Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14548 April 29, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VALERIO ANDRES, defendant-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

On Ma rch 11, 1958, the Provi ncial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte filed with the Court of First Instance of s aid province, the following information for libel
a ga inst defendant Valerio Andres:

Tha t on or a bout the 12th day of December, 1957, i n the municipality of La oag, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, a nd wit hin the jurisdiction of
thi s Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, being one of the a ttorneys of record for the plaintiffs in Ci vil Ca se No. 591, Court of Fi rst
Ins tance of Ilocos Norte, entitled DAMASO BAQUIRAN, et al vs . BENITO BAQUIRAN, et al., tri ed a nd decided by the herein complainant, Fidel
Vi l lanueva , when he was s till the presiding Judge of Sala II of said Court, filed i n said ca se with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, a motion
for reconsideration of the decision, a nd duly furnished with a copy thereof the a ttorney of record for the defendant in the herein -mentioned case.
Atty. El vi ro L. Pera lta, and the said accused, with i ntent to discredit, destroy the good name and expose to public contempt a nd ridicule the said
compl ainant, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously published in said motion, the following l ibelous words and phrases, to wit:

It i s deeply regretted that the former Judge who gave s uch orders and who is not now the one sitting on this bench, forgot sa id fundamental l aw, or
tha t i n his desire to favor the a dverse party, he purposely forgot his law or disregarded intentionally the law in a manner to highly pre judice the
pl a intiffs and favor the defendants moving party, for s aid party i s a relative of a great political l eader of the son of the presiding judge who
ha ppened to be then a ca ndidate for Congress in the second district of Ilocos Sur, and i n the desire of the presiding judge t o appear in the good
gra ces of said political l eader of a s on, s aid presiding judge, wilfully, a nd malicio usly vi olated the law to suit the whims, caprices a nd a buses of the
defendants i n a manner that the defendants i n this case had bragged to the people of Laoag, that in no case said defendants s hall never he beaten in
a ny l i tigation before s aid presiding judge, as the s on of said presiding judge needs the votes of the relatives of the defendants which he could deliver
to the s on of the said presiding judge.

A ca reful s crutiny of the behaviour a nd manner on the actuations of this then presiding judge had tak en in this i nstant case, is s o glaring an example,
of prejudice a buse of power, that the plaintiffs could not be given a bit of justice before him.

Jus t to s how the partiality on the presiding judge an instant of lack of delicacy on his part, said presidi ng judge used to board i n the house of the
defendants a nd uses the car of a son of the defendant for his personal use and convenience all the ti me, before a nd even duri ng the ti me that this
ca s e pending in his sala. Could the poor plaintiffs in this case e xpect justice from said presiding judge? It is respectfully s ubmitted that his orders be
ca refully s tudied to show the abuse of power he has committed i n this ca se.

a nd other words of s imilar i mport, thereby bringing the herein complainant into public con tempt, discredit a nd ridicule.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On Augus t 11, 1958, defendant filed a motion to quash, on the grounds that (1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense ; (2) the court tryi ng
the ca use has no jurisdiction of the offense charged, in that the fiscal has no authority to file the s ame; (3) i t does not conform s ubstantially with the
pres cribed form; (4) the information is premature, i n that there is a prejudicial question; a nd (5) the a ccuse has been previ ously i n double jeopardy
of bei ng convicted or acquitted of the offense charged. To this motion to quash, the Special Counsel of Ilocos Norte filed an opposition on August 27,
1958, to whi ch defendant filed a reply on September 11, 1958.

On September 24, 1958, the court rejecting the last four but s ustaining the fi rst ground, dismissed the case in an order which, in part reads:

. . . there i s no doubt that the alleged libelous part of the said motion i s privilege. Atty. Andres has the bounden duty to a llege in his motion for
reconsideration his personal observa tions that the court (now p resided by the Hon. Wenceslao Ortega) should be guided a nd i nformed a ccordingly
of the fa cts and ci rcumstances s urrounding the ca se in order to a rrive a t a just conclusion. And although the said motion for reconsideration is
couched i n libelous words, were it not privileged, "The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made i n i ntemperate
terms ". A pri vileged communication should not be s ubjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsit y. Such excessive
s cruti ny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communication. (U. S. vs . Bustos, Vol. 37, p. 743, body of decision.)

It ma y a lso be true that there is no truth i n the above-quoted paragraph of the motion for reconsideration, however, Atty. Andres, i n bringing this
ma tter known to the court, has been prompted only by good motive, considering that, a lthough the above-quoted libelous matter is not true
a ccording to the complainant, i t may be the truth in the opinion of the a ccused and that being his opinion, one ca nnot blame the accused, if as a
l a wyer of the s aid case he brought the matter to the attention of the court a s one of his reasons in his motion for reconside ration so as to secure a
revers al of the order of the complainant. In doing so, it was perhaps, due to the accused's firm conviction and belief, and ri ghtly, tha t in this country,
i n the hearings before our Courts of Justice, there is a "free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an i ncide ntal result, it may i n s ome
i ns tances afford a n immunity to the evil-disposed a nd malignant slanderer". (Abbot vs . National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma (1899) 175 U.S. 409,
411, ci ted i n the case of U.S. vs . Bustos. supra; emphasis supplied.)

Si nce the face of the information s hows that the a lleged l ibelous statement had been a lleged i n a motion for reconsideration filed i n connection with
Ci vi l Ca se No. 591 pending before this court (Sala II) and in vi ew of the above findings of this Court a nd the authorities ci ted, this case must,
therefore, be dismissed with costs de officio.

From the foregoing decision, the prosecution i nterposed the present appeal.

The prosecution claims that the tri al court erred i n dismissing the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the tri al judge's conclusion on
the fa ce of the i nformation that defendant-appellee was prompted only by good motives assumes a fact to be proved, a nd that the alleged
pri vi leged nature of defendant-appellee's publication in a matter of defense a nd i s not a proper ground for dismissal of the complaint for libel (Lu
Chu Si ng, et al. vs . Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil., 669.)
Whi le there is some point to this contention, yet when i n the i nformation itself i t appears, as it does i n the present case, that the communication
a l leged to be libelous is contained in a n a ppropriate pleading i n a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at once apparent a nd defendant need not
wa i t until the trial a nd produce evidence before he ca n raise the question of privilege. And if a dded to this , the questioned imputations a ppear, as
they s eem, in this case, to be really pertinent a nd relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based on complainant's s upposed partiality a nd
a buse of power from which defendant's has a right to s eek relief i n vi ndication of his client's interest as a litigant in complainant's court, i t would
become evident that the facts thus alleged i n the i nformation would not constitute an offense of l ibel.

As ha s already been said by this Court:1 "As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matter pri vileged, the
courts a re i nclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be s o palpably wanting i n relation to the subject matter of
the controversy that no reasonable man ca n doubt i ts i rrelevancy a nd impropriety." Having this in mind, i t can not be said that the tri al court
commi tted a reversible error i n this case i n finding that the allegations in the i nformation i tself present a ca se of a n a bsolutely privileged
communication justifying the dismissal of the case. Note that the information does not contain a ny a llegation of irrelevancy a nd i mpertinency to
counteract the quotations from the motion for reconsideration in question.

For the foregoing, the order a ppealed from is affirmed. So ordered.

Pa ra s , C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, La brador, Concepcion and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4841 January 8, 1909
JAMES F. MACLEOD,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PHILIPPINE PUBLISHING COMPANY,Defendant-Appellant.

WILLARD, J. :cha nrobles vi rtual law library

On the 14th of June, 1907, Al decoa & Co., i n l iquidation, filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Ma nila a compla int in a civil a ction a gainst
Al ejandro S. Ma cleod and James Macleod. It was alleged therein that Al ejandro S. Ma cleod, being the m a nager of Al decoa & Co. a nd conspiring with
Mi guel Ossorio, wrongfully used the money of Al decoa & Co. i n the purchase of a n interest in the Pa say estate, a nd as a resul t of s uch wrongful use
of the money of Aldecoa & Co., Al ejandro S. Ma cleod had obtained a profit of P161,000, which was represented by the stock of the Pasay Estate
Compa ny, Li mited. The only a llegation i n regard to James Macleod was to the effect that Alejandro S. Ma cleod had tra nsferred to him, James
Ma cl eod, a ll of the s tock i n the Pa say Es tate Company, Li mited; that this tra nsfer was fraudulent and simulated, and was made in order to defraud
Al decoa & Co. a nd to prevent it from obtaining the s tock.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

On the a fternoon of the 14th of June a reporter of the "Manila Times" examined this complaint in the office of the clerk of the court a nd, the
compl aint being in Spanish, procured the cl erk to tra nslate it to him, i n English. This the clerk did, and from the tra nslati on thus made by the clerk
the reporter made the notes of the contents of the complaint. On the a fternoon of Fri day, June 14, 1907, the "Ma nila Ti mes," owned by the
defendant, published a n article i n its newspaper which contained the following statement:

Sensational charges for recovery a lleging collusion, removing money from the va ults of Al decoa & Co., a nd charging wrongful entry of the amounts
on the books, were made this morning by Aldecoa & Co., i n liquidation, a gainst Alejandro S. Ma cleod a nd Ja mes Ma cleod i n the Court of First
Ins tance.

On the morning of June 15, there was published i n the "Ma nila American," a paper also owned by the defendant, a n article rela ting to this case,
whi ch contained the following s tatement:

Al ejandro Ma cleod and James Ma cleod a re charged by Al decoa & Co., i n l iquidation, in a complaint filed this morning, with fra ud, collusion, and
removi ng money from the safe of the company for private purposes.

It wi l l be seen that these statements were not true, so far a s James Ma cleod was concerned. The complaint made no allegations a gainst him in
col l usion or removi ng money from the va ults of Aldecoa & Co. or of wrongful entry of a mounts i n the books of that company. Th ese charges by the
compl aint were l imited to Al ejandro Ma cleod.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

It wa s proven at the trial that the plaintiff Ja mes F. Ma cleod was the James MaCleod referred to i n this complaint a nd i n the se articles so published.
He wrote a letter on the night of the 14th, which was published on the morning of the 15th i n the "Ma nila Ca blenews," in which he referred to the
a rti cl e published in the "Times" and stated that i t was a lie a nd was not even substantiated i n a ny way by the tenor of the c omplaint. The "Times" on
the a fternoon of June 15 published a nother a rticle relating to the matter, which contained the letter of the plaintiff published i n the "Ca blenews" of
tha t morning and, among of others, the following s tatement:

So fa r a s the complaint is concerned, while published in part yesterday as a matter of court record a nd s o a privileged communication, i ts being filed
i n court does not by a ny means imply that i t sustains the truth. Frequently i n court complaints s erious charges a re made with a vi ew to prejudicate
the ca s e, only later to be neglected or entirely disproved. Pending further a ction i n the case i t will be well to s uspend judgment.

On the 17th of of June, Aldecoa & Co., i n liquidation, filed a n a mended complaint in the s uit, in which i t was stated that a mistake had been made in
i ns erting the name of James Ma cleod a s a defendant a nd a sking that the complaint be a mended by s triking his name out a nd i nserting in lieu
thereof the name of William S. Ma cleod. This was done. On the a fternoon of June 17 the "Times" published, i n a prominent place to the effect that
thi s amendment had been made and the reasons thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

On the 19th of June, plaintiff commenced this a ction of libel a gainst the defendant for the recovery of P100,000 da mage s. Judgment was entered in
the court below in fa vor of the plaintiff for the sum of P15,000. Of thi s sum, P4,000 wa s a llowed for a ctual damages s uffered by the plaintiff by
rea s on of the publication a foresaid; P7,000 for da mages to his feelings a nd reputation, a nd P4,000 a s punitive damages. From this judgment the
defendant has a ppealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

As s a id by the defendant in i ts brief, there i s very l ittle controversy about the fa cts i n the case. Section 7 of Act No. 277 i s as follows:

No reporter, editor, or proprietor of a ny newspaper i s liable to any prosecution for a fair a nd true report of a ny judicial, legislative, or other public
proceeding, or of any statement, speech, a rgument, or debate in the course of the same, except upon proof of malice in making such report, which
s ha ll not be implied from the mere fact of publication.

It wa s held by the court below that the filing of a complaint in a ci vil action does not contain a judicial proceeding until s ome action is taken thereon
by the court Cons iderable space i n the briefs devoted to a discussion of that question, but it i s not necessary to decide it, because i t is apparent that
the a rti cles published in these newspapers, were not a fair and true report of the complaint. The complaint did not charge Ja mes Ma cleod with
removi ng the money from the va ults of Al decoa & Co. nor di d i t charge him with making wrongful entry of the a mounts i n the books of that
compa ny. The articles published stated that the complaint did make these charges. It i s apparent that in no way ca n the published articles be said,
therefore, to be a fair a nd true report of the complaint. That they were libelous within the meaning of the definition of "libel" found i n section 1 of
Act No. 277, ca n not be doubted. For their publication the defendant is responsible unless s ome excuse therefor is s hown.chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
cha nrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

It i s cl aimed that they were published with justifiable motives, and that the defendant is therefore, not liable by vi rtue of s ection 3 of Act No. 277.
Tha t s ection is as follows:

An i njurious publication is presumed to have been malicious i f no justifiable motive for making i t is shown.

The meaning of this s ection was considered by this court i n the case of the United States vs . Lerma (2 Phil. Rep., 254). In t he case a t bar the
defendant entirely fa iled to prove any justifiable motive for the publication. The mere desire of a newspaper to keep the public i nformed of what is
goi ng on i n court ca n not be considered a justifiable motive for making false statements as to what has actually occurred i n s uch courts. With what
wa s said to the contrary i n the case of Butler vs . News-Leader Co. (104 Va ., 1), ci ted by the a ppellant in its brief, we can not agree, a nd i t is to be
noted moreover that what was there said was entirely outside the question really decided i n the case, because judgment was rendered therein for
the defendant on the ground that the article published did not refer to the plaintiff but to another person.chanroblesvi rtual awlibrary chanrobles
vi rtua l law library

The defendant being liabled to the plaintiff for damages, the question is, what damages ca n the latter recover? Section 11 of Act No. 277 i n part is as
fol l ows:

In a ddition to such criminal action, any person l ibeled as hereinbefore set forth, s hall have a ri ght of ci vil action against the person libeling him for
da mages sustained by reason of s uch l ibel, and the person s o libeled shall be entitled to recover i n s uch ci vil action not only the actual pecuniary
da mages sustained by him but a lso damages for injury for his feelings a nd reputation, a nd i n a ddition i n such punitive damages as the court may
thi nk will be a just punishment to the libeler a nd a n example to others.

The court below a llowed the plaintiff P4,000 a ctual pecuniary da mages. We do not think that the evi dence i n the case s howed t hat the plaintiff had
s uffered any damages of this kind. The phrase "actual pecuniary da mages" found in this law, would probably by considered as e quivalent to the
phra se "special damages," as that term is defined in the common law of England and America. Th e phrase "actual damages," is found by the s tatutes
of s everal of the United States, and in the case of Al len vs . Pioneer-Press Company (40 Mi nn. Rep., 117), the court said that i t included "all injuries
pecuniary i n their nature which he may have s ustained by the l ibel." The nature of s uch damages is illustrated by the case of Ca usin vs . Ricamora (5
Phi l . Rep., 31), where, by reason of the publication of the libel, the plaintiff l ost employment as a s chool -teacher.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
cha nrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

The pl aintiff testified that he had relatives in Scotland to whom he sent copies of the paper containing this publication a nd a dded:

They a re persons of means a nd very religious, a nd i f they s hould come to know a nything concerning me, they might believe that I a m not a person
worthy to recei ve a l egacy from them. Naturally they ma y differ i n the way they l ook upon this a ffair.

There was no evidence in the case to show that a ny one of these relatives had in fa ct disinherited the plaintiff or had failed to bequeath property to
hi m by reason of the publication of these articles. It, therefore, was not proven that he had suffered a ny pecuniary l oss as far as these persons are
concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual l aw l ibrary

The pl aintiff was and is engaged i n the business of a commercial broker. He testified that -

The business has for sometime now much less than i t was formerly; I ca n not attribute it to a ny particular person; I do not k now whether they have
wi thdrawn their confidence from me or not, but my business a t the present time is much l ess either by reason of the times being bad or from some
other ca use.

He further testified upon this s ubject as follows:

Q. Be ki nd enough to tell the court the a mount, nature, and income of your business as a broker? - A. Heretofore P20,000 a
yea r.cha nroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual l aw library

Q. Wha t would you s aid it is now? - A. Much l ess than heretofore; I have not made my s ettlement for the last year, but know i t was much less than
heretofore, some P20,000 a t l east.

Thi s is all the evi dence there i s on the branch of the ca se, and it is very a pparent that i t falls far s hort of proving that the decrease i n the plaintiff's
bus iness was due to the publication of the libel. As he says himself, he does not know whether i t was or not. The judgment for P4,000 pecuniary
da mages can not be sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles virtual l aw library

The a ppellant devotes considerable s pace in his brief to the claim that, no actual pecuniary da mages having been proven, the plaintiff i s entitled to
no da mages a t all. That there i s nothing in this point, is apparent from a mere reading of section 11, a bove quoted. The cases cited by the a ppellant
i n s upport of its contention are cases brought a gainst telegraph companies for failure to deliver messages or for the wrongful transmission thereof,
i n which it was held that damages for mental s uffering alone could not be recovered. These cases have nothing to do with the ques tion here
i nvol ved. Section 11 expressly a llows s uch damages. Moreover, the general damages which are a llowed in a ctions of libel a re not for mental
s uffering alone, but they a re a llowed for i njury to the s tanding and reputation of the person libeled a nd the common l aw of E ngland a nd America
pres umed that s uch damages existed, without proof thereof, from the mere fact of the publicati on of the libel. It would s eem a bsurd to pay that the
pl a intiff could recover no damages for the i njury to his reputation unless he proved that he had s uffered some other special pecuniary
da mages.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

The court below a lso allowed the plaintiff P4,000 a s punitive damages. Such damages ca n not be recovered in every a ction for libel. These cases i n
whi ch they ca n be recovered i n the United States are i ndicated by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the U nited States. The case of the
Phi l adelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company vs . Quigley (21 How., 202), wa s, like the case at bar, a n action for libel. The court below
cha rged the jury i n that ca se that they mi ght give exemplary damages. The Supreme Court held that this instruction was erroneous. The court said,
a t pa ge 213:

In Da y a gainst Woodward (13 Howard, 371), this court recognized the power of a jury i n certain a ctions i n tort to assess a gai nst the tort-feasor
puni tive or exemplary da mages. Whenever the injury complained of has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, a nd with ci rcumstances of
contumely or i ndignity, the jury a re not limited to the ascertainment of a simple compensation for the wrong committed agains t the aggrieved
pers on. But the malice spoken of in this rule is not merely the doing of an unlawful or injurious a ct. The word implies that the act c omplained of was
concei ved i n the spirit of mischief, or of criminal indifference to ci vil obligations. Nothing of this kind can be imputed to these defendants.

In the ca se of Scott vs . Donald (165 U.S., 58), the court said, a t page 86 -

Da mages have been defined to be the compensation which the law will award for an injury done, and are s aid to be exemplary a nd allowable i n
exces s of the a ctual loss where a tort i s aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate vi olence or oppression -

a nd a t page 88, quoting from the case of Day a gainst Woodward, i t said:

In a cti ons of trespass, where the i njury ha s been wanton and malicious, or gross a nd outrageous, courts permit juries to add to the measured
compensation of the plaintiff which he would have been entitled to recover, had the injury been inflicted without design or i ntention, s omething
further, by wa y or punishment or example, which has sometimes been ca lled "smart money.
It i s very a pparent that the facts proven i n the case a t bar do not bring i t within the rule thus l aid down. There was of cou rse the malice a pplied by
l a w, but there was no proof whether of any a ctual malice a gainst the plaintiff, either on the part of the reporter or of the managers of the
news paper. The reporter testified that he did not know who Ja mes Ma cleod was until he saw him in court. It appeared that a re lative of the plaintiff
wa s one of the members of the Board of Directors of the defendant company. It seems plain that the false publication was due to a n unintentional
mi s take made by the reporter in believing that the charges contained i n the complaint were made a gainst both defendant when i n fact they were
ma de against one only.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

It i s true that the paper did not make a ny formal retraction, nor did it expressly apologize to the plaintiff for its mistake . But, on the other hand, it
di d not propagate the libel. On the following day i t was published the letter of the plaintiff in which he s tated that the charges against him were not
true; i t s uggested that judgment be withheld until the facts could be restrained, and later published the facts rel ating to an a mendment of the
compl aint, which exonerated the plaintiff from the charges formerly ma de a gainst him. The case is not one for punitive
da mages.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

The general damages allowed for injury to the plaintiff's feelings a nd reputation the court fi xed a t P7,000. In vi ew of all the ci rcumstances i n the
ca s e, we think that P5,000 i s a reasonable compensation for such injuries. The judgment of the court below is reversed, and j udgment is entered in
fa vor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P5,000, wi th costs of the first instance. No costs will be all owed to either party i n this
court. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual l aw library

Arel lano, C.J., Torres, Ma pa, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Ca rs on, J., did not suit i n this ca se.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48135 June 22, 1942
FELIX MONTENEGRO, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ENRIQUE MEDINA, Defendant-Appellee.

OZAETA, J.: cha nrobles vi rtual law library

Thi s is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Ori ental Negros sustaining defendant's demurrer to, and at the s ame ti me
di s missing, plaintiff's complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

The complaint, which was dated November 14, 1939, a l leged i n s ubstance that on July 14, 1939, the defendant Enrique Medina instit uted civil case
No. 1614 of the Court of Fi rst Instance of Ori ental Negros against the herein plaintiff Felix Montenegro a nd Ni cola sa Montenegro for the recovery of
a s um of money alleged to be due to Enrique Medina for professional s ervices rendered at the i nstance of Felix Montenegro; th at in relation to the
compl aint in said civil ca se No. 1614, a nd without being material, releva nt, and pertinent to the cause of action alleged therein, but with the only
purpose of mortifying the plaintiff and attacking his honesty, i ntegrity, a nd reputation a nd of exposing him to public hatred and ri dicule, the said
defendant Enrique Medina wrote, inserted, and published a s paragraph 24 of the first ca use of a ction of the complaint in s aid civil case No. 1614 the
fol l owing words which were highly malicious, defamatory a nd libelous per s e, to wit:

24. Que el demandado Felix Montenegro es de l as perso nas que con frecuencia procuran eludir el pago de s us justas obligaciones y no obstante s u
i ndiscutible solvencia, no paga religiosamente sus compromisos y cuentas legales, y muchos de s us acreedores, abogados, emple ados, contratistas, y
pers onas con quienes ha tenido cuentas, no han podido cobrarle sino reñido el y muchos, presentando a ccion o escrito judicial por la cual, sus
mi s mos parientes que trabajaban con dicho Felix Montenegro salieron todos disgustados, por no poder cobrar, l o que por l ey te nian derecho de
cobra r.

Tha t s ubsequently, upon motion of the plaintiff a nd over the opposition of the defendant, the paragraph above quoted was stri cken out by order of
the court for being impertinent a nd unnecessary to the ca use of a ction of the plaintiff in s aid civil case No. 1614; tha t the plaintiff is a n hacendero
a nd a merchant and possesses valuable real estate in Manila, Cebu, and in the Province of Ori ental Negros, and is the preside nt a nd principal
s tockholder of the corporation Felix Montenegro, Inc., to which the Philippine National Bank gra nted a credit of P100,000 wi thout a ny s ecurity on
a ccounts of his good name a nd reputation, a nd that the success of his enterprises depends to a great extent on the confidence of the public in his
honesty a nd i ntegrity; a nd that, as a consequence of s aid acts of defamation, the plaintiff has suffered damages in the sum of P25,000 on a ccount of
the outra ge to his feelings a nd reputation, and that, in addition to said s um, he is entitled to receive from the defendant a nother s um of P25,000 a s
puni tive exemplary da mages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

To tha t complaint the defendant demurred on the grounds (1) that the facts alleged i n the complaint do not constitute a cause of a ction a nd (2) that
there exists another case between the parties founded on the same cause of action. In resolving said demurrer the tri al court quoted i ts o rder
entered on October 11, 1939, i n ci vi l case No. 1614, i n which i t held that paragraph 24 of the complaint in said case was "im pertinent, redundant
a nd unnecessary" a nd ordered that the s ame be s tricken out; and, upon the ground that said order had not yet become final i na smuch as the
therein plaintiff (defendant i n this ca se) had excepted, thereto, the court held that the plaintif f did not yet have a cause of a ction, a nd therefore
di s missed the complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual l aw library

The fi rst ground of the demurrer - that the facts alleged i n the complaint do not constitute a ca use of a ction - was based on the contention that the
a l leged defamatory ma tter complained of, havi ng been published i n the course of a judicial proceeding, was a bsolutely privile ged a nd therefore not
a cti onable; while the s econd ground of the demurrer - the existence of another a ction between the parties - was based on the contention that the
order of the trial court s triking out paragraph 24 of the complaint in ci vil case No. 1614 ha d not yet become fi nal, that the re was a n intimate relation
between the two cases, and that the plaintiff s hould have represented his claim for damages in the same ci vil case No.
1614.cha nroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual l aw library

The ordered a ppealed from i s based on the assumption that it i s an essential prerequisite that the court declare a defamatory ma tter uttered i n the
cours e of a judicial proceeding to be immaterial and irrelevant and order that the same be stricken out before an a ction for l ibel could be brought
thereon. There is no basis in l aw or i n jurisprudence for such a n assum ption. An a ction for libel a ccrues from the date of publication and must be
i ns tituted within two years thereafter. The fact that the plaintiff had moved to strike out the allegedly libelous allegation as being i mmaterial,
i rrel evant, a nd i mpertinent could not a nd did not in any wa y a ffect his right to bring a n independent a ction for damages on account of the libel. The
moti on to s trike out and the action for damages may be filed simultaneously and i ndependently of each other; they a re not mut ually excl usive.
Indeed, the court ma y of its own motion order expunged from its records any s ham, irrelevant, scurrilous, or i ncident matter to preserve its dignity
a nd protect public morals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

It i s patent that the tri al court erred i n holding i n effect that plaintiff's action was premature.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law
l i brary

The i mportant question raised by the demurrer, which the trial court failed to decide, i s whether the allegedly l ibel ous matter complained of is
a bs olutely privileged a nd therefore not actionable. In Santiago vs. Ca lvo (48 Phil., 919, 923) thi s Court held that "parties counsel, a nd witnesses are
exempted from liability i n libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory p ublished i n the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements
a re pertinent or relevant to the case." The same doctrine was applied in Smith, Bell & Co. vs . El lis (48 Phil., 475). It i s t he generally a ccepted rule that
i n order to be protected by the mantle of privilege the defamatory words must be pertinent and relevant to the s ubject under inquiry. ( See Newell
on Sl ander a nd Li bel, 3d ed., section 518, pa ge 515, a nd cases therein ci ted; 33 Am. Jur., s ection 149, pages 144-145, a nd cases; s ection 230, pages
1253-1254.) The reason for such requirement is that the protection given to i ndividuals in the interest of an efficient administra tion of justice may
not be a bused as a cl oak from beneath which private malice may be gra tified (16 A. L. R., 748).cha nroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law
l i brary

Are the a llegations of paragraph 24 of the complaint i n ci vil case no. 1614, herein before quoted, material a nd relevant to t he ca se? We do not need
to deci de that question on the merit because the case is before us on demurrer a nd the complaint in case No. 1614 has not been brought up here. It
i s expressly a lleged i n the complaint demurrered to:

4. Que en relacion con dicho escrito de demanda en dicha ca usa civil No. 1614 y s i n ser materiales, relevantes y pertinentes a l motivo de accion
objeto de dicha demanda pero si con el solo proposito mortificar al demandante y a tacar l a honradez, i ntegridad y reputacion del aqui demandante
y exponerle al desprecio odio, oprobio y ri diculo publicos, escribio, inserto, y publico e hizo que s e escribiera redactara, insertara y publicara, como
pa rra fo 24 del primer motivo de accion de la demandada en dicha causa civil No. 1614 l a s iguientes palabras altamente maliciosas, difamatorias y
l i belosas per s e, que se l een sigue:

xxx xxx x x xcha nrobles vi rtual l aw library

(Emphasis ours)

a nd these allegations are hypothetically a dmitted by the demurrer. We must therefore a ssume that paragraph 24 i s immaterial a nd irreleva nt and,
hence, not privileged Since the i mputations contained i n said paragraph constitute a grave reflection upon the moral character and reputat ion of
Fel ix Montenegro as a property owner a nd businessman, they a re libelous per s e.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

Defendant's contention that the plaintiff should have presented his cl aim for damages i n the same civil case No. 1614, i s devoid of merit i nasmuch
a s plaintiff's cl aim did no exist at the ti me of the commencement of ca se No. 1614 a nd did not a rise out of tra nsaction therein i nvolved. Hence it was
no obl igatory for the plaintiff herein to set up his claim by way of counter-claim in said case. (Section 97, Act No. 190.)cha nrobles vi rtual law library

We deem i t unnecessary a t this ti me to pass upon the question of whether or not s ection 11 of Act No. 277, whi ch expressly a llows the recovery, not
onl y of a ctual pecuniary da mages s ustained by the party l ibeled but a lso of damages for injury to his feelings a nd reputation as well as punitive
da mages, is still in force notwithstanding repealing clause of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint under consideration s tates fact s sufficient to
cons titute a ca use of a ction for a ctual damages, and the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to have i t heard on the merits regardless of whether or not he
i s entitled a lso to damages for injury to his feelings and reputation a nd to punitive damages. That question has not been sub mitted to the court
bel ow, and we do not deem it necessary to decide i t at this stage of the case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

The order appealed from is reversed, and let the ca se be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, with the co sts of this a ppeal
a ga inst the appellee. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

Yul o, C.J., Pa ra s and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

Mora n, JJ., concurs in the result.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126466. January 14, 1999.]
ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO, Respondents.

