MEANING OF LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
Maximum Area of Quarry License Notwithstanding the
Repubic vs. Rosemoor Mining (2004) 426 SCRA 517
Facts:
The four (4) petitioners namely, Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual, Dr. Pedro De la
Concha, Alejandro De La Concha, and Rufo De Guzman, after having been
granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-
na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of
high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part
of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range. The petitioners applied with the Bureau
of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the
corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits. License No. 33 was
issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners. Shortly after
Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister of the DENR,
petitioners License No. 33 was cancelled by him through his letter to
ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION dated September
6, 1986.
CA Ruling:
Cancellation of respondents’ license without notice and hearing was
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. It added
that under the clause in the Constitution dealing with the non-impairment of
obligations and contracts, respondents license must be respected by the
State.
Petitioners Argument:
The license was validly declared a nullity and consequently withdrawn or
terminated. In the said issued letter, respondents were informed by then
Minister Maceda that their license had illegally been issued, because it
violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more public interest
served by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The latter
reason, they added, was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84.
According to this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel
of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of
that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park.
*Section 69.
provisions of Section 14 hereof, a quarry license shall cover an area of not
more than one hundred (100) hectares in any one province and not more
than one thousand (1,000) hectares in the entire Philippines.
The license in question, QLP No. 33, is dated August 3, 1982, and it was issued
in the name of Rosemoor Mining Development Corporation. The terms of the
license allowed the corporation to extract and dispose of marbleized
limestone from a 330.3062-hectare land in San Miguel, Bulacan. The license
is, however, subject to the terms and conditions of PD 463, the governing law
at the time it was granted;
Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation no. 84 violated the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution.
Held:
NO.
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly
be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable
right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.
Proclamation No. 84 cannot be stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. As pointed out earlier, respondents license is not a
contract to which the protection accorded by the non-impairment clause may
extend. Even if the license were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws
and a reservation of police power are deemed read into it, because it
concerns a subject impressed with public welfare. As it is, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
In line with the foregoing jurisprudence, respondents license may be revoked
or rescinded by executive action when the national interest so requires,
because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Chavez vs. Romulo G.R.No. 157036, June 9, 2004
o A mere license is always revocable
FACTS:
This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in
order to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a
violation of his right to property.
GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to
suspend the issuance pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence
PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of
residence. Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the
implementation. The request was denied. Hence the petition for prohibition
and injunction against Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief
Ebdane.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is
unconstitutional
o Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right
HELD:
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must
be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence
is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a
property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that
“a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor
does it create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held
in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:
“Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution.”
xxx
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance
of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of Constabulary may,
in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he
may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of
residence.” Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a
PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our
Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields,
may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a
personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may
thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such
conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory
conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their
pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not
deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the
meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court,
in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power to revoke or
recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere
license by the State is always revocable.”
LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN HELD:

233 SCRA 163 Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any
office which the officer charged might currently be holding and not
Petitioner: Marcelino Libanan
necessarily the particular office under which he was charged.
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN and Agustin B. Docena
The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without
Ponente: J. Vitug due process of law. Public office is "a public agency or trust,"and it is not the
property envisioned by the Constitutional provision which petitioner invokes.

Hence, SC dismissed the petition. SANDIGANBAYAN’s decision is affirmed.

FACTS:
C. ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS
Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern Samar and was
a former member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 1992
elections.
KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA
He was charged in conspiring to other members to prevent and exclude
Docena (Respondent), a qualified replacement of a deceased member, from
exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said body. Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who
has general and the same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary
In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a resolution suspending their injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance
respective public position and office for ninety (90) days. No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be
in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging three grounds: [1]
of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The
Order of Suspension if executed shall affront the petitioner’s right for due
permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is
process; [2] the suspension would assault his covenant to the people of Samar
that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they
as their vice-governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be prevented by the
are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar
suspension no longer exist.
circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property
Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act
supposedly committed while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an
no longer attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent Vice- appeal with the Supreme Court.
Governor of Eastern Samar.
Issues:
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond
Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the SANDIGANBAYAN is the scope of police power
valid?
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that
infringes property rights.
 this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative
Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private
permissible under the police power. The police power of the City of Manila to interests for the public welfare.
enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of
the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petitionfor
municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.
city:
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad
xxxxxlaundries xxxx.
7 June 1926 | Taft | Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion
of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general Facts
welfare of the city and its inhabitants.
Act No. 2972 (An act to provide in what languages account books shall be
kept, and to establish penalties for its violation), also known as the “Chinese
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid
Bookkeeping Act,” was passed by the Philippine Legislature and approved in
disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protectcustomers of
1921. It provides:
laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being
defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more
familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
 Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or
partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance
other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in
invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the
accordance with existing law, to keep its account books in any
guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal
language other than English, Spanish, or any local dialect.
property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in
its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether  Section 2. Any person violating the provisions of this act shall, upon
they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand
without exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.
comply with the ordinance. The obviousobjection for the implementation of
the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although,
an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, keeps the books of account of his lumber
affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few business in Chinese, as he cannot read, write nor understand English, Spanish,
words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly or any local dialect. He was arrested for violating Act No. 2972, and his books
issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, were seized.
even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and
even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance,

Trial was about to proceed when Yu Cong Eng and another petitioner Co Liam
(on behalf of all other Chinese merchants in the Philippines) filed a petition
against the fiscal, the collector of internal revenue, and the presiding judge.
Arguments
 By the petitioner
 Even if he would employ a bookkeeper who could keep his
books in English or Spanish, he would have no means of
verifying the correctness of the books. If he would employ a
translator or interpreter, he might be at the mercy of his
employees if they might cheat and defraud him. According to
the Act, he is prohibited from even keeping a duplicate set of
accounts in his own language and he will be compelled to
remain in total ignorance of the status of his business.
 The enforcement of the Act would drive several Chinese
merchants out of business (They do 60% of the business in
the country).
 The enforcement of the Act would deprive the Chinese
merchants of their liberty and property without due process
of law, and deny them the equal protection of the laws.
 Under the treaty in force between US and China, petitioners
are entitled to the same rights, privileges, and immunities as
the citizens and subjects of Great Britain and Spain.
 By the respondent
 The law is valid and necessary, and it is only the exercise of
proper legislative power. Due to the inability of internal
revenue officials to check the books of the Chinese
merchants, the treasury loses large sums of money
corresponding to taxes.
Pronouncements of the Philippine Court
 A literal translation of the Act makes it unlawful for any Chinese
merchant to keep his account books in languages other than those
listed
 Another interpretation of the Act is that the Chinese merchant may
keep his account books in Chinese, but he has to keep another set of
books in the prescribed languages
 A third construction is that the law only intended to require the
keeping of such books to facilitate governmental inspection of the
same for tax purposes. However, the law does not specify what kinds
of books shall be kept.
 The Act is not unconstitutional under the Court’s construction of the
law. A literal interpretation would render it unconstitutional, so the
Court made a reasonable construction to preserve the law.
A writ of certiorari was filed before the U.S. Supreme Court to review the
Philippine Supreme Court’s decision denying an original petition for
prohibition against the enforcement of criminal prosecution of Act No. 2972,
on the ground of its invalidity.
Issues
 WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO
 WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES
Issue # 1
WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO
It is the duty of a court in considering the validity of an act to give it such
reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental
law. However, a court may not exercise legislative functions to save the law
from conflict with constitutional limitation.
What the court did was to change a penal prohibitive law to a mandatory
law of great indefiniteness to conform to what the court assumes was, or
ought to have been, the purpose of the legislature, and which in the change
would avoid a conflict with constitutional restriction. Such strained
construction, in order to make a law conform to a constitutional limitation,
cannot be sustained.
“It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough
to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and
say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at large. This
would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department
of the government.” (US v. Reese)
Issue # 2
WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES
The law is invalid because it deprives Chinese persons of their liberty and
property without due process of law, and denies them the equal
protection of the laws.
Guarantees equivalent to the due process and equal protection clauses of the
14th Amendment were extended to the PH; hence, said guarantees are to be
interpreted as meaning what the provisions meant at the time when Congress
made them applicable to the PH. (Serra v. Mortiga, citing Kepner v. US)
PH government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to
keep records of their transactions. However, it is NOT within the police power
of the legislature to prohibit Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of
books in Chinese.
To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, 1)
the interests of the public require such interference and 2) the means are
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not oppressive upon
individuals. The determination as to what is a proper exercise of the
legislature’s police power is subject to the courts’ supervision. (Lawton v.
Steel)
We are likely thus to trespass on the provision of the Bill of Rights that the
accused is entitled to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and to violate the principle that a statute which requires the doing of an
act so indefinitely described that men must guess at its meaning violates due
process of law.
Act No. 2972 deprives the Chinese merchants of something indispensable to
the carrying on of their business, and is obviously intended to affect them (as
distinguished from the rest of the community) is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.
JUDGMENT REVERSED. ACT NO. 2972 IS INVALID.
DELOSO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 86899-903 May 15, 1989
Facts :
The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in
the local elections of November 1971. While he occupied the position of
mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the Tanodbayan
accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law
(Republic Act 3019) in relation to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals
in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales during the period 1976 to 1978
and the issuance of five (5) tractors of the municipality to certain individuals
allegedly without any agreement as to the payment of rentals. The complaint
with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed.
As regards the other complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate
informations, all dated May 30, 1984 accusing the petitioner of violation of
Section 3(e), of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan.
The complaint alleged that Amor Deloso taking advantage of his public
and official position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
give unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer thru manifest partiality and
evident bad faith in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to him a
tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the
Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost,
without any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by
Daniel Ferrer thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.
Deloso was suspended indefinitely pending the hearing of the complaint.
Thus, the instant petition.
Issue : Act of 1977.
Whether or not there was violation of the right to due process when
Deloso was suspended indefinitely.
Held :
The order of suspension does not have a definite period so that the
petitioner may be suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case
is terminated sooner. An extended suspension is a distinct possibility
considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's plea for earlier
dates of trial of his cases on the ground that there are other cases set earlier
which have a right to expect priority.
It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the
petitioner to the highest provincial office in their command if they are
deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his
case possibly extending beyond his entire term simply because the big
number of sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder, malversation of public
finds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and resolutions that may
be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the expedited determination of
his innocence or guilt.
The court ruled that a preventive suspension of an elective public
officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety
(90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service
Decree, which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the
circumstances of this case.
The petition is GRANTED.
GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004
FACTS:
Nicolas Montesclaros, a 72-year-old widower married Milagros Orbiso, who
was then 43 years old, on 10 July 1983. Nicolas filed with the GSIS an
application for retirement benefits under the Revised Government Insurance
In his retirement application, he designated his wife as his sole beneficiary.
GSIS approved Nicolas’ application for retirement effective 17 February 1984,
granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly
annuity after.
Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with the GSIS a claim for
survivorship pension under PD 1146 but was denied the claim because, under
section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship
pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner
within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on 17 February 1984. Milagros filed with the trial court a special
civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of Sec. 18 of PD 1146.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship
pension and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits including
interest. Citing Articles 115and 117 of the Family Code, the trial court held
that retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned for services
rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed through monthly
salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are
property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits are conjugal
property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is
deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The
Family Code has retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested
rights.
The trial court held that Section 18 of PD 1146 was repealed by the Family
Code, a later law. GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
trial court’s decision. Hence, this appeal.
In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has
accepted GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension
and that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. However, the Court
will still resolve the issue despite the manifestation of Milagros because social
justice and public interest demand the resolution of the constitutionality of
the proviso.
ISSUE:
Whether the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is constitutional.
HELD:
NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional. Under Section 18
of PD 1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship
pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years
before the pensioner qualified for the pension. The Court holds that such
proviso is discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law.
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which
provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses
claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage
to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without
giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure
comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to
government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness,
disability, death, and retirement of the government employees.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements
for a valid and reasonable classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may
treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are
real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso
discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the
pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the dependent
spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place
within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of
the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide
any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is
to prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons
the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension
and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on
substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages
contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as
having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension
benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the
reason Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA
8291), otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act of 1997,
the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the implementing
rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the member immediately
before the members death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension
unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage
solely to receive the benefit.
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted
within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham
marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law
does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving
spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years before
the members retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship
benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping
classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and
defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
Wherefore, the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146 is void
for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the law.
Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo Pacificador
Due Process – impartial and competent court
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be
members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier
complained of “massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud,
tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and
intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the
provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On
June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately
convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the
case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation
made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been
made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had
seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election
must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of
the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the
Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb
1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then
moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of
Javier’s death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of
Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor.
The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster
that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who
shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go
to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will
not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance
with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls
for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a
court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already
made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to
make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script.
There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on
the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
INHIBITION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary.
Under the first paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that
judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned. The
second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound
discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and
valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.
In denying the motions for his inhibition, Justice Hernandez explained that
petitioner failed to impute any act of bias or impartiality on his part, to wit:
What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point of law is
the necessity of proving bias and partiality under the second paragraph of the
rule in question. The proof required needs to point to some act or conduct on
the part of the judge being sought for inhibition. In the instant Motions, there
is not even a single act or conduct attributed to Justice Hernandez from where
a suspicion of bias or partiality can be derived or appreciated. In fact, it is
oddly striking that the accused does not even make a claim or imputation of
bias or partiality on the part of Justice Hernandez. Understandably, he simply
cannot make such allegation all because there is none to be told. If allegations
or perceptions of bias from the tenor and language of a judge is considered
by the Supreme Court as insufficient to show prejudgment, how much more
insufficient it becomes if there is absent any allegation of bias or partiality to
begin with.
We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the assailed
Resolution upon the grounds so stated. We have ruled in Philippine
Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi, G.R. No. 171137, June 5, 2009,
588 SCRA 612, 632 that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough
ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic
evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or
corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from
the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the
judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be
branded the stigma of being biased or partial.
An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture
and is not one of the just or valid reasons contemplated in the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which a judge may
inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare allegations of the judges
partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his
noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and
without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered valid
reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough.
Petitioner contends that his motions were based on the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137, but a closer examination of the motions for inhibition
reveals that petitioner undoubtedly invoked the second paragraph by
underscoring the phrase, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above. This was an express indication of the rule that he was invoking.
Moreover, it was specifically stated in paragraph 7 of both motions that in
accused mind, such circumstances militates against the Hon. Justice
Hernandez and constitutes a just and valid ground for his inhibition under the
2nd paragraph, Section 1 of Rule 137, in so far as the cases against accused
are concerned. Hence, there is no question that petitioner relied on the
second paragraph of the Rule which contemplates voluntary inhibition as
basis for his motions for inhibition.
And even if we were to assume that petitioner indeed invoked the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 in his motions to inhibit, we should stress
that marital relationship by itself is not a ground to disqualify a judge from
hearing a case. Under the first paragraph of the rule on inhibition, No judge
or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise…. The
relationship mentioned therein becomes relevant only when such spouse or
child of the judge is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to show that Professor
Carolina G. Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases
before the Sandiganbayan to justify the inhibition of Justice Hernandez under
the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 (Ramiscal Jr. v. Justice Hernandez
et al., G.R. Nos. 173057-74, September 20, 2010).
In Umale v. Villaluz, 151-A Phil. 563, 568, May 25, 1973, the Court traced the
history of the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision, which had
been added only as an amendment to the Rules of Court in 1964. Prior to that
year, the question on whether to take cognizance of the case did not depend
upon the discretion of the judges not legally disqualified to sit in a given case.
If those concerned were not disqualified, it was their official duty to proceed
with the case or else risk being called upon to account for their dereliction.
They could not voluntarily inhibit themselves on grounds of prejudice or bias,
extreme delicacy, or even if they themselves took great interest and an active
part in the filing of the case. Gutierrez v. Santos 112 Phil. 184, May 30, 1961
and Del Castillo v. Javelona 116 Phil. 451, September 29, 1962 paved the way
for the recognition of other circumstances for disqualification –those that
depended upon the exercise of discretion of the judges concerned.
The judges right, however, must be weighed against their duty to decide
cases without fear of repression. Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered discretion to decide whether to
desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes.
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to
inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be
shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before
it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality Gohu v. Spouses Gohu,
397 Phil. 126, October 13, 2000; Abdula v. Guiani, 382 Phil. 757, February 18,
2000).
Luis A. Tabuena, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan (268 SCRA 332, February 17, 1997)
FACTS:
Then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena, General Manager of
the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), over the phone to pay
directly to the president’s office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Phil.
National Construction Corp. The verbal instruction was reiterated in a
Presidential memorandum.
In obedience to Pres. Marcos’ instruction, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo
Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, the Asst. Gen. Mgr. and the Acting Finance Services
Mgr. of MIAA, respectively, caused the release of P55M of MIAA funds of
three (3) withdrawals and delivered the money to Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez,
private secretary of Marcos. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she
received from Tabuena. Later, it turned out that PNCC never received the
money.
The case involves two (2) separate petitions for review by Luis Tabuena and
Adolfo Peralta. They appeal the Sandiganbayan decision convicting them of
malversation of MIAA funds in the amount of P55M.
Further, petitioners claimed that they were charged with intentional
malversation, as alleged in the amended information, but it would appear
that they were convicted for malversation with negligence. Hence, their
conviction of a crime different from that charged violated their constitutional
right to be informed of the accusation.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan convicted them of a crime not
charged in the amended information; and
(2) Whether or not Tabuena and Peralta acted in good faith.
appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or
not.
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was
certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its
overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. Time
and again the Court has declared that due process requires no less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge. That the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than
this, as a minimum guaranty of due process.

HELD: HENCE, Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of
malversation.
(1) No. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence.
The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the
perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the
mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved.

(2) Yes. Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS

Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President
and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official
of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly
issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no
law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled
with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly
without question.

However, a more compelling reason for the ACQUITTAL is the violation of the
accused's basic constitutional right to due process. Records show that the
Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and
of the accused themselves. The questions of the court were in the nature of
cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation.
Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there is
nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider such matter as
additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal
throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment