BLUE Tips 2010 (Criminal Procedure) / Atty.
Salvador
** DISCLAIMER: This is a simplified digest of the cases Atty. Salvador provided for the Ateneo
Central Bar Operations 2010. I will not write the whole facts of the case, just those that are
relevant to the Rules.
People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Judge Jose R. Hernandez, et al.
G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372 / August 28, 2006
FACTS:
Judge H granted a 30-day continuance in view of the manifestation of the prosecution
that it would file an appeal from the interlocutory order (validity of arraignment) of the trial
court. However, the prosecution failed to obtain any TRO to stop the proceedings. The
hearings of the case were also cancelled several times due to the repeated absence of the
public prosecutor. Subsequently, Judge H dismissed the case on the ground of the denial of
L& S right to speedy trial, without giving the prosecution the chance to present evidence.
111 days have elapsed from the time L & S were arraigned on June 15, 2001 up to the filing of
the Motion to Dismiss on October 4, 2001.
HELD:
(1) Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA was the proper remedy.
A dismissal on the ground of the denial of the accused's right to a speedy trial
will have the effect of acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for
the same offense. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious, certiorari
lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition
challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal and such grave
abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction which prevents double jeopardy
from attaching.
(2) The court correctly dismissed the case for failure to prosecute in violation of the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial.
The dismissal of the case following a number of postponements at the instance of
the prosecution is not an abuse of discretion, and the 111 days that have elapsed is
beyond the 80-day limit provided under Section 6, Rule 119. Moreover, "delay
resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in
harmony with Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Bernadette L. Adasa vs. Cecille S. Abalos.
G.R. No. 168617 / February 19, 2007
FACTS:
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) issued a
resolution affirming the finding of probable cause against B. Meanwhile, during her
arraignment, B entered an unconditional plea of not guilty. Dissatisfied with the finding of
the OCP, B filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ which reversed resolution of the OCP
and directed the said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa against B.
GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 4A 2011
HELD:
(1) DOJ gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to B’s petition for review.
Since Section 7 of the DOJ Circular No. 70 clearly and categorically directs the DOJ
to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no
resort to interpretation is necessary. If through misapprehension of law or a rule an
executive or administrative officer called upon to implement it has erroneously applied
or executed it, the error may be corrected when the true construction is ascertained.
If a contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous, the same must be
declared null and void.
(2) B’s arraignment was without any restriction, condition or reservation.
When an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to
preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds
it. This precept is also applicable in cases of reinvestigation as well as in cases of
review of such reinvestigation. Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of probable
cause. For this reason, there is no need for the Court to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause.
Hannah Eunice D.Serana vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.
G.R. No. 162059 / January 22, 2008
FACTS:
The Ombudsman charged S and her brother for estafa, S moved to quash the
information and claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
HELD:
(1) The denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari.
When a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition
for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the
special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. The only exception is if the court,
in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies.
(2) Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa.
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public
officials in relation to their office. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office.
(3) A UP student regent is a public officer.
It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
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 BLUE Tips 2010 (Criminal Procedure) / Atty. Salvador
of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Moreover, compensation is not an essential element of
public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.
Ma. Rosario Santos-Concio, et al. vs. Department of Justice, et al.
G.R. No. 175057 / January 29, 2008
FACTS:
The DOJ Secretary constituted an Evaluating Panel to "determine whether there is
sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the basis of
the documents submitted" regarding the Ultra stampede. The Evaluating Panel found no
sufficient basis to conduct a PI. The NBI-NCR, acting on the Evaluating Panel’s referral of
the case to it for further investigation, in turn submitted to the DOJ an investigation report
through a transmittal letter recommending the conduct of PI for Reckless Imprudence
resulting in Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries against C et al. (this is allegedly
the complaint-affidavit not sworn under oath)
HELD:
A complaint for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation differs from a
complaint for purposes of instituting a criminal prosecution. As provided under Section 3,
Rule 112, the complaint is not entirely the affidavit of the complainant, for the affidavit is
treated as a component of the complaint. All necessary allegations need not be contained
in a single document. It is unlike a criminal "complaint or information" where the
averments must be contained in one document charging only one offense, non-compliance
with which renders it vulnerable to a motion to quash. A preliminary investigation can
thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent person, without the
referral document having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant.
A complaint for purposes of conducting preliminary investigation is not required to exhibit
the attending structure of a "complaint or information" laid down in Rule 110.
Rebecca E. Badiola vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 170691 / April 23, 2008
FACTS:
CA denied B’s petition for review on the Ombudsman’s resolution proceeding with the
administrative case against her despite the prior dismissal of the criminal aspect that was
based on the same set of facts. B filed 2 MRs in this case which were subsequently denied
by the court. She filed a petition for certiorari 343 days after she received notice of the
denial of her 1st MR.
HELD:
B’s filing of a second motion for reconsideration with the CA, being a prohibited
pleading, did not toll the running of the reglementary period for filing a petition for review
GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 4A 2011
under Rule 45 (the proper remedy, not certiorari) with this Court. A second MR is a
prohibited pleading, which shall not be allowed, except for ordinarily persuasive reasons
and only after an express leave shall have first been obtained. In this case, the dismissal of
the criminal case involving the same set of facts does not necessarily foreclose the
continuation of the administrative action or carry with it relief from administrative liability.
People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Bohol
G.R. No. 171729 / July 28, 2008
FACTS:
B was arrested after he sold shabu to a police officer during a buy-bust operation.
When he was frisked by the police, the buy-bust money and three plastic sachets
containing similar white crystalline granules suspected to be shabu were recovered from
him.
HELD:
An arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant. Such
warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which
has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Law. In a legitimate warrantless arrest, the arresting police officers are authorized to
search and seize from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which
may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
Concepcion Cuenco Vda De Man Guerra et al. vs. Raul Risos, et al
G.R. No. 152643 / August 28, 2008
FACTS:
Due to C’s advanced age and health condition, the prosecution applied for the taking
of C’s deposition under Rule 23 instead of conditional examination of witnesses under Rule
119. The deposition was taken before the Clerk of Court.
HELD:
The conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his
deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the
instant case, the court no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise. While
the court recognizes the prosecution’s right to preserve its witness’ testimony to prove its
case, rules cannot be disregarded since they are designed mainly for the protection of the
accused’s constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such,
calls for a strict construction of the rules.
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 BLUE Tips 2010 (Criminal Procedure) / Atty. Salvador
Sharon Castro vs. Hon. Merlin Deloria etc., et al.
G.R. No. 163586 / January 27, 2009
FACTS:
In 2000, C was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC with Malversation of Public
Funds. After he entered his plea, C filed an MTQ on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the
Information. C argued that the Information failed to allege her salary grade citing the
decision in Uy v. Sandiganbayan (1999). RTC denied the MTQ pointing out the ruling in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan (MR 2001).
HELD:
The Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. The power to
investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.
It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
Carmelo Lazatin, et al. vs. Hon. Aniano A. Disierto, et al.
G.R. No. 147097 / June 5, 2009
FACTS:
The OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution recommending the dismissal of
the cases against L et al. for lack or insufficiency of evidence. The Ombudsman, however,
adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution and ordering
the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases against L et al.
HELD:
Giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with paragraph 8,
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution. The OSP is "merely a component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of
the Ombudsman." The power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing
of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP.
People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan and Victoria Amante
G.R. No. 167304 / August 25, 2009
FACTS:
The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing V of violating The
Auditing Code. At that time, V was a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and was
occupying a position of salary grade 26.
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HELD:
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. They may
not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or
felonies in relation to their office. As long as the offense charged in the information is
intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the
accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions,
there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been
indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.
People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F. Duca
G.R. No. 171175 / October 9, 2009
FACTS:
A copy of the CA Resolution which required the filing of Comment was served upon
the counsels for the defense and prosecution and the RTC Judge. No copy was furnished to
the Solicitor General. Subsequently, the CA acquitted defendant D.
HELD:
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and
the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General. In criminal cases,
the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines
and as such, should have been given the opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People.
The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be
given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. Where there is a
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction.
Ariel M. Los Baños vs. Oel R. Pedro
G.R. No. 173588 / April 22, 2009
FACTS:
The Information charged P of violating Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code,
instead of Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which amended Section 261(q). P filed an MTQ on
the grounds that the Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule 117].
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 BLUE Tips 2010 (Criminal Procedure) / Atty. Salvador

HELD: (2) The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
(1) While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and
to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic circumstances in the complaint or information. The amendment under Section 32 of
deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a R.A. No. 7166 does not affect the prosecution of the accused who was charged under
motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking Section 261(q) of the Code.
the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the
circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal.
Notable features of Section 8, Rule 117:
1. Dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in
character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-filing of the case),
and not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the
case).
2. The delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a
motion to quash is a class in itself, and where the grounds cited are those listed
under Section 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any
other remedy.
3. A dismissal under Section 8is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided
under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the
special terms of Section 8. When a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash
under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply.

MOTION TO QUASH PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL

Filed by the accused to question the efficacy
of the complaint or information filed against
him or her.
Form and content are as stated under
Section 2 of Rule 117.
Assails the validity of the criminal complaint
or the criminal information for defects or
defenses apparent on face of the
information.
Allowed before the arraignment.
An information that is quashed stays
quashed until revived; the grant of a motion
to quash does not per se carry any
connotation of impermanence, and
becomes so only as provided by law or by
the Rules.
At the instance of either the prosecution or
the accused, or both, subject to the
conditions enumerated under Section 8,
Rule 117.
These requirements do not apply to a
provisional dismissal.
May be grounded on reasons other than the
defects found in the information.
Available even when the trial proper of the
case is already underway provided that the
required consents are present.
Impermanent until the time-bar applies, at
which time it becomes a permanent
dismissal.

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