest of both
appointive and elected officials, over another in which a significant portion thereof is contained. The
absurdity of that position is self-evident, to say the least.

The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that elected
officials (vis-à-vis appointive officials) have greater political clout over the electorate, is indeed a
matter worth exploring – but not by this Court. Suffice it to say that the remedy lies with the
Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the authority, under our constitutional system, to balance
competing interests and thereafter make policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the times. It is
certainly within the Legislature’s power to make the deemed-resigned provisions applicable to
elected officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented are of such frequency and
magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of expanding the class. This Court cannot and should not
arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and impose on the people the best state of affairs from a
public policy standpoint.

iii. Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled

Finding no Philippine jurisprudence to prop up its equal protection ruling, our assailed Decision
adverted to, and extensively cited, Mancuso v. Taft.52 This was a decision of the First Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals promulgated in March 1973, which struck down as unconstitutional a
similar statutory provision. Pathetically, our assailed Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:

(1) The right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms – freedom
of expression and association;

(2) Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental right must be subjected to
strict equal protection review; and

(3) While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public
work force, the deemed-resigned provisions pursue their objective in a far too heavy-handed manner
as to render them unconstitutional.

It then concluded with the exhortation that since "the Americans, from whom we copied the
provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is
high-time that we, too, should follow suit."

Our assailed Decision’s reliance on Mancuso is completely misplaced. We cannot blink away the fact
that the United States Supreme Court effectively overruled Mancuso three months after its
promulgation by the United States Court of Appeals. In United States Civil Service Commission, et al.
v. National Association of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, et al.53 and Broadrick, et al. v. State of Oklahoma,
et al.,54 the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether statutory provisions
prohibiting federal55 and state56 employees from taking an active part in political management or in
political campaigns were unconstitutional as to warrant facial invalidation. Violation of these
provisions results in dismissal from employment and possible criminal sanctions.

The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection clause. It held that (i) in
regulating the speech of its employees, the state as employer has interests that differ significantly
from those it possesses in regulating the speech of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must
therefore balance the legitimate interest of employee free expression against the interests of the
employer in promoting efficiency of public services; (iii) if the employees’ expression interferes with
the maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning services, the limitation on speech is not
unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility or latitude in ascertaining
which positions are to be covered by any statutory restrictions.57 Therefore, insofar as government
employees are concerned, the correct standard of review is an interest-balancing approach, a means-
end scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit between the governmental interests and the
prohibitions in question.58

Letter Carriers elucidated on these principles, as follows:

Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to have been that
partisan political activities by federal employees must be limited if the Government is to operate
effectively and fairly, elections are to play their proper part in representative government, and
employees themselves are to be sufficiently free from improper influences. The restrictions so far
imposed on federal employees are not aimed at particular parties, groups, or points of view, but apply
equally to all partisan activities of the type described. They discriminate against no racial, ethnic, or
religious minorities. Nor do they seek to control political opinions or beliefs, or to interfere with or
influence anyone's vote at the polls.

But, as the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education,59 the government has an interest in
regulating the conduct and ‘the speech of its employees that differ(s) significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any
case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the (employee), as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the (government), as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’ Although Congress is free to
strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the balance it has so far struck is
sustainable by the obviously important interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan
political activities now contained in the Hatch Act.

It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of the Government, or
those working for any of its agencies, should administer the law in accordance with the will of
Congress, rather than in accordance with their own or the will of a political party. They are expected
to enforce the law and execute the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or
against any political party or group or the members thereof. A major thesis of the Hatch Act is that to
serve this great end of Government-the impartial execution of the laws-it is essential that federal
employees, for example, not take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play
substantial roles in partisan political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets.
Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective government.

There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only important that the Government and its
employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public
to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a
disastrous extent.

Another major concern of the restriction against partisan activities by federal employees was perhaps
the immediate occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939. That was the conviction that the
rapidly expanding Government work force should not be employed to build a powerful, invincible,
and perhaps corrupt political machine. The experience of the 1936 and 1938 campaigns convinced
Congress that these dangers were sufficiently real that substantial barriers should be raised against
the party in power-or the party out of power, for that matter-using the thousands or hundreds of
thousands of federal employees, paid for at public expense, to man its political structure and political
campaigns.

