Primicias v.

Urdaneta
GR L-26702, 18 October 1979 (93 SCRA 462)
First Division, de Castro (p): 8 concurring, 1 on leave, 1 did not take
part.

Facts: On 13 March 1964, Ordinance 3 (Series of 1964) was enacted by the

Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Ordinance is patterned after and
based on Section 53, 5 paragraph 4 of Act 3992, as amended (Revised Motor
Vehicle Law). On 20 June 1964, RA 4136  (Land Transportation and Traffic
Code) became effective. Section 63 explicitly repealed Act 3992.

On 8 February 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was driving his car within
Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta’s Municipal Police asked him to stop.
He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance 3 (S.
1964), for overtaking a truck.” The policeman then asked for plaintiff’s
license which he surrendered, and a temporary operator’s permit was issued
to him. This incident took place about 200 meters away from a school
building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a criminal complaint
was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of
Ordinance 3 (S. 1964).

Due to the institution of the criminal case, Primicias initiated an action for
the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta,
Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from
enforcing the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined
from further proceeding in the criminal case.  On 29 June 1966, the Court of
First Instance Lingayen held in its decision that the ordinance was null and
void and had been repealed by RA 4136. The writ of preliminary injunction
against Judge Soriano definite and permanent. It also restrained Perez,
Suyat, and Andrada from enforcing said ordinace throughout Urdaneta,
ordering them to return the plaintiff’s driver’s license, and to pay the cost of
the suit. The public officials appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.

Held: The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The
ordinance’s validity should be determined vis-a-vis RA 4136, the “mother
statute” (not Act 3992), which was in force at the time the criminal case was
brought against Primicias. Further, when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta
used the phrase “vehicular traffic” (Section 1, Ordinance) it did not
distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks
and buses. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness,
definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that an average man
should be able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain
whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct.
Thus, as the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of
its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section
38, RA 4136. The Ordinance refers to only one of the four classifications
mentioned in paragraph (b), Section 35. The classifications which must be
based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36 which states that no
provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or
resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided
in this Act. The ordinance, therefore in view of the foregoing, is void.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision.

G.R. No. L-17931             February 28, 1963

 CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, 
v.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the
Philippines, 
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central
Bank, respondents.

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a

claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.

FACTS: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production

of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The
main components of the said glue are "urea and formaldehyde" which are
both being imported abroad.

Pursuant to R.A. 2609 Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, The Central
Bank issued Circulars fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
exchange transactions. The bank also issued memorandum establishing the
procedure for the applications for exemption from the payment of said fee as
provided by R.A. 2609.

Petitioners paid the required margin fee with their 2 import

transactions. In both of their transactions through R.A. 2609 they wanted to
avail the exemption from the payment of said fee as provided by RA. 2609.
Petitioners filed a refund request to the Central Bank and the Central Bank
issued the vouchers but was not accepted by the Auditor of the Bank. The
refusal was also affirmed by the Auditor General. The refusal was based on
the fact that the separate importation of "urea and formaldehyde" is not in
accord with the provisions of R.A. 2609. Becuase section 2 of R.A. 2609
clearly provides “Urea formaldehyde” and not “urea and formaldehyde”

Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in

this provision should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde". Petitioner
contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that
the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde"
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners contentions that the bill approved in

Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms
"urea" and "formaldehyde"

RULING: No, because what is allowed in RA. 2809 is urea formaldehyde,

not "urea and formaldehyde" , both are different from each other.
 The National Institute of Science and Technology defines urea
formaldehyde is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
definite proportions of “urea and formaldehyde” under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when
applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a
fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and
different from “urea and formaldehyde”,

What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the

courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term
“urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive
upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on
which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation
of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
 Astorga v Villegas
G.R. No. L – 234
Facts: 
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was
filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading
without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the
Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on
Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo
M. Roxas. 

     The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor

amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer
it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed
the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.

     On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in view of
the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on
House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous
July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to
convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of
Congress."

     Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued
circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He
likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the
city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under
authority of Republic Act 4065.

Issue: Whether the so-called RA 4065 became law and that Vice-Mayor

Astorga should exercise any of the powers conferred by RA 4065. 
Held: 
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the
so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS,
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have
been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary
restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio: It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the
respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires
the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated." Thus, it has also been stated in
other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the
journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment. 

 In view of the enrolled bill theory

     The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on
the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a political
question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under
the 'enrolled bill rule' born of that respect."    It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus
attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of
the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and
is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed
Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. 

     As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by

Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that
it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance,
and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution."

 In view of Sec. 313 Act 190 of Rules of Evidence Code of Civil
Procedures

     Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice

Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question
presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy of the
resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us,"
specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210.
This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure
appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill"
theory rests. It reads:

     "The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body

that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be
proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or
secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the case of acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is in
existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and
of the due enactment thereof."

 In view of neutralization

     By the respect due to a co-equal department of the government,

is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President
declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant
that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate.
Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect
than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
 
In view of the signatures

     The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by

both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or
cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the
approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers
that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill
passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the
President."  

In view of the need to inquire through the Journal

     The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary

record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the
point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether
the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same
text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate
journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him. 

Tobias v. Abalos
G.R. No. L-114783
FACTS:
Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one
legislative district.  A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong
whether or not they approved of the said conversion.  The plebiscite was
only 14.41% of the said conversion.  Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes”
whereas “7, 911” voted “no”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article
VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)
HELD/RULING:
For the purposes of discussion, let’s breakdown all of the claimed violations
to the 1987 Constitution Section 26(1) every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion.  Moreover, a
liberal construction of the “one-title-one-subject” rule has been liberally
adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec). Sec.
5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by
law.  The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the
House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative
enactment.  Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not
unconstitutional.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standard provided in this section.
The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was
the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed
law.
The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Tobias v. Abalos
G.R. No. L-114783

FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675,

otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into
a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong” because
Article VIII, Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of
San Juan/ Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts.

ISSUE: W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R.A.
No. 7675.

HELD: RA 7675 is constitutional. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the

creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into
a highly urbanized city Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one
subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or
impede legislation. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in
the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index
or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. LATIN MAXIM:
20a, d
 Cordero vs. Cabutando

G.R. No. L – 114783

FACTS: Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines. Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be
represented by Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Congress then
amended this in Republic Act No. 2263: “An Act Amending Certain Sections
of Republic Act No. 1199.” Section 19 of the amendatory act says that
mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice.
Section 20 also provides that indigent tenants shall be represented by trial
attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission.

ISSUE: W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional

because of the constitutional provision that “No bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill.”

HELD: Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. The constitutional requirement

is complied with as long the law has a single general subject, which is the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the amendatory provisions no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions
relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d

Cordero v Cabatuando

Case Number: G.R. No. 14542 Date: October 31, 1962

Synopsis:

This is a case about the disqualification of petitioner Manuel Cordero (Trial

Attorney, Tenancy Counsel Unit, Mediation Division, Agricultural Tenancy
Commission, Department of Justice) from appearing as counsel for petitioner
tenant or for any indigent tenant in any other cases before the Court of
Agrarian Relations (CAR). The CAR ruled an adverse decision against the Trial
Attorney because according to Section 54 Republic Act No. 1199 (Agricultural
Tenancy Act), the public defenders of Department of Labor will represent
indigent tenants. Subsequently, the trial attorney was able to secure a writ of
preliminary injunction from the Supreme Court, restraining the respondent
judge from enforcing his order until further orders from the Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, Congress passed Republic Act No. 2263, amending the

Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 1199) providing
among others that it shall be the duty of the trial attorney of the tenancy
mediation commission to represent the indigent tenant. After the enactment
of the Republic Act No. 2263, on August 11, 1959, petitioner filed a
MANIFESTATION contending "that the issue in the case at bar is now moot
and academic."

The respondent opposed the petitioner, arguing that Section 19 of Republic

Act No. 2263, authorizing the Secretary of Justice, acting through a tenancy
mediation division, to carry out a national enforcement program including
the mediation of tenancy disputes, is not expressed in the title of the bill as
required by the Constitution.

The Supreme Court held that Republic 2263 complied with the constitutional
requirement. According to the Court, the constitutional requirement in
question is satisfied if all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title of the bill. The title of Republic Act No.
2263 reads as follows: AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC
ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES. The
constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the
instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy
Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will
be regarded as valid.

The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed

in the title should be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with
the enactment of necessary legislation. The requirement that the subject of
an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable (or practical)
and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of the object. Mere details need not be set
forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

Provisions/ Concepts/ Doctrine and how applied to the case

1987 Constitution, Art. VI Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The constitutional requirement is satisfied if all parts of the law are related,
and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title of the bill.

In this case, the constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the

law has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and
the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be
regarded as valid. The provisions of sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No.
2263 are certainly germane to, and are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the one general subject, agricultural tenancy.

In other Supreme Court decisions, the Constitutional requirement that the

subject of an act shall be expressed in the title should be reasonably
construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary
legislation.The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in
its title should receive a reasonable (or practical) and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably
to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of the object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title
need not be an abstract or index of the Act."

Facts:

This case is about the disqualification of the Trial Attorney Manuel Cordero in
appearing as counsel for indigent tenants. He is from the Tenancy Council
Unit of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. He
was counsel for a certain Vicente Salazar, an indigent tenant, in filing a case
before the Court of Agrarian Relations against respondent landlord Leonardo
Sta. Romana and others "for reinstatement and reliquidation of past
harvests.” During the court proceedings, the respondent landlord filed a
motion to disqualify counsel. And the court acted upon the motion and
issued an order (September 1958) against the trial attorney, disqualifying
him from appearing as counsel for his client. The basis of the court for such
disqualification is Republic Act No. 1199 Section 54, wherein it states that
public defenders of Department of Labor will represent indigent tenants.

As a result of this order, he filed a petition before the Supreme Court for a
writ of preliminary injunction, which was subsequently issued and in effect
restraining the respondent judge from enforcing his order until further orders
from the Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, Congress passed Republic Act No. 2263, amending the

Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 1199) providing
among others that it shall be the duty of the trial attorney of the tenancy
mediation commission to represent the indigent tenant. After the enactment
of the Republic Act No. 2263, on August 11, 1959, petitioner filed a
MANIFESTATION contending "that the issue in the case at bar is now moot
and academic."

Opposing the trial lawyer’s petition, the respondent judge argues that before
the enactment of Republic Act No. 2263, there was no Tenancy Mediation
Division in existence nor was there any law creating the same and defining
its functions, and that its only basis for existence therefore, are sections 19
and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 which are null and void because the
Constitution provides that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill." He contended further that nowhere in the titles of Republic Act No.
1199 and Republic Act No. 2263 is the creation of the Tenancy Mediation
Division ever mentioned, thereby indicating that section 19, Republic Act No.
2263 falls under the first class of prohibited bills.

The fundamental objection of the respondent is that Section 19 of Republic

Act No. 2263, authorizing the Secretary of Justice, acting through a tenancy
mediation division, to carry out a national enforcement program including
the mediation of tenancy disputes, is not expressed in the title of the bill as
required by the Constitution.

Issue:

Does the RA No. 2263 violate the constitution in not embracing one subject
requirement in its title?

Ruling:

No, the law is valid and in accordance with the Constitution. It is to be noted
that the basic law, Republic Act No. 1199, is called "The Agricultural Tenancy
Act of the Philippines." The constitutional requirement in question is satisfied
if all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title of the bill. The title of Republic Act No. 2263 reads as
follows: AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES. The
constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the
instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy
Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will
be regarded as valid.

The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the

instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy
Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will
be regarded as valid.

The ruling of the Supreme Court in its other decisions regarding this
provision: The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in the title should be reasonably construed so as not to interfere
unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. The requirement that
the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable (or practical) and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if
the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object
which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of the object. Mere
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of
the Act.

The only amendment brought about by Republic Act No. 2263 is the transfer
of the function of representing these indigent tenants to the Department of
Justice, apparently to consolidate in the latter Department the functions
relative to the enforcement of tenancy laws. In essence, therefore, there is
no change in the set-up established by Republic Act No. 1199 and that
provided for by Republic Act No. 2263. There is only a transfer of functions
from one department of the government to another.

One salient aspect of this case the Court notes is the fact that, shortly after
the enactment of Republic Act No. 2263 in 1959, the function of representing
these indigents before the Agrarian Court by public defenders of the
Department of Labor had been actually transferred to the Tenancy Mediation
Division of the Department of Justice by virtue of a Memorandum Circular of
the Department of Labor, dated July 15, 1959, addressed to all Regional
Labor Administrators, Officers-in- Charge of Local Offices, Legal Advisers and
Labor Attorneys of that Department.
 Insular Lumber Company v Court of Tax Appeals

Case Number: G.R Number L-31057 Date: May 29, 1981

Recit Ready Synopsis:

StatCon Issue/Topic/Facts

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue challenged the constitutionality of

Section 5, of RA 1435 since the subject of the RA was to increase Highway
Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the act deals with another subject which
is the partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption is
not expressed in the title of the aforesaid act.

SC concluded that RA 1435 deals with only one subject. Since Section 5 of
the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case:

RA 1435 “An Act to Provide Means for Increasing the Highway Special Fund”

"Section 5. . . . Provided, however, that whenever any oils mentioned above

are used by miners or forest concessionaires in their operations, twenty-
five per centum of the specific tax paid thereon shall be refunded by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue upon submission of proof of actual use of
oils and under similar conditions enumerated in subparagraphs one and two
of section one hereof, amending section one hundred forty-two of the
National Internal Revenue Code: . . ."

Facts:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 granting

miners and forest concessionaires the right to partial refund of specific taxes
paid for manufactured oils and fuels used in their operations, petitioner
company, a duly licensed forest concessionaire, filed in December 1964 with
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a claim for such refund for oils it had
used in its logging and sawmill operations covering periods from January
1963. Respondent Commissioner denied the claim on the ground that the
privilege, which was limited to a period of five years from the date of
effectivity of said Act, had already prescribed in 1961. On petition for review
filed by petitioner in April 1965, the Court of Tax Appeals allowed petitioner's
claim only in so far as it pertained to oils it had used in its logging operations
but excluding those used beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing
claims with the Court of Tax Appeals. Both the company and the
Commissioner appealed from the decision, the latter further assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1435 for embracing more than one
subject.

The Supreme Court held, (1) that the proviso in Section 5 of Republic Act No.
1435 which in effect is a partial exemption from the increased tax imposed
by the Act is not a deviation from the general subject of the law which is to
increase the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of increased
specific taxes; (2) that the five-year limitation period for refund of specific
taxes paid on oils provided for in Section 1 of said Act very apparently refers
only to those used in agriculture and aviation; (3) that the operation of a
sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession; and (4) that
although claims for refund should first be filed with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, the subsequent appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals must
be instituted within the two-year prescriptive period commencing from the
occurrence of the supervening cause giving rise to the right of refund.

Decision affirmed. Granting P10,560.20 instead of P19,921. 37 representing

25% of the specific tax paid on manufactured oil and motor fuel utilized by
said company in the operation of its forest concession.

Issue:

Is Section 5 of RA 1437 unconstitutional? (StatCon Issue)

Ruling:

No. Republic Act No. 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one
policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund
through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils.

Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed

increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and
fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law.

The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit

duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or
its operation.

Furthermore, in deciding the Constitutionality of a statute alleged to be

defectively titled, every presumption favors the validity of the act.

Additional Notes:

Defense of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

The Commissioner contends that the first proviso in Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 1435 is unconstitutional. In claiming the unconstitutionality of the
aforesaid section, the Commissioner anchored its argument on Article VI,
Section 21(1) of the 1935 Constitution which provides: "No bill which may be
enacted unto a law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill."

The title of R.A. No. 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The
Highway Special Fund." The Commissioner contends that the subject of R.A.
No. 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the
Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and
loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its claim
for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More
importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the
Highway Special Fund.

People v Carlos

Case Number: G.R. 239 Date: June 30, 1947

Recit Ready Synopsis:

This is the case where the defendant, a japanese invokes only questions of
law. He insisted that he (being a japanese spy) cannot be convicted of the
offense of treason because it is a settled principle in international law that in
a territory actually under the authority of the enemy, all laws of political
complexion of the previous government are suspended (U.S. & Ph
Commonwealth). Since the Ph is under Japanese occupation, he argued that
all penal laws inconsistent with the Japanese occupation is deemed
suspended. And finally, he argued that the law creating the “People’s Court
in unconstitutional.

Provisions/ Concepts/ Doctrines and how applied to the case:

“(c) It is a bill of attainder in that it virtually imposes upon specific, known

and identified individuals or group of individual, the penalty of detention and
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months without any form of
judicial trial or procedure."

