RULE 77 - Allowance of Will Proved
Outside of Philippines and Administration
of Estate Thereunder
1.)DE ARANZ v. GALING
161 SCRA 628 (1988)
FACTS:
 Private respondent Joaquin R-Infante filed
with the RTC of Pasig, a petition for the
probate and allowance of the last will and
testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante
y G-Pola. The petition specified the names
and addresses of herein petitioners as
legatees and devisees.
 The probate court issued an order setting
the petition for hearing on 5 May 1986 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was
published in the "Nueva Era," a newspaper
of general circulation in Metro Manila once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On
the date of the hearing, no oppositor
appeared. The hearing was then reset to 12
May 1986, on which date, the probate court
ordered the private respondent to present
his evidence ex-parte.
Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of 12 May 1986
alleging that, as named legatees, no notices
were sent to them as required by Sec. 4,
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they
prayed that they be given a period of ten
(10) days within which to file their
opposition to the probate of the will.
 The MR was denied.
ISSUE:
 Is personal notice of probate proceedings to
the known legatees and devisees a
jurisdictional requirement in the probate of
a will?
HELD & RATIO:
 YES. It is clear from Section 4, Rule 76 of
the Rules of Court that notice of the time
and place of the hearing for the allowance
of a will shall be forwarded to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees,
and devisees residing in the Philippines at
their places of residence, if such places of
residence be known. There is no question
that the residences of herein petitioners
legatees and devisees were known to the
probate court. The petition for the
allowance of the will itself indicated the
names and addresses of the legatees and
devisees of the testator. But despite such
knowledge, the probate court did not cause
copies of the notice to be sent to
petitioners. The requirement of the law for
the allowance of the will was not satisfied
by mere publication of the notice of hearing
for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
2.) MANINANG VS CA
FACTS:
 Clemencia Aseneta died at the Manila
Sanitarium. She left a holographic will – all
her realproperties and personal properties
shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad
Maninang.
 Petitioner Soledad filed a petition for
probate of the will of the decedent.
 Aseneta who as the adopted son, claims to
be the sole heir of the decedent. He filed a
motionto dismiss the testate case on the
ground that the holographic will was null
and void becausehe, as the only compulsory
heir, was preterited and therefore, intestacy
should ensue.
 In her Opposition to said Motion to
Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it
is still the rulethat in a case for probate of a
Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited
to an examination of and resolution on the
extrinsic validity of the will; and that
respondent Bernardo waseffectively
disinherited by the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in
dismissing the testate proceedings.
HELD:
NO. The law enjoins the probate of the Will
and public policy requires it, because unless the
Will is probated and notice thereof given to the
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of
his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into
its intrinsic validity.
“The authentication of a will decides no
other question than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with
those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the
validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these
may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The
que0stions relating to these points remain
entirely unaffected and may be raised even after
the will has been authenticated.”
As a general rule, in a probate case, only
the extrinsic validity of the will should be
examined. The exception is where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity
of the will be passed upon, before it is probated.
"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or
legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
entertained in Probate proceeding because its
only purpose is merely to determine if the will
has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law."
3.) RODELAS VS. ARANZA
DOCTRINE: A photocopy of the lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
can be determined by the probate court with the
standard writings of the testator.
FACTS:
Appellant Marcela Rodelas filed a petition
for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo
B. Bonilla presenting to the court a photostatic
copy of said will as the original of the will was
lost. But appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, et al.
opposed the petition asserting that it should be
the holographic will itself that must be produced
in court and not an alleged copy thereof. They
anchored their opposition in the case of Gam v.
Yap which declared that an alleged copy of the
holographic will, produces no legal effect.
The court rendered judgment in favor of
appellees, Aranza, et al. and against appellant
Rodelas. Appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not a photostatic copy or xerox
copy of the holographic will of deceased
Ricardo B. Bonilla can be allowed for
probate.
RULING:
Yes, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of a
holographic of deceased Ricardo B. Bonilla may
be allowed for probate.
Article 811 of the Civil Code states that
probate of holographic wills is the allowance of
the will by the court after its due execution had
been proved. If the holographic will has been lost
or destroyed and no other copy is available, the
will cannot be probated. Because the handwriting
of the testator in the said will is regarded as the
“best and only evidence.” It is, therefore,
necessary that there be a comparison between
sample handwritten statements of the testator
and the handwritten will.

