Villareal vs People (Lenny Villa Case)

Facts:
February 1991- 7 freshmen law students of ADMU signified their intention to join the Aquila
Legis fraternity. They were met by members of AL at the lobby of Ateneo Law. They were
informed that there will be physical beatings and that they can quit anytime. The rites were
scheduled to last 3 days. They were subjected to traditional Aquilan initiation rites such as the
“Indian Run”, “Bicol Express”, “Rounds”, “Auxies Privilege Round”, rough basketball, comic
plays, and other forms of paddling. Lenny received several blows, one of which was so strong
that it sent him sprawling to the ground. When they were already sleeping, the neophytes were
roused by Lenny’s shivering and mumblings. He was brought to the hospital but was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Held:
No crime without a law punishing it
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle
of mala in s eadhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an
amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle
of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing
— unique as against typical crimes — cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the
act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in seat the time.
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness,
which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that
organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. With
the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victim’s death was the cumulative
effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly
participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall
cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in
effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime
of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua(life imprisonment).  Since there was no law
prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing
laws at the time of his death.

People of the Philippines vs Elizar Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188 July 23, 2004

Extrajudicial confession before a barangay captain who is also a lawyer is an uncounselled

confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence. 

Facts: 
Appellant Elizar Tomaquin was convicted with murder. There were no eyewitnesses to the
incident, and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from appellant’s extrajudicial confession, was
mainly circumstantial. Said extrajudicial confession was given in the presence of Atty. Parawan,
a barangay captain who is also a lawyer. Tomaquin questions the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession because it was an uncounselled confession. Tomaquin contends that
the barangay captain, although a lawyer, may not be considered an independent counsel within
the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Decision: 

Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. 

The words “competent and independent counsel” in the constitutional provision is not an
empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him
by a diligent and capable lawyer.

A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay and ensure
peace and order at all times.

In fact, a barangay captain is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:

 Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be deemed as
such. – In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person
directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio
captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. 

On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider the barangay captain as an independent
counsel of appellant.

In this case the role of the barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and
therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant
who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, the barangay captain could not be
considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial
confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent
counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict
of interest.

Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant
counsel. An “effective and vigilant counsel” necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be
present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first
question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.  As
held in People vs. Velarde:
. . .  The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the
interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and
stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may
either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDMUNDO BRIONES AYTALIN, appellant.||| (People

v. Aytalin, G.R. No. 134138, [June 21, 2001], 411 PHIL 863-880)
"At around 4:20 o'clock in the afternoon of December 23, 1990, appellant Edmundo Aytalin
shot Eleazar Aquino four times along Iba St., Brgy. San Isidro Labrador, Quezon City. After
shooting the latter, appellant looked at the crowd and the prostrate victim. He then entered a
house, came out with a long gun, and boarded a taxi with his wife. Aquino was rushed to the
National Orthopedic Hospital, where he died the following day.
"After the incident, Captain Philmore Balmaceda brought appellant and his (appellant's) .22
caliber revolver used in the shooting, as well as four (4) empty shells and two live ammunition
of the gun to the Quezon City Police.
"An autopsy (was) conducted on the body of Aquino by Dr. Emmanuel Aranas of the PNP Crime
Laboratory. After examining the cadaver, Aranas found a gunshot wound on the left side of the
forehead of Aquino, and recovered a deformed caliber .22 slug embedded on the left side of
the brain of the deceased, which slug the doctor submitted to the Ballistics Division of the crime
laboratory for examination. Aranas concluded that based on his findings, the cause of death of
the victim [was] hemorrhage due to the gunshot wound in the head. The ballistics test
conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory revealed that the deformed slug recovered from the
brain of the deceased was fired from the gun of the appellant."
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellant presents this version of the facts: 5
"Upon being arraigned, accused entered a plea of 'NOT GUILTY'. A trial on the merits was
conducted, and after the prosecution ha(d) rested its case, accused, through counsel, and with
leave of court, filed a DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. The same was denied. The accused opted not
to present evidence in his defense. Hence, a decision was rendered finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, for which he was sentenced to suffer a penalty of
imprisonment of 'reclusion perpetua.'
"On December 23, 1990, at around 4:20 PM, the alleged victim Eleazar Aquino was shot along
Iba Street, Brgy. San Isidro Labrador, Quezon City. Alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting pointed
to accused as the person who shot the victim. No motive was established for the shooting. As to
the cause of death, the decision assailed relied heavily on the opinion of the prosecution
witness Anacleto Reyes, who testified thus: 'Ang pagkakaalam ko ho ay yung pagkabaril po sa
kanya ni Edmund Aytalin.' (TSN p. 12, 1/15/93)"
||| (People v. Aytalin, G.R. No. 134138, [June 21, 2001], 411 PHIL 863-880)

CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; REQUISITES; MUST

BE ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND POSITIVE EVIDENCE SHOWING PLANNING AND PREPARATION
STAGES PRIOR TO KILLING; ABSENT IN CASE AT BAR. — For evident premeditation to be
appreciated, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to their
determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and its
execution as would have allowed them to reflect upon the consequences of their act. Without
such evidence, mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable, will not
suffice. Hence, because the trial court failed to establish the presence of evident premeditation,
it erred in using this circumstance to qualify the killing.
6. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; WHEN PRESENT; MUST BE BASED ON POSITIVE OR CONCLUSIVE
PROOFS, NOT MERE SUPPOSITIONS OR SPECULATIONS. — On the other hand, there is
treachery when the offenders commit any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof, tending directly and specially to ensure its
execution without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. It is present when the attack comes without warning, is sudden and unexpected, and the
unsuspecting victim is not in a position to parry the assault. Likewise, treachery cannot be
established where no particulars are known regarding the manner in which the aggression was
carried out, or how it began or developed. Treachery must be based on positive or conclusive
proofs, not mere suppositions or speculations. Moreover, it must be proved as clearly and as
convincingly as the killing itself. In the present case, such evidence is wanting.
7. ID.; HOMICIDE; PROPER PENALTY IN CASE AT BAR. — Considering that the crime committed
by appellant was only homicide, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
imposable penalty as provided in Article 249 — in conjunction with Article 64(1) of the Revised
Penal Code — is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the proper penalty should be ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum; to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
||| (People v. Aytalin, G.R. No. 134138, [June 21, 2001], 411 PHIL 863-880)

Monday, Aug
People vs. Larrañaga
G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004

Appellee: People of the Philippines

Appellants: Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel
Balansag, Davidson Rusia, James Anthony Uy, James Andrew Uy
Per curiam decision
FACTS:

On the rainy night of July 16, 1997, Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, sisters, failed to come home
on the expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff in
Tan-awan, Carcar Cebu. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra
was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with masking tape, and attached to her left
wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused
Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of
the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan,
Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in
the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial court: that he met Rowen and Josman
at Ayala Mall at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, who told him to ride with them in a white
car. Following them were Larrañaga, James Anthony and James Andrew, who were in a red car.
Josman stopped in front of the waiting shed where Marijoy and Jacqueline were standing, and
were then forced to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them
jointly, that after stopping by a safehouse at Guadalupe, Cebu City, the group thereafter
headed to the South Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van
driven by the former. They traveled towards Tan-awan, leaving the red car at the South Bus
Terminal, that after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session.
Later, they started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jacqueline, that
Josman instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the ravine,
and that they made fun of Jacqueline, who was made to run while being followed by the group
while boarding the van; and was beaten until she passed out.
In his defense, Larrañaga, through his witnesses, claimed the following:

that on July 16, 1997, he was at Quezon City taking his mid-term examinations at the Center for
Culinary Arts, that he also attended his teacher’s lecture in Applied Mathematics, that in the
evening of that day until 3:00 in the morning of July 17, 1997, he was with his friends at the R &
R Bar and Restaurant, Quezon City,  that representatives of four airline companies plying the
route of Manila-Cebu-Manila presented proofs showing that Larrañaga does not appear in their
records from July 15 to July 17, 1997, and  that his neighbors at Loyola Heights Condominium,
Quezon City, including the security guard saw him in his condo unit in the evening of July 16,
1997.

The brothers James Anthony and James Andrew claimed that they were at their home in Cebu
City, celebrating their father’s 50th birthday, which ended at 11:30 in the evening.

Alberto and Ariel claimed that they had the van’s aircon repaired in the evening of July 16,
1997, accompanied by the former’s wife and the owners of the van. The repair shop was only
able to finish the work at 10:00 the following morning.

Josman claimed that he was at his house together with his friends about 8:00 in the evening of
July 16, 1997, ate dinner and drank, and thereafter went to BAI Disco, transferred to DTM Bar,
and went home at 3:00 the following morning.
Rusia was discharged as an accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline
was never found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalties of two (2)
reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court
erred in finding that there was consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years
old when the crimes were committed.

ISSUES:

1) Whether there was conspiracy.

2) Whether the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
3) Whether the trial court erred in imposing the correct penalty.

HELD:

1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a
joint design and community of interest. The appellants’ actions showed that they had the same
objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed the trial court’s finding
that the appellants indeed conspired in the commission of the crimes charged.