DE CI SI ON

" The question is not so much a s who was aimed a t as who was hit." (Pound, J., i n Corri gan v. Bobbs -Merill Co., 228 N .Y . 58 [1920]).

BELLOSILLO, J.:

PERPETUALLY HAGRIDDEN as the public is a bout losing one of the most basic yet oft hotly contested free doms of man, the issue of the ri ght of free
expression bestirs and presents itself ti me a nd a gain, i n cycl ic occurrence, to i nveigle, may, challenge the courts to re -survey i ts ever shifting terrain,
expl ore and furrow its heretofore uncharted moors a nd valleys and finally redefine the metes a nd bounds of its controversial domain. This,
promi nently, is one s uch case.chanrobles l aw l ibrary

Perha ps, never in jurisprudential history has any freedom of man undergone ra dical doctrinal metamorphoses than his rig ht to freely a nd openly
express his views. Blackstone’s pontifical comment that "where blasphemous, i mmoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or s candalous libels are
punished by English l aw . . . the l i berty of the press, properly understood, is by n o means infringed or vi olated," found kindred expression i n the
l a ndmark opinion of England’s Star Chamber i n the Li belis Famosis case i n 1603. 1 Tha t ca se established two major propositions i n the prosecution
of defamatory remarks: fi rst, that l ibel against a public person i s a greater offense than one directed against a n ordinary ma n, a nd s econd, that i t is
i mma terial that the libel be true.

Unti l republicanism ca ught fire i n early America, the vi ew from the top on l ibel was no less dismal. Even the vene rable Justice Holmes appeared to
wa ffle a s he swayed from the concept of cri minal libel liability under the cl ear a nd present danger rul e, to the other end of the s pectrum i n defense
of the constitutionally protected s tatus of unpopular opinion i n free society.

Vi ewed i n modern times a nd the current revolution i n i nformation and communication technology, l ibel principles formulated a t one ti me or
a nother have waxed and waned through the years in the constant ebb a nd flow of judicial review. At the very l ea st, these principles have lost much
of thei r flavor, drowned a nd swamped a s they have been by the ceaseless ca cophony and din of thought a nd discourse emanating from just about
every s ource a nd direction, aided no less by a n increasingly powerful a nd i rrepressible mass media. Public discourse, l aments Knight, has been
deva lued by i ts utter commonality; a nd we agree, for its l ogical effect is to benumb thought a nd sensibility on what ma y be c onsidered as criminal
i l legitimate encroachments on the ri ght of persons to enjoy a good, honorable a nd reputable name. This may explain the imperceptible demise of
cri mi nal prosecutions for libel a nd the trend to rely i nstead on indemnity s uits to repair any damage on one’s reputation.

In thi s petition for review, we are a sked to reverse the Court of Appeals in "Francisco Wenceslao v. Arturo Borjal and Ma ximo Soliven," CA-G.R. No.
40496, hol ding on 25 Ma rch 1996 tha t petitioners Arturo Borjal and Ma ximo Soliven a re solidarily l iable for damages for wri ti ng and publishing
certa i n a rticles claimed to be derogatory a nd offensive to priva te respondent Francisco Wenceslao.

Peti ti oners Arturo Borjal a nd Ma ximo Soliven are a mong the incorporators of Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The
Phi l ippine Star, a daily newspaper. At the ti me the complaint was filed, petitioner Borjal was i ts President while Soliven was (and st ill i s) Publisher
a nd Chairman of its Editorial Board. Among the regular wri ters of The Philippine Star i s Borjal who runs the column Jaywalker.

Pri va te respondent Fra ncisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, i s a ci vil engineer, businessman, business consultant a nd journali st by profession. In
1988 he s erved as a technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman of the House o f Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial
Pol i cy.

Duri ng the congressional hearings on the tra nsport cri sis s ometime in September 1988 undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial
Pol i cy, those who attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on La nd Tra nsportation (FNCLT) to be participated i n by the private
s ector i n the tra nsport i ndustry a nd government agencies concerned i n order to fi nd ways and means to solve the transportation cri sis. More
i mportantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft a n omnibus bill that would embody a l ong-term land tra nsportation policy for presentation to
Congress. The conference which, a ccording to private respondent, was estimated to cost a round P1,815,000.00 woul d be funded t hrough
s ol icitations from va rious sponsors s uch as government agencies, private organizations, tra nsport firms, a nd i ndividual delegates or partic ipants. 2

On 28 February 1989, a t the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent Fra ncisco Wenceslao was elected Exec utive Director. As such,
he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference.

Between Ma y a nd July 1989 a s eries of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his column Ja ywalker. The articles
dea lt with the alleged a nomalous activities of a n "organizer of a conference" without naming or i dentifying private Responden t. Neither did i t refer
to the FNCLT a s the conference therein mentioned. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the a rticles of petitioner together with the dates they were
published 3 —

31 Ma y 1989

Another self-proclaimed ‘hero’ of the EDSA Revolution goes a round organizing ‘seminars and conferences’ for a huge fee. This is a simply p loy
coa ted i n ja zzy l etterheads a nd slick prose. The ‘hero’ has the gall to s olicit fees from a nybody wi th bucks to spare. Recently, i n his usual
s tra ightforward s tyle, Transportation Secretary Rainerio ‘Ray’ Reyes, a sked that his name be stricken off from the letterheads the ‘hero’ has been
us i ng to implement one of his pet ‘s eminars.’ Reyes said: ‘I would l ike to reiterate my request that you delete my na me.’ Note that Ray Reyes is a n
honest man who would confront anybody eyeball to eyeball without blinking.

9 June 1989

Another questionable portion of the so-called conference is its unauthorized use of the names of Pre sident Aquino and Secretary Ra y Reyes. The
conference program being ci rculated cl aims that President Aquino a nd Reyes will be main s peakers in the conference. Yet, the word is that Cory a nd
Reyes have not a ccepted the i nvitation to appear i n this confab. Ray Reyes even says that the conference should be unmasked a s a moneymaking
gi mmick.

19 June 1989
. . . s ome 3,000 fund s olicitation l etters were s ent by the organizer to every Tom, Dick and Harry a nd to almost a ll governme nt agencies. And the
l etterheads ca rried the names of Reyes and Periquet. Agra rian Reform Secretary on leave Philip Juico received one, but he decided to find out from
Reyes himself what the project was all about. Ray Reyes, in effect, advised Juico to put the fund s olicitation letter i n the waste basket. Now, if the
3,000 pers ons and agencies approached by the organizer s helled out 1,000 ea ch, that’s easily P3 mi llion to a project that see ms s o unsophisticated.
But note that one garment company gave P100,000, a fter which the Garments Reg ulatory Board headed by Tra de and Industry Undersecretary
Gl oria Ma capagal-Arroyo was approached by the organizer to expedite the garment license application of the P100,000 donor.

21 June 1989

A ‘conference organizer’ associated with shady deals seems to have a l ot of trash tucked i nside his cl oset. The Jaywalker continues to receive
i nformation about the ma n’s dubious deals. His notoriety, a ccording to reliable sources, has reached the Premier Guest House where his name is
s poken like dung.

x x x

The fi rst i nformation says that the ‘organizer’ tri ed to mulct half a million pesos from a garment producer and exporter who was being i nvestigated
for vi ol ation of the rules of the Garments, Textile, Embroidery a nd Apparel Board. The ‘organizer’ told the garment exporter that the ca se could be
fi xed for a s um of P500,000.00. The organizer got the s hock of his life when the exporter told him: ‘If I have that a mount, I will hire the best lawyers,
not you.’ The organizer left i n a huff, his thick face very pale.

x x x

Fri ends in government and the private s ector have promised the Ja ywalker more ‘dope’ on the ‘organizer.’ It seems that he was not only indiscreet;
he even failed to cover his tra cks. You will be hearing more of the ‘organizer’s’ exploits from this corner s oon.

22 June 1989

The s cheming ‘organizer’ we have been writing a bout seems to have been spreading his wings too far. A congressional source ha s informed the
Ja ywa lker that the schemer once worked for a congressman from the North a s some sort of a consultant on economic affairs. The first thing the
"orga nizer" did was to i nitiate hearings and round-the-table discussions with people from the business, export a nd — his fa vorite — the garments
s ector.

x x x

The ‘orga nizer’s’ principal gamely went along, thinking that his ‘consultant’ had nothing but the good of these sectors i n mi nd. It was only later that
he rea lized that the ‘consultant’ was a cting with a burst of energy ‘i n a id of extortion.’ The ‘consulta nt’ was fired.

x x x

There s eems to be no end to what a man could do to pursue his dubious ways. He has tri ed to operate under a guise of a well -meaning reformist. He
ha s intellectual pretensions — a nd sometimes he s ucceeds in getting his thoughts in the inside pages of some newspapers, with the aid of s ome
na i ve newspaper people. He has been turning out a l ot of funny-looking advice on i nvestments, export growth, a nd the l ike.

x x x

A ca bi net secretary has one big wish. He i s hoping for a broad power to ban crooks and influence-peddlers from entering the premises of his
department. But the Ca binet man might not get his wish. There is one ‘organizer’ who, even i f physically banned, ca n still co ncoct ways of doing his
thi ng. Without a tinge of remorse, the ‘organizer’ could fill up his letterheads with names of Ca binet members, congressmen, and reputable people
from the pri vate sector to shore up his shady reputation and cover up his notoriety.

3 Jul y 1989

A s upposed conference on transportation was a big failure. The attendance was very poor a nd the few who participated i n the a ffair were mostly
l eaders of jeepney dri vers’ groups. None of the government officials involved in regulating public tra nsportation was there. The big names in the
i ndustry a lso did not participate. Wi th such a poor a ttendance, one wonders why the conference organizers went a head with the affair a nd tri ed so
ha rd to convince 3,000 companies a nd i ndividuals to contribute to the a ffair.

x x x

The conference was doomed from the start. It was bound to fail. The personalities who count i n the field of tra nsportation re fused to a ttend the
a ffa ir or withdrew their s upport a fter fi nding out the background of the organizer of the conference. How could a conference on tra nsportation
s ucceed without the participation of the big names in the i ndustry a nd government policy-makers?

Pri va te respondent reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The Philippine Star insisting that he was the "organizer" all uded to i n petitioner Borjal’s
col umns. 4 In a s ubsequent letter to The Philippine Star, private respondent refuted the matters contained in petitioner Borjal’s columns and openly
cha l lenged him i n this ma nner —

To tes t i f Borjal has the guts to back up his holier than thou attitude, I a m prepared to relinquish this position in case it i s found that I have
mi s appropriated even one peso of FNCLT money. On the other hand, i f I ca n prove that Borjal has used his column as a ‘hammer’ to get clients for
hi s PR Firm, AA Borjal Associates, he s hould resign from the STAR a nd never again write a column. Is it a deal? 5

Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint with the National Press Cl ub (NPC) a gainst petitioner Borjal for unethical c onduct. He accused
peti tioner Borjal of using his column a s a form of l everage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm, AA Borjal Associate s. 6 In turn, petitioner
Borja l published a rejoinder to the challenge of private respondent not only to protect his name and honor but a lso to refute the cl aim that he was
us i ng his column for character assassination. 7

Appa rently not s atisfied with his complaint with the NPC, pri vate respondent filed a criminal ca se for l ibel against petition ers Borjal and Soliven,
a mong others. However, i n a Resolution dated 7 August 1990, the Assistant Prosecutor handling the case dism issed the complaint for insufficiency
of evi dence. The dismissal was sustained by the Department of Justice a nd later by the Office of the President.

On 31 October 1990 pri va te respondent instituted against petitioners a ci vil action for damages based on libel s ubject of the instant ca se. 8 In their
a ns wer, petitioners interposed compulsory counterclaims for a ctual, moral and exemplary da mages, plus a ttorney’s fees and cos ts. After due
cons ideration, the trial court decided i n favor of private respondent Wenceslao a nd ordered petitioners Borjal a nd Soliven to i ndemnify private
res pondent P1,000,000.00 for a ctual a nd compensatory damages, in a ddition to P200,000.00 for mora l damages, P100,000.00 for e xemplary
da mages, P200,000.00 for a ttorney’s fees, and to pay the costs of s uit.

The Court of Appeals a ffirmed the decision of the court a quo but reduced the amount of the monetary a ward to P110,000.00 a ct ual damages,
P200,000.00 mora l damages and P75,000.00 a ttorney’s fees plus costs. In a 20-page Decision promulgated 25 Ma rch 1996, the appellate court rul ed
i nter alia that private respondent was sufficiently i dentifiable, although not named, i n the questioned articles; that privat e respondent was in fact
defa med by petitioner Borjal by describing him va riously a s a "self-proclaimed hero," "a conference organizer associated with shady deals who has a
l ot of tra sh tucked i nside his cl oset," "thick face," and "a person with dubious ways;" that petitioner’s claim of privilege communication was
una vailing since the privileged character of the articles was lost by their publication in a newspaper of general circulation; that petitioner could have
performed his office as a newspaperman without necessarily tra nsgressing the ri ghts of Wenceslao by calling the attention o f the government
offi ces concerned to examine the authority by which Wenceslao a cted, warning the public a gainst contributing to a conference that, according to his
perception, lacked the univocal indorsement of the responsible government officials, or s imply i nforming the public of the letters Wenceslao wrote
a nd the fa vors he requested or demanded; a nd, that when he i mputed dishonesty, falsehood a nd misrepresentation, shamelessness and intellectual
pretensions to Wenceslao, petitioner Borjal crossed the thin but clear l ine that separated fair comment from a ctionable defamation.

Pri va te respondent manifested his desire to a ppeal that portion of the a ppellate court’s decision which reduced the amount of damages awarded
hi m by fi ling with this Court a Petition for Extension of Time to File Petition and a Motion for Suspension of Ti me to File Petition. 9 However, i n a
Res olution dated 27 Ma y 1996, the Second Division denied both motions: the first, for being premature, a nd the s econd, for be ing a wrong remedy.

On 20 November 1996 when the First Division consolidated and transferred the present case to the Second Division, there was n o longer any case
thereat with which to consolidate this case since G.R. No. 124396 ha d already been disposed of by the Second Di vision a lmost six (6) months earlier.

On thei r part, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the motion i n i ts Resolution of 12 September 1996.
Hence the instant petition for revi ew. The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (a ) i n ruling that private respondent Wenceslao was
s ufficiently i dentified by petitioner Borjal in the questioned a rticles; (b) in refusing to accord s erious consideration to t he findings of the Department
of Jus tice a nd the Office of the President that private respondent Wenceslao was not sufficiently i dentified i n the questioned articles, this
notwi thstanding that the degree of proof required in a preliminary i nvestigation is merely pri ma facie evidence which i s significantly l ess than the
preponderance of evi dence required in civil cases; (c) i n ruling that the subject articles do not constitute qualifiedly privileged communication; (d) in
refus ing to apply the "public official doctrine" laid down i n New York Times v. Sul livan; (e) in ruling that the questioned articles lost their privileged
cha ra cter because of their publication i n a newspaper of general ci rculation; (f) i n ruling that priva te respondent has a val id ca use of action for libel
a ga inst petitioners although he failed to prove a ctual malice on their part, a nd that the prosecutors of the Ci ty of Ma nila, the Department of Justice,
a nd eventually, the Office of the President, had already resolved that there was no sufficient evi dence to prove the existenc e of libel; a nd, (g)
a s suming arguendo that Borjal s hould be held liable, in a djudging petitioner Soliven s olidarily l iable with him. Thus, petiti oners pray for the reversal
of the a ppellate court’s ruling, the dismissal of the complaint a gainst them for l ack of merit, a nd the a ward of damages on their counterclaim.

The petition is i mpressed with merit. In order to maintain a libel suit, i t is essential that the vi ctim be identifiable although it i s not necessary that he
be na med. It is also not s ufficient that the offended party recognized himself a s the person a ttacked or defamed, but i t must be shown that at least a
thi rd person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. 10 Regrettably, these requisites have not been com plied with i n the case a t
ba r.

In rul ing for private respondent, the Court of Appeals found that Borjal’s column writings s ufficiently i dentified Wenceslao a s the "conference
orga nizer." It ci ted the First National Conference on Land Transportation, the l etterheads used listing different telephone numbers, the donation of
P100,000.00 from Jul iano Li m a nd the reference to the "organizer of the conference" — the very same a ppellation employed i n all the column items
— a s having sufficiently established the i dentity of private respondent Wenceslao for those who knew about the FNCLT who were present a t i ts
i nception, and who had pledged their assistance to i t.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We hol d otherwise. These conclusions are a t va riance with the evidence a t hand. The questioned articles wri tten by Borjal do not identify private
res pondent Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. The first of the Ja ywalker articles which appeared in the 31 Ma y 198 9 i s sue of The
Phi l ippine Star yi elded nothing to i ndicate that private respondent was the p erson referred to therein. Surely, a s observed by petitioners, there were
mi l lions of "heroes" of the EDSA Revolution a nd a nyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or a n "organizer of seminars and conferences." As a
ma tter of fact, i n his 9 June 1989 col umn petitioner Borjal wrote a bout the "so-called First National Conference on Land Transportation whose
pri ncipal organizers a re not s pecified" (Emphasis supplied). 11 Neither did the FNCLT l etterheads 12 di sclose the i dentity of the conference organizer
s i nce these contained only a n enumeration of names where private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was described as Executive Direc tor a nd
Spokesman and not a s a conference organizer. 13 The printout 14 a nd tentative program 15 of the conference were devoid of a ny i ndication of
Wenceslao as organizer. The printout which contained a n a rticle entitled "Who Organized the NCLT?" did not even mention priva te respondent’s
na me, while the tentative program only denominated private respondent as "Vice Chairman and Executive Director," a nd not as organizer.

No l ess than private respondent himself admitted that the FNCLT had s everal organizers a nd that he was only a part of the org anization, thus —

I woul d like to clarify for the record that I was only a part of the organization. I was invited then because I was the head of the technical panel of the
Hous e of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy that took ca re of congressional hearings. 16

Si gnificantly, pri vate respondent himself entertained doubt that he was the person spoken of i n Borjal’s columns. The former even called up
col umnist Borjal to i nquire i f he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to i n the s ubject a rticles. 17 Hi s letter to the editor pu blished i n the 4 June 1989
i s sue of The Philippine Star even showed private respondent Wenceslao’s uncertainty —

Al though he used a subterfuge, I was a lmost certain that Art Borjal referred to the First National Conference on La nd Transpo rtation (June 29-30)
a nd me in the s econd paragraph of his Ma y 31 col umn . . . 18
Identification is grossly i nadequate when even the alleged offended party i s himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. It is well to
note that the revelation of the i dentity of the person alluded to came not from petitioner Borjal b ut from private respondent himself when he
s upplied the i nformation through his 4 June 1989 l etter to the editor. Had private respondent not revealed that he was the "o rganizer" of the FNCLT
referred to i n the Borjal a rticles, the public would have remained i n blissful ignorance of his identity. It is therefore clear that on the element of
i dentifiability a lone the case falls.

The a bove disquisitions notwithstanding, and on the assumption arguendo that private respondent has been s ufficiently i dentif ied as the subject of
Borja l’s disputed comments, we now proceed to resolve the other i ssues a nd pass upon the pertinent findings o f the courts a quo.

The thi rd, fourth, fifth a nd sixth assigned errors all revolve around the primary question of whether the disputed a rticles c onstitute privileged
communications as to exempt the author from liability.

The tri al court ruled that petitioner Borjal ca nnot hide behind the proposition that his a rticles are privileged i n character under the provisions of Art.
354 of The Revised Penal Code which s tate —

ARTICLE 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory i mputation i s presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good i ntention and
jus ti fiable motive for ma king it is s hown, except in the following ca ses:chanrob1es vi rtual 1a w l ibrary

1) A pri va te communication made by a ny person to another i n the performance of a ny l egal, moral or s ocial duty; a nd,

2) A fa i r a nd true report, ma de in good faith, without a ny comments or remarks, of a ny judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of a ny s tatement, report or s peech delivered in said p roceedings, or of a ny other act performed by public officers i n
the exercise of their functions.

Res pondent court explained that the writings in question did not fall under any of the exceptions described in the a bove -quoted article since these
were neither "private communications" nor "fair and true report . . . wi thout any comments or remarks." But this is i ncorrect.

A pri vi leged communication may be either a bsolutely privileged or qualifiedly pri vileged. Absolutely pri vileged communications a re those which a re
not a cti onable even if the author has a cted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI, of the 1987 Cons titution w hich exempts a member of
Congress from liability for a ny s peech or debate i n the Congress or i n any Committee thereof. Upo n the other hand, qualifiedly privileged
communications containing defamatory i mputations a re not a ctionable unless found to have been made without good i ntention or justifiable
moti ve. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report wi thout any comments or remarks."cralaw vi rtua1aw library

Indisputably, petitioner Borjal’s questioned writings are not wi thin the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for , as correctly observed by
the a ppellate court, they a re neither pri vate communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks. However this does not
necessarily mean that they a re not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 i s not a n exclusive list of qualifi edly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest a re likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had i ts ge nesis
not i n the nation’s penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech a nd of the press. 19 As early a s 1918, i n
Uni ted States v. Ca ñete, 20 this Court ruled that publications which a re privileged for reasons of public policy a re protecte d by the constitutional
gua ra nty of freedom of speech. This constitutional ri ght cannot be a bolished by th e mere failure of the legislature to gi ve i t express recognition i n
the s tatute punishing libels.

The concept of privileged communications is i mplicit in the freedom of the press. As held i n Elizalde v. Gutierrez 21 a nd rei terated i n Santos v. Court
of Appeals 22 —

To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing vi ole nce to the concept of
pri vi leged communications implicit i n the freedom of the press. As was s o well put by Justice Ma l colm i n Bustos: ‘Public policy, the welfare of
s oci ety, a nd the orderly a dministration of government have demanded protection of public opinion. The inevitable a nd incontes table result has
been the development a nd a doption of the doctrine of privilege.’

The doctri ne formulated i n these two (2) cases resonates the rule that privileged communications must, sui generis, be protect ive of public opinion.
Thi s closely a dheres to the democratic theory of free s peech a s essential to collective self -determination and eschews the strictly l ibertarian vi ew
tha t i t i s protective solely of self-expression which, in the words of Yale Sterling Professor Owen Fiss, 23 ma kes its appeal to the indivi dualistic ethos
tha t s o dominates our popular a nd political culture. It is therefore cl ear that the restrictive i nterpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on the
penal provision exempting from liability only priva te communications a nd fair a nd true report without comments or remarks def eats, rather than
promotes, the objective of the rule on privileged communications, sadly contrivi ng as it does, to s uppress the healthy efflorescence of public debate
a nd opinion as s hining linchpins of truly democratic societies.

To rei terate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged a nd constitute a va lid defense i n an action for l ibel or slander. The
doctri ne of fair comment means that while i n general every di screditable imputation publicly ma de is deemed false, because every man is presumed
i nnocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
di rected against a public person i n his public capacity, i t is not necessarily a ctionable. In order that s uch discreditable i mputation to a public official
ma y be a ctionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false s upposition. If the comment is a n expression of opinion,
ba s ed on established facts, then it i s immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
24

There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public i nterest. In his testimony, pri vate respondent spelled out the objectives
of the conference thus —

. . . The pri ncipal conference objective is to come up with a draft of an Omnibus Bill that will embody a l ong term l and tra nsportation p olicy for
pres entation to Congress in i ts next regular s ession in July. Since last January, the National Conference on La nd Tra nspo rtation (NCLT), the
conference secretariat, has been enlisting support from all sectors to ensure the success of the project.25cralaw:red

Pri va te respondent l ikewise testified that the FNCLT was raising funds through s olicitation from the public —

Q: Now, i n this first letter, you have attached a budget a nd i t says here that i n this s eminar of the First National Conference on La nd Tra nsportation,
you wi l l need around One million eight hundred fifteen thousand pesos, is that ri ght?

A: Tha t wa s the budget estimate, s ir.

Q: How do you i ntend as executive officer, to raise this fund of your s eminar?

A: Wel l, from sponsors such as government agencies a nd priva te sectors or organizations as well as individual tra nsport fi rms a nd from individual
del egates/participants. 26

The declared objective of the conference, the composition of its members a nd participants, and the manner by which it was i nt ended to be funded
no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public i nterest. An organization such as the FNCLT a iming to reinvent and reshape the
tra ns portation laws of the country a nd seeking to s ource its funds for the project from the public at l arge ca nnot dissociate itself from the public
cha ra cter of i ts mission. As s uch, it ca nnot but invite close s crutiny by the media obliged to i nform the public of the legitimacy of the purpose of the
a cti vi ty a nd of the qualifications and i ntegrity of the personalities behind it.

Thi s in effect i s the strong message in New York Times v. Sulliva n 27 which the appellate court failed to consider or, for that matter, to heed. It
i ns isted that private respondent was not, properly s peaking, a "public official" nor a "public figure," which is why the defa matory i mputations
a ga inst him had nothing to do with his task of organizing the FNCLT.

New York Ti mes v. Sul liva n was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in the 1960s a t the height of the bloody ri oting i n the Ame rican South over racial
s egregation. The then Ci ty Commissioner L. B. Sullivan of Montgomery, Al abama, sued New York Times for publishing a paid political advertisement
es pousing ra cial equality a nd describing police atrocities committed a gainst students i nside a college ca mpus. As commissione r having charge over
pol ice a ctions Sullivan felt that he was sufficiently identified i n the a d as the perpetrator of the outrage; consequently, he s ued New York Times on
the ba sis of what he believed were libelous utterances against him.

The U.S. Supreme Court s peaking through Mr. Jus tice William J. Brennan Jr. rul ed a gainst Sullivan holding that honest cri ticisms on the conduct of
public officials and public figures are insulated from libel judgments. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibi t a public official or
public fi gure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the s tatement was made
wi th a ctual malice, i.e., with knowledge that i t was false or with reckless disregard of whether i t was false or not.

The ra ison d’etre for the New York Times doctrine was that to require cri tics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of a ll their factual a ssertions
on pa in of libel judgments would lead to s elf-censorship, since would-be cri tics would be deterred from voi cing out their cri ticisms even if such were
bel ieved to be true, or were i n fact true, because of doubt whether i t could be proved or because of fear of the expense of h aving to prove it. 28

In the present case, we deem private respondent a public fi gure within the purview of the New York Times ruling. At a ny ra te, we have also defined
"public figure" i n Ayers Production Pty., Ltd. v. Ca pul ong 29 a s —

. . . a pers on who, by his a ccomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by a dopting a profession or ca lling which gives the publ ic a legitimate interest i n
hi s doings, his affairs a nd his character, has become a ‘public personage.’ He is, i n other words, a celebrity. Obvi ously, to be included i n this ca tegory
a re those who have a chieved s ome degree of reputation by a ppearing before the public, a s in the ca se of a n actor, a professional baseball player, a
pugi list, or a ny other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous i nventors an d explorers, war heroes a nd
even ordinary s oldiers, i nfant prodigy, a nd no less a personage than the Great Exa lted Ruler of the lodge. It i ncludes, i n s hort, a nyone who has
a rri ved at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person.

The FNCLT wa s a n undertaking infused with public interest. It was promoted as a joint project of the government a nd the private s ector, a nd
orga nized by top government officials a nd prominent businessmen. For this reason, it a ttracted media mileage a nd drew public a ttention not only to
the conference itself but to the personalities behind as well. As i ts Executive Director a nd s pokesman, private respondent consequently a ssumed the
s ta tus of a public figure.

But even assuming ex-gratia a rgumenti that priva te respondent, despite the position he occupied in the FNCLT, would not qualify a s a public figure,
i t does not necessarily follow that he could not va lidly be the s ubject of a public comment even if he was not a public official or a t least a public
fi gure, for he could be, as l ong as he was involved in a public issue. If a matter i s a s ubject of public or general interest, i t cannot s uddenly become
l ess s o merely because a private individual is i nvolved or because i n some s ense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become i nvolved. The
public’s primary i nterest is in the event; the public focus i s on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct,
not the participant’s prior anonymity or notoriety. 30

There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public i nterest. A reading of the i mputations of petit ioner Borjal against
res pondent Wenceslao shows that all these necessarily bore upon the l atter’s official conduct and his moral an d mental fitness as Executive Director
of the FNCLT. The nature a nd functions of his position which included s olicitation of funds, dissemination of information abo ut the FNCLT i n order to
generate interest i n the conference, and the management and coordination of the various activities of the conference demanded from him utmost
honesty, i ntegrity a nd competence. These are ma tters a bout which the public has the ri ght to be i nformed, taking into account the very public
cha ra cter of the conference itself.