A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to further serve the goal that
employment and advancement in the Government service not depend on political performance, and
at the same time to make sure that Government employees would be free from pressure and from
express or tacit invitation to vote in a certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor
with their superiors rather than to act out their own beliefs. It may be urged that prohibitions against
coercion are sufficient protection; but for many years the joint judgment of the Executive and
Congress has been that to protect the rights of federal employees with respect to their jobs and their
political acts and beliefs it is not enough merely to forbid one employee to attempt to influence or
coerce another. For example, at the hearings in 1972 on proposed legislation for liberalizing the
prohibition against political activity, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission stated that ‘the
prohibitions against active participation in partisan political management and partisan political
campaigns constitute the most significant safeguards against coercion . . ..’ Perhaps Congress at some
time will come to a different view of the realities of political life and Government service; but that is
its current view of the matter, and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our view, does
the Constitution forbid it.

Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute in any
event.60 x x x

xxxx

As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will
of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations. (italics supplied)

Broadrick likewise definitively stated that the assailed statutory provision is constitutionally
permissible, viz.:

Appellants do not question Oklahoma's right to place even-handed restrictions on the partisan
political conduct of state employees. Appellants freely concede that such restrictions serve valid and
important state interests, particularly with respect to attracting greater numbers of qualified people
by insuring their job security, free from the vicissitudes of the elective process, and by protecting
them from ‘political extortion.’ Rather, appellants maintain that however permissible, even
commendable, the goals of s 818 may be, its language is unconstitutionally vague and its prohibitions
too broad in their sweep, failing to distinguish between conduct that may be proscribed and conduct
that must be permitted. For these and other reasons, appellants assert that the sixth and seventh
paragraphs of s 818 are void in toto and cannot be enforced against them or anyone else.

We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague.61 We have little doubt that s 818
is similarly not so vague that ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’62
Whatever other problems there are with s 818, it is all but frivolous to suggest that the section fails to
give adequate warning of what activities it proscribes or fails to set out ‘explicit standards' for those
who must apply it. In the plainest language, it prohibits any state classified employee from being ‘an
officer or member’ of a ‘partisan political club’ or a candidate for ‘any paid public office.’ It forbids
solicitation of contributions ‘for any political organization, candidacy or other political purpose’ and
taking part ‘in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign.’ Words
inevitably contain germs of uncertainty and, as with the Hatch Act, there may be disputes over the
meaning of such terms in s 818 as ‘partisan,’ or ‘take part in,’ or ‘affairs of’ political parties. But what
was said in Letter Carriers, is applicable here: ‘there are limitations in the English language with
respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the prohibitions
may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary
person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without
sacrifice to the public interest.' x x x

xxxx

[Appellants] nevertheless maintain that the statute is overbroad and purports to reach protected, as
well as unprotected conduct, and must therefore be struck down on its face and held to be incapable
of any constitutional application. We do not believe that the overbreadth doctrine may appropriately
be invoked in this manner here.

xxxx

The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First Amendment area is
that any enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting
construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to
constitutionally protected expression. Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is,
manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort. x x
x

x x x But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial over-breadth adjudication is an
exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset,
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from
‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct-even if expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise
valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter
protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect-at best a
prediction-cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State
from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the
matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that
the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep. It is our view that s 818 is not substantially overbroad and that
whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations
to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.

Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts, s 818 is directed, by its
terms, at political expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. But at the same time, s 818 is not a censorial statute, directed at
particular groups or viewpoints. The statute, rather, seeks to regulate political activity in an even-
handed and neutral manner. As indicted, such statutes have in the past been subject to a less exacting
overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remains that s 818 regulates a substantial spectrum of
conduct that is as manifestly subject to state regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass. This
much was established in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, and has been unhesitatingly reaffirmed
today in Letter Carriers. Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is no question that s 818 is valid at
least insofar as it forbids classified employees from: soliciting contributions for partisan candidates,
political parties, or other partisan political purposes; becoming members of national, state, or local
committees of political parties, or officers or committee members in partisan political clubs, or
candidates for any paid public office; taking part in the management or affairs of any political party's
partisan political campaign; serving as delegates or alternates to caucuses or conventions of political
parties; addressing or taking an active part in partisan political rallies or meetings; soliciting votes or
assisting voters at the polls or helping in a partisan effort to get voters to the polls; participating in the
distribution of partisan campaign literature; initiating or circulating partisan nominating petitions; or
riding in caravans for any political party or partisan political candidate.