2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more component
offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or
is raped or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed. Thus, the resulting crime will change from complex crime to special complex crime. In
the present case, the victims were raped and subjected to dehumanizing acts. Thus, the Court
held that all the appellants were guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case where Marijoy is the victim; and simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case of Jacqueline.

3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the imposable
penalty to the offender is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. James Anthony was
only 16 years old when the crimes were committed. As penalty for the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to
be imposed should be reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping
and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said
penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the
penalty to be imposed on him should be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years
of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum. With regard to the rest of the appellants, the
statutory penalty as provided above should be imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in merely
imposing “two (2) reclusiones perpetua”.

US v. ALANO 32 Phil. 381; 383-384, G.R. No. L- 11021, December 1, 1915 Death or Physical
Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances FACTS
: Accused Alano, feeling tired, went to bed, while his wife remained at the window looking out
and a little while afterward told her husband that she would go down for a moment to the
Chinese store nearby, which she did. As Teresa Marcelo was slow in returning and her sick child
was crying, Eufrasio Alano left the house to look for her in the Chinese store situated on the
corner of Calles Dakota and Tennessee, and, not finding her there, went to look for her in
another Chinese store nearby, with the same result. He therefore started to return home
through an alley where he tripped on a wire lying across the way. He then observed as he
stopped that among some grass near a clump of thick bamboo a man was lying upon a woman
in a position to hold sexual intercourse with her, but they both hurriedly arose from the ground,
startled by the noise made by the defendant in stumbling. Alano at once recognized the woman
as his wife, for whom he was looking, and the man as Martin Gonzalez, who immediately
started to run. He was wearing an undershirt and a pair of drawers, which lower garment he
held and pulled up as he ran. Enraged by what he had seen, the defendant drew a fan-knife he
had in his pocket and pursued Martin Gonzalez, although he did not succeed in overtaking him,
and, not knowing where he had filed, returned to the house, where he found his wife Teresa in
the act of climbing the stairs. He then reprimanded her for her disgraceful conduct and
immediately stabbed her several times, although she finally succeeded in entering the house,
pursued by her husband and fell face downwards on the floor near the place where a sick
woman
Ricarda Garces was lying. The latter on seeing this occurrence, began to scream and started to
run, as did also Teresa Marcelo who had arisen and gone down the stairs out of the house; but
her infuriated husband again assaulted her and when she reached the ground she fell on one
of the posts beside the stairs. When the defendant saw her fall, he entered the house, took
some clothes and started out in the direction of Fort McKinley. 
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the accused killed her wife “immediately thereafter” the act of sexual
intercourse
 
to entitle him to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
 HELD: 
Yes.
 
The unfaithful wife was not killed in the very place where she was caught, for the reason that
the wronged husband preferred first to attack the despoiler of his honor and afterwards the
adulterous wife who succeeded in getting away from the place where she was caught with her
paramour. The assault upon the woman must be understood to be a continuation of the act of
the wronged husband's pursuit of her paramour, who had the good fortune to escape and
immediately get away from the place of the crime. Consequently, although the deceased did
not fall dead in the place where she was caught, but in another place nearby, logically it must
be understood that the case at bar comes within the provisions of the said article. The
discovery, the escape, the pursuit and the killing must all form part of one continuous act. 
RATIO: For a husband to be justified, it is not necessary that he sees the carnal act being
committed by his wife with his own eyes. It is enough that he surprises them under such
circumstances as to show reasonably that the carnal act is being committed or has just been
committed. 

--- PEOPLE v. GONZALES 69 Phil. 66, G.R. No. 46310, October 31, 1939 
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances FACTS: 
At the trial, the appellant testified that, on June 2, 1938, on returning to his house from the
woods, he surprised his wife, Sixta Quilason, and Isabelo Evangelio in the act, told her that the
man was the very one who used to ask rice and food from them, and counseled her not to
repeat the same faithlessness. His wife, promised him not to do the act again. Thereafter - the
accused continued testifying - he left the house and went towards the South to see his
carabaos. Upon returning to his house at above five o'clock in the afternoon, and not finding
his wife there, he looked for her and found her with Isabelo near the toilet of his house in a
place covered with underbush, who was standing and buttoning his drawers, immediately took
to his heels. The accused went after him, but unable to overtake him, he returned to where his
wife was and, completely obfuscated, attacked her with a knife without intending to kill her.
Thereafter, he took pity on her and took her dead body to his house. The Court of First Instance
of Tayabas found him guilty of parricide. The appellant contends that, having surprised his wife,
in the afternoon of the date in question, under circumstances indicative that she had carnal
intercourse with Isabelo, he was entitled to the privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code. 
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the accused can avail himself of Article 247
 HELD: 
No. The accused cannot avail himself of the aforesaid article, because the privilege there
granted is conditioned on the requirement that the spouse surprise the husband or the wife in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; the accused did not surprise his
wife in the very act or carnal intercourse, but after the act, if any such there was, because from
the fact that she was rising up and the man was buttoning his drawers, it does not necessarily
follow that a man and a woman had committed the carnal act. The court cannot entirely accept
the defense sought to be established by the accused, first, because his testimony is improbable.
It is not conceivable that the accused had only mildly counseled his wife not to repeat
committing adultery with Isabelo, instead of taking harsher measures as is natural in such
circumstances, if it were true that he had surprised the two offender in the act of adultery on
returning to his house on the date in question. Secondly, because even assuming that the
accused caught his wife rising up and Isabelo cannot invoke the privilege of article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code, because he did not surprise the supposed offenders in the very act of
committing adultery, but thereafter, if the respective positions of the woman and the man were
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they had committed the carnal act. 
RATIO: Article 247 is not applicable when the accused did not see his spouse in the act of sexual
intercourse with another person.

Magno vs. PP

Ligsan sa isuzu na truck or gi tuok?

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; CONVICTION FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACT
CAN BE HAD UNDER AN INFORMATION EXCLUSIVELY CHARGING THE COMMISSION OF A
WILLFUL OFFENSE. — In People v. De Fernando, this Court ruled that one charged with murder
may be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In People v. Carmen, the Court
convicted the appellants of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide on a charge of murder.
The Court ruled that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is
necessarily included in a charge of murder. The Court in Samson v. Court of Appeals,
emphasized that while a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, but a
distinct crime in itself, defined as an offense in the Revised Penal Code, it may, however, be said
that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the
commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968 (PROBATION LAW); ENTITLEMENT THEREOF
IS TO BE ASCERTAINED BY THE TRIAL COURT. — The conviction of the petitioner for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty has nothing
to do with his qualifications or disqualification's for probation under P.D. No. 968. Whether or
not the petitioner may still file a petition for probation despite his appeal from the judgment of
the trial court; and whether or not he is entitled to probation under P.D. No. 968, as amended,
and under prevailing jurisprudence, will have to be ascertained by the trial court in which a
petition for probation is filed as mandated in Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, and not by this
Court.
||| (Magno v. People, G.R. No. 149725, [October 23, 2003], 460 PHIL 393-408)

FLORDELIZA MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. MUTYA SORIANO and Minor JULIE ANN SORIANO duly
represented by her
natural mother and guardian ad litem MUTYA SORIANO, respondents
G.R. 164012, June 8, 2007
FACTS:
- At around 1:00 a.m., July 14, 1997, Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth
Avenue near Luzon
Avenue in Quezon City, was hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Soriano
was thrown five
meters away, while the vehicle only stopped some 25 meters from the point of impact. Gerard
Villaspin, one
of Soriano’s companions, asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to the hospital, but after checking
out the scene of the
incident, Macasasa returned to the FX, only to flee. A school bus brought Soriano
to East Avenue Medical Center where he later died. Subsequently, the Quezon City Prosecutor
recommended
the filing of a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide against Macasasa.
- On August 20, 1997, respondents Mutya Soriano and Julie Ann Soriano, Soriano’s wife and
daughter, respectively,
filed a complaint for damages against Macasasa and petitioner Flordeliza Mendoza, the
registered owner of the vehicle
- Respondents prayed that Macasasa and petitioner be ordered to pay them: P200,000 moral
damages; P500,000
for lost income; P22,250 for funeral services; P45,000 for burial lot; P15,150 for interment and
lapida; P8,066 for
hospitalization, other medical and transportation expenses; P28,540 for food and drinks during
the wake; P50,000
exemplary damages; P60,000 indemnity for Soriano’s death; and P25,000 for attorney’s fees
plus P500 per court
appearance
- In her answer, petitioner Mendoza maintained that she was not liable since as owner of the
vehicle, she had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family over her employee, Macasasa.
- Upon respondents’ motion, the complaint for damages against Macasasa was dismissed.
- After trial, the trial court also dismissed the complaint against petitioner. It found
Soriano negligent for
crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using a small gap in the island’s fencing rather
than the pedestrian
overpass. The lower court also ruled that petitioner was not negligent in the
selection and supervision of
Macasasa since complainants presented no evidence to support their allegation of
petitioner’s
Negligence. Respondents appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
- While the appellate court agreed that Soriano was negligent, it also found Macasasa negligent
for speeding, such
that he was unable to avoid hitting the victim. It observed that Soriano’s own negligence did
not preclude recovery of
damages from Macasasa’s negligence. It further held that since petitioner failed to present
evidence to the contrary,
and conformably with Article 2180
[8]
of the Civil Code, the presumption of negligence of the employer in the selection
and supervision of employees stood. Dispositive portion reads:
1. Hospital and Burial Expenses P80,926.25
2. Loss of earning capacity P77,000.00
3. Moral Damages P20,000.00
4. Indemnity for the death of Sonny Soriano P50,000.00
Actual payment of the aforementioned amounts should, however, be reduced by twenty
(20%) per cent due to the presence of contributory negligence by the victim as provided
for in Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied
ISSUE:
(1) Did the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to try the case?
(2) Was there sufficient legal basis to award damages?
(3) WON Mendoza, owner of the vehicle, was still liable
RATIO:
- Petitioner argues that the amount claimed by respondents is within the jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial
Court. She posits that to determine the jurisdictional amount, what should only be
considered are the
following: P22,250 for funeral services; P45,000 for burial lot; P15,150 for interment
and lapida; P8,066 for
hospitalization and transportation; P28,540 for food and drinks during the wake; and
P60,000 indemnity
for Soriano’s death. She maintains that the sum of these amounts, P179,006, is below the
jurisdictional amount
of the Regional Trial Court. She states that under Section 19(8) of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, the
following claims of respondents must be excluded: P200,000 moral damages, P500,000 for lost
income; P50,000
exemplary damages; P25,000 attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance. Petitioner thus
prays that the
decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and the dismissal of the case by the trial court be
affirmed on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
- Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
[11]
as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, states the pertinent law.

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.–Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original
jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand
pesos
(P200,000.00).

- But relatedly, Administrative Circular No. 09-94

[12]
expressly states:
xxxx
2. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional
amount
under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691, applies to
cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of
action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of
the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of
the court. (Underscoring supplied.)
- Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, are primarily and effectively
actions for the
recovery of a sum of money for the damages for tortious acts. In this case, respondents’
claim of P929,006 in
damages and P25,000 attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance represents the
monetary equivalent for
compensation of the alleged injury. These money claims are the principal reliefs sought by
respondents in their
complaint for damages. Consequently then, we hold that the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City possessed and
properly exercised jurisdiction over the case.
- Petitioner further argues that since respondents caused the dismissal of the complaint against
Macasasa,
there is no longer any basis to find her liable. She claims that “no iota of evidence” was
presented in this case to
prove Macasasa’s negligence, and besides, respondents can recover damages in the criminal
case against him.
- Respondents counter that as Macasasa’s employer, petitioner was presumed negligent in
selecting and
supervising Macasasa after he was found negligent by the Court of Appeals.
- The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land Transportation
and Traffic
Code. First, he failed to maintain a safe speed to avoid endangering lives.
[16]
Both the trial and the appellate
courts found Macasasa overspeeding.
[17]
The records show also that Soriano was thrown five meters away after
he was hit.
[18]
Moreover, the vehicle stopped only some 25 meters from the point of impact.
[19]
- Both circumstances support the conclusion that the FX vehicle driven
by Macasasa was overspeeding. Second, Macasasa, the vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano, the
accident victim, in
violation of Section 55,
[20]
Article V of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. While Macasasa at first agreed to
bring Soriano to the hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there
is no showing of any
factual basis that Macasasa fled for fear of the people’s wrath. What remains undisputed is
that he did not report the
accident to a police officer, nor did he summon a doctor. Under Article 2185
[21]
of the Civil Code, a person driving a
motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating traffic
regulations.
- While respondents could recover damages from Macasasa in a criminal case and
petitioner could
become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, as owner and employer, is directly and separately
civilly liable for her
failure to exercise due diligence in supervising Macasasa.
[22]
We must emphasize that this damage suit is for the
quasi-delict of petitioner, as owner and employer, and not for the delict of Macasasa, as driver
and employee.
- Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the
presumed negligence of the
employers in supervising their employees unless they prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage.
- In this case, we hold petitioner primarily and solidarily liable for the damages caused by
Macasasa.
Respondents could recover directly from petitioner since petitioner failed to prove that she
exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in supervising Macasasa. Indeed, it is unfortunate that petitioner
harbored the notion that
the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over the case and opted not to present her
evidence on this point.
- Lastly, we agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Soriano was guilty of
contributory
negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass while crossingCommonwealth Avenue. We
even note that the
respondents now admit this point, and concede that the appellate court had properly reduced
by 20% the amount of
damages it awarded. CA affirmed.