BAIL (RULE 114)

Purpose of Bail
Purpose of bail: to guarantee the appearance of a person before any court when so
required.
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law. Its
purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until
his conviction while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial.

Where to File
SECTION 17: BAIL, WHERE FILED (exact provision)
Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in
the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the
province, city, or municipality.

(a) If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where
the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said
place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
(b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be
released on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the
case is pending, whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or on appeal.

(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with
any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held.

WHERE APPLICATION OR PETITION FOR BAIL MAY BE FILED


• General Rule: application for bail may be filed with the court where the case is
pending.

• If the judge is absent or unavailable, then application may be filed with any
RTC judge, Metropolitan Trial Court judge, Municipal Trial Court judge, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court judge in the province, city, or municipality.
• It is wrong for another judge to entertain a bail application despite knowledge of
the pendency of the case in another court, where there is no showing that the first
judge of the court where case was pending was unavailable (Savella v. Ines)
• Judges who approve applications for bail of accused whose cases are pending in
other courts are guilt of gross ignorance of the law. (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
in RTC Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar)
• Where the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where
the case is pending, the application for bail may also be filed w/ any RTC of said
place. (Sec. 17a, Rule 114)
• If no judge is available, then with any Metropolitan Trial Court judge, Municipal
Trial Court judge or Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge in the said place. (Sec. 17a,
Rule 114)
• When bail is filed w/ the court other than where the case is pending, the judge who
accepted the bail shall forward it, together w/ the order of release and other
supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending. (Sec. 19, rule 114)
• The failure of a judge who granted the bail to transmit the order of release and
other supporting papers to the court where the case is pending constitutes violation
of the rules. (Savella v. Ines)

BAIL TO GUARANTEE APPEARNCE OF WITNESSES

General rule: bail does not apply to a person who is not in custody of the law
Exception: bail required to secure the appearance of a material witness
This material witness may be ordered to post bail even if he is not under 
detention


If he refuses to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he 
complies or
is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken. 

Bail may thus be required to guarantee the appearance of a material 
witness other
than that of the accused. 


Bail Before Filing of Information

BAIL FOR THOSE NOT YET CHARGED 

• Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any
court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. (Sec. 17, Rule 114)

• A person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender
may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or
information is filed against him. (Serapio v. Sandiganbayan) 

• The application for bail shall be made with any court in the province, city, or
municipality where the person arrested is held. 

• Ruiz v. Beldia: the person arrested was detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The
application for bail should have been filed before the proper Quezon City court and
not in Marikina City. 

• A municipal trial court judge has no authority to grant bail to an accused arrested
outside of his territorial jurisdiction. (Barbero v. Dumlao) 


Discretionary Bail
SECTION 5: BAIL WHEN DISCRETIONARY
(exact provision)

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.

The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for
bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to
the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed

the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously
escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his
bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

WHEN BAIL IS A MATTER OF DISCRETION

• When accused has been convicted in RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (Sec. 5, Rule 114)
• Notice of hearing applies in all cases whether bail is a matter of right or a matter of
discretion (Zuno v. Cabebe)

• It is a misconception that when crime is murder, accused is not entitled to bail
at all, or that murder is non-bailable. An offense with a penalty of reclusion perpetua
is discretionary on the part of the trial court. It is no longer bail as a “matter of
right,” but it is up to the discretion of the court depending on whether evidence of
guilt is strong or not. (Eduardo San Miguel v. Maceda)

WHERE APPLICATION FOR BAIL IS TO BE FILED WHEN BAIL IS A MATTER OF

DISCRETION AND AFTER CONVICTION BY THE RTC
 The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court even if a
notice of appeal has already been filed, provided that the trial court has not yet
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. (Sec. 5, Rule 114) 

 If the original record has already been transmitted to the appellate court, then
the application shall be filed w/ the said appellate court. 

 If the decision of the RTC convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed
with and resolved by the appellate court. (Sec. 5, Rule 114) 

 If the application for bail is granted, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail. This
is subject to the consent of the bondsman. (Sec. 5, Rule 114) 


Forfeiture and Cancellation of Bail

SECTION 21. FORFEITURE OF BOND
(exact provision)

When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his
bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date
and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be
declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to
produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be
rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period,
the bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-
production; and

(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when
first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the
bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall
not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the
accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.

FORFEITURE OF BAIL
 If accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared
forfeited. 
The bondsmen shall be given 30 days within which to produce their
principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them
for the amount of bail.
 The bondsmen must, within the period:

a. produce the body of principal, or give reasons for his non-production
 
b. explain why accused did not appear before the court when first required to
do so

 Failure in these 2 requirements -> a judgment shall be rendered against the
bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail
If bondsmen move
for mitigation of their liability, the court is required not to reduce or mitigate it
unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. Judgment against
bondsmen cannot be entered unless it is preceded by an order of forfeiture and
an opportunity given to the bondsmen to a) produce the accused, or b) adduce
satisfactory reason for their inability to do so. (Mendoza v. Alarma)
 An order of forfeiture is interlocutory. (Mendoza v. Alarma)
The order is
different from the judgment on the bond which is issued if the accused was not
produced within the 30 day period. (Mendoza v. Alarma)

SECTION 22: CANCELLATION OF BAIL
(exact provision)

Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail
may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the
accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on
the bond.

CANCELLATION OF THE BAIL | REMEDY

 Bail may be cancelled upon application of the bondsmen w/ due notice to the
prosecutor
1. upon surrender of the accused, or 

2. proof of his death 

 Automatic cancellation – bail may be deemed automatically cancelled upon
1. acquittal of the accused 

2. dismissal of the case, or 

3. execution of the judgment of conviction 

 Sec. 5, Rule 114- bail can be cancelled where the penalty imposed by trial court
is imprisonment exceeding 6 years if any of the grounds in par. 3 are present.

“If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That
he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
 (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal. “

Appellate court is also authorized to motu proprio or on motion of any party

review the resolution of the RTC after notice to the adverse party in either case.


 The appropriate remedy against trial court’s order canceling the bail is by filing
with the CA a motion to review said order. (Chua v. CA) 

 The filing of a separate petition via a special civil action for certiorari before the
appellate court is proscribed and contravenes the rule against multiplicity of
suits, and constitutes forum shopping. (Chua v. CA) 


Bail Pending Appeal

The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for
bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to
the consent of the bondsman.

Hold Departure Order

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
xxx
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
CASES:

1. Serapio vs Sandiganbayan

DOCTRINE:

 A person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary 
surrender may apply for bail as
soon as he is deprived of his liberty. A 
prior arraignment is not needed for an accused to post bail. 


 A motion to quash and petition for bail have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each
other. One questions the validity of the information to charge the accused; Bail is the security given
for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee
his appearance before any court as required 
under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court.



 A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of course avoid duplication of time
and effort of both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused,
especially so if both movants for bail are charged of having conspired in the commission of the same
crime and the prosecution adduces essentially the same 
evidence against them. 


SUMMARY: Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap
Muslim Youth foundation and he was charged of plunder with Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada. During the
course of his case he applied for bail, questioned various resolutions of the sandiganbayan, and filed a
motion to quash the information. His petition to bail was delayed due to various incidents and
people/prosecution in this case argued that he should first enter his plea before the hearing of his petition
to bail can be conducted. He also questioned the propriety of a joint hearing on the accused petitions for
bail because it would unduly delay the process. If Joseph Estrada’s petition for bail were to be conducted
simultaneously with his, it would become a fullblown trial on the merits of the case. Moreover, the
prosecution assailed the propriety of a motion to quash the information while the hearing for his petition
for bail was still pending.

The Supreme Court ruled that prior arraignment is not required before an accused can post bail. A person
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is
deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him.

Regarding the propriety of a motion to quash pending a hearing on a petition for bail, the SC said that an
accused may file a Motion to quash the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment. These two
reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an
accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but after
due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the
validity of the Information charging him with such offense.

On the issue of a joint hearing for the petitions for bail, the SC likewise ruled in favor of Serapio and said
in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the convenience of
the State, including the prosecution, but also that of the accused and the witnesses of both the
prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a speedy trial. A joint hearing of two separate
petitions for bail by two accused will of course avoid duplication of time and effort of both the
prosecution and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused, especially so if both movants for
bail are charged of having conspired in the commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces
essentially the same evidence against them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of
the petition for bail of Serapio with the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an
entirely different matter. For, with the participation of the former president in the hearing of Serapio’s
petition for bail, the proceeding assumes a completely different dimension. The proceedings will no
longer be summary. As against former President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a fullblown
trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing.

2. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPEC. ADM. REGION V. OLALIA


Doctrine:

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person
and the sanctity of human rights. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases— clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.

FACTS:

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by
virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a
petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in
extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:

Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that 
he will
appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to
orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking,
the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government; 


Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court; 


The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion 
for hold
departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and 


Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to
require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the
condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation 
be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a
motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. 


Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail


HELD:

A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
 Ratio Decidendi

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory
law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance
of the following trends in international law:

1. the growing importance of the individual person in public international; 


2. the higher value now being given to human rights; 


3. the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their 
treaty
obligations; and 


4. the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand,
and 
the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where
emphasis is given to the

worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan,
and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

3. ZUNO VS CABEBE

DOCTRINE:

The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered
aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate
the grant or denial of bail.
FACTS:

The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn complaintof Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R.
Zuño of the Department of Justice, against Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe,then Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court. The charges are knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and
partiality.

In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuño alleged that Criminal Case for illegal possession of
prohibited or regulated drugs was filed with the Regional Trial Court, against Rey DaquepArcangel,
VictorinoGametMalabed, William Roxas Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn Malabed Manuel and
Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment, all the accused, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged.

On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the right of the accused to a
speedy trial. On November 5, 2002, respondent judge motupropioissued an Order granting bail to the
accused, fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or property bond at P120,000.00, except for
accused Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash. Respondent judge issued the Order
without the accused’s application or motion for bail.

The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of acting thereon, respondent judge
issued an order inhibiting himself from further proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did was
patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that respondent judge be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.

In his comment, respondent denied the charges. While admitting that he issued the Order granting bail to
the accused without any hearing, “the same was premised on the constitutional right of the accused to a
speedy trial.” The prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the accused.

On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired.

In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent judge liable
for gross ignorance of the law and recommended that a fine ofP20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law by granting bail without hearing.

HELD:

YES. In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,we held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on
the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail,
especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
where bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail
whether it is a matter of right or discretion.It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases
where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must
first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where
there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.

There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting a hearing, in
violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in case an
application for bail is filed:

1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of
the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and
8, id.); 
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the petition should be denied. 


Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must
contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should formulate his
own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused.

Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated in Cortes. He did not
conduct a hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity
to interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a
summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence
cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution
and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.

Respondent’s contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the records of the criminal case that
the prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even assuming there was delay, this does
not justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a
bail hearing has been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and the Rules and maintain professional competence; and by
the very nature of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his duties. He must render
justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these
standards. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, now retired, is found guilty of violation
of Supreme Court Rules and is hereby fined in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), the same
to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

4. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan

DOCTRINE: Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown
to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.

SUMMARY: Enrile and several others were charged by the Ombudsman of plunder because of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under PDAF. Enrile then filed his
Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying that he be allowed to post bail should probable
cause be found against him. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground that such is premature
because Enrile had not yet voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. Enrile then voluntarily surrendered to CIDG and was later
confined at PNP General Hospital. Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion to Fix Bail. Sandiganbayan denied the
motion because the prosecution has not yet presented its evidence and Enrile has not even filed yet his
application for bail. Also, the presence of mitigating circumstances is not considered in determining the
grant of bail. Enrile then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the SC.

The SC ruled that the Enrile’s application for bail should be granted. The Court is guided by the principal
purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required
by the court. His social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail.

5. Leviste v. CA

DOCTRINE: Two Stages of Determining Discretion in Bail Applications:
(1) In the determination of

discretion stage, the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish WoN the appellate court will exercise sound
discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeall.
(2) The second
stage is the actual exercise of discretion, where assuming that the applicant falls within the first scenario
allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances,
other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of
equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail

Leviste was convicted of homicide (penalty was 6 and 1 day to 12years) by the RTC of Makati. He
appealed to the CA. Pending appeal, he filed for an urgent application for bail because of his advanced
age and health condition, which was denied by the CA. Leviste appealed his bail denial to the SC through a
Special Civil Action for Certiorari. Leviste's claimed that there was grave abuse of discretion and that the
CA should have ruled that when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than 6 years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 114 are
absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal. SC ruled that there was no grave abuse of
discretion as there was no evidence presented by Leviste that the CA made a whimsical and capricious
judgement. SC also ruled that the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where
the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years.The first
scenario deals with none of the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph present.The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances. In the first scenario, bail is
discretionary. In the second scenario, no bail shall be granted.