Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
RELIGIONAND POLITICSWORLDWIDE
PippaNorris
Hat'uanl Uniaersit_y
RonaldInglehart
Uniaersitl of Mihi.qut
ffiCavBRTDGE
uurvERSrrYPRESs
QjP
r10 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S
o.75 {
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0.7 0
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A ReligiousRevival in Post-Communist
Europe?
0. 60
0.55
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tt2 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S A RELIGIOUS
REVIVALIN POST.COMMUNIST
EUROPE? ll3
a long time-series, we think that the best alternarive way to probe into rwentieth century',a simple version of the modernization thesiswould lead
long-term trends is to examinesurveyscarried out during the rggos using us to expect a linear relationship between age and religious values(such as
generational comparisons, based on the assumption that the artitudes to- the importance anached to religion), as well as berween age and religious
ward religion that were instilled during a given generation'sformative years participation (such as aftendance at religious services and daily prayer): in
will leavelasting tracesin subsequentyears.If we find substantialintergen- both cases,we would expect to find that the young were less religious than
erational differences within given countries, they suggest (although they the old. Conversely, religion would be expected to remain sftong among
do not prove) the direction in which prevailing rends are moving. \4rhere both young and old in post-Communist agrariansocietiesthat remain poor
important cross-national differencesare evident, such as contTastsbetween and underdeveloped (such as Albania, Moldova, and Azerbaijan), for the
a relatively religious Romania and a reladvely secularEstonia, then we need samereasonsrhat apply to other low-income sociedesaround t}le world.
to explore their causesat the societal level, examining the role of such fac- Countries such as Turlrnenistan, Kazakhsran, and lJzbekistan in Central
tors as state reguladon of religious insdrutions, and the impact of human Asialost ground markedly during the r99os, with economiescharacterized
development indicators. bv large numbers of peasantfarmers, faltering healy manufacruring indus-
try, structural underemplolmlent, negative growth, poor basic healthcare,
shrinking averagelife spans,social inequality, and widespread poverty (with
The Secularization versus Supply-Side Debate
per capita Gross National Incomes in zooo below $5,ooo).
Theories of demand-side secularization and of supply-side religious mar- Support for the traditional secularization thesis can be found in the lit-
kets haveboth been used to explain developmentsin the region, but previous erature.For example,Need and Evans compared pafterns of religiosity in
studieshave been unable to resolvewhich is most clearly supported.On one t9g3-r994in ten post-Commulist societiesthat they classifiedaspredomi-
hand, the tradidonal secularizationthesisimplies that religiosity has gradu- natelyCatholic (the Czech Republic, Hungary Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia)
ally decayedin Central and Eastern Europe over successivedecades,for the and Orthodox (Belarus,Bulgaria, Romania, Russia,and Ukraine). Tested
samereasonsthat operate in other industrialized societies.[n particular, the with both linear and logged age regressionmodels, the study reports that
salienceofreligious values and habituai churchgoing would be expectedto ratesof church participarion usuallyshoweda paftern of linear decline asone
erode as a society experiencesthe long-term transition from poorer agrar- moved from older to younger generations,precisely as secularizationthe-
ian to more affluent industrial states. Social policies in the Soviet Union ory implies.: Qualitative casesrudiesalso support these findings; Borowik
emphasizedthe expansion of ttre welfare state, emplo),rnent securiry and arguesthat the break-up of the Soviet Union brought a radical shift in Cen-
widespreadaccessto public servicesin healthcare,housing, unempiol'rnent tral and Eastern Europe when the legal position of the churches changed
benefits, childcare, and pensions.The state invested heavily in broadening dramatically,with the new regimes recognizing freedom of relision as a
accessto schoolsand universities,so that by the early r98os levelsofpartic- basichuman right.+ In Russia,Belarus, and Ukraine, the number of those
ipation in higher education in Soviet bloc nations r,r'ereonly slighdy behind who declaredtheir belief in God and their adherenceto t-heOrthodox tra-
those in the West.' Oflicial repressionof religion u'ould be expectedto have dition rose in the short-term, immediately after the fall of communism, but
reinforced these factors, although its impact varied videly from one coun- the srudv found that commirment to the Church, and the level of religious
try to anottrer: in Poland, for example, Sor-iet-ledattempts at repressionof practice, are as low today as in the most secularizedWestern Europcan
religion \{'ere counter-productive, Ieading the Polish people to emphasize societies.Borowik concludes that the conremporary picrure of religiosiry
their attachment to religion as a way to preserl'etheir Polish identity. After in these countries, where atheism was imposed for many ye.ars,remains
the collapseof communism, the tendency toq'ard secularizationlinked with quite similar to that in W'estern Europe, where secularizationdeveloped
development should have acceleratedin counffies that experienceda suc- spontaneously.Kaariainen also concludesthat a brief religious resurgence
cessful uansition to democracv, such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech occurredin Russiaat the beginning of the r99os, but after that the situation
Republic, and more secureexternal relationshipsrvherestatesare becoming stabilized.By the late r99os, he found, only one-third of the Russianpopu-
integrated into the European lJnion and NATO. ln those post-Communist lation consideredthemselvesbelievers,the majority remaining irrdifferent
societieswhere people'slives gradually becamemore secureduring the late towardreligion. Furthermore, becauseof their atheistheritage,most people
ll4 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIC ION A N D P OLITIC S A RELICIOUS
REVIVALIN POST.COMMUNIST
EUROPE? ll5
have only a cursory knowledge of common Orthodox beliefs and many also are likely experience a shoft-tenn revival of religiosity if conditions since
believein astrologl',magic, reincarnation, and so on. The RussianOrthodox the fall of communism generatewidespreadfeelings of sharply diminished
Church is respectedbut only a minoriry of the people describethemselves existentialsecurity.
as Orthodox. Despite the grou.ing number of churchesand parishesacross In conuast to this interprerarion, a very different set of expectations
the country Kaariainen found that Russiansgo to church less often than is generated by theories of supply-side religious markets. The evidence
other Europeans.SSome have also einphasized that new forms of "indi- considered eariier threrv serious doubt on the capacity of this theory to
ri
vidualized" spiriruaiiq' outside the church are emerging in Cenual and explain variations within Western Europe, but it might be that this ac-
Eastern Europe.6 count provides a more convincing caseunder the conditions operating in
If the processof secularizationis relatedto human developmentand exis- post-Communist states.Supply-sidetheory emphasizesthat panerns oFre-
tential securi6', as the evidence presentedearlier in this book suggests,then ligrosiryin post-Communist sratesare determined by the role of religious tl
we might expect the long-term erosion of religiosiq' acrossa broad range organizationscompeting activelv for "hearts and minds," and in panicu-
of post-Communist societiesto be more complex than simpler versions of lar the degree of state regulation of the church. During the Soviet era, iii
I
modernization theory suggest.\\here living standardshave gradually risen religious organizations were strongly constrained or persecuted through- t,
in the region, this should tend to erode religiosity gradually over succeed- out most of Central and Eastern Europe, with the "Godless" Communisr t;
ing birth cohorts, astradidonal secularizationtheory suggests.On the other party actively promoting atheist beliefs and practice.EReligion was nor de- ri
hand, the collapseof liring standrrds and the disappearanceof the welfare stroyed,but it rvas strongly discouragedin most of these societies.eThe
state tiat occurred during the past decadewould lead us to expect a short- dissolutionof the Soviet Union and the collapse of comrnunism brought
'i1
term rez,iaalof religiosiw in low- to moderate-income societies,especially a radical change in the relationship berween chorch and state, with free- LI
i.i
for the more mlnerable seg:nentsof the population such as the elderly liv-
ing on dwindling state pensionsrvhile facing hyperinflation in food and fuel
costs.Widespread feelings of existentialinsecurity were also engenderedby
dom of religion becoming officially recognized as a basic human right and
a multitude of denominations becoming free to compere for followers. If
the poliry of atheism under the Soviet srate discouraged religiosiry, then
rilii
the sudden inroducdon of neo-liberal free markets,which produced severe we might expect a curvilinear pattern of age differences in religiosity. We
recessions,throwing millions of public sector employeesout of work; and might expect to find a U-shaped curve, with religiosity being relatively
where household savingsare threatened by hyperinfladon (asin Azerbaijan strong among the older generation that grew up in pre-Communist soci-
and Belarus);where political stability and government leadershipis under- eties,and also the youngest cohort that came of age under more liberal
mined by scandalsover corruption or a banking crisis;and where etlrnic con- conditions, while by contrast the middle-aged generation should prove the
flict sharplv worsensor where domestic securiryis threatenedby secessionist leastreligious. This can be tested by seeing v'hether age is most closeh.