x x x It may be that such restrictions are impermissible and that s 818 may be susceptible of some
other improper applications. But, as presently construed, we do not believe that s 818 must be
discarded in toto because some persons’ arguably protected conduct may or may not be caught or
chilled by the statute. Section 818 is not substantially overbroad and it not, therefore,
unconstitutional on its face. (italics supplied)

It bears stressing that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachura does not deny the principles
enunciated in Letter Carriers and Broadrick. He would hold, nonetheless, that these cases cannot be
interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso, since they "pertain to different types of laws and were
decided based on a different set of facts," viz.:

In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or threatening
to enforce, the Hatch Act’s prohibition against "active participation in political management or
political campaigns." The plaintiffs desired to campaign for candidates for public office, to encourage
and get federal employees to run for state and local offices, to participate as delegates in party
conventions, and to hold office in a political club.

In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague and overbroad a provision in the
(sic) Oklahoma’s Merit System of Personnel Administration Act restricting the political activities of the
State’s classified civil servants, in much the same manner as the Hatch Act proscribed partisan
political activities of federal employees. Prior to the commencement of the action, the appellants
actively participated in the 1970 reelection campaign of their superior, and were administratively
charged for asking other Corporation Commission employees to do campaign work or to give referrals
to persons who might help in the campaign, for soliciting money for the campaign, and for receiving
and distributing campaign posters in bulk.
Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic resignation provision. Kenneth
Mancuso, a full time police officer and classified civil service employee of the City of Cranston, filed as
a candidate for nomination as representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. The Mayor of
Cranston then began the process of enforcing the resign-to-run provision of the City Home Rule
Charter.

Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a
different set of facts, Letter Carriers and Broadrick cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of
Mancuso. x x x (italics in the original)

We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these cases. Contrary to his claim,
Letter Carriers, Broadrick and Mancuso all concerned the constitutionality of resign-to-run laws, viz.:

(1) Mancuso involved a civil service employee who filed as a candidate for nomination as
representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. He assailed the constitutionality of §14.09(c) of
the City Home Rule Charter, which prohibits "continuing in the classified service of the city after
becoming a candidate for nomination or election to any public office."

(2) Letter Carriers involved plaintiffs who alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or
threatening to enforce, the Hatch Act’s prohibition against "active participation in political
management or political campaigns"63 with respect to certain defined activities in which they desired
to engage. The plaintiffs relevant to this discussion are:

(a) The National Association of Letter Carriers, which alleged that its members were desirous of,
among others, running in local elections for offices such as school board member, city council
member or mayor;

(b) Plaintiff Gee, who alleged that he desired to, but did not, file as a candidate for the office of
Borough Councilman in his local community for fear that his participation in a partisan election would
endanger his job; and

(c) Plaintiff Myers, who alleged that he desired to run as a Republican candidate in the 1971 partisan
election for the mayor of West Lafayette, Indiana, and that he would do so except for fear of losing his
job by reason of violation of the Hatch Act.

The Hatch Act defines "active participation in political management or political campaigns" by cross-
referring to the rules made by the Civil Service Commission. The rule pertinent to our inquiry states:

30. Candidacy for local office: Candidacy for a nomination or for election to any National, State,
county, or municipal office is not permissible. The prohibition against political activity extends not
merely to formal announcement of candidacy but also to the preliminaries leading to such
announcement and to canvassing or soliciting support or doing or permitting to be done any act in
furtherance of candidacy. The fact that candidacy, is merely passive is immaterial; if an employee
acquiesces in the efforts of friends in furtherance of such candidacy such acquiescence constitutes an
infraction of the prohibitions against political activity. (italics supplied)

Section 9(b) requires the immediate removal of violators and forbids the use of appropriated funds
thereafter to pay compensation to these persons.64

(3) Broadrick was a class action brought by certain Oklahoma state employees seeking a declaration of
unconstitutionality of two sub-paragraphs of Section 818 of Oklahoma’s Merit System of Personnel
Administration Act. Section 818 (7), the paragraph relevant to this discussion, states that "[n]o
employee in the classified service shall be … a candidate for nomination or election to any paid public
office…" Violation of Section 818 results in dismissal from employment, possible criminal sanctions
and limited state employment ineligibility.
Consequently, it cannot be denied that Letter Carriers and Broadrick effectively overruled Mancuso.
By no stretch of the imagination could Mancuso still be held operative, as Letter Carriers and
Broadrick (i) concerned virtually identical resign-to-run laws, and (ii) were decided by a superior court,
the United States Supreme Court. It was thus not surprising for the First Circuit Court of Appeals – the
same court that decided Mancuso – to hold categorically and emphatically in Magill v. Lynch65 that
Mancuso is no longer good law. As we priorly explained:

