People V.

Vera

Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine Islands and the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and
the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case.

The information in the aforesaid criminal case was 􏰋led with the Court of First
Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial
unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by
the court as well as in the volume of the testimony and the bulk of exhibits presented, the
Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction
sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prison mayor, to pay
the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modi􏰋ed the
sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision
correccional to seven years, six months and twenty- seven days of prison mayor, but
affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng 􏰋led a motion for
reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on
December 17, 1935, and 􏰋nal judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935.
The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November,
1936. This court, on November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently 􏰋led by the
defendant for leave to 􏰋le a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and
thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation 􏰋led by
the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court,
under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the
crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe
good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason
presiding, referred the application for probation to the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same on June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First
Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for
hearing on April 5, 1937.

On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila 􏰋led an opposition to the
granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private
prosecution also 􏰋led an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that
Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the
Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability
is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of said Act No. 4221 endows
the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their
respective provinces. The private prosecution also 􏰋led a supplementary opposition on
April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality of Act No. 4221, as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces.

Vera concluded respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional"
of the crime for which he stands convicted by this court in G. R. No. 41200, but denying
the latter's petition for probation.

On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng 􏰋led an
exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to 􏰋le a motion for
reconsideration.

Petioners:

To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari
and prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:

I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng under probation for the following reasons:

(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said Act of the Philippine Legislature
is made to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be
made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.

(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect
that in the absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include
the City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also
true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only
to those provinces in which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the
salary of a probation officer.

(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No.
4221 would not be applicable to it because it has not provided for the salary of a probation
o􏰋cer as required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular
Probation O􏰋ce willing to act for the City of Manila, said Probation Office provided for in
section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided
for in section 11 of the same Act.

Respondent:

It does not infringe the equal protection clause of the constitution.

Application: In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man.

He is not 􏰋nally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment
which the law in􏰋icts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated
by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the
probation may be de􏰋nitely terminated and the probationer 􏰋nally discharged from
supervision only after the period of probation shall have been terminated and the
probation o􏰋cer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the
probationer has complied with the conditions of probation.

Rule:

Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But
classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted.

The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions

which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not
be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

One province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation
officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation
Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a
person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the
bene􏰋ts of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another
province would be denied those same bene􏰋ts. This is obnoxious discrimination.
Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary
funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case
no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in
each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial
boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act
would be entitled to avail of the bene􏰋ts of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting
inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for
the salary of the probation officer — which is the situation now — and, also, if we accept
the contention that, for the purposes of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be
considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any
appropriation for the salary of a probation officer.

Section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality
are permitted or allowed.

We see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which
permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibition.

Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several
provinces and not be in force in the other provinces, but one province may appropriate
for the salary of a probation officer of a given year — and have probation during that year
— and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation in
subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which
delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation
which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act,
to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand".

Conclusion:

It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salaries
of probation o􏰋cers were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act
would still be valid and may be enforced.

We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void
because it is also repugnant to the equal- protection clause of our Constitution.

Ichong v. Hernandez

Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships,
or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above
prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are
allowed to continue to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for
ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical
persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United
States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor
and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional
stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in
the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified
statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the
business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal o􏰋ces of juridical
entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business
who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought
this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin
the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality
of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law.

Issue: Whether or not Act 1180 denies to alien the equal protection of the laws.

c. The equal protection clause. —

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a speci􏰋ed class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824- 825.)

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation

a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. —

The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of
the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the
distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes
allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal
convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and pro􏰋t. His aim or purpose of stay, we
admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty
and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of
that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would
prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he
makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved
kin and country men. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown
such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his pro􏰋t, that
it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a
genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to
general distribution, but the gains and pro􏰋ts he makes are not invested in industries that
would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in
this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to
continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out
above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter
disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of
the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard
do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and
actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully
justify the legislative classi􏰋cation adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences
are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in the retail
trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or
ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.

Conclusion:

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation
and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao

Facts:

The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of
Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J.
Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968.

City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:

"AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF

THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE
ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY
OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE
MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." 3

Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to
engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated
therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without 􏰋rst securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00
except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign
countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine
Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective
households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.

Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three

(3) months to six (6) months or 􏰋ne of not less than P100.00 but not more than
P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction.

On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and
on September 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and
void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction.

Respondent:

On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed
in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I,
denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance
No. 6637 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and
void.
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for
wanting the ordinance declared null and void:

It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus,
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT

ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.

RULE:

The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it
fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens
who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution
does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be
based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the
subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected
from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full
time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.

Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard
or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted
to him by the ordinance.

The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection
rule of the Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor
of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While
it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due
process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens.
Dumlao v COMELEC

Facts:

The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva
Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the
forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a
qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a
taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. cdasia

Petitioner 1:

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:

"Sec. 4. Special Disqualification. — In addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XII-C of

the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby
declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years
of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall
not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired."
(Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him,
and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation."

Petitioner 2:

For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following
statutory provisions:

"Sec. 7. Term of office. — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective o􏰋cials
hereinabove mentioned shall hold o􏰋ce for a term of six (6) years. which shall commence
on the first Monday of March 1980."

. . ." Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 "Sec. 4. . . .

"Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be
qualified to be a candidate for any of the o􏰋ces covered by this Act, or to participate in
any partisan political activity therein:

provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and.

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

RULE:

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal

protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and
real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject
to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that

candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if
applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although,
as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might
be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service

may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one
thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may
neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a
good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired
from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from
running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the
retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the
retired employee has already declared himself tired an unavailable for the same
government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume
again. It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither
does it permit such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly
situated are similarly treated.
 In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all
legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of
younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the
objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.

In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which
they challenged, may be divided in two parts. The first provides:

"a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be

conclusive evidence of such fact. . . . "

The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We

are aware of the presumption of validity that attached to a challenged statute, of
the well- settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as
constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra).
We are constrained to hold that this in one such clear case. Cdphil

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19,
1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not
synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional
presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public
office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil
or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect,
except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been
filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the
accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term
of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie

evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present
danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will
prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to
overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be

aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the
COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of finding between two government bodies,
to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided.
Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be
allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.

Conclusion:

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby

declared valid. Said paragraph reads:

"SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C)

of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby
declared as disqualifications for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1
hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment
of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been
65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has
retired."

2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52

providing that ". . . the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil
court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of
such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

Concurring opinion Fernando:

If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it

amounts to a denial of equal protection, then his plea for nulli􏰋cation should be accorded
a sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes a clear, such imputation is
not deserving of credence. The classi􏰋cation cannot be stigmatized as lacking in
rationality. It is germane to the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement and the
receipt of retirement bene􏰋ts are factors that can enter into any legislative determination
of what disquali􏰋cations to impose. As was pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration: 9 "It su􏰋ces then that the laws operate equally and uniformly
on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle
is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances,
which if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges,
those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions
cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 10 It cannot be denied that others
similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The most that
can be said is that he falls within the proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as
to why should national o􏰋cials be excluded in the above provision. The answer is simple.
There is nothing to prevent the legislative body from following a system of priorities. This
it did under the challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a
measure is the propensity of the local officials having reached the retirement age and
having received retirement benefits once again running for public o􏰋ce. Accordingly, the
provision in question was enacted. A portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason
and Co., Inc. finds relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that called for correction,
and the legislation that was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the necessary
palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous ills
certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our
sanction to the principle underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly
not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is not required by the Constitution to
adhere to the policy of all "or none." Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of the
equal protection clause is futile and unavailing."

Philippine Association of Service Exporters v Drilon

Facts:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI,

for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male
and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Petitioner:

Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against

males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of
the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.

In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of
prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-
impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.

Issue:

Whether or not the DO 1 violates the equal protection of laws as it is only applicable
to domestic workers and not to other workers of the same skill or job description.

Rule:

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested

measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1
applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before
the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among
all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4)
they apply equally to all members of the same class.

The Court is satisfied that the classification made — the preference for
female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy

plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic
servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases,
physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed
by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent
Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court
is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
sustains the Government's efforts.

The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first
place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men
abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament. The petitioner has
proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to
male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic
notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was
largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-
treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary
yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed
of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court
cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is
simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that
insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions
are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.

There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to

the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of
Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas
workers." 17 This Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment
Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own
good and welfare.

The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is

intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from
the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the
Philippines and in the host countries .., meaning to say that should the authorities
arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall
be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability,
depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. — The Secretary of Labor and Employment

(DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:

1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,

2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the

welfare and protection of Filipino workers.

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable

to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all
Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been
given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and
arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group
of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group
or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply
the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B,
would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be
a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and
gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of
contract and needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the
classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy,
sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is
to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities
are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of
unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law
ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation
against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of
denial of equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords
protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)