In the case of Gam v. Yap, it was held that

the will itself must be presented, otherwise, it will
produce no effect. The law regards the document
itself as material proof of authenticity. But a
footnote of said decision provides that “perhaps
it may be proved by a photographic or
photostatic copy, even a mimeographed or
carbon copy, or by other similar means whereby
the authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased may be exhibited and tested before the
probate court”. Hence, a photostatic copy or 5.) BALTAZAR vs. LAXA | G.R. No. 174489
xerox copy of the holographic will may be April 11, 2012
allowed because comparison can be made with
the standard writings of the testator.
FACTS:
Therefore, in the instant case, the  Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she
photostatic copy of the holographic will of the made her last will and testament in the
deceased Ricardo B. Bonilla which was presented Pampango dialect, executed in the house of
by appellant Marcela Rodelas may be admitted retired Judge Limpin.
for probate because the authenticity of the  Childless and without any brothers or sisters,
deceased’s handwriting can be determined by the Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
probate court. respondent Lorenzo.
 After the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a
4.) GAN V YAP petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga
for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and
 for the issuance of Letters of Administration
in his favor.
 There being no opposition to the petition
after its due publication, the RTC issued an
Order on June 13, 2000 allowing Lorenzo to
present evidence.
 On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she
was one of the instrumental witnesses in the
execution of the last will and testament of
Paciencia.
 Questioned by the prosecutor regarding
Judge Limpin’s present mental fitness, Dra.
Limpin testified that her father had a stroke
in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery.
 The judge can walk but can no longer talk and
remember her name. Because of this, Dra.
Limpin stated that her father can no longer
testify in court.
 June 23, 2000: petitioner Antonio Baltazar
(Antonio) filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s
petition and opposed the issuance of Letters
of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor. They
also prayed that Letters of Administration be
instead issued in favor of Antonio.
 September 26, 2000: petitioners filed an
Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny
the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the
following grounds: the Will was not executed
and attested to in accordance with the
requirements of the law;
 January 29, 2001: RTC issued an Order
denying the requests of both Lorenzo and
Antonio to be appointed administrator since
the former is a citizen and resident of the USA
while the latter’s claim as a co-owner of the
properties subject of the Will has not yet been
established.
 Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico
Mercado (Monico) also took the witness
stand. Monico, son of Faustino, another
witness to the will, testified on his father’s
condition. According to him his father can no
longer talk and express himself due to brain
damage. A medical certificate was presented
to the court to support this allegation. 
 Petitioners dispute the authenticity of
Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section 11
of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not
complied with.
ISSUE:
Whether the authenticity and due execution of
the notarial Will was sufficiently established to
warrant its allowance for probate. – YES.
RULING:
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or
accounted for where will contested. – If the will
is contested, all the subscribing witnesses,
and the notary in the case of wills executed
under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present
in the Philippines and not insane, must be
produced and examined, and the death, absence,
or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily
shown to the court. If all or some of such
witnesses are present in the Philippines but
outside the province where the will has been
filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or
all of them testify against the due execution of
the will, or do not remember having attested to
it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the
will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is
satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses
and from all the evidence presented that the will
was executed and attested in the manner
required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall
be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who
know the handwriting of the testator explicitly
declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any
competent witnesses, and if the court deem it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the
notary public should have been presented in
court since all but one witness, Francisco, are still
living.
It is an established rule that "[a] testament may
not be disallowed just because the attesting
witnesses declare against its due execution;
neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just
because all the attesting witnesses declare in
favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that
the court is convinced by evidence before it, not
necessarily from the attesting witnesses,
although they must testify, that the will was or
was not duly executed in the manner required by
law."
Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x
x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards
the authenticity and due execution of the will x x
x in question, it is the mandate of the law that it
is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence
that] ought to be before it that is controlling."
"The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima
facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has
willed that [her] estate be distributed in the
manner therein provided, and it is incumbent
upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire
be given full effect independent of the attitude of
the parties affected thereby."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

6.) PALAGANAS V. PALAGANAS

FACTS:
Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who
became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen,
died single and childless. In the last will and
testament she executed in California, she
designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas
(Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had
left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto),
another brother of Ruperta, 􏰅led with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
a petition for the probate of Ruperta's will and
for his appointment as special administrator of
her estate.
Petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel)
and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin),
nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the
ground that Ruperta's will should not be
probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where
she executed it.
Respondent Ernesto filled a motion with the RTC
for leave to take their deposition, which it
granted.
RTC issued an order admitting to probate
Ruperta's last will; (b) appointing respondent
Ernesto as special administrator at the request of
Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the
will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special
Administration to Ernesto.
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that an
unprobated will executed by an American citizen
in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time
in the Philippines. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner
abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and
allowed in the country where it was executed?
HELD:
YES. In insisting that Ruperta's will should have
been first probated and allowed by the court of
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin
obviously have in mind the procedure for
thereprobate of will before admitting it here. But,
reprobate or re- authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is
different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent
court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule
77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners'
stance, since this latter rule applies only to
reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to
the present case. In reprobate, the local court
acknowledges as binding the findings of the
foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction
over the matter can be established. caTIDE

Besides, petitioners' stand is fraught with

impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have
the means to go abroad for the probate of the
will, it is as good as depriving them outright of
their inheritance, since our law requires that no
will shall pass either real or personal property
unless the will has been proved and allowed by
the proper court.
7.) In the Matter of the Testate Estate of
Basil Gordon Butler, Mercedes Leon,
petitioner-appellant and Ada Loggey
Ghezzi, administratrix-appellant, versus
Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co., thru
Philippine Branch, oppositor-appellee.

G. R. No. L-3677, November 29, 1951

Facts:

