The Historian 2005

The Historian
Volume 3 July-December 2005 Number 2
Department of History
GC University, Lahore
The Historian
Volume 3 (July-December 2005) Number 2
© The Historian is published by the Department of History, GC

University, Katchehry Road, 54000 Lahore, Pakistan.
No potion of this journal may be reproduced by any mechanical,

photographic or electronic process, or in the form of a photographic
recording without written permission from the copyright holders.
ISSN. 2074-5672
Price: 250 PKR

Editor: Tahir Kamran
Associate Editors: Hussain Ahmad Khan, Noor Rehman
Design & Production Incharge: Shifa Ahmad
Editorial Advisory Board
Farhat Mahmud - Department of History, GC University, Lahore, Pakistan

Ian Talbot- Department of History, University of Southampton, UK
Iftikhar Haider Malik - Department of History, University College of Newton
Park, UK
Kathrine Adeney - Department of Political Science, University of Sheffield,
UK
Mridula Mukherjee - Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India
Qalb-i-Abid – Department of History, University of the Punjab, Lahore,
Pakistan
Sharif-ul-Mujahid – Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, Karachi,
Pakistan
Shinder S. Thandi - Department of Economics, Coventry University , UK
Shuan Gregory – Peace Studies, Bradford University, UK
Surrinder Singh - Department of History, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India
Virinder Kalra - Department of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, UK
THE HISTORIAN
JULY-DECEMBER 2005 (VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2)
ARTICLES
TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF PARALLEL CULTURE

…. SHUJA ALHAQ 05
HISTORICIZING PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY…. IRFAN WAHEED USMANI
27
JINNAH–MOUNTBATTEN RELATIONS …. BASHARAT HUSSAIN 59
ASSERTIVENESS IN INTER-SUBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT: HEIDEGGERIAN

PERSPECTIVE …. UMBER BIN IBAD 85
CONCEPT PAPER
FAILURE OF PAKISTANI PRESS IN STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY: A CASE

OF ARTICLE 58 (2B) …. TAIMUR-UL-HASSAN 117
NOTES FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS AND BOOK REVIEWERS

Shuja Alhaq, Parallel Culture
TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

CONCEPT OF PARALLEL CULTURE
SHUJA ALHAQ
SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES,
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, UK
ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to cast a fresh look on

medieval Indo-Muslim culture. Here it is
argued that this culture cannot be treated as
a single, monolithic phenomenon. The very
advent of Islam in India is seen as marked
by two distinctly contrasting figures of
Mahmud of Ghazna-Uthman b. Hujwiri in
the eleventh century and Shahabuddin
Ghuri-Muinuddin Chishti in the twelfth-
thirteenth centuries. While the former in the
two pairs are known for their love of
plunder and wealth, the latter are
recognized through their cultivation of
poverty. These two modes of personalities
are seen as representatives of two cultures.
While the property culture is most typically
reflected in the life of the sultan/king, that of
opposing or parallel culture is epitomized in
the personality of ascetic/faqir. The two
cultures, each recognizing the necessity of
the other, yet keep their respective
autonomies by offering distinct sets of values
and ideals in human life. Whereas the
established culture offers man the possibility
to seek happiness in appropriation of wealth
and property, the parallel culture provides
for the principle of freedom and autonomy
from the material world. The qualitative
difference between the two was universally
recognized equally among the rulers as well
as the common people. If we are able to do
so today, it may lead to some significant
5
repercussions in respect of our

understanding of Indo Muslim society in
particular and man in general.
KEY WORDS: Culture, Subcontinent, Sufism, Mahmud of

Ghazna-Uthman, Shahabuddin Ghuri-Muinuddin Chishti.
Islam penetrated into India in the eleventh century 1 as a

composite of two distinct cultures. The one is manifested in
the life of Mahumd of Ghazni [d. 1030] whose love for
plundering the wealth of India far exceeded his better known
passion for the propagation of his faith. 2 The opposing culture
is represented in the personality of the famous Sufi, Ali bin
Uthman Hujwiri[d. 1072], who, incidentally, also hailed from
Ghazni, but settled in Lahore sometime in the fourth decade of
the eleventh century at the direction of his sheikh. He
considered wealth as a misfortune for a faqir. 3
In the late twelfth century this pattern was again
repeated in a similar fashion. This time we find, on the one
hand, Shahabuddin Ghauri [d. 1206], an adventure par
excellence, who after repeated invasions of India laid the
foundations of the Dehli Sultanate, the first Muslim kingdom
of India [1206-1526]. The treasure he left behind, in the words
of Firishta, was ‘almost incredible’, with the weight of
diamonds of various sizes alone amounting to 500 maunds. 4
On the other side we see the figure of Muinuddin Chishti
[d.1236], who settled in Ajmer, in the capital of the Hindu
ruler Prithvi Raj, shortly before the defeat of the latter at the
hands of Ghauri in 1192. 5 The pride and distinction of
Muinduddin was his self-cultured poverty. 6
Around these two figures of the king and faqir is
evolved the whole of medieval Indo-Muslim culture. 7 In other
words, medieval Indo-Muslim culture is essentially a pluralist
culture, or to be more accurate, a unity of multiple cultures
where the established culture, whose arch representative is the
king, co-existed with the parallel culture led by the faqir. The
individual and society is permeated with two sets of values
and ideals. One is motivated by the acquisition of wealth and
physical power over the others while the other is based on the
cultivation of personality, detachment from the physical
world, and integration with the Whole, the totality of
existence. However, the two cultures exist with the
consciousness of each other’s necessity for social existence.
The term ‘parallel culture’ therefore should by no means
6
imply that it intended to replace or impose its hegemony by

