ADM. CASE No.

3319               June 8, 2000

LESLIE UI, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant,
Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4)
1 

children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in
December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, was
carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a
daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos
Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the
College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in
1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then
visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as
the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child
with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that everything was over between her and Carlos
Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would
turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent would come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband
and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her
husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent
sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit
relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her
husband in his company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August
11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer, respondent2 

averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a
bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman
in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of
their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got
married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 . Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with
3 

Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence
because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and
accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together. 4 

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only
return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties.
During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a
woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon
her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu,
Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children.
On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm she was 5 

connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again
came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.

It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they
were married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's
true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never
lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged
to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from
her parents' funds. By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the
6 

amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the
present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.

In her Reply dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent
7 

knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her
even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went
abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also
charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:

Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit

relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in
December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still
living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents
started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent
Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early
(sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit
as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant's evidence, this
same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's
cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala
Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable
cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement
only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's
evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).

It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their

respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be

dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 8 

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the
Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of
9 

evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband
and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a
Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission  wherein she charged
10 

respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting
document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of
respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she
was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to
substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage  duly certified by the
11 

State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of
Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii,
USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in
her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because
respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos
Ui was within the wedlock.  It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a
12 

violation of Articles 183 13 and 184  of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of
14 

the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer
and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity
and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),  respondent averred

15 

that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was
in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in
good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.

Respondent filed her Memorandum  on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of
16 

whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves
to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:

(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good
moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and

(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an
immoral manner.

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim
in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already
married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties
with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the
civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her,
and he was so open in his courtship.  18 

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly
incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had
she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no
compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got
married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier
marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who
testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the
marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to
rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.

Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent

with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a
picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and
portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No.
PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,  does not prove that she acted in
19 

an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were
taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented
during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui
against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged  and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice21 to bolster her
20 

argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship
with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui
in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless,
nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed
to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with
him.

In the Memorandum  filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for
22 

the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality
by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2)
children. Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally
knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the
bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager.  It was thus highly improbable that
23 

respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed
by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that
respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of
a document containing an intercalated date.

In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum  , respondent stated that complainant

24 

miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists
that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her
mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was
made known to respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its
Report and Recommendation, finding that:

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the
latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too
difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be
single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason
therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of
Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with
him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother,
Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because
of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of
respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and
should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode
destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by
every single girl.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a
Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her
Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same will merit a more severe penalty.

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege
that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his
oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law
are:

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;

c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or
pending in court;

f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations.  (Emphasis supplied)

25 

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that
an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good
moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It
has been held —

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the
legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to
have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in
addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly
immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).  26 

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos
Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got
married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent
are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of
our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a
far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and
thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us
to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising
situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about
Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's

suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to
ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui
had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the
slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also,
despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child,
a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that
Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community.  Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action,
27 

the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 
28 

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 

Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his
true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no
intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only
if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.  This, herein
30 

complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her

Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied
on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an
event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the
date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as
in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary
to human experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment
to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an
intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of

morality.  The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called
1avvphi1

upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio,
for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy

of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN
WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6486             September 22, 2004

EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N 

PER CURIAM:

Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains
constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must
demonstrate that he or she has "good moral character," and once he becomes a lawyer
he should always behave in accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good
moral character is not only a condition precedent 1 to the practice of law, but an unending
requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of
grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.2

In an Affidavit-Complaint3 dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin
G. Dantes on the ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics
and law. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851. 

Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged

in illicit relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children
with them. From the time respondent’s illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular
support to complainant and their children, thus forcing complainant to work abroad to
provide for their children’s needs. Complainant pointed out that these acts of respondent
constitute a violation of his lawyer’s oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role
model to the community. 

On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order4 requiring

respondent to submit his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint.

Respondent submitted his Answer5 on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of
marriage with the complainant and the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they
have mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had
abandoned him in their Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga.
Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted
that she be accommodated in the place where he and their children were residing. Thus,
he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment. 

Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford
and provided for their needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons,
Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant adequate financial support even after she had
abandoned him in 1983. 

Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit
seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her. 

Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint.
Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and documentary, 6 to support the
allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint. 

From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19,
1979, complainant and respondent were married7 and lived with the latter’s mother in
Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends
meet, complainant engaged in the buy and sell business and relied on dole-outs from the
respondent’s mother.

Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were
born on February 20, 1980,8October 14, 19819 and August 11, 1983,10 respectively.
Complainant narrated that their relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of
respondent’s extra-marital affairs.11 Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to her
mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent had failed to provide
adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic
helper. 

Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live
separately, complainant asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to
support their children. When she returned to the Philippines, she learned that respondent
was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did not want to
live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses. 

Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray

Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave,12 all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of
respondent and his paramour 13 to prove the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate
children out of his illicit affairs with two different women. Letters of complainant’s
legitimate children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.14

In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to
cross-examine complainant, after he failed to appear during the scheduled hearings
despite due notice. He, however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the
Complainant’s Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the
Records of the Proceedings15 on August 1, 2002. 

Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative

Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondent’s motion was denied because it was filed
after the complainant had already presented her evidence.16 Respondent was given a
final chance to present his evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise
denied for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission
on Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.

In respondent’s Position Paper,17 he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that

this time, he argued that in view of the resolution of the complaint for support with
alimony pendente lite18 filed against him by the complainantbefore the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City,19 the instant administrative case should be dismissed for
lack of merit. 

On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant
its Report20 and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851.21 The IBP
recommended that the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.

Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."

"Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar."
"Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that
conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community. 22 To be the basis of disciplinary
action, the lawyer’s conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it
must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree23 or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.24

In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as
to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic
ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but
should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good
moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than
the possession of legal learning. 

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible
purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and
(iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.26

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the
Bar but also throughout their legal 

career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity.27 They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.28

Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different

women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly
immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s
testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established
respondent’s commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had
breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.29

In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and
cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs.
Obusan,31 we ruled that abandoning one’s wife and resuming carnal relations with a
paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community. 

We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral delinquency which affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which
makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. 

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the Court and as a member of the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed.34 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the
Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. 

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is

hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent’s record as a member of the
Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the 

Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country. 

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 2474               June 30, 2005

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Providing one’s children with a comfortable life and good education does not render
marriage a fait accompli. Leo J. Palma, respondent herein, may have provided well for
his children but this accomplishment is not sufficient to wipe away the penalty for his
transgression. He ought to remember that before he became a father, he was a husband
first. As such, he should have loved, respected and remained faithful to his wife.

At bar is respondent’s Motion to Vacate1 our Decision dated September 15, 2004 finding

him guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer and imposing
upon him the penalty of disbarment from the practice of law.

In resolving the instant motion, a brief revisit of the facts is imperative. On June 22, 1982,
respondent, despite his subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima, married Maria
Luisa Cojuangco, the 22-year old daughter of complainant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
This prompted the latter to file with this Court, on November 8, 1982, a complaint for
disbarment against respondent.

Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint.

In our Resolution2 dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. Then Assistant Solicitor
General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili heard the testimonies of the complainant and his witness in
the presence of respondent’s counsel.

On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an urgent motion to suspend
proceedings3 on the ground that the final outcome of Civil Case No. Pq–0401-P,4 for
declaration of nullity of marriage between him and his wife Lisa, poses a prejudicial
question to the disbarment proceeding. The motion was denied.

Respondent then filed with this Court an urgent motion for issuance of a restraining
order.5 On December 19, 1984, we issued a Resolution enjoining the OSG from
continuing the disbarment proceedings.6

In the interim, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court took effect. Hence, the OSG transferred
the disbarment case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). On October 19, 1998,
IBP Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo required the parties to manifest within ten (10) days
from notice whether they are still interested in pursuing the case.7
In his manifestation,8 complainant confirmed his continuing interest in prosecuting the
case.

For his part, respondent moved to postpone the hearing eight (8) times. In one of those
instances, particularly on August 28, 2001, complainant moved "that respondent be
deemed to have waived his right to present evidence and for the case to be
deemed submitted for resolution in view of his continuing failure to present his
evidence." However, complainant withdrew such motion upon the promise of the
respondent’s counsel that on the next hearing, scheduled on October 4, 2001, he would
definitely present his client’s evidence. But even before that date, respondent already
manifested that he would not be able to return to the Philippines for his direct testimony.
Instead, he promised to submit his "direct testimony in affidavit form."9 In an Order issued
that day, the IBP Commissioner reset the hearing for the last time on January 24, 2002
and warned respondent that should he fail to appear or present his "direct testimony in
affidavit form," the case will be deemed submitted for resolution. 10On January 24,
2002, respondent neither appeared nor presented his "direct testimony in affidavit
form," hence, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. 11

On March 20, 2003, the IBP Commissioner submitted a Report and Recommendation
finding respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer
and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) years.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and
Recommendation, but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one (1) year.

