Topic 2: Power of Eminent Domain
2. MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC.,
The State, by its power of eminent domain, it can then, upon payment of just
compensation, forcibly acquire the needed property in order to devote it to the
intended public use. Also called the power of “expropriation”, eminent domain is
described as “the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the
government” that maybe acquired for some public purpose through a method in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the STATE.
A. Definition/ Scope
- Constitutional Bases
Sec. 9 Article 3, 1987 Constitution
Sec. 18, Article 12, 1987 Constitution
Sec. 4 and 9, Article 13, 1987 Constitution
B. Police Power vs. Power of Eminent Domain
“ power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those
entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private
property to public use upon payment of just compensation. On the other
hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. Although both
police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for
their object, and recent trends show a mingling the two with the latter being
used as an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions
between the two.” A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence leads to a
cogent deduction that where a property interest is merely restricted because
the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or where
property is destroyed because its continued existence would be injurious to
public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a property
interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is
compensable taking.
C. Art. III, Section 9 “Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation” – a mere limitation of the power that asits
negative and restrictive language clearly suggest.
CASES:
Petitioners, v. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
Respondents.
FACTS:
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 or the Seniors Citizens Act was passed into law granting
20% discounts from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation
services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation
centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in the country, Provided, That private
establishments may claim the cost as tax credit.
On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 02-94 was issued to implement
RA 7432. Sections 2(i) of which provides for the definition of a Tax credit which refers
to the amount representing the 20% discount granted to a qualified senior citizen by
all establishments which discount shall be deducted by the said establishments from
their gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-
added tax or other percentage tax purposes and Section 4 of RR No. 02-94 which
provides for the recording/bookkeeping requirements for private establishments
requiring them to keep separate and accurate records of sales made to senior
citizens.
In CIR v. Central Luzon Drug Corp, 496 Phil 307 (2005), the Court declared Sections
2(i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 as erroneous because these contravene RA 7432 that
specifically allow private establishments to claim a tax credit the amount of discounts
they grant. In turn the IRR issued pursuant thereto provide for the procedures for its
availment. To deny such credit, despite the plain mandate of the law and the
regulations carrying out that mandate, is indefensible.
In effect, the tax credit benefit under RA 7432 is related to a sales discount. This
contrived definition is improper, considering that the latter has to be deducted from
gross sales in order to compute the gross income in the income statement and
cannot be deducted again, even for purposes of computing the income tax. When
the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means
that the amount when claimed shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability,
plain and simple. The option to avail of the tax credit benefit depends upon the
existence of a tax liability, but to limit the benefit to a sales discount which is not
even identical to the discount privilege that is granted by law does not define it at all
and serves no useful purpose. The definition must, therefore, be stricken down.
The law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. In fact, a regulation that "operates
to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity;" it cannot prevail.
It is a cardinal rule that courts "will and should respect the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to
enforce it x x x."
In the present case, the tax authorities have given the term tax credit in Sections 2.i
and 4 of RR 2-94 a meaning utterly in contrast to what RA 7432 provides. The intent
of Congress in granting a mere discount privilege, not a sales discount.
In case of conflict, the law must prevail. A "regulation adopted pursuant to law is
law." Conversely, a regulation or any portion thereof not adopted pursuant to law is
no law and has neither the force nor the effect of law.
On February 26, 2004, RA 9257 or the Expanded Senior Citizens Actamended certain
provisions of RA 7432, granting 20% discount to qualified senior citizens and the
establishments may claim the discounts granted as tax deduction based on the net
cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount
shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax
deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales
receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
The Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4-2006 and the DSWD issued its own IRR for
their implementation of the tax provision of RA 9257.
Whether Section 4 of RA No. 9257 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
insofar as they provide that the 20% discount to Senior Citizens may be claimed as
tax deduction by the private establishments are invalid and unconstitutional.
HELD: The Petition lacks merit.
POLITICAL LAW tax deduction scheme is an exercise of police power of the State
Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully
reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is
because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is
subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Being a tax
deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but
merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the treatment of
the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private establishments
concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of
the gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257. The
permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the
taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable
taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just
compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers
gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

Petitioners Manila Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria Paz-Sucat, Inc., domestic A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As
corporations engaged in the business of providing funeral and burial services, feeling such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation. Having said that, this
aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners prayed that Section 4 of RA 9257 raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a
and the IRR issued by DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional insofar as special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of
these allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior partly subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so.
citizens as a tax deduction; that the DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from enforcing
the same; and that the tax credit treatment of the 20% discount under the former The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior
Section 4 (a) of RA 7432 be reinstated. citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their
improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our
ISSUES society.

Whether the petition presents an actual case or controversy The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in
the law itself.
As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments
extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as
a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the
power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities
of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the
operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the
process.
Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support
imparted by petitioners and the other private establishments concerned. This being
the case, the means employed in invoking the active participation of the private
sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and
directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is
arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same would be
unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a
legislative act. Carlos Superdrug Corp v. DSWD, 553 Phil. 120 (2007).
When we ruled that petitioners in Carlos Superdrug case failed to prove that the 20%
discount is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. We noted that no evidence, such as
a financial report, to establish the impact of the 20% discount on the overall
profitability of petitioners was presented in order to show that they would be
operating at a loss due to the subject regulation or that the continued
implementation of the law would be unconscionably detrimental to the business
operations of petitioners.
In the case at bar, petitioners proceeded with a hypothetical computation of the
alleged loss that they will suffer similar to what the petitioners in Carlos Superdrug
Corporationdid.
We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid
exercise of the police power of the State.
Hence, the Law is valid and constitutional
3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. LUCENITO TAGLE AND HELENA BENITEZ
G.R. No. 129079; December 2, 1998; PANGANIBAN, J:
Eminent Domain. It is well-settled that eminent domain is an inherent power on
the State that need not be granted even by the fundamental law.
FACTS:
Private respondent Benitez signed a Memorandum of Agreement with Philippine
Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC) allowing PHRDC to lease her lands
for a period of 20 years and/or buy the property site. As Benitez donated to PWU the
parcel of land, they entered into a contract of lease with PHRDC to occupy and use
the land in question and to make all and necessary development to attain its
objectives. One of PRHDC’s proposed projects involved the establishment of a
Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC), an agency new under DTI.
At the expiration of the lease contract, the parties agreed to cease the lease
payments and to proceed with the negotiations for its sale. However, when the Deed
of Absolute Sale was done, Benitez refused to sign it, thereafter ordering the
payment of rentals and to vacate the premises in 30 days from notice. She later filed
an unlawful detainer suit against the petitioner.
The petitioner also filed a Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession which the
TC granted but later quashed due to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondents, stating that the writ is only used as a leverage in the ejectment suit
filed against it wherein the issue in possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge may quash a Writ of Possession on the ground that
the expropriating government agency is already occupying the property sought to be
expropriated.
HELD:
The expropriation proceeding in this case involves a project covered nu EO 1035.
Under this provision, when the government or its authorized agent makes the
required deposit, the TC has the ministerial duty to issue a Writ of Possession.
The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or
occupation of the land. Although Eminent Domain usually involves a taking of the
title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property
interests in the bundle of rights constituting ownership. The Court merely enforced
the Constitutional limitation regarding the payment of just compensation. Clearly,
an ejectment suit should not prevail over the States power of Eminent Domain.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The assailed orders are annulled and set aside.
No costs.
4. CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO),
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 109338, November 20, 2000
FACTS:
On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the Regional Trial Court, Daet,
Camarines Norte, a complaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of
mortgage against Philippine Smelter Corporation (PSC).
For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court declared PSC in default
and allowed plaintiff Leviste to present evidence ex-parte.
A copy of the writ of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines
standing on certain portions of the subject property. Later, on August 12, 1992, Vines
Realty filed an amended motion for an order of demolition and removal of
improvements on the subject land.
Among the improvements for removal were the power lines and electric posts
belonging to petitioner.
Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground, among other reasons, that petitioner
was not a party to the case and therefore not bound by the judgment of the trial
court and that it had subsisting right-of-way agreements over said property.
The sheriff, at the request of Vines Realty demolished the remaining electric posts
resulting in the cutting off of power supply to various business establishments and
barangays.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines
located in the land sold at public auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage.
RULLING:
Yes. To exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the
exercise of such power by other corporations constructing or operating electric
generating plants and electric transmission and distribution lines or systems."
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-
way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private
property condemned for public use.37 The Supreme Court, in Republic vs. PLDT38
thus held that:
"Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon
the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right-of-way."
Public utilities’ power of eminent domain may be exercised although title is not
transferred to the expropriator.
Consequently, we rule that a court’s writ of demolition cannot prevail over the
easement of a right-of-way which falls within the power of eminent domain.
Masikip v. City of Pasig
G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly
provided for by statute
FACTS:
Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City
of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the “sports development and
recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January
1994. Masikip refused.
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for
the alleged purpose that it was “in line with the program of the Municipal
Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our
community.”
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the
expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court Melendres Compound Homeowner’s Association, a private, non-profit organization,
on the ground that there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case not the residents of Caniogan.
was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit.
REPUBLIC vs. CA
Hence, this petition. FACTS: Petitioner (PIA) instituted expropriation proceedings covering a total of
544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway,
ISSUE:W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use
ofradio transmitter facilities for the “Voice of the Philippines” project.
HELD: Eminent domain is “the right of a government to take and appropriate private
property to the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the
done only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor.” It is the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than 9 years after
power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order
is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. condemning the property and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendantsthe just
compensation for the property.
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power
thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only It would appear that the National Government failed to pay the respondents the just
to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. The respondents then filed
may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. In
response, the court issued a writ of execution for the implementation thereof.
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada issued Proc. No. 22 transferring 20 hectares of the
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare expropriated land to the Bulacan State University.
for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. Despite the court’s order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid and no action was on
their case until petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit
Provided: in court of the amount P4,664,000 by way of just compensation.

(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer
has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;
The Santos heirs submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of
P6/sq.m. as previously fixed to its current zonal value of P5,000/sq.m. or to cause
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
the return of the expropriated property.
least 15% fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property
The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of the Santos heirs declaring its 26 February
There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center 1979Decision to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription in accordance with
at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no “genuine necessity” to justify Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the 1964/1997 ROC which states that a final and executory
the expropriation. The records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan judgment or order may be executed on motion within 5 years from the date of its
Barangay Council which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4,
entry. RTC denied petitioner’s Motion to Permit Deposit and ordered the return of
the expropriated property to the heirs of Santos.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioner may appropriate the property
2. WON the respondents are entitled to the return of the property in question
HELD:
1. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a
public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no
recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely
confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of
the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching
that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to
every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it,
all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or
implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession
of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the
expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the
conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any
conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in
effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and
the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be
for public use, and second, that just compensation must be given to the private
owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition
of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand,
and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and
affording protection to the latter. In determining “public use,” two approaches are
utilized - the first is public employment or theactual use by the public, and the
second is public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as being
subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands
upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the
resources of the individual may be devoted.
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the
PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the
Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao,
themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question
the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property,
pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in
the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The
property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner,
as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter
and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public
use, which, decidedly, it is.
2. NO. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would
exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda.
deVillaroya where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of
recovery of the property there in question. It might be borne in mind that thecase
involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power ofeminent
domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. The grant
of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160
cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in
the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the
power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but
even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power
of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real
authority would want it to be.
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid
ten years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled -
“The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what
amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and
executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as
part of an airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x It follows that both by
virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations
upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their
expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for which they were
expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same.

"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies, which
may be deemed just and equitable under the premises'."
The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City where
the recovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid
landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were first
instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation
for his property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and
appropriated by the State.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings
provides not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but
likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties,
as well as their privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents
and purposes, exercised dominion over the propertypursuant to the judgment. The
exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at
least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting
any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the
return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact
that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in
ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem
proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the
paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving
notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a
judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained
by voluntary conveyance.
Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the
same argument could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted
proceedings for payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years after the
1979 judgment had become final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to
compel payment against herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently
with the rule that one should take good care of his own concern, respondents should
have commenced the proper action upon the finality of the judgment which, indeed,
resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and possession of the
property.
The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be the sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one
who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus,
if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on
its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the
taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place
the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before
the taking occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the
zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted
condemnation proceedings and “took” the property in September 1969. This
allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the
time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum
should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value
of the currency over time. Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of
extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the
establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no
agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual
obligations. In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of
extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency.
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating
its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only
authority left to it being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although
not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly
on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the
Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest
thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e.,
19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid.
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION VS. MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG G.R.
NO. 152230 August 09, 2005
FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a
municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig,
where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located. The road had
to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks
could pass through in case of conflagration. Likewise, the residents in the area
needed the road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to
acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT).
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance
authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the
said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that the
property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to purchase the property
for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer.
On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint, amended on August 6, 1993,
against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19
ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. The
plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to
construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the
same portion. The plaintiff appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter
addressed to defendant Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based
on the latest tax declaration covering the property. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC
issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be expropriated. On
November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at
the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian
School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the property.
Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three
meters; the road was called Damayan Street.
In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had
sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced by a deed of sale bearing the signature
of defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife.
When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as
defendant-in-intervention, which motion the RTC granted on August 26, 1994.
In its answer-in-intervention, JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative
defenses, that the plaintiff’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular
class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It alleged that the property
sought to be expropriated is not the best portion for the road and the least
burdensome to it. The intervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-defendants for
reimbursement in case the subject property is expropriated. In its amended answer,
JILCSFI also averred that it has been denied the use and enjoyment of its property
because the road was constructed in the middle portion and that the plaintiff was
not the real party-in-interest. The intervenor, likewise, interposed counterclaims
against the plaintiff for moral damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUES / ALLEGATIONS OF THE OWNER
A.) WON the letter written by the Engineer inviting the owners to talk about the price
of the land was the ‘valid offer previously made’ contemplated by the law.
B.) WON if the property is being used already for public purpose, the same can still
be expropriated. Because the petitioner alleged that the land sought to be
expropriated was originally bought to construct a school and a church.
C.) WON the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing a road
particularly in petitioners property and not elsewhere.
D.) WON the petitioner was deprived of due process when it was not notified of the
ocular inspection.
HELD: (Focus more dun sa mga naka red na font)
A.) NO. (In the present case, Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-
owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of
the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-
owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the
eprice that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.)
The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and
definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the
rejection thereof by the latter. It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all
reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove
compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the
complaint. An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other
for the celebration of a contract. It creates a power of acceptance permitting the
offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the offeror’s promise into a contractual
obligation. Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient
clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions
of the proposed contract. An offer would require, among other things, a clear
certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned
contract.
B.) YES. We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be
expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place
for religious worship and a school for its members. As aptly explained by this Court
in Manosca v. Court of Appeals, thus: It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila
Railroad Co., that: . . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term
“public use” to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon
the individual increases and each demand is a new use to which the resources of
the individual may be devoted. . . . for “whatever is beneficially employed for the
community is a public use.” Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states: The taking
to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into
play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided
into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the
exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It
is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for
the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use.
C.) YES. The respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road
particularly in the petitioner’s property and not elsewhere. We note that the
whereas clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest
and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E.R. Santos Street. The
respondent’s complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioner’s lot has
been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent
failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims.
D.) YES. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record
that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court
conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the
petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its
right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial
as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any
stage of the trial. Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not
notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court
based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the trial court
based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected.
Iron and Steel Authority vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 102976, October 25, 1995
FACTS:
The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by PD No. 272, in order,
generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines.
Initially, it was created for a term of 5 years but when its original term expired, its
term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555. The National Steel
Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development
Corporation which is an entity wholly owned by the National Government embarked
on an expansion program which includes the construction of a steel mill in Iligan City.
Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President withdrawing from sale or
settlement a tract of land in Iligan City to be used by the NSC. However, certain
portions of the public land under Proclamation 2239 were occupied by Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Co. (MCFC). LOI No. 1277 was issued directing NSC to negotiate with the
owners of MCFC for and on behalf of the Government for the compensation of
MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject land. The LOI directed that ISA may
exercise the power of eminent domain should the negotiations fail. The negotiations
failed and ISA commenced expropriation proceedings against MCFC. While trial was
on-going the statutory existence of ISA had expired prompting MCFC to file the
dismissal of the case since ISA has ceased to be a juridical person. The trial court
granted MCFC’s motion to dismiss anchoring on the Rules of Court that “only natural
or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties to a civil case.” ISA
moved for a reconsideration contending that despite the expiration of its term, its
juridicial existence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be completed.
In the alternative ISA urged that the Rep. of the Philippines should be allowed to be
substituted in its place. The RTC denied its motion for reconsideration. This was
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted
for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s term.
HELD:
There is no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general
or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the
Government. ISA in fact appears to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that
other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are case in
corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities,
sometimes with and other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a
juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic. The term
“Authority” has been used to designate both incorporated and non-incorporated
agencies or instrumentalities of the Government.
The Court considers that ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the
Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical
person vested with full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously
described as “legal personality.”
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties
and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and
are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof such as e.g. devolution
or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified
successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the
expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be
looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of
supplementation in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since ISA is a non-
incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions,
assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government of
the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory
provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other
entity or agency of the Republic.
It follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the
expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA
having expired. The expiration of ISA’s statutory did not by itself require or justify the
dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings. Further, no new legislative act is
necessary should the Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to
continue to prosecute the expropriation proceedings
SAN ROQUE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through the Armed Forces of the Philippines),
respondent.
G.R. No. 163130, September 7, 2007
Facts:
The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City. It was originally owned
by Ismael D. Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. Subject parcels of
land, together with seventeen (17) others, were the subject of an expropriation
proceeding initiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines docketed as Civil
Case No. 781. Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initial deposit of P9,500.00 as pre-
condition for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. On 14 May 1940, a
Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land. However, the title of the
subject parcel of land was not transferred to the government.
Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was cancelled and new
titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos.
128197 (Lot No. 933-B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendant-
appellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun construction of townhouses on the
subject parcels of land.
Plaintiff-appellant filed the present case (Records, pp. 1-15) alleging that it is the
owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 Decision in the expropriation
case, thus, T.C.T. Nos. 128197 and 128198 are null and void. It argued that
defendant-appellee, had no right to possess the subject properties because it was not
its lawful owner.
In its Answer, defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It also
claimed that there was no valid expropriation because it was initiated by the
executive branch without legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation
was never consummated because the government did not actually enter the land nor
were the owners paid any compensation.
The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Republic's complaint and upholding
SRRDC's ownership over the subject properties as supported by SRRDC's actual
possession thereof and its unqualified title thereto. It also found that there was no
valid expropriation since the records are bereft of a showing that consideration was
paid for the subject properties.
Aggrieved, the Republic appealed the decision to the CA insisting on its absolute
ownership over the subject properties.
The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal from the CFI Decision
in the expropriation case was never perfected by the original owners of the subject
properties, and thus, the expropriation of Lot No. 933 became final and binding on
the original owners, and SRRDC, which merely stepped into the latter's shoes, is
similarly bound.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in holding that the (a)validity of the expropriation proceedings; (b)
respondent had a better right to the subject properties and (c) respondent is not
guilty of laches
Ruling:
The CA disregarded relevant facts and ignored the evidence, noteworthy among
which is that when the Republic filed its complaint with the RTC, it alleged that the
CFI Decision in Civil Case No. 781 had long become final and executory. However, this
assertion would compound the Republic’s predicament, because the Republic could
not adequately explain its failure to register its ownership over the subject property
or, at least, annotate its lien on the title. Trying to extricate itself from this quandary,
the Republic belatedly presented a copy of an Exception and Notice of Intention to
Appeal dated July 9, 1940, to show that an appeal filed by the original owners of Lot
No. 933 effectively prevented the Republic from registering its title, or even only
annotating its lien, over the property.
The CA’s categorical pronouncement that the CFI Decision had become final as no
appeal was perfected by SRRDC’s predecessor-in-interest is, therefore, contradicted
by the Republic’s own allegation that an appeal had been filed by the original owners
of Lot No. 933. Not only did the CA fail to resolve the issue of the Republic’s failure to
register the property in its name, it also did not give any explanation as to why title
and continuous possession of the property remained with SRRDC and its
predecessors-in-interest for fifty-six years. The CA ruling that disregards these
established facts and neglects to reconcile the contradiction mentioned above does
not deserve concurrence by this Court.
In Republic v. Lim, Court emphasized that no piece of land can be finally and
irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation in paid.
Without FULL PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, there can be no transfer of title
from the landowner to the expropriator. Thus, the Republic's failure to pay just
compensation precluded the perfection of its title over the lot sought to be
expropriated. In fact, we went even further and recognized the right of the unpaid
owner to recover the property if within 5 years from the decision of the expropriation
court, the expropriator fails to effect payment of just compensation.
Time and again, we have declared that EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly
construed against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private
property taken for public use is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the
State's sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement
renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To
disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to expropriate is to
ride roughshod over private rights.
From the records of this case and our previous findings in the related case, the
Republic manifestly failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment
of just compensation and receipt thereof by the property owners. More importantly,
if the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary
course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the
annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the certificate of title.
The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from the
exercise of it's power or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land Registration
Act. There is no showing that the Republic complied with the aforesaid registration
requirement.
From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause the
registration of the subject properties in its name or record the decree of expropriation
on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to register the subject properties in its
name, it failed to do so for 56 years.
LACHES is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.

The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the mistakes
or errors of its officials or agents. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. One
exception is when the strict application of the rule will defeat the effectiveness of a
policy adopted to protect the public, such as the Torrens system.

Very telling of the Republic's silence and inaction, whether intentional or by sheer
negligence, is the testimony of Infante, the Republic's witness in the proceedings
before the RTC, testifying that several surveys were conducted on a number of
expropriated lots, which surveys showed that the subject lot was still registered in the
name of the original owners. As such, Infante recommended in his report that legal
action be taken. Yet despite aforesaid recommendation, title to subject lot remained
registered in the name of the original owners, ans subsequently, its transferees. This
silence and unexplained inaction by the Republic clearly constitute laches.

The trial court correctly held that title registered under the Torrens system is notice
to the whole world. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of its certificate of title and the law will not oblige him to go beyond what
appears on the face thereof to determine the condition of the property.

An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought
the property from the registered owner, without notice that some other person has
a right to, or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at
the time of such purchase, or before ha has notice of the claim or interest of some
other person in the property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED

White Light Corporation vs City of Manila
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
Petitioner: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist &
Development Corporation
Respondent: City of Manila
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission,
Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns,
Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.”
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC)
filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) impleading as defendant, herein
respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the prayer that the
Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground
that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-
hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and
desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power- “To regulate the establishment peration and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses andother similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports”. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the
Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies
and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions
warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the
Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for
illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State.
Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging
sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of
these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject
to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any
way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise
enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, Petitioner, v. CITY OF CEBU, T.C. (TITO) SAYSON AND
RICARDO HAPITAN,Respondents.
FACTS:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted
Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any
motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic
Code of Cebu City.
On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido
Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the RTC against the City of
Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the
chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management
(CITOM),seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being
in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages.
Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car
in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and
documents from his office and after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
immobilized by a steel clamp. His car was impounded for three days, and was (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to oppressive;(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car but such imposition the fine regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must
was without any court hearing and without due process of law. He was also not be unreasonable.
compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping andP1,000.00 for
the violation) without any court hearing and final judgment; As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the
ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was
That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where there passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive
was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the
and that he was compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the release of his limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements
car without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice. of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc.,
On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000the Court cogently observed that police power is
Cebu, demanded the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or
theTraffic Code of Cebu City, and damages. body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature,
however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well
He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once
portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on
the vehicle of theanayexterminator, upon returning outside, his car was towed by them by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied)
the group even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.
The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance No.
1664 as null and void In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of
The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the Cebu.The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with
decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 valid. the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done
through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare
Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the Jabans and Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.
Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals
were consolidated. The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional. utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection
of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as
HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is sustained. its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Tests for a valid ordinance respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those
forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court restates the adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
tests of a valid ordinance thusly: demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of property.
the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law,
the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny
review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and
the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its
consistency with public policy.

The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in
all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times".

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable
way to enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors
would evade liability by simply driving away. DENIED.