ousting the other and vice versa. Thus what we call the
medieval Indo-Muslim culture is in fact the unity of two
cultures, at once in harmony as well as in opposition to each
other.
The popular tendency however is to trace the socio-
historic or cultural pattern of this period from the vantage
point of politics and the state. This inevitably leaves the
culture of the faqir in the periphery while the major,
sometimes even the sole emphasis goes to the lives and culture
of the kings and their dynasties. This tendency grows from our
perception of the state as the chief embodiment of socio-
political and cultural life of the society. This perception also
derives from the fact that to the state is dependent the
institution of property which we conceive as the primary and
objective form of man’s creation, as his supreme self
manifestation. However, the faqir’s life and work does not
come into the domain of politics, state, and property. To say in
more popular terms, he lived outside the world. But we tend
very often to perceive his living outside the world too literally
and place him at the periphery of the society. The fact is that
he only lived outside the established culture and not the
culture and society itself. His being was the manifestation of
the higher dimension of human consciousness, the
consciousness that endeavors not to be tied down to the given
and the concrete, that aims to remain free from the actualized,
the materialized dimension of human consciousness. Thus in
his idealized form the faqir was free from all the given
relations of family, state, and property.
The faqir, in other words, represented the other end
of the social order and his existence for the survival of society
was universally reckoned as necessary a condition as that of
the king, or even more than his. While the king was taken to
represent the body of human society, the faqir or dervish was
the soul, and the superiority of the soul over body was never
doubted, for soul represented the eternal dimension of human
existence. A medieval Muslim historian writes:
The world is bound by serious law and order,

upheld by men of faith. In every country there
lives a master-mind, in every region a man of
acquirements. Although every country has a
king, it is really protected by a dervish. The
kings lord over the land, but the dervishes
consume its calamities. Were there no autar
on the face of the earth, the seven-fold tent of
7
skies would have collapsed. When the Lord of

days and nights wills to destroy a land, He
first orders the man [of God] to depart from
there and then appoints there a tyrant as a
ruler. 8
The tendency to see the king or the state as the pivot of society
signifies the one-sidedness of most evaluations of pre-modern
Indian culture, resulting in the enormous deficiency in the
understanding of the culture of the faqir. Out of this deficiency
emerges an incomplete picture of man in general, an
essentially distorted understanding of human nature and
consequently a failing in the comprehension of the totality of
human culture.
Though the king and the faqir are typified in the
character of Ghauri and Chishti, we find the great mass of
humanity living with two cultures intricately bound or
diffused together. Thus we are in fact confronted with the
phenomena of not only two but three cultures. That is, it may
be that we find a faqir who manifests deficient understanding
of the parallel culture and thus represents a confusion of two
cultures. Likewise a king can manifest traits of parallel culture
in his character or a deep sympathy and understanding of the
role of parallel culture in maintaining balance in the individual
and social spheres of human life. But whereas the broad social
consensus on the role of the two, the king and the faqir, as the
essential ingredients of human culture was never questioned,
the relationship between the two was far from being smooth: it
ranged from friendship, indifference, suspicion, tension and
sometimes hostility.
The tension and hostility between the two cultures
grew also from the active role of the ulama on the side of the
established culture. Though the state was not run strictly
according to the sharia, the Islamic law governing the relation
of family, state and property, yet it provided the basic
categories on which the identity of the Muslim rule was
established. Since the ulama were the ultimate authority and
the specialists on sharia, their coalition and association with
the royal court was a fact taken for granted. In their capacity
as a party in the structure of the given order their relationship
towards the leaders of the parallel culture was bound to be
tense and fraught with difficulty and suspicion. Here we
cannot go into detail over the history of this not too pleasant
relationship. Suffice to say that though the ulama had their
share of differences with the king but as a class or a party they
largely confronted the culture of the faqir which they found
8
too erratic and liberal for the identity and absolute nature of
sharia.
The prime features of the established culture are
reflected in, firstly, the finitude of human consciousness
ascertained in the dogma of the duality of God and man,
vigorously expounded by the ulama as the very foundation of
sharia, and, secondly, the property-relation with the world.
The parallel culture emerged in the context of a conception of
man in which he was tied down to the world of matter while
his consciousness lacked the content of infinity, the experience
of the whole. If by asserting the essential oneness of man and
God the parallel culture asserted that man, in his essence, was
immortal and infinite; through cultivating the non-possessive
relationship with the world, popularly known as renunciation,
asceticism, non-detachment, or faqr (voluntary poverty), it
also sought to free man from the bondage of the outer world.
Unity with the Whole, i.e. infinity and immortality of
consciousness and faqr, i,e., non-property relation with the
world go hand in hand and each fails to realize its meaning in
isolation from the other. This is because struggle to attain
Unity without faqr, which is also defined as the absence of
desire, of self, turns out to be hypocrisy, and faqr not directed
towards or without the goal of Unity degenerates into
destitution and dogmatism. If the latter is the theory of the
former, the former is the practice, the methodology for
realization of the latter. Abul Qasim Junaid’s remarkable
description of the state of the faqir that ‘when his heart is
empty of phenomena he is poor’ 9 points to the dialectical
nature of Unity and faqr. Emptiness of phenomena indicates
freedom at once from property-relation with the world as well
as from duality, that is, from everything other than God. This
dialectic assures that neither lack of physical objects or
apparent destitute condition nor high flying in the realm of
mind or metaphysics can lead one to Transcendence. 10
However it needs to be emphasized that the parallel
culture neither arose nor developed in a neat and well marked
demarcation from the established, given culture. Within its
domain grew different tendencies or currents. Its core was
represented by what may be called the essential Sufism. It
stood for ascension, the movement from humanity to divinity;
that is, nothing less than essential union between man and
God. It perceived sharia as the initiatory discipline that
reflected and governed the given condition of man, the
condition of duality, of man’s separation from God, of his
finitude. This condition is often stated in Sufi writings as
human nature or the humanity. 11 As man actively engages
9
himself in the movement of spirit, and sheds his given

condition, the state of bondage and duality, the human
qualities, he grows out of the domain of sharia since the
condition reflecting that domain begins to fade. Sharia, in
other words, is the consciousness of the alienation, of
separation from the truth, the whole, the totality of existence.
This consciousness in turn implies the struggle to move out of
separation. And when one moves nearer to the Unity the
discipline practiced in the state of separation becomes
redundant and its memory a sin. Saadi offered a very apt
description of the point when he wrote:
The sinners repent from their sins