movements,asin the Chechnya conflict.7 In the most dramatic case,the dis- relatedto indicators of religiosity in either a linear (monotonic) or a logged
integration of the tbrmer Yugoslar.ianrepublic led to the outbreak of bloody (curvilinear)fashion.
civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,heightening ethno-religious identities and Somestudieshave detectedsupport for this thesis;for example,Greeley
the salienceof religiosity among the Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim com- cornparedpublic opinion toward religion in nine former Communist coun-
munities co-existing in the Balkans.The tieory of secularizationbasedon tries,mosdy located in the Baltics and Central Europe (Russia,Hungary
existential security therefore predicts tlat the processof societalmodern- Siovenia,Slovakia,East Germany, Poland, Lan'ia, Bulgaria, and the Czech
ization in post-Communist Europe would tend to generatea long-term lin- Republic),derived from analvsisofthe r99r and r998 International Social
ear decline ofreligiosiry over successivebirth cohorts, but that this gradual SurveyProgram.'o Greeley found that common Christian beliefs, such as
ffansformation w'ould tend to be offset by short-term factors linked u'ith the faith in God and in reincarnation, are quite widespreadin this region. He
collapseof communism. Thus (r) itwill onlvoccur in those Cenual and East arguesthat generational comparisonsof these beliefs suggesta curvilinear
European countries that have experienceda long-term processof human U-shapedcun'e, with the oldest and the post-r96os generationbeing more
development and economic equaliry (z) it will be clearestamong the most likely to expressfaith than the middle-aged. Greeley concludes that a revival
secureand affluent social sectors,and also(3) specificcountries in the region in religious convictions has occurred among the younger generation in the
. 16 CASE ST UDIES OF RELIGTONA N D P OLITIC S A RELIGIOUS
REVIVALIN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE? tt7
, cgion, especiallyin Russia,although he acknowledgesthat this has not, as degreeof ethno-religious homogeneity and fractionalization.Any system-
, ct, been accompanied by a rise in church attendance.Other dimensions atic study therefore will need to utilize multivariate analysiscontrolling
.t'religious behar-ior,including affiliation to the Orthodox Church and for tle intervening factors that could affect the relationship betu'een agJe
:rgagementin prayer, remain relatively lou'and show clear erosion over and religiosin'.
,ccessivebirth cohorts.'' Arother study bv Froese also concludesthat the The most successful post-Communist societies, such as Poland,
rpply-side theory fits the casesof Hungary Poland, and East Germany, Hungary Siovakia,Slovenia,and the Czech Repubiic, havedevelopedstable
here a religious resurgence occurred after independence,driven, he be- representativedemocracieswith multiparty competition, free elections,and
eves,by a revival ofchurch organizations." thriving civic societies.Wtth economiesthat adjustedrelativel,vsuccessfully
to the free market, and positive ratesof economic growth, by the end of z ooo
thcscnrtions achieied per capitaincomesranging from $8,oooto $r6,ooo.
.lditional Relevant Factors
Just over a decadeafter achieving independence,these countries entered
'he debate between seculzrrizationdemand-siders and religious market dre European Union and NATO. The Baltic states,Latvia, Lithuania, and
rpply-siders has been difficult to resolve, in part becauseof the limited Estonia also engineered a fairlv rapid transition from a Soviet-swle com-
ine-seriessun.ey data that is available,but also becausepreviousstudies mand economl.to the free market and integration with M/estern Europe.