On September 15, 2004, we rendered the assailed Decision.

In his motion for reconsideration, respondent raised the following issues:

First, the complaint for disbarment was filed by an improper party, complainant not
being the offended party.

Second, he was denied due process because the case was submitted for resolution on
January 24, 2002 without his "direct testimony in affidavit form."

Third, the disbarment proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
is void because our Resolution dated December 19, 1984 restraining the OSG from
continuing such proceedings has not been lifted.

Fourth, our Decision is barred by laches because of the lapse of almost fourteen (14)
years from December 19, 1984, the date we restrained the OSG from continuing the
disbarment proceedings, until October 19, 1998, the date the IBP Commissioner
required the parties to "manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting the
case."

Fifth, the Resolution dated June 21, 2003 of the IBP Board of Governors imposing upon
him the penalty of one (1) year suspension "has attained finality and should be
deemed served already."

And sixth, he acted under a "firm factual and legal conviction" in declaring before the
Hong Kong Marriage Registry that he is a "bachelor" because his first marriage is void
even if there is no judicial declaration of nullity.

In his comment, complainant countered that: first, respondent cannot claim denial of due
process because his failure to adduce evidence was due to his own fault; second, it is
now too late to invoke this Court’s Resolution of December 19, 1984 restraining the OSG
from continuing the disbarment proceedings; third, laches does not apply because the
14-year hiatus was brought about by the said Resolution; fourth, the penalty of one-year
suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors cannot be deemed "final and served
already" because it is a mere recommendation to this Court; and fifth, although his
previous marriage was annulled, it can not erase the betrayal of trust and abuse of
confidence he committed against complainant.

Respondent’s motion is bereft of merit.

We observe that in his motion, respondent alleged new issues 12 which were not
considered below. Nonetheless, in view of the caveat that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, we shall resolve all these new issues.

I - Improper Party

We find no merit in respondent’s contention that the complainant, being the father of the
offended party, does not have the standing to file the instant complaint.

Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The only question for
determination is whether respondent is fit to be a member of the Bar. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of this Court to the lawyer’s alleged misconduct is in
no sense a party and generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens
may have in the proper administration of justice.13 Thus, this Court may investigate
charges against lawyers, regardless of complainant’s standing. In fact, it can do
so motu proprio. Our ruling in Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos14 applies four-square, thus:

"x x x A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or

lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the
facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.They
are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration
of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may
be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the
charges."

II – Due Process

Neither do we find merit in respondent’s claim that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
violated his right to due process when it considered the case submitted for resolution on
January 24, 2002 without his "direct testimony in affidavit form." The records show that
the case dragged on for three (3) years after the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
resumed its investigation on October 19, 1998. Of the fifteen15 (15) settings from
February 2, 1999 to January 24, 2002, respondent had the hearing postponed for eight
(8) times.

Indisputably, it was respondent’s failure to submit his "direct testimony in affidavit form"
that caused delay. Since the proceedings had been dragging on a lethargic course, the
IBP Commissioner is correct in considering the case submitted for resolution. At this
juncture, it must be stressed that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently
met.16 Here, respondent was given sufficient opportunity to explain his side and adduce
his evidence. Despite his sudden "flight into oblivion," the IBP Commissioner notified him
of the proceedings. Significantly, he was duly represented by a counsel who attended the
hearings and submitted manifestations and motions on his behalf, the latest of which is
the instant Motion to Vacate. In short, the active participation of his lawyer in every stage
of the proceedings rules out any badge of procedural deficiency therein. Of course, we
need not mention the fact that respondent was able to file with this Court a motion to
dismiss the complaint, as well as to confront and cross-examine the complainant and his
witness during the investigation in the OSG.

III – Restraining Order

The restraining order was anchored on the ground that the final outcome of Civil Case
No. Pq–0401-P poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceedings. It appears
from complainant’s allegation, which respondent does not deny, that Civil Case No. Pq–
0401-P was dismissed without prejudice.17 Necessarily, there is no more prejudicial
question to speak of.

IV - Laches

Respondent cannot find solace in the principle of laches. While it is true that there was a
hiatus or delay of 14 years before the IBP Commissioner resumed the investigation, the
same was pursuant to the said restraining order of December 19, 1984.