 A motion to render an accounting was filed

by the administratrix in the proceedings for
the testate estate of Basil Gordon
 Said motion was denied by the court on the
ground that the funds came into the
possession of the Manufacturers Life
 Insurance Co., Inc. regularly and in due
course and therefore no justifiable ground
to require said company to render an
accounting thereon
 Basil Gordon Butler is a former resident of
the Philippines who died in Brooklyn, New
York City in 1945, leaving a will which was
duly probated in the Surrogate’s Court of
New York County on August 3 of the same
year
 James Ross Sr., James Madison Ross, Jr
and Ewald Selph were named executors
and as the estate having been settled, the
proceedings were closed on July 17, 1947.
 James Madison was appointed as trustee,
and as trustee, he bought an annuity from
the Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co at its
head office in Toronto, Canada paying in
advance the combined premiums.
 The contract also stipulates to pay $57.60
to Mercedez Benz during her lifetime and
beginning May 27, 1948, Mercedes has
been receiving monthly allowance through
the insurance company in Manila
 In her desire to get hold at once of the
entire amount invested in annuity,
Mercedes de Leon then presented Butler’s
will for probate in the Court of First
Instance in Manila on September 4, 1948.
 Mercedes secured the appointment of
Ghezzi as administratrix and after having
been qualified thereto, Ghezzi filed the
motion for accounting which the court
denied.
 Hence, the instant appeal.
Issue:
Whether the provisions in the will of Butler
with respect to the annuity of Mercedes can be
respected/recognized by the probate court in the
Philippines. - NO
Held:
 Appealed order was affirmed.
 The administration of Butler’s estate
granted in New York as the principal or
domiciliary administration while the
administration taken out in the Philippines
is ancillary.
 However, the distinction serves only to
distinguish one administration from the
other, for the two proceedings are separate
and independent.
 The important thing to inquire into is the
Manila court’s authority with respect to
assets herein involved.
 The general rule universally recognized is
that administration extends only to the
assets of a decedent found within the state
or country where it was granted, so that the
administrator appointed in one state or
country has no power over property in
another state or country.
 It is manifests from the facts that the funds
in question are outside the jurisdiction of
the probate court of Manila. Having been
invested in an annuity in Canada under a
contract executed in that country, Canada
is the situs of the money.
 The party whose appearance seeks is only a
branch or agency of the company which
holds the funds in its possession, the
agency’s intervention being limited to
delivering to the annuitant the checks made
out and issued from the home office.
 There is no showing or allegation that the
funds have been transferred or removed to
the Manila branch.
 Even if the money were in the hands of the
Manila branch, yet it no longer forms apart
of Butler’s estate and is beyond the control
of the court.
 The company’s assumed obligation, which
it had been religiously performing, of
paying periodical allowances to the
annuitant, the proceeds of the sale cannot
be withdrawn without the consent of the
company, except, upon the death of the
annuitant, the residuary legatee may claim
the remainder.
 Neither the domiciliary or ancillary
executor of Butler’s will, nor the trustee,
nor the annuitant has disposition of any of
these funds beyond the amounts.
 The administratrix is a complete stranger
to the subject motion, there being no
creditor.
 Mercedez desire to get the lump sum is
contrary to the desire of the testator.
8.) SUNTAY V SUNTAY
9.) VDA DE PEREZ V. TOLETE
(Warning. Medyo magulo ang facts. Please refer
to the full text if necessary.)
FACTS: Spouses Dr. Jose and Evelyn Cunanan,
who became American citizens, executed their
last will and testament in New York. It contained
provisions on presumption of survivorship (in
the event that it is not known which one of the
spouses died first, the testator shall be presumed
to have predeceased the other spouse). Later, Dr.
Cunanan’s entire family perished by fire that
gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of
the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the
probate thereof with the Surrogate Court in New
York. These two wills were admitted to probate
and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
Salud Teodoro Perez (Petitioner), mother of Dr.
Evelyn Cunanan, filed with RTC Bulacan a
petition for the reprobate of the two bills
ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York.
She also asked that she be appointed the special
administratrix of the estate. RTC granted the
petition. However, Cunanan heirs sought the
nullification of the appointment of petitioner as
special administratrix of the estates contending
that Petitioner is not the sole heir and that the
formalities of New York law should govern.
The RTC issued an Order disallowing the
reprobate of the two wills. It reasoned out that
petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on
the allowance of wills. In the absence of such
evidence, it is presumed that the law of
succession of the foreign country is the same as
the law of the Philippines. However, RTC noted
that there were only two witnesses to the wills of
the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law
requires three witnesses and that the wills were
not signed on each and every page, a requirement
of the Philippine law.
For the Petitioner, she contended that she was
the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the
two wills were in accordance with New York law.
But before she could present evidence to prove
the law of New York, the reprobate court already
issued an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE: W/N the reprobate of the separate wills
should be allowed.
HELD: Yes. Provided that the Rules on Court on
the allowance of wills of non-resident aliens be
followed.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who
were American citizens, will only be effective in
this country upon compliance with Art. 816 of the
Civil Code which provides that: The will of an
alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he
resides, or according to the formalities observed
in his country, or in conformity with those which
this Code prescribes. Thus, proof that both wills
conform with the formalities prescribed by New
York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or
allowance of wills which have been probated
outside of the Philippines are as follows:
(1) the due execution of the will in accordance
with the foreign laws;
(2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines;
(3) the will has been admitted to probate in such
country;
(4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate
court, and
(5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure
and allowance of wills
The necessity of presenting evidence on the
foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
them.
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as
in fact she moved for more time to submit the
pertinent procedural and substantive New York
laws but which request respondent Judge just
glossed over. While the probate of a will is a
special proceeding wherein courts should relax
the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the
best evidence of which the matter is susceptible
before a purported will is probated or denied.
DISPOSITION: Questioned Order is SET
ASIDE. Respondent Judge directed to allow
petitioner reasonable time within which to
submit evidence needed for the joint probate of
the wills and see to it that the brothers and
sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all
notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to
the probate proceedings.
Other Issue (lack of notice): This petition
cannot be completely resolved without touching
on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always
considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn
Perez Cunanan and because she does not
consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan,
she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the
filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the
instant petition, she only impleaded respondent
Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is
being assailed is merely a nominal or formal
party.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over
the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof
to be given as in case of an original will presented
for allowance" (Rule 27, Section 2) means that
with regard to notices, the will probated abroad
should be treated as if it were an "original will" or
a will that is presented for probate for the first
time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3
and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and
notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in
the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not
the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan,
contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to
notices of the time and place for proving the
wills. Under Rule 76 Sec 4, the "court shall also
cause copies of the notice of the time and place
fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator, . . . "
10.) ANCHETA v GUERSEY-DALAYGON
FACTS:
Spouses Audrey and Richard Guersey were
American citizens, resided in the Philippines for
30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle.
In 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. She
bequeathed her entire estate to Richard who was
also designated as executor. The will was
admitted to probate before the Court in US,
which named James Phillips as executor due to
Richard's renunciation. The Court also named
petitioner Ancheta as ancillary administrator.
In 1981, Richard married respondent Candelaria
with whom he has 2 children, Kim and Kevin.
In 1982, Audrey's will was also admitted to
probate by CFI Pasig. As administrator of
Audrey's estate in the Philippines, Ancheta filed
an inventory and appraisal of Audrey's
properties.
In 1984, Richard died leaving a will wherein he
bequeathed his entire estate to Candelaria,
except his shares of stock which he left to Kyle.
The will was also admitted to probate by the
court in US and James Phillips was likewise
executor who in turn designated Quasha as
ancillary administrator.
Richard's will was then submitted for probate
before RTC Makati.
In 1987, Ancheta filed a motion to declare
Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. He also filed
a project of partition of Audrey's estate. The
motion and partition was granted. Consequently,
RD issued TCT in the names of Estate of Richard
and Kyle.
Meanwhile, Quasha also filed a project of
partition wherein 2/5 of Richard's 3/4 undivided
interest in the Makati property was allocated to
Candelaria and 3/5 for their children. This was
opposed by Candelaria on the ground that under
the law of the State of Maryland "a legacy passes
to the legatee the entire interesy of the testator in
the property subject of the legacy." Since Richard
left his entire estate to respondent, except for his
rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc,
shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in
the Makati property should be given to
respondent.
The trial court disapproved the project of
partition insofar as it affects the Makati property
and adjudicated the entire 3/4 interest to
Candelaria.
Candelaria filed an annulment of the trial court's
order issued in the 1st special proceeding
contending that Ancheta willfully breached his
fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of
the State of Maryland on the distribution of
Audrey's estated in accordance with her will. She
further argued that since Audrey devised her
entire estate to Richard, then the Makati
property should be wholly adjudicated to him
and not merely 3/4, and the entire Makati
property should now pertain to Candelaria.
Ancheta contended that he acted in good faith in
submitting the partition before the court as he
had no knowledge of the State of Maryland's laws
on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner
alleged that he believed that it is to the "best
interests of the surviving children that Philippine
law be applied as they would receive their just
shares."
CA annulled the trial court's decision. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner committed fraud in not
applying the laws of Maryland.
HELD: YES.
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the
distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the
terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable
law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of
Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are
her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e.,
the law of the State of Maryland.
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of
the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will
Proved Outside the Philippines and
Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will
is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with
the will annexed, and such letters testamentary
or of administration, shall extend to all the estate
of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate,
after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to
such will, so far as such will may operate upon it;
and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is
provided by law in cases of estates in the
Philippines belonging to persons who are
inhabitants of another state or country.
(Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them;however,
petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s
estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence
the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in
evidence the law of the State of Maryland on
Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the
presumption that such law is the same as the
Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the
trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws
and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s
will. The obvious result was that there was no fair
submission of the case before the trial court or a
judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.
Petitioner insists that his application of
Philippine laws was made in good faith. The
Court cannot accept petitioner’s protestation.
How can petitioner honestly presume that
Philippine laws apply when as early as the
reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in
1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey
was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of
Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner
is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with
a "big legal staff and a large library."
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional
or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed
to consider said law when it issued the assailed
RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s
heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according
to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent
and deprived her of her full successional right to
the Makati property.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant
Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have
breached his duties and responsibilities as
ancillary administrator of the subject estate.
While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be
considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary
circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said
defendant’s position, as well as the resultant
frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to
create a circumstance that is tantamount to
extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s
omission to prove the national laws of the
decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in
sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject
orders without a fair submission of the real issues
involved in the case.