rve focused on different periods and compararive frameworks. One clas- By contrast, econornic groilth and progress on human rights and politi-
c danger in the casestudv approach, focusing on historical studies of the cal liberties proved sluggish, or even failed outright, in many other former
, ,le of the church in given counfties such as Poland or dre United States, Communist nations. Russianper capita GDP fell by 6% per year during
that specific countries can be selected to fit almost any given theory the r99os, while economic inequality (measuredby the GINI coefficient)
he ten-nation comparative study by Need and Evans was more wide- roseto the highest level in the region, and the averagelife expectanry de-
nging, but it r,l'asbased on surveys conducted during the early I99os, clined sharply.Belarusunder PresidentLukashenko experiencedeconomic
st a few years after independence,when many societiesremained in the stagnationand decline, experiencing a 3"/o fall in per capita GDP fiom
idst of democratic and neo-liberal market economic transitions. Gener- tggo-rggg, together with hyperinflation of consumer prices, and rigged
ronal changes emerge too slorvly to be captured so quickly. .{ny gener- elections.The countries of the South Caucusesand Central Asia are char-
ional shifts in religious values and beiiefs that did occur after indepen- acterizedby failing economies,repressiveregimesrvith no transition to even
ncervould take manl vears to become apparent.Ifost comparativesurvey competitive elections, and endemic poverty and hardship. Azerbaijan has
rurkhas also analyzedreligiosiry among Catholic Central European coun- considerablereservoirsof oil and gas,but GDP fell by a massiveg.6o/"an-
res,with lessattention given to developmentsin Eastern Orthodox and in nually during the rg9os, and the ruling regime has often been criticized for
;uslim societies. extensivecorruption and vote rigging. K)'rgyzstan has experienced flawed
This limits the generalizationsthat can be drawn about post-Communist parliamentaryand presidentialelections,the harassmentand imprisonment
.rrope, as dramatic contrasts are er,-identwithin this vast region, stretch- of opposition leaders,and the closure of dissident newspapers,as well as
g longitudinally from the Baltic to the Bering Strait and latitudinally negativeanlual economic gror.rth during the last decade.In this country
.xn the Arctic to t}re Caucuses.Societiesin Central and Eastern Europe nith averageper capitaincome around $z,4zo, the economy has failed: fac-
l'f'er significantly in numerous factors that could plausibly act as in- tories remain closed, unemployrnent has soared, and malnutrition is rife.
rvening variables conditioning the relarionship between age and reli- After the breakdoun of Soviet control, Balkan societieswithin the former
r.,n.These factors include a society's experiencesduring the transition Yugoslaviadescendedinto chaos and the bloody Bosnian war, fueled by
,cl consolidation of democracl', as well as in its historical religious cul- deep-rootedethnic conflict.
re, the duration of Soviet rule, the relationship between church and In short, post-Communist societieshave shown very diverse rates of
.rte under Communism, the successof its economrc adfustrnent to t}re progFesstoward democratizarion and economic development, and the
':c market during the last decade, its integration into international or- historical reladonships between church and srate also differed radically.
,nizations such as NATO and the EuroDean Union, as well as in its Johnston suggeststhat public religiosity continues to be relatively high
n8 CASE ST UD]ES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S A R E LIGIOU SR E V IV A L IN POS T-C OMMU N IS TE U R OP E ? ll9
in nations where the church u'as actively involved in resistlnce againstthe GenerationalChangein Religiosity
il
Sovietregime and the struggle for independence.'l In Poland and the Czech
Republic, for example, t}re role of the Catholic Church in opposing the Becausetime-seriesdata covering a reasonablylong period of time (suchas
Communist state, and the Western orientation and organizational links of the five decadesthat were used to test secularization in Western countries)
Roman Catholicism, meant that the Church rnaintained or even strength- arenot availablefrom the ex-Communist countries,we will usegenerational
enedits roie after independence.Strassbergarguesthat the Catholic Church comparisonsof the nvenw-two post-Communist societiescovered in the
has been involved in politics throughout the history of Poland, and after World Values Sun'ey 04"V.S)as a proxy indicator of long-tenn change. We
1945 it functioned as the main opposition to the Communist party.Ia [n will compare linear and logged regressionmodels to seewhich provides a
this regard, Polish Catholicism became associatedwith nationalism, free- better fit to the data. Our revised version of secularization tieory implies
dom, human rights, and democracy.'s By contrast, in Hungary the state that we should find a linear relationship between age and religious par-
establisheda policy of a "church within socialism," where the credibility ticipation, with religiosity falling through successivebirtl cohorts, in the
of the Catholic Church was eroded by collaboration with the Communist economically more developed societies. If, however, we find no significant
government. Religious freedoms expandedafter Hungarian independence, age-relateddifferences;or that the young are more religious than the old; or
but nevertheless peopie did not flock back to the Church.'6 In Croatia, a cun'ilinear relationship between age and religiosity, it wiil tend to refute
by contrast, during the Bosnian war religion played a key syrnbolic role our theory (and we will we need to explore further the causesof any appar-
in reinforcing a senseof disdnct national identity, distinguishing between ent religious revival among the younger generation). We will also compare
the Catholic Croats, the Orthodox Serbs,and the Islamic groups in Bosnia patternsof religiosiryin given societies.to seeu-hetherpost-Communist
and elsev'here.t7 countriesvary systen-ratically accordingto their level of human development
Comparisons also need to take account of the historically predominant andeconomic equaliq', as predicted by the theory of secularizationand ex-
religious culture in each nation, since the Soviet Union included Catholic, istentialsecuriry- or u'hether state regulation of religious institutions and
Protestant, Orthodox, and Muslim societies.In previous chapterswe found religiouspluralism provesa more conl'incing explanation,asthe supply-side
that beliefs and values differed in \A/estern Europe by the type of pre- thesiscontends.As in previous chapters,our core dependentvariableswill
dominant faith, and Need and Evans also found that Catholics in Cen- be religious ualues,measured by the importance of religion, and religious
tral and Eastern Iiurope are generally more regrrlar churchg;oersthan Or- particiPation,as indicated by frequency of attendance at servicesof worship,
thodox Christians.'8 The post-Communist counffies in the World Values and by frequency of prayer. For comparison with the work of Greeley, we
Survey include seven Catholic societies - Croatia, the Czech Republic, will also determine rvhether any generational differences exist in a range
Hungary Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,and Slovenia.From 7oo/oto 95o/oof of common religious beliefs.Ingeneralwe anticipate that generationaldif-
the population is Catholic in these countries, with a substantialProtestant ferenceswill be sftongestwith religious aalues,although if they exist, these
minoriqy in Hungary. The survey also covers eleven Eastern Orthodox soci- will also tend to be linked with one's patterns of religious behaaior-
eties,including Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia,Moldova, Thble 5.r presentsthe results of the fitted regressionmodels for age in
Montenegro, Rornania, Russia,Ukraine, and Serbia. Some of these coun- vears,using all the pooled surveysin post-Communist Europe from r995
tries contain more homogeneous populations than others, u'ith substantial to 2oor. The resultsof the models show that for all the dependentvariables
religious minorities (of rcY" or more) coexisting in Belarus (Catholics), exceptone (belief in life after death) dre linear models provide a slightly
Bulgarian (,Nluslims),Nlacedonia (Muslims), and Montenegro (Muslims betterfit than the logged ones.Among all post-Communist societies,across
and Catholics), as well as smaller populations of Muslims and Catholics nearlyallindicators,we find that (r) religiositywas stronger among the older
living elsewhere. The Protestant ex-Communist societies in the survey generationthan among the young; and (z) the age-relateddifferencestend
include Estonia, East Germany, and Lawia, and there are three Muslim to be linear, rather than curvilinear.'e This is precisely the pattern that is
ex-Communist nations, Nbania, Azerbaijan, and Bosnia-H erzegovina,al- predictedby the theory ofsecularization and existentialsecurity.
though both Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina contain substantialCatholic To illustrate these patterns graphically, and to help examine variadons
and Orthodox minorities. acrossthese counries, the trends by birth cohort are shown for religious
gKH""ru
t20 CASE ST UDIE S OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S A R E LIGIOU SR E V IV A L IN P OS T.C OMMU N IS TE U R OP E S r2l
RZ slg. srg.
RELIGIOUSPARTICIPAIION
Religiousparticipation .006 .000 .005 .000
Frequencyof pr.ryer .0 3 9 .000 .032 .000
RELIGIOUS VALUES 0,4
Importanceof religion .026 .000 .022 .000 4.2
r-^^-+-^^^
ttllPUI tdttLt ^t
ul
a^:
uuu .0 1 6 .000 .013 .000 0.0
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS Lithuania Macedonia
ENN
Believe in God .0 0 8 .000 .006 .000
Believe in life after death .0 0 1 .000 .002 .000
Believe in hell .0 0 1 .000 .000 N/s
Believe in heaven .0 0 1 .000 .000 .000
Believe in soul .0 0 0 N/s .000 N/s
Poland Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Slovenia
NE NK
NorEs: The models represent the results of individual-level regression analysis models
where age (in ve.rrs) was regressed as a linear or logged variable on indicators of
r e l i g i o s i t y , w i t h o ut a n y p r io r co n tr o ls, u sin g cu r ve fi t. The coeffi ci ents represent the
a m o u n t o f v a r i . r n ce ( Rr ) in r e lig io sity, a n d th e sig n ificanceof the rel ati onshi p,expl ai ned
b y a g e . N : 1 S ,5 9 5 ; N/s : No t sig n ifica n t; Sig . : 51gn1i 1.ance. R el i gi ous val ues:
" H o w i m p o r r a n r r s r e ftg lo n L n yo u r life i" Ye r y [4 ) , rather [3). not very (2) or not
Ukraine Yuooslavia
at all (t). Religious participation: "Do you attend reliSious selices severol times a
week. once o rpeek, a few times during, the year. onae a year or |ess, or never?" The tttl
h |I
percentage that repoiled attending religious services "several times o week" or "once c I
raeek." Frequency of prayer: QI99: 'Hour often do yolt pray to God outside of reLigious l\ ll: : _l
s e r u r c e s /t \ / o u l d yo u sa y...Eu e r y d a y ( 7 ) . m o r e th un once a w eek (6). once a w eek
( 5 ) . a t l e a s tt > n c ea m o n th 1 4 ) . se ve r a ltim e s a ye a r ( J), l ess often (2). never (1)." Mean
lrttl\l 1 -l
2.0 4.0 6,0 8.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
frequency per type of societl'. Importance of God scale: "How important is God in your Cohort ol birth Cohort of birth
life? Please u.setlzls scole to Lndicate - 10 means uery [mportant ond 1 means not ot aII
important." Mean per nation. Religious beliefs: Whether respondents expressed belief in
Iigure 5.1. ReligiousValuesby Cohort of Birth. Note: The proportion saying
G o d , i n h e a v e n , i n h e ll, in life a fte r d e a th , a n d in wh ether peopl e have a soul . thatreligion was "very important" to their lives, with the regressionline of the
S o u r c e : W o r l d V a l u e s Su r ve v, p o o le d 1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 1 .
hend.Source:World ValuesSurvey,pooled 1990-2001.
values(in liizure 5.r) and for religious participation (Figure 5.2). Linear
and logged reqression models fbr the effectsof age on religious valuesand than East German\', Estonia, and Montenegro. For the moment, we will
participation ll'ere also run for each nation. Regardlessof whether we fo- leaveasidet}re causesof these cross-nationalcontrasts(which could be due
cus on religious values or religious participation, the resultsshow two clear . to such factors as the historical relationship between church and state, or
i
patterns. First, there is a clear overall decline in all indicators ofreligiosity differences in levelsof human develop*..r} These cross-nationalcontrasts
acrosssuccessivebirth cohorts; the older generationsare almost alwayssig- . areinteresting in themselves: the countries where the older generation is
nificandy more religious than the young. Second,there are important dif- 'most seculargenerally display relatively flat patterns acrosssuccessivebirth
ferencesin levelsof religiosiq'in post-Communist societiestoday,similar to gohorts- while in those countries in which the older generation is rela-
tiose we have already observedin Western Europe. Poland, Romania, and tively religious, we find a more dramatic decline in religiosiry among tlre
Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, tend to be consistendy more religious younger cohorts. In other words, we find much stronger indications of
il
t22 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S A RELIGIOUS IN POST-COMMUNIST
REVIVAL EUROPE? r23
n
osnia & Heueoovin Table 5.2. ExplainingIndividual ReligiousParticipationin
0 .6 {-----l Post-Communist Europe
0 .4 l>\ I
\-=l s.e. (io
I3 ti )l
Beta ".o
o .2
c;
06
0 .4
o .2
0 .0
ffi
l :' l
1l
l.-= -l
SOCIALBACKGROUND
Age (linearin yearsJ
Malegender(0 women/i men)
Education(4-pointscalelow to high)
Income(l0-pointscalelow to high)
. 001
- . 164
. 207
- . 018
. 001
. 0r 7
. 0\ 2
. 003
.008
-.04i
.074
- . 023
.050
.000
.000
. 000
Lithuania Macedonia
i
vq)
f
0 .6
[-l N---l
1\ |
RELIGIOUSVALUESAND BELIEFS
Importance of religion( -pointscale
Iow to highj
. 594 . 010 . 308 . 000
= o 02 1\l l-\ I
0 .0 r_-l I >>l Reiigiousbeliefs(5-pointscale)
TYPEOF RELIGIOUSFAITH
.3t2 .006 . 232 . 000
Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Slovenis
1> IN N
>t
=9
g3
0 .6
0 .4
[--l Protestant
Catholic
Orthodox
1. 10
1. 67
.56s
. 046
. 025
.023
.10_s
. 377
. 130
.000
. 000
. 000
0 .2
Muslim - . 080 . 080 - . 004 N/ s
0 .0
Constant - ) , . 097
3E 0 .4
g8
0 .6
1-= R2 . 453
NorE: Models use ordinary ieast squares regression analysis with religious partici-
l:l
0 .2 pation (7-point scale measuring frequency of attendance at services of worshipJ as
0 .0 the dependent variable measured at individual level in 22 post-Communist societies.
'a'J"'. :ir'';"
:ir'lon'a'J.'^ The table lists the unstandardized regression coefficient (BJ, the standard error
(s.e.),the standardi zedregres s tonc oeffi c i ent [B eta), and the s i gni fi c anc e(S i g.1of
Figure 5.2. ReligiousParticipationby Cohort of Birth. Note: Religiouspartici the coefficients. N : 32,348. Religious participation: "Dct you attend religious serulces
pation fthe proportion that attendedchurch at leastweekly) by cohort of birth, seueraltimes cLveek, once a veek, a few times dtLing the year, once a year or Less,
with the regressionline of the trend. Source:World Values Survey,pooled or neuerl" The percentage that reported attending religious services "several iimes a
week" or "once a rveek." Importance of religion scale: "Hou' important ls rellglon ln
I 990-2001.
your Ltfe?' 4-point scale. Religious beliefs: Whether respondents expressed belief in
God, in heaven, in hell, in life after death, and in whether people have a soul. Type
of religious faith: Dummy variables (0/i) for whether the respondent belonged to
historical change in some countries than in others. The generationalcon- each type of major world religion.
trastsare most marked in Hungary Nloldova, and Romania, and lessevident Source: World Vaiues Survev. oooled 1990-2001.
in some otier nations rvith a more secularolder generation, such asin East
Germany, Estonia, and Lawia. These trends are strikingly similar whether whetherthesepatterns hold up - or seemto reflect the influence of specific
the comparisons are based on the importance of religious values, aften- variables.The regression models in Table 5.2 control for the society's
dance at servicesof worship, or the frequenry of prayer, which enhances level of human development as well as for the standard social and atti-
our confidencethat we are dealing v'it}r a robust and reliable phenomenon. tudinal variablesthat Chapter 3 demonstrated tend to influence pafterns
To control for the many other factors that could affect the relationship of churchgoing, such as gender, education, and income, in addition to the
between age and religiosity, we will use multivariate analysisto confirm impact of religious values and beliefs, and belonging to different world
124 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S A RELIGIOUS
REV]VAL
IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE' I25 il
religions. The pooled World Values Survey r990-2oor is used to analyze as the standard Herfindahl indicator for each country, ranging from zero
patterns acrossthe twenty-rwo post-Communist societies.The resultsshow to one.
that the linear effectsof age continue to be significant even with thesemul-
tiple controls, with religiosity continuing to be srronger among rhe older
generations.A similar regressionnlodel was replicatedusing logged ageand
StateRegulation of Religion
Europe
Table 5.3. ExplainingSocietal-LevelReligiosityin Post-Communist stronglyand signihcantly related to religious participation and frequencyot
d
ReligiousMcrket
Indicators
Re&gious
SocietalDevelopment
sI
a
frung
. tlovk
Slov
a . Muslim i.i
o
Lirh .,|;
NorE: Models use ordinary least squares regression analysis with mean religious values 34 a
' Orthodox f:
(the lO-point scale measuring importance of God) as the dependent variable measured (\
^ Protestant
at societal level in 19 post-Communist societies. The table lists the unstandardized
regression coefficient (Bl, the standard error (s.e.), the standardized regression
=J
o
Esl
Czech
I
r RomanCatholic
it
c oef f i c i e n t [ B e t a ) , a n d th e sig n ifica n ce o f th e co e fficie nts (S i g.). The smal l number
of cases (19) created problems of multi-collineanty and instability when the type of
6Z
E rf
religious culture was introduced (because of the close association between Catholicism
and the societies which were highest in human development and in religiosityl, so this
variable was excluded from the final model. See Figure 5.3. The growth in per capita
F1
o ./
Rsq= 9.4264
ii
f
HumanDevelopment
Index1998
GDP was also closely correlated with the Human Development lndex, so this was also
dropped to avoid problems of multi-collineairy. lmportonce of religion scole: "How
important ls God in your lifel" ]0-point scale. Human Deuelopment lndex, 1998'.Index
based on lon8evity, literacy, and education, and per capita GDP (in PPP); UNDP Human
DeveLopment Report 2002. New York: UNDP/Oxford University Press. ReLgious Freedom
rlili
Ind.ex'. 2}-point measure explained in the text and in the Technical Appendix, Table
A6.1, at the end of Chapter 6. Relryious pLuroLism: The Herfindahl index of relSious
ili
W
pLuralism or fractionalizotion, from Alesina et al. 2003. See Chapter 4 note 32 for details
of its c o n s t r u c t i o n .
Source: World Values Survey, pooled 1990-2001.
;
To confirm the finding of negative correlations between religiosiry and Religiousculture
religious markets we can also examine the scatter gram to seewhat is un- . Muslim
derlying this reladonship. Contrary to religious market theory Figure 5.4 o
r
shows how the salienceof religious valuesis related to both the Herfindahl 64 ' Orthodox
measureof religious pluralism and the Religious Freedom Index. The most (r^ " Protestant
secularcountries (such asthe Czech Republic and Estonia) havethe greatest
bJ
o . RomanCatholic
religious pluralism and fieedom of the church from state regulation. This o
6Z
is no accident;the reason,we believe, is that human development generates E
more secular values among the general population - and also greater 91
Rsq= 0.4040
religious freedoms, social tolerance, and democrary. Religion not only 0 2000 4000 6000 Sooo 10000
becomelless important to people'slives in securesocieties,but freedom of EconomicArowth1990-2000(Changein per capitaGDp in US$)
Religious
culture Conclusions
o
. Muslim
a There are manv reasonswhv patterns of secularizationin post-Communist
' Orthodox Furope mighr plausiblv be expectedto dil1-erfrom those we have already
rn +
found in the west. The role of the statein restricti'g religion under com-
^ Protestant
o3 munism is u'ell establishedand rve do not need to documenr its history
()
. BomanCatholic here.'4But the kev question for us is whether this repressionactuallv gen-
-
E, erated the erosion of mass spirirualiw in the soviet bloc, or whether it
o-
o_
may have exacerbated,but not necessarilycaused,a long-term growth of
L'I R s q= 6 . 1 2 6 1
50 60 70 80 90 100
secularizationin this region which parallelssimilar developmentsin other
Low -- Religious
FreedomIndex-- High countries.The fact that \A/esternEuropean democracieshave a long his-
tory of religious tolerance, human rights, and civic liberties during the
Aze
twentieth cenrury means that the comparison of these regions provides an
exceptionallvu'ell-designed"narural experiment" to rest the "bottorn-up"
Rom
and "top-down" claims in the sociology of religion.
Geo
The generational comparisonssuggestthat there has been a rong-term
Alb Mol Bc
decline of reiigiosiw across succeeding generations in post-communist
Cro'
rArm
w N4ac Europe,and rve found no convincing evidenceof a cun ilinear pattern from
o
the generadonalcomparisons,suggestingthat the younger generarion has
------ Likr
Pol --_ --------Edlel
Religious
culture not experienceda significanrrer.ivalof religious r-alues,beliefs,or behanor.
I
6 r{oreover, the cross-nationalcomparisonsindicate that the cross-national
O<
ar Slov Rus
Hung t . Muslim
' ]- . Slovk
r differencesthat do remain important today can be satisfactorilyexplained
' a But
/11 LIIN ' Orthodox by levels of human development among post-communist narions, just as
=4 a
^ Protestant
thesefactors explain pafterns elsewhere.The supplv-side tl-resisthat reli-
o
()
c
giousmarkets are crirical, so rhat participadon is determined by reliqious
t:' r RomanCatholic
L czech piuralism and the lack of state regulation of church institutions, is given
o t
o- no positivesupport from the evidence;instead,the opposite position seems
F^
B s q= 0 . 0 1 3 3 to be the case.It is the more homogenous religious cultures, exemplified
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7
by the role of catholicism in Poland, which have best-preservedfaith in
Low - - R e l i g i o u sp l u ra l i s m-- h i g h
God and habirual church aftendance,not rhe most plural. And todav the
Figure 5.4. ReligiousValues,ReligiousPluralism,and the ReligiousFreedom post-communisr stareswith the greatesrregulation of the church *.n or.,
Index. NotqiSee the text for details of the 2O-pointReligiousFreedomIndex. to be the most religious, not the least. we argue that this is no accident;
Source:WorlihValuesSurvey,pooled I 981-2001.
r32 CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S
ro
rN sEEKTNG understand the role of religion in the Muslim world, many
popular commentators have rurned to Samuel P. Huntington's provocative
and controversial thesis of a "clash of civilizations." This account empha-
sized that the end of the Cold War brought new dangers. Huntington
argued:
133