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Annu.Rev. Anthropol.1998. 27:171-95
Copyright? 1998 by AnnualReviews.All rights reserved
WITTGENSTEINAND
ANTHROPOLOGY
Veena Das
Departmentof Anthropology,GraduateFaculty,New School for Social Research,
New York, New York 10003, and Departmentof Sociology, University of Delhi,
Delhi 110007, India;e-mail cdedse@del2.vsnl.net.in
KEYWORDS:culture,language,rules,skepticism,
everydaylife
ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
I wish to invite reflection in this paper on a certain kinship in the questions that
Wittgenstein asks of his philosophy and the puzzles of anthropology. Consider
his formulation-"A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my
way about"' (Wittgenstein 1953:para. 123). For Wittgenstein, then, philo-
sophical problems have their beginnings in the feeling of being lost and in an
unfamiliar place, and philosophical answers are in the nature of finding one's
way back. This image of turning back, of finding not as moving forward as to-
ward a goal but as being led back, is pervasive in the later writings of Wittgen-
stein. How can anthropology receive this way of philosophizing? Is there
171
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172 DAS
Definitions
In his recent, passionate work on the "anthropography"of violence, Daniel
(1997) is moved to say, "Anthropologyhas had an answer to the question,
Whatis a humanbeing? An answerthathas, on the whole, servedus well, with
or without borrowingsfrom philosophers.The answer keeps returningto one
form or anotherof the concept of culture:humanshave it; other living beings
do not"(p. 194). He goes on to discuss how Tylor's (1974) foundingdefinition
of culturehelped to move it away from the "clutchesof literature,philosophy,
classical music, and the fine arts-in otherwords, from the conceit of the Hu-
manities"(Daniel 1997:194). Let us consider for a moment the actual defini-
tion proposed by Tylor: "Cultureor civilization taken in its widest ethno-
graphic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art,
morals,law, custom, andany othercapabilitiesandhabitsacquiredby man as a
memberof society" (Tylor 1974:1). Whatis interestingin this definition is not
only the all-inclusive natureof culturebut also the referenceto it as capability
and habit acquiredby man as a memberof society. As Asad (1990) has noted,
this notion of culturewith its enumerationof capabilitiesand habits,as well as
the focus on learning,gave way in time to the idea of cultureas text "thatis as
somethingresemblingan inscribedtext"(p. 171). Withinthis dominantnotion
of cultureas text, the process of learningcame to be seen as shapingthe indi-
vidual body as a pictureof this text, inscribingmemory often throughpainful
rituals so that the society and culture of which the individual is a member is
made present,so to say, on the surfaceof the body (Clasteres 1974, Das 1995a,
Durkheim 1976). The scene of instructionin Wittgenstein (1953) is entirely
different.
WITTGENSTEINAND ANTHROPOLOGY 173
Scenes of Instruction
Philosophical Investigations begins with an evocation of the words of
Augustine in Confessions. This opening scene has been the object of varying
interpretations.The passage reads as follows:
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordinglymoved towards
something, I saw this and grasped that the thing they called was the sound
they utteredwhen they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by
theirbodily movements, as it were the naturallanguageof all peoples: the ex-
pression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of otherpartsof the
body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking,
having, or avoiding something. Thus as I heard words repeatedly used in
their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand
what objects they signified; and after I had trainedmy mouth to form these
signs, I used them to express my own desires. (Wittgenstein 1953:para.1)
Stanley Cavell (1982, 1990), who has given the most sustainedreading of
this passage, senses here the presence of the child who moves invisible among
his or her elders and who must divine speech for himself or herself, trainingthe
mouth to form signs so thathe or she may use these signs to express his or her
own desires. Now contrastthis scene of instructionwith the famous builders'
scene, which follows soon after in Wittgenstein(1953:para.2):
Let us imagine a language for which the descriptiongiven by Augustine is
right.The language is meantto serve for communicationbetween a builderA
and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pil-
lars, slabs, and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in orderin which A
needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words
"block","pillar","slab","beam".A calls them out; B brings the stone which
he has learntto bring at such-and-sucha call.-Conceive this as a complete
primitive language.
If we transposethe scene of instructionin which the child moves among the
adultswith that of the builders,we might see that even if the child were to use
only four words, these may be uttered with charm, curiosity, a sense of
achievement.The child has a futurein language.The builders' languageis, in a
way, closed. Wittgensteinwills us to conceive of this as a "completeprimitive
language."Yet as Cavell (1995) points out, thereis no standinglanguagegame
for imaginingwhat Wittgensteinasks us to imagine here. It has been noted of-
ten enough that Wittgensteindoes not call upon any of the naturallanguages
from which he could have taken his examples: Thus his game in this sec-
tion-whether with referenceto the child or the dreamlikesequence by which
one might arriveat an "understanding"of what the words five red apples mean
or with reference to the builders' language-is in the nature of a fiction
throughwhich his thoughts may be maintainedin the region of the primitive.
But the "primitive"here is conceived as the builders' tribe,which seems bereft
174 DAS
someone means such and such and that his present applicationaccords with
what was said in the past.
My discomfortwith this descriptionarises from the centralitythat Kripke
(1982) places on the notion of rule as well as from the processes he privileges
for bringingthe child in agreementwith a particularform of life thatwould li-
cense such blind and unhesitatingobedience to the rule.
If we take the teacherin Kripke(1982) to be the representativeof the com-
munity within which the child is being initiated, then I am compelled to ask
whetherthe "agreement"in a formof life thatmakes the communitya commu-
nity of consentcanbe purelya matterof makingthe child arriveat the same con-
clusion or the same procedurethatthe adultwould have applied.Rather,it ap-
pears to me thatas suggested by Cavell (1990), this agreementis a much more
complicatedaffair in which there is an entanglementof rules, customs, habits,
examples,andpracticesandthatwe cannotattachsalvationalimportanceto any
one of these in questions pertainingto the inheritanceof culture.Wittgenstein
(1953) speaks aboutordersor commandsin several ways: Thereis the gulf be-
tween the orderand its execution or the translationof an orderone time into a
propositionand anothertime into a demonstrationand still anothertime into ac-
tion. I do not have the sense thatthe agreementin formsof life requiresthe child
to producethe same responsethatthe teacherdoes. To have a futurein language,
the child should have been enabledto say "andafterI had trainedmy mouthto
form these signs, I used them to express my own desires."There is of course
the reference in Wittgenstein(1953:para.219) to following a rule blindly.
"Allthestepsarealreadytaken"means:I no longerhaveanychoice.The
meaning,tracesthelinealongwhichit is
rule,oncestampedwitha particular
to be followedthroughthe whole of space,-But if somethingof this sort
reallywerethecase,howwouldit help?
No; my descriptiononlymadesenseof it was to be understood
symboli-
cally.-I shouldhavesaid:Thisis howit strikesme [emphasisin the origi-
nal].
WhenI obeya rule,I do notchose.
I obeytheruleblindly[emphasisin theoriginal].
And then in paragraph221, he explains, "My symbolical expression was
really a mythological descriptionof the rule."I cannot take up fully the ques-
tion here of what it is to speak mythologically or symbolically, but from the
aurathat surroundsthe discussion of these issues, speaking of obeying a rule
blindly seems to be similarto the way one speaks of wishes, plans, suspicions,
or expectationsas, by definition,unsatisfiedor the way one speaks of proposi-
tions as necessarily true or false, that is, thatthey are grammaticalstatements.
When Wittgenstein(1953) talks aboutrules and agreementbeing cousins, the
kinship between them seems more complicatedthan Kripke's (1982) render-
ing of either of these two concepts allows.
WITTGENSTEINAND ANTHROPOLOGY 177
scenes arealso markedby contingenciesof all kinds in which one might end up
not a hero but a buffoon. Yet it is throughthe entanglementof rule, custom,
habit, and example thatthe child has not only been initiatedin the community
of men but has also foundhis own style of being a man.In fact, the aftermathof
the story of this young hero convertshim into a source of danger,always look-
ing for some replication of the originatingmoment of his public biography,
and who finally dies in a quarrelas if he were predestinedto have such a death.
A considerationof thatevent would take us into a differentregion of Wittgen-
stein's thought:the region of the dangersthatthe othernessof this hero posed
for the rest of the community.
Anthropologicalaccounts have suggested that attentionto Wittgenstein's
discussion on rules and especially the distinctionbetween regulativerules and
constitutive rules, as suggested by Searle (1969), may give new direction to
questions of how to distinguishthe natureof prescriptionsin ritualactions and
otherkind of actions. Humphrey& Laidlaw(1994) have not only writtena fas-
cinatingaccountof the Jainritualofpuja (worship),they have also arguedthat
what is distinctive about ritualprescriptionsin general is the constitutive na-
ture of rules that go to define rituals.
Constitutiveritualscreatea formof activity,by definingtheactionsof which
it is composed.Wepointedoutthatritualizedactionis composedof discrete
actswhicharedisconnected fromagents'intentionsandwe saidthatthisfea-
tureof ritualization
dependsuponstipulation. as distinct
Itis thisstipulation,
frommereregulationwhichis constitutiveof ritual.Onlyritualacts (like
validmovesinchess)countashavinghappened, so thecelebrantmovesfrom
actto act,completingeachin turnandthenmovingonto thenext.Thisis un-
affectedby delays,falsemoves,extraneoushappenings, ormishaps.(Hum-
phrey& Laidlaw1994:117)
They use this distinctionthen to show the wide variationin the ways of per-
forming the ritual act ofpuja, which are nevertheless consideredright by the
participantsbecause they may be said to accordwith the constitutiverules. The
importanceof this formulationis not only thatit breaksaway fromthe distinc-
tions between instrumentalaction and expressive action, or from the overde-
terminedview of ritualas a form of communication,but also that it addresses
some puzzling featuresof ritualobservationsthat are often ironed out of final
ethnographictexts. I refer to the kinds of mundaneactivities that may be car-
ried on duringa ritualbut are neverthelessnot seen as constitutiveof the ritual
and hence can be ignored in judgments about "rightness"of a ritualact.
Thereis an explicit analogy in Humphrey& Laidlaw's (1994) discussion of
the constitutiverules of ritualandof chess. Wittgenstein's(1953) observations
on chess may be pertinenthere. He has talkednot only aboutthe rules thatcon-
stitute the game but also customs-for example, the use of the king to decide
by lots which playergets white in drawinglots (para.563) or not stampingand
ANDANTHROPOLOGY179
WITTGENSTEIN
The reference to language here is obviously not to suggest that those who
have masteredthe use of a languagehave acquiredthe logical skills necessary
to express hope but ratherthatgrammartells us what kinds of objects hope and
grief are. Thus the innerstates are not distinguishedby some referenceto con-
tentbut by the way we imagine somethinglike an innerstatefor creaturescom-
plicated enough to possess language (and hence culture).I would like to illus-
tratethis idea with referenceto the discussion of belief and then follow the il-
lustrationwith a discussion on pain.
Belief
The questionof belief in Philosophical Investigationsappearsas the asymme-
try between the use of first-personindicative and third-personindicative. Two
observations in the second part of this text are crucial. The first is "If there
were a verb meaning to believe falsely it would not have a first person indica-
tive" (Wittgenstein1953:190). The second, closely relatedto thatobservation,
is "I say of someone else 'He seems to believe. ....' And other people say it of
me. Now, why do I never say it of myself, not even when othersrightlysay it of
me?-Do I not myself see or hear myself, then?"(Wittgenstein 1953:191).
Wittgensteinis asking, Whatdoes a belief look like from the inside? When
he says that it is possible to misinterpretone's own sense impressionsbut not
one's beliefs, he is not referringto the contentof an innerexperiencebut rather
to the grammaticalimpossibility of inferringone's belief (or one's pain) intro-
spectively. That is why he says that if therewere a verb thatmeant "to believe
falsely," it would lack a first-personpresent indicative. Wittgenstein is not
stating a metaphysical truth about belief here, but a grammaticalone. Even
when it is possible to make such statementsas "Itis rainingandI do not believe
it," the grammarof the termbelief does not allow us to make these statements,
for we cannot imagine a context for such statements-they violate the picture
of the inner in the grammarof the word belief.
Anthropologistshave wrestled with the problemof belief in the context of
translationof cultures.The problemhas been persistent:Whenanthropologists
attributebelief statementsto membersof othercultures(i.e. non-Westerncul-
tures), are they making a presumptionthat a common psychological category
of most Western languages and cultures is to be treatedas a common human
capacitythatcan be ascribedto all men andwomen? Such questionshave been
asked of several categories of emotion (see Lutz & Abu- Lughod 1990, Lutz &
White 1986), but the case of belief is special because it has been anchoredto
questionsof universalhumanrationalityon the one hand(Gellner 1970, Lukes
1977) and common human condition of corporealityon the other (Needham
1972).
As far as the side of universalrationalityis concerned,the puzzle for many
scholarsseems to be to accountfor the apparentirrationalityof beliefs like that
ANDANTHROPOLOGY189
WITTGENSTEIN
is not likely" (p. vi). Beam (1998) writes thatthe destructivemomentof the In-
vestigationsthreatensthe fabricof our daily lives, so it is more destructivethan
textbook skepticism of the philosopheror the cafe skeptic. If in life, said Witt-
genstein, we are surroundedby death,so too in the health of ourunderstanding
we are surroundedby madness (Wittgenstein 1980:44). Ratherthan forcefully
excluding this voice of madness, Wittgenstein(1953) returnsus to the every-
day by a gesture of waiting. "If I have exhausted the justifications, I have
reached bedrock, and my spade is turned.Then I am inclined to say: 'This is
simply what I do (handle)' "(para. 217). In this pictureof the turnedspade,we
have the pictureof what the act of writing may be in the darknessof this time.
The love of anthropologymay yet turnout to be an affairin which when I reach
bedrockI do not breakthroughthe resistanceof the other.But in this gestureof
waiting, I allow the knowledge of the otherto markme. Wittgensteinis thus a
philosopherof both cultureand the counterpointof culture.
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