V – Finality of the Penalty Imposed

by the IBP-Board of Governors

The penalty of one-year suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors cannot
attain finality. Section 12 of Rule 139-B provides:

"Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.-

xxxxxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action."

Clearly, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is merely recommendatory. The
"power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement,
which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is
made."18 Necessarily, the "final action" on the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
still lies with this Court. Obviously, respondent’s argument that we affirmed such
resolution when we "noted" it is certainly misplaced. In Re: Problem of Delays in Cases
Before the Sandiganbayan,19 we held that the term "noted" means that the Court has
merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a
judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter. It does not imply agreement
or approval. The power to disbar belongs to the Court alone.

VI - Good Faith

Respondent’s argument that he was of the "firm factual and legal conviction when he
declared before the Hong Kong authorities that he was a bachelor since his first marriage
is void and does not need judicial declaration of nullity" cannot exonerate him. In Terre
vs. Terre,20 the same defense was raised by respondent lawyer whose disbarment was
also sought. We held:
"x x x Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that
such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds
that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held
that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan
Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be
deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage must be regarded as bigamous
and criminal in character."

Before we write finis to this case, we find it necessary to stress certain points in view of
respondent’s additional reason why he should be exonerated – that he loves all his
children and has always provided for them. He may have indeed provided well for his
children. But this accomplishment is not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue
being a member of the noble profession of law. It has always been the duties of parents –
e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good
example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and
spiritual guidance.21 But what respondent forgot is that he has also duties to his wife. As
a husband, he is obliged to live with her; observe mutual love, respect and fidelity;
and render help and support.22 And most important of all, he is obliged to remain
faithful to her until death.

The undeniable truth is that respondent married Lisa while his marriage with Elizabeth
Hermosisima was still subsisting. Such act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground
for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Obviously, he
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
In Cordova vs. Cordova,23 we held that "The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of
a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage."

We also reiterate our ruling that respondent’s conduct speaks of a clear case of betrayal
of trust and abuse of confidence, thus:

"x x x. It was respondent’s closeness to the complainant’s family as well as the latter’s
complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his
concern was supposed to be complainant’s legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latter’s
back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when
nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of complainant’s resources by securing a
plane ticket from complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s daughter in Hong
Kong. He did this without complainant’s knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity
to assure complainant that "everything is legal." Clearly, respondent had crossed he
limits of propriety and decency.
Indeed, we are not prepared to exonerate respondent or reduce the penalty we imposed
on him as it will denigrate the standard of the law profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent’s Motion to Vacate our Decision dated September 15, 2004 is
hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian

Tabang's good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one
docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February
1983.

It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at

Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was
performed under Article 76 of the Civil 
Code  as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
1

The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had
finished his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981),
allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainantadmits, though, that they had
not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).

Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his
application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations
but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No.
78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and,
thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral
character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became
aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).

The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June
1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he
admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the
marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his
law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our
future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to take
the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single
since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He
further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to
the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.

Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was

Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a
misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her
Complaint against Respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78
and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.

On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time
praying for Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:

a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me
assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage
institution.

b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his
application to take the bar exam.

c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court;

d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the
affidavit ofdesistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to
his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended
me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his
wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with
the Supreme Court.

Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and

unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had
already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for
Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore
and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to
comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum
cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that
effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21)
years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the
time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name
"in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and
there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any
court."According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials
appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").

Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it
is Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.

In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had
covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and
take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the
absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the
marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant
because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the
1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.

On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General
submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the
charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate
her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting
statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.

On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant
for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter
recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is
settled.

Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find
Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established.

Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that
he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith,
for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of
Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with
his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known,
would have disqualified him outrightfrom taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably
exhibits lack of good moral character.

Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as
"single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps
but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning, are
mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his
marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions
of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been
met and that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been regularly
performed.

Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings

submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.

The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation,"
in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married"
to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under
oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is
only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the
averments on the first page which were merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp.
59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes
reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).

Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to

Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and,
instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage
contract.

In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be
made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case,
however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in
order from the beginning."

Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned

letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the
reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning,
that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.

Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had
reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter
No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been
unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he
again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious
tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. Inso doing, he has violated Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes
candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states
that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect
only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them
(Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent,
through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a
member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent toadmission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law(People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360,
30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice GeorgeA. Malcolm:
"As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is
unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers ofan attorney, the courts retain the
power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to

continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.

Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served
on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate
the same to all Courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,

Duran & Lim for respondent.

Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial
board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card
written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
 LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela

(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the
purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost
documents of your animals; can make your application and final
requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a
lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well
as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town,
Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and
serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant
of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as
follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching

date for our induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that
is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction into office I should be
very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of
the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to
my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of
suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my
residence here in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of
Ilagan, but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to
live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election
as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as
a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any
week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on every
Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding
preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn
to before me as notary public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some
people are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be
in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession
as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it
 clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will
have my residence here in Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio
people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be
informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as
lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet
contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the
registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in
court and would charge only three pesos for every registration.

Yours respectfully,

(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA

Attorney 
Notary Public.

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments
of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said
codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following:
"The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics

adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association
in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective

advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers,
is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The
publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal
taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But
solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or
interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether
allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or
wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced
by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the
traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is
unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases
where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and
litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to
hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the
employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal
injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or
to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate
policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may
succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the
criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional
services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the
bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to
inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between

individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense
when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same
evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar
itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is
not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not
seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be
unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of
cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the
standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to
strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension.

That should be distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the
respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those
canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which
should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the
representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that
the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this
if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the
respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify
permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of
the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of
his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to
commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit
the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is
reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively
lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that
future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the
respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an
attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,

Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions

OSTRAND, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would have been sufficient
punishment.

[B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993.]

MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, v. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW, MEANING AND EXTENT OF. — Practice of law
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts
by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. In the
practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed
by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and
authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as
a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal
rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is
also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another
and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.

2. ID.; ID.; LEGAL SUPPORT SERVICES IN CASE AT BAR CONSTITUTE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The
practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law." The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s own description of the services it
has been offering, to wit: . . . While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is
that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information,
for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoptation, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to
the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals,
it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the
proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice,
as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal
research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. The aforesaid conclusion is further
strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday
Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure,
main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales: . . .

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARALEGAL OR LEGAL ASSISTANT; CONCEPT IN THE UNITED STATES. — Paralegals
in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. As the concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of
Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT IN THE PHILIPPINES. — In the Philippines, we still have a restricted
concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by
FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation
in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. (Illustrations: . . .)

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL POLICY ON PARALEGAL. — We have to necessarily and
definitely reject respondent’s position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an
occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its
merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or
legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. . . . Accordingly, we have adopted the
American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has
not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot
be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights
and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW IN CASE AT BAR CANNOT BE PERFORMED BY
PARALEGALS; REASON. — It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by
private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person
duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law. . . .

7. ID.; ADVERTISEMENT BY LAWYER; RULE. — Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or
in return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer
has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHARACTER AND CONDUCT AS BEST ADVERTISEMENT. — We repeat, the canons of
the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing
itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and
the unwholesome result of propaganda.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISEMENT OF TALENT OR SKILL. — The standards of the
legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal
business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. . . .

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law
lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the
bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or
quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships and
offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references;
and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.." . . The use of an
ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR LAW LIST. — The law list must be a reputable law list
published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine,
trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer
may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or
the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents
of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of
the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the
same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION IN BATES, ET AL. v. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA (433 U.S.
350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691) AS TO PUBLICATION OF LEGAL FEES, NOT APPLICABLE;
REASONS. — The ruling in the case of Bates, Et. Al. v. State Bar of Arizona, which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the
case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement
of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or
an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso
that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented
by such authority in that state." This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that
being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for
such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar. It bears mention that in a
survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the
public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly with respect to these characteristics of lawyers: . . . Secondly, it is our firm belief that
with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements
of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and
the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct
which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the
legal profession.

RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A’ and `B’ (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law." 
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.

ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767,

LEGAL 5217232, 5222041

CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm

7-Flr. Victoria Bldg.UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment
in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy

CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232521-7251

522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted. chanrobles

virtual lawlibrary

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O’Steen
v. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the
(1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers’ Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federation International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit
their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar
associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this
Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this
bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms,
i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the
same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search,
evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or
non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitute practice of law?
x       x       x

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent’s foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one’s legal
services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent’s act of establishing a
"legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed 4 .
x       x       x

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements
in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical
services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the
term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent’s name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case,
appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being
operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and
this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services
being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed
by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it
becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as
the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of
the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to
inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however,
emphasize a Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce, is recognized, and that is: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is
that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law,
by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to
induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A"
of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its
bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution,"
which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is
suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license. chanrobles law library : red

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above
impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that
criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas)
with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where
the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute
legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier
discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the
integrity of the Bar.
x       x       x

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering,
storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like
services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in
other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and
advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of
law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for
the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of, illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if
such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would
then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of
carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which
should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent’s services ought to be prohibited outright,
such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or
otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information
given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal
under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer
should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend
any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the

Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation’s Articles of Incorporation and By-laws
must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court 5 
2. Philippine Bar Association: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent’s acts
of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to
the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent’s own commercial advertisement which announces a
certain Atty. Don Perkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications,
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but
includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal
rights and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court (See
Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1948 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is
the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and
solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the
public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to
court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it
be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who
are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6 

3. Philippine Lawyers’ Association: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Philippine Lawyers’ Association’s position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.
x       x       x

Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal
support services" to lawyers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose
Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent’s Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in
law practice, albeit outside the court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the
Investment Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid laws, the legal principles
and procedures related thereto, the legal advises based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall
squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7 

4. U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a
four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only
then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to
establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist
in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to take measures to protect the
general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise
of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the
present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal
services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly,
measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services." 8 

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression
that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters, will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent’s name — The Legal Clinic,
Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it
also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there
are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent’s allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9 

5. Women Lawyer’s Association of the Philippines: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal
in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of
a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one
has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to
employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter
of this petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve.
The law has yet to be amended so that such as act could become justifiable. chanrobles law library

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce
are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that
which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional and offenses of this character justify
permanent elimination from the Bar. 10 

6. Federacion International de Abogadas: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

". . . Of necessity, no one . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar
with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the
law forbids. It seems . . . clear that (the consultant’s) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the
practice of law . . .. It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men
have considerable acquaintance with the broad features of the law . . .. Our knowledge of the law —
accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we
are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of
the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must
be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and
who draws plans and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

"But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the
statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

"It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

"If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and
the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer
always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of
industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them
are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to
delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical
knowledge and skill in such matters, and without regard to legal training or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendant have tendered to the smaller employers the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

"The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate
courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring
[that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that
the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

"In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client
or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client’s obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law.
This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant’s primary efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the architect may
plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities
into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services
which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as
part of a welfare program, he drew employees’ wills.

"Another branch of defendant’s work is the representation of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of
law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the
subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not
he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a
question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value
of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the
probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be
that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men
grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant
should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not
presented by the proofs. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere
with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear `in person,
or by counsel, or by other representative.’ Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
`Counsel’ here means a licensed attorney, and `other representative’ one not a lawyer. In this phase
of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions
purely legal." (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar;

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succinctly states the rule of conduct: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity." cralaw

virtua1aw library

1.10. In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A",
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making
arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is
as complicated as that described in Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-
Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such
as the Legal Clinic, renders such services, then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage
and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B", Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not
constitute practice of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys
materials on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic’s
paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would
constitute unauthorized practice of law.

"It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amounts to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the
forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many
approved and accepted texts. Dacey’s book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact
or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so
necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most
the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant’s publication does not purport `to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in the publication and sale of the
kits, such publication and sale did not constitute the unlawful practice of law . . .. There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction
against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against
his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in
the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation
and presentation of the purchaser’s asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal
remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought
to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice
and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with
a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed." (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.)

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory." It is
not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual
inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites
of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not
necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services" or
"legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11 

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for a proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause
"practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have
laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of
which we now take into account. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render
any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12 
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13 

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed
by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and
authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, inorder to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14 

When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.
15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to
an attorney and asks the later to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice
for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of
a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18 

In the recent case of Cayetano v. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down
the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Black defines "practice of law" as: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law." cralaw virtua1aw library

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights
of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)." cralaw virtua1aw library
This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),
stated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of, such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving
of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance
to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144)." cralaw virtua1aw library

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law." cralaw virtua1aw library

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s own description of the services it
has been offering, to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen
and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers
and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and
reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to
laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or
adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country, and other
matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts, and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services." 20 

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That
is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to
legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue
of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where
an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its
own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh
floor of the Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client’s problem, and
even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors, are "specialists" in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law.
These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "When they come, we start by analyzing the problem.
That’s what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what’s bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the symptoms, and so on. That’s how we operate, too. And once
the problem has been categorized, then it’s referred to one of our specialists." cralaw virtua1aw library

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital, the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa ospital,
out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It’s just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.