The Gnostics implore forgiveness for
worshipping. 12
The arif (gnostic) repents from worshipping since the

worshipping represents the duality, the separation of I-thou,
worshipper and the worshipped. Ibn Arabi, in a brilliant
exposition of the two contrasting positions, remarked:
God is known only by means of God. The

scholastic theologian says: “I know God by
that which he created” and takes as his guide
something that has no real relation to the
object sought. He who knows God by means
of phenomena, knows as much as these
phenomena give to him and no more. 13
Here Ibn Arabi conceives the knowledge of God essentially as

transcendence. The concept, and the corresponding endeavour,
remains alien to the alim because he approaches the Creator
from the vantage point of the creation, to the Whole from that
of the fragment which is as hopeless an endeavour as that of
the blind men seeking to know the elephant by touching his
different limbs separately in Rumi’s famous story. The
knowledge of God on the other hand implies a decisive break
from the condition of humanity, of creation, of separateness
and fragmentation. In simple words, only through assuming
the consciousness of Unity, of the Whole that one becomes
whole and by no other means.
Besides essential Sufism there were also the middle
and the orthodox currents within the large domain of Sufism.
The moderate tendency did manifest the consciousness of the
autonomy of the Sufi culture but remained equally concerned
to expound the inner consistency between the sharia and the
10
Sufi path. The orthodox tendency, however, failed to draw the

demarcating line between Sufism and orthodoxy, the
institutional religion. It visualized Sufism merely as the
rigorous fulfillment of ritual and absolute exclusion of
initiative and individuality from spiritual life. This current
gained ground as the prestige and role of the Sufis in society
grew rapidly affecting almost all the domains of social life. It
therefore became increasingly apparent that Sufism could only
be combated in its essentials; or, in other words, much of its
exterior was interiorized by the orthodoxy with the awareness
that it could not be dealt with from without. So that with the
passage of time it becomes increasingly difficult for an
ordinary man to decipher who was who and what was what?
How far essential Sufism lagged behind to allow this
development is a vexed question needing a separate treatment.
[I]
When Sufism arrived in India, it had already reached its

highest theoretical development. This development manifested
itself both vertically, i.e., in its theory, and, horizontally i.e. in
its practice. In theory it represented in almost universal
consensus among the major Sufi thinkers in the twelfth and
thirteen centuries that the highest destiny of man lay in unity
(with God). This unity we can term as Transcendence or even
Freedom which implies release from the (individual) self and
realization or attainment of the consciousness of the Whole.
Its best formulation was offered by Ibn Arabi, in the doctrine
of Wahdat al-Wujud, the unity of all being, so much so that he
and his doctrine eventually became identified with Sufism
itself. Besides Ibn Arabi, Jalaluddin Rumi was the most
powerful voice expounding the cause of Transcendence and
Freedom.
The horizontal development of Sufism was
manifested in the origination and expansion of the great
associations of the Sufis, called the silsilahs, (spiritual)
‘chains,’ brotherhoods or orders. These orders, originating
from the major Sufi leaders of the twelfth-thirteenth centuries,
were the outcome of more than one inter-related developments
in the world of Sufism. Mainly among these were, on the
theoretical side, a near consensus on essential unity of man
and God, and the determination of the goal of spiritual
endeavour as the shedding of human nature and assumption of
the divine. On the practical side of the development was the
emergence of khanaqah as the parallel institution to the
mosque and its gradual establishment as the center of not only
11
spiritual but wider public socio-culture activity. Out of the

interaction of these two developments grew the powerful
figure of the Sheikh, the embodiment as well as the
manifestation of the Divine.
But whereas quite a few orders had already come into
being in the Islamic world by the turn of the twelfth century,
the first to gain roots in India, the Chishtiya, did not have a
prior history. However its early history in India in the span of
a hundred and fifty years provides a superb illustration of the
growth of parallel culture in the Indo-Muslim world from
humble beginnings to its zenith when the Chishti centre in
Dehli emerged as the parallel center of power in the Sultanate
in the first quarter of the fourteenth century, to its dispersion
and persecution at the hands of state power in the second
quarter.
It is important to remember that the parallel culture
had a rich indigenous history in India. Thus when Muinuddin
Chishti settled at Ajmer by the end of the twelfth century, the
country already had the yogi’s 14 culture firmly established on
its soil. Dumont writes:
Is it really to adventurous to say that the agent

of development in India religion and
speculation, the “creation of values”, has been
the renouncer? The Brahman, as scholar, has
mainly preserved, aggregated, and combined:
he may well have created and developed
special branches of knowledge. Not only the
founding of sects and their maintenance, but
the major ideas, the “inventions” are due to
the renouncer whose unique position gave him
a sort of monopoly for putting everything in
question. 15
The central figure of this culture was individual, the individual

whom society not only allowed to exist but sanctified for
having his own mode of existence, i.e., his personal way
towards life and truth. 16 It was sanctified because he was
occupied with the fundamental questions of freedom and
salvation with which the whole society was deeply concerned.
The society took responsibility for his living for the reason
that the questions and the quest towards their resolution were
given a place far higher than earning one’s living. Basically it
was this preoccupation with what may be called transcendence
that formed the paramount feature of India and newly
emerging Indo-Muslim society. And it is only through this
12
context that the pioneer position of faqir/dervish or

yogi/sanyasi in the society can be determined.
There were also some other factors which contributed
in the growth of tolerant culture in India that most Muslims
encountered on their arrival. Of these the paramount factor
was diversity in religion and mode of spirituality. Perhaps in
no other part of the world can one find the evidence of such
great variety of sacred scriptures, sects, deities, and rituals,
modes of worship, beliefs, and seers with the caliber of
prophets as that which emerged in India in the span of two to
three thousand years. This remarkable diversity gave birth to
an atmosphere of peaceful co-existence, a generally tolerant
attitude towards divergent beliefs. It was due to this liberal
environment that the Muslims who settled in India peacefully
during the eighth to the ninth-eleventh centuries mainly
through the coastal areas did not face hostile attitudes from the
local population or rulers and were allowed to build mosques
and preach their religion. 17
The strong presence of the ascetic, the renouncer, in
the Indian soil played an important role in Muinuddin Chisti’s
settlement at Ajmer, the capital of a strong Hindu state even
before its conquest by Shihabuddin Ghauri. For, he was well
advanced in the discipline of renunciation and had not come
into an absolutely alien soil. The importance of discerning the
real circumstances of Muinuddin’s integration into a new soil,
or, to be more precise, the discernment of the close affinity
between the Sufi and Indian spiritual traditions, lies in the fact
that failure in doing so has led, consciously or unconsciously,
many Muslim writers of the past as well as present to resort to
fabulous miracles in order to account for the Sufis’ survival in
such ‘hostile’ conditions. Typical is the case of the
seventeenth century writer of Jawahar-i Faridi who offers
quite a fantastic description of Muinuddin’s arrival and
settlement at Ajmer. 18
[II]
Muinaddin Chishti, born in Sijistan, east Persia, had travelled

widely and shared the company of a number of Sufi leaders of
Islamic world when he decided to settle in India. He seems to
be a man free from dogma and ritual. Besides that his great
asset in gaining roots in the new soil must have been his deep
faith and practice in the cultivation of voluntary poverty. He
was a Unitarian and his thought was characterized by fullness
of humanist content. Love could be realized through
13
transcendence from externals and coming into grips with the

essence, the oneness, while the highest form of devotion to
God was ‘to redress the misery of those in distress, to fulfill
the needs of the helpless and to feed the hungry.’ 19 The three
principles of the life of faqir attributed to him were later to
become the epitome of Chishtiya order. These are: River-like
generosity, sun-like affection and earth like hospitality. 20
It may well be pointed out that though knowledge
and practice, Unity and faqr are ultimately inseparable in Sufi
doctrine, yet in the twelfth-thirteenth centuries we may find
individuals in whom one aspect outshined the other. Ibn Arbi
for instance is a case of high excellence in the domain of
knowledge and theoretical exposition of the doctrine. In
Muinuddin Chishti on the other hand is manifested more the
domination of ecstasy of faqr and service to humanity as the
hallmark of spiritual life. Thus his successors were to offer the
model of the individual who lived with minimum needs for
himself but lived among the people fulfilling multiple
responsibilities: meeting their spiritual needs both by guiding
them towards higher goals and soothing and sharing them in
their everyday pains and difficulties; he also comforted them
in their physical needs from the resources invested in him by
the society itself.
His successor in Dehli, Qutbuddin Bukhtiyar Kaki
[d.1236] was equally well-versed in faqr. The two had met in
Baghdad finding commonness in their character and approach
towards Sufism. Qutbuddin came to India probably sometime
in the second decade of the thirteenth century during the reign
of Shamsuddin Iltutmish [1211-36]. Iltutumish had a high
regard for the Sufis and, we are told, he himself bore a mystic
temperament and sought the company of the saints. 21 Hearing
the news of Qutbuddin’s arrival he went out of the city to
receive him. He also offered Qutbuddin residence near his
palace and later the post of Shaikh ul-Islam. The latter
declined both the offers 22 presumably as part of his attempt to
safeguard the autonomy of Sufism by keeping it away from
the Muslim rulers and the state. In this endeavor he was also
helped by another outstanding Chishti leader, Hamiddudin
Sufi, also scholar of high repute, for whom spiritual excellence
grew predominantly from a critical attitude towards property
rather than excessive zeal in the fulfillment of religious
duties. 23
Thus the most important contribution of these Chishti
leaders towards the development of parallel culture in the
newly emerging Indo-Muslim society lay in their strict
adherence to the ideal of distance from property, politics and
14
all the institutions of the state. In a time when Muslims were

strongly identified with the state, the symbol of their power,
and all the aspirations of the intelligent members of this
community were directed towards joining the state
institutions, the channels of wealth and power, the Chishtis
struggled towards the growth of culture based on altogether
different aspirations, that enjoyed autonomy from the state
power, property and their associated values of greed, hatred
and ruthless competition to jump over the other for a higher
prize.
But at same time it should also be noted that the
Chishtis were not advocating polarization of the spiritual and
material in the society. This is indicated by the fact that high
officials of state including princes, and sometimes also the
king, for instance Iltutmish, would visit the khanaqah, and
occasionally were even accepted as the lay disciples. But
spiritual excellence was reckoned an autonomous discipline
that required one’s establishment in a centre different from
that of the worldly culture. The identity of spiritual realm
could only be maintained if its leaders exercised as much
autonomy in their thought and behavior as their counterparts
did in their sphere. 24
Chishti leaders also introduced music as the essential
component of spiritual life. If their commitment to faqr helped
them to distance themselves from the court and the Muslim
ruling classes, their devotion to music led them increasingly
towards estrangement from the religious establishment and
nearer to the common people and the native culture. Music, in
the form of sama (musical rendering of poetry in a gathering)
accompanied by dance was practiced as means to ecstasy, i.e.,
freedom from self consciousness. The Chishtis’ immense
contribution to the cause of music in India in early Muslim
period is epitomized in the person of Amir Khusrau [1254-
1325] who was raised in Chishti circles. A composer as well
as a theoretician, he is known as the founder of the Indo-
Muslim musical tradition.
Sufism in India took a new leap with the coming on
the scene of two great Chishti leaders, Fariduddin Shakarganj
[d.1265] and Nizamuddin Auliya [d.1325]. Fariduddin hailed
from the Punjab while his grandfather was an immigrant from
Kabul. Though the greater part of his life passed in Punjab, ‘it
was due to his efforts’ ‘observes Nizami, ‘that the Chishti
order attained an all-India status and its branches came to be
established in many important towns of India. 25 And further
that ‘he gave to the Chishti silsilah the momentum of an
organized spiritual movement.’ 26 He was very conscious of
15
the autonomous character of Sufi culture. So when he was

designated by his master as the chief of the Chishti order after
his death, the first decision he took was to move the Chishti
centre away from Delhi. He found the city unsuitable, being
too polluted by the royal presence, for the organization and
expansion of the spiritual movement. With it he took another
bold decision. He left even Hansi, where he was staying
before his master’s death, and chose a deserted place near the
town of Ajodhan (now Pakpatten) as his home and the new
centre of the order, thus setting a difficult example for his
followers.
Fariduddin Shakarganj is also known, particularly in
the Punjab, as the ‘father of Punjabi language and literature.’
This title comes from the collection of dohras, rhymed
couplets, attributed to him appearing first time in the Guru
Granth, the sacred book of the Sikhs compiled in 1603-
4. 27 The verses often look like whispers, more to one’s own
self. Sometimes they are addressed towards the given
condition of man characterised by a conditioning in which
even the knowledge of good does not deter him from evil and
heedlessness emerges as his dominant trait. When the poet
finds himself a member of this species, sharing so much with
it, fear comes in. Then he thinks of death and the limited
period of time at his disposal. The time seems too short given
so much to redress, so long to go. He is forced to visualize the
grave. The immobility in the grave terrorizes him;
Faridaa it sarhaana, bhoen son, kiraa lario

maas
Ketariaan jug vaapre, ikat piaan paas. 28
O Farid! A brick under your head, lying on the

soil, while the insects eating your flesh; the
ages would pass and you would keep lying on
one side.
It is this immobility, inability to move, to act, in the death that

pushes him towards action, towards overcoming his inner
nature and heedlessness. As long there is life, the possibility of
freedom of union is alive. There are two other verses in which
the indecision, conflict and resolution is portrayed beautifully:
Faridaa galien chikkar dur ghar naal piaare

nenh
Turaan taan bhijje kambli rahaan taan tutte
nenh
16
Bhijjo sijjo kambli Allaah verso menh

Jaae Milaan tinhaan sajnaan tutto nahin
nenh. 29
O Farid! The streets are full of mire [with
consistent rain], the house of the one I love is
far away: if I step out I wet my garments but if
I stay home I loose my love.
O let the garments be wet, let God pour rain as
much as He
Likes; I must see my beloved so that my love
may survive.
The movement that Fariduddin organized found its finest

expression in the personality of Nizamuddin Auliya. Born in
1238 in Badayun, a city near Dehli, he was yet in his twenties
when Shaikh Farid, as he was then called, chose him as his
chief successor of all his older disciples. Such was Farid’s
vision that this young successor soon rose to become what was
later reckoned to be ‘the greatest Indo-Muslim saint of all
time.’ 30
Nizamuddin began his work in the outskirts of Delhi
called Ghiyaspur. There he synthesized in himself to the
utmost the Chishti emphasis on faqr, on the one hand, while
realizing it in the process of disseminating its meanings to
humanity, on the other. Expounding the common Sufi theme
of renunciation of the world, he observed once that world
renunciation by no means implied that one should sit semi
naked idly. On the contrary it was to wear clothes and eat. But
whatever came to him he should spend and not attach his heart
to anything. 31 He emphasized that the world in Sufism
signified not the gold, silver or the property itself but it was
the relationship with it, of love and possession, which was in
question. 32 On another occasion he pointed out the complexity
of the concept of world-worship, or the relationship of love
with the world as envisioned in Sufism. He said:
One [attitude ] is that of world [worship] in

form as well as in content; the other is neither
in form nor in content; the third is not in form
but in content and the fourth is in form but
not in content. And what is world in both form
and content? That is having beyond one’s
needs. That which is world neither in form nor
in content, what is that? That is prayer in
poverty. That which is not world in form but
is in content is prayer for personal ends. And
17
that which is world in form but not in content

is fulfilling one’s wife’s rights, that is,
meeting the needs of one’s family with the
thought that he is paying to the family what is
its due. Apparently this act may appear as
worldly but in reality it is not. 33
Nizamuddin Aliya was the embodiment of Sufi liberality and

it should therefore be evident that by prayer he is not implying
dogmatic fulfillment of the religious duties as the apparent
reading of the passage might have us believe. Once he even
suggested that a man too much occupied with the religious
duties might have some other guilt to compensate and not
fulfillment of prayers. And it was precisely for this reason, he
added, that the need for a guide arose on the path of
spirituality for it was he who led towards sincerity and purity
even if there were not too many prayers. 34
He would often narrate to his audience, in the
assemblies at his khanaqah, the stories of the derwishes and
Sufis pertaining to the fact that the formal acts of worship
devoid of sincerity were meaningless while inner purity on the
other hand was not dependent on the performance of the
rituals. 35 He differentiated between devotion that led only to
personal benefit and that which was source of comfort for
others. The former comprised of the performance of the
religious duties like prayer, fasting etc. whereas the latter was
derived from spending money on others, showing affection
towards people and helping them in their needs. 36 He would
even express his dislike for excess in supererogatory prayers.
He believed it could lead one farther from God rather than
bringing him any nearer. 37 He followed his master’s
instructions strictly that fasting covered half the path towards
God while the rest, prayers, pilgrimage et al, did the
other. 38 And once he endorsed the view that pilgrimage was
meant for one who had no pir, the guide (to lead him to the
path of spirituality that made the act of physical pilgrimage
superfluous). 39
He was a man of charisma and his presence radiated
light and power. His influence grew quickly in the early years
of the thirteenth century so that he soon emerged as the
paramount leader of the parallel culture among the Indo-
Muslim community. In a way the pattern narrated above, that
of faqir and king as the twin centres of culture and power,
epitomised in his personality at the one side and that of all-
powerful sultan, Alauddin Khilji [1296-1316], on the other.
However the difference with the previous patterns is too
18
remarkable to be ignored. Whereas previously the figure of the

faqir seemed too docile or withdrawn, in Nizamuddin Auliya
it emerged as the embodiment of power and grandeur. His
khanaqah grew into a great centre of spiritual culture,
becoming almost a centre of pilgrimage for all Indian
Muslims. Ziauddin Barani, by no means having much to share
with what the Shaikh stood for, but nevertheless attracted by
his magnetism and authority, observed that ‘people came to
see Shaikh Nizamuddin from two thousand and three thousand
farsangs, and the young and the old, the literate and the
illiterate from the city tried to present themselves before the
Shaikh by every means they could.’ 40
It was but natural that doubts began to grow in the
royal court that this parallel centre of power might threaten the
royal authority. Sultan Alauddin Khiji offered the Shaikh
responsibilities in state affairs presumably to test his
intentions. When the Shaikh got the message he in a way
ridiculed the offer by inviting his audience to raise their hands
for the fatiha, which is recited at the death of someone. Then
he said sternly to the messenger, who happened to be the son
of the Sultan, that if at all he was told to do anything like that
again only because he happened to be in the city [same as that
of the Sultan], he would simply leave the city, for God’s land
was very vast. Khilji was obviously delighted at this but now
he asked to be allowed to pay a visit to the saint. The saint
declined by saying that there was no need for it since he was
already praying for his welfare. When the sultan insisted he
was told that the faqir would better leave his house than
receive the sultan there. 41
Thus in the personality of Nizamuddin Auliya was
realized the power which brought to the fore the perennial
assertion of spirituality that world-renunciation or the
cultivation of spirit was not a passive state. It induced in man a
certain power that raised him above the material constraints.
Hitherto this power had manifested itself in individual
transcendence of physical limitations, i.e. in the show of
miracles. Now in the early period of Indo-Muslim history it
was demonstrated on a larger, social scale. The faqr- power
equation emerged as a direct opposition to the property-power
equation. The power in the former was of course radically
varied from the latter. It involved neither coercion nor
compulsion. Rather it radiated assertion, an energy that flowed
and impressed upon the one it encountered the presence and
power of the spirit.
Conversions and preaching of Islam among non-
Muslims did not form part of Nizamuddin Auliya’s work. Of
19
the common Hindu folk he thought only a fine example could

lead them to change of their heart and therefore preaching was
of no use. However he had a great regard for their devotion
that they manifested in the worship of their deities, and
respected every people’s right to have their own religion. 42
Once he related Hamiduddin Sufi’s observation that a Hindu
residing in his area was a Wali Allah, friend of God. 43
The Chishti attitude towards conversion is important
in the evaluation of their contribution to parallel culture.
Modern scholars have gone against the exaggerated narratives
by some enthusiastic Muslim chroniclers about the Sufi ‘role
in conversions. 44 However, the conversion was found quite
low on the agenda of Chishti Saints. In this respect again they
manifested remarkable distance from the official enthusiasm
for conversion displayed by the ulama and a part of the secular
intelligentsia. The fundamental difference in the two
approaches lay in that whereas the latter considered forcible or
otherwise conversion of the non-Muslims as incumbent on
every Muslim in the capacity to do so, i.e., as inalienable part
of Islamic culture, the Chishtis placed little emphasis on the
change of external mould. For them the chief task was
transformation (of the individual) rather than conversion.
It was this indifference towards conversion or the so-
called propagation of Islam accompanied with their low
opinion of the rulers that gradually led to the view among the
ulama, and part of the ruling elite that the Chishti Sufis were
not interested in the sustenance of the Muslim power in India.
This view gained further strength when Qutbuddin Mubarak,
the last Khilji Sultan was murdered in 1320 by his newly
convert lover, Khusrau Khan, and Nizamuddin Auliya refused
to take sides in the power struggle that ensued between
Khusrau and the Turk leader Ghazi Malik, who later founded
the Tughlaq dynasty.
Closely related to this is the Chishti attitude towards
other religions. The Chishtis did not see the Hindu-Muslim
difference in black and white as it appeared in the ruling
Muslim culture. Very often in the history of the period we find
the ulama and scholars urging the kings to fulfill their divine
duty by slaughtering, or at least humiliating to utmost
submission the non-Muslims who were not prepared to submit
to the true religion. 45 Even if such exhortations were not all
the times meant wholly literally, still the purpose was to
emphasize the superior, alien character of Islam in the Hindu,
Indian environment. This was part of the efforts undertaken to
resist and block the assimilation of the two religious
communities. Interestingly enough, the ulama as the official
20
ideologues of Islam, while taking pride in the egalitarian

character of their religion, manifested same contempt towards
non-Muslims which their counterparts in Hinduism, the
Brahmans, displayed towards the lower castes and the
Muslims. In other words, both were united in a common cause
of mutual exclusiveness. 46
Chishtis, on the other hand, represented those forces
in the Indo-Muslim society which were not prepared to live in
India as perpetual aliens. They were quick in assimilation and
adopted many indigenous practices both from spiritual and
mundane realms ranging from the techniques of yoga to
vegetarianism. Thus they opened the way for dialogue
between the two communities and religions that was to take
place in subsequent centuries on quite a significant scale.
Nizami writers:
They looked upon all religions as different

roads leading to the same destination. They
did not approve of any discrimination or
destination in human society which was one
organism for them. They had free social
intercourse with the Hindus and tried to
understand their approach towards the basic
problems of religion and morality. It was their
firm conviction that spiritual greatness could
be attained by Hindus in the same way as it
could be achieved by the Muslims. 47
Such recognition of the truth in the other and readiness to

assimilate and learn in a spirit of tolerance and openness grew
from Chishtis’ dynamic concept of man. For them, the most
sacred of all things was man’s unity with the totality, the
whole, the reality. And his physical environment was never
outside of this reality.
To sum up, man in Indo-Muslim culture does live in
singular earthly reality. His reality is defined by terrestrial as
well as extra-terrestrial dimension. Other than his material
concrete world, he also lives in the world of his own, the
world of his consciousness, which provides him sense of
identity and freedom and thus puts meaning in his life.
Theoretically the former is the realm of man while the latter
that of God. Yet they are the two ends of man’s world and it is
the transition, the movement from the one to the other that not
only unites them but also constitutes the realm of human
freedom.
21
CONCLUSION
The implications of the findings and hypothesis presented

above can be consequential in our understanding of the nature
of man, and of human culture in general. 48
Modern age, or modernity, to be more precise, as we
know, began in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries in
Europe, 49 and which is now a universal perspective. It sought
its legitimacy in a wholesale repudiation of the pre-modern
civilizations and their achievements. It was a colossal
operation of destruction of the past and its replacement by a
reconstruction of what we know as history. 50 The concept of
man and his culture developed out of this operation was the
model with reference to which pre-modern man and his age
had to be evaluated. Obviously he was found seriously
wanting, for he turned out to be a lesser man; except for the
ancient Greeks, though, who somehow, presumably by some
great miracle of nature, escaped the misfortunes of pre-
modern, lesser man, and thus emerged as the worthy ancestors
of modern man.
Perhaps the chief charge against the pre-modern man
is that his commitment to the life and world was half-hearted,
if not hypocritical, for he was more occupied to the illusory
world of beyond. From this occupation what followed almost
naturally was a culture which was monolithic, authoritarian,
and absolutist. What could be the greater indication of its
poverty than the fact that the idea of pluralism was foreign to
it!
However, the idea of modern pluralism, we may note,
is wholly political on which is based the structure of modern
democracy. While it is true that political pluralism was foreign
to a monarchical setting, we have drawn attention to cultural
pluralism of pre-modern civilizations, a concept foreign to
modern civilization. For modernity visualizes man as
essentially a material, physical being who is enthralled to
material needs and which propel him to realize himself in the
acquisition of material goods. The net result of this concept of
man is not hard to see presently, when the specter of global
warming and depletion of the planet’s resources haunts us as
billions of non-Western peoples enter into the reckless drive to
modernize themselves, i.e., to match the material affluence of
the modern West. 51
The pre-modern man, or, to be more precise, the
civilizations that arose in the first millennium BC and
afterwards, had developed a keen awareness that if man were
to be conceived solely as a being enslaved by material ideals,
22
he would sooner or later destroy himself, for there was after

all no end to his desire for material affluence. This awareness
came from the simple observation that not all men were by
disposition given to material pursuits. For there are also men
and women who aspire for knowledge and a life, or a life-
style, if you like, devoted to this end. This life-style,
epitomized in the life of the saint, of the sufi, sant, faqir,
derwish, yogi, or sadhu, they thought, was the pre-condition of
knowledge of reality, which is a concept foreign to modernity.
In short, the pre-modern thought perceived man as a
unity of dual natures, and on which were raised the dual ideals
of the king and the ascetic, and their respective cultures. The
pre-modern or medieval culture, then, was truly a pluralist
culture in which human beings had the freedom to live their
lives according to their varied dispositions. This freedom has
been taken away from us by the cultural despotism of
modernity. Perhaps only the re-claiming of that freedom can
avert the disaster as foreseen in the NIC report and many
others besides it.
23
END-NOTES
1
Until the invasions of Mahmud of Ghazni Islam in India was a
peripheral phenomenon contained mainly to Sind, Multan and some
coastal areas.
2
For details of Mahmud’s love for wealth see M. K. Firishta, History
of the Rise of the Mohemdan Power in India, trans. J. Briggs, Vol. 1
(London, 1908), pp. 84-5.
3
Ali b. Uthman Hujwiri, Kashf al-Mahjub, trans. R. A. Nicholson
(Lahore: 1976), p. 20.
4
‘We shall only mention,’ writers Firishta, ‘as an instance of his
wealth, that he had in diamonds alone, of variation sizes, 500muns.
‘[Mun appr. 38kg], Firishta, 1908, p. 187.
5
Abdul Haq, Akhbar al-Akhyar, Urdu trans. M. Fazil, (Karachi, n.d.),
p. 55; B. B. Lawrence, Notes from a Distant Flute: The Extant
Literature of Pre-Mughal Indian Sufism (Tehran, 1978), p. 20.
However some hold that Muinuddin Chishti’s arrival coincided with
or followed the conquest of Ghauri.
6
Kinberg, in a very instructive article in respect of our present
argument, has observed that poverty was a crucial idea in Islam right
from its origin. He argues that the Traditions of the Prophet praising
poverty and the poor appeared before those favoring the wealth and
the property. He goes on to conclude that the ‘renunciation of worldly
goods was always the main current in Islam.’ L. Kinberg, ‘Commerce
and Compromise: A study of early traditions concerning poverty and
wealth’, Der Islam, Band 66, Heft 2, 1989, p. 152.
7
This in no way implies that the two figures were absent from the
pre- Muslim Indian culture. For a fuller treatment see Shuja Alhaq, A
Forgotten Vision: A Study of Human Spirituality in the Light of
Islamic Tradition, 2 vols. (New Delhi, 1997). Also published in
single volume by Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1997.
8
Quoted by Aziz Ahamd, ‘The Sufi and the Sultan in Pre-Mughal
India,’ Der Islam, 1963, p. 152.
9
Hujwir Kashf al-Mahjub i, p. 27.
10
The role of cultivation of faqr in Sufism can be gauged by the fact
that sometimes it is equated with the very state of Godhead, as that of
absolute independence from need. It was for instance observed by a
Sufi that ‘the faqir is one who has no need of God.’ J. Nurbakhsh,
Spiritual Poverty in Sufism (London, 1984) p. 21. For a
comprehensive selection of the descriptions concerning faqr, faqir,
dervish, and Sufi in the Sufi literature see ibid, pp.1-62.
11
See, e.g., Hujwiri, Kashf al-Mahjub p. 18.
12
Shaikh Saadi, Gulistan, Hertford, 1863, p.47.
13
Ibn Arabi, Turjuman al-Ashwaq, ed. & trans. R. A. Nicholson,
Beruit, 1966, p . 115.
14
Yogi here also implies sanyasi, bhikshu, sadhu etc.
15
Louis Dumont, ‘World Renunciation in Indian Religions,’
Contributions to Indian Sociology,, No. 4, 1960, p. 47.
16
Cf. ibid. pp. 46-7.
24
17
Cf. Tara Chand, Influence of Islam on Indian Culture (Allahabad,
1976), pp. 26 & 35-7. Ali Hujwari, the patriarch of Indian Sufism, it
may be recalled, settled in Lahore during this period.
18
S. A. A Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India, Vol. ! (New Delhi,
1978), p. 117; Yusuf Husain, Glimpses of Medieval Indian Culture
(Bombay, 1962) p.37
19
K. A. Nizami, Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India
During the Thirteenth Century (Bombay, 1961), p. 184-5.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid., ‘Iltutmush the Mystic,’ Islamic Culture, Vol. XX, 1946, p. ,
173.
22
Ibid p .175.
23
See his correspondence with Bahauddin Zakariya in Abdul Haq,
op.cit.
24
The autonomy of faqr viz-a-viz the kingship was illustrated by
Saadi in an anecdote. A certain pious one saw in a dream certain king
in heaven while a dervish in hell. When he inquired about it he was
told that king was in paradise for his proximity to the dervish, and the
dervish was in hell for his closeness with the king. Saadi, op. cit., p.
54.
25
Nizami, Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India During the
Thirteenth Century, p. 190.
26
Ibid. p. 191.
27
For the discussion of the controversy over the authorship of the
verses attributed to Farid see Akhlaq Hussain Dehlawi, ‘The Poetical
Work of Baba Farid,’ Journal of Sikh Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1978,
and B. S. Anand, Baba Farid (New Delhi, 1975), pp. 34-43.
28
H. Singh Shan, So Said Sheikh Farid (Chandigarh, 1974), p. 53.
29
Ibid. p. 56-7.
30
Lawrence, op. cit., p. 24.
31
A. H. Sijzi, Fawaid ul-Fuad, Urdu trans. M. Sarwar. (Lahore,
1973), p. 56.
32
Ibid., p. 56-7.
33
Ibid., p. 169.
34
Ibid., p.111
35
Cf., e.g., ibid., pp.111, 339, 419.
36
Ibid., p. 78.
37
38
Haq Akhbar al-Akhyar, p. 125.
39
Sijz, Fawaid ul-Fuad i, p. 309.
40
Quoted by M. Habib in The political theory of the Delhi
Sultanante, including a translation of Ziauddin Barani's Fatawa-i
Jahandari, circa 1358-9 A.D. (Allahabad, 1960), p. 134.
41
42
Sijzi, Fawaid ul-Fuad, p. 165.
43
Ibid.
25
44
For a brief discussion of the subject see Z. H. Zaidi, ‘Conversion to
Islam in South Asia: Problems in Analysis’, The American Journal of
Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1, September 1989, pp. 102-15.
45
See for instance Elliot & Dowson, The History of India as Told by
its Historians, Vol. 11, London, 1873, p. 184; Barani, in M. Habib,
pp. 5-6, 46-7.
46
Cf. R. Thapar, A History of India, Vol. 1 (Penguin Books, 1966), p.
302.
47
48
The findings, with reference to both Islamic and Hindu pre-modern
civilizations, are presented on a larger canvas in Shuja Alhaq, op.cit.
49
For a brief treatment of the rise of modernity see Shuja Alhaq,
‘Islam and Modernity: Towards a New Paradigm,’ The Historian,
Vol. 4, No. 1, 2006, pp. 50-64.
50
For the substitution of past with history though in European,
Christian context, see J. H. Plumb, The Death of the Past (New York:
Palgrave, 2004 [orig publ. 1969).
51
See, for instance, the just issued report by US National Intelligence
Council, ‘Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,’ on
www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html
26
Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy
HISTORICIZING PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY

(1947-88)
I RFAN W AHEED U SMANI

GC U NIVERSITY , L AHORE
P AKISTAN
A BSTRACT
This article makes an historical analysis of Pakistani

Kashmir policy between 1947-88. Besides providing
a synoptic view of the Kashmir policies, pursued by
various regimes in Pakistan both civilian and
military also provides a thorough insight into all the
major developments concerning Kashmir dispute as
well as the responses of Pakistani governments’ vis-
à-vis these developments. It contextualizes these main
planks of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy by situating
historical factors which invariably shaped its main
contours. The last portion of this article analyses this
policy by isolating discernable trends largely shaped
by extraneous factors which subsequently limitized
the options and choices before our policy makers.
Consequently, these factors led to the failure of
Kashmir policy in terms of realization of its main
objectives by reducing it merely to rhetorics. The
recurrent theme of this article is that Pakistan’s
Kashmir policy remained consistent i.e. focused on
resolution of Kashmir dispute through the UN
resolution.
K EY W ORDS : UN Resolutions, Kashmir, Pakistan, India.
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy cannot be comprehended without

tracing the nature of the origin of Kashmir dispute and its geo-
strategic significance for Pakistan. These two factors proved to
be the defining features of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Mussarat
Sohail has very aptly summed up the crux of the origin of
Kashmir dispute. She contends that:
The Kashmir dispute need never have arisen

had certain principles of partition of Indo-
Pakistan sub-continent as agreed by the
27
Muslims and the Hindus also been applied to

the issue of the accession for the Indian states. 1
The immediate roots of the Kashmir tragedy lie in the

mechanics of partition i.e. the manner in which British
surrendered their imperial role in South Asia. 2 According to
Pakistan’s perception Kashmir issue was outcome of Hindu-
British conspiracies aimed at undoing partition and ensuring
the preservation of the Indian unity. The view is lent further
credence by the findings of British Professor Alaistar Lamb’s
whose magnum opus Kashmir: A Disputed legacy: 1945-1990
(Karachi: OUP, 1993) provides a very candid analysis of the
long term interests of British rulers in this region and brings to
fore the main rationale behind Hindu-British connivance to
prevent Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. According to Lambs
research British believed that of the two successor dominions
of British in the sub-continent India would be much more
strong and in far better position to guard against Russian threat
(which by now had transformed in to the communist threat)
Lamb contends that British northwestern policy was based on
the premise of thwarting Russian advance towards the warm
waters of South Asia.
Burke is of the view that accession of Kashmir was
accomplished by Indian openly through “ministry of states” rather India
employed political pressure behind the scene. 3 Burke asserts that this
was done to create impression that majority of the Kashmir wanted to
accede to India of their own accord or choice as direct approach for
getting Kashmir seemed impossible on account of the stance taken up
by India for accession of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Jodhpur. 4 The
Indian Kashmir case would have been certainly ruined had this
criterion applied to Kashmir case. There were three major hurdles in
the way of Kashmir’s accession to India.
The ruler of the state Maharaja Hari Singh intensely
disliked Nehru. The state had no direct link to East Punjab. The
state was predominantly a Muslim majority. 5 These hurdles
were systematically removed. 6 Most Pakistani historians hold
Mountbatten responsible in context of his controversial role in
facilitating Kashmir’s accession to India. At least three of his
steps significantly contributed towards the birth of Kashmir
tragedy. These include: his controversial role in Gurdaspur
episode, his ambivalent policy regarding the issue of the
accession of states, his facilitation in allowing only Congress
leaders to visit Kashmir. This enabled them to influence
Maharaja.
Most significant was the Award of Grudaspur District
to India 7 , which virtually decided the fate of Kashmir and
28
consequently paved the way for state’s accession with India. As

the transfer of Muslim majority Tehsils of Gurdaspur and
Batala enabled India to have a direct road access to Kashmir.
The construction of Jammu Khutta road “rendered possible the
maintenance of an Indian Air Force at Jammu, based on
Pathnakot as rail head and which enabled India to consolidate
her defences south-wards all the way from Uri to Pathan-Kot
boarder. 8 Even Andrew Roberts concedes that “It is not hard to
believe that Mountbatten also pressurized Redcliffe to ensure
that “Gurdaspur wound up in India”. 9
British pursued very ambivalent policy as regard the
issue of the accession of states was concerned. This was to
enