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72. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., Petitioner

vs.
ERNANI GUINGONA MEÑEZ, Respondent

G.R. No. 209906, November 22, 2017, CAGUIOA, J.

Topic: Quasi Delict

FACTS:

Ernani Guingona Meñez was a frequent customer of Rosante Bar and Restaurant. On March 28, 1995,
Meñez went to Rosante and ordered two (2) bottles of beer. Thereafter, he ordered pizza and a bottle of
"Sprite". His additional order arrived consisting of one whole pizza and a bottled softdrink Sprite.
However, he noticed that the taste of the softdrink was not one of Sprite but of a different substance
repulsive to taste. The substance smelled of kerosene. He then felt a burning sensation in his throat and
stomach and could not control the urge to vomit.

He brought the bottle of sprite to the place where the waitresses were and angrily told them that he was
served kerosene. He reported the incident and went to the Silliman University Medical Center (SUMC).
Later Meñez came to know that a representative from Rosante came to the hospital and informed the
hospital staff that Rosante would take care of the hospital and medical bills.

The incident was reported to the police and the bottle of Sprite was examined by a chemist. The analysis
identified the contents of the liquid inside the bottle was pure kerosene.

As a result of the incident, Meñez filed a complaint for damages against CCBPI and Rosante.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. It declared that there was failure of Meñez
to categorically establish the chain of custody of the "Sprite" bottle which was the very core of the
evidence in his complaint for damages. CA however granted the appeal and reversed the Decision of the
RTC.

ISSUE:

WON CCBPI is liable for damages

RULING:

No. Meñez is not entitled to moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The cases when moral damages may be awarded are specific. Unless the case falls under the enumeration
as provided in Article 2219, which is exclusive, and Article 2220 of the Civil Code, moral damages may not
be awarded. Apparently, the only ground which could sustain an award of moral damages in favor of
Meñez and against CCBPI is Article 2219 (2) — quasi-delict under Article 2187 causing physical injuries.
Unfortunately, Meñez has not presented competent, credible and preponderant evidence to prove that
he suffered physical injuries when he allegedly ingested kerosene from the "Sprite" bottle in question.
Nowhere in the CA Decision is the physical injury of Meñez discussed. Consequently, in the absence of
sufficient evidence on physical injuries that Meñez sustained, he is not entitled to moral damages.

As to exemplary or corrective damages, these may be granted in quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with
gross negligence pursuant to Article 2231 of the Civil Code

Evidently, the CA's reasoning is not in accord with the gross negligence requirement for an award of
exemplary damages in a quasi-delict case.

Moreover, Meñez has failed to establish that CCBPI acted with gross negligence. Other than the opened
"Sprite" bottle containing pure kerosene allegedly served to him at the Rosante Bar and Restaurant.
Meñez has not presented any evidence that would show CCBPFs purported gross negligence.

Regarding attorney's fees the CA did not provide any basis for the award. The award is found only in the
dispositive portion and, unlike the award of moral and exemplary damages, there was no explanation
provided in the body of the Decision

Meñez is not entitled to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation because, as with his claim for exemplary
damages, he has not established any other ground that would justify this award.

112. VICENTE G. HENSON, JR., Petitioner,

Vs.
UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 223134, August 14, 2019 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Topic: Payment or Performance (As to parties)

FACTS:

From 1989 to 1999, National Arts Studio and Color Lab (NASCL) leased the front portion of the ground
floor of a two (2)-storey building located in Pampanga owned by petitioner. In 1999, NASCL gave up its
initial lease and instead, leased the right front portion of the ground floor and the entire second floor of
the said building, and made renovations with the building's piping assembly. Meanwhile, Copylandia
moved in to the ground floor.

A water leak occurred in the building and damaged Copylandia's various equipment and as the said
equipment were insured with respondent, Copylandia filed a claim with the former. Eventually, the two
parties settled. This resulted in respondent's subrogation to the rights of Copylandia over all claims and
demands arising from the said incident. Respondent as subrogee to Copylandia' s rights, demanded from,
inter alia, NASCL for the payment of the aforesaid claim, but to no avail. Thus, it filed a complaint for
damages against NASCL.

Meanwhile, petitioner transferred the ownership of the building to Citrinne Holdings, Inc. (CHI), where he
is a stockholder and the President.

Respondent then filed an Amended Complaint impleading CHI as a party-defendant to the case, as the
new owner of the building. However, it filed again an amended complaint praying that petitioner instead
of CHI be impleaded as a party-defendant to the case, considering that petitioner was then the owner of
the building when the water leak damage incident happened. According to respondent, such negligence
on their part directly resulted in substantial damage to Copylandia's various equipment. CHI opposed the
motion on the ground of prescription. Arguing that since respondent's cause of action is based on quasi-
delict, it must be brought within four (4) years from its accrual. As such, respondent is already barred from
proceeding against CHI/petitioner, especially since the latter never received any prior demand from the
former.

ISSUE:

WON the cause of action of UCPB has prescribed

RULING:

NO. The claim of UCPB has not yet prescribed.

The CA in ruling that respondent's claim against petitioner has yet to prescribe, cited the case of Vector
Shipping Corporation v. American Home Assurance Company (Vector).

In. Vector, the Court held that the claim has yet to prescribe as it is based on a breach of Vector's contract
of affreightment with Caltex, which has a longer prescriptive period often (10) years, again reckoned from
the time of the loss. The Court in Vector, agreed with the CA that the claim has yet to prescribe, but
qualified that the present action was not upon a written contract, but upon an obligation created by law.

However, it must be concluded that the court must abandon the ruling in Vector that an insurer may file
an action against the tortfeasor within ten (10) years from the time the insurer indemnifies the insured.
Following the principles of subrogation, the insurer only steps into the shoes of the insured and the
therefore for purposes of prescription, inherits only the remaining period within which the insured may
file an action against the wrongdoer. To be sure, the prescriptive period of the action that the insured
may file against the wrongdoer begins at the time that the tort was committed and the loss/injury
occurred against the insured. The indemnification of the insured by the insurer only allows it to be
subrogated to the former' s rights, and does not create a new reckoning point for the cause of action that
the insured originally has against the wrongdoer.
Be that as it may, it should however be clarified that the Court's abandonment of the Vector doctrine
should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.

In this case, it is undisputed that the water leak damage incident, which gave rise to Copylandia's cause
of action against NASCL and petitioner happened on May 9, 2006. As this incident gave rise to an
obligation classified as a quasi-delict, Copylandia would have only had four (4) years, or until May 9, 2010,
within which to file a suit to recover damages. When Copylandia's rights were transferred to respondent
by virtue of the latter's payment, respondent was likewise bound by the same prescriptive period. Since
it was only on: (a) May 20, 2010 when respondent made an extrajudicial demand to NASCL, and thereafter,
filed its complaint if adjudged under the present parameters of legal subrogation under this Decision
should have already set in.

However, it must be recognized that the prevailing rule applicable to the pertinent events of this case is
Vector. Pursuant that the abandonment of Vector doctrine should be prospective in application. Hence,
as the amended complaint impleading petitioner was filed within ten (10) years from the time respondent
indemnified Copylandia for its injury/loss, the case cannot be said to have prescribed under Vector.

32. JULIO C. ABELLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GUILLERMO B. FRANCISCO, Defendant-Appellee.

G.R. No. 32336. December 20, 1930, AVANCEÑA, C.J.

Topic: Mora Solvendi

FACTS:

Defendant Guillermo B. Francisco purchased from the Government on installments, lots 937 to 945 of the
Tala Estate in Novaliches, Caloocan, Rizal. He was in arrears for some of these installments. On the 31st
of October, 1928, he signed a document acknowledging payment of P500 and the balance to be paid on
or before December 15, 1928, extendible fifteen days thereafter. On December 27th of the same year,
the defendant, being in the Province of Cebu, wrote to Roman Mabanta of this City of Manila, attaching
a power of attorney authorizing him to sign in behalf of the defendant all the documents required by the
Bureau of Lands for the transfer of the lots to the plaintiff. Mabanta, as attorney-in-fact, did what was
instructed to him. The plaintiff, asked for an extension until January 9, 1929. However, Mabanta, only
extended it until January 5, 1929. When Abella was not able to pay of the said date, Mabanta refused to
accept the full payment on January 9, 1929 and already considered the contract rescinded. On the same
day, Mabanta returned by check the sum of P915.31 which the plaintiff had paid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant be compelled to accept the payment and the plaintiff be judicially declared
as owner of the land.
RULING:

The court relied on the fact that the plaintiff had failed to pay the price of the lots within the stipulated
time; and that since the contract between plaintiff and defendant was an option for the purchase of the
lots,’ time was an essential element in it. It is to be noted that in the document signed by the defendant,
the 15th of December was fixed as the date, extendible for fifteen days, for the payment by the plaintiff
of the balance of the selling price. It has been admitted that the plaintiff did not offer to complete the
payment until January 9, 1929. He contends that Mabanta, as attorney-in-fact for the defendant in this
transaction, granted him an extension of time until the 9th of January. But Mabanta has stated that he
only extended the time until the 5th of that month. Mabanta’s testimony on this point is corroborated by
that of Paz Vicente and by the plaintiff’s own admission to Narciso Javier that his option to purchase those
lots expired on January 5, 1929. The defendant wanted to sell those lots to the plaintiff in order to pay off
certain obligations which fell due in the month of December, 1928. The time fixed for the payment of the
price was therefore essential for the defendant, and this view is borne out by his letter to his
representative Mabanta instructing him to consider the contract rescinded if the price was not completed
in time. In accordance with article 1124 of the Civil Code, the defendant is entitled to resolve the contract
for failure to pay the price within the time specified.