1. IN RE PURISIMA
3
Facts:
Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar
Examinations. As required, he was directed to submit a
certification of completion of the pre-bar review course within
sixty days from the last day of the examinations. Petitioner
passed the 1999 Examinations, but in a resolution passed by
the Court he was disqualified to become a member of the
Philippine Bar and declared his examinations null and void for
two reasons. One, for his failure to submit the required
certificate of completion; and two, for making a false statement
that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law
School when, as certified by the said school, it had not offered
such course since 1967. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration
of the resolution, but his motion was denied. In 2002, petitioner
filed a motion for due process before the Supreme Court and
makes the necessary explanation and submitted supporting
documents to that effect.
Issue:
1. Whether petitioner did enroll in and complete his pre-
bar review course in UST as he herein avows.
2. Whether enrollment and completion of pre-bar
reviews is a requirement.
Held:
Yes. There is nothing on record which impugns the authenticity
of the subject Certification as well as that of the other
documentary evidence proffered by petitioner to establish that
he was duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review course in
UST, not in PLS. As to the argument that the Certification of
Dean Dimayuga did not include the "taking and completion" of
the pre-bar review course, the realities of our bar reviews
render it difficult to record the attendance religiously of the
reviewees every single day for several months.
Yes. Court's growing concern over the apparent laxity of law
schools in the conduct of their pre-bar review classes.
Specifically, it has been observed that the attendance of
reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some reviewees
are able to comply with the requisite with minimal attendance.
Enrollment and completion of pre-bar review course is an
additional requirement under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for
those who failed the bar examinations for three (3) or more
times. For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be
literally asking for the moon but it can be done. We just have to
bear in mind that this requirement is not an empty or idle
ceremony; it is intended to ensure the quality and
preparedness of those applying for admission to the bar.
||
YeeeeYe||
2. PAGUIA V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Facts:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer,
filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's nomination of respondent
former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide)
as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for
violation ofSection 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the
Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that
respondent Davide's age at that time of his nomination in
March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post.
Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157
pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and
employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65.
Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule
for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent
Davide's entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the
rest of the DFA officials and employees.|||
Respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold
issues against the petition. First, they question petitioner's
standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension
from the practice of law. Second, the Office of the President
and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue
that neither petitioner's citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests
him with standing to question respondent Davide's
appointment because petitioner remains without personal and
substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not
involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement
of public funds. Third, public respondents question the
propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a
petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a
contender for the office in question.
||n
Issue: Whether the Petitioner has capacity to sue?
Held:
No. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and
the relief prayed for moot.
Petitioner's citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him
with standing to bring this suit. We have granted access to
citizen's suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise
issues of "transcendental" importance calling for urgent
resolution.The same conclusion holds true for petitioner's
invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers' contributions to
the state's coffers entitle them to question appropriations for
expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or
illegal. However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide
received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law
and other executive issuances, the funding for which was
included in the appropriations for the DFA's total expenditures
contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since
respondent Davide's nomination. Having assumed office under
color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least
a de facto officer entitled to draw salary, negating petitioner's
claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds."
Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to
petitioner also obtains. Petitioner's suspension from the
practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience." Certainly,
preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on
equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic
rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA
7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
3. CRUZ V. MINA
Facts: Petitioner Cruz who is a third year law student filed
before the MeTC, as private prosecutor, or Grave Threats,
where his father is the complaining witness. The MeTC
however denied permission for petitioner to appear on the
ground that Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court requires
supervision by a member of the IBP authorized by the law
school. Furthermore it denied the issuance of an injunctive writ
on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, is one that can
be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 1
indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not legally tenable.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner as a law student may act as a
private prosecutor in the case.
Held: Yes. There is really no problem as to the application of
Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party
litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for
conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, may appear before the courts. Section 34, Rule
138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a
non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a
law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by
virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as
an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision
of a lawyer before inferior courts. The petitioner is correct in
stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior
institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it
follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is
deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the
private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil
aspect.
4. BULACAN V. TORCINO
Facts: A complaint for forcible entry and damages with
preliminary mandatory injunction was filed with the Municipal
Court of Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan against Faustino
Torcino and Felipa Torcino. The complaint was signed by
Nicolas Nuñes, Jr., "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff" but was
verified by the plaintiff-appellee himself. It is alleged in the
complain that respondent constructed a house encroaching
petitioner’s lot. Upon examination of the Geodetic Engineer,
the court held in favour of petitioner. Respondent now moves
to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was not signed by
a member of the IBP.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint was validly signed and
filed.
Held: Yes. It is only in cases before the regional trial court, that
the litigant must be aided by a duly authorized member of the
bar. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a
friend, agent, or an attorney. Court procedures are often
technical and may prove like shares to the ignorant or the
unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear
for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of
the bar are not available. For relatively simple litigation before
municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or
capable person to appear in behalf of a litigant who cannot get
a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest
of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial
courts and higher courts is more stringent.
LAW STUDENT RULE
5. IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING
UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING
TRIAL
FACTS: In a civil case, the plaintiff was represented by Mr.
Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the UP Office of Legal Aid.
Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the
presentation of the plaintiff’s evidence-in-chief without the
presence of a supervising lawyer, which was questioned by
Justice Barredo.
Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring
Mr. Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on
the next hearing. In compliance with said Order, UP-OLA and
the Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum of
Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the
Public Attorney’s Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the
subsequent hearings.
Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before
the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a
supervising lawyer.
UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits
that the matter of allowing a law intern to appear
unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should
be left to the sound discretion of the court after having made at
least one supervised appearance.
ISSUE: Whether a law student who appears before the court
under the Law Student Practice Rule should be accompanied
by a member of the bar during the trial.
HELD: YES.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" under Rule 138-A
requires no less than the physical presence of the supervising
lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with the
threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to
wit:
to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result
of incompetence or inexperience of law students, who, not
having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are
presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own;
to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school
clinic may be able to protect itself from any potential vicarious
liability arising from some culpable action by their law students;
and
to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no
person is allowed to practice a particular profession without
possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required
by law.
The matter of allowing a law student appear before the court
unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the
discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that
the appearance of the law student shall be under the direct
control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines duly accredited by the law schools. The rule
must be strictly construed because public policy demands that
legal work should be entrusted only to those who possess
tested qualifications, are sworn to observe rules and ethics of
the legal profession and subject to judicial disciplinary control.
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like
snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has
allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places
where duly authorized members of the bar are not available.
For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the
Rules still allow a more educated or capable person in behalf
of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 2
the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for
appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more
stringent.
The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule.
Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the law student
appearing before the court is properly guided and supervised
by a member of the bar.
6. CRUZ V. MINA (REPEAT CASE #3)
Facts: Petitioner Cruz who is a third year law student filed
before the MeTC, as private prosecutor, or Grave Threats,
where his father is the complaining witness. The MeTC
however denied permission for petitioner to appear on the
ground that Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court requires
supervision by a member of the IBP authorized by the law
school. Furthermore it denied the issuance of an injunctive writ
on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, is one that can
be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil
indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not legally tenable.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner as a law student may act as a
private prosecutor in the case.
Held: Yes. There is really no problem as to the application of
Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party
litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for
conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, may appear before the courts. Section 34, Rule
138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a
non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a
law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by
virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as
an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision
of a lawyer before inferior courts. The petitioner is correct in
stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior
institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it
follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is
deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the
private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil
aspect.
7. CRUZ V. CABRERA
Facts: Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law
student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several
actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his
behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the
counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14,
2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112,
Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo.
Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act
of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a
lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public,
inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a
lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant
in prior cases; respondent’s imputations of complainant’s
misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to
discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to
appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the
manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words “appear
ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” were uttered were totally with
the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule,
incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating
personally his cases
Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law
Ruling:
1. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear,
pumasa ka muna” does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such single
outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to
warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product
of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an
argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should
not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of
the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the
big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous
language.
2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not
precluded from litigating personally his cases. A party’s right to
conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom litigation
conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must
be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
3. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly,
involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for
gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity
and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private
practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
[referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or
employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General from engaging in private practice] has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to
the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not
customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a
lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such
services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of
law.
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers
are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them
certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting
the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of
judicial forum.
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 3

8. CANTIMBUHAN V. CRUZ
Facts: Petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal
complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo
Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively, and were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then
Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila. Petitioners
Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior
law students of the U.P. College of Law where, as part of the
curriculum of the university they were required to render legal
assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid.
Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their
separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner
Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C.
Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and
respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979,
sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the
appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private
prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4,
1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others
Issue: WON permission from a fiscal is necessary for one to
appear as a private prosecutor
Held: No. The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one
to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first
place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal
can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow
the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer
or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal
desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he
can just manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with
its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case: under his
supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-
lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the
accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more
reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor
under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
9. BULACAN V. TORCINO (REPEAT CASE #4)
Facts: A complaint for forcible entry and damages with
preliminary mandatory injunction was filed with the Municipal
Court of Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan against Faustino
Torcino and Felipa Torcino. The complaint was signed by
Nicolas Nuñes, Jr., "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff" but was
verified by the plaintiff-appellee himself. It is alleged in the
complain that respondent constructed a house encroaching
petitioner’s lot. Upon examination of the Geodetic Engineer,
the court held in favour of petitioner. Respondent now moves
to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was not signed by
a member of the IBP.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint was validly signed and
filed.
Held: Yes. It is only in cases before the regional trial court, that
the litigant must be aided by a duly authorized member of the
bar. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a
friend, agent, or an attorney. Court procedures are often
technical and may prove like shares to the ignorant or the
unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear
for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of
the bar are not available. For relatively simple litigation before
municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or
capable person to appear in behalf of a litigant who cannot get
a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest
of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial
courts and higher courts is more stringent.
SOLICITATION OF LEGAL SERVICES
10. LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
[1]
Facts: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro
Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law
Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of
clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of
[2]
paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer
legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
[3] [4]
assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To
induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them
and sent them text messages. To support his allegations,
[5]
complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his
lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents
services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
[6]
Complainant also attached respondents calling card:
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and
authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in
[9]
its report and recommendation, found that respondent had
encroached on the professional practice of complainant,
[10] [11]
violating Rule 8.02 and other canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Issue: WON Tolentino should be disbarred
Held: Yes.
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE
DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT
LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
[15]
brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground
[16]
for disbarment.
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the
CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT
MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of
almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
[17]
through an agent in order to gain employment) as a
measure to protect the community from barratry and
[19]
champerty. Complainant presented substantial evidence
(consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons
coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove
that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as
profited from referrals suits. Through Labianos actions,
respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos
word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 4
employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of
the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. With
regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR,
settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another
lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise
of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.
[25]
any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for
the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-
solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating
contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
[26]
employment. Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule
to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
11. KHAN, JR. V. SIMBILLO
Facts: The administrative complaint arose from the paid
advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of
Philippine Daily Inquirer which read: Annulment of Marriage
Specialist 532-4333/521-2667. Ms. Ma. Theresa Espeleta, a
staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme
Court, took notice of the advertisement and inquired by
pretending as an interested party. After such inquiry,
confirming that Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is actually promoting
himself as an expert in handling annulment cases and is
guaranteeing a court decree within four to six months with afee
of P48,000 to be paid in installment basis, further research
was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). The research revealed other similar advertisements
published in two other newspapers –August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The
Philippine Star. Atty. Ismael Khan,Jr., afterwards, in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the
Public Information Office filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation
in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.The IBP, taking cognizance of the referral to
investigate, report and recommend, found the respondent
guilty.Respondent, then, filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of
violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of CPR.
Held: Yes. The Court agreed with the IBP’s resolution, holding
that the practice of law is not a business but a profession in
which duty to public service and not money is the primary
consideration. By advertising himself as an “Annulment
Specialist,” he undermined the stability and sanctity of
marriage — encouraging people who might have otherwise
been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their
marriage bonds, to do so. In addition, although solicitation of
legal business is not altogether proscribed, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession which the petitioner failed to do. Therefore, the
Court suspended the petitioner from the practice of law for one
year and sternly warned him that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
12. FABILLO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: Florencio Fabillo contracted the services of Atty.
Murillo to revive a lost case over his inheritance from his
deceased sister Justinia. He sought to acquire the San
Salvador and Pugahanay Properties that his sister left behind,
against the latter’s husband. They entered into a contract
where a contingent fee in favor of Atty. Murillo in case the case
was won was agreed upon. The fee was for 40% of the value
of whatever benefit Florencio may derive from the suit – such
as if the properties were sold, rented, or mortgaged. It was
vague, however, regarding the fee in case Florencio or his
heirs decide to occupy the house – allowing Atty. Murillo the
option to occupy or lease 40% of the said house and lot. A
compromise agreement was entered into where Florencio
acquired both the San Salvador and Pugahanay Properties.
Atty. Murillo installed a tenant in the Pugahanay Property; later
on Florencio claimed exclusive rights over the properties
invoking Art. 1491 of the Civil Code. Florencio and Atty. Murillo
both died and were succeeded by their respective heirs.
ISSUE: W/N contingent fees agreed upon are valid.
HELD: Contingent fees are not contemplated by the prohibition
in Art. 1491 disallowing lawyers to purchase properties of their
clients under litigation. The said prohibition applies only during
the pendency of the litigation. Payment of the contingent fee is
made after the litigation, and is thus not covered by the
prohibition. For as long as there is no fraud or undue influence,
or as long as the fees are not exorbitant, the same is valid and
enforceable. It is even recognized by the Canons of
Professional Ethics.
However, considering that the contract is vague on the matter
of division of the shares if Florencio occupies the property; the
ambiguity is to be construed against Atty. Murillo being the one
who drafted the contract and being a lawyer more
knowledgeable about the law. The Court thus, invoking the
time-honored principle that a lawyer shall uphold the dignity of
the legal profession, ordered only a contingent fee of P
3,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees.
13. YU V. BONDAL
Facts: Complainant engaged the services of the respondent
for five case (Rescission of Contracts, Estafa, BP22). It was
agreed by the complainant and respondent to have a retainer
agreement wherein they agreed to have 200,000 acceptance
fee, 1500 for appearance fee and 10% of the collected amount
should they win the case. Complainant issued a check in favor
of defendant in the amount of 51,000 allegedly intended for the
filing of case against Swift Realty and Development. According
to the allegations of the complainant the rescission of contracts
before Swire Realty and Development Corporation was not
filed because of gross negligence of the respondent, the estafa
case was dismissed by the office of the prosecutor and that
she was fraudulently forced to agree to the compromise of the
defendant in the BP22 cases because the respondent said that
he will waive his 10% fee for the realty case. After knowing the
dismissal she demanded twice the document. The case was
assigned to the bar confidant and ordered the respondent to
file a comment which the latter failed to do despite of an
extension thus the bar confidant ordered that she may present
her evidence ex parte. The Bar confidant decided that the case
should be dismiss since the mere allegation of the complaint
does not itself provide a conclusive presumption of gross
negligence of the respondent.
Issue: Whether the respondent should be reprimanded
Held: No. The decision of the office of the prosecutor to
dismiss the case was not attributable to the negligence of the
respondent (if there is any) furthermore failure of the
respondent to appeal to department of justice is the right
choice since the case was already dismiss by two forums. With
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 5
regard to the compromise she had also opportunity to retract
the compromise. As for complainants claim that the amount of
P51,716.54, which was the only amount on record that
complainant paid for respondents legal services, was intended
for the filing fees in the complaint against Swire Development
Corporation, the same was not substantiated as in fact the
retainer agreement does not so confirm. If, admittedly, the only
payment given to complainant by respondent is the amount of
P51,716.54, then complainant still owes respondent more, as
respondent rendered his legal services in 4 out of the 5 cases.
An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute
fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get paid for his
efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation. However,
since respondent had been advised by complainant through
counsel Chavez Laureta and Associates, by letter of July 18,
2001, that she intended to terminate his services, as of said
date, he was obliged, under Rule 22.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, viz:
Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall,
subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with
his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all
information necessary for the proper handling of the matter,
to immediately turn over all papers and property which
complainant entrusted to his successor.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent is, however, hereby directed to RETURN all the
records in his possession relative to the cases he handled for
complainant.
14. SAMONTE V. GATDULA
FACTS: Petitioner is the authorized representative of Flor
Borromeo De leon in an ejectment case before the MTC of
quezon city. A typographical error was committed in the
complaint which stated that the address of defendant is No. 63-
C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. The
mistake was rectified by the filing of an amended complaint
which was admitted by the Court. A decision was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff who subsequently filed a motion for
execution. Complainant however, was surprised to receive a
temporary restraining order signed by Judge Prudencio Castillo
of Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando
Gatdula is the Branch Clerk of Court, enjoining the execution of
the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Complainant
alleges that the issuance of the temporary restraining order
was hasty and irregular as she was never notified of the
application for preliminary injunction.Complainant alleges that
when she went to Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, respondent
blamed her lawyer for writing the wrong address in the
complaint and told her that if she wanted the execution to
proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the law
office of respondent at the same time giving his calling card
with the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and
Celera" otherwise she will not be able to eject. Respondent on
the other hand alleged that sometime before the hearing of the
motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
complainant Samonte went to court "very mad".Respondent
tried to calm her down.. Later the Regional Trial Court granted
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The
complainant went back to court "fuming mad" because of the
alleged unreasonableness of the court in issuing the
injunction.He also claims complainant returned to his office,
and informed him that she wanted to change counsel and that
a friend of hers recommended the Law Finn of "Baligod,
Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera," at the same time
showing a calling card, and asking if he could handle her case.