"Thebillofattainderisalegislativeactwhichinflictspunishmentwithoutjudicialtrial
."(Cummingsvs.Missouri,4Wall.,232,etc.) Detention of a prisoner for a period
not exceeding six months pending investigation or trial is not a punishment
but a necessary extension of the well-recognized power to hold the criminal
suspected for investigation. This proviso was held by this Court to be justified
and reasonable under existing circumstances in Laurel vs. Misa, supra.

Facts:

In July or August, 1944, about two or three o'clock in the morning, a truck
pulled up to the curb in front of a house on Constancia Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, where one Martin Mateo lived. From the truck the accused, a
Japanese spy, alighted together with members of the Japanese military police
and pointed Martin Mateo's house and Fermin Javier's house to his Japanese
companions, whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into Martin Mateo's
dwelling first and Fermin Javier's afterwards. In those houses they seized
Martin Mateo, Ladislao Mateo and Fermin Javier, bound their hands, and put
them in the truck. Along with other persons who had been rounded up in the
other places and who had been kept in the truck while it was parked, they
were taken to Fort Santiago where the two Mateos and Fermin Javier were
tortured and from which they were released six days later. The reason for
the arrest and maltreatment of Martin and Ladislao Mateo was that they had
refused to divulge the whereabouts of their brother, Marcelino Mateo, who
was a guerrilla and who had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier
was arrested and tortured because he himself was a guerrilla, a fact which
Carlos knew or at least suspected.
Issue:

Is the law creating a “People’s Court” unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The People's Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its
own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason case. The
various provisos mentioned, in our opinion, are allied and germane to the
subject matter and purposes of the People's Court Act; they are subordinate
to its end. The multitude of matters which the legislation, by its nature, has
to embrace would make mention of all of them in the title of the act
cumbersome. It is not necessary, and the Congress is not expected, to make
the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. (Government of
the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil., 634.) The
constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject
expressed in its title.

The People's Court is a court of special and restricted jurisdiction created

under the stress of an emergency and national security. It was devised to
operate for a limited period only, a limitation imposed by economic necessity
and other factors of public policy.

People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos

Case No. 204 G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947) Chapter I, Page 16,
Footnote No.63

FACTS: The People’s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant
attacked the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it
contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject
matter expressed in its title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; (2) a provision which adds to the
disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure
for their substitution; (3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of
Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional.

HELD: No. The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete
scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of
treason cases. The provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the
subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. The Congress is not
expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents.
The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject
expressed in its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a
 China Banking Corp. v. CA
Case No. 59 G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996) Chapter I, Page 19,
Footnote No.84

FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. and its president, So Ching,
in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. Two extra mortgages were
additionally executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. The loans
matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. This caused Petitioner
to file for extra judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. The
properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28, 1989 the court
ruled on the side of So Ching. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was
granted; therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petitioner
sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. They
were appealing that Act No. 3135 was the governing rule in their case, instead of
Administrative Order No. 3 as So Ching was contending.

ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties. 2. W/N

Administrative Order No. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure.

HELD: 1. Petitioner can foreclose the properties. 2. Act No. 3135 is the governing
law. Administrative Order No. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. It is an elementary
principle that a statute is superior to an administrative directive. Thus, the statute
cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative directive. LATIN MAXIM:
None

Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)
En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1 took no
part, 1 on leave

Facts: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public

concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ
of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders. They maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they are proper parties for the petition. The
respondents alleged, however through the Solicitor-General, that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They
further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectiveness of laws where the laws provide for their
own effectivity dates. Thus publication is not indispensable.

Issue: Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the

effectivity of laws

Held: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where

the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date — for then the
date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is
the fifteenth day following its publication — but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 however,
considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further,
publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations
and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. In the
present case, Presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect. The
implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication
in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences
which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
that unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
 Tañada v. Tuvera
Case No. 287 G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) Chapter I, Page
37, Footnote No.159

FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the

disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not
been published as required by law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise
provided” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUE: W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code

pertains to the necessity of publication.

HELD: No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event
be omitted. Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice
or publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
“ignorantia Legis non excusat”. The court, therefore, declares that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published
shall have no force and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished
decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately. LATIN MAXIM: 6c,
9a