Those cases which require more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich
realtive who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property,
we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which
would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her
property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with that problem. Now, if
there were other heirs contesting your rich relative’s will, then you would need a litigator, who knows
how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case." 21 

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals,
but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22 

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23 

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24 
The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction where from respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or liabilities of
their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control. 27 

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent’s position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are
none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major
standards, or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association. 29 

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered, as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30 

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32 

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value
to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation. 36 

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The proscription against advertising of legal services
or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs v. Estanislao R. Bavot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member
of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old
defiled the temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.)

We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40 

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41 

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal
and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names
and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42 

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43 

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening
of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44 

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the time definitely do not and conclusively
cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, Et. Al. v. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees
for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate
of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an
exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar. chanrobles law library : red

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%

Honest from 65% to 14%

Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what
is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will
be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage
in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising,
cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged
support services. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of
the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent’s corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which
is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5299               August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 157053               August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner, 

vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July
5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667." 1 

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court
decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property
or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of
P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half
after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star. 2 

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 3 

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising
and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our
views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is
not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the
ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition
should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges
against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services
offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is
dignified.
4 

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation. On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed
5 

Resolution No. XV-2002-306, finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and
6 

3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that
a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was
noted by this Court on November 11, 2002. 7 

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was 8 

denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002 9 
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or
not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. 10 

Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting
any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on
the basis of pleadings and records thereof.  Respondent, on the other hand, filed a
11 

Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.

– A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a
12 

profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not
a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
13 

secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
14 

should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves. The following elements distinguish the legal
15 

profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness

to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice,
or dealing directly with their clients.
16 

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering
the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and
after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy &
Sell Free Ads Newspaper. Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be
17 

published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. Such acts of respondent are a
18 

deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not
only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite
the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring
prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time
of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
19 

disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it
is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to
the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the
20 

office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is
now acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
21 

standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:
22 

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the
bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof,
in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable
law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be
a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law
list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found

GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4984            April 1, 2003

ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR.

ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA
CORONACION, and JOSE RABALO,complainants, 
vs.
ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.
 RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,1 an
official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross
misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used her public
office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the
CHED.

Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their
sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege
that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that
are grounds for disbarment under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation as

Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C.
Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon
City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...

b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation
of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED…

c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s

designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition,
Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of
the existence of a prior registration…

d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of

Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer
who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of
name.3
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing
eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.4

Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section

365 of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to "Borela
Tire Supply" and "Nova’s Lining Brake & Clutch" as evidenced by the dishonored checks
she issued,6 the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.7

Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against
complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she
encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening
of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the
respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.8

Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph
Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of
no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing
their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for herself.9

In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the

charges.10 A copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4,
Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court
with the notation "Unclaimed."11

On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served
by registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.

In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office
informed the Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and
signed for by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on August 27,
1999.12

On November 22, 2000, we granted complainant’s motion to refer the complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.

In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed
respondent to submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be
considered in default and the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said order
and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file her Answer, but again
she failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she had
waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was
mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record.

In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline stated as follows:

From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation
of her oath as a government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful
demands or attempted to extort money from certain people who had pending
applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act favorably on
said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office in order
to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission
on Higher Education.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning
that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.

On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393,
the full text of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules; and considering that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher
Education, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
years.13

At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge

(OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance,
considering that her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was "Chief Education
Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards,
CHED."

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official.14 However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation
of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the
Bar.15

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her
tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon,
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before
her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondent’s failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to
comment on the charges. We find that respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED
is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a
lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to
demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office.

The Attorney’s Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any
violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The
Attorney’s Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for
money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.16 Respondent’s demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of
pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of
the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule
1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional
obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21,
1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all
lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 617 of said Code.
Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public
service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional
obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests

pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any
unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule
6.0219 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private
interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by
the functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and
good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high
public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon
120 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for
acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find
that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years’ suspension from
membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board
of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys
upon finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and
dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
records of the respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination
to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.