Respondent refused as he was not connected with the law
firm, although he was invited to join but he chose to remain in
the judiciary. Respondent Gatdula claims that the complainant
must have filed this administrative charge because of her
frustration in procuring the ejectment of the defendant lessee
from the premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the
complaint against him.The case was raffled with the executive
judge of quezon city where she decided in favor of the
respondent.
Issue: Whether Respondent is liable.
Held: Yes. He is reprimanded. "For failure of the complainant
to appear at the several hearings despite notice, she failed to
substantiate her allegations in the complaint particularly that
herein respondent gave her his calling card and tried to
convince her to change her lawyer. This being the case, it
cannot be established with certainty that respondent indeed
gave her his calling card and even convinced her to change
her lawyer. Moreover, as borne by the records of Civil Case
No. Q-96-28187, complainant was duly notified of all the
proceedings leading to the issuance of the TRO and the
subsequent orders of Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr. of
RTC, Branch 220. Complainant's lack of interest in prosecuting
this administrative case could be an indication that her filing of
the charge against the respondent is only intended to harass
the respondent for her failure to obtain a favorable decision
from the Court. However, based on the record of this
administrative case, the calling card attached as Annex "B" of
complainant's affidavit dated September 25, 1996 allegedly
given by respondent to complainant would show that the name
of herein respondent was indeed included in the BALIGOD,
GATDULA, TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW
OFFICES. While respondent denied having assumed any
position in said office, the fact remains that his name is
included therein which may therefore tend to show that he has
dealings with said office. Thus, while he may not be actually
and directly employed with the firm, the fact that his name
appears on the calling card as a partner in the Baligod,
Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give the
impression that he is connected therein and may constitute an
act of solicitation and private practice which is declared
unlawful under Republic Act No. 6713. It is to be noted,
however, that complainant failed to establish by convincing
evidence that respondent actually offered to her the services of
their law office. Thus, the violation committed by respondent in
having his name included/retained in the calling card may only
be considered as a minor infraction for which he must also be
administratively sanctioned."
15. DACANAY V. BAKER & MCKENZIE
Facts: Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay sought to enjoin ten
lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker &
McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
Respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, had
asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay
Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply, denied any liability of Clurman
to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the
lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your
purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not
having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
Issues: Whether or not an alien law firm can practice law in the
Philippines
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 6
Held: No. We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law
firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their
memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership
organized in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in
30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being
members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name
of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker &
Mckenzie. Respondents' use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated
with the firm they could "render legal services”. This is
unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to
practise law here.
16. DIRECTOR OF RELIGOUS AFFAIRS V. BAYOT
Facts: The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged
with malpractice for having published an advertisement in the
Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the
annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having
published the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his
attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed
for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to
repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide
himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In
further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was
published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any
case at law by reason thereof.
Issues: Whether or not such advertisement constitutes
malpractice
Held: Yes. It is undeniable that the advertisement in question
was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other
things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services
or offering them to the public. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be
the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of
Ethics.)
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat
the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that
the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
17. IN RE: TAGORDA
FACTS: The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the
provincial board of Isabela, admits that in the last general
elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and
Ilocano, which in translation, read as follows:
“LUIS B. TAGORDA” Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE
FOR BOARD MEMBER, Province of Isabela. (NOTE.- as
notaty public, he can execute for a deed of sale for the
purchase of land as required by the cadastral office, can renew
lost documents of your animals; can make your application and
final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind
of affidavit. As a lawyer he can help you collect your loans
although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against
you. Come or write to him in his town Echague, Isabela. He
offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the
poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter
addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality
written in Ilocano, which letter reads as follow:
“ I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason
that some people are in the belief that my residence as
member of the Board will be in Iligan and that I would then be
disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary
public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am
free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have
my residence here in Echague, I would request your kind favor
to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your
meeting or social gatherings so that they may be informed of
my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as
lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not
as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection
with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to
handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for
every registration.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the advertisement of Atty. Tagorda
through the card and letter is wrong and be punished.
HELD: Yes. The acts of Atty Tagorda of direct and indirect
advertising and stirring up litigation were violative of the Code
of Ethics. Still, the most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his
brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
It becomes the duty of the court to condemn in no uncertain
terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is
destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the
standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of
the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It
results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise
peacefully inclined citizens.
The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify
permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating,
circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are,
first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of
his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and,
third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future.
Atty. Tagorda is suspended for one month.
18. ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC
FACTS: In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio
Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales, was to move toward
specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms.
Atty. Ulep files a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of
its advertisements which states undignified phrases like--
“Secret Marriage? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Information on
DIVORCE, ANNULMENT, ABSENCE, VISA. The Legal Clinic,
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 7
Inc. Please call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am to
th
6:00pm 7 Floor Victoria Bldg. UN Avenue, Manila.”
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article
entitled Rx for Legal Problems in The Philippine Star because
it is composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s
situation no matter how complicated it is, especially on
marriage problems like the Sharon and Gabby situation.
Citing John Bates vs. The State Bar of Arizona, Atty. Nogales
said that it should be allowed based on this American
Jurisprudence. According to him, there is nothing wrong with
making known the legal services his Legal Clinic has to offer.
ISSUE: Whether or not such advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals,
which is undoubtedly beyond the domain of the paralegals. As
stated in a previous jurisprudence, practice of law is only
reserved for the members of the Philippine bar, and not to
paralegals. As with the Legal Clinic’s advertisements, the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer in
making known his legal services must use only honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner that a
merchant advertise his goods. The Legal Clinic promotes
divorce, secret marriages, bigamous marriages which are
undoubtedly contrary to law.
The only allowed form of advertisements would be: (1.) Citing
your involvement in a reputable law list, (2.) An ordinary
professional card (3.) Phone directory listing without
designation to a lawyer’s specialization.
19. U.S. V. NEY
FACTS: In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant,
J. Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law
in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change
of sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and
as such was not qualified for admission to the bar and an order
was entered accordingly.
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant
Ney, a practicing attorney, to carry on business together,
sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they
had established an office for the general practice of law in all
the courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself
especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish
law. The paper was headed "Law Office Ney & Bosque. Juan
G. Bosque, jurisconsulto español C. W. Ney, abogado
americano."
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally
appeared in the courts, and with one exception, occurring
through an inadvertance, papers from the office were signed
not with the firm name alone nor with any designation of the
firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney & Bosque C. W.
Ney, abogado."
On two occasions, this court refused to consider petitions so
signed with the names of the defendants and the practice
being repeated, ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-
General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon
instituted this proceeding. The defendants disclaim any
intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being within the
law.
Section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that
every pleading must be subscribed by the party or his attorney,
does not permit, and by implication prohibits, a subscription of
the names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise;
therefore a signature containing the name of one neither a
party nor an attorney was not a compliance with this section,
nor was it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the addition
of the individual name of a licensed attorney. The illegality in
this instance was aggravated by the fact that one of the agents
so named was a person residing in these Islands to whom this
court had expressly denied admission to the bar. The papers in
question were irregular and were properly rejected.
ISSUE: Should either of these defendants be thus punished for
contempt?
HELD:
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt
as follows:
"1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted
by a court or judge;
"2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of
his official duties or in his official transactions."
As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or
command of this court has been disobeyed or resisted by the
defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant Bosque can
have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice
law. This order, however, was directly binding upon him,
notwithstanding proceedings taken for its review, and any hope
on his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its
violation. Even had he been entitled under the statute to
practice law without any license from the court and without an
application to it, yet having voluntarily invoked its action, he
was bound by its order made on his own petition. The irregular
signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his
authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to engage
in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting forth the
establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all
the courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right
and purpose, not effectively qualified by the addition that he
would devote himself to consultation and office work relating to
Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the
equipment of a lawyer in the Archipelago, standing on a
different footing from the law of other foreign countries, in
regard to which a skilled person might as a calling, advise
without practicing law. The fact stated on the circular that he
was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of his
professional character in the Islands. Independent of statutory
provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status
disqualified from practicing law.
Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is
obviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer
of the court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, the
defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct
amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In
the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general
practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper signature of
the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible. It is
impossible to say that the signature itself was a violation of the
law, and yet hold guiltless the man who repeatedly wrote it.
Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash
disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 8
our indulgence, while the offensive character of certain papers
recently filed by him forbids us from presuming on the hope of
his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of
members of the bar.
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COMPENSATION FOR LEGAL
SERVICES
20. PEOPLE V. ESTEBIA
FACTS: Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court
of First Instance of Samar and was sentenced to suffer the
capital punishment. On December, Lope Adriano was
appointed as Estebia’s counsel de oficio when his case came
up before the Supreme Court on review. Adriano was required
to prepare and file his brief within 30 days from notice. On
January 19,1967, Adriano sought a 30-day extention to file
appellant’s brief in mimeograph form. On February 18, Adriano
again moved for a 20-day extension. A third extensionwas filed
on March 8 for 15 days. On March 27 Adriano filed for another
15-day extension and on April 11 he moved for a “last”
extension of ten days. However, on April 21 he sought a
special extension of five days. All of these motions for
extension were granted by the Court and the brief was due on
April 26, 1967. However, no brief was filed. For failing to
comply, the Supreme Court resolved to impose upon Adriano a
fine of P500 with a warning that a more drastic disciplinary
action will be taken against him upon further non-compliance.
On December 5, 1968, Adriano was ordered to show cause
why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for
gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office as attorney.
A resolution was personally served upon him on December 18,
1968 however Adriano ignored the said resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct of Atty Lope E. Adriano as
member of the bar deserve disciplinary action.
HELD: Yes, by specific authority, this Court may assign an
attorney to render professional aid to a destitute appellant in a
criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney.
Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the lawyer so
assigned "to render the required service." A lawyer so
appointed "as counsel for an indigent prisoner", our Canons of
Professional Ethics demand, "should always exert his best
efforts" in the indigent's behalf.No excuse at all has been
offered for non-presentation of appellant's brief. And yet,
between December 20, 1966, when he received notice of his
appointment, and December 5, 1968, when the last show
cause order was issued by this Court, more than sufficient time
was afforded counsel to prepare and file his brief de oficio.
In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed,
counsel's statements in his motions for extension have gone
down to the level of empty and meaningless words; at best,
have dubious claim to veracity.Adriano’s pattern of conduct
reveals a propensity to benumb appreciation of his obligation
as counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that
should be accorded this Court.
For the reasons given Attorney Lope E. Adriano was
suspended from the practice of law throughout the Philippines
for a period of one (1) year.
21. JUNIO V. GRUPO
Facts:
Rosario Junio entrusted to Atty. Salvador Grupo, P25,000 to
be used in the redemption of a property in Bohol. For no
reason at all, Atty. Grupo did not redeem the property so the
property was forfeited. Because of this, Junio wanted the
money back but Grupo refused to refund. Instead, Grupo
requested that he use the money to help defray his children’s
educational expenses. It was a personal request to which
Grupo executed a PN. He maintains that the family of the Junio
and Grupo were very close since Junio’s sisters served as
Grupo’s household helpers for many years. Grupo also stated
that the basis of his rendering legal services was purely
gratuitous or “an act of a friend for a friend” with “consideration
involved.” He concluded that there was no atty-client
relationship existing between them.
The case was referred to the IBP and found Grupo liable for
violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Profesisonal
Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money
from their clients. The IBP Board of Governors recommended
that he be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
Grupo filed a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not there was an atty-client relationship.
Held:
Yes. If a person, in respect to his business affairs, consults
with an attorney in his professional capacity and the attorney
voluntarily permits in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established.
Having gained dominance over Junio by virtue of such long
relation of master and servant, Grupo took advantage of his
influence by not returning the money. Grupo has committed an
act which falls short of the standard conduct of an attorney. If
an ordinary borrower of money is required by law to repay his
loan, it is more so in the case of a lawyer whose conduct
serves as an example.
*SC orders Grupo suspended from the practice of law for a
month and to pay Junio within 30 days with interest at the legal
rate.
* Note: 5 yrs. has already passed since the loan.
22. LEVISTE V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of
prision mayor as... minimum to 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to
bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of
flight on his... part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application for bail.
It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending
appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of
appeal should be exercised "with grave caution and only for...
strong reasons." Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled
that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a
prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 9
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the
denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Petitioner's theory is that, where... the penalty imposed by the
trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years
and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.
Issues:
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application
for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial
court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years,
does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending
appeal mean that bail should... automatically be granted
absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. -- Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted...
upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from
non-bailable to bailable, the... application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be
allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency
of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or
his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without
a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.
WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5,... RULE
114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONER'S
INTERPRETATION
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two
scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying
for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years.
The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in
the said paragraph (namely, recidivism,... quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal
confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions
of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the
offense while... under probation, parole or conditional pardon;
circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on
bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the
pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not
present.
The second scenario contemplates the... existence of at least
one of the said circumstances.
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion.
This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate
court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for
bail pending... appeal may be denied even if the bail-
negating[26] circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate court's
denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of... itself, constitute
abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court
exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully
ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact
exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny
or revoke bail pending... appeal. Conversely, if the appellate
court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will
thereby be committed.
On the other hand, if the appellant's case falls within the
second scenario, the appellate court's stringent discretion
requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the
determination of the proof of the presence of any of the
circumstances that are prejudicial to... the allowance of bail.
This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances
is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a
finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will...
simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound
discretion approach.
PETITIONER'S THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY
AND EVOLUTION OF RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL
The development over time of these rules reveals an
orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending
appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock
principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not
with leniency but with grave caution and... only for strong
reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after
conviction for a non-capital offense by the Court of First
Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court)
discretionary.
The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending
appeal favorable to the... appellant-applicant. Bail before final
conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not
punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter of right,
meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage
of the action where the charge was not for a... capital offense
or was not punished by reclusion perpetua.
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-
94 made bail pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 10
perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus,
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid... down more stringent
rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards
approach to bail pending appeal? What is more in conformity
with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is
it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence
of any of the... circumstances under the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of
bail after due consideration of all relevant circumstances, even
if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to
frown on bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in
the United States where our original constitutional and
procedural provisions on bail emanated.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards
the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the
principle that judicial discretion -- particularly with respect to
extending bail -- should be exercised not with laxity but with
caution and only for strong... reasons.
After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of
innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is
rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in
the conviction.
23. RUSTIA V. JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
BATANGAS
FACTS:
On July 31, 1921, the respondent Justo Porcuna, for himself
and on behalf of his wife, Rosa H. de Porcuna, by means of a
written contract, retained the petitioner to represent them as
their lawyer, then pending in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas and in which Rosa H. de Porcuna was the plaintiff
and one Eulalia Magsombol was the defendant. The contract
fixed the petitioner's fee at P200 in advance with an additional
contingent fee of P1,300. It was also provided in the contract
that Justo Porcuna should not compromise the claim against
the defendant in the case without express consent of his
lawyer, the herein petitioner. After trial, the petitioner then
being plaintiffs' attorney of record, the Court of First Instance,
under date of December 24, 1921, rendered judgment in favor
of Justo Porcuna and Rosa H. de Porcuna ordering the
defendant Eulalia Magsombol to return to them 602 pieces of
cloth or in default thereof to pay to them the sum ofP3,250. On
January 14, 1922, Eulalia Magsombol filed her exception to the
judgment and on the following day presented a motion for a
new trial, which was denied on the 21st of the same month.
She thereupon gave notice of appeal and presented a bill of
exceptions which was approved. Petitioner presented a motion
which states that they through Mr. Miguel Olgado, they already
settled this case with the herein defendant and That the basis
of the compromise is that the plaintiffs, finally agree that they
should be paid and recognize not to have any further rights in
this case than to the aforesaid amount of eight hundred pesos
(P800) and that they have no right whatever to any other
amount than the aforementioned.
ISSUE: WON A client may dismiss his lawyer at any stage of
the proceedings
HELD: under section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure a client
may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the
proceedings and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from
appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. (Sec.
34, Code of Civil Procedure.) The client has also an undoubted
right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his
lawyer. In the present instance the clients did nothing that they
did not have a perfect right to do. By appearing personally and
presenting a motion they impliedly dismissed their lawyer. The
petitioner's contingent interests in the judgment rendered did
not appear of record. Neither as a party in interest nor as an
attorney was he therefore entitled to notice of the motion.|
24. ARO V. NAÑAWA
FACTS:
The services of petitioner, as practicing attorney, was engaged
by respondents Luis and Pablo Magtibay for the prosecution of
their claim, as heirs, in the estate of their deceased uncle Lucio
Magtibay. Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay agreed with
herein petitioner to avail of his services and entrust the
prosecution of their claim on a contingent basis.The petitioner
took the necessary steps to gather the needed papers and
documents for the filing of a petition to litigate as pauper and a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, in which
respondents Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay were the
plaintiffs and the other respondents, excepting the respondent
Judge, were the defendants.on October 24, 1964, there was a
conversation which took place between herein petitioner and
the attorney of the defendants, Atty. Rustico de los Reyes, Jr.,
in the civil case and one who was then acting as a sort of
spokesman for the defendants (Ex-mayor Cordova of Sta.
Maria, Laguna)for the amicable settlement of the case between
the plaintiffs and the defendants to the effect that a certain
property of the spouses Lucio Magtibay (deceased) and
respondent Aurelia Martinez,worth P3,000.00, would be given
to the plaintiffs in full settlement of their claim, as share in the
properties left by their deceased uncle Lucio Magtibay, if
having been agreed by herein petitioner and Atty. de los Reyes
and the spokesman of the defendants that for the purpose
ofsaid amicable settlement, the plaintiffs or one of them and
herein petitioner would go to Sta.Maria, Laguna, on October
23, 1964.
On October 28, 1964, petitioner received on the said day a
second motion to dismiss dated October 26, 1964, together
with Annex 'A' of said motion, which is entitled KASULATAN
NG PAGHAHATIAN NA LABAS SA HUKUMAN AT
PAGPAPALABI, dated October 23, 1964at Sta. Cruz, Laguna
and signed by the plaintiffs and defendant Aurelia Martinez
(the three being now respondents in this case), it having been
made to appear that the plaintiffs and defendant Aurelia
Martinez had made an extrajudicial partition of the properties of
the deceased Lucio Magtibay and the said Aurelia Martinez
adjudicating to the plaintiffs one-fourth (1/4) share inthe
properties of the spouses and three-fourth (3/4) share of the
defendant Aurelia Martinez, but making it appear also that said
plaintiffs waived their share in favor of Aurelia Martinez, thru
which fraudulent waiver, herein petitioner was deprived of his
contingent fees, agreed upon.Petitioner filed his opposition to
the second motion to dismiss and prayed, among
others,invoking the provisions of Section 5(d) and Section 6,
Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court,for the protection of the
rights of herein petitioner as an officer of the Court. The
respondent Judge, instead of denying the second motion to
dismiss and fixing his attorney's fees in the said case and
recording the same as lien, dismissed the case and refused to
give herein petitioner any kind of immediate protection to
safeguard his rights.Upon these facts, petitioner tries to make
out before this Court a case of certiorari for grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge in dismissing the
case on the basis of the compromise agreement of the parties,
entered into at the back of petitioner, notwithstanding the
reservation made in his favor to file an action against both
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 11
parties "with respect to his alleged attorney's fees," as well as
a case of mandamus "to order and command the said
respondent judge" to take cognizance of and resolve his
opposition and countermotion for the court to fix the
compensation he should be paid.
ISSUE: WON there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondent Judge
RULING:
Under Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics,"in fixing
fees, it should not be forgotten that the profession is a branch
of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting
trade."In the case at bar, by entering into the compromise
agreement in question and even inserting therein a prayer to
the court to dismiss their case filed by petitioner, petitioner's
clients impliedly dismissed him. In other words, through the
services of petitioner, his clients secured, in effect, a
recognition, which had been previously denied by their aunt-in-
law, that they were entitled to a1/4 share in the estate left by
their uncle. The court also held that under these
circumstances, and since it appears that said clients have no
other means to pay petitioner, since they instituted their case
as paupers, and that their aunt-in-law was aware of the terms
of their contract of professional services with petitioner, said
clients had no right to waive the portion of their such
acknowledged rights in favor of their opponent to the extent
that such waiver would prejudice the stipulated contingent
interest of their lawyer and their aunt-in- law had no right to
accept such waiver unqualifiedly.Under the circumstance
extant in the record, it is clear that the compromise agreement
in question falls short of the moral requirements of this quoted
article of the Civil Code. If for this reason alone, it should not
be allowed to prejudice the rights of petitioner. Accordingly, as
all of these circumstances were presented to respondent judge
before he issued the challenged order of dismissal and all the
parties were heard thereon, it was incumbent upon His Honor,
in equity and to avoid multiplicity of suits, particularly, because
the amount claimed by petitioner is only P1,000.00, to have
directly passed upon petitioner's claim, and not having done
so, it would appear that the court a quo abused its discretion
gravely enough to warrant the writ of certiorari herein prayed
for in so far as the questioned orders prejudiced petitioner's
right to the fees for the professional services which appear to
have been creditably rendered by him. Respondents allege
that the judgment of dismissal in question is already final
because no appeal was taken there from, but since We hold
that the same was rendered with enough grave abuse of
discretion to warrant the certiorari prayed for, such alleged
finality could not have materialized; obviously, petitioner could
not have appealed, not being a party in the case.The orders of
the respondent court dated November 21, 1964 and January 9,
1965 in Civil Case No. SC-525 are hereby set aside in so far
as they prejudice the payment of petitioner's claim of attorney's
fees in the form of either one-third of the 1/4 share
acknowledged as his clients in the compromise in question or
P1,000.00, which should constitute as a lien on the said share,
in spite of the waiver thereof in favor of respondent Aurelia
Martinez. It is unnecessary to consider the petition for
mandamus
25. OROCIO V. ANGULUAN
Facts:
On 8 June 2001, Congress passed the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act (EPIRA). EPIRA directed the restructuring of the
power industry which includes the reorganization of
NAPOCOR. Thus, the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund Department
and other departments were abolished.
Pursuant to Resolution No. 2004-001, herein respondent
Edmund P. Anguluan (Anguluan), as Ex-Officio Chairman of
the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund Board of Trustees NAPOCOR-
WFBT, issued a memorandum on 17 May 2004 to implement
the release of P184 million only to the EPIRA separated
members
This prompted Mrs. Perla A. Segovia, former Ex-Officio
Chairman of the NAPOCOR-WFBT, in behalf of the 559 non-
EPIRA separated members (those who have resigned, retired,
or separated prior to the effectivity of EPIRA) and in her own
personal capacity, to write a letter to the NAPOCOR President,
demanding their equal shares in the remaining assets of the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund.
There being no action or response on her letter, the non-
EPIRA separated members, filed with the RTC-Quezon City a
Petition for Mandamus, Accounting and Liquidation with a
Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and Injunction against
respondents NAPOCOR, the NAPOCOR Board, Anguluan and
Lorna T. Dy (as Senior Department Manager on Finance).
The non-EPIRA separated members were represented by
petitioner Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio under a "Legal Retainer
Agreement":
4. Contingency or success fees of fifteen percent
(15%) of whatever amounts/value of assets (liquid
and/or non-liquid) are recovered;
On 22 February 2006, the parties in the case executed a
Compromise Agreement :
1. Both the NPC EPIRA separated members and
NPC non-EPIRA separated members are entitled to
"Earnings Differential" of the NPC Welfare Fund;
5. As of March 2006, the estimated Corrected
Earnings Differential for the non-EPIRA separated
members is ₱119.196 Million while for the EPIRA
separated members is ₱173.589 Million or a total of
₱292.785 Million, inclusive of the 6% legal interest;
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Approval of Charging
(Attorney’s) Lien. The RTC granted petitioner’s motion and
decreed that he is entitled to collect the amount so demanded.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Execution of the RTC Order. Respondents opposed the
motion on the ground that there was no stipulation in the
Compromise Agreement to the effect that petitioner is entitled
to collect an amount equivalent to 15% of the monies due the
non-EPIRA separated members.
The RTC issued an Order on 25 July 2006 granting petitioner’s
Motion.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA held
that petitioner was entitled to only P1M as attorney’s fees on
the basis of quantum meruit.
Issue:
W/N petitioner is entitled to 15% contingency fee – Only 10%
Held:
It should be made clear that petitioner is the counsel for the
non-EPIRA separated members. Petitioner was never hired or
employed by respondents as their counsel in the cases at bar.
In fact, petitioner is representing the non-EPIRA separated
members, the opposing party to the respondents in the present
cases.
It appears, however, that none of the non-EPIRA separated
members has questioned or complained about petitioners
claim for attorney’s fees.
The Compromise Agreement was submitted to the RTC for
approval through the joint motion of the non-EPIRA separated
members and respondents, and the RTC had rendered a final
and executory decision approving the same. By virtue of res
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 12
judicata, the Court of Appeals cannot alter or change the terms
of the Compromise Agreement by prohibiting petitioner from
collecting his stipulated amount of attorney’s fees.
The client and his lawyer may enter into a written contract
whereby the latter would be paid attorney’s fees only if the suit
or litigation ends favorably to the client. This is called a
contingency fee contract. The amount of attorney’s fees in this
contract may be on a percentage basis, and a much higher
compensation is allowed in consideration of the risk that the
lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. In the case at bar, the
non-EPIRA separated members and petitioner voluntarily
entered into a contingency fee contract whereby petitioner did
not receive any acceptance fee or appearance/meeting fee.
However, contingent fees should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness, such that
under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees.
The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves)
may be a basis for determining the reasonable amount of
attorney’s fees.
The SC found that were it not for petitioner’s vigilance and
zeal, respondents would not have executed the Compromise
Agreement with the non-EPIRA separated members. Hence, it
is fair to conclude that petitioner was entitled to a reasonably
high compensation.
However, petitioner’s attorney’s fees should be equitably
reduced to 10%.
26. PINEDA V. DE JESUS
Facts:
On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage against petitioner Vinson Pineda in RTC-
Pasig. Petitioner was represented by respondents Attys.
Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano.
The parties agreed on a settlement on the visitation rights over
their minor child, which was approved by the court.
Subsequently, their marriage was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-
compensated. They, including their relatives and friends, even
availed of free products and treatments from petitioner’s
dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed petitioner
additional legal fees amounting to P16.5M, which the latter
refused to pay. Petitioner issued them several checks totaling
P1.12M as full payment.
Respondents filed with the RTC a motion for payment of
lawyers fees for P50M. The RTC ordered petitioner to pay P5M
to Atty. de Jesus and P2M each to Atty. Ambrosio and Atty.
Mariano. On appeal, the CA reduced the amounts to P1M and
P500k each respectively.
Issue:
W/N the respondents are entitled to additional legal fees – NO
Held:
The professional engagement between petitioner and
respondents was governed by the principle of quantum meruit
which means as much as the lawyer deserves. The recovery of
attorneys fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case, where
there is no express agreement for the payment of attorneys
fees.
Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerning
their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees
should be avoided and should be filed only when
circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.
In the case at bar, respondents’ motion for payment of their
lawyers fees was not meant to collect what was justly due
them; the fact was, they had already been adequately paid.
Demanding P50M on top of the generous sums and perks
already given to them was an act of unconscionable greed
which is shocking to this Court.
As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are
members of an honorable profession, the primary vision of
which is justice. It is respondents’ despicable behavior which
gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some people. The
vernacular has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of
law is a decent profession and not a money-making trade.
Compensation should be but a mere incident.
27. RILLORAZA V. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PHILS., INC.
DOCTRINE:
Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a
reasonable compensation which lawyers may receive for their
professional services. A lawyer has the right to be paid foe the
legal services he has extended to his client, which
compensation must be reasonable. A lawyer would be entitled
to receive what he merits for his services. Otherwise stated,
the amount must be determined on a quantum meruit basis.
FACTS:
Eastern Telecommunications, Phils., Inc. (ETPI) represented
by the law firm SAGA, filed with the Regional Trial Court a
complaint for the recovery or revenue shares against PLDT.
Atty. Rilloriza, a partner of the firm appeared for ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount. The
latter was dissolved and the junior partners formed RADA,
which took over as counsel in the case for EPTI. ETPI signed a
retainer agreement with counsel wherein it was stated that in
cases of collection or judicial action, “our attorney’s fees shall
be 15% of the amounts collected or the vaule of the property
acquired or liability saved.” The retainer agreement was
terminated in 1988. The next day, RADA filed a notice of
attorney’s lien. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there
were negotiations toward a compromise between ETPI and
PLDT.
In 1990, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and the
same was entered as a judgement. The petitioner, RADA filed
a motion for the enforcement of attorney’s lien.
ISSUE:
Is RADA entitled to the awards of attorney’s fees that they are
claiming?
HELD:
RADA is entitled to attorney’s fees but the Supreme Court
remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination
of the amount of attorney’s fees to which the petitioner is
entitled.
Atty. Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until ETPI
terminated the law firm’s services in 1988. Petitioner’s claim for
attorney’s fees hinges on two grounds: First, the fact that Atty.
Rilloraza personally handled the case when he was working for
SAGA. Second, the retainer agreement. Whether there is an
agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers may receive for their professional
services. A lawyer has the right to be paid foe the legal
services he has extended to his client, which compensation
must be reasonable. A lawyer would be entitled to receive what
he merits for his services. Otherwise stated, the amount must
be determined on a quantum meruit basis.
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 13

28. TAN TEK BENG V. DAVID
FACTS:
Atty. Timoteo David and Tan Tek Beng, a non-lawyer, entered
an agreement. Where in the agreement lawyer David did not
only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an
intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself
not to deal directly with the clients.
However, mutual accusations of double-cross ended such.
Hence, Tan Tek Beng denounced David to the President
Assistant, Office of the Civil Relation and to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said agreement is tantamount to
malpractice.
HELD:
The Court held that the said agreement is void because it was
tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers”. The practice of law is a
profession and not a business. A lawyer may not seek or
obtain employment by himself or through others. The Court
censures David for entering such void and unethical
agreement and discountenances his conduct, not because of
the complaints, but because David should have known better.
Respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.
29. DE GUZMAN V. VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT CO., INC.
FACTS:
The respondent, Nicolas Concepcion, engaged the
professional services of the petitioner for the purpose of
obtaining the suppression, reduction and refund of certain toll
rates on various bridges along the line operated by the
respondent transportation company. At the time of the
employment of the petitioner, it appears that the respondent
transportation companies had paid the sum of P89,816.70 as
toll charges up to December 31, 1932, an amount said to
represent one-seventh of their gross income up to that date,
and in view of their high rates, the payment of the toll charges
were detrimental to the transportation business of the
respondent if not remedied in time. The herein petitioner
accordingly took steps to obtain first the suppression, and later
the reduction of toll rates on said bridges and also the refund of
P50,000 of toll charges already collected by the Province of
Occidental Negros.
As a result of this reduction of tolls, the respondents have been
benefited with an economy of PhP 78,448.00 for every
eighteen months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to reasonable
compensation.
HELD:
Yes. Although the professional services rendered by the
petitioner are purely administrative and did not require a high
degree of professional skill and experience, the fact remains
that these services were rendered and were productive of
substantial beneficial results of his client.
Section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "a
lawyer shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for the services
rendered, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of
the controversy, to the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the lawyer . . .." The following are the
circumstances to be considered in determining the
compensation of an attorney: the amount and character of the
services rendered; the labor, time, and trouble involved; the
nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the
services were rendered; the responsibility imposed; the
amount of money or the value of the property affected by the
controversy, or involved in the employment, the skill and
experience called for in the performance of the services; the
professional character and social standing of the attorney; the
results secured; and whether or not the fee is absolute or
contingent, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may
properly charge a much a larger fee when it is to be contingent
that when it is not.
30. DEE V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner and his father went to the residence of private
respondent, accompanied by the latter’s cousin, to seek his
advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of
petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar’s Palace, a well-
known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Private
respondent personally talked with the president of Caesar’s
Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised the president that
for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better
to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The
president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to
acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be exculpated
from liability for the account.
Upon private respondent’s return to Manila, he conferred with
Ramon Sy and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the
indebtedness. In August, 1981, private respondent brought to
Caesar’s Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and
asking for a discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee
was cleared and the casino never bothered him. Having thus
settled the account of petitioner’s brother, private respondent
sent several demand letters to petitioner demanding the
balance of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Petitioner, however,
ignored said letters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an attorney-client relationship between
parties.
HELD:
Yes. Court affirmed the decision of the defendant Court of
Appeals. Costs against the petitioner.
There is no question that professional services were actually
rendered by private respondent to petitioner and his family.
Through his efforts, the account of petitioner’s brother, Dewey
Dee, with Caesar’s Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and
petitioner and his family were further freed from the
apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by
the so-called mafia. For such services, respondent Mutuc is
indubitably entitled to receive a reasonable compensation and
this right cannot be concluded by petitioner’s pretension that at
the time private respondent rendered such services to
petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine
consultant of Caesar’s Palace.
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 14
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and
reasonable compensation for services rendered at the special
instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly
and in good faith trying to serve and represent the interests of
his client, the latter is bound to pay his just fees.
31. TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-
INDEPENDENT V. NLRC
Facts:
Petitioner Union and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel
A. Cruz, head of the E.N.A. Cruz and Associates law firm,
entered into a retainer agreement on February 26, 1987
whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly
retainer fee of P3,000.00 in consideration of the law firms
undertaking to render the services enumerated in their
[1]
contract. Parenthetically, said retainer agreement was
terminated by the union on April 4, 1990. During the existence
of that agreement, petitioner union referred to private
respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and
year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank
(TRB). After the appropriate complaint was filed by private
respondent, the case was certified by the Secretary of Labor to
the National Labor Relations Commission. NLRC Decision –
Favored the employees, awarding them holiday pay
differential, mid-year bonus differential, and year-end bonus
differential. TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC before
the Supreme Court. The Court, modified the decision of the
NLRC by deleting the award of mid-year and year-end bonus
differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay
differential. The bank voluntarily complied with such final
judgment and determined the holiday pay differential to be in
the amount of P175,794.32. Petitioner never contested the
amount thus found by TRB. Private Respondent notified the
petitioner union, the TRB management and the NLRC of his
right to exercise and enforce his attorneys lien over the award
of holiday pay differential. Thereafter, private respondent filed
a motion before the Labor Arbiter for the determination of his
attorneys fees, praying that 10% of the total award for holiday
pay differential computed by TRB at P175,794.32, or the
amount of P17,579.43, be declared as his attorneys fees, and
that petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit said amount
to him. After considering the position of the parties, the labor
[15]
arbiter issued an order on November 26, 1991 granting the
motion of private respondent. This constrained petitioner to file
an appeal with the NLRC seeking a reversal of that order.
NLRC Decision - Affirmed the order of the labor arbiter.
CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES
Petitioner – NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the award of
attorneys fees granted as holiday pay differential to its
members, in violation of the retainer agreement.
Private Respondent - His motion to determine attorneys fees
was just an incident of the main case where petitioner was
awarded its money claims.
Issue:
Whether or not Cruz should have been awarded attorney’s
fees
Ratio:
Firstly, there is no showing that private respondent
unequivocally opted to waive the additional charges in
consonance with Part D of the agreement. Secondly, the
prompt actions taken by private respondent, i.e., serving notice
of charging lien and filing of motion to determine attorneys
fees, belie any intention on his part to renounce his right to
compensation for prosecuting the labor case instituted by the
union. And, lastly, to adopt such theory of petitioner may
frustrate private respondents right to attorneys fees.
[31]
Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. One of the
sources of extra-contractual obligations found in our Civil Code
is the quasi-contract premised on the Roman maxim that nemo
cum alterius detrimento locupletari protest. A quasi-contract
between the parties in the case at bar arose from private
respondents lawful, voluntary and unilateral prosecution of
petitioners cause without awaiting the latters consent and
approval. Petitioner cannot deny that it did benefit from private
respondents efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an
award of holiday pay differential in favor of the union. It cannot
even hide behind the cloak of the monthly retainer of
P3,000.00 paid to private respondent because, as
demonstrated earlier, private respondents actual rendition of
legal services is not compensable merely by said amount.
Private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration for
pursuing legal action in the interest of petitioner before the
labor arbiter and the NLRC, on top of the P3,000.00 retainer
fee he received monthly from petitioner. In any case, whether
there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers should receive for their
[37]
professional services. However, the value of private
respondents legal services should not be established on the
basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code alone. In the first place,
the fees mentioned here are the extraordinary attorneys fees
recoverable as indemnity for damages sustained by and
payable to the prevailing part. In the second place, the 10%
attorneys fees provided for in Article 111 of the Labor Code
and Section 11, Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules is
the maximum of the award that may thus be granted. Article
111 thus fixes only the limit on the amount of attorneys fees
the victorious party may recover in any judicial or
administrative proceedings and it does not even prevent the
NLRC from fixing an amount lower than the ten percent (10%)
ceiling prescribed by the article when circumstances warrant it.
The measure of compensation for private respondents services
as against his client should properly be addressed by the rule
of quantum meruit long adopted in this jurisdiction, meaning as
much as he deserves. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a
device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable
postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without
[43]
paying for it.
32. FABILLO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
(REPEAT CASE #12)
33. RAMOS V. NGASEO
Facts:
Petitioner’s side of the story
Petitioner went to private respondent’s Makati office to engage
[1]
his services as counsel in a case involving a piece of land in
San Carlos, Pangasinan. Respondent agreed to handle the
case with appearance fee and the cost of meals, transportation
and other incidental expenses. Complainant alleges that he did
not promise to pay the respondent 1,000 sq. m. of land as
appearance fees. On September 16, 1999, complainant went
to the respondent’s office to inquire about the status of the
case. Respondent informed him that the decision was adverse
to them because a congressman exerted pressure upon the
trial judge. Respondent however assured him that they could
still appeal the adverse judgment and asked for the additional
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 15

amount of P3,850.00 and another P2,000.00 on September 26,
2000 as allowance for research made. Although an appeal was
filed, complainant however charges the respondent of
purposely failing to submit a copy of the summons and copy of
the assailed decision. Subsequently, complainant learned that
the respondent filed the notice of appeal 3 days after the lapse
of the reglementary period. Complainant received a demand-
letter from the respondent asking for the delivery of the 1,000
sq. m. piece of land which he allegedly promised as payment
for respondent’s appearance fee which also contains a threat
wherein respondent would file a case in court if the
complainant would not confer with him and settle the matter
within 30 days.
Private Respondent’s side of the story
Respondent alleged that a former client, Federico Ramos and
his brother, Dionisio, went to his Makati office to engage his
professional services in connection with a 2-hectare parcel of
land situated in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Complainant, who
was deaf and could only speak conversational Tagalog
haltingly, was assisted by his brother Dionisio. Complainant,
through Dionisio, avers that he has consulted 2 local lawyers
but did not engage their services because they were
demanding exorbitant fees Respondent agreed to handle the
case for an acceptance fee of P60,000.00 plus an appearance
fee of P3,000.00 per hearing. Complainant told him that he
would consult his siblings on the matter. Six months later
complainant, assisted by one Jose Castillo, went to
respondents office to discuss the legal fees. Complainant,
through Castillo, told respondent that he was willing to pay an
acceptance fee of P40,000.00, P20,000.00 of which shall be
paid upon engagement and the remaining P20,000.00 to be
paid after their treasure hunt operations in Nueva Viscaya were
terminated. Further, complainant offered, in lieu of P3,000.00
per appearance, 1,000 sq. m. of land from the land subject
matter of the case, if they win, or from another piece of
property, if they lose. In addition, complainant also offered to
defray the expenses for transportation, meals and other
incidental expenses. Respondent accepted the complainants
offer.
Respondent claims that after the trial court dismissed the case,
he filed a timely notice of appeal and thereafter moved to be
discharged as counsel because he had colon cancer.
Complainant, now assisted by one Johnny Ramos, implored
respondent to continue handling the case, with an offer to
double the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land earlier promised and the
remaining balance of P20,000.00 acceptance fee. The Court of
Appeals rendered a favorable decision ordering the return of
the disputed 2-hectare land to the complainant and his siblings.
Since then complainant allegedly failed to contact respondent,
which compelled him to send a demand letter.
Complainant filed a complaint before the IBP charging
respondent Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000
sq. m. parcel of land which was the subject of litigation.
IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found the
respondent guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that he be suspended from
[4]
the practice of law for 1 year.
Issue:
Whether or not the IBP was wrong in its decision in ruling
Ngaseo as guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer.
Ratio:
Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited
from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property
or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which
[7]
they intervene by virtue of their profession. The prohibition on
purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private
individuals but also public or judicial sales. The rationale
advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the
transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e.,
the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control
[8]
exercised by these persons. However, the said prohibition
applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the clients
property. Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was
violated, the illegal transaction was consummated with the
actual transfer of the litigated property either by purchase or
assignment in favor of the prohibited individual.
In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the
property in litigation since the respondent only made a written
demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to
comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does
not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited
transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even
assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical,
respondents act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491.
The letter of demand dated January 29, 2003 was made long
after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final
and executory on January 18, 2002.
We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted
by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-
47, does not clearly specify which acts of the respondent
constitute gross misconduct or what provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility have been violated. We find the
recommended penalty of suspension for 6 months too harsh
and not proportionate to the offense committed by the
respondent. The power to disbar or suspend must be
exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will
[12]
disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty. All
considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and reasonable.
34. LIJAUCO V. TERRADO
FACTS: The present was complaint was prompted by the
alleged inability of the respondent lawyer to “meet his end of
the bargain” after collecting excessive lawyer’s fees. He was
the counsel of the petitioner who gave him P 70,000 for the
recovery of P 180,000 from the Planter’s Bank and the release
of the petitioner’s foreclosed lot in Laguna as well. It was also
alleged that he only appeared as counsel for the petitioner for
the recovery of the bank deposit and did not appear in the
hearing of the Writ of Possession of the lot in Laguna. In his
denial, the respondent claims that the amount he collected was
only for the recovery of deposit and not for the recovery of the
foreclosed lot. He claimed further that the amount was not
excessive for it was the referral fees for two other individuals
who were non-lawyers. Upon investigation, it was found that he
was involved in the release of the foreclosed Laguna lot
because he was the one who made the Compromise
Agreement in favor of the client. The IBPCommission on
Discipline found his acts violative of the Code of Professional
responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not he indeed violated the Code of
Professional responsibility.
HELD: The Supreme Court approved the decision of the
Commission on discipline that he violated the Code of
Professional responsibility specifically Canon 9.2. By openly
admitting he divided the Php 70,000.00 to other individuals as
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 16
commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for
legal services with persons not licensed to practice law. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that
they possessed and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at
all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Respondent’s
claim that the attorney’s fee pertains only to the recovery of
complainant’s savings deposit from Planter’s Development
Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as
complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the compromise
agreement between the latter and the bank relative to LRC
Case No. B-2610. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the
duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. The canons of the legal
profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a
case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost
devotion.
35. BURPE V. MAGULTA
FACTS:
On September 1998, respondent agreed to legally represent
petitioner Dominador Burbe in a money claim and possible civil
case against certain parties for breach of contract. In
consequence to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta
prepared the demand letter and some other legal papers, for
which services he was accordingly paid and an amount of
P25,000.00 for the required filing fee. A week later, petitioner
was informed by the respondent that the complaint had already
been filed in court, and that he should receive notice of its
progress. The petitioner waited for several months for the
notice from the court but there was no progress in the case, he
was also inquired repeatedly in the respondent’s Law Office,
however he was told to just wait.
The petitioner decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court
with the draft of Atty. Magulta’s complaint to personally verify
the progress of the case, and there told that there was no
record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on his
behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999. As such,
the petitioner confronted the latter. The respondent admitted
that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent
the money for the filing fee for his own purpose he offered to
reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and
June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00.
The petitioner filed a case against Atty. Magulta for
misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct. The
respondent denied the allegations and alleged that he was
never been paid by complainant for his acceptance and legal
fees and that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the
acceptance fee
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Magulta is liable for
misrepresentation of funds given to him for the filing fee.
HELD:
YES. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys
of their clients and properties that may come into their
possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in
gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal
of public confidence in the legal profession. It may be true that
they have a lien upon the client’s funds, documents and other
papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they
may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have
been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the
satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these
considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly
account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct. In any event, they must
still exert all effort to protect their client’s interest within the
bounds of law.
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted
into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client
and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the
former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his
breach of duty.
36. CENIZA V. RUBIA
Facts: Atty. Rubia’s legal service was sought by the
complainant, her mother-in-law, for the partition and recovery
of ownership/possession representing legitime of the estate of
her husband Carlos Ceniza. As the complainant was coming
from the United States, the respondent made her sign a
promissory note for P32, 000.00 for attorney’s fees, which
amount was lent by Domingo Natavio. After her mother-in-law
arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished them a copy of
the complaint but with no docket number on it. Three months
lapsed before respondent informed them that it was already
filed in court. It was then that they received a copy of the
complaint with Civil Case No. 4198 and a rubber stamped
RECEIVED thereon. However, when complainant verified the
status of the case with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with
said title and docket number was filed. Further, complainant
alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for intending to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when
the properties to be recovered were located in Koronadal,
South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani Province, in
violation of the rule on venue. Complainant also alleged that
respondent forged the signature of her husband, Carlito C.
Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss. Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza
charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with grave misconduct, gross
ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents.
In her comment, respondent assailed the personality of the
complainant to institute the administrative complaint for
disbarment and that her allegations in the administrative
complaint were all hearsay, self-serving and unsubstantiated.
Further, the charge of forgery of the Affidavit of Loss was
belied by the March 3, 2003 decision of the trial court, wherein
Carlito C. Ceniza affirmed his statements in the said affidavit
when he was called to testify.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be found guilty of falsification of public document
and be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of three years. However, the Board of
Governors reconsidered by reducing the recommended
penalty of disbarment to five years suspension from the
practice of law.
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 17
Issue: The sole issue in this case is whether or not there is
preponderant evidence to warrant the imposition of
administrative sanction against the respondent.
Ruling: No. A perusal of the records shows that complainant’s
evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and the
annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all the
mandatory conferences set by the investigating commissioner
in order to give respondent the chance to test the veracity of
her assertions. Complainant failed to disprove by preponderant
evidence respondents claim that the case was not filed but was
in fact withdrawn after it was stamped with RECEIVED and
assigned with a docket number. We find this explanation
satisfactory and plausible considering that the stamp did not
bear the signature of the receiving court personnel, which is
normally done when pleadings are received by the court.
However, we find that respondent committed some acts for
which she should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned.
We find nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondent’s act of
charging an acceptance fee but the impropriety lies in the fact
that she suggested that complainant borrow money from
Domingo Natavio for the payment thereof. This act impresses
upon the Court that respondent would do nothing to the cause
of complainants mother-in-law unless payment of the
acceptance fee is made. Her duty to render legal services to
her client with competence and diligence should not depend on
the payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case
promised to be paid upon the arrival of complainant’s mother-
in-law.
Respondent’s transgression is compounded further when she
severed the lawyer-client relationship due to overwhelming
workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of
Companies, which constrained her to return the money
received as well as the records of the case, thereby leaving her
client with no representation. Standing alone, heavy workload
is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services.
Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line of
communication with her client regarding the status of their
complaint.
Fallo:
Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyers Oath which imposes
upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for
money or malice, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, and
Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or
gratis et amore, he undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill
and competence to it, regardless of its significance. Thus, his
client, whether rich or poor, has the right to expect that he will
discharge his duties diligently and exert his best efforts,
learning and ability to prosecute or defend his (clients) cause
with reasonable dispatch.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Vivian G. Rubia is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 18.03 and
Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that similar
infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
37. NAVARRO V. SOLIDUM
Facts: This case originated from a complaint for disbarment
filed by Natividad P. Navarro (Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero
(Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD).
Presbitero and her daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo),
engaged in the services of Atty. Solidum for each of their own
cases concerning land. Yulo, pursuant to her land registration
case, convinced her sister, Natividad P. Navarro (Navarro), to
finance the expenses. Navarro paid P200,000.00 for the
registration expenses, but later learned that the property was
already registered in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro
alleged that she would not have spent for the registration of the
property if respondent only apprised her of the real situation of
the property.
Meanwhile, Atty. Solidum obtained loans in two different dates
for P1,000,000.00 each from Navarro under a MOA with 10%
interest for a period of 1 year secured by postdated checks and
a real estate mortgage over his property in Bacolod City, to
finance his sugar trading business. At the same time,
respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000 from Presbitero
covered by a third MOA with the same terms also secured by
postdated checks, except that the real estate mortgage was
over a different property in Bacolod City. Atty. Solidum was
able to pay complainants a total of P900,000.00 but thereafter
failed and his checks were drawn against his closed accounts.
Atty. Solidum promised to pay but asked for reduction of the
interest for the succeeding months.
Respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand,
Presbitero terminated the services of respondent as counsel.
Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of
the mortgages executed by respondent in their favor.
Complainants also filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.
Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in
sugar and realty business and that it was Yulo who convinced
Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Respondent
alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business
was good but he was unable to continue paying when the price
of sugar went down. He claimed that complainants were
aware that he could no longer open a current account and they
were the ones who proposed that his wife and son issue the
checks.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the
penalty of disbarment. The IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD with
modification by reducing the recommended penalty from
disbarment to suspension from the practice of law for two
years.
Issue: The only issue in this case is whether respondent
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling: Yes. The records show that respondent violated at
least four provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect
to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect
to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed
respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements.
Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates
(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 18
were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he
assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued
checks that were drawn from his son's account whose name
was similar to his without informing complainants. Further,
there is nothing in the records that will show that respondent
paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from
complainants.

Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel

and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received for or from his client.
We agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this
duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent
received various amounts from complainants but he could not
account for all of them. His failure to return the excess money
in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.

Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was

not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the
client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the
legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In his dealings
with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his
knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence
reposed in him by his client.

We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

imposing on respondent the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we
see no reason to deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-
CBD imposing on respondent the penalty of disbarment.

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.
GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law
effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.

(PALE 3B – WEEK 2) 19