Magill involved Pawtucket, Rhode Island firemen who ran for city office in 1975. Pawtucket’s "Little
Hatch Act" prohibits city employees from engaging in a broad range of political activities. Becoming a
candidate for any city office is specifically proscribed,66 the violation being punished by removal from
office or immediate dismissal. The firemen brought an action against the city officials on the ground
that that the provision of the city charter was unconstitutional. However, the court, fully cognizant of
Letter Carriers and Broadrick, took the position that Mancuso had since lost considerable vitality. It
observed that the view that political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be infringed
upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not available, was a position which was no longer viable,
since the Supreme Court (finding that the government’s interest in regulating both the conduct and
speech of its employees differed significantly from its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in
general) had given little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercion of government
employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of Congress, and
applying a "balancing" test to determine whether limits on political activity by public employees
substantially served government interests which were "important" enough to outweigh the
employees’ First Amendment rights.67

It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this manner even though the election in Magill
was characterized as nonpartisan, as it was reasonable for the city to fear, under the circumstances of
that case, that politically active bureaucrats might use their official power to help political friends and
hurt political foes. Ruled the court:

The question before us is whether Pawtucket's charter provision, which bars a city employee's
candidacy in even a nonpartisan city election, is constitutional. The issue compels us to extrapolate
two recent Supreme Court decisions, Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers and
Broadrick v. Oklahoma. Both dealt with laws barring civil servants from partisan political activity.
Letter Carriers reaffirmed United Public Workers v. Mitchell, upholding the constitutionality of the
Hatch Act as to federal employees. Broadrick sustained Oklahoma's "Little Hatch Act" against
constitutional attack, limiting its holding to Oklahoma's construction that the Act barred only activity
in partisan politics. In Mancuso v. Taft, we assumed that proscriptions of candidacy in nonpartisan
elections would not be constitutional. Letter Carriers and Broadrick compel new analysis.

xxxx

What we are obligated to do in this case, as the district court recognized, is to apply the Court’s
interest balancing approach to the kind of nonpartisan election revealed in this record. We believe
that the district court found more residual vigor in our opinion in Mancuso v. Taft than remains after
Letter Carriers. We have particular reference to our view that political candidacy was a fundamental
interest which could be trenched upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not available. While
this approach may still be viable for citizens who are not government employees, the Court in Letter
Carriers recognized that the government's interest in regulating both the conduct and speech of its
employees differs significantly from its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in general. Not only
was United Public Workers v. Mitchell "unhesitatingly" reaffirmed, but the Court gave little weight to
the argument that prohibitions against the coercion of government employees were a less drastic
means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of the Congress. We cannot be more precise than
the Third Circuit in characterizing the Court's approach as "some sort of 'balancing' process".68 It
appears that the government may place limits on campaigning by public employees if the limits
substantially serve government interests that are "important" enough to outweigh the employees'
First Amendment rights. x x x (italics supplied)

Upholding thus the constitutionality of the law in question, the Magill court detailed the major
governmental interests discussed in Letter Carriers and applied them to the Pawtucket provision as
follows:

In Letter Carriers[,] the first interest identified by the Court was that of an efficient government,
faithful to the Congress rather than to party. The district court discounted this interest, reasoning that
candidates in a local election would not likely be committed to a state or national platform. This
observation undoubtedly has substance insofar as allegiance to broad policy positions is concerned.
But a different kind of possible political intrusion into efficient administration could be thought to
threaten municipal government: not into broad policy decisions, but into the particulars of
administration favoritism in minute decisions affecting welfare, tax assessments, municipal contracts
and purchasing, hiring, zoning, licensing, and inspections. Just as the Court in Letter Carriers identified
a second governmental interest in the avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy,
so there is an equivalent interest in avoiding the appearance of political preferment in privileges,
concessions, and benefits. The appearance (or reality) of favoritism that the charter's authors
evidently feared is not exorcised by the nonpartisan character of the formal election process. Where,
as here, party support is a key to successful campaigning, and party rivalry is the norm, the city might
reasonably fear that politically active bureaucrats would use their official power to help political
friends and hurt political foes. This is not to say that the city's interest in visibly fair and effective
administration necessarily justifies a blanket prohibition of all employee campaigning; if parties are
not heavily involved in a campaign, the danger of favoritism is less, for neither friend nor foe is as
easily identified.

A second major governmental interest identified in Letter Carriers was avoiding the danger of a
powerful political machine. The Court had in mind the large and growing federal bureaucracy and its
partisan potential. The district court felt this was only a minor threat since parties had no control over
nominations. But in fact candidates sought party endorsements, and party endorsements proved to
be highly effective both in determining who would emerge from the primary election and who would
be elected in the final election. Under the prevailing customs, known party affiliation and support
were highly significant factors in Pawtucket elections. The charter's authors might reasonably have
feared that a politically active public work force would give the incumbent party, and the incumbent
workers, an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power. In municipal elections especially, the small size
of the electorate and the limited powers of local government may inhibit the growth of interest
groups powerful enough to outbalance the weight of a partisan work force. Even when nonpartisan
issues and candidacies are at stake, isolated government employees may seek to influence voters or
their co-workers improperly; but a more real danger is that a central party structure will mass the
scattered powers of government workers behind a single party platform or slate. Occasional misuse of
the public trust to pursue private political ends is tolerable, especially because the political views of
individual employees may balance each other out. But party discipline eliminates this diversity and
tends to make abuse systematic. Instead of a handful of employees pressured into advancing their
immediate superior's political ambitions, the entire government work force may be expected to turn
out for many candidates in every election. In Pawtucket, where parties are a continuing presence in
political campaigns, a carefully orchestrated use of city employees in support of the incumbent party's
candidates is possible. The danger is scarcely lessened by the openness of Pawtucket's nominating
procedure or the lack of party labels on its ballots.

The third area of proper governmental interest in Letter Carriers was ensuring that employees achieve
advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from
political activity. The district court did not address this factor, but looked only to the possibility of a
civil servant using his position to influence voters, and held this to be no more of a threat than in the
most nonpartisan of elections. But we think that the possibility of coercion of employees by superiors
remains as strong a factor in municipal elections as it was in Letter Carriers. Once again, it is the
systematic and coordinated exploitation of public servants for political ends that a legislature is most
likely to see as the primary threat of employees' rights. Political oppression of public employees will
be rare in an entirely nonpartisan system. Some superiors may be inclined to ride herd on the politics
of their employees even in a nonpartisan context, but without party officials looking over their
shoulders most supervisors will prefer to let employees go their own ways.
In short, the government may constitutionally restrict its employees' participation in nominally
nonpartisan elections if political parties play a large role in the campaigns. In the absence of
substantial party involvement, on the other hand, the interests identified by the Letter Carriers Court
lose much of their force. While the employees' First Amendment rights would normally outbalance
these diminished interests, we do not suggest that they would always do so. Even when parties are
absent, many employee campaigns might be thought to endanger at least one strong public interest,
an interest that looms larger in the context of municipal elections than it does in the national
elections considered in Letter Carriers. The city could reasonably fear the prospect of a subordinate
running directly against his superior or running for a position that confers great power over his
superior. An employee of a federal agency who seeks a Congressional seat poses less of a direct
challenge to the command and discipline of his agency than a fireman or policeman who runs for
mayor or city council. The possibilities of internal discussion, cliques, and political bargaining, should
an employee gather substantial political support, are considerable. (citations omitted)

The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings in respect of the
petitioners’ overbreadth charge. Noting that invalidating a statute for being overbroad is "not to be
taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark," the court held:

The governing case is Broadrick, which introduced the doctrine of "substantial" overbreadth in a
closely analogous case. Under Broadrick, when one who challenges a law has engaged in
constitutionally unprotected conduct (rather than unprotected speech) and when the challenged law
is aimed at unprotected conduct, "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial
as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Two major uncertainties attend
the doctrine: how to distinguish speech from conduct, and how to define "substantial" overbreadth.
We are spared the first inquiry by Broadrick itself. The plaintiffs in that case had solicited support for a
candidate, and they were subject to discipline under a law proscribing a wide range of activities,
including soliciting contributions for political candidates and becoming a candidate. The Court found
that this combination required a substantial overbreadth approach. The facts of this case are so
similar that we may reach the same result without worrying unduly about the sometimes opaque
distinction between speech and conduct.

The second difficulty is not so easily disposed of. Broadrick found no substantial overbreadth in a
statute restricting partisan campaigning. Pawtucket has gone further, banning participation in
nonpartisan campaigns as well. Measuring the substantiality of a statute's overbreadth apparently
requires, inter alia, a rough balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the number of
potentially invalid applications. Some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is far-
fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable. The question is a matter of degree;
it will never be possible to say that a ratio of one invalid to nine valid applications makes a law
substantially overbroad. Still, an overbreadth challenger has a duty to provide the court with some
idea of the number of potentially invalid applications the statute permits. Often, simply reading the
statute in the light of common experience or litigated cases will suggest a number of probable invalid
applications. But this case is different. Whether the statute is overbroad depends in large part on the
number of elections that are insulated from party rivalry yet closed to Pawtucket employees. For all
the record shows, every one of the city, state, or federal elections in Pawtucket is actively contested
by political parties. Certainly the record suggests that parties play a major role even in campaigns that
often are entirely nonpartisan in other cities. School committee candidates, for example, are
endorsed by the local Democratic committee.

The state of the record does not permit us to find overbreadth; indeed such a step is not to be taken
lightly, much less to be taken in the dark. On the other hand, the entire focus below, in the short
period before the election was held, was on the constitutionality of the statute as applied. Plaintiffs
may very well feel that further efforts are not justified, but they should be afforded the opportunity to
demonstrate that the charter forecloses access to a significant number of offices, the candidacy for
which by municipal employees would not pose the possible threats to government efficiency and
integrity which Letter Carriers, as we have interpreted it, deems significant. Accordingly, we remand
for consideration of plaintiffs' overbreadth claim. (italics supplied, citations omitted)
Clearly, Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate beyond doubt that Mancuso v. Taft, heavily
relied upon by the ponencia, has effectively been overruled.69 As it is no longer good law, the
ponencia’s exhortation that "[since] the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question,
had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too,
should follow suit" is misplaced and unwarranted.70

Accordingly, our assailed Decision’s submission that the right to run for public office is "inextricably
linked" with two fundamental freedoms – those of expression and association – lies on barren
ground. American case law has in fact never recognized a fundamental right to express one’s political
views through candidacy,71 as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.72 Bart v. Telford73 pointedly
stated that "[t]he First Amendment does not in terms confer a right to run for public office, and this
court has held that it does not do so by implication either." Thus, one’s interest in seeking office, by
itself, is not entitled to constitutional protection.74 Moreover, one cannot bring one’s action under
the rubric of freedom of association, absent any allegation that, by running for an elective position,
one is advancing the political ideas of a particular set of voters.75

Prescinding from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the case at bar,
are not violative of the equal protection clause. The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve
governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people rather
than to party; (ii) avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the
danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on
their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity).
These are interests that are important enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive
officials and employees to seek elective office.1avvphi1

En passant, we find it quite ironic that Mr. Justice Nachura cites Clements v. Fashing76 and Morial, et
al. v. Judiciary Commission of the State of Louisiana, et al.77 to buttress his dissent. Maintaining that
resign-to-run provisions are valid only when made applicable to specified officials, he explains:

…U.S. courts, in subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality of resign-to-run provisions when
applied to specified or particular officials, as distinguished from all others,78 under a classification
that is germane to the purposes of the law. These resign-to-run legislations were not expressed in a
general and sweeping provision, and thus did not violate the test of being germane to the purpose of
the law, the second requisite for a valid classification. Directed, as they were, to particular officials,
they were not overly encompassing as to be overbroad. (emphasis in the original)

This reading is a regrettable misrepresentation of Clements and Morial. The resign-to-run provisions
in these cases were upheld not because they referred to specified or particular officials (vis-à-vis a
general class); the questioned provisions were found valid precisely because the Court deferred to
legislative judgment and found that a regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it
happens to be incomplete. In fact, the equal protection challenge in Clements revolved around the
claim that the State of Texas failed to explain why some public officials are subject to the resign-to-
run provisions, while others are not. Ruled the United States Supreme Court:

Article XVI, § 65, of the Texas Constitution provides that the holders of certain offices automatically
resign their positions if they become candidates for any other elected office, unless the unexpired
portion of the current term is one year or less. The burdens that § 65 imposes on candidacy are even
less substantial than those imposed by § 19. The two provisions, of course, serve essentially the same
state interests. The District Court found § 65 deficient, however, not because of the nature or extent
of the provision's restriction on candidacy, but because of the manner in which the offices are
classified. According to the District Court, the classification system cannot survive equal protection
scrutiny, because Texas has failed to explain sufficiently why some elected public officials are subject
to § 65 and why others are not. As with the case of § 19, we conclude that § 65 survives a challenge
under the Equal Protection Clause unless appellees can show that there is no rational predicate to the
classification scheme.