Concededly, petitioner Borjal may ha ve gone overboard in the l anguage employed describing the "organizer of the conference." On e is tempted to
wonder if it was by s ome mischievous ga mbit that he would also dare test the limits of the "wild blue yonder" of free speech in this jurisdiction. But
no ma tter how intemperate or deprecatory the utterances appear to be, the privilege is not to be defeated nor rendered i nutil e for, as succinctly
expressed by Mr. Jus tice Brennan i n New York Times v. Sul livan," [D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust a nd wide open, a nd that it
ma y wel l include vehement, ca ustic a nd sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on the government a nd public officials." 31

The Court of Appeals concluded that since malice i s always presumed i n the publication of defamatory ma tters in the absence of proof to the
contra ry, the question of privilege is i mmaterial.

We reject this postulate. While, generally, malice ca n be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a commu nication destroys
the presumption of malice. 32 The onus of provi ng actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent Wenceslao herein. He must bring home to
the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice a s the true motive of his conduct. 33

Ma l i ce connotes i ll will or s pite and speaks not in response to duly but merely to i njure the reputation of the person defame d, and implies a n
i ntention to do ulterior a nd unjustifiable harm. 34 Ma lice i s bad faith or bad motive. 35 It i s the essence of the cri me of libel. 36

In the milieu obtaining, ca n it be reasonably i nferred that in wri ting a nd publishing the a rticles i n question petitioner Bor jal acted with malice?
Pri ma rily, pri vate respondent failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioner was animated by a desire to i nflict unjustifiable harm
on hi s reputation, or that the articles were written and published without good motives or justifiable ends. On the other han d, we find petitioner
Borja l to have acted in good faith. Moved by a sense of civi c duty a nd prodded by his responsibility a s a newspaperman, he proceeded to expose and
denounce what he perceived to be a public deception. Surely, we ca nnot begrudge him for that. Every ci tizen has the ri ght to enjoy a good name
a nd reputation, but we do not consider that petitioner Borjal has violated that ri ght in this ca se nor abused his press freedom.chanrobles law library

Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge that they
a re fa lse or i n reckless disregard of whether they a re false or not. 37 "Reckless disregard of what is false or not" means th at the defendant entertains
s eri ous doubt as to the truth of the publication, 38 or tha t he possesses a high degree of a wareness of their probable falsity. 39

The a rti cles subject of the instant ca se can hardly be said to have been written with knowledge that these a re false or i n re ckless disregard of what is
fa l se or not. This is not to s ay however that the very s erious allegations of petitioner Borjal a ssumed by pri vate respondent to be directed against
hi m a re true. But we nevertheless find these at l east to have been based on reasonable grounds formed after the columnist conducted s everal
pers onal i nterviews and after considering the va ried documentary evidence provided him by his s ources. Thus, the following a re supported by
documentary evidence: (a) that private respondent requested Gloria Ma capagal-Arroyo, then head of the Garments a nd Te xtile Export Board
(GTEB), to expedite the processing a nd release of the import approval a nd certificate of a vailability of a garment fi rm i n ex change for the monetary
contri bution of Juliano Li m, which necessitated a reply from the office of Gloria Macapa gal-Arroyo explaining the procedure of the GTEB in
processing applications and clarifyi ng that a ll a pplicants were treated equally; 40 (b) that Antonio Periquet was designated Chairman of the
Executi ve Committee of the FNCLT notwithstanding that he had previously declined the offer; 41 a nd, (c) that despite the fact that then President
Aqui no and her Secretary of Tra nsportation Rainerio Reyes declined the i nvitation to be guest speakers i n the conference, the ir names were still
i ncl uded in the printout of the FNCLT. 42 Added to these are the a dmissions of private respondent that: (a) he assisted Juliano Li m i n his a pplication
for a quota allocation with the GTEB in exchange for monetary contributions to the FNCLT; 43 (b) he i ncluded the name of then Secretary of
Tra ns portation Rainerio Reyes i n the promotional materials of the conference notwithstanding the latter’s refusal to l end his name to a nd
pa rti cipate in the FNCLT; 44 a nd, (c) he used different letterheads a nd telephone numbers. 45

Even a ssuming that the contents of the a rticles are false, mere error, i naccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove a ctual malice. Errors or
mi s statements a re inevi table i n a ny s cheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable car e, the press should
not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or i mperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for
mi s statement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by gi ving them much leeway a nd tolerance ca n they courageously a nd effectively function a s
cri ti cal a gencies i n our democracy. 46 In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel 47 we held —

A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events a nd developments in which the public has a
l egitimate i nterest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on cri minal or ci vil charges for libel , so long a s the
news paper respects and keeps within the s tandards of morality a nd ci vility prevailing within the general community.

To a voi d the s elf-censorship that would necessarily a ccompany strict l iability for erroneous s tatements, rules governing liability for i njury t o
reputa tion are required to a llow a n adequate margin of error by protecting s ome i naccuraci es. It is for the same reason that the New York Times
doctri ne requires that liability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not be i mposed i n the absence of pr oof of "actual malice" on
the pa rt of the person making the libelous s tatement.

At a ny ra te, it may be salutary for private respondent to ponder upon the advice of Mr. Jus tice Ma lcolm expressed i n U .S. v. Bus tos, 48 tha t "the
i nterest of society a nd the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Co mplete liberty to comment on the conduct
of public men is a s calpel i n the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the a bscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may
s uffer under a hostile a nd unjust accusation; the wound may be assuaged by the balm of a cl ear conscience. A public official must not be too thin-
s ki nned with reference to comments upon his official a cts."cralaw vi rtua1aw library

The foregoing disposition renders the second a nd seventh assigned errors moot a nd a cademic, hence, we find no necessity to pass upon them.

We mus t however ta ke this opportunity to l ikewise remind media practitioners of the high ethical s tandards a ttached to a nd de manded by their
nobl e profession. The danger of a n unbridled irrational exercise o f the right of free s peech and press, that is, i n utter contempt of the ri ghts of
others and in willful disregard of the cumbrous responsibilities i nherent in it, is the eventual self-destruction of the right a nd the regression of
huma n s ociety i nto a veritable Hobbesian s tate of nature where life is s hort, nasty a nd brutish. Therefore, to recognize that there can be no absolute
"unrestraint" i n speech is to truly comprehend the quintessence of freedom i n the marketplace of s ocial thought a nd a ction, g enuine freedom being
tha t which is limned by the freedom of others. If there is freedom of the press, ought there not also be freedom from the pre ss? It is in this sense
tha t s elf-regulation as distinguished from self-censorship becomes the ideal mean for, as Mr. Jus tice Frankfurter has warned," [W]ithout lively s ense
of res ponsibility, a free press may readily become a powerful i nstrument of injustice." 49

Les t we be misconstrued, this i s not to diminish nor constrict that space i n which expression freely fl ourishes a nd operates. For we have a lways
s trongly maintained, as we do now, that freedom of expression is man’s birthright — constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that it has
become the singular role of the press to act as i ts "defensor fi dei" in a democratic society s uch as ours. But it is a lso worth keeping in mind that the
pres s is the serva nt, not the master, of the ci tizenry, a nd i ts freedom does not ca rry wi th i t an unrestricted hunting l icense to prey on the ordinary
ci ti zen. 50

On peti tioners’ counterclaim for damages, we find the evidence too meager to s ustain any a ward. Indeed, private respondent ca nnot be s aid to
ha ve i nstituted the present suit in abuse of the l egal processes and with hostility to the press; or tha t he acted maliciously, wa ntonly, oppressively,
fra udulently a nd for the sole purpose of harassing petitioners, thereby entitling the latter to damages. On the contrary, pri vate respondent acted
wi thin his ri ghts to protect his honor from what he perceived to be malicious i mputations against him. Proof a nd motive that the institution of the
a cti on was prompted by a sinister design to vex a nd humiliate a person must be clearly a nd preponderantly established to entitle the vi ctim to
da mages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the ri ght to litigate, nor should counsel’s fees be a warded ever y ti me a party wins a
s ui t. 51

For, concl uding with the wisdom in Warren v. Pulitzer Publishing Co. 52 —

Every ma n has a ri ght to discuss matters of public interest. A cl ergyman with his flock, an a dmiral with his fleet, a general with his army, a judge with
hi s jury, we are, all of us, the subject of public discussion. The vi ew of our court has been thus s tated: ‘It is only i n despotism that one must speak
s ub rosa, or i n whispers, with bated breath, around the corner, or i n the dark on a subject touching the common welfare. It i s the brightest jewel in
the crown of the law to s peak and maintain the golden mean between defamation, on one hand, and a healthy a nd robust ri ght of free public
di s cussion, on the other.’
WHEREFORE, the petition i s GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 25 Ma rch 1996 a nd its Resolution of 12 September 1996 denying
reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, a nd the complaint for damages a gainst petitioners is DISMISSED. Petitioners’ counterclaim for
da mages is likewise DISMISSED for l ack of merit. No costs.chanroblesvi rtuallawlibrary:red

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Ma rti nez and Buena, JJ., concur.

Mendoza, J., concurs in the result.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4998 October 25, 1909
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSE SEDANO Y CALONGE,Defendant-Appellant.

CARSON, J.:

Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Ma nila of the crime of libel, as defined and penalized in Act No. 277 of the
Phi l ippine Commission, and sentenced to three months' imprisonment a nd to pay a fine of P1,000, Phi lippine currency, and the costs of the
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

The a lleged libelous matter appeared i n an article bearing as its title the words "A Portra it, Dedicated to the Filipino People, a nd Especially to the
Peopl e of Ca vite," which was published on or a bout the 3d day of Ma y, 1908, i n the Ci ty of Ma nila, i n a w eekly publication known as "Chispazos."
cha nrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

At the tri al i n the court below, defendant and his counsel a dmitted in writing that defendant, as editor a nd proprietor of th e periodical, published,
pri nted, and circulated the issue which contained the a lleged libelous matter; a nd the evidence of record conclusively establishes the allegation of
the pros ecution that the person referred to in the alleged libelous a rticle, a nd whose character, reputation, and standing i n the community are
a s sailed therein, is the Hon. Rafael Pa lma, now a member of the United States Philippine Commission, a nd a t the time when the article was
published a Delegate to the Philippine Assembly from the Provi nce of Ca vite.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

Tha t the article i n question was "an injurious publication: which i mpeached the honesty, vi rtue, a nd reputation of the person a gainst whom i t was
di rected, and tended to expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ri dicule by publishing to the world his a lleged mental, moral, and physical
defects, is not a nd ca n not be questioned; a nd counsel for the appellant rests his argument on appeal, s olely a nd exclusively on his contention that
the evi dence of record discloses that the matter charged a s libelous is true, a nd was published "with good motives and for justifiable ends," and that
a ppellant should, therefore, be acquitted under the provisions of section 4 of the Li bel Law (Act No. 277).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
vi rtua l law library

But one witness was called by the defense, whose testimony, a s so fa r as it bears upon the truth of falsity of the statements made in the defamatory
a rti cl e, is practically limited to a relation of certain political differences between the witness a nd the s ubject of the article, whom the witness
s pecifically charged with having vi olated a political compact, whereby, as wi tness cl aims, mutual assistance was to be render ed i n the political
ca mpaign i ncident to the l ast general election of members of th e Philippine Assembly. The tri al judge was of opinion that "the most" that "could be
cl a imed" for this evidence was that i t disclosed a misunderstanding between the parties of the quarrel; a nd even if it be a dmitted that the
uncontradicted testimony of this witness would sustain a finding that the subject of the a rticle had failed, for s ome reason unknown and not
i ndicated by the witness, to fulfill the terms of a certain political compact entered into with the witness, nevertheless suc h a fi nding would fail
utterl y to s ustain defendant's allegations of the truth of defamatory a rticle, which produces the physical, mental, and moral qualities of the injured
pa rty, a s perses his reputation and standing i n both public a nd private l ife, i mpugns his professional a ttainments, a bility, a nd conduct as a n attorney,
a nd by di rect imputation as well as by i nsinuation a nd veiled s uggestion, charges him with gra ve offenses defined a nd penaliz ed in the Penal
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

No evi dence whatever was s ubmitted at the tri al in s upport of defendant's contention that the defamatory matter was published wi th justifiable
moti ves; but counsel on appeal i nsists that it a ppearing that the subject of the article was a member of the Philippine Assembly, a nd a candidate for
reel ection a nd for a ppointment to the Philippine Commission a t the time when it was published, comment and cri ticism upon his conduct, a nd upon
hi s mental, moral, a nd physical fitness for the offices for which he was a n aspirant might l awfully be made by the public press, and that in the
a bs ence of proof of a ctual malice, such comment and cri ticism s hould be presumed to have been made for justifiable
moti ves.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

But whi le it may be admitted that the public a cts of public men may l awfully be made the subject of comment a nd cri ticism by the pu blic a nd by the
pres s, and that such cri ticism, when made in good faith , s hould be a nd is privileged; a nd while it may, perhaps, a lso be a dmitted that a somewhat
broa d license s hould be allowed to cri ticisms of and comment on the mental, moral, a nd physical fitness of candidate for publ ic office, the very fa ct
of ca ndidacy putting these matters i n issue, a nd the public having a right to be informed a s to the qualifications of those who s eek election, and
perha ps appointment to public office, nevertheless i t is cl ear upon general principles as well as under the express provisions of the Libel La w (Act
No. 277) tha t s uch comment or cri ticism, i f defamatory i n its nature, constitutes a criminal l ibel if it a ppears that it was a ctuated by a ctual or express
ma l ice; that from the very na ture of the privilege claimed the freedom of such cri ticism is necessarily limited to fair comme nt on the matters under
di s cussion, fair comment being comment which is true, or which, if false, expresses the real opinion of the author, s uch opinion havi ng been formed
wi th a reasonable degree of ca re a nd on reasonable grounds. (Steph. Dig. Cr. La w, a rt 274); a n d that such criticism ca n not be permitted to be used
a s a cloak for malicious assaults on the priva te life a nd character of the person criticized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

A mere reading of the article in question is s ufficient to s ustain a finding that i ts publication was inspired by a ctual or express malice, a nd the trial
court properly found that it bears upon its face "plain evidence of a purposed ca lumny a nd furious malice." We do not deem i t necessary or proper
to gi ve s uch an article further publicity by s etting i t out i n this opinion, a nd i t is sufficient for our purposes to say that the vi le a nd i nsulting epithets
wi th which i t abounds, the manifest vi ndictiveness with which i t assails the family, s ocial, professional, and political relations of the i njured person,
a nd the reckless manner in which i t imputes the commission of grave cri mes a nd misdemeanors, which the defendant did not even a ttempt to prove
a t the tri al, although he undertook to justify by offering evidence as to the truth of other portions of defamatory ma tter contained in the article,
l eave no room for doubt of the animus i n the mind of the a uthor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

It need hardly be added that such a n article ca n not be said to have been limited to fair comment and criticism of the public conduct of the public
offi cial assailed, or of his qualifications and capacity a s a ca ndidate for office, a nd that i ts a uthor should not and can not be permitted to shield
hi mself, by claiming that the publication was made with justifiable motives, from the consequences to himself entailed by his malicious assaults on
the public a nd private life of his vi ctim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

Moreover the grounds of public policy upon which the s o-called privilege of "fair cri ticism" of the public acts of the public acts of public officers, and
of di recting public attention to the character a nd qualifications or l ack of qualifications of candidates for of fice i s based, by no means justify or
necessitate the extension of the privilege to false a nd unfounded allegations of fact. The i nterests of s ociety require that immunity should be
gra nted to the discussion of public affairs, a nd that all acts a nd matters of a public nature may be freely published wi th fitting comments a nd
s tri ctures; but they do not require that the ri ght to criticize the public acts of public officers s hall embrace the right to base such cri ticisms upon false
s ta tements of fact, or to a ttack the private character of the officer, or to fa lsely i mpute to him malfeasance or misconduct in office; a nd as to
ca ndidates for office it has frequently been held in the United States that false allegation of fact even when made in good f aith a nd with probable
ca us e are not privileged (59 Fed., Rep., 530; 21 Fl a ., 431; 136 Ma s s., 164; 36 S. W. Rep. (Texas), 765; 66 Mi ch., 307; 69 Pa ., 103; 42 N. S. Rep. (N. Y.),
270); a l though i t has also been held that where there is an honest belief in the truth of charges made against ca ndidates for office, a nd the
publication is made i n good faith and with probable cause one i s not responsible even for publishing a n untruth (46 Ia., 533; 64 Tex., 354; 111 Pa .,
404), a nd the latter vi ew is that held by Bishop, who asserts that this "is believed to be the better doctrine" in reason as well as in authority.
(Bi s hop's Cri m. Law, Vol. II � 936.) cha nrobles virtual l aw library

For the purposes of this opinion, however, i t is not necessary to discuss this latter question, or the distinction usually dra wn i n the connection
between ca ndidates for elective a nd a ppointive offices, because in the case at bar the lack of proof of probable cause for th e belief by the publisher
of the a rticle of the truth of the charges contained therein; the lack of good faith disclosed i n the manifest recklessness and malicious vindictiveness
wi th which the a ttack was made; a nd the utter failure of the attempt to justify by provi ng the truth of the numerous defamato ry allegations of fact,
l eave no room for doubt as to the criminal l iability of the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual l aw library

Couns el for the appellant ca lls upon this court, by i ts decision in this case, to protect the freedom of s peech a nd secure to the people of these
Is lands the liberty of the press which are guaranteed i n the Philippine Bill. But while i t is "fundamental with us that the p roper a nd open discussion
of wha tever concerns the public shall be free," a nd that "the law of l ibel is never to be s o a dministered as to impair the just l iberty of the press"
(Bi s hop's Cri m. Law, Vol. II, � 913); the provisions of the Constitution of the United States guaranteeing the liberty of the press, from which the
provi sions of the Philippine Bill were adopted, have never been held to s ecure i mmunity to the person responsible for the publication of l ibelous
defa matory ma tter i n a newspaper, the ri ght guaranteed consisting merely of a ri ght to print what one chooses, without any previous license, but
s ubject to be held responsible therefor in like manner as would a nyone else be held responsible for a similar publication made i n s ome other w ay.
(Jones vs . Townsend, 21 Fla., 431 Gi ddens vs . Thirk, 4 Ga ., 364; Sweeney vs . Baker, 13 W. Va ., 158.) cha nrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

We fi nd no error i n the proceedings prejudicial to the ri ghts of the a ccused, a nd we are satisfied that the judgment of convi ction of the trial court be
s us tained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

We a re unanimously of opinion, however, that the tri al court erred on the side of l eniency i n i mposing a sentence upon the convict, which, we think,
i s wholly i nadequate in vi ew of the gra vity of the offense committed. The publication of falsehood and calumny a gainst public officers or candidates
for public office has frequently been held to be s pecially reprehensible and an offense most dangerous to the people and to t he public welfare,
beca use of the danger that the services of the best ci tizens may thereby be lost to the State (151 Ma ss., 50; 74 Tex., 89; 93 Ky., 347; 117 Pa ., 520);
a nd i n the case a t bar the offense is a ggravated to a degree, not only by the form of the a ttack i tself and the manner in whi ch i t was ma de public,
but by the hi gh and responsible nature of the duties performed by the official attacked and the dignity of both the office which he held a t the time
the l i bel was published and of the office for which he was a t that ti me a candidate and to which he was later appointed. The libelous a rticle occupies
a bout four foolscap pages typewritten matter, a nd every pa ragraph, and nearly every s entence, contains one or more distinct defamatory
a l legations of fa ct; and it would be difficult to conceive of a more wilfully a nd vi ndictively cruel, wicked, base, and dasta rdly attack upon the honor
a nd i ntegrity of a high public official and upon his private, fa mily, s ocial, a nd professional relations than that which is c ontained therein; i t is couched
i n l anguage so indecent, a nd a bounds in indirections so vulgar, that i t is not fit for publication in a ny respectable newspaper, a nd yet i t was
published in a n illustrated weekly, which was spread broadcast throughout the Islands and sought especially to gain a n entrance i nto the homes of
the people of the ci ty of Ma nila where i ts vi ctim resided and of the Provi nce of Ca vite which he represented i n the Philippine Assembly, a nd, finally
a s the tri al court well found, the mere reading of the article not only discloses "purposed calumny a nd furious malice," but a wanton and reckless
a ttempt on the part of its publisher to i nflict upon the vi ctim of his malicious attacks the utmost pain and suffering and injury which could be ca used
by a s curri lous a nd l ibelous attack in the public press.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law li brary

In vi ew of a ll the ci rcumstances of the ca se, we think that the penalty which s hould be imposed upon the offender s hould not fall far s hort of the
ma xi mum penalty prescribed by law, and we therefore, modify the s entence i mposed by the tri al court, b y s ubstituting for s o much thereof as
i mposes the penalty of three months' i mprisonment and a fine of P1,000, the penalty of one year's i mprisonment and a fi ne of P1,000, together with
s ubsidiary i mprisonment in accordance with l aw i n the event of i nsolvency a nd failure to pay the fi ne, the subsidiary i mprisonment, however, not to
exceed one-third of the principal penalty; a nd thus modified, the sentence imposed by the trial court is affirmed, with the costs of thi s instance
a ga inst the appellant. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

Arel lano, C. J., Torres , Mapa, Johnson, a nd Moreland, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 7897. November 23, 1912. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FULGENCIO CONTRERAS ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

DE CI SI ON

MORELAND, J. :

An a ppeal from a judgment convicting the appellants of the cri me of libel.

The a rti cles i n question a ppeared in the "Ca marinense," a newspaper published i n the Province of Ambos Ca marines. The publica tion of the articles
a nd the responsibility for the same, if a ny, a re admitted by the accused.

The s alient features of the a rticles complained of are as follows:chanrob1es vi rtual 1a w library

(From a n a rticle published June 9, 1910, entitled "The Babudo Affair.")

"We ca nnot believe, as some s uppose, that Governor Perfecto, incapable a nd powerless to go a gainst the will of Ma jor Swann and other Americans,
s uccumbed to the demands of the all powerful, performing an a ct of shameful fawning. There s till remains to us a little of th e good opinion which
we ha d of him when his government was i naugurated."cralaw vi rtua1aw library

(From a n a rticle published July 14, 1910, enti tled "Balance Semestral.")

"Wha t then has been his policy during the six months? A policy of i ntrigue, of fawning a nd of s ubmissions. Policies of cowardice when confronted by
a nother man more powerful than himself, a nd a policy of oppression toward his fellow -creatures. And to think that he boasts of being a
Na ci onalista!

"Wha t Ri zal said is true: ’Ma n is a creature of ci rcumstances.’

"An i ronical expression which is appropriately a pplied to those persons who draw their s ustenance from the people but who pay no atte ntion to the
groa ns of the people."cralaw vi rtua1aw library

(From a n a rticle published August 4, 1910, enti tled "Consummatum Es t.")

"Al together the postponement in the casting of his vote i n order to examine this matter more carefully a nd s ubmit it to the m unicipalities was a
mos t comical farce, put on the stage in order to conceal a nd s hroud his villainous falsity.

"Beca use, i t is falsity a nd a vi llainous one too, to promise the people before the elections took place that a s soon as he was made governor he would
vote for the s ingle cedula, ta x, which promise was repeated — a s governor — ma ny ti mes on different occasions and i n the presence of many
pers ons, a nd then to act a s did — JUDAS."cralaw vi rtua1aw library

(From a n a rticle published August 4, 1910, enti tled "Gobierno de Pa rientes.")

"Wha t nepotism! We first said that the government of Perfecto was one of favors to his partisans. We must now rectify this a nd further reduce the
ci rcl e, because it is not a government of favors to partisans, but exclusively a government of ’relatives.’

"It bea ts by fa r the motto: ’When Sagasta goes up, Sagasta’s a dherents go up.’

"Perfecto practices this other one, s till more lucrative: ’When I go up, my relative go up with me.’ ENOUGH.

"Thi s i s to have neither decorum nor shame."cralaw vi rtua1aw library

Tha t these publications are l ibelous under the statute is beyond question. They tend directly to i mpeach the honesty, i ntegri ty, a nd reputation of the
pers on slandered and to expose him to public hatred, contempt, a nd ri dicule.

Men ha ve the right to a ttack, ri ghtly or wrongly, the policy of a public official wi th every a rgument which ability ca n find or i ngenuity i nvent. The y
ma y s how, by a rgument good or bad, such policy to be injurious to the individual and to s ociety. They ma y demonstrate, by l ogic true or false, that it
i s destructive of human freedom a nd will result in the overthrow of the nation i tself. But the law does not permit men falsel y to i mpeach the
moti ves, attack the honesty, blacken the vi rtue, or i njure the reputation of that official. They ma y destroy, by fa ir means or foul, the whole fabric of
hi s statesmanship, but the law does not permit them to a ttack the man himself. They may falsely charge that his policies are bad, but they may not
fa l sely allege that he i s bad.

The defendants had the ri ght to call the attention of the public to the personal or official relations existing between Governor Perfecto and Major
Swa nn a nd other Americans. They might comment, fairly or unfairly, upon what he had actually done as a result of those relat ions, and what he had
a ctua lly done upon their representations and initiative. They were justified in dilating upon those relations a nd a cts a nd i n demonstrating, by
a rguments good or bad, all of the disasters which they mi ght claim would follow them. But unless i t was true, and they were doing it with good
moti ves and for justifiable ends, they ha d no ri ght to draw the i nference that he was a coward or that his administration was one of cowardice, or to
cha rge that, when confronted by men more powerful than himself, he displayed the nature of a weakling a nd a fawner.

The a ccused had also the ri ght to call a ttention to the preelection promise of the governor a nd his failure to fulfill that p romise after his election.
They ha d a ri ght to take up a nd discuss the reasons which he gave for his not fulfilling s uch promise; and that were justified i n their a ttempts to
s how what evil results flowed from his failure to live up to it by a ny a rguments they chose to present. but they had no ri ght , unless i t was true a nd
they published i t with good motives and for justifiable ends, to s ay that his a cts were the product of a villainous falsity a nd that he carried out his
promi se in the same manner as Judas.

It i s undoubted that the accused might call attention to the fact that Governor Perfecto was a ppointing a number of his relatives to public office.
They ha d a ri ght to comment upon what they deemed to be the i mpropriety of s uch a policy a nd to use every a rgument to s ustain their contention.
They ha d a ri ght to call the attention of the people to what they might claim to be the disastrous effects flowing from s uch a policy. But they had no
ri ght, unless i t was true and they published it with good motives a nd for justifiable ends, to assert that, for that reason, he was without s hame or
decorum in his administration of public a ffairs.

Men ma y a rgue, but they may not tra duce. Men may differ, but they ma y not, for that reason, falsely cha rge dishonesty. Men ma y l ook a t policies
from di fferent points of vi ew and see them in different lights, but they ma y not, on that account, falsely charge criminality, i mmorality, l ack of virtue,
ba d motives, evil i ntentions, or corrupt heart or mind. Men may fa lsely charge that policies a re bad, but they ca nnot falsely charge that men are bad.

The a ttempt on the part of the defendants to prove the truth of their allegations resulted i n complete failure. While they ma y have proven as a fact
tha t policies a re bad, but they ca nnot falsely charge that men a re bad. The attempt on the part of the defendants to prove the truth of their
a l legations resulted in complete failure. While they may have proven as a fact that Governor Perfecto made a promise before e lection that he did
not ful fill after election a nd that he placed some of his relations in public office, that does not establish the charge that he was dishonest, that he
a cted with villainous falsity, a nd that the was without shame or decorum. The proof of the commission of an act does not esta blish at the same time
a n unjustifiable i nference from that fa ct against the i ntegrity a nd character of the man who performed the act proved.

Whi le the defendants were properly convicted, we a re of the opinion that the ends of justice will be fully s ubserved i n the p resent case by a fine
merely, i nstead of fine and imprisonment. The judgment appealed from is hereby modified and the defendants sentenced to pay a fine of P1,000
ea ch, with s ubsidiary i mprisonment to each according to law in case of nonpayment, with costs.

Arel lano, C.J., Torres, Ma pa, and Johnson, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Thi s petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti -Wiretapping Act, on the i ssue of
whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices i n Section 1 of the Act, s uch that its use to overhear a private conversation
woul d constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

The fa cts presented by the People a nd narrated in the respondent court's decision a re not disputed by the petitioner.

In the morning of October 22, 1975, compl ainant Atty. Ti to Pi ntor a nd his client Manuel Montebon were in the l iving ro om of complainant's
res i dence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the Ci ty Fiscal of Cebu
a ga inst Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to La conico (tsn, August 26,
1981, pp. 3-5).

Tha t s ame morning, La conico telephoned appellant, who i s a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the s ettlement of the direct assault
ca s e because his regular l awyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business tri p. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico
where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', ts n, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).

When complainant called up, Laconico requested a ppellant to s ecretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so a s to
hea r personally the proposed conditions for the s ettlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions fo r withdrawal of the
compl aint for direct assault.

(a ) the P5,000.00 wa s no longer a cceptable, a nd that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A brea kdown of the P8,000.00 ha d been made
together wi th other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no l onger for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pi ntor himself in persuading his client
to wi thdraw the case for Di rect Assault against Atty. La conico before the Cebu Ci ty Fiscal's Office;

(b) Publ ic apology to be made by Atty. La conico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School;

(c) Pl ,000.00 to be gi ven to the Don Bosco Faculty cl ub;

(d) tra nsfer of son of Atty. La conico to a nother school or a nother section of Don Bosco Technical High School;

(e) Affi davit of desistance by Atty. La conico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Ma nuel Montebon at the Cebu Ci ty Fiscal's Office,
whereas Montebon's a ffidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case a gainst Atty. La conico to be filed later;

(f) Al l ow Ma nuel Montebon to continue teaching a t the Don Bosco Technical School;

(g) Not to di vulge the truth a bout the settlement of the Direct Assault Ca se to the mass media;

(h) P2,000.00 a ttorney s fees for Atty. Pi ntor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).

Twenty mi nutes later, complainant called up a gain to ask Laconico i f he was a greeable to the conditions. Laconico a nswered 'Y es'. Complainant then
tol d La conico to wait for i nstructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, Ma rch 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).

Compl ainant ca lled up again and instructed La conico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico
who ea rlier a lerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Cri minal Investigation Servi ce of the Philippine Constabulary, i nsisted that complainant himsel f
s hould receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money a t the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was a rrested by
a gents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day a n affidavi t stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the wi thdrawal of the case for direct
a s sault. La conico a ttached the a ffidavit of appellant to th e complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed a gainst complainant. Since appellant
l i stened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant a nd La conico with vi olati on of the Anti-
Wi retapping Act.

After tri a l on the merits, the l ower court, i n a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan a nd La conico guilty of vi olating S ection 1 of
Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each s entenced to one (1) year i mprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the deci sion, the petitioner
a ppealed to the a ppellate court.

On Augus t 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the tri al court, holding that the communication between the
compl ainant and a ccused Laconico was private i n nature a nd, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; tha t the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge a nd consent of the complainant; a nd that the extension telephone which was used by the pe titioner to
overhear the telephone conversation between complainant a nd La conico is covered in the term "device' as provided i n Rep. Act No. 4200.

In thi s petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court a nd raises the following i ssues; (a) whether or not the
tel ephone conversation between the complainant a nd a ccused La conico was p riva te in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered
by the term "device or a rrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had a uthority to l isten or ove rhear said telephone
convers ation a nd (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 i s ambiguous and, therefore, s hould be construed in fa vor of the petitioner.

Secti on 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provi des:

Secti on 1. It s hall be unlawful for a ny person, not being a uthorized by all the parties to any pri vate communication or s poken word, to ta p any wi re
or ca bl e or by using a ny other device or a rrangement, to secretly overhear, i ntercept, or record such communication or s poken word by using a
devi ce commonly known a s a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or ta pe-recorder, or however otherwise described:

It s hall be unlawful for a ny person, be he a participant or not in the act or a cts penalized i n the next preceeding s entence, to knowingly possess any
ta pe record, wire record, disc record, or a ny other s uch record, or copies thereof, of any communication or s poken word s ecured either before or
a fter the effective date of this Act i n the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for a ny other person or pers ons; or to communicate
the contents thereof, either verbally or i n writing, or to furnish tra nscriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provi ded,
tha t the use of such record or a ny copies thereof as evidence in a ny ci vil, cri minal investigation or tri al of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof,
s ha ll not be covered by this prohibition.

We rul e for the petitioner.

We a re confronted in this case with the i nterpretation of a penal statute a nd not a rule of evidence. The i ssue is not the a dmissibility of evidence
s ecured over a n extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone a nd his lawyer
l i stening to the conversation on an extension line s hould both face prison sentences s imply because the extension was used to enable them to both
l i sten to an a lleged a ttempt at extortion.

There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pi ntor and accused Atty. La conico was "private " in the sense that
the words uttered were made between one person a nd a nother as distinguished from words between a s peaker a nd a public. It is also undisputed
tha t only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to l isten to a nd overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone
l i ne. Obviously, complainant Pi ntor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the a lleged demand for a n P8,000.00 c onsideration in
order to ha ve his client withdraw a direct assault charge a gainst Atty. La conico filed with the Cebu Ci ty Fiscal's Office if he knew that another lawyer
wa s also l istening. We have to consider, however, that a ffirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a ca ller by merely using a
tel ephone line ca n force the listener to s ecrecy no matter how obscene, cri minal, or annoying the ca ll may be. It would be the word of the caller
a ga inst the listener's.

Beca use of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy l oads which telephone ca bles a re made
to ca rry i n certa in a reas, telephone users often encounter what a re called "crossed lines". An unwary ci tizzen who happens to pick up his telephone
a nd who overhears the details of a cri me might hesitate to inform police a uthorities if he knows that he could be a ccuse d under Rep. Act 4200 of
us i ng his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be cri minals. Surely the law was never i ntended for such
mi s chievous results.

The ma in issue i n the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or a rrangement." Is an
extension of a telephone unit s uch a device or a rrangement as would s ubject the user to i mprisonment ranging from s ix months to six years with the
a ccessory penalty of perpetual a bsolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for a n alien? Pri vate secretaries with extension lines to
thei r bosses' telephones are s ometimes asked to use a nswering or recording devices to record business conversations between a boss and another
bus inessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party l ine" be a
devi ce or arrangement under the law?

The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones a re not i ncluded in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording
devi ces, nor do they belong to the same cl ass of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by l aw. He maintains that i n 1964 , when Senate Bill
No. 9 (l a ter Rep. Act No. 4200) wa s being considered in the Senate, telephones a nd extension telephones were a lready widely us ed instruments,
proba bly the most popularly known communication device.

Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the fl oor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized
i nto a statute, no mention was ma de of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph , detectaphone
or wa l kie talkie or ta pe recorder or however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party l ines were intentionally
del eted from the provisions of the Act.

The res pondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of th e a forementioned
l a w because it i s not a part or portion of a complete s et of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct s et of a mova ble apparatus
cons isting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set w hich ca n be detached or removed a nd ca n be
tra ns ferred a way from one place to another a nd to be plugged or a ttached to a main telephone line to get the desired communic ation corning from
the other party or end.

The l aw refers to a "tap" of a wi re or cable or the use of a "devi ce or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recordi ng the communication. There must be either a physical i nterruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
a rra ngement in order to overhear, i ntercept, or record the s poken words.

An extension telephone ca nnot be placed in the s ame ca tegory as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devi ces enumerated i n S ection 1 of RA No.
4200 a s the use thereof ca nnot be considered as "tapping" the wire or ca ble of a telephone line. The telephone extension i n this case was not
i ns talled for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in s tatutory construction that in order to determine the
true i ntent of the l egislature, the particular cl auses and phrases of the statute should not be ta ken as detached a nd isolated expressions, but the
whol e and every pa rt thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of a ny of i ts parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Es so Estandard Eastern,
Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).

In the ca se of Empire Insurance Com a ny v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we rul ed:

Li kewise, Arti cle 1372 of the Ci vil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be u nderstood to
comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to a gree.' Similarly, Arti cle 1374 of the
s a me Code provides that 'the va rious stipulations of a contract s hall be i nterpreted together, a ttributing to the doubtful ones that s ense which may
res ult from a ll of them taken jointly.

xxx xxx xxx

Cons equently, the phrase 'all l iabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) s hould be then restricted only to those l isted
i n the Inventory a nd should not be construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that 'particula rization followed by a
general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the fact i n human experience that usually the min ds of parties are
a ddressed s pecially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they s tood alone, are used
i n contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties a re centered. (Hoffman v. Ea s tern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 W i s . 603, 607, 115 NW
383, ci ted i n Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evi dence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).

Hence, the phrase "device or arra ngement" i n Section 1 of RA No. 4200, a l though not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend i nstruments of the same or s imilar nature, that is, i nstruments th e use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
tel ephone. It refers to i nstruments whose i nstallation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their
very na ture, they a re not of common usage a nd their purpose is precisely for ta pping, i ntercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

An extension telephone is a n i nstrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connec ted by wire to
the ma in telephone but ca n be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person s hould safely presume that the party he
i s ca lling a t the other end of the l ine probably has a n extension telephone a nd he runs the ri sk of a third party l istening a s i n the case of a party l ine
or a tel ephone unit which s hares its line with another. As was held in the ca se of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):

Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may ca use the bel l to ri ng in more than one ordinarily used i nstrument.
Ea ch pa rty to a telephone conversation ta kes the risk that the other party ma y have a n extension telephone a nd may a llow anot her to overhear the
convers ation. When s uch ta kes place there has been no vi olation of any pri vacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of
605, i nterception, has not occurred.

In the s ame case, the Court further rul ed that the conduct of the party would differ i n no way i f instead of repeating the me ssage he held out his
ha nd-set so that another could hear out of it a nd that there is no distinction between that s ort of a ction a nd permitting a n outsi der to use a n
extension telephone for the same purpose.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly i n fa vor of the a ccused. Thus, i n case of doubt as in the case at bar, on
whether or not an extension telephone is included i n the phrase "device or a rrangement", the penal s tatute must be construed as not including a n
extension telephone. In the ca se of People v. Puri sima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we expl ained the ra tionale behind the rule:

Ameri can jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the o bject is to establish a
certa i n rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Ha rris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780,
20 S Ct 609; Bra ffi th v. Vi rgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Ca udill v. Sta te, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jenn ings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all
ci ted i n 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to p rovide a precise
defi nition of forbidden acts." (State v. Za zzaro, 20 A 2d 737, qu oted i n Ma rtin's Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).

In the s ame case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or i nterpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule i s to search for and
determine the i ntent a nd s pirit of the l aw. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate
the i nclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited devi ce or arrangement" but of greater i mportance, they were more conc erned wi th
penalizing the a ct of recording than the a ct of merely listening to a telephone conversation.

xxx xxx xxx

Sena tor Tañada. Another possible objection to that i s entrapment which is certainly objectionable. It is made possible by s pe cial a mendment which
Your Honor may i ntroduce.

Sena tor Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be l ess possible with the amendment than without it, because wi th the
a mendment the evidence of entrapment would only consist of government testimony a s against the testimony of the defendant. With this
a mendment, they would have the ri ght, a nd the government officials and the person i n fact would have the right to ta pe record their conversation.

Sena tor Tañada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.

Sena tor Diokno. In the s ame way, under this provision, neither party could record and, therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is
more credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace offices.

(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, Ma rch 12, 1964).

xxx xxx xxx

Sena tor Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with a n a gent outside listening in, he could falsify the testimony a nd there is
no wa y of checking i t. But i f you allow him to record or ma ke a recording in any form of what i s happening, then the chances of falsifying the
evi dence is not very much.

Sena tor Tañada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false testimony. If we could devise a way by whi ch we could
prevent the presentation of false testimony, i t would be wonderful. But what this bill i ntends to prohibit is the use of ta pe record and other
el ectronic devi ces to i ntercept private conversations which later on will be used in court.

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, Ma rch 12, 1964, p. 629).

It ca n be readily s een that our lawmakers i ntended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives
of orga nized groups from i nstalling devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to i ntimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted
a dva ntage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, i n order to be punishable must s trictly be with the use of the
enumerated devi ces i n RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We a re of the view that an extension telephone is not a mong s uch devices or
a rra ngements.

WHEREFORE, the petition i s GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 i s ANNULLED a nd SET ASIDE.
The petitioner i s hereby ACQUITTED of the cri me of vi olation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known a s the Anti -Wiretapping Act.

SO ORDERED.

Feri a (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay a nd Pa ras, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-21734 September 5, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABELARDO SUBlDO, defendant-appellant.

MARTIN, J.:

Appeal on questions of law from the Orders of the Court of First Instance of Ma nila in Cri minal Case No. 23041, entitled People of the Philippines
vers us Abelardo Subido, denying defendant-appellant's motion for the ca ncellation of his a ppeal bond and declaring him to suffer subsidiary
i mprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine a nd i ndemnity.

From a n a dverse decision i n said ca se, the dispositive portion of which reads:

From the fa cts above stated the Court fi nds the accused guilty of libel and he is hereby s entenced to three (3) months of arresto mayor with the
a ccessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to i ndemnify the offended party, Ma yor Ars enio La cson i n the sum of
ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, with subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of i nsolvency, a nd to pay the costs.

defendant-appellant Abelardo Subido has ta ken a n a ppeal to the Court of Appeals, which modified the said judgment i n the following tenor:

However, in the application of the penalty provided for the vi olation of the libel law, the courts a re given discreti on of whether or not both fine and
i mprisonment are to be imposed upon the offender. In the i nstant case, we believe, considering the a ttendant circumstances of the case that the
i mposition of the corresponding penalty should be tempered with judicial discretion. For this reason, we impose upon a ccused-appellant a fine of
P500.00.

Si milarly, the amount of the i ndemnity to be paid by a ppellant to the offended party is reduced to P5,000.00.

WHEREFORE, with the modifications above i ndicated, the a ppealed judgment is hereby a ffirmed a t appellant's costs.

In due time the case was remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment.

On September 27, 1958, the a ccused-appellant filed a motion with the tri al court praying that (1) the court enter of record that the judgment of the
Court of Appeals has been promulgated a nd (2) that his appeal bond be ca ncelled. Accused-appellant a rgued that although he could not pay the fine
a nd the i ndemnity prescribed i n the judgment of the Court of Appeals, he could not b e required to serve the a mount of fine a nd i ndemnity i n the
form of s ubsidiary i mprisonment because said judgment did not expressly a nd s pecifically provi de that he should s erve the fin e and indemnity i n
form of s ubsidiary i mprisonment in case of insolvency.

On December 20, 1958, upon motion of the offended party the lower court issued a writ of execution of i ts judgment. However, the writ was
returned unsatisfied.

On February 25, 1959, the Sheriff of the Ci ty of Ma nila, a rmed with a n alias writ of execution, a ttached "whatever rights, i nterests, or participation,
i f a ny, defendant Abelardo Subido ma y have" in a two -storey building situated at No. 2313 Suter, Sta . Ana, Ma nila, covered by Tra nsfer Certificate of
Ti tl e No. 54170 of the Register of Deeds of Ma nila. However, it turned out that the property l evi ed upon be the sheriff was registered in the name of
Aga pito Subido who, upon learning of the levy, i mmediately filed a Third party cl aim with the s heriff's office and instituted an a ction i n the l ower
court (Ci vi l Ca se No. 41731) to enjoin the Sheriff of Ma nila from proceeding with the sale of his property. In the meantime the l ower court i ssued a
wri t of preliminary i njunction enjoining the sale of property l evied upon by the s heriff.

On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered i ts opposition to accused-appellant's motion for ca ncellation of appeal bond a nd asked the
l ower court to require accused-appellant to pay the fine of P500.00 a nd the i ndemnity of P5,000.00 wi th subsidiary i mprisonment i n ca se of
i ns olvency.

On December 19, 1959, the l ower court i ssued an order denying the accused-appellant's motion and declared that in accordance with the terms of
the judgment of the Court of Appeals the accused-appellant has to suffer s ubsidiary i mprisonment in ca se he could not pay the fine a nd i ndemnity
pres cribed in the decision. Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration, but the s ame was denied on December 26, 1959.

Hence this a ppeal from the l ower court's orders of December 19 a nd 26.

In hi s appeal, a ccused-appellant presses that the lower court erred

IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ACCUSED -APPELLANT IS LIABLE TO SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT
IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY.

II

IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF ACCUSED -APPELLANT HAS BEEN SATISFIED WITH THE ATTACHMENT SECURED BY THE OFFENDED
PARTY.1

The threshold issue in this a ppeal is whether or not the accused-appellant ca n be required to serve the fine a nd i ndemnity prescribed in the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in form of subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of insolvency. Under Arti cle 355 of the Revised P enal Code "a libel
commi tted by means of writing, printing, litography, engraving, radio, phonograph, paintings, theatrical exhibition, ci nematographic exhibition or
a ny s i milar means, shall be punished by prision correccional i n i ts minimum and medium period or a fine ra nging from 200 to 6 000 pes os or both, i n
a ddition to the civil a ction which may be brought by the offended party". It is evident from the foregoing provision that the court is given the
di s cretion to i mpose the penalty of imprisonment or fi ne or both for the cri me of libel. It will be noted that the lower court chose to i mpose upon
the a ccused: three months of a rresto mayor; a fine of P500.00; i ndemnification of the offended party i n the sum of P10,000.00; s ubsidiary
i mprisonment in case of insolvency; a nd the payment of the costs. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals i n the exercise of i ts discretion decided
to el i minate the penalty of three (3) months a rresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity of P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.

Thus the Court of Appeals resolved:

However, in the application of the penalty provided for in the violation of the l ibel law, the courts are gi ven discretion of whether or not both fine
a nd i mprisonment are to be imposed upon the offender. In the i nstant case, we believe, considering the a ttendant circumstance s of the same, that
the i mposition of the corresponding penalty should b e tempered wi th judicial discretion. For this reason we impose the a ccused a fine of P500.00.

Si milarly, the amount of the i ndemnity to be paid by a ppellant to the offended party is reduced to P5,000.00.

WHEREUPON, wi th the modifications a bove indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby a ffirmed a t appellant's cost.

To Us i t i s clear that when the Court of Appeals provided in the concluding portion of its decision:

WHEREUPON, wi th the modifications a bove indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby a ffirmed a t appellant's costs

the a lluded modifications could mean no l ess than the elimination of the three months of arresto mayor and the reduction of t he indemnity to the
offended party, Ma yor Ars enio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00. Al l the rest of the punishment remains including the subsidiary i mprisonment
i n ca se of insolvency. Ha d the Court wanted to do a way with the subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of insolvency of a ccused-appellant to pay the fine
a nd the i ndemnity i t would have s o expressly provi ded.

A ca reful s crutiny of the decision of the tri al court reveals that the cl ause "with subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of insolvency" i s separated by a
comma (,) from the preceding clause" is hereby s entenced to three months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of
fi ve hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Ma yor Arsenio Lacson, in the s um of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,00 0.00) pesos." The
us e of a comma (,) i n the part of the sentence is to make "the s ubsidiary i mprisonment in case of i nsolvency" refer not only to non-payment of the
i ndemnity, but also to non-payment of the fine.

If the l ower court intended to make the phrase "with s ubsidiary i mprisonment in ca se of i nsolvency" refer to non-payment of i ndemnity only a nd
not to the non-payment of the fine, it would have omitted the comma (,), a fter the phrase "to i ndemnify the offended party, Ma yor Ars enio La cson
i n the a mount of P10,000.00 pesos," so that the decision of the l ower court would read:

From the fa cts above stated the Court fi nds the accused guilty of libel and he is hereby s entenced to three (3) months of arresto m ayor, to pay a fine
of fi ve hundred (P500.00) pesos, to i ndemnify the offended party, Ma yor Ars enio La cson, i n the s um of ten thous and (P10,000.00) pesos wi th
s ubsidiary i mprisonment in case of i nsolvency, a nd to pay the costs.

As thus worded a nd punctuated there would be no doubt that the lower court would want to make accused -appellant s erve the s ubsidiary
i mprisonment in case of non-payment of the indemnity only.

Bes ides, We s ee no plausible reason why the l ower court would want accused -appellant to s uffer s ubsidiary i mprisonment i n case of insolvency to
pa y the i ndemnity only a nd not to suffer subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of n on-payment of the fine. Accordingly i f according to the lower court's
deci sion, the a ccused-appellant should s uffer s ubsidiary i mprisonment in case of i nsolvency to pay the fine and the i ndemnity a nd the only
modi fications made by the Court of Appeals a re to eliminate the three (3) months of arresto mayor a nd to reduce the i ndemnity to the offended
pa rty, Ma yor Ars enio La cson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00, then by force of l ogic a nd reason, the fine of P5000.00, the reduced indemnity of
P5,000.00 a nd the subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of insolvency s hould s tand.

Fortunately, however, a ccused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, a s amended by Republic Act No.
5465 whi ch exempts an a ccused person from s ubsidiary i mprisonment in ca se of i nsolvency to pay his civil l iability.2

It i s a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes a re to be strictly construed a gainst the government and liberally in favor of the
a ccus ed.3 In the i nterpretation of a penal statute, the tendency i s to give i t careful s crutiny, a nd to construe it with s uch strictness as to safeguard
the ri ghts of the defendant.4 Considering that Arti cle 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is favorable to the accused-appellant, the same
s hould be made a pplicable to him. It is so provided in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that:

Pena l laws s hall have a retroactive effect in s o far a s they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual cri mi nal, as this term is defined i n
Rul e 5 of Arti cle 62 of thi s Code, a lthough a t the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is s erving
s entence.

Thus a pplying Arti cle 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as a mended, to the a ccused-appellant, he cannot also be required to s erve his civil liability to the
offended party i n form of subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of i nsolvency because this is no longer required by the aforesaid a rticle.

Accus ed-appellant contends that he cannot be made to s uffer s ubsidiary i mprisonment because his ci vil liability has be en satisfied with the
a tta chment secured by the offended party on the property of Aga pito Subido, wherein he is s upposed to have a n i nterest. He th erefore a rgues that
unti l the final determinations of Civil Ca se No. 71731 which Agapito Subido filed to enjoin the Sheriff of Ma nila from proceeding with the sale of his
property, a ccused-appellant's liability for s ubsidiary i mprisonment cannot a ttach as the determination of whether the a ccused is s olvent or not is a
prejudicial question which must first be determined before subsidiary i mprisonment may be imposed.

We ca nnot a gree. Atta chment does not operate as a s atisfaction of the judgment on civil l iability a nd the a ccused must suffer subsidiary
i mprisonment in case of non-payment thereof. Subsidiary i mprisonment applies when the offender is i nsolvent a s shown in the present case. There
i s nothing in the law that before s ubsidiary i mprisonment may a ttach, there must be prior determination of the question of solvency of the accused.
The moment he cannot pay the fi ne, that means he is insolvent a nd he must s erve the s ame i n form of s ubsidiary i mprisonment. So a ccused-
a ppellant has to choose to pay the fine or serve in jail.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING except with the modification that a ccused-appellant may no longer be required to s uffer s ubsidiary i mprisonment in
ca s e of i nsolvency to pa y the i ndemnity provided for i n the judgment below, the Orders of the lower court dated December 19 a nd 26, 1959 denying
defendant-appellant's motion for ca ncellation of appeal bond a nd s entencing him to suffer the subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of insolvency to pay
the fi ne imposed by s aid judgment, are hereby a ffirmed.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13540 October 24, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. SALVADOR A. EGUIA and SEBASTIAN LOZANO, objector-appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:

Bl a ckmail, i n the restricted form in which the cri me i s punished by s ection 10 of the Philippine Li bel Law, is the s ubject wh ich this a ppeal brings, as a
ca s e of first i mpression, to the Supreme Court for consideration.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.cha nroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

Acti on i n this case was begun by a n i nformation filed by the Fiscal of the city of Ma nila against Salvador A. Eguia and Sebas tian Lozano, in which it
wa s alleged:

Tha t on or a bout the period between July 2 a nd August 23, 1917, i n the city of Ma nila, Philippine Islands, said Salvador A. Eguia and Sebastian
Loza no, conspiring and confederating with each other, willfully, unlawfully, a nd cri minally threatened one Ma ria S. Tuason to publish i n The
Independent, a we ekly newspaper edited and published in the said city of Ma nila, a libel consisting of certain l etters which, a ccording to the said
defendants, would expose the name of said Ma ria S. Tuason to public contempt, the said defendants promising at the same time, moved by a desire
to ga i n, to prevent the publication of said letters i n the above-mentioned newspaper, s hould the aforementioned Ma ria S. Tuason agree to pay
them the sum of P4,000, Phi lippine currency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law l i brary

Act commi tted i n vi olation of law.

Both defendants filed demurrers to the information. They contended that: (1) The facts alleged did not constitute a cri me; (2 ) the i nformation did
not conta in a copy of the alleged libelous l etters; and (3) the i nformation was bad for duplicity since it charged two crimes, namely, a threat to
publish a libel a nd a n offer to prevent the publication of a libel for a sum of money. The trail court overruled the demurrer s. The defendants
dema nded separate trials, which was gra nted. The court rendered a single decision, convicting the defendants, a nd s entencing Salvador a. Eguia to
four months i mprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, a nd Sebastian Lozano to two months imprisonment a nd to pay a fine of P400 ; ea ch was to pay
one-half of the costs, and i n case of insolvency to s uffer subsidiary i mprisonment as provided by law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual
l a w library

The defendants a ppeal from the judgment. The questions arising from the va rious a ssignments of error involve the sufficiency of the information, of
the evi dence, and of the penalty. Before resolving these specific points, it i s well, however, to know exactly what the appli cable law is.

STATEMENT OF THE LAW.cha nroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

Secti on 10 of the Libel La w (Act No. 277) i s as follows:

Every pers on who threatens a nother to publish a libel concerning him, or a ny parent, husband, wife, or child of such person, or a ny member of his
fa mi ly, and every person who offers to prevent the publication of any l ibel upon another person, with i ntent to extort a ny money or other va luable
cons ideration from a ny person, shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars or by i mprisonment for not e xceeding six months,
or both.

The s ection above quoted contemplates two offenses, one which we may denominate "a threat to publish a l ibel," and the other, "an offer to
prevent the publication of a libel." A reading of the section further discloses that we have i n Philippi ne cri minal law a provision, which finds no
counterpart, a s far as a rather extensive investigation discloses, i n the laws of a ny other country. The cri me, which we here call " a threat to publish
a l a bel, is punished" in the United States and Great Britain by the law penalizing blackmailing a nd extortion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles
vi rtua l law library

In common parlance, blackmail and extortion are synonimous, although the latter term may have the wider signification. Blackmail, in its
meta phorical sense, may be defined as any unlawful extortion of money by a n a ppeal to the fears of the vi ctim, especially extortion of money by
threa ts of accusation or exposure. Two words are expressive of the cri me - hush money. The grava men of the offense is the intent to extort money
or other thi ng of value. The extortion is committed by obtaining property from another wi thout his consent, induced by wrongful use of fear. The
end i s the same a s in cri mes a gainst property, but the means employed a re different. In deed, certain classes of threatening letters have been held in
the Uni ted States when followed by extortion to constitute robbery. ( See Green vs . The State [1901], 157 Ind., 101; Sta te vs . Hammond [1881], 80
Ind., 80; Chunn vs . The State [1906], 125 Ga ., 789; 8 Corpus Juris, p. 1114, ci ting cases; Wharton's Cri minal La w, s ecs. 1087, 1990.)

OPINION.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

1. Suffi ciency of the i nformation - The i nformation alleged that the a ccused threatened to publish i n a weekly periodical certain letters wri tten by a
ma rri ed lady unless s he paid P4,000 to them. The defendants demurred to the i nformation on the ground that it did not charge a public offense a nd
tha t i t did not set out the alleged libelous matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

Defendants rely on the definition of l ibel contained i n the first section of the Libel La w. This section, it will be remembered, defines a libel a s "a
ma l icious defamation, expressed either i n writing, printing, or by s ings or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead or to i mpeach the honesty, vi rtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, a nd
thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ri dicule." Defendants insist that a s these l etters were written by the offended party, they could
not cons titute a l ibel, as a person cannot libel himself or herself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles virtual l aw l ibrary

Thi s argument is fallacious. The prime requisite of the crime of libel is not necessarily the composing of the a rticle, but t he publishing of i t. Thus, the
s ending of love letters by one person to another is not a libel, but when some third person obtains possession of these letters and publishes them i n
the public press, i t must be self-evi dent that such l etters, i nnocent as they a re i n themselves, would a ppear highly ri diculous to a ny one except the
i nterested parties. To revert to the definition of libel, relied upon by the defendants, the publication of these compromising l etters would tend to
i mpeach the vi rtue a nd reputation of the lady who wrote them and would thereby expose her to public contempt and
ri di cule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

The general rule i s that the complaint or i nformation for libel must s et out the particular defamatory words as published, a nd a statement of their
s ubstance a nd effect is usually considered insufficient. For i nstance, i t is necessary to s et out the threatening l etter a ccording to i ts tenor. But this is
not precisely a prosecution for libel. The cri me of "threatening to publish a libel," while covered by a section of the Li bel Law, is of an entirely
di fferent character from the usual conception of the cri me of libel. From the very nature of the cri me charged, i t is cl early s een that to require a n
i nformation to set forth the alleged threatened libel would usually a mount to asking the performance of the i mpossible. The m enacing libel has not
a s yet been published; i t may be i n the possession of the person threatening to publish i t, or it may only exist in the imagi nation of a perverted mind.
In ei ther ca se, i t would be impossible to set out the matter threatened to be published. In the present i nstance, the fact that the letters which the
defendants threatened to be published were seized before the i nstitution of these proceedings does not change the rule in regard to the
pl eadings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual l aw library

A common law crime which is somewhat akin to the offense now before us is that called "threats," and here it has been held that the i ndictment
need not set out the exact words of the threat, it being s ufficient that the substance be stated with certainty. Aga in, as to the offense of "obscenity,"
i t ha s been held that a n i ndictment for using obscene language need not s et forth the language used. Indeed, for the i nformation to reproduce a
l etter in haec verba would be equivalent to publishing i t - would be to permit of the very thi ng which the law i s tryi ng to avoid, the exposure to the
public ga ze of matter essentially private i n nature. The purposes of the l aw s hould be effectuated, not frustrated.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
cha nrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

We a gree with counsel for a ppellant that "the procedure in the present case was admirably a dapted to protect the feelings of the o ffended party,
a nd this motive seems to have been the guiding principle of the entire case." The record should be kept pure, i f pos sible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
cha nrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

The constitutional principle "that i n all cri minal prosecutions the a ccused s hall enjoy the ri ght . . . to demand the nature a nd ca use of the a ccusation
a ga inst him" is relied upon. This court has repeatedly held in cases, which have received the approval on appeal of the United States Supreme Court,
tha t the complaint or information is not defective i f i t sets forth the alleged cri me i n such a manner that a person of ordinary i ntelligence can tell
wi th what he is charged. The i nformation herein is s ufficient to put men ca pable of devising an intricate blackmailing scheme on notice of what
cri me they are charged.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

2. Suffi ciency of the evidence - The true facts are believed to be the following: chanrobles vi rtual law library

Ma ri a s. Tuason, the offended party, i s a marri ed woman livi ng in the ci ty of Ma nila. For nineteen years s he and her husband have been s eparated,
her husband during these years living outside of the Philippine Islands. i n the year of 1915, Sa lvador A. Eguia and his wife resided for s everal months
i n the house of Mrs . Tuason. As Mrs . Tuason was sick at this time and as she had complete confidence in Eguia, she ga ve the key to her post office
box i nto his keeping. during this period, Mrs . Tuason wrote a number of l etters, ra ther a morous in nature, to a Dr. Harmer i n France, and gave them,
to Egui a to mail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

About the first of July, 1917, Mrs . Tua son received an anonymous letter which read;

A number of your love l etters addressed to Harmer a re to be published in The Independent in the form of a s tory. I a m a since re fri end of yours and I
i nform you of this in order that you may ta ke proper s teps to avoid your name being exposed to public contempt. I happened to discover this in a
vi s i t I mate this in a vi sit I made this morning in the office of said newspaper.

La ter on, Ma ria Paves, a friend of Mrs. Tuason, ca me and told her that she had been approached by certain persons who had s ome letters of Mrs .
Tua s on's which they would sell to her for P10,000 a nd that i f s he did not buy these letters they would be published in "The I ndependent." After
s ome negotiations between the parities, the price of the letters was reduced to P4,000. Mrs . Tuason made a rrangements to meet one of the go-
between, who i t later turned out was Sebastian Lozano, in front of "El Centro Escolar" and go with him to the Luneta and ther e receive the letters in
return for the P4,000. She reported the matter to the police and on the day named went to the rendezvous. Detectives followed her a nd remained
nea r by. A ca l esa was seen drivi ng up and down Ca lle Azcarraga i n front of "El Centro Escolar." After thi s ca lesa had passed up and down three times,
Mrs . Tua son went up to the vehicle. The cochero then told her that s he was not to proceed to the Luneta a s had been agreed up on but was to go to
s ome house. This s he refused to do a nd s o the plan feel through. Ma ria Pa ves told Mrs . Tuason that the owners of the l etters had learned that s he
ha d reported the matter to the police and that they had decided not to have a ny further dealings with her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles
vi rtua l law library

Mrs . Tua son later went to a friend of hers a nd told him that she needed assistance. He recommended one Villaba, who was working for him a nd
who wa s acquainted with Eguia. Villaba a t first did not ca re to have a nything to do with the matter but was finally persuaded to l end his aid. He was
gi ven a free hand a nd told to do whatever he thought best. He called up the police a uthorities and told them of his plan and secured permission to
go a head. Villaba then went to s ee Eguia and told him a story to the effect that Mrs . Tuason had offered him a thousand pesos i f he would get the
l etters. Eguia pretended to know nothing about the l etters a nd Villaba said he would go and see Lozano. Eguia objected s trongly to this and said he
woul d i ntroduce Villaba to Lozano. Eguia finally did i ntroduce Villaba to Lozano a nd the Villaba repeated his story to Loza no a nd a dded that he
woul d try to get P4,000 from Mrs . Tua son, and that then Lozano could threaten him with some weapon and he would deliver the m oney to him i n
excha nge for the l etters. Lozano was to hold back one of the l etters, however, to give to Villaba i n order that Villaba could get s omething for i t.
Loza no and Eguia agreed to this scheme a nd were to deliver the letters on the Luneta at 8.30 p.m. Vi llaba reported this to th e police and they went
to the "Ma nila Hotel" to lay their plans. Villaba was to meet Lozano at the Rizal Monument on the Luneta, so the police a gree d that they would
s ta tion men a t the hotel a nd a round the Luneta, all of whom were to have binoculars, a nd that Villaba was to l ift his ht as a signal to them that the
l etters were i n the possession of Lozano.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

The fi rst night Villaba went to the Luneta with Mrs . Tuason to keep the a ppointment but after waiti ng a l ong time no one turned up. Villaba then left
Mrs . Tua son a nd went to the house of Eguia to see why Lozano had not come. Eguia said he did not know why Lozano had not done s o, but to wait
unti l 10 o'cl ock, which Villaba did. As no one had then a rrived , he went a gain to the house of Eguia a nd this time Eguia told him to meet Lozano at
the Luneta the next night a t 6 o'clock.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

The following afternoon Villaba a nd Mrs . Tuason a gain went to the Luneta and after waiting for a little while they s aw Lozano coming along. Villaba
got out of the calesa and went up and spoke to him. Lozano ca me up to the calles where Mrs . Tuason was and showed her a l ette r which she
i dentified as hers. She then gave the P4,000 to Vi llaba a nd Lozano s aid he would go a nd get the letters. He l eft and went i n the direction of Calle San
Lui s and returned in a few minutes a nd told Villaba a nd Mrs . Tuason to go to a more s ecluded s pot a s they would attract too m uch attention where
they were. The money was handed over to Lozano. Villaba had a lready given the signal to the police and when they all s tarted to go to another place
the police ca me a nd a rrested Lozano. The money (which previously ha d been marked) was taken away from Lozano. L ozano was removed to the
Luneta Police Station and there searched and the letters, a toy pistol, and a negative of one of Mrs . Tuason's letters were f ound i n his
pos session.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

Loza no made a s tatement to the police i n which he tri ed to lay the blame on Eguia a nd to excuse himself. Eguia when arrested a lso made a
s ta tement i n which he tri ed to shift responsibility to Lozano.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual l aw library
The ci rcumstances of this case are s uch that they l ead to the i rresistible conclusion that Eguia was the prime mover i n this nefarious s cheme. The
onl y reasonable deduction is that he took the letters from the post office boss of Mrs . Tuason. He was the only person who had possession of the
key to the box. He knew that Mrs. Tuason was writing to Dr. Harmer. Not all the l etter found in the possession of Lozano were from Mrs . Tuason but
a l l had been addressed to Dr. Harmer. The post office box used by Mrs . Tu ason was in the name of Dr. Ha rmer a nd so i f any ma il was returned to
Ma ni la with his name on i t, it would be put i n this box. The night on which the letters were delivered, Lozano went in the di rection of Eguia's house
to get the l etters. Eguia composed the note that fixed the price for the l etters at P8,000. He entered into a nd a greed to the plot made by Vi llaba. He
i ntroduced Villaba to Lozano. Though Eguia never a ppeared in the open he was always lurking in the background.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
cha nrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

Defendants a ttack the evidence from two directions. They contend, i n the first place, that the court erred in ta king into consideration against each
a ppellant evidence presented at the tri al of the other defendant. While the cou rt rendered but one judgment, i t is nevertheless true that practically
the s ame facts were a dduced i n the two trials. Ea ch defendant moreover, endeavors to shield himself behind the acts of his co defendant. Of course,
s uch a contention ca nnot be permitted to a vail for a moment, where the proof shows that both defendants are
i nculpated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

We hol d that Salvador A. Eguia a nd Sebastian Lozano have been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a violation of s ection 10 Act No.
277.cha nroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

3. Suffi ciency of the penalty. - The law provides a punishment of a fine of not exceeding P2,000 or of i mprisonment for not exceeding s ix months, or
both.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

Words a re inadequate to castigate the despicable a cts of these men. Counsel for Eguia apparently i n full recognition of this and ashamed of the l ow
des igns of his client, says: It was unmanly a nd contemptible to attempt to extort money from this woman, as the purchase price of her l ove letters
whi ch had gone astray a nd place upon her greater shame than she already s uffered, i f s he did not buy." Counsel for Lozano exp eriences the same
feeling, when he says: "It must be a dmitted that the appellant played in i gnoble part i n this matter."chanrobles vi rtual law library

In fi xing the measure of culpability, we conceive Eguia to be the master mind, who planned a nd engineered the whole s cheme. L ozano was merely
the ca t's paw of Eguia.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

In order to prevent further occurrences of this kind, as far a s may be done by judicial action, we are a ll s trongly of the opinion that the judgment of
the l ower court must be reversed, a nd that the defendant a nd appellant Salvador Eguia is deserving of the maximum penalty permitted by l aw, a nd
a ccordingly i s sentenced to six months imprisonment i n case of insolvency, a nd that the defendant and appellant Sebastian Loz ano, while culpable in
a l ess degree, i s also deservi ng of a n i ncreased penalty, a nd a ccordingly i s sentenced to three months i mprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 or to
s uffer s ubsidiary i mprisonment in case of insolvency. Ea ch defendant s hall pay one-half the costs of both i nstances. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

Torres , Johnson, Street, Avenceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529 March 28, 1969
ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Thi s case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that a the municipal cour t of Ca vite Ci ty,
convi cti ng Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of gra ve threats and grave oral defamation, a nd s entencing him, in the f irst ca se (Criminal Ca se No. 2594), to
four (4) months and ten (10) days of a rresto mayor a nd to pay a fine of P300, wi th subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of insolve ncy; a nd in the second
ca s e (Cri minal Ca se No. 2595), to a n i ndeterminate penalty of from fo ur (4) months of a rresto mayor to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prison
correcci onal and to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 a s moral damages, with costs in both ca ses.

The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former ci vilian employee of the Navy Excha nge, Sangley Point, Cavi te City, whose s ervices were
termi nated on Ma y 6, 1961. In the a fternoon of June 6, 1961, he l ed a group of a bout 20 to 30 pers ons in a demonstration stag ed i n front of the
ma i n ga te of the United States Naval Station a t Sangley Poi nt. They ca rried placards bearing statements s uch as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla
bos s con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos co n Nolan;" "Agustin,
di l lega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" a nd others. The base commander, Ca pt. McAllister, called up Col. Pa tricia Monzon, who as Phil ippine
Mi l i tary Li aison Officer a t Sangley Poi nt was in charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval st ation a nd the civilian
population of Ca vite Ci ty. Ca pt. McAl lister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main ga te of the base to meet the demons trators. Col. Monzon
went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon l earning that the demonstration was not directed a gainst the naval
s ta tion but a gainst Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their having a llegedly ca used the dismissal of Rosauro Reye s from the Navy
Excha nge, Col. Monzon s uggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the
s ta tion to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They a ssured him, however, that they did not intend to use vi olence, a s "they just wanted to
bl ow off s team."

At tha t ti me Agustin Hallare was in his office i nside the naval s tation. When he learned about the demonstration he became a pprehensive about his
s a fety, s o he s ought Col . Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, a nd another person in going out of the station,
us i ng his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col . Monzon purpose s lowed down to a ccommodate the request of Reyes. He told Hallare to
ta ke a good look at the demonstrators a nd a t the placards they were ca rryin g. When the demonstrators s aw Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si
Agus tin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the ca r. One jeep overtook passed the car while the other to l ed behind. After Hallare and his
compa nions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Ca vite Ci ty, Col . Monzon sped away.

The three jeeps ca rrying the demonstrators parked i n front of Hallare's residence after having gone by i t twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and
pos ted himself a t the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his l eft holding the gate-door, he s houted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang i na
mo. Agus tin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayi n kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep a nd the motorcade left the pre mises. Meanwhile,
Ha l lare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes a nd the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.lâwphi1.ñet

On the ba sis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 a nd 25, 1961 wi th gra ve threats and grave oral defa mation, respectively
(Cri mi nal Ca ses Nos. 2594 a nd 2595, Municipal Court of Ca vite Ci ty), as follows;

The undersigned Ci ty Fiscal of the Ci ty of Ca vite a ccuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as defined by Arti cle 282 of the Revised Penal
Code a nd penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Arti cle, committed as follows:

Tha t on or a bout June 6, 1961, i n the Ci ty of Ca vite, Republic of the Philippines a nd within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the a bove
na med accused, did then a nd there, willfully, unlawfully a nd feloniously, orally threaten to kill, one Agustin Hallare.

Contra ry to l aw.

Ca vi te Ci ty, July 24, 1961.

DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS
Ci ty Fi s cal

BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ

Special Counsel

The undersigned complainant, after being duly s worn to a n oath i n accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Ora l
Defa mation, as defined and penalized by Arti cle 358 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

Tha t on or a bout June 6, 1961, i n the Ci ty of Ca vite, Republic of the Philippines a nd within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the a bove
na med accused, without any justifiable motive but with the i ntention to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt to the undersigned complainant, i n
the presence of a nd within hearing of several persons, did then a nd there, willfully, unlawfully a nd feloniously utter to the undersigned complainant
the fol lowing i nsulting a nd serious defamatory remarks, to wi t: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if translated i nto English a re as follows: "Agustin,
Your mother is a whore."

Contra ry to l aw.

Ca vi te Ci ty, July 25, 1961.

(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE

Compl ainant

Subs cribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July, 1961, i n the Ci ty of Ca vite, Philippines.
(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ
Special Counsel

Upon a rraignment, the a ccused pleaded not guilty to both charges a nd the ca ses were s et for joint tri al. On the day of the hearing the prosecution
moved to a mend the i nformation i n Cri minal Ca se No. 2594 for gra ve threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel objected
to the moti on on the ground that the a ccused had a lready been arraigned on the original information a nd that the a mendment "would affect
ma terially the interest of the a ccused." Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint tri al proceeded.

From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A motion for reconsideration
ha vi ng been denied, the accused brought this a ppeal by certiorari.

Peti ti oner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) i n a ffirming the proceedings i n the l ower court a llowing the substantial a mendment of the
i nformation for grave threats a fter petitioner had been a rraigned on the original i nformation; (2) i n proceeding with the tri al of the case of grave
threa ts without first requiring petitioner to enter his p lea on the a mended i nformation; (3) i n convicting petitioner of both offenses when he could
l egally be convicted of only one offense, thereby putting him i n jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4) i n convicting petitioner
of gra ve threats when the evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to establish the offense of light threats only; a nd (5) i n convicting
peti tioner of gra ve oral defamation when the evidence tend to establish that of simple slander only.

On the fi rs t error assigned, the rule is that a fter the a ccused has pleaded the information may be a mended as to all matters of form by l eave a nd at
the di scretion of the court when the same ca n be done without prejudice to the ri ghts of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of Court).
Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be permitted a fter the plea is entered.

After a ca reful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the cri me of grave threats as def ined i n Arti cle 282 1 of the
Revi sed Penal Code a nd penalized by i ts paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the
i nfliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a cri me; and (3) that the threa t was not subject to a condition. Hence,
peti tioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the a forementioned provision the particular manner in which the
threa t is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature a nd essence of the
cri me a s charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes s o as to
requi re the petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the concurrence of the
Sol icitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the a mendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Arti cle 28 2, whi ch provides for
a di fferent penalty, s ince there was no a llegation i n the amended information that the threat was made s ubject to a condition. In our vi ew the
del etion of the word "orally" was effected in order to ma ke the information conformable to the evi dence to be prese nted during the trial. It was
merely a formal a mendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.

Peti ti oner next contends that even assuming that the a mendment was properly a llowed, the tri al court committed a reversible e rror i n proceeding
wi th the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter his plea to the a mended information. Considering, however, that the a mendment
wa s not s ubstantial, no second plea was necessary a t all.

The thi rd and fourth i ssues a re related and will be discussed together. Petitioner a vers that the appellate court erred i n affirming the decision of
the tri al court erred i n a ffirming him of gra ve threats and of grave oral defamation when he could l egally be convicted of only one offense, a nd in
convi cti ng him of grave threats a t all when the evidence adduced and considered by the court i ndicates the commission of light threats only.

The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare i n front of the main gate of the naval station; the fa ct that placards wi th threatening
s ta tements were ca rried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; a nd t he demonstration
conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voi ce, give ri se to only one conclusion: that the threats were
ma de "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carrie d into effect." 2
Indeed, Hallare became so a pprehensive of his safety that he s ought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed
whi le the demonstration was going on. It ca nnot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely i n a tempora ry fi t of anger,
moti va ted as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the i ncident. We, therefore, hold that the a ppellate court was correct i n
upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.

The cha rge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang i na mo". This is a common enough expression in the
di a lect that i s often employed, not really to slander but ra ther to express anger or displeasure. It is s eldom, if ever, take n i n its literal sense by the
hea rer, that is, a s a reflection on the vi rtues of a mother. In the instant case, i t should be vi ewed as part of the threats voiced by a ppellant a gainst
Agus tin Hallare, evidently to ma ke the same more emphatic. In the ca se of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, thi s Court s aid:

The l etter containing the allegedly libelous remarks i s more threatening than l ibelous a nd the i ntent to threaten is the principal aim a nd object to
the l etter. The libelous remarks contained in the l etter, if s o they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In
other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the wri ter of the letter, which heat of passion i n the latter part of the
l etter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court
bel ieves, after the s tudy of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein i s clearly a nd principally that of threats and that the statements
therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an i ndependent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from
the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats.

The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed a nd petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as Cri minal Case No. 2595 of
the Court a quo (for oral defamation) i s concerned; a nd a ffirmed with respect to Cri minal Ca se No. 2594, for gra ve threats, with costs against
peti tioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Santos, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee a nd Barredo, JJ., concur.
Ca s tro a nd Ca pistrano, JJ., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-32836-37 May 3, 1989
DANIEL VICTORIO and EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

Thi s is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision** of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1970 i n Cri minal Cases N os. 09243 a nd 09244
enti tled "People of the Philippines v. Exequiel Victorio and Daniel Vi ctoria", affirming the lower court's judgment of conviction of the petitioners for
gra ve ora l defamation with modification of s entence a nd the a ppellate court's resolution dated October 28, 1970 denying herei n petitioners' motion
for rehearing and/or new trial as well as their urgent motion for reconsideration filed on October 19, 1970. The dispositive portion of the a ppealed
deci sion reads as follows:

IN VIEW HEREOF, with the modification that a ppellants are s entenced to the indeterminate penalty of one (1) month a nd one (1) day of a rresto
ma yor to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, the judgment appealed from is a ffirmed in a ll respects with co sts." (as amended by the
res olution dated August 7, 1970, Rol lo, p. 19).

The fa cts of the case taken from the decision of the Court of Appeals a re as follows:

Atty. Vi vencio Ruiz, a practising l awyer since 1926, one time Justice of the Peace a nd member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Eci ja, a professor of
l a w a nd for sometime president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association, has been the attorney of petitioner Exeq uiel Victorio in certain ci vil cases from
1953 unti l 1963 when petitioner decided to hire the servi ces of a nother lawyer, Atty. L. Ca s tillo i n place of Atty. Rui z and his collaborator Judge
Al fredo Guiang, then Municipal Judge of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Exequiel Victorio and his wife a fterwards filed a n administrative charge against Judge
Gui ang which was assigned to Judge Ramon Ava ncena, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Eci ja, for i nvesti gation and disbarment
proceedings against Atty. Rui z, then pending i n the Office of the Solicitor General. Petitioner Daniel Victorio is the s on of Exequiel Victoria.

Duri ng the hearing of the administrative case on that particular a fternoon of Ja nuary 9, 1964 i n the s ala of Judge Avanceña, Atty. Ca s tillo, counsel of
the Vi ctorios, presented a n urgent motion to disqualify Judge Ava nceña to hear the administrative case, who a pparently ta ken aback, called down
Atty. Ca s ti llo and gave him a l ecture, while Atty. Rui z, a s counsel for respondent Judge Guiang i n the a dministrative ca se, moved that Atty. Ca stillo
be ci ted for contempt of court.

After the s aid hearing and while the two accused were later walking down the corri dor l eading to the stairs from the sala of Judge Ava nceña, the
i nci dent that gave rise to the cri minal prosecution for oral defamation took place. Petitioners were overheard by Emiliano Ma nuzon, a policeman of
Ca ba natuan Ci ty and one of the witnesses for the prosecution, to have uttered the following defamatory words:

Da niel: "Ka yabang ng putang-inang a bogadong Ruiz na iya n, tunaw naman ang utak, suwapang at estapador."

Exequiel: "Lastog ta ukinnanata a bogado Ruiz, s uwapang, estapador, paltogak ta ukinana ta abogado Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador." (Translated in
Ta ga log as, Ma yabang ya ng putang-inang a bogado Ruiz na i yan, babarilin ko a ng putang inang i yan, s uwapang a t estapador.")

On February 8, 1964, Da niel Victorio a nd Exequiel Victorio were s eparately charged with the cri me of Serious Oral Defamation i n the Ci ty Court of
Ca ba natuan Ci ty, in Identical i nformations (Original Record, p. 1) i ndicting the accused a s follows:

Tha t on or a bout the 9th day of January, 1964, i n the Ci ty of Ca banatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdi ction of this Honorable
Court, the a bovenamed accused moved by resentment a nd hatred which he entertained against the person of one Vivencio Ruiz, and in order to put
hi m i nto public ri dicule, discredit, and contempt, did then a nd there willfully, unlawfully, a nd feloniously, a nd in the the presence of many persons,
uttered the following defamatory words, to wit:

LASTOG TA UKINANATA ABOGADO RUIZ, SWAPANG, ESTAPADOR, PALTOGAK TA UKINNANATA. 1

a nd other words of s imilar i mport to the great embarrassment of s aid Vivencio Ruiz.

Contra ry to l a w.

Both a ccused pleaded not guilty upon a rraignment (Ori ginal Record, p. 10; p. 4) a nd the cases were tri ed jointly.

After tri a l, both accused were convi cted in a decision of the the Ci ty Court dated April 10, 1968,*** the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the a ccused beyond reasonable doubt, the a ccused, Exequiel Victoria is hereby found guilty
of Gra ve Ora l Defamation a nd is hereby s entenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS & ONE (1) DAY, a nd the a ccused Daniel Victorio is
hereby s entenced to suffer an imprisonment of (6) MONTHS a nd ONE (1) DAY and to pay the costs proportionately.

SO ORDERED. (Ori ginal Record, p. 179).

Thei r motion for reconsideration and/or modification of judgment (Original Record, p. 181) fi led on the same date was denied i n an order of the trial
court da ted September 25, 1968 (Ori gi nal Record, p. 189). On a ppeal, the Court of Appeals, on October 9, 1968 (Ori gi nal Record, p. 201) a ffirmed
the decision of the trial court but modified the penalty to the indeterminate sentence of one (1) month and one (1) day of a rresto mayor as
mi nimum to one (1) year a nd one (1) day of prisIon correccional as maximum (R esolution of August 7, 1970; Rol lo, p. 19). The motion for hearing
a nd/or reconsideration filed on October 15, 1970 a s well as their urgent motion for reconsideration filed on October 19, 1970 were denied by the
Court of Appeals i n i ts resolution dated October 28, 1970. Thus , this petition for review by certi orari filed with the Court on December 18, 1970
(Rol lo, P. 9).

On February 11, 1971, the Court res olved to deny the petition for insufficient showing that findings of facts are unsupported by s ubstantial evidence
a nd for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 43). However, i n i ts Resolution of April 15, 1971, the Court, considering the grounds of the motion of petitioners for
reconsideration of the resolution of February 11, 1971, res olved to: (a ) reconsider said res olution; and (b) to give due course to the petition for
revi ew on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (Rollo, p. 56).

On October 15, 1974, couns el for petitioners-appellants filed a motion to dismiss G.R. No. L-32836 (Cri minal Case No. 9469 of the Ci ty Court of
Ca ba natuan Ci ty and CA-G.R. No. 09243-44-CR), manifesting that the petitioner-appellant Exequiel Victorio died on April 14, 1974 a t Gui mba, Nueva
Eci ja where he was then residing (Rollo, p. 131). There being no objection interposed by the Solicitor General in his comment filed with the Court on
December 11, 1974, the death of petitioner-appellant having occurred prior to the rendition of final judgment (Rollo,p. 154), the Court resolved on
December 18, 1974 to di s miss L-32836-37 only i nsofar as a ppellant Exequiel Victorio is concerned (Rollo, p. 157).

The l one assignment of error (Brief for the Petitioners, p. 91), i s as follows:

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE WORDS UTTERED BY THE PETITIONERS IN CONVERSA TION WITH EACH
OTHER AND WHILE IN THE HEAT OF ANGER CONSTITUTE GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION INSTEAD OF MERELY LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION.

In effect, counsel for petitioners abandoned all the assignments of error in the Court of Appeals, confined himself to only o ne, and practically
a dmitted that the accused committed the cri me charged although of a l esser degree that of slight oral defamation only, i nstead of gra ve oral
defa mation.

There is no dispute regarding the main facts that had given ri se to the present case. Appellant-petitioner i n this i nstant appeal, does not deny that
the a ccused, on the occasion in question, uttered the defamatory words alleged in the information. Thus, the s ole issue that the Court has to resolve
i s whether or not the defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or s imply slight oral defamation.

The term oral defamation or slander a s now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which te nd to prejudice
a nother in his reputation, office, tra de, business or means of l ivelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39). Arti cl e 358, Revised Penal Code, s pells out the demarcation
l i ne, between serious a nd s light oral defamations, as follows: "Oral defamation s hall be punished by a rresto mayor i n i ts max imum period to prision
correcci onal in its minimum period, if i t is of a serious and insulting nature, otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pes os." (Balite v. People, 18 SCRA 280 [1966]).

To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court a dopted the following guidelines:

. . . We a re to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending upon, as Viada
puts i t, '...upon their s ense and grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, a ntecedents or
rel a tionship between the offended party a nd the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender a t the time : ... Ba lite v. People,
Ibi d., quoting Viada, Codigo Penal, Quinta edicion, page 494).

Thus , i n the same case cited where s currilous words i mputed to the offended party the cri me of estafa, the Court rul ed:

The s currilous words imputed to the offended party the crime estafa. The l anguage of the indictment strikes deep into the character of the victim;
He 'ha s sold the union; he 'has s windled the money of the vendees; he 'received bribe money i n the amount of P10,000.00 ... a nd a nother
P6,000.00'; He 'i s engaged in racketeering and enriching himself with the capitalists'; He 'has s pent the funds of the union for his personal use.'

No a mount of sophistry will take these s tatements out of the compass of grave oral defamation. They a re serious a nd i nsulting . No circumstances
need to be shown to upgrade the slander. . . .

In a nother case where a woman of vi olent temper hurled offensive a nd scurrilous epithets i ncluding words i mputing unchastity a gainst a respectable
ma rri ed lady a nd tending to injure the character of her young daughters, the Court rul ed that the crime committed was grave slander:

The l anguage used by the defendant was deliberately a pplied by her to the complainant. The words were uttered with evi dent i ntent to i njure
compl ainant, to ruin her reputation, a nd to hold her in public contempt, for the sake of revenge. One who will thus s eek to i mpute vi ce or
i mmorality to a nother, the consequences of which might gravely prejudice the reputation of the person i nsulted, i n this i nsta nce a pparently a n
honorable a nd respectable lady and her young daughters, all prominent i n s ocial ci rcles, d eserves l ittle judicial sympathy. Certainly, i t is time for the
courts to put the stamp of their disapproval on this practice of vile a nd l oud slander. (U.S. v. Tol osa, 37 Phil. 166 [1917]) .

In a ca se where the accused, a priest, called the offended party a gangster, i n the middle of a sermon, the court affirmed the conviction of the
a ccus ed for slight slander (People v. Arca nd 68 Phi l. 601 [1939]). There was no imputation of a cri me nor a vi ce or i mmoralit y i n said case.

In the i nstant case, a ppellant-petitioner a dmitted having uttered the defamatory words against Atty. Vi vencio Ruiz. Among others he ca lled Atty.
Rui z, "estapador", which attributes to the latter the cri me of estafa, a serious and insulting i mputation. As s tated by the Court i n Balite v. People,
s upra, "no a mount of s ophistry will ta ke these statements out of the compass of gra ve oral defamation . . . No ci rcums tances need to be shown to
upgra de the slander."

