LATIN MAXIMS FOR EXAM:

Verba accipienda sunt secundum materiam - A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used
Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda – A general statement is understood in a general sense
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus – Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish
Nosciter a sociis – where a word is obscure or ambiguous (susceptible of various meanings), it may be interpreted by considering the company of words
in which it is found or with which it is associated
Ejusdem generis- same kind or specie
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius – what is not included is excluded
Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est – a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
Redendo singula singulis –referring each to each – each word is applied to the subject to which it appears, by context, most appropriately related

I. Interpretation of words and phrases

In general:
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products v. CA: In construing statutes, the terms used therein are generally to be given their ordinary meaning, that is, such
meaning which is ascribed to them when they are commonly used, to the end that absurdity in the law must be avoided. The term “obligations” as used
in the final clause of the second paragraph of Section 61 of P.D. 705 is construed to mean those obligations incurred by the transferor in the ordinary
course of business. It cannot be construed to mean those obligations or liabilities incurred by the transferor as a result of transgressions of the law, as
these are personal obligations of the transferor, and could not have been included in the term “obligations” absent any modifying provision to that effect.

Ernesto v. CA: Yes. The court believes that there is no valid reason why the statutory definition of planters under Act 4166 and Executive Orders 900
and 901 should still be adhered to after the factual situation to which they were addressed had already changed. The limitation to sugar quotas, whether
export, domestic or reserve among all the mills continued only until 1955. From that year, emergency, non- quota, non-district or accommodation
planters came into being with the blessings of the Sugar Quota Administration. With such a change in situation, it would not be logical to continue
adhering to the previous definitions that had already lost their legal effect. Consequently, the court is of the considered opinion that after the quota
system ceased, the definition of planters within the district for the purposes of Section 1 of the Sugar Act should be all planters who delivered their
sugarcane to the respondent Central who milled the same. Hence, as such, they should all be counted in determining the total number of planters in the
sugar district in ascertaining whether or not a majority of them have written milling contracts with the respondent Central.

Amadora v. CA: Yes. The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it
is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts
of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of
reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."

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(Nosciter a sociis):

Carandang v. Santiago: Yes. The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in
their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that
these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their
generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a
crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article — some in
their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of
physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh: No. The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also
to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the
Islands during the Japanese occupation. It should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in
using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of principles of international law.
The court ruled that the term “processes” does not refer to judicial processes but to executive orders of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive
Committee, ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines and the constitution itself of said Republic, and others
that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the word “processes” is associated.

(Ejusdem generis):

Cornejo v. Naval: No. Where the removal is to be for official misconduct or for misfeasance or mal-administration in office, the misconduct which shall
warrant a removal of the officer must be such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affect his character as a private
individual. It is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction and of the law of public officers that a statute prescribing the grounds for which an
officer may be suspended is penal in nature, and should be strictly construed. Making this principle the basis of our investigation, it is not possible to
reach any other conclusion than that the prepositional phrase "in office" qualifies the various grounds for legal suspension. The law says "or other form
of maladministration in office". By the maxim Ejusdem generis, the scope of the word "other" is limited to that which is of the same kind as its
antecedent. Corruption, therefore, refers to corruption in office. The holding of the court is that the provincial board and the provincial governor of Rizal
acted in excess of jurisdiction in suspending the petitioner as municipal president of Pasay. Where the power of suspension is limited to specific causes,
the suspending authority may not suspend for any cause not so specified.

(Expressio unius est exclusion alterius):

Escribano v. Avila: Yes. The lawmaking body, by means of that amendment of Art. 360, never intended to take away the jurisdiction of the proper Court
of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation in libel cases. The amendment merely sought to strip the ordinary municipal court of its power to
hold a preliminary investigation of written defamations. The fact that the Court of First Instance is not mentioned in Article 360 as a tribunal that may
conduct the preliminary investigation of libel cases would seem to suggest that it cannot conduct such preliminary investigation, following the maxim
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another or the enumeration of particular things excludes the Idea of
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something else not mentioned.) However, the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be applied in this case because, as shown above, the fact
that the Court of First Instance is not mention in the amendment, as being empowered to conduct a preliminary investigation in cases of written
defamation, has nothing to do with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that in construing a law, the court must look to the object to be
accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and it should give the law a reasonable or liberal
construction which win best effect its purpose rather than one which win defeat it. The silence of article 360 on the power of a judge of the Court of First
Instance to conduct an investigation of criminal actions for written defamations does not preclude a judge of that court from holding such investigation.

(Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est) (Doctrine of last antecedent / Redendo singula singulis):

People v. Tamani: Yes. Section 22, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or
notice of judgment or order appealed from.” The court held that the 15­day period should be counted from the promulgation and not from receipt of
copy of judgment. The word "promulgation" in Section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment" under Section 6 of Rule 120, while the word
"notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis. Therefore, when the order
denying appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1) day within which
to file his notice of appeal and not eleven days. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was fifty­eight days late.

(Provisos, exceptions, saving clauses):

Pendon v. Diasnes: No. Paragraph B of RA 180 in no way violates the pardoning power of the chief executive. Paragrapg B must be interpreted in
construction with paragraph A. Paragraph B modifies that part of paragraph A, which refers to sentences for less than a year and not that which refers of
the nature of the crime committed. To interpret paragraph A and B together, should read, “Absolute pardon for any crime for which 1 year of
imprisonment or more was given restores the prisoner of his political rights.

II. Strict or liberal construction

(Strict construction):

People v. Purisima: No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged
in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts
alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative
intent is the controlling factor, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would
result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary
to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, “whereas" clauses.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.
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People v. Subido: No. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code "a libel committed by means of writing, printing, litography, engraving, radio,
phonograph, paintings, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum
and medium period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party". It is
evident from the foregoing provision that the court is given the discretion to impose the penalty of imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It
will be noted that the lower court chose to impose upon the accused: three months ofarresto mayor; a fine of P500.00; indemnification of the offended
party in the sum of P10,000.00; subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and the payment of the costs. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in
the exercise of its discretion decided to eliminate the penalty of three (3) months arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity of P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.

A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals that the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" is separated by a comma
from the preceding clause" is hereby sentenced to three months ofarresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred
(P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The use of a comma
in the part of the sentence is to make "the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer not only to non-payment of the indemnity, but also to
non-payment of the fine.

Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
5465 which exempts an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay his civil liability.

It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes are to be strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.
In the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it careful scrutiny, and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the
defendant. Considering that Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is favorable to the accused-appellant, the same should be made
applicable to him. Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to the accused-appellant, he cannot also be required to serve his
civil liability to the offended party in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency because this is no longer required by the aforesaid article.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos: In PD 1564, it stated that “Charitable or public welfare purposes”, which means that it was not the intention of the
framers of the law to include solicitations for religious purposes. In 1987 constitution, “charitable and religious” are separate.

(Liberal construction):

Quibuyen v. Court of Appeals: No. The court is satisfied that it is a case of lapsus calami. The mistake consists in mentioning in the prayer of the
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that the writ be issued "annulling the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge of January 5, 1959, and
directing the respondent Judge to give due course to the appeal interposed by the herein petitioners", without a attaching a copy of said order, but
accompanying the said petition, as Annex A, with a copy of the order of the court dated April 27, 1959. The order of January 5, 1959 was one denying
the petition for relief "for lack of merit" while order of April 27, 1959 was an order denying the defendants' appeal and granting the issuance of a writ of
execution. The petition mentioned the order of January 5, 1959 as the order assailed, instead of designating that April 27, 1959, as the order appealed
from. It is seen, therefore, that the designation of the order by date, in the petition was a mistake.

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(2) No. The query invites a negative answer, because it being a special action of certiorari, Rule 67 governs, at least, in matter of form of petition. All
that the Rules require is that the petition be verified, the facts be alleged with certainty and it must pray for the annulment of the judgment order
complained of (sec. 1, Rule 67). These requisites were met by the petitioner with the respondent Court. Granting for the sake of argument, that section 2,
Rule 49 is applicable, the same was also substantially complied with. The copy of the order of April 27, 1959 was filed as (Annex A with the petition, on
the date the petition was presented, and the other pleadings such as the Petition for Relief from Judgment Annex B), opposition to petition for relief
(Annex C) order of the respondent court denying petition for relief (Annex D), Notice of Appeal (Annex E), Opposition to Defendants' appeal, and
Motion for Execution (Annex F), with the motion for reconsideration, dated March 14, 1960, of the order of dismissal of the petition, which served to
cure the alleged defect, in form and substance, of the petition in question. If at all, petitioners were guilty of a technical violation of procedural
requirements, a technicality which does not seem to be of much moment presently, since the reason for its existence had been satisfied.

III. Mandatory and directory statutes:

In re Guaricña: YES. In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him
to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval
of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be
justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor,
without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. So ordered.

Dizon v. Encarnacion: The language of the above quoted provision is, to our mind, plain and clear. It establishes a general rule and an exception thereto.
Civil actions for damages in cases of written defamation "shall" be filed with the court of first instance of the province or city in which "any of the
accused or "any of the offended parties resides. "In other words, the plaintiff is limited in his choice of venue to the court of first instance of his
residence or to that of any of the accused. Plaintiff may not file the action elsewhere, unless the libel is published, circulated, displayed, or exhibited in a
province or city wherein neither the offender nor the offended party resides, in which case "the civil criminal actions may be brought in the court of first
instance thereof." The verb "may" is permissive. Hence, it does not necessarily imply a complete abrogation/repeal of the general rule laid down in the
preceeding sentence, except in so far as it broadens the two (2) alternatives therein set forth, by giving the plaintiff a third choice of venue. Although the
term "may" should be taken as "must" or "shall" when the intention of the law maker to give thereto a mandatory or compulsory meaning is patent or
manifest, no such intent appears insofar as the above provisionis concerned.

On the contrary, the use of the word "may" in the first, clearly suggest that Congress meant the second sentence to be merely permissive, not mandatory.
Indeed, when the libelous imputation has not been published or circulated in the locality wherein either of the parties resides, the offended party may not
wish to initiate the action therein, for the same would have the the effect of giving the additional publicity to the derogatory, and of increasing the harm
already caused to the complainant.

As a consequence, he "may" prefer to file suit where the libel had actually been published or circulated. Hence, the provision of this effect has been
established, in our opinion, for his benefit, which he may waive.

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 De Mesa v. Mencias: Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or public duty, or where it vests a public body,
municipality or public officer with power and authority to take actions which concerns the public interests or rights of individuals, the persuasive
language will be construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted upon as duty.

Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp: No. The word, “shall” was construed as directory and imperative, but not mandatory. Hence, the RFC has the
discretion on whether to accept the backpay certificate or not. The acceptance and discount of backpay certificates are within the sound discretion of the
RFC and it cannot be compelled by mandamus to accept such certificate because from the phrase “Subject to availability of loanable funds”, it can be
inferred that the legislative intent was to make such provision discretionary and not mandatory.

IV. Prospective and retroactive effect of statutes:

Ferrer v. Pecson: No. The jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the law at the time of the institution of the action. Sec 67
of Revised motor vehicle law and not under RPC, “the criminal jurisdiction of a justice of peace or a municipal court as defined in the judiciary act 1948
is confined to offenses in which the penalty is not more than 6 months.” From this, it is clear that the municipal court of manila had no jurisdiction over
this case where a maximum penalty og 6 years may be imposed and if it had no original jurisdication, the CFI presided over by judge Pecson had
likewise no appellate jurisdictions.

Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank & Trust Co: Resolution 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Sec 3 of RA 2264 of the local autonomy act empowers a
municipal council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances for the municipality. Sec 12 of RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality
should be “literally construed in its favor”, “to give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare and material
progress in the community.” This is found in the general welfare clause of the same act although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of power.