FACTS:

This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with
Japan, concerning trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in
services, investment, etc.
Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners – non-government organizations,
Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to
obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA, including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA,
but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until the negotiation
is completed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the negotiation process are privileged
Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and
power to concur in treaties, from the negotiation process
RULING:
Standing
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,
which is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part
of the general public which possesses the right. As the present petition is anchored on the right to
information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens
including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally are suing in
their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in
jurisprudence.
JPEPA, A Matter of Public Concern
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern xxx
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are
matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic
negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to
the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
Privileged Character of Diplomatic Negotiations Recognized
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In
discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
“information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.”
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the
JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for
discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to
conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that
“historic confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability
of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be open to public scrutiny would
discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from
entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that
matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing
to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an
area of greater national interest.
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does
not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the
context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for
the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged
status.
Does the exception apply even though JPEPA is primarily economic and does not involve
national security?
While there are certainly privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security
such as those involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the
“informer’s privilege,” or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person
or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement
of that law. The suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national security
for this privilege to apply in any given instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable
in all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-
standing practice. It would also be highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general.
Also illustrative is the privileged accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed
privileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and
those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is
essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential,
Legislative and Judicial power.
In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the
case deliberated upon, so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve
matters of national security.
It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not
absolute, one significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than the other
branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and
employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal
wrongdoing.” This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of
a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.
Closely related to the “presidential communications” privilege is the deliberative process
privilege recognized in the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co, deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not
on the need to protect national security but, on the “obvious realization that officials will not
communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and
front page news,” the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions.
The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and
presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the
confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential
communications is similar, if not identical.
The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus shows that the privilege for diplomatic
negotiations is meant to encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the
negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from public view. Similar to the privilege for
presidential communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through the same
means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in its
capacity as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations.” And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to
diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content of the information per se, but
because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public
interest, must be presumed confidential.
Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from
the privileged character of the deliberative process.
Does diplomatic privilege only apply to certain stages of the negotiation process?
In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that with regard to the duty to disclose
“definite propositions of the government,” such duty does not include recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.
Treaty-making power of the President
xxx they (petitioners) argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA
negotiations since whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international
trade agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section
28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No. 1464.
The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties
and international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and
other taxes xxx.
As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII
– the article on the Executive Department.
xxx
While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is
exercised by the President only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the
power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the
concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty.
In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations
provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent
in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to
Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for
the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still enure that all treaties will
substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers,
may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for
Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to
the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a
while that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making
power of the President, but only the Senate.
Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members
of the House of Representatives fail to present a “sufficient showing of need” that the
information sought is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do
not include treaty-negotiation.
Did the respondent’s alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege constitute waiver of such
privilege?
That respondent invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present
petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioner’s position
presupposes that an assertion of the privilege should have been made during the House
Committee investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to have waived it.
xxx (but) Respondent’s failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may
not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. xxx what respondents
received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for
information. And as priorly stated, the House Committee itself refrained from pursuing its earlier
resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecia’s alleged
request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.
The privilege is an exemption to Congress’ power of inquiry. So long as Congress itself finds no
cause to enforce such power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light,
respondent’s failure to invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations did not
amount to waiver thereof.
“Showing of Need” Test
In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a “sufficient showing of
need” only means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure
sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in
a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional
adjudication involving fundamental rights.
xxx However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the privilege, and it has been
established that the subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a
party overcome the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of
public concern, without any further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the
doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to
information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an information is
a matter of public concern.
Right to information vis-a-vis Executive Privilege
xxx the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to
information, a specific “showing of need” for such information is not a relevant consideration,
but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has
claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the
same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that
information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively
and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.
Right to Information
1. Chavez vs. Presidential Commission of Good Governance, 299 SCRA 744 (1998)
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated
the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the
public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the countrys economy, alleges that what
impelled him to bring this action were several news reports[2] bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged
discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through
PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
A provision in the compromise agreement provides:
xxx the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to the FIRST PARTY, and which
shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall
be net of, and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines. Xxx
ISSUE:
Whether or not such provision in the compromise agreement exempting the Marcoses from the
taxes due to the government in valid
6. Genuino vs. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 12, 2018
FACTS:
These consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO) and/or Writs of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assail the constitutionality of Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 41,
series of 2010, otherwise known as the Consolidated Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance
and Implementation of Hold Departure Orders, Watchlist Orders and Allow Departure Orders,
on the ground that it infringes on the constitutional right to travel.
On May 25, 2010, then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the assailed DOJ Circular
No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which govern the issuance and
implementation of HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs.
After the expiration of GMA’s term as President of the Republic of the Philippines an her
subsequent election as Pampanga representative, criminal complaints were filed against her
before the DOJ particularly plunder, malversation and/or illegal use of OWWA funds, illegal use
of public funds, graft and corruption, violation of the OEC, violation of the Code of Conduct on
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and qualified theft. In view of the foregoing criminal
complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-422 against GMA pursuant to her authority
under DOJ Circular No. 41. She also ordered for the inclusion of GMA’s name in the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) watchlist.
On October 20, 2011, two criminal complaints for Electoral Sabotage and Violation of the OEC
were filed against GMA and her husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo. Following the filing of criminal
complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-573 against GMA and Miguel Arroyo with a
validity period of 60 days, unless sooner terminated or otherwise extended.
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 197930, HDO No. 2011-64 was issued against Genuinos, among others,
after criminal complaints for Malversation and Violation of Sections 3(e), (g), (h) an (i) of R.A.
No. 3019. The petitioners therein seek to annul and set aside the following orders issued by the
former Secretary Leila De Lima, pursuant to the said circular.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the DOJ has the authority to issue Circular No. 41; and
2) Whether there is ground to hold the former DOJ Secretary guilty of contempt of Court.

HELD:
1) The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. Under Sec 6, Art. 3 of the 1987
Constitution provides three considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to travel:
national security, public safety or public health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit
provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the impairment.[ FEU.LAWREV]
To begin with, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to
curtail the exercise of the right to travel. To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a
legislative enactment which underwent the scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to
the President for approval. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the
provisions of an enabling law which the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.
It is, however, important to stress that before there can even be a valid administrative issuance, there
must first be a showing that the delegation of legislative power is itself valid. It is valid only if there
is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
A painstaking examination of the provisions being relied upon by the former DOJ Secretary will
disclose that they do not particularly vest the DOJ the authority to issue DOJ Circular No. 41 which
effectively restricts the right to travel through the issuance of the WLOs and HDOs. Sections 1 and
3, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292 did not authorize the DOJ to issue WLOs and HDOs
to restrict the constitutional right to travel. There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in the
Constitution that will justify the impairment. The provision simply grants the DOJ the power to
investigate the commission of crimes and prosecute offenders, which are basically the functions of
the agency. However, it does not carry with it the power to indiscriminately devise all means it
deems proper in performing its functions without regard to constitutionally-protected rights. The
curtailment of fundamental right, which is what DOJ Circular No. 41 does, cannot be read into
mentioned provision of the law.
As such, it is compulsory requirement that there be an existing law, complete and sufficient in itself,
conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency to promulgate rules. On its own, the DOJ
cannot make rules, its authority being confined to execution of laws. The DOJ is confined to filling
in the gaps and the necessary details in carrying into effect the law as enacted. Without a clear
mandate of an existing law, an administrative issuance is ultra vires.
To sum, DOJ Circular No. 41 does not have an enabling law where it could have derived its
authority to interfere with the exercise of the right to travel. Thus, the said circular is
unconstitutional.
2) In view of the complexity of the facts and corresponding full discussion that it rightfully deserves,
the Court finds it more fitting to address the same in a separate proceeding. It is in the interest of
fairness that there be a complete and exhaustive discussion on the matter since it entails the
imposition of penalty that bears upon the fitness of the respondent as a member of the legal
profession. The Court, therefore, finds it proper to deliberate and resolve the charge of contempt
against De Lima in a separate proceeding.
FACTS:
Rallies or the right to peaceably assemble to express freedom of expression, to petition for
redress of grievances hounding the government which was co-organized by various mass based
groups, and as Bayan and KMU sometime in September 26 and October 4-6 2005 has been
violently preempted and and forcibly dispersed causing injuries by police and peace keeping
authorities under the “no permit, no rally” policy whereby enforcing the Batasang Pambansa Blg
880, otherwise known as the “Public Assembly Act of 1985” and the Calibrated Preemptive
Response (CPR) Policy recently in force “in lieu of” maximum tolerance under the directive of
the office of the Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita.
ISSUE:
Is the “moot and academic” principle a magical formula that can immediately dissuade the
courts in resolving the case?

RULING:-
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. The Court holds that President Arroyo’s
issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.
The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there
is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

Soriano vs. La Guardia G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009 Freedom of Speech

JANUARY 26, 2018

FACTS:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister
of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE:

Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and
within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

RULING:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his
duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for
three months.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of
his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the
reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a
broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent
language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language.

Facts:
On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of
other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are members of
petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other
petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1 (ILECO 1) and
Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized and existing
under PD 269, as amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration
(NEA).
Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all
National Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including franchise,
fling recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in
any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.
From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as
amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic council (now
National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA, entered into six loan agreements
with the government of the United States of America, through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan
agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any
property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan.
Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code their tax exemptions
have been validly withdrawn. Particularly, petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234
of the said code. Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to
all persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938,
while Sec. 234 exempts the same cooperatives from payment of real property tax.
Issue:
(1) Does the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234) violate the equal protection
clause since the provisions unduly discriminate against petitioners who are duly registered
cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938 or the Cooperatives Code of
the Philippines?
(2) Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the loan entered into between
the Philippine and the US Governments?
Held:
(1) No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by a law based on a
reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable must (a) rest on substantial
classifications; (b) germane to the purpose of the law; (c) not limited to the existing
conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same class. We hold that there is
 reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax
treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric cooperatives under
RA 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and those under RA
6938. In the former, the government is the one that funds those so-called electric
cooperatives, while in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source of
funds.
a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 doe sit require cooperatives to
make equitable contributions to capital. Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a
member of an electric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00 membership
fee is required which is even refundable the moment the member is no longer interested in
getting electric service from the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area
covered by the cooperative. However, under the Cooperative Code, the articles of
cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration must be accompanied with the bonds
of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers
showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least
25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share capital be
less than P2,000.00.
b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extent of government control over
electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a
primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal clear that NEA incurred
loans from various sources to finance the development and operations of these electric
cooperatives. Consequently, amendments were primarily geared to expand the powers of
NEA over the electric cooperatives o ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to
the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient
and independent organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation.
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane
to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that “every local government unit shall
enjoy local autonomy,” does not mean that the exercise of the power by the local
governments is beyond the regulation of Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the
legislative intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units and to limit
exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically provided therein.
Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification as these exemptions
are not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class.
(2) No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment
of the obligations of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within
the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but
the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect
a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-
parties.
The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport to grant any tax exemption
in favor of any party to the contract, including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions
simply shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements to the
borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the withdrawal by the Local Government
Code under Sec. 193 and 234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does
not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or the beneficiary under the loan
agreements as, in fact, no tax exemption is granted therein.
HELD:
1. NO. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the RTC’s Order granting their prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. Since petitioners did not appeal from that order, the petitioners
presumed that the order became a final judgment on the issues.
The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication on the merits of the case that would trigger res
judicata.
A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of the issues, it being a provisional
remedy.
2. YES. The petitioners claimed that DO 74, DO 215 and TRB’s rules and regulation issued under
them unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in sec. 4 of RA 2000 to regulate toll ways.
They contend that DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like redesigning curbings or
central dividing sections.
They claim that DPWH is only allowed to redesign the physical structure of toll ways and not to
determine “who or what can be qualifies as toll ways user”.
The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare
certain expressways as limited access facilities.
Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities.
Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the Toll Regulatory
Board (TRB) cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing limited access
facilities.
The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place.
3. NO. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then Department of Public Works and
Communications had issued AO 1 in February 1968, as authorized under Section 3 of Republic Act
2000, prior to the splitting of the department and the eventual devolution of its powers to the DOTC.
Because administrative issuances had the force and effect of law, AO 1 enjoyed the presumption of
validity and constitutionality. The burden to prove its unconstitutionality rested on the party assailing
it, more so when police power was at issue and passed the test of reasonableness. The Administrative
Order was not oppressive, as it did not impose unreasonable restrictions or deprive petitioners of
their right to use the facilities. It merely set rules to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of
traffic within those limited-access facilities.
The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a tollway. Petitioners
were free to access the tollway as much as the rest of the public. However, the mode in which they
wished to travel, pertaining to their manner of using the tollway, was a subject that could validly be
limited by regulation. There was no absolute right to drive; on the contrary, this privilege was
heavily regulated.
 GARCES VS ESTENZO

Facts:

Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided
for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for
the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiestawould be the caretaker of the image
of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the
election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the
celebration of the saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s
property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the
priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a
representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.
The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and
Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue:

Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held:
No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over thecustody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to
facilitate the worship of the patronsaint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was
placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow
the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the
image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination ofcustody is their right, and even if they
decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used.
Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some
religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,
freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

[A.M. NO. 02-2-10-SC December 14, 2005]

RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT COURTS IN ILIGAN CITY (RE: OFFICE HOURS)

In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar, Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts in the said city request that they be
allowed to enjoy the following privileges:

1. to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks during the
month of Ramadan;

2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the
entire calendar year.

Judge Salazar forwarded the said letter-request to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Judge
Salazar expressed his conformity with the first request, i.e., allowing them to hold office from 7:30 a.m.
to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan. However, he expressed some misgivings
about the second request, i.e., excusing them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday
during the entire calendar year.

In support of their requests, the Muslim employees invoke Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2911 ﾧ as
amended by P.D. No. 3222 ﾧ enacted by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The avowed purpose of
P.D. No. 291 was to reinforce national unity by recognizing Muslim holidays and making them part of our
national holidays. Section 2 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 322, provides that the following are
recognized Muslim holidays:

A. Eid-ul-Fitr (Hariraya Puasa) - which falls on the 1st day of the lunar month of Shawwal
commemorating the end of the fasting season;

b. Eid-ul-Adha (Hariraya Haj) - which falls on the 10th day of the 12th Lunar month of Zul Hajj;

c. Mauledan Nabi - Birthday of Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H), which falls on the 12th day of the 3rd
Lunar month of Rabbiol-Awwal;
d. Lailatul Isra Wal Miraj - (Ascension) which falls on the 27th day of the 8th Lunar month of Rajjab;

e. Muharram (Ashura) - which falls on the 10th Lunar month of Muharram; andcralawlibrary

f. Amon Jaded (New Year) - which falls on the 1st day of the 1st Lunar month of Muharram.

Muslims employees in the government are excused from reporting to office during these holidays in
order that they may be able to properly observe them.

Section 3 of the same law, as amended by P.D. No. 322, further provides that:

Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all Muslim employees in the national
government, government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities shall observe office hours from seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty
in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no diminution
of salary or wages, provided, that the employee who is not fasting is not entitled to the benefit of this
provision.

(b) Regulations for the implementation of this section shall be issued together with the implementing
directives on Muslim holidays.

Pursuant thereto, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated Resolution No. 81-1277 dated
November 13, 1981 which states in part:

2. During "Ramadan" the Fasting month (30 days) of the Muslims, the Civil Service official time of 8
o'clock to 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock to 5 o'clock is hereby modified to 7:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M. without noon
break and the difference of 2 hours is not counted as undertime;

3. During Friday, the Muslim pray day, Muslims are excused from work from 10 o'clock in the morning to
2 o'clock in the afternoon.

Moreover, in its Resolution No. 00-0227 dated January 26, 2000, the CSC clarified that the term "Friday"
in the above resolution is not limited to the Fridays during the month of Ramadan, but refers to "all
Fridays of the calendar year." However, in order not to run afoul of Section 5,3 ﾧ Rule XVII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2924 ﾧ which enjoins civil servants
to render public service not less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week, the CSC prescribes
the adoption of a flexible working schedule to accommodate the Muslims' Friday Prayer Day subject to
certain conditions, e.g., the flexible working hours shall not start earlier than 7:00 a.m. and end not later
than 7:00 p.m.5 ﾧ

In the Resolution dated October 1, 2002, the Court required the Court Administrator to study the
matter. In compliance therewith, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recommends that the
Muslim employees in the Judiciary be allowed to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.
without break during the month of Ramadan. Further, that they be excused from work from 10:00 a.m.
to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow them to attend the Muslim Prayer Day. However, to compensate for
the lost hours, they should be required to observe flexible working schedule which should start from
7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. and from 2:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. every Friday. In that way, the working hours
mandated by the civil service rules is complied with.

The recommendation of the Court Administrator with respect to the matter of allowing the Muslim
employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during
the month of Ramadan is well taken. The same has statutory basis in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as
amended by P.D. No. 322, which categorically states that "[d]uring the fasting season in the month of
Ramadan, all Muslim employees in the national government, government-owned or controlled
corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall observe office hours from
seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break
or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no diminution of salary or wages ..."

The Court, however, is constrained to deny for lack of statutory basis the request of the Muslim
employees to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow them to attend
the Muslim Prayer Day. As correctly observed by Atty. Edna Diño, Chief, Office of the Court Attorney, in
her Report dated May 13, 2005, the CSC exceeded its authority insofar as it declared in Resolution No.
81-1277 and Resolution No. 00-0227 that Muslim employees are excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to
2:00 p.m. every Friday subject to certain conditions. CSC Resolution No. 81-1277 was purportedly issued
pursuant to Sections 2 and 5 of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No 322, but neither of the two decrees
mention "Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day" as one of the recognized holidays.

The Court is not unmindful that the subject requests are grounded on Section 5, Article III of the
Constitution:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights.

This provision contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2) the free exercise clause.
The subject requests are based on the latter and in interpreting this clause (the free exercise clause)
embodied in the Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine that:

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom
to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare.6 ﾧ

Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two concepts in this wise:

(1) Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge
his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any
religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or
deny the immortality of his soul - in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit.
However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has
full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be
punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what they
cannot prove." Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he
cannot prove what he believes.

(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom
to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious
freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard
for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate
the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be
exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are
pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable
requirements or prohibitions of the law.

Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
dogma.7 ﾧ

The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to
the Islamic faith. However, while the observance of Ramadan and allowing the Muslim employees in the
Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of
Ramadan finds support in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is no such
basis to excuse them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day,
during the entire calendar year.

On the other hand, the need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well as to enforce
them uniformly to all civil servants, Christians and Muslims alike, cannot be disregarded. Underlying
Section 5,8 ﾧ Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 is the interest of the
general public to be assured of continuous government service during office hours every Monday
through Friday. The said rule enjoins all civil servants, of whatever religious denomination, to render
public service of no less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week.

To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution of the
prescribed government working hours. For then, they would be rendering service twelve (12) hours less
than that required by the civil service rules for each month. Further, this would encourage other
religious denominations to request for similar treatment.

The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to other
religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the exercise of religious
freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable requirements of the law, including
civil service laws.

In fine, the remedy of the Muslim employees, with respect to their request to be excused from work
from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year, is legislative, which is to ask
Congress to enact a legislation expressly exempting them from compliance with the prescribed
government working hours.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to:

1. GRANT the request to allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold office hours from 7:30
a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during the month of Ramadan pursuant to Section 3 (a) of Presidential
Decree No. 291, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 322; andcralawlibrary

2. DENY for lack of legal basis the request that the Muslim employees in the Judiciary be excused from
work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar year.