Defa matory words uttered s pecifically a gainst a lawyer when touching on his profession are l ibelous per s e. Thus, i n Kl eeberg v. Si pser (191 NY 845
[1934]), i t wa s held that "where statements concerning plaintiff i n his professional capacity a s attorney a re s usceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of
s uch construction as would tend to i njure him in that ca pacity, they a re libelous per se a nd (the) complaint, even in the a bsence of allegation of
s pecial damage, states cause of a ction." Oral s tatements that a certain lawyer i s 'unethical,' or a false charge, dealing wit h office, trade, occupation,
bus iness or profession of a person charged, are slanderous per s e (Kraushaar v. La Vi n, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 857 [1943]; Ma i ns v. Whi ting 49 NW 559 [1891];
Greenburg v. De Salvo, 216 So. 2d 638 [1968]).

In Pol lard v. Lyon (91 US 225 [1876]), the court there had occasion to divide oral slander, a s a ca use of a ction, i nto s everal classes, as follows:

(1) Words falsely spoken of a person which i mpute to the party the commission of some cri minal offense involving moral turpit ude for which the
pa rty, i f the charge is true, may be i ndicted and punished;

(2) Words falsely spoken of a person which i mpute that the party is i nfected with some contagious disease, where, i f the charge is true, it would
excl ude the party from s ociety;

(3) Defa matory words falsely s poken of a person which impute to the party unfitness to perform the duties of a n office or employment, or the want
of i ntegrity i n the discharge of the duties of s uch office or employment;
(4) Defa matory words falsely s poken of a party which prejudice s uch party i n his or her profession or tra de; and

(5) Defa matory words falsely s poken of a person, which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion the party s pecial damag e."

In the i nstant case, a ppellant-petitioner i mputed the cri me of estafa against a prominent lawyer one-time Justice of the Peace and member of the
Provi nci al Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law a nd for sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association. As the s currilous i mputation
s tri kes deep i nto the character of the vi ctim, no special circumstance need be s hown for the defamatory words uttered to be considered grave oral
defa mation Balite v. People, s upra. In a ddition, the fact that the offended party i s a lawyer, the totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang
uta k", "s wapang at estapador", i mputed a gainst him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or i mproper pra ctice i n the performance of his
duti es, hence, a ctionable per s e.

Peti ti oner a rgues that this Court i n People v. Doronila (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 231 [1941]) a nd People v. Modesto (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p.
128 [1941]) rul ed that defamatory words uttered i n the heat of anger could only give rise to slight oral defamation (Rono, p. 13).

We di sagree.

An exa mination of the rulings relied upon by petitioner s howed that said cases were decided not by this Court but by the respondent court. Suffice it
to s a y tha t said decisions do not bind this Court.

Nevertheless, the cases adverted to by petitioner would not in a ny ma nner help his cause. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, there was no
rea s on for the petitioner to be angry a t the offended party who was merely performing his duties as a lawyer in defense of his client. Petitioner's
a nger was not lawfully ca used. (Brief for the Appellee, p. 7). The fact that the defamatory words were uttered by the petitioner without provocation
by pri va te respondent and ta ken s eriously by the latter, renders i napplicable the cases relied upon by petitioner.

As a ma tter of fact, the s currilous remarks were found by the respondent court to have been uttered i n a l oud voice, i n the p resence of at l east ten
(10) pers ons, taken seriously by the offended party a nd without provocation on his part.

WHEREFORE, the petition i s Denied for lack of merit and the appealed decision Affirmed i n toto.

SO ORDERED.

Ferna n, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano a nd Cortes, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160351 April 10, 2006
NOEL VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and YOLANDA CASTRO, Respondents.

DE CISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Thi s is no ordinary word war s tory. Here, the Councilor a nd Vi ce-Mayor of a town, both holders of exalted government positions, became slaves to
thei r human limitations and engaged i n a verbal s cuffle a t the municipal hall a s if they were ordinary men i n the streets. A moment of unguarded
emoti onal outburst lead to the l ong-drawn out twists and turns of this case, which s hould have been a voided if only they ha ve imbedded i n their
compl ex emotions, habits and convictions that consciousness to regulate these deflecting forces a nd not to let them loose, ei ther to their own
detri ment or to that of the public they s erve. This is the high price they have to pay a s occupants of their exalted positions.1

At ba r i s a petition for revi ew assailing the decision2 dated 28 Ma rch 2003 of the Court of Appeals i n CA -G.R. CR No. 22932 whi ch a ffirmed with
modi fication the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, likewise a ffirming with modification the joint decision of the 2nd Municipal
Ci rcui t Tri al Court (MCTC) of Ca pas-Bamban-Concepcion, convicting petitioner of the crime of Grave Ora l Defamation in Cri minal Case No. 139-94
a nd Slander by Deed in Cri minal Case No.140-94. Also assailed is the resolution3 dated 9 October 2003 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner.

Peti ti oner Noel Villanueva was then a member of the Municipal Council while private complainant Yolanda C. Ca s tro was then Mu nicipal Vice Mayor,
both of Concepcion, Ta rlac. Upon complaint of private complainant, two separate Cri minal Complaints were filed on 9 October 19 94 a gainst the
peti tioner i n the 2nd MCTC of Ca pas-Bamban-Concepcion, to wit:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 139-94

For: Gra ve Ora l Defamation

On September 12, 1994 on or a bout 10:00 i n the morning at the SB Office in the Municipal Building of Concepcion, Tarlac, in t he presence of s everal
pers ons a nd again in the a fternoon on or a bout four thirty (4:30 PM) a t the Ol d Session Hall of the Munici pal Building in my presence a nd i n the
pres ence of s everal persons, defendant NOEL L. VILLANUEVA, in a l oud voice and within hearing distance of everyone present, u nlawfully,
ma l iciously a nd feloniously uttered in a serious and insulting manner at the undersigned complainant the following words: ["]Nagmamalinis ca , ena
ca ma n malinis, garapal ca ["] a nd "Balamu mansanas cang malutu, pero queng quilib ularan ca , tictac ca rinat" (You are pretending to be clean and
honest yet you are not clean a nd honest, you a re corrupt; you a re like a red a pple, but i nside you a re worm infested and extremely di rty), which
uttera nces a re serious and insulting in nature, tending to ca use dishonor, discredit a nd contempt of undersigned complainant and causing her
extreme mental anguish, wound (sic) feelings, besmirched reputation and serious a nxiety for which s he is entitled to recover moral a nd exempl ary
da mages in a n a mount to be determined by the honorable court. Contrary to l aw.

CRIM.CASE NO. 140-94

For: Sl a nder by Deed

On September 12, 1994 a round four thirty (4:30 P.M.) i n the afternoon, more or l ess, a t the Municipal Building of Concepcion, Ta rlac, where public
a uthorities a re engaged i n the discharge of their duties, and in the presence of several persons, the a ccused No el L. Villanueva while in the process
of hurl ing verbal i nsults a t the complainant, then and there unlawfully, feloniously a nd contemptuously ga ve the complainant what is commonly
known as "dirty fi nger" by poking his hand a t complainant’s face with the middle finger extended a nd the rest of his fingers half-closed, an act
tending to ca use dishonor, discredit and contempt on the complainant a nd ca using her mental anguish, wounded feelings and mor al suffering for
whi ch she is entitled to moral a nd exemplary da mages in a n a mount to be determined by the honorable court. Contrary to l aw.4

Peti ti oner entered a plea of "not guilty" on both counts and trial ensued. The prosecution witnesses presented were the compl ainant a nd her two
wi tnesses.

The MCTC res ta ted the fa cts a s presented by the prosecution evidence as follows:

On 12 September 1994, a t 10:00 o’cl ock i n the morning, two utility men came to complainant’s office, bringing with them the a pplication for
monetized leave of Sangguniang Bayan member Noel Villanueva , petitioner in this case. The a pplication for monetized leave was not i mmediately
a ttended to by complainant as she was then busy dictating some important matters to her secretary.5

The a ccused a t that ti me was s tanding in front of the Vi ce Mayor’s Office and he allegedly said: "E a no kung wala sa mood, e a no kung galit sya ."6
Thes e utterances of accused were disregarded by complainant but a ccused then entered the complainant’s office bringing with h im his Application
for Moneti zed Leave. The a ccused a ddressed the complainant’s secretary: "Ma lou, pag a tiu ne keng mood, papirma mu ne." The alleged request of
a ccus ed to the Secretary wa s made i n a very s arcastic manner.7

Compl ainant got the monetized leave a nd filed it i n her "in and out" files a nd while doing this, the paper a ccidentally fell on the floor. When she was
a bout to pick i t up, the accused allegedly got a yellow pad and swung i t at complainant’s fa ce, but she was a ble to evade i t. Accused then said: "Ibuat
da ka ken, inabu daka keng awang, e baling masukul naku." (I will lift you from there and I will throw you out of the window and I don’t ca re if I will
go to ja i l). Then the accused went out of the office and before leaving, he pointed a "dirty fi nger" at complainant, prompting the latter to s tand and
get a n empty bottle of coke to shield her fa ce. Accused proceeded towards the office of the municipal mayor. Because accused was still frothing
i nvectives, complainant purportedly "rolled" the empty bottle of coke towards him. The incident was witnessed by s o many people numbering about
20 to 30 who were then at the municipal hall.8

Pros ecution evidence further showed that accused allegedly mouthed the following disparaging remarks, "Magmalinis ka, ena ka man malinis,
ga ra pal ka." "Balamu mansanas kang malutu, pero king kilub ularan ka, ti ktak karinat" (You a re pretending to be cl ean and honest yet you a re not
cl ea n and honest, you a re corrupt. You a re like red apple, you a re worm i nfested inside a nd extremely dirty). While this was going on, the Municipal
Attorney, Atty. Pepi to Torres, intervened to pacify the a ccused, but he was unable to do so.9
Ba s ed on the account of the prosecution witnesses, from the municipal s ession hall, the complainant was persuaded to enter th e office of the
Sa ngguniang Bayan Secretary. Accused followed her and i nside said office, the accused again said, "Ibuat daka, inabu daka keng a wang, e baling
ma s ukul ku (I will l ift you from there and I will throw you out of the window and I don’t ca re if I will go to jail). I Ta ta mu tinagal ya ng kapitan pero
ma s ambut ya , pero i ng kaputul ku sinambut ne man" (Your fa ther ra n for barangay ca ptain and lost but my brother won)10 a nd a gain, the a ccused
poi nted a "dirty fi nger" at complainant.11

The defense, on the other hand, presented s ix witnesses. From their testimonies, the MCTC ga thered that on 12 September 1994, a ccused
requested Flora Ca laya g to prepare the application for monetized l eave and asked her to have i t approved by the complainant. Because th e
a pplication remained unsigned by the latter, i t was Joel Cecilio who i n the afternoon went to her office for the a pproval of the monetized l eave, but
a ga in, to no avail.12

Accus ed then personally ca rri ed his a pplication to complainant’s office. At that ti me, complainant was dictating s omething to the Secretary a nd as
he wa s about to gi ve the copy to the Secretary, complainant got u p and grabbed the paper from him and placed it on the right s ide of her table.13

Thi s angered the a ccused a nd he s aid to complainant, "[i]s this the a ctuation of the high government official?" The complaina nt replied, "Bolang
(Insane)." A verbal squabble ensued a nd the complainant allegedly said, "nung munta kayo keng municipiyong a yni balamu ninu kayong hari, ala
na kong depatan nung-e gawang pera, sira nako kareng tau." (When you go to the municipal building as i f you are a king, you did nothing except to
ma ke money, the people no longer believe in you.)14

Compl ainant, a t that instant, hurled a bottle of coke at petitioner a nd hit one of the Barangay Ca ptains then present.15

After tri a l, the MCTC found petitioner guilty of Grave Oral Defamation a nd Serio us Slander by Deed i n a joint decision dated 26 February 1998. The
MCTC hel d that the statements uttered by petitioner and the act of making a dirty fi nger constitute an affront on complainant who, as Vi ce Mayor
a nd a lady, deserves greater respect.1avvphil.net The MCTC pos ited that the defense i nterposed by the petitioner that complainant brought the
ha voc upon herself when she refused to approve his a pplication for accrued l eave credits monetization ca nnot be considered as va lid to obviate or
obl iterate the cri me or damage done unto the complainant. The MCTC then held:

Wi th these, this Court finds overwhelming evidence a gainst the a ccused and as s uch this Court finds the a ccused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
a cha rged (sic) of Grave Oral Defamation pu nishable under Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code and Slander by Deed punishable under Art. 359 of the
Revi sed Penal Code. x x x The complainant a lthough she ca n estimate the value of the moral damages is entitled to the sum of P50,000.00 a nd
a ttorney’s fees of P30,000.00 a nd P1,000.00 a s appearance fee plus litigation expenses.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offenses or charges mentioned a bove, he is hereby s ente nced to a n
i mprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS and one (1) day to one (1) year in each ca se which the a ccused s hall s erved (a t the same ti me), a nd to pay by
wa y of mora l damages the s um of P50,000.00 wi thout subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of insolvency a nd litigation expenses and attorneys fees of
P30,000.00 pl us P1,000.00 per a ppearance fee.16

Both pa rties appealed to the RTC of Tarlac, which affirmed petitioner’s conviction, but modified the penalty a nd the manner o f servi ng accused’s
s entence, a nd with a s ubstantial i ncrease in the award of damages. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Municipal Ci rcuit Trial Court, i nsofar as i t finds the a ccused guilty of gra ve oral defamation in
Cri mi nal Case No. 139 a nd slander by deed i n Cri minal Ca se No. 140 i s hereby AFFIRMED wi th the modification that the a ccused is to be s entenced
to s uffer the indeterminate penalty of i mprisonment from three (3) months a s minimum to TWO (2) years a nd TWO (2) months as m aximum in each
of the ca ses, the same to be served SUCCESSIVELY.

Li kewise, the decision of the Municipal Ci rcuit Trial Court is further modified and the a ccused is ordered to pay the a mount of P100,000.00 a s m oral
da mages and another a mount of P50,000.00 a s exemplary damages, i ncluding the a mount of P30,000.00 a s attorney’s fees and P1,0 00.00 per
hea ring as a ppearance fee.17

On a ppeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court with the modification that the a ward of exemplary dama ges was deleted
beca use a ccording to the Court of Appeals i t was shown from the records that the petitioner himself was a vi ctim of complainant’s indiscretion for
refus ing, for no reason at all, to a pprove petitioner’s a pplication for monetization of his accrued l eave credits. The Court of Appeals disposed as
fol l ows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision i s hereby a ffirmed with the modification that the award of exemplary damages is hereby
del eted.18

As petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise met with failure, petitioner, in a last stab at absolution, l odged th e present petition for
revi ewhttp://elibrary.supremecourt.gov.ph/dtSearch/ - _ftn36 on the following a rguments:

I.

The honorable court of a ppeals gravely erred in ruling on only ONE (1) i ssue raised by petitioner in his petition for review and in not ruling squarely
on the other FIVE (5) issues, thus, denyi ng petitioner of his ri ght to be heard and to due process.

II.

III.

IV.

19

The i ssues are: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred i n s ustaining the conviction of petitioner for gra ve oral defamation i n Cri minal Case No. 139-
94, a nd (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for s erious s lander by deed in Cri minal Case No. 140-94.

Anent the first issue, Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 358. Sl a nder. – Ora l defamation shall be punished by a rresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in i ts m inimum period if it is of
a s erious a nd i nsulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

Sl a nder is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of i n writing. The term oral defamation or s lander as now understood, has been defined
a s the s peaking of base a nd defamatory words which tend to prejudice a nother i n his reputation, office, tra de, business or me ans of livelihood.20

There is gra ve slander when it is of a serious a nd i nsulting nature. The gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions
us ed, but also (2) on the personal relations of the accused a nd the offended party, a nd (3) the ci rcumstances surrounding the case.21 Indeed, i t is a
doctri ne of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their s ense, grammatical
s i gnificance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them s eparately, but also upon the s pecial ci rcumstances of the ca se, ant ecedents or
rel a tionship between the offended party a nd the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender a t the time.22

In our previous rulings, we held that the s ocial s tanding and position of the offended party a re also ta ken i nto account a nd thus, i t was held that the
s l ander was grave, because the offended party ha d held previously the Office of Congressman, Governor, a nd Senator and was th en a candidate for
Vi ce-President,23 for which no amount of sophistry would ta ke the statement out of the compass of grave oral defamation.24 However, we have,
l i kewise, ruled i n the past that uttering defamatory words in the heat of a nger, wi th some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes
onl y a l ight felony.25

In the ca se at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position of Councilor a t that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society
a ga inst the use of i ntemperate language particularly because the offended party was a Vi ce-Mayor. However, we ca nnot keep a blind eye to the fact
tha t s uch s cathing words were uttered by him i n the heat of a nger tri ggered by the fact, as found by the Court of Appeals, that co mplainant refused,
wi thout va lid justification to a pprove the monetization of a ccrued leave credits of petitioner. In a manner of s peaking, she sowed the wind that
rea ped the storm.

In the words of the Court of Appeals:

The a lready existing a nimosity between them does not vest i n the complainant the prerogative to deny petitioner a ri ght to wh ich he was legally
enti tled. Exemplary da mages ca nnot be recovered as a matter of right. They a re designed to permit the court to mould behavior that has s ocially
del eterious consequences. Its imposition is required by public policy to s uppress the wanton acts of the offender. It cannot be i nvoked as a matter of
ri ght. x x x 26

The a bove findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by s ubstantial evidence are conclusive and binding on the partie s and are not
revi ewable by this Court.27 Considering this finding, the Court of Appeals not only s hould have struck out the award of exemplary damages but
s hould have modified as well the offense committed to be of simple nature punishable by a rresto mayor or a fine not exceeding P200.00 under the
a bove-quoted Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code.

In Pa der v. People,28 complainant was conversing with his political leaders a t the terrace of his house a t Morong, Bataan, when petitioner a ppeared
a t the ga te and shouted "putang ina mo Atty. Es colango. Na pakawalanghiya mo!" The latter was dumbfounded and embarrassed. At that ti me, Atty.
Es colango was a ca ndidate for Vice Ma yor of Morong, Bataan i n the elections of 8 Ma y 1995. We held that the offense committed wa s only slight
s l ander. We explained why i n this wise:

The i ssue is whether petitioner is guilty of s light or s erious oral defamation. In resolving the issue, we a re guided by a doctrine of a ncient
res pectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, gra mmatical signi ficance, a nd a ccepted
ordi nary meaning judging them s eparately, but a lso upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended
pa rty a nd the offender, which might tend to prove the i ntention of the offender a t the time.

Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however, the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight.
The tri al court, in arriving a t its decision, considered that the defamation was deliberately done to destroy Atty. Es colango’s reputation since the
pa rti es were political opponents.

We do not a gree. Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk a t the time
he uttered the defamatory words; a nd the fact that petitioner’s anger was i nstigated by what Atty. Es colango did when petitioner’s father died. In
whi ch case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.

In Reyes v. People [137 Phil. 112, 120 (1969)], we rul ed that the expression "putang ina mo" is a common enough utterance i n the dialect that is
often employed, not really to s lander but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it i s just a n expletive that punctuates one’s
expression of profanity. We do not find i t seriously i nsulting that after a previous i ncident involving his fa ther, a drunk Rogelio Pa der on s eeing Atty.
Es colango would utter words expressing a nger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not necessa rily to i nsult the
l a tter. Being a ca ndidate running for vi ce ma yor, occasional gestures a nd words of disapproval or dislike of his person a re not uncommon.

In s imilar fashion, the tri al court erred i n awarding moral damages without proof of suffering. Accordingly, petitioner may b e convicted only of slight
ora l defamation defined a nd penalized under Arti cle 358, Revised Penal Code, prescribing the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 200
pes os.29 (Emphasis supplied.)

Si milarly, i n Cruz v. Court of Appeals,30 petitioner a nd complainant, a Municipal Judge, were next door neighbors. Animosity grew between their
two fa milies because of s ome disputes. Petitioner resented the practice of complainant of throwing ga rbage a nd animal excreme nt i nto her
premi ses. There was also a boundary dispute between petitioner's mother a nd complainant, which was the s ubject of a ci vil suit for "Recovery of
Pos s ession, Ownership, Enforcement of Legal Easement and Abatement of Nuisance" filed by the mother before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
a ga inst complainant. Additionally, petitioner's mother had previously i nstituted a n a dministrative complaint against the complainant before the
Supreme Court, but the same was dismissed. There was a pent-up feeling of being a ggrieved, resentment, a nger, and vexation on petitioner's part,
cul minating i n her outburst a gainst complainants. For having called the complainant judge "land gra bber," "shameless" and "hypocri te," petitioner
wa s charged and subsequently convicted by the Court of First Instance of three separate offenses of Grave Ora l Defa mation committed on 5, 6 and 8
Augus t 1976. On a ppeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdicts of conviction. On review, however, we held that a lthough t he abusive remarks
ma y ordi narily be considered as serious defamation, under the environmental ci rcumstances of the case, there having been provocation on
compl ainant's part, a nd the utterances complained of having been made in the heat of unrestrained a nger and obfuscation, peti tioner i s liable only
for the cri me of Slight Oral Defamation. Petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 i n each of the cri minal ca ses, with subsidiary
i mprisonment in case of insolvency, a nd to pay the costs.
Gui ded by the foregoing precedents, we find petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation because of the a ttendant circumstances in the case a t
ba r.

Les t we be misconstrued, the Court does not condone the vilification or use of s currilous l anguage on the part of petitioner, but following the rule
tha t a ll possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be taken i n his fa vor, i t is our considered vi ew that the slander committed by
peti tioner ca n be characterized as s light s lander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of a nger, with s ome provocation
on the part of the offended party, constitutes only a light felony.31

In fa ct, to be denied approval of monetization of leave without va lid justification, but as a n offshoot of a political dissension may have been vexing
for peti tioner a nd may have been perceived by him as provocation that triggered him to blow his top and utter those disparaging words. In
hi ndsight, to be denied monetization of leave credits must have stirred upon the petitioner a feeling a kin to begging for money that he was legally
enti tled to. This oppressive conduct on the part of complainant must have s carred petitioner’s s elf-esteem, too, to a ppear a s begging for money. But
a ga in, this is not a n excuse to resort to i ntemperate language no matter how s uch embarrassment must have wreaked havoc on hi s ego.

The next i ssue that faces this Court i s whether or not petitioner’s act of poking a dirty finger a t complainant constitutes grave slander by deed.

Fol lowing the same principle as enunciated in our foregoing discussion of the first issue, we find petitioner guilty onl y of slight slander by deed i n
Cri mi nal Case No. 140-94 i nasmuch as we find complainant’s unjust refusal to sign petitioner’s a pplication for monetization and her act of throwing
a coke bottle a t him constituted a perceived provocation that tri ggered the "poking of finger" incident.

Arti cl e 359 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 359. Sl a nder by deed. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in i ts mi nimum period or a fi ne ranging from
200 to 1,000 pes os shall be i mposed upon any person who s hall perform a ny a ct not i ncluded and punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor,
di s credit, or contempt upon another person. If said a ct is not of a serious nature, the penalty s hall be arresto menor or a f i ne not exceeding 200
pes os.

Sl a nder by deed is a cri me a gainst honor, which is committed by performing any a ct, which casts dishonor, discredit, or conte mpt upon a nother
pers on. The elements are (1) that the offender performs any a ct not i ncluded in a ny other cri me a gainst honor, (2) that s uch a ct is performed in the
pres ence of other person or persons, and (3) that such act ca sts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party. Whe ther a certain
s l anderous a ct constitutes slander by deed of a s erious nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended party, the circumstances under
whi ch the a ct was committed, the occasion, etc.32 It i s libel committed by a ctions ra ther than words. The most common example s are slapping
s omeone or s pitting on his/her fa ce in front of the public market, i n full vi ew of a crowd, thus casting dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon the
pers on of another.

In Ma ri v. Court of Appeals,33 complainant a nd petitioner were co -employees in the Department of Agriculture, with office at Digos, Davao del Sur,
a l though complainant occupied a higher position. On 6 December 1991, petitioner borrowed from complainant the records of his 201 fi le. However,
when he returned the same three days later, complainant noticed that s everal papers were missing which i ncluded official communications from the
Ci vi l Servi ce Commission and Regional Office, Department of Agri culture, a nd a copy of the complaint by the Rural Bank of Dig os against petitioner.
Upon i nstruction of her superior officer, complainant s ent a memorandum to petitioner asking him to explain why his 201 fi le was returned with
mi s sing documents. Instead of a cknowledging receipt of the memorandum, petitioner confronted complainant and angrily s houted at her: "Putang
i na , bullshit, bugo." He banged a chair in front of complainant a nd choked her. With the i ntervention of the s ecurity guard, petitioner was prevailed
upon to desist from further i njuring complainant. We held:

Pres ci nding from the foregoing, i t would serve the ends of justice better i f the p etitioner were sentenced to pay a fine instead of imprisonment. The
offense while considered s erious slander by deed was done in the heat of a nger a nd was i n reaction to a perceived provocation. The penalty for
s eri ous slander by deed may be either imprisonment or a fine. We opt to i mpose a fine.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals a nd i n lieu thereof renders judgment finding pe titioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of serious slander by deed defined a nd penalized under Arti cle 359 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to pay
a fi ne of P1,000.00, wi th subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of insolvency.34 (Emphasis s upplied.)

In Ma ri , the Court found petitioner guilty of s erious slander by deed defined a nd penalized under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code, and
s entenced him to pay a fine of P1,000.00, wi th subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of insolvency. The deed involved was the bangi ng of a chair in front
of compl ainant and choking her.

In a nother case, Teodoro v. Court of Appeals,35 the incident, which gave rise to this case, is narrated as follows:

Peti ti oner Ama do B. Teodoro was vi ce-president a nd corporate s ecretary of the DBT-Marbay Construction, Inc., while complainant, Ca rolina Tanco -
Young, was treasurer of the same corporation. Petitioner is the brother of the president of the corporation, Donato Teodoro, while complainant is
the da ughter of the chairman of the board of the corporation, Agustin Ta nco. x x x

Records show that the incident complained of took place at the Board Room of the D.B.T. Ma r Bay Construction Incorporated i n the afternoon of
Augus t 17, 1984. Pres ent at the meeting were Agustin Ta nco, Chairman of the Board; the President, Donato Teodoro; the a ccused, Amado Teodoro,
a s Corporate Secretary; the complainant, Ca rolina Ta nco-Young who i s the Treasurer; a nd one Oscar Benares.

xxxx

It a ppears that there was a controversial document being insisted upon by the a ccused, a s secretary, to be signed by the chai rman. The Board
Trea surer, Ca rolina Tanco-Young questioned the propriety of having the document s igned as there was, according to her, no such meeting that ever
took pl ace as to show a supposed resolution to have been deliberated upon. A verbal exchange of words and tirades took place between the
a ccus ed Secretary a nd the Treasurer. One word led to another up to the point where Ca rolina Tanco-Young, the treasurer, either by i mplication or
expressed domineering words, alluded to the accused as a "falsifier" which blinded the a ccused-appellant to extreme a nger and ra ge, thus leading
hi m to s lap Tanco-Young — the alleged name caller.[36] (Emphasis supplied.)

Thi s Court i n Teodoro held that there was grave slander by deed.
In a nother case, the a cts of pushing a nd slapping a woman i n order to ridicule and shame her before other people constitute the felony of slander by
deed defined and penalized under Arti cle 359 of the Revised Penal Code by a rresto mayor i n i ts maximum period to prision corr eccional in its
mi nimum period.37

In the ca ses as a bove-cited, there was no provocation on the part of the complainants unlike the present ca se. Moreover, the "poking of the finger"
i n the case a t bar was, palpably, of l ess serious magnitude compared to the banging of chair, the choking in Ma ri a nd the slapping of a face i n
Teodoro. Thus, we fi nd that the poking of dirty fi nger in the case at bar, while it smacks of slander by deed, is of a l esser magnitude than the acts
commi tted in the foregoing cases.

Moreover, pointing a dirty fi nger ordinarily con notes the phrase "Fuck You," which is similar to the expression "Puta" or "Putang Ina mo," i n local
pa rl ance. Such expression was not held to be l ibelous i n Reyes v. People,38 where the Court s aid that: "This is a common enough expression in the
di a lect that i s often employed, not really to slander but ra ther to express anger or displeasure. It is s eldom, if ever, taken i n its l iteral sense by the
hea rer, that is, a s a reflection on the vi rtues of a mother." Following Reyes, a nd i n light of the fact that th ere was a perceived provocation coming
from complainant, petitioner’s a ct of pointing a dirty fi nger a t complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, i t appearing from the factual milieu
of the ca se that the a ct complained of was employed by petitioner "to express anger or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating the approval
of hi s l eave monetization. While it may ha ve cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon complainant, said a ct is not of a seri ous nature, thus, the
penalty s hall be arresto menor meaning, imprisonment from one day to 30 da ys or a fine not exceeding P200.00. We opt to i mpose a fi ne following
Ma ri .39

Yes , complainant was then a Vice-Mayor and a lady a t that, which ci rcumstances ordinarily demanded respect from petitioner. But, it was, likewise,
her mora l obligation s pringing from s uch position to act i n a ma nner that is worthy of respect. In the case a t bar, complainant’s demeanor of
refus ing to sign the leave monetization of petitioner, an otherwise va lid claim, because of a political discord s macks of a c onduct unbecoming of a
l a dy a nd a Vice-Mayor at that. Moreover, i t appears that s he had, i ndeed, thrown a bottle of coke at petitioner, which a ctuation reveals that s he,
too, ha d gone down to petitioner’s l evel.

Hol ding an esteemed position is never a license to a ct capriciously with i mpunity. The fa ct that there was a squabble between petitioner a nd
compl ainant, both high-ranking l ocal public officials, that a verbal brawl ostensibly took place, s peaks very poorly of their s elf-control and public
rel a tions. For this, they both deserve to be censured and directed to conduct themselves in a more composed manner and keep their pose as befits
ra nking officials who officially deal with the public.40

To be worthy of respect, one must a ct respectably, remembering always that courtesy begets courtesy.

Anent the award of damages, the Court of Appeals erred i n i ncreasing the a ward of moral damages to P100,000.00 i n l ight of its own finding that
peti tioner himself was "a vi ctim of complainant’s indiscretion for her refusal, for no reason at a ll, to a pprove petitioner’s application for
monetization of his a ccrued l eave credits."

In s imilar fashion, considering that petitioner a nd complainant belong to warring political ca mps, occasional gestures a nd wo rds of disapproval or
di s like are a mong the hazards of the job.41 Considering this political reality and the fact that the Court of Appeals concluded, based on evidence on
records , that petitioner himself was a victim of complainant’s indiscretion, her cl aim for damages a nd a ttorney’s fees must, likewise, fail. Akin to the
pri nciple that "he who comes to court must have clean hands," each of the parties, in the case at bar, must bear his own l oss.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22932 i s hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1) In Cri m. Ca s e No. 139-94, petitioner Noel Vi llanueva is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the cri me of s light oral defamation only for which we
i mpose on him a fine of P200.00, wi th subsidiary i mprisonment i n case of insolvency;

2) In Cri m. Ca s e No. 140-94, petitioner Noel Vi llanueva is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of s imple slander by deed for which we impose a fine of
P200.00, wi th s ubsidiary i mprisonment i n case of i nsolvency;

3) The a wards for moral damages a nd a ttorney’s fees are DELETED.

Fi nally, the decision of the Court of Appeals i nsofar a s it deleted the a ward for exemplary damages is AFFIRMED. No costs.

s o ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12696 November 19, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PETRA TOLOSA, Defendant-Appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:

An a l l too frequent occurrence i n the Philippines, in which a certain class of i gnorant people s eem to ta ke a delight, i s for two or more i ndividuals to
express l oudly a nd in unabridged a nd forceful words, their fra nk opinion of each other's characters and antecedents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
cha nrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

Tha t s omething l ike such a neighborhood brawl occurred in this i nstance, we have little doubt. Two families, livi ng in houses a bout 15 meters apart,
ha d a ltercations on va rious s ubjects. The defendant, whom the lower court describes i n his decision as having the natural temperament, vehemence
of expression, a nd other peculiar characteristics as indicate i n the kind of a woman that would stir up disturbances at the l east provocation or
whenever she feels offended, fa nned the flame of her wrath with these quarrels. The result - defendant leaned from her window and hurled at the
compl ainant offensive a nd scurrilous epithets, i ncluding words i mputing unchastity to the mother a nd tending to i njure the characters of her
da ughters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

The common scold was the denomination i n by-gone days for women with loose and free tongues; their punishment was the ducking s tool. The old
common law rule was, that oral words i mputing unchastity to a woman were not a ctionable without proof of special damage. After being
denounced as barbarous by eminent English judges, this rule has, within recent years, been discarded in many progressive juri sdiction. In Great
Bri ta in, certain provinces of Canada, and certain States of the American Union, oral words imputing unchastity a re per s e act ionable. The Spanish
l a w reaches an identical conclusion.

The i mputation of vi ce or lack or morality, the consequences of which may greatly damage the fame, credit or i nterest of the offended party, being a
s eri ous insult ( i njuria grave) according to a rticle 472; a nd the words which the a ccused hurled against her to the effect that the l atter's house was
one of i ll fame,' thereby undoubtedly prejudiced her name, fame, and credit, as they a ttributed lack of morality i n her habits which belittles her in
the public eye, etc. (Decisions of the s upreme court of Spain of November 22, 1873, a nd of February 4, 1878; Vi a da, Codigo Pe nal, vol . 3, pp. 222 et
s eq.)

Under the Li bel La w, a similar rule prevails i n the Philippines. (U. S. vs . Grino [1917], 36 Phi l. Rep., 738.) chanrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

Two decisions of this court a re brought to our notice. In the United States vs . Ganzon ( [1915] 30 Phil., 1), the defendant a nd a ppellant was convicted
to a mi s demeanor, instead of the cri me of i njurias graves, on the ground principally that the offensive language was not inte nded to be ta ken i n its
l i teral s ense and neither of the parties so understood i t. But i n the United States vs. Ca nleon ([1908] 11 Phi l., 215), a man was convicted of injurias
gra ves because of i nsulting words said to a woman.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

Our pres ent facts follow rather the latter case than the former. The language used by the defendant was deliberately a pplied by her to the
compl aint. The words were uttered with evident i ntent to i njure complainant, to ruin her reputation, and to hold her i n publi c contempt, for the
s a ke of revenge. One who will thus s eek to i mpute vi ce or i mmorality to a nother, the consequences of which might gravely prejudice the reputation
of the person insulted, i n this instance, a pparently a n honorable a nd respectable l ady a nd her young daughters, all promi nent in s ocial circles,
des erves little judicial sympathy. Certa inly, i t is time for the courts to put the s tamp of their disapproval on this practic e of the vi le and loud slander,
whi ch so debauches a nd degrades womanhood. Shrews must be tamed i n the modern Philippines just as they were in the lines of Shakespeare. The
words of the Good Book i n the Proverbs xxi , ca n also be read with profit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual l aw li brary

Arti cl e 457, Nos. 2 a nd 3, i n connection with a rticle 458, l ast paragraph, of the Penal Code, define s uch gra ve insults a nd provide for their
punishment. In accordance with these provisions of the law, the judgment of the lower court is modified by sentencing the defendant a nd a ppellant
to des tierro (banishment), to be served 25 kilometers beyond the municipality of Donsol, Provi nce of Sorsogon, for the period of one year eight
months a nd twenty-one days , to pay a fine of 325 pesetas, or to suffer subsidiary destierro i n case of insolvency, a nd to pay the costs. S o
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

Arel lano, C. J., Johnson, Araullo, a nd Street, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46336 September 29, 1939
REVEREND ULRIC ARCAND, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

IMPERIAL, J.:

The a ccused was charged in the justice of the peace court of Lucena, Provi nce of Tayabas, with the l ight felony of oral defamation defined a nd
punished by a rticle 358 of the Revised Penal Code, for having insulted the offended party from the pulpit of the Roman Ca thol ic Church of said town,
ca l ling him ga ngster No. 1 a nd saying that he would s end him to jail l ike gangster No. 2, referring to Antonio Nosce. The accused pleaded not guilty
but the justice of the peace court, a fter due trial, found him guilty of s aid light felony and sentenced him to pay a fine in the sum of P20, wi th the
corres ponding s ubsidiary i mprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of th e provi nce wherein he
l i kewise pleaded not guilty, a nd a fter due trial he was convicted of the s ame offense a nd sentenced to pay a fine of P150, wi th the corresponding
s ubsidiary i mprisonment in case of i nsolvency, plus the costs of both instances. He a gain a ppealed to the Court of Appeals a nd s aid court modified
the judgment a ppealed from by s entencing him to pay a fine of P100, a ffirming i t in a ll other respects, wi th costs. The a ccused a ppealed for the third
ti me to this court.

The fa cts of the case are summarized by the court of Appeals as follows:

The a ccused i n this ca se, Reverend Ulric Arca nd, had been designated by the Bishop of the Diocese of Lipa to ta ke personal charge of the spiritual
gui dance of the catholic youth of Lucena, capital of the Province of Taya bas, by teaching them the doctrine and principles of their religion. For one
rea s on or a nother, the truth is that the accused had provoked hostility a nd discontent not only among s ome elements of Lucena not affiliated with
the Ca tholic church but even a mong ca tholics themselves. This hostility a nd discontent took the form of public parades including vi olence
commi tted on the person of the a ccused. In fact, on the afternoon of December 3, 1933, one Antonio Nosce went to the vi cinity of the Lucena
church a nd, upon meeting the a ccused therein, he s lapped the latter, for which he was later prosecuted a nd convicted i n cri minal case No. 5864. In
thi s movement Of protest a gainst the accused, it s eems as i f Aniceto Enriquez, the offended party i n the case a t bar, a lso to ok part. The enmity
between the a ccused a nd the offended party must have been very s trong since the former had filed more than one complaint, for threats, a gainst
the l a tter with the office of the provincial fiscal of Tayabas, which complaints, however, were not s ustained by the fiscal's office i nasmuch as i t
refus ed to ta ke a ction a gainst Enriquez.

Such wa s the state of affairs when, on November 25, 1934, the feast of the "The Miraculous Virgin" was celebrated in Lucena. On this occasion,
Fa ther Arcand mounted the pulpit to deliver the sermon which, a ccording to the evi dence f or the defense, dwelt on a certain phase of the life of
Jes us Christ. After developing his theme, the orator proceeded to a nswer the written questions dropped by the faithful i nto a box placed a t the door
of the church and labeled "Question Box". The a ccused was engaged i n this ta sk when all of a sudden the strains from a band playing outside the
church were heard. Thereupon, the a ccused s topped answering the written questions of the faithful a nd a ddressed a n exhortation to his hearers,
a dvi sing them not to be scandalized by said music which, a ccording to him, was dedicated to the feast of the Miraculous Virgin and was not in any
wa s a demonstration against him, adding that during the public demonstration organized against him the year before, not more than s ixty persons
took pa rt, only four of whom were catholics, and that he would take the necessary s teps for the excommunion of three of them. He further stated:
"I believe you will remember that for said fi rst demonstration, we sent to jail gangster No. 2, ( a lluding to Antonio Nosce, who s lapped him on
December 3, 1933); now we a re going to s end to ja il ga ngster No. 1, tha t man Ceto (alluding to the offended party who was the n outside the church,
nea r the door). I was with him in the office of the fiscal for more than three hours yesterday."

xxx xxx xxx

There is no dispute regarding the main facts have given ri se to the present case. The defense does not deny tha t the accused, on the occasion in
question, uttered the defamatory words alleged in the i nformation. Nor is i t denied that said words were a ddressed to the offended party, Aniceto
Enri quez. The a ccused does not seriously nor positively deny tha t in the middle of his sermon he called the offended party ga ngster No. 1, saying
tha t he would send him to ja il a s he did to gangster No. 2 (Antonio Nosce), and that to this effect he had had a three -hour conference with the
provi ncial fiscal the day before. . . .

We ha ve transcri bed the conclusions of fact a rrived at by the Court of Appeals because the same ca nnot be altered and upon them must be based
the concl usions of l aw which will hereinafter be expounded (sec. 138, s ubsec. (6), of the Revised Administrative Code, as a me nded by s ection 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 3).

After the ca se had been decided by the Court of Appeals, the a ccused, i n a motion for reconsideration, asked said court to make s pecific fi ndings on
the fol lowing facts:

1. When the Bishop of Li pa designated the herein accused Father Ulric Arca nd, as a missionary, to ta ke ch arge of the religious instruction of the
young s tudents i n the town of Lucena, capital of Tayabas, a protestant organization, the Young Men Christian Association, had a monopoly of the
rel i gious proselytism among the youth of said l ocality. As was to be expected, a bitter ri valry i mmediately a rose between the two organizations. A
ha rml ess incident gave occasion for s ome evil-disposed persons to excite public animosity a gainst the accused Father Arca nd. Bonifacio Day was
bei ng celebrated i n 1933 wi th a parade and a meeting. The parade was organized by the residents in general, but the meeting was under the
a us pices of the Y.M.C.A. (Testimony of Superintendent V. Tri nidad, page 174.) Fa ther Arca nd, in turn, prepared a program a t t he Catholic Cl ub, part
of whi ch was dedicated to the same hero Andres Bonifacio (testimony of the accused, page 122). Father Arca nd, i n a s peech delivered prior to the
a rri va l of the feast day, cri ticized the school a uthorities for compelling the s tudents of the public s chools to a ttend the meeting patronized by the
Y.M.C.A. a nd went to the extent of a dvising the youth not to a ttend said meeting (testimony of the accused, page 125). This s peech was distorted by
s ome people and Father Arca nd was accused of being anti-Filipino for preventing the youth from honoring the memory of Andres Bonifacio.

2. Such wa s the state of affairs when a notorious malefactor (who then had already been convicted i n Ma nila a nd Ta yabas for h aving i mprudently
embra ced a nd kissed young women a gainst their will) slapped Father Arca nd i n the face a t the door of the church, while the latter was
a ccompanying the Bishop who was on a vi sit to the parish (criminal case No. 5864). This i ndividual, Antonio Nosce, was l ater sentenced to jail for the
a ct commi tted on that occasion. Before said i ncident took place, an i mpromptu meeting had been held in a ci nema theater of the l ocality during
whi ch the orators i ndividually exploited the anti-Filipinism of the missioner Father Arca nd in their s peeches. During the meeting, the h erein
compl ainant, Aniceto Enriquez, ca relessly said i n a loud voice that he would "ta ke charge of Father Arcand" (criminal ca se No. 5684, pa ges 196-198).
3. In the night of said day on which Father Arca nd was iniquitously maltreated a t the door of the church i tself, the Bishop w as i n the convent taking
s upper with s everal priests and residents when shouts were heard from the street. The parish priests Father Emilio Merchan went down, followed
by Mr. Ca s iano Sandoval (now governor of the provi nce), Mr. Antonio Marquez, Father Daete a nd a brother of Father Merchan. On the s treet among
the crowd was the herein complainant Aniceto Enriquez a rmed with a swagger stick with which he attempted to slug Father Merchan on the head. If
he di d not succeed in dealing the blow, it was due to the ti mely i ntervention of Mr. Sa ndoval a nd Mr. Ma rquez. While other re sidents, who rushed
to the s cene, were taking a way Aniceto Enriquez from said place, the latter s houted a t the top of his voice that the was disposed to kill "all the friars
a nd a ll foreign priests who come here" (testimony of A. Ma rquez, page 65; tes timony of C. Sa ndoval, page 69). "I a m going to kill Father Arcand and
a l l the friars a nd white priests" (testimony of Father Daete, page 91).

4. Upon i nstructions from the Bishop, Mr. Antonio Marquez and Father Daete went to ask for help at the police headquarters wh ich was separated
from the convent by only one s treet. The sole policeman therein answered that he could not give them a ny help because there was nobody to take
hi s post (testimony of Antonio Marquez, page 65). Mr. Ma rquez telephoned the Constabulary barracks but there he was informed that a ccording to
thei r regulations, they were not bound to l eave their barracks unless there was a "clash or bloodshed" (testimony of A. Ma rquez, pag e 67; testimony
of Fa ther Daete, page 92).

5. On the ni ght of December 7, 1933, whi le Father Arca nd was a bout to go up the house o f Attorney Pedro Guevara for the purpose of rendering
hi m s piritual assistance because he was dying, the herein "offended party" Aniceto Enriquez followed him and held him by the arm with the evident
i ntention of a ssaulting him. Father Arcand had to hurry up the stairs of Mr. Guevara's house and was able to l eave only when a sergeant and a
pol iceman arrived a nd a ccompanied him to the convent (testimony of Father Arca nd page 110; tes timony of policeman Salamanca, pages 97, 98).
On s a id occasion, Antonio Nosce and Aniceto Enriquez were seen by the accused standing a t the door of the post office which was in from of the
hous e of Mr. Guevara (testimony of U. Arca nd, page 109). During those days, Antonio Nosce and Aniceto Enriquez, armed with th e cane, were
frequently s een together near the convent (testimony of U. Arca nd, page 109).

6. The proceeding against Antonio Nosce for the maltreatment inflicted upon Father Arcand was still pending when said Antonio Nosce, with the
evi dent intention of spreading terror i n the entire community, with a big ca ne a ttacked from behind the a ttorney who represented Father Arca nd as
pri va te prosecutor i n said case, while said a t attorney ca me from mass, ca using a wound on his head a nd felling him unconscious to the ground. This
took pl ace on January 28, 1934 (s ee cri minal case No. 5905). Nosce was charged with frustrated homicide a nd convicted of serious physical i njuries.

7. On October 18, 1934, a group of i ndividuals hostile to Father Arca nd, who were organized into a "parade," passed i n front of the convent
s houting: "Out, Father Arca nd; out, Father Arca nd", while the l atter looked out of the window of the convent. Among those individuals was the
herein complainant Aniceto Enriquez, who upon s eeing the a ccused Arca nd, stretched his hand to convey him the i dea that he would cut his neck
(tes timony of Ma ria Ca bañero, page 74; tes timony of H. Ma nalo, pages 77, 78).

8. In the night of November 21, 1934, s tones were thrown a t the convent, breaking the window panes. The a ccused Father Arcand a nd Father
Ra fi ñan went down. They found Ceto Enriquez himself in the vi cinity of the convent. Father Arca nd requested a policeman to a r rest said Enriquez.
Undoubtedly, i t was Father Arca nd's ri ght to request it. Upon hearing it, however, Aniceto Enriquez became furious a nd, with the cane ca rried by
hi m, wa nted to s trike Father Arca nd. The policeman i ntervened a nd warded off the blow. (Testimony of Father Arca nd, pages 59, 60.)

9. Even i n the very church, while Father Arca nd performed the duties of his ministry, Aniceto Enriquez used to insult him. According to the testimony
of Enri quez himself, he used to enter the church (although he was not a ca tholic but a n a glipayan) and as s oon as Father Arca nd began to preach, he
l eft on the pretext that he did not understand English (testimony of Aniceto Enriquez, page 42).

10. On November 25, 1934, the da y of the i ncident i n question, while Father Arca nd was on his way from the convent to the chu rch, he met the
chi ef clerk of the provincial treasury of Taya bas, Mr. Ni colas Tolentino. This gentleman told the a ccused: "My wi fe told me not to go to church
frequently because they say tha t they a re going to kill Father Arca nd. I a nswered: why s hould I not go to church i f I want to comply wi th my duties as
a ca tholic?" (Testimony of Nicolas Tolentino, page 55; testimony of the a ccused, page 103.)

11. On tha t da y, the feast of the Miraculous Virgin was being celebrated. Shortly a fterwards, and while the accused was preac hing from the pulpit, a
ba nd passed. "I noticed i n the congregation", says the a ccused, "a movement not only of surprise but also of fear" (testimony of the a ccused, page
101). Thi s s tate of the mind was due to the series of aggressions, vexations a nd i nsults of which Father Arca nd had been the object, a nd to rumors
s pread that the latter would be killed, for which reason the faithful would do well not to go to church frequently. It was du e to a great extent to the
pres ence i n i tself constituted a provocation to panic a nd disorder.

12. It i s not true that the complaint was filed by Aniceto Enriquez, prompted by the offense ca used to him by the phrase uttered by the accused. The
i nci dent occurred on November 25, 1934. In the very churchyard, immediately a fter the mass, the teacher Pa terno Africa inform ed Aniceto Enriquez
of wha t Father Arca nd had said of him (testimony of Aniceto Enriquez, page 37). Ani ceto Enriquez did not file any complaint e ither on the the s ame
da y, or on the following day, or the following week, or the following month. The complain t was filed by him, at the instigation of others and purely
for vengeance, on January 3, 1935, one day a fter Fa ther Arca nd had gone to the office of the provincial fiscal to demand prot ection from the a cts of
vi ol ence that Ceto himself had been committing (testimony of the accused Arcand, page 114. See date of the complaint, January 3, 1935).

The Court Appeals denied the motion. In his brief the a ttorney for the accused asserts that the Court of Appeals denied the m otion without stating
a ny ground therefor. We do not have the order of denial before us for the reason that i t has not been forwarded. It may be presumed, however,
tha t the Court of Appeals denied the motion for being unfounded and because in i ts decision there already a ppears a detailed s tatement of all the
ma terial facts necessary to a rrive at the conclusion whether or not the a ccused is really guilty of the offense imputed to hi m.

In the first a ssignment of error, the a ccused maintains that the Court of Appeals vi olated the law in refusing to make the a foresaid findings of fact.
We a re of the opinion and so hold that such error does not exist. By rea ding the appealed decision, i t will be s een that it c ontains a methodical a nd
compl ete statement of all the essential fa cts necessary to determine the degree of criminal l iability i ncurred by the accused. With the fullness and
preci sion demanded by the case, the Court of Appeals s tated the material fa cts, i ncluding the greater part of the ones on whi ch specific findings
were s ought. A reproduction of all the facts which the defense cl aims to have been proved would not serve any pra ctical purpose i n vi ew of the fact
tha t those not a ppearing i n the appealed decision are i rrelevant a nd do not establish the i nnocence of the accused.

The ma in a nd only defense i nvoked in favor of the a ccused a nd which is the object of the s econd assignment of error, i s that the words, which have
been considered defamatory, constitute a privileged communication a nd that he a cted without malice and good faith.

In the ca se of United States vs . Cañete (38 Phil., 253 et s eq.), we s aid that "A communication made bona fide upon any s ubject matter i n whi ch the
pa rty communicating has a n i nterest, or i n reference to which he has a duty, i s privileged, i f ma de to a person having a co rresponding i nterest or
duty, a l though i t contained cri minatory matter which without this privilege would be s landerous a nd a ctionable (Harrison vs . Bush, 5 E. & B., 344; 1
Jur. [N.S.], 846; 25 L.J.Q.B., 25; 3 W.R., 474; 85 E.C.L., 344)." The defense of privileged communication, to be good, must be based on the good faith
of the person violating the law or i nvoking the privilege. Speaking of oral defamation or s lander, the facts or ci rcumstances under which the
defa mation or s lander was committed must show that the offender a cted without malice or i n good faith. In the case under consideration, the
a ccus ed is not found i n this situation a nd ca nnot successfully plead that he acted in good faith and without malice. Acceptin g a ll the fa cts i nvoked i n
jus ti fication of his a ttitude, i t appears clear that he was not justified in defaming a nd discrediting from the pulpit the good name a nd reputation of
the offended party.

The l ight felony committed by the a ccused is that defined i n the last part of article 358 of the Revised Penal Code a nd the penalty i s in accordance
wi th l aw, for which reason the a ppealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance to the a ccused-petitioner. So ordered.

Ava nceña, C.J., Vi lla-Real, Diaz, La urel, and Moran, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19857. October 26, 1968.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAMASO ATIENZA, Defendant-Appellee.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Thi s is an appeal from the order of dismissal of the Municipal Court of the Ci ty of Ca gaya n de Oro i n its Cri minal Ca se No. 6612.

Defendant-appellee, Damaso Ati enza, was charged with grave oral defamation i n the said Court upon a sworn complaint signed by the offended
pa rty, Pi l ar Lee. The defamatory words allegedly u ttered by the defendant were: "Pa uli na, puta ka. Oo, puta ka, puta kat bilaw." The tra nslation
gi ven i n the complaint i tself is: "Go home, you prostitute. Yes, you are a prostitute, really a prostitute." Below the verifi cation a nd the l ist of
pros ecution witnesses, the complaint l ikewise had the signature of the s pecial counsel, a cting as public prosecutor.

The tri al of the case, a fter the defendant’s plea of not guilty, wa s already well a dvanced, with only the sur-rebuttal witness for the defense still to be
pres ented when counsel moved to dismiss the ca se on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. S pecifically, the
juri s dictional objection was based on the fa ct that the ca se was being prosecuted upon complaint signed by th e offended party herself i nstead of
upon i nformation signed by the prosecuting officer.

The l ower court s ustained the motion and issued the order of dismissal on Ma rch 30, 1962, ci ti ng Arti cle VII, Section 24 of t he charter of the City of
Ca ga ya n de Oro (Republic Act No. 521), which provides that the Ci ty a ttorney s hall "investigate all charges of cri mes, misdemeanors, and vi ol ations
of l a ws a nd city ordinances and prepare the necessary i nformations or make the necessary complaints against the persons a ccused." The theory
a dva nced is that since the offense of prostitution i mputed by the defendant to the offended party for which i mputation the co mplaint for oral
defa mation was l odged, is a public cri me, i t cannot be prosecuted except by information signed by the public prosecutor himself. Consequently, i t is
poi nted out, the complaint here, having been s igned by the offended party herself, did not effectively and va lidly launch the cri minal a ction.

There is a misapprehension both of law a nd of fact i n the order of dismissal appealed from. The provision of the charter of the Ci ty of Ca gayan de
Oro a forecited is not restrictive in character. While it i mposes upon the Ci ty a ttorney the duty to i nvestigate offenses a nd to sign the corresponding
i nformations or complaints, i t does not say tha t the victim of the offense may not himself file a complaint. The law of more i mmediate relevanc y is
Arti cl e 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: "No criminal action for defamation which consists in the i mputation of a cri me which ca nnot be
pros ecuted de officio s hall be brought except at the i nstance of a nd upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party." A s construed by the
l ower court, i nvoking People v. Ma rti nez, L-50, Apri l 30, 1946, the foregoing provision sets up a prohibition against the prosecution of a charge of
defa mation upon complaint by the offended party when the defamation consists of the i mputation of a cri me which may be prosec uted de officio.
The decision i n People v. Ma rti nez does not s upport this conclusion. It simply underlines the indispensability of such a complaint where the crime
i mputed ca nnot be prosecuted de officio such as a dultery, concubinage, ra pe, s eduction, abduction, or acts of lascivi ousness. The more recent case
of Ba l ite v. People, L- 21475, September 30, 1966, i s more apropos, its facts being s imilar to those in the ca se before us now. Speaking through Mr.
Jus ti ce Conrado V. Sa nchez, this Court there said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Rea d a s it should be, the plain i mport of the statute just reproduced i s that where defamation i mputes a cri me which ca nnot be prosecuted de
offi cio, the general rule must give way, the cri minal a ction must have to be brought s olely ‘a t the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by
the offended party.’ The converse proposition, however, ca nnot be true. Reasonable construction will not permit a deduction which could cons trict
cri mi nal prosecution — of defamation which ca n be prosecuted de officio — by means of i nformation. We do not propose to undertake the
i mpermissible ta sk of writing into the statute a n alien concept: that which would exclude cri minal a ction started by complain t. Nor should we
a ttri bute to the l aw a n occult content."cralaw vi rtua1aw library

The mi sapprehension of fact on the part of the l ower court l ies i n its having overlooked two ci rcumstances: (1) the word "puta" alleged to have been
uttered by the defendant in referring to the offended party does not necessarily connote the crime of prostitution as defined i n the Revised Penal
Code. (Art. 202); a nd (2) the subject complaint, while signed and sworn to by the offended party herself, is also s igned by t he s pecial counsel, as
public prosecuting officer, who retained s upervision and control of the case for the State a nd i n fact conducted the cross-examination of the
wi tnesses for the defense a nd the presentation of the rebuttal witness for the prosecution. Besides, the technical objection ra ised by the defense
s hould have been deemed waived under those ci rcumstances and at that late s tage of the case.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal a ppealed from is set aside a nd the case is remanded for further proceedings, with costs aga inst Defendant-
Appellee.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Ca stro, Angeles, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-41757 November 13, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANTONIO NOSCE, Defendant-Appellant.

Offi ce of the Solicitor General Hilado for a ppellee.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.: cha nrobles vi rtual law library

For ha vi ng slapped the Reverend Father Ul ric Arcand, a Catholic priest, before a large congregation, the a ppellant Antonio No sce was sentenced to
from four months of arresto mayor, a s the minimum, two years and four months of prision correccional, as the maximum penalty, with
cos ts .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

The offended party, Reverend Father Ul ric Arcand, was the chaplain of the Ca tholic Youth in the municipality of Lucena, Ta ya bas, a nd had his
res i dence i n said municipality. Some disgruntled residents were working for his tra nsfer to another municipality. On December 3, 1933, Mgr.
Verzosa, the Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Lipa, was on a pastoral vi sit in the municipality of Lucena and, taking adva ntage of his presence there,
thos e who were against the offended party s taged a public demonstration, held a meeting, and even sent a delegation headed by the appellant to
s eek a n audience with the bishop and express their desire to have the offended party tra nsferred to a nother municipality. On the a fternoon of that
da y the bishop administered the sacrament of confirmation in the parish church a nd l ater, while he was leaving the church pre ceded by the priests
i n a ttendance, a mong them the offended party, a nd while he was presenting his pastoral ring to be kissed by the faithful who thronged the
pa ssageway, the appellant a rrived. At that moment the offended party was at the main door of the church l ooking outward and t ryi ng to locate the
ca r tha t wa s to take the bishop to the convent. The a ppellant approached the offended party i n a n attempt to s peak to him but the latter told him
tha t he had no time to talk to him then, whereupon the a ppellant assaulted and struck him in the fa ce wi th his hand. Upon feeling the blow the
offended party ca lled to a policeman for help a nd while the appellant a ttempted to pursue the offended party, one of the pers ons present held a nd
deta ined the former a nd put a n end to the incident. According to the a ppellant, when he tri ed to talk to the offended party, the l atter, who had his
ha nd raised to a bout the level of his head, made gestures of refusal to hear him a nd what he did was to repel the offended pa rty's hand. It was said
offended party's own hand that touched his cheek.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual l aw library

When the offended party wa s thus assaulted, he was i n s urplice which is sworn only during religious ceremonies. The ceremonie s on said occasion
cons isted i n accompanying the bishop from the convent to the altar of the church; then follows the confirmation ceremonies and later the bishop i s
a ccompanied from the altar on his return to the convent. In going to the church as well as on his return to the convent, the bishop is accompanied
by the fa i thful and the priests i n procession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

The court declared that the facts stated constitute the offenses punished in articles 133 a nd 359 of the Revised Penal
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

Arti cl e 133 punishes anyone who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony, s hall perform acts
notori ously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. This court is of th e opinion that the appellant's acts do not constitute this vi olation. This article is
ta ken from article 241 of the Spanish Penal Code which reads as follows:

The penalty of a rresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods s hall be i mposed upon anyone who, in a religious place s hall s candalously perform
a cts not included i n the preceding a rticles, which s hall offend the religious feelings of the people present.

Furthermore, article 240, pa ragraph 1, of the Spanish Penal Code reads as follows:

The penalty of prision correccional in i ts medium and maximum periods and a fine ranging from 250 to 1,500 pesetas shall be imposed
upon:chanrobles vi rtual law library

1. Anyone who, by a cts, words, gestures or threats, shall insult the minister of any religion while in the performance of his functions.

From these two provisions i t may be i nferred that the offense penalized i n the former does not i nclude that punished in the l atter on the ground
tha t both are punished separately. The appellant's acts fall under a rticle 240 a nd, therefore, are not punished i n a rticle 241 of the Spanish Penal
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library

Arti cl e 240 of the Spanish Penal Code was not a dopted i n our Revised Penal Code but i n lieu thereof there is a rticle 359 which reads as follows:

ART. 359. Sl a nder by deed.-The penalty of a rresto mayor i n i ts maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ra nging from
200 to 1,000 pes os shall be i mposed upon any person who s hall perform a ny a ct not i ncluded and punished in th is title, which shall cast dishonor,
di s credit or contempt upon another person. If said a ct is not of a serious nature, the penalty s hall be arresto menor or a fi ne not exceeding 200
pes os.

Thi s court is of the opinion that the act committed by the a ppellant falls under this l egal provision. The offended party i s invested with sacerdotal
di gnity i n his religion and was officiating as s uch priest during s olemn religious ceremonies before a large congregation. Th ere certainly could have
been no other ci rcumstances under which greater dishonor, discredit a nd contempt could be ca st upon him before the faithful over whom he held
s o hi gh a dignity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

Wherefore, by modifying the a ppealed judgment and taking into consideration the s erious nature of the cri me charged, the a ppellant is declared
gui lty i n accordance with article 359 of the Revised Penal Code a nd s entenced to from three months of a rresto mayor, as the m inimum, to one year
a nd one day of prision correccional, as the maximum penalty, with costs. So ordered.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

Street, Vi ckers, Imperial, Butte and Diaz, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. 2919, October 12, 1906 ]
THE UNITED STATES AND ANDRES AVILA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. LUCAS KANLEON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DE CI SI ON
WILLARD, J.:

Whi le a religious procession was passing through the streets of Maasin, i n the Provi nce of Leyte, and several persons were wa lking immediately
behind the band of music which was a part of the procession, the complainant, Pa dre Andres Avi la, who was the parish priest and who was i n charge
of the procession, directed these persons to leave that place and to join in the procession itself. All of them except one le ft the place. Thereupon the
defendant said to a bys tander, "We will see i f I will be ordered to leave there," a nd he went to the place where the former group had been
di s banded. Thereupon the complainant went to him and told him that "that was a reserved place in the procession a nd that i f h e desired to join in
the procession he could go before or i n the middle of the procession, and that for him to remain where he was would be a disturbance of the order
of the procession." The defendant refused to l eave the place a nd thereupon the complainant laid hands upon him. The defendant pushed the
compl ainant away a nd the complainant struck the defendant with a candle. The defendant thereupon s truck the complainant with his fists, causing
s l ight i njuries.

The defendant was prosecuted for the cri me of injurias gra ves, as defined in articles 456 a nd 457 of the Penal Code. He was convicted and
s entenced to one year eight months a nd twenty days of banishment and prohibited from coming within 50 ki lometers of the puebl o of Maasin
duri ng that ti me. He was a lso sentenced to pay a fine of 650 pesetas.

There was considerable testimony in the case as to whether the place in the rear of the,band. was or was not a part of the procession, it being
cl a imed by the defendant that the procession terminated with the band and that i t was the custom of the people to follow the band without joining
the fi les in front of the band of which the procession was made up. We do not find i t necessary to decide this question, beca use we do not think
under a ny ci rcumstances the defendant can be convicted of the cri me of i njurias graves. We have had occasion recently to discuss that offense a nd
i n the case of Pa dre Simeon Oñate vs . Engracio Beltran,[1] No. 2182, we s aid:

"El enjuiciado pudo haber buscado a l querellante en otro sitio que no fuera via publica a pedir las explicaciones que deseaba , pero prefirio hacerlo
en publico en la calle y a l a vi sta del vecindario con i ndudable y maliciosa intencion de a frentar, envilecer y menospreciar al sacerdote Onate como
mi nistro del culto de la mayoria de l os vecinos de Nabua."

In the present case, while it a ppears that the defendant went where he did for the purpose of seeing what the priest would do, we do not think that
i t a ppears that he had a ny i ntention of committing a physical assault upon the complainant. If he had no such i ntention, then the offense of injurias
gra ves was not committed. Every s treet fi ght i n which two persons engage can not constitute that offense. There must be evide nce that the
defendant intended to engage i n the fight for the purpose of insulting and bringing his opponent into contempt i n the eyes of the public. (Judgments
of the s upreme court of Spain of the 12th of July, 1878, a nd the 31s t of May, 1892.)

The judgment of the court below is reversed and the defendant is a cquitted, with the costs of both instances de oficio. A fter the expiration of ten
da ys from the date of final judgment let the ca use be remanded to the Court of First Instance for proper procedure. So ordere d.

Arel lano, C. J., Torres , Mapa, Johnson, Ca rson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1219 February 25, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. SIXTO VELEZ, Defendant-Appellee.

R E S O L U T I O N cha nrobles vi rtual law library

FERIA, J.:

Thi s is a motion filed by the Solicitor General with this Court to dismiss the appeal, i nterposed by the a ttorney for the offended party, from the order
of the Court of Fi rst Instance of Mi samis Occi dental that dismissed the i nformation a gainst the accused , upon motion of the l atter's counsel, on the
ground that supposed libelious document is a privilege communication. The provincial fiscal did not oppose to the motion for dismissal filed by the
defendant in the Court of First Instance, because he was a lso of the opinion that the letter which was the s ubject matter of the case was a privilege
communication.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles vi rtual law library

It i s true that the offended party or hi s attorney may commence a cri minal action and file the proper complaint, but according to section 15, Rule
106, of the Rules of Court, he may i ntervene in the prosecution of the cri minal a ction s o commenced only i f he has not waived the civil a ction or
expressly reserved the right to i nstitute it, s ubject a lways to the direction and control of the fiscal under s ection 4 of the same Rule 106. Said s ection
15 of Rul e 106 provi des as follows:

SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party i n cri minal a ction. - Unless the offended party has waived the ci vil a ction or expressly reserved the right
to i ns titute it a fter the termination of the cri minal case, a nd s ubject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he ma y interve ne, personally or by
a ttorney, in the prosecution of the offense.

It a ppearing from the record that there was a pending civil action arising out of the same alleged libelous document, filed by the offended party
a ga inst the same defendant (p. 28, Record), the offended party has no right to i ntervene i n the prosecution of this case, a nd consequently ca n not
a ppeal from the order of the court dismissing the i nformation. The reason of the law i n not permitting the offended party to i ntervene i n the
pros ecution of a cri minal ca se if he has waived his ri ght to institute a civil a ction a rising from the criminal act, or has reserved or, a fortiori, already
i ns tituted the said ci vil action, is that he has no special interest i n the prosecution of the cri minal action.chanroblesvi rt ualawlibrary chanrobles
vi rtua l law library

Bes ides, even i f the offended party ha s not instituted a s eparate civil a ction nor reserved his right to do so, a nd has intervened in the prosecution of
the cri minal a ction, as his intervention is subject to the direction and control of the fiscal, that is, the provincial fisca l or the Solicitor General, the
l a tter in the exercise of his a uthority to control the prosecution has the ri ght to move for the dismissal of the a ppeal inte rposed by the offended
pa rty, i f s uch dismissal would not affect the ri ght of the offended party to ci vil i ndemnity. And in the present case the dismissal of the information or
the cri minal a ction does a ffect the ri ght of the offended party to i nstitute or continue the civil a ction already i nstituted arising from the offense,
beca use such dismissal of extinction of the p enal action does not ca rry with it the extinction of the ci vil one under section 1 (d) Rule 107, Rules of
Court, whi ch reads as follows:

(d) Exti nction of the penal a ction does not carry wi th it extinction of the ci vil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration i n a final judgment
tha t the fact from which the civil might a rise did not exist. In the other ca ses, the person entitled to the ci vil a ction may i nstitute i t in the jurisdiction
a nd i n the manner provided by l aw against the person who may b e liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or i ndemnity for the damages
s uffered;

In vi ew of the foregoing, the a ppeal interposed by the offended party i s dismissed, with costs against the appellant.chanrobl esvirtualawlibrary
cha nrobles vi rtual law l ibrary

Mora n, Bengzon, C.J., Pa ra s, Pablo, Hilado, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28882 May 31, 1971
TIME, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, ELISEO S. ZARI, as Deputy Clerk of Court, Branch VI, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Peti ti on for certiorari a nd prohibition, with preliminary i njunction, to a nnul certain orders of the respondent Court of Firs t Instance of Rizal, issued in
i ts Ci vil Ca se No. 10403, entitled "Antonio J. Vi llegas and Juan Ponce Enrile vs . Time, Inc., and Time-Life International, Publisher of 'Time' Ma gazine
(As i a Edition)", a nd to prohibit the said court from further proceeding with the said ci vil case.

Upon petitioner's posting a bond of P1,000.00, thi s Court, as prayed for, ordered, on 15 Apri l 1968, the issuance of a wri t of preliminary i njunction.

The petition a lleges that petitioner Time, Inc.,1 is an American corporation with principal offices at Rocketfeller Center, N ew York City, N. Y., a nd is
the publisher of "Time", a weekly news ma gazine; the petition, however, does not allege the petitioner's l egal capacity to s u e in the courts of the
Phi l ippine.2

In the a foresaid Ci vil Ca se No. 10403, therein plaintiffs (herein respondents) Antonio J. Vi llegas and Juan Ponce Enrile seek to recover from the
herein petitioner damages upon a n alleged libel a rising from a publication of Time (Asia Edition) magazine, i n i ts issue of 1 8 August 1967, of a n
es say, entitled "Corruption i n Asia", which, i n part, reads, as follows:

The problem of Ma nila's mayor, ANTONIO VILLEGAS, is a case in point. When i t was discovered last year that the mayor's coffer s contained far more
pes os than seemed reasonable i n the light of his i ncome, an investigation was launched. Wi tnesses who had helped him out under curious
ci rcums tance were asked to explain in court. One government official a dmitted lending Villegas P30,000 pesos ($7,700) wi thout interest because he
wa s the mayor's compadre. An assistant declared he had given Villegas loans without collateral because he regarded the boss as my own son. A
wea lthy Ma nila businessman testified that he had lent Villegas' wife 15,000 pesos because the mayor was l ike a brother to me. With that, Villegas
denounced the investigation a s an i nvasion of his family's privacy. The case was dismissed on a technicality, a nd Villegas is s till mayor.3

More s pecifically, the plaintiffs' complaint alleges, i nter a lia that:

(4) Defendants, conspiring and confederating, published a libelous a rticle, publicly, fa lsely a nd maliciously i mputing to Pla intiffs the commission of
the cri mes of graft, corruption and nepotism; that said publication particularly referred to Pl aintiff Ma yor Antonio J. Vi llegas as a case i n point i n
connection wi th graft, corruption a nd nepotism i n Asia; that said publication without a ny doubt referred to co -plaintiff Juan Ponce Enrile as the high
government official who helped under curious circumstances Plaintiff Ma yor Antonio J. Vi llegas i n l ending the latter a pproximately P30,000.00
($7,700.00) wi thout interest because he was the Ma yor's compadre; that the purpose of said Publications is to ca use the dishonor, discredit and put
i n public contempt the Plaintiffs, particularly Pl aintiff Mayor Antonio J. Vi llegas.

On moti on of the respondents-plaintiffs, the respondent judge, on 25 November 1967, gra nted them l eave to take the depositions "of Mr. Anthony
Gonzales, Time-Life i nternational", and "Mr. Cesar B. Enri quez, Muller & Phi pps (Ma nila) Ltd.", in connection with the a ctivi ties a nd operations i n the
Phi l ippines of the petitioner, a nd, on 27 November 1967, i ssued a writ of attachment on the real and personal estate of Time, Inc.

Peti ti oner received the summons a nd a copy of the complaint at i ts offices i n New York on 13 December 1967 a nd, on 27 December 1967, i t filed a
moti on to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, relyi ng upon the provisions of Republic Act 4363 . Pri va te respondents
opposed the motion.

In a n order dated 26 February 1968, res pondent court deferred the determination of the motion to dismiss until a fter tri al of the ca se on the merits,
the court ha ving considered that the grounds relied upon i n the motion do not appear to be i ndubitable.

Peti ti oner moved for reconsideration of the deferment private respondents again opposed.

On 30 Ma rch 1968, res pondent judge i ssued an order re -affirming the previ ous order of deferment for the reason that "the rule laid down under
Republic Act. No. 4363, a mending Arti cle 360 of the Revised Penal Code, is not a pplicable to actions against non-resident defendants, and because
questions i nvolving harassment and inconvenience, as well as disruption of public servi ce do not a ppear i ndubitable. ..."

Fa i ling i n i ts efforts to discontinue the ta king of the depositions, previously a dverted to, a nd to have action taken, before tri al, on its motion to
di s miss, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

The orders for the ta king of the said depositions, for deferring determination of the motion to dismiss, and for reaffirming the de ferment, and the
wri t of a tta chment are s ought to be annulled in the petition..

There is no dispute that at the ti me of the publication of the allegedly offending essay, private respondents Antonio Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile
were the Mayor Of the Ci ty of Ma nila a nd Undersecretary of Finance and concurrently Acti ng Commissioner of Customs, respectively, with offices in
the Ci ty of Ma nila. The issues i n this case are:

1. Whether or not, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal has jurisdic tion to ta ke cognizance
of the ci vil s uit for damages a rising from an a llegedly l ibelous publication, considering that the a ction was i nstituted by public officers whose offices
were i n the City of Ma nila at the ti me of the publication; if it has no jurisdiction, whether or not its erroneous assumption of jurisdiction may be
cha l lenged by a foreign corporation by writ of certiorari or prohibition; a nd

2. Whether or not Republic Act 4363 i s applicable to a ction a gainst a foreign corporation or non-resident defendant.

Provi s ions of Republic Act No. 4363, whi ch a re relevant to the resolution of the foregoing issues, read, as follows:
Secti on 1. Arti cle three hundred sixty of the Revised Penal Code, as a mended by Republic Act Numbered Twelve hundred and eighty-nine, is further
a mended to read as follows:

'ART. 360. Pers ons responsible. — Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or ca use the publication or exhibition of a ny defamation in wri ting or by
s i milar means, shall be responsible for the s ame.

The a uthor or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
res ponsible for the defamations contained therein to the extent as i f he were the author thereof.

The cri minal and ci vil action for damages in cases of wri tten defamations as provi ded for i n this chapter, s hall be filed simultaneously or s eparately
wi th the court of first i nstance of the province or ci ty where the l ibelous a rticle is printed and first published or where a ny of the offended parties
a ctua lly resides a t the time of the commission of the offense; Provi ded, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose
offi ce i s in the Ci ty of Ma nila at the ti me of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed i n the Court of First Instance of the Ci ty of Manila
or of the ci ty or provi nce where the l ibelous article is printed and first published, a nd i n ca se s uch public officer does no t hold office i n the Ci ty of
Ma ni la, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or ci ty where he held office at the ti me of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous a rticle i s printed a nd first published and in case one of the offended parties i s a private i ndividual, the a ction s hall be
fi l ed i n the Court of First Instance of the province or ci ty where he a ctually resides a t the time of the commission of the offense or where the
l i belous matter is printed and first published; Provi ded, further, That the civil a ction s hall be filed i n the same court whe re the cri minal a ction is filed
a nd vi ce versa; Provi ded, furthermore, That the court where the cri minal action or ci vil action for damages is first filed, s hall a cquire jurisdiction to
the excl usion of other courts; And provided finally, Tha t this a mendment shall not apply to ca ses of written defamations, the ci vil and/or cri minal
a cti ons which have been filed i n court at the ti me of the effectivity of the law

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Thi s Act s hall ta ke effect only i f a nd when, within thirty da ys from i ts approval, the newspapermen in the Philippines s hall organize, and elect
the members of, a Philippine Press Council, a private a gency of the said newspapermen, whose function shall be to promulgate a Code of Ethics for
them a nd the Philippine press investigate vi olations thereof, and censure a ny newspaperman or newspaper guilty of a ny vi olation of the said Code,
a nd the fa ct that s uch Philippine Press Council has been organized a nd i ts members have been duly elected i n a ccordance herewith s hall be
a s certained and proclaimed by the President of the Philippines.

Under the fi rst proviso i n section 1, the venue of a civil a ction for damages i n cases of written defamations is l ocalized upon the basis of, first,
whether the offended party or pl aintiff is a public officer or a private individual; a nd s econd, if he is a public officer, whether his office is i n Manila or
not i n Ma nila, at the ti me of the commission of the offense. If the offended party i s a public officer i n the office i n the Ci ty of Ma nila, the proviso
l i mits him to two (2) choices of venue, namely, i n the Court of First instance of the Ci ty of Ma nila or in the city or provi nce where the libelous article
i s printed and first published ..."

The complaint lodged in the court of Rizal by respondents does not allege that the libelous article was printed a nd fi rst published in the province of
Ri za l and, since the respondents-plaintiffs a re public officers with offices i n Ma nila at the ti me of the commission of the a lleged offense, it is clear
tha t the only place l eft for them wherein to file their a ction, is the Court of First Instance of Ma nila.

The l imitation of the choices of venue, as i ntroduced i nto the Penal Code through its amendments by Republic Act 4363, wa s in tended "to minimize
or l i mit the filing of out-of-town l ibel suits" to protect a n alleged offender from "hardships, i nconveniences a nd harassments" and, furthermore, to
protect "the interest of the public s ervice" where one of the offended parties i s a public officer."4 The i ntent, of the law is cl ear: a l ibeled public
offi cial might sue i n the court of the locality where he holds office, i n order that the prosecution of the a ction s hould int erfere a s little as possible
wi th the discharge of his official duties and labors. The only a lternative a llowed him by l aw is to prosecute those responsible for the libel i n the place
where the offending article was printed a nd first published. Here, the law tolerates the i nterference with the libeled office r's duties only for the sake
of a voi ding unnecessary harassment of the a ccused. Since the offending publication was not printed i n the Philippines, the alternative venue was
not open to respondent Ma yor Villegas of Manila a nd Undersecretary of Finance Enrile, who were the offended parties.

But res pondents-plaintiffs argue that Republic Act No. 4363 i s not a pplicable where the action i s against non-existent defendant, as petitioner Time,
Inc., for s everal reasons. They urge that, i n enacting Republic Act No. 4363, Congress did not i ntend to protect non-resident defendants as s hown by
Secti on 3, which provides for the effectivity of the s tatute only i f and when the "newspapermen in the Philippines" have orga nized a "Philippine
Pres s Council" whose function s hall be to promulgate a Code of Ethics for "them" a nd "the Phi lippine press"; a nd since a non-resident defendant is
not i n a position to comply with the conditions i mposed for the effectivity of the s tatute, such defendant may not invoke its provisions; that a
forei gn corporation is not inconvenienced by a n out-of-town l ibel suit; that i t would be absurd and i ncongruous, i n the absence of a n extradition
trea ty, for the l aw to give to public officers with office in Ma nila the second option of filing a criminal case in the court of the place where the
l i belous article is printed and first published i f the defendant is a foreign corporation a nd that, under the "single publication" rule which o riginated in
the Uni ted States and imported i nto the Philippines, the rule was understood to mean that publications in a nother stat e a re not covered by venue
s ta tutes of the forum.

The i mplication of respondents' a rgument is that the law would not ta ke effect as to non-resident defendants or a ccused. We s ee nothing i n the text
of the l aw that would sustain such unequal protection to s ome of those who ma y be charged with l ibel. The official proclamation that a Philippine
Pres s Council has been organized is made a pre-condition to the effectivity of the entire Republic Act No. 4363, a nd no terms a re employed therein
to i ndicate that the law can or will be effective only as to s ome, but not a ll, of those that may be charged with libeling our public officers.

The a ssertion that a foreign corporation or a non-resident defendant is not inconvenienced by a n out-of-town suit is i rrelevant a nd untenable, for
venue and jurisdiction a re not dependent upon convenience or inconvenience to a party; a nd moreover, venue was fi xed under Re public Act No.
4363, purs uant to the basic policy of the l aw that is, as previously s tated, to protect the i nterest of the public servi ce when the offended party is a
public officer, by minimizing as much a s possible a ny i nterference with the discharge of his duties.

Tha t respondents-plaintiffs could not file a cri minal case for l ibel against a non-resident defendant does not make Republic Act No. 4363
i ncongruous of absurd, for s uch i nability to fi le a cri minal case a gainst a non-resident natural person equally exists i n cri mes other than libel. It i s a
fundamental rule of i nternational jurisdiction that no state can by i ts laws, and no court which is only a creature of the state, can by i ts judgments or
decrees, directly bind or affect property or persons beyond the limits of the s tate.5 Not only this, but if the accused is a corporation, no cri minal
a cti on ca n lie a gainst it,6 whether s uch corporation or resident or non-resident. At a ny ra te, the case filed by respondents-plaintiffs is case for
da mages.
50 Am. Jur. 2d 659 di fferentiates the "multiple publication" and "single publication" rules (invoked by priva te res pondents) to be as follows:

The common law as to ca uses of action for tort a rising out of a single publication was to the effect that each communication of written or printed
ma tter was a distinct a nd s eparate publication of a l ibel contained therein, gi ving rise to a separate cause of a ction. This rule ('multiple publication'
rul e) is still followed i n several American jurisdictions, a nd seems to be favored by the American La w Institute. Other juris dictions have a dopted the
's i ngle publication' rule which originated i n New York, under which a ny s ingle i ntegrated publication, s uch a s one edition of a newspaper, book, or
ma ga zine, or one broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving ri se to only one cause of action, regardless of the number of ti mes i t is exposed to different
people. ...

Thes e rules a re not pertinent in the present scheme because the number of ca uses of a ction that may be a vailable to the respo ndents-plaintiffs is
not here in issue. We a re here confronted by a specific venue statute, conferring jurisdiction in ca ses of libel a gainst Public officials to s pecified
courts , a nd no other. The rule i s that where a statute creates a ri ght and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy i s exclusive; a nd where
i t confers jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive, unless otherwise provided. Hence, the venue provisions of
Republic Act No. 4363 s hould be deemed mandatory for the party bri nging the a ction, unless the question of venue should be wa ived by the
defendant, which was not the ca se here. Only thus ca n the policy of the Act be upheld a nd maintained. Nor is there a ny reason why the
i na pplicability of one alternative venue s hould result i n rendering the other alternative, also inapplicable.

The di smissal of the present petition is asked o n the ground that the petitioner foreign corporation failed to allege its ca pacity to s ue in the courts of
the Phi lippines. Respondents rely on section 69 of the Corporation law, which provides:

SEC. 69. No forei gn corporation or corporations formed, organized, or existing under a ny l aws other than those of the Philippines s hall be permitted
to ... ma i ntain by i tself or a ssignee any s uit for the recovery of a ny debt, claim, or demand whatever, unless i t shall have the license prescribed i n the
s ecti on i mmediately preceding. ..." ...;

They a lso invoke the ruling i n Ma rshall-Wells Co. vs . Elser & Co., Inc.7 tha t no foreign corporation may be permitted to maintain any s uit i n the local
courts unless i t shall have the license required by the law, and the ruling in Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., Inc. vs . Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc.8 that "where
... the l aw denies to a foreign corporation the ri ght to maintain suit unless it has previously complied with a certain requi rement, then such
compl iance or the fact that the s uing corporation is exempt therefrom, becomes a necessary a verment in the complaint." We fail to see how these
doctri nes can be a propos in the case at bar, since the petitioner is not "maintaining a ny s uit" but is merely defending one a gainst itself; i t did not file
a ny complaint but only a corollary defensive petition to prohibit the lower court from further proceeding with a s uit that i t had no jurisdiction to
entertain.

Peti ti oner's failure to a ver i ts l egal capacity to i nstitute the present petition is not fatal, for ...

A forei gn corporation may, by wri t of prohibition, seek relief against the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction. And a foreign corporation seeking a
wri t of prohibition a gainst further maintenance of a suit, on the ground of want of jurisdiction in which jurisdiction is not bound by the ruling of the
court i n which the s uit was brought, on a motion to quash service of summons, that i t has jurisdiction.9

It i s also a dvanced that the present petition is premature, s ince respondent court has not definitely ruled on the motion to dismiss, nor held that i t
ha s jurisdiction, but only a rgument is untenable. The motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent court's lack of juri sdiction to entertain the
a cti on; a nd the rulings of this Court a re that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may i ssue in case of a denial or deferment of a ction on s uch a
moti on to dismiss for l ack of jurisdiction.

If the question of jurisdiction were not the main ground for this petition for review by certiorari, i t would be premature because i t seeks to have a
revi ew of an i nterlocutory order. But as i t would be useless and futile to go ahead with the proceedings i f the court below had no jurisdiction this
peti tion was given due course.' (San Beda vs. CIR, 51 O.G. 5636, 5638).

'Whi le i t is true that action on a motion to dismiss may be deferred until the trial and an order to that effect is i nterlocu tory, s till where i t clearly
a ppears that the trial judge or court i s proceeding i n excess or outside of its jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since it would be
us eless a nd a waste of ti me to go ahead with the proceedings. (Philippine International Fair, Inc., et al. vs . Ibañez, et al. , 50 Off. Ga z. 1036; Enri que v.
Ma ca daeg, et al., 47 Off. Ga z. 1207; s ee also San Beda College vs . CIR, 51 Off. Ga z. 5636.)' (University of Sto. Tomas v. Vi llanueva, L-13748, 30
October 1959.).

Si milarly, i n Edward J. Nell Co. vs . Cubacub, L-20843, 23 June 1965, 14 SCRA 419, thi s Court held:

'.......................................................... It i s a settledrule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter is determined by the allegations in the
compl aint; a nd when a motion to dismiss is filed for lack of jurisdiction those allegations a re deemed admitted for purposes of s uch motion, so that
i t ma y be resolved without waiting for the tri al. Thus i t has been held that the consideration thereof may not be postponed i n the hope that the
evi dence may yi eld other qualifying or concurring data which would bring the case under the court's jurisdiction.'

To the s ame effect are the rulings in: Ruperto vs . Fernando, 83 Phil. 943; Admi nistrator of Hacienda Luisita Estate vs . Alber to, L-12133, 21 October
1958.

Summi ng up, We hold:

(1) The under Arti cle 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as a mended by Republic Act No. 4363, a cti ons for damages by public officials for l ibelous
publications a gainst them can only be filed i n the courts of first i nstance ofthe city or provi nce where the offended functionary held office a t the
ti me ofthe commission of the offense, i n case the libelous article was first printed or published outside the Philippines.

(2) Tha t the action of a court in refusing to rule, or deferring its ruling, on a motion to dismiss for l ack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or for
i mproper venue, is i n excess of jurisdiction a nd correctable by wri t of prohibition or certiorari s ued out in the appellate Court, even before tri al on
the meri ts is had.

WHEREFORE, the wri ts a pplied for are granted: the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal is declared wi thout jurisdiction to take cognizance of
i ts Ci vil Ca se No. 10403; a nd i ts orders issued i n connection therewith are hereby a nnulled and set aside,. Respondent court i s further commanded
to des ist from further proceedings in Ci vil case No. 10403 a foresaid. Costs a gainst private respondents, Antonio J. Villegas a nd Juan Ponce Enrile.

The wri t of preliminary i njunction heretofore issued by this Supreme Court is made permanent.
Concepcion, C.J., Di zon, Ma kalintal, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor a nd concur.

Ca s tro, J., took no part.