The history behind § 65 shows that it may be upheld consistent with the "one step at a time"
approach that this Court has undertaken with regard to state regulation not subject to more vigorous
scrutiny than that sanctioned by the traditional principles. Section 65 was enacted in 1954 as a
transitional provision applying only to the 1954 election. Section 65 extended the terms of those
offices enumerated in the provision from two to four years. The provision also staggered the terms of
other offices so that at least some county and local offices would be contested at each election. The
automatic resignation proviso to § 65 was not added until 1958. In that year, a similar automatic
resignation provision was added in Art. XI, § 11, which applies to officeholders in home rule cities who
serve terms longer than two years. Section 11 allows home rule cities the option of extending the
terms of municipal offices from two to up to four years.

Thus, the automatic resignation provision in Texas is a creature of the State's electoral reforms of
1958. That the State did not go further in applying the automatic resignation provision to those
officeholders whose terms were not extended by § 11 or § 65, absent an invidious purpose, is not the
sort of malfunctioning of the State's lawmaking process forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. A
regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. The Equal
Protection Clause does not forbid Texas to restrict one elected officeholder's candidacy for another
elected office unless and until it places similar restrictions on other officeholders. The provision's
language and its history belie any notion that § 65 serves the invidious purpose of denying access to
the political process to identifiable classes of potential candidates. (citations omitted and italics
supplied)

Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the dissenters took the Morial line that "there is no blanket
approval of restrictions on the right of public employees to become candidates for public office" out
of context. A correct reading of that line readily shows that the Court only meant to confine its ruling
to the facts of that case, as each equal protection challenge would necessarily have to involve
weighing governmental interests vis-à-vis the specific prohibition assailed. The Court held:

The interests of public employees in free expression and political association are unquestionably
entitled to the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. Nothing in today's decision should
be taken to imply that public employees may be prohibited from expressing their private views on
controversial topics in a manner that does not interfere with the proper performance of their public
duties. In today's decision, there is no blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public
employees to become candidates for public office. Nor do we approve any general restrictions on the
political and civil rights of judges in particular. Our holding is necessarily narrowed by the
methodology employed to reach it. A requirement that a state judge resign his office prior to
becoming a candidate for non-judicial office bears a reasonably necessary relation to the achievement
of the state's interest in preventing the actuality or appearance of judicial impropriety. Such a
requirement offends neither the first amendment's guarantees of free expression and association nor
the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. (italics supplied)

Indeed, the Morial court even quoted Broadrick and stated that:

In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining which of its employment
positions require restrictions on partisan political activities and which may be left unregulated. And a
State can hardly be faulted for attempting to limit the positions upon which such restrictions are
placed. (citations omitted)

V.

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth

Apart from nullifying Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code on equal protection ground, our assailed Decision struck them down for being
overbroad in two respects, viz.:

(1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts without
due regard for the type of position being held by the employee seeking an elective post and the
degree of influence that may be attendant thereto;79 and

(2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil servants holding appointive positions
without due regard for the type of office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in
character, or in the national, municipal or barangay level.

Again, on second look, we have to revise our assailed Decision.

i. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Incumbent Appointive Official’s Position, Valid

According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they
apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of
position being held by the employee running for elective office and the degree of influence that may
be attendant thereto.

Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are extant only when
the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post.

Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the
government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of
systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has amassed "the scattered
powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp
on the reins of power."80 As elucidated in our prior exposition:81

Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to make use of their respective
positions (apparently) to promote their own candidacy may seem tolerable – even innocuous –
particularly when viewed in isolation from other similar attempts by other government employees.
Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount the equally (if not more) realistic and dangerous
possibility that such seemingly disjointed attempts, when taken together, constitute a veiled effort on
the part of an emerging central party structure to advance its own agenda through a "carefully
orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective] officials" coming from various levels of the
bureaucracy.

…[T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an emerging
political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is reason enough to impose a
restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public officials without further distinction as to the
type of positions being held by such employees or the degree of influence that may be attendant
thereto. (citations omitted)

ii. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid

The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they
are made to apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive offices, without due regard
for the type of elective office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in
the national, municipal or barangay level.

This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that "the concerns of a truly partisan office and
the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed from
regular party politics [so as] to warrant distinctive treatment,"82 so that restrictions on candidacy akin
to those imposed by the challenged provisions can validly apply only to situations in which the
elective office sought is partisan in character. To the extent, therefore, that such restrictions are said
to preclude even candidacies for nonpartisan elective offices, the challenged restrictions are to be
considered as overbroad.

Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the matter will show that the
alleged overbreadth is more apparent than real. Our exposition on this issue has not been repudiated,
viz.:

A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules and guidelines set forth therein
refer to the filing of certificates of candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered
political parties, in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.83 Obviously, these
rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued
specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which, it must be noted,
are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678
applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against Section
4(a) is clearly unsustainable.

Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
in conjunction with other related laws on the matter, will confirm that these provisions are likewise
not intended to apply to elections for nonpartisan public offices.

The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the elections for barangay offices,
since these are the only elections in this country which involve nonpartisan public offices.84

In this regard, it is well to note that from as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code
in 1985, Congress has intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by special
rules, including a separate rule on deemed resignations which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Said provision states:

Section 39. Certificate of Candidacy. – No person shall be elected punong barangay or kagawad ng
sangguniang barangay unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy in triplicate on any day from the
commencement of the election period but not later than the day before the beginning of the
campaign period in a form to be prescribed by the Commission. The candidate shall state the
barangay office for which he is a candidate.

xxxx

Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those in the
civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be
considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.

Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present
state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any
election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail. 85

In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and the corresponding provision in Section 13 of RA 9369 are general rules that apply
also to elections for nonpartisan public offices, the overbreadth challenge would still be futile. Again,
we explained:

In the first place, the view that Congress is limited to controlling only partisan behavior has not
received judicial imprimatur, because the general proposition of the relevant US cases on the matter
is simply that the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and speech of its employees
that differs significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general.86

Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its face for being overly
broad, particularly where, as in this case, "conduct" and not "pure speech" is involved, the
overbreadth must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly
legitimate sweep.87
In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of a statute’s overbreadth would entail, among
other things, a rough balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the number of
potentially invalid applications.88 In this regard, some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid
application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable.89 The
question is a matter of degree.90 Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the partisan-
nonpartisan distinction is valid and necessary such that a statute which fails to make this distinction is
susceptible to an overbreadth attack, the overbreadth challenge presently mounted must
demonstrate or provide this Court with some idea of the number of potentially invalid elections (i.e.
the number of elections that were insulated from party rivalry but were nevertheless closed to
appointive employees) that may in all probability result from the enforcement of the statute.91

The state of the record, however, does not permit us to find overbreadth. Borrowing from the words
of Magill v. Lynch, indeed, such a step is not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark,92
especially since an overbreadth finding in this case would effectively prohibit the State from
‘enforcing an otherwise valid measure against conduct that is admittedly within its power to
proscribe.’93

This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when it comes to the application
of the overbreadth doctrine in the analysis of statutes that purportedly attempt to restrict or burden
the exercise of the right to freedom of speech, for such approach is manifestly strong medicine that
must be used sparingly, and only as a last resort.94

In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in the judgment
of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances
left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs the possible
harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or conduct to go unpunished.95 Facial
overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting construction could be placed on the
challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would cure, or at least
substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute.96

In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain
in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having
arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad
statute.a1f

In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes – which are, at
best, bold predictions – cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State
from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been, unquestionably
within its power and interest to proscribe.97 Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal
with these conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather than
through a total invalidation of the statute itself.98

Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our assailed Decision have taken place. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, intervenor Drilon stated that a number of high-ranking Cabinet members had
already filed their Certificates of Candidacy without relinquishing their posts.99 Several COMELEC
election officers had likewise filed their Certificates of Candidacy in their respective provinces.100
Even the Secretary of Justice had filed her certificate of substitution for representative of the first
district of Quezon province last December 14, 2009101 – even as her position as Justice Secretary
includes supervision over the City and Provincial Prosecutors,102 who, in turn, act as Vice-Chairmen
of the respective Boards of Canvassers.103 The Judiciary has not been spared, for a Regional Trial
Court Judge in the South has thrown his hat into the political arena. We cannot allow the tilting of our
electoral playing field in their favor.

For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of RA
9369, which merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not unconstitutionally
overbroad.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions for
Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the
Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No.
9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice