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G.R. No. L-45892.

JULY 13, 1938

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. TRANQUILINO LAGMAN

AVANCEÑA, J.:

FACTS:
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa,
both Filipino citizens whom have attained the age of twenty years, are charged with a violation of
section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law to join and render the
military service. Lagman and de Sosa willfully and unlawfully refused to join the military upon failure
to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service despite notices.

De Sosa contended that he is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support,
and Lagman whom has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be
killed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1 is unconstitutional?

HELD: No. Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 is not unconstitutional.

The National Defense Law, may require its citizens to compulsory render military service, in faithful
compliance with the Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution which states that “The prime duty of government,
and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military, or civil
service.”

The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave
the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.

What justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in
preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have
dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in complying with
their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family
responsibilities

MEYER V. NEBRASKA (263 US 393)

FACTS: Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the
teaching of foreign language to students that had not yet completed the eight grade. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
HELD: Yes. The statue as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the
plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state. The Fourteenth
Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The state argues that
the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of all children
raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other
languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of
the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.

PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS (266 US 610)

FACTS: Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain
academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an
elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders
prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory Eduction Act. The Act required all parents
and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the
granting of the preliminary restraining orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act unreasonably with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the up
bringin and education of children under their control?

HELD: Yes. The Acts violated the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests
and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state. The Appellees
have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees’ schools.
The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to
choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

G.R NO. 143855. SEPTEMBER 21, 2010

ESPINA V. ZAMORA

ABAD, J.:

FACTS: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases
Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United
States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in
1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement.

On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the
Philippines.

On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia
Pacific Kurt 165 Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary
Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on “the complementing strategic interests of the United States
and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA,
which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador
Thomas Hubbard.

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
ratified the VFA.

On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the
President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to
question the constitutionality of the VFA?

HELD: No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the
VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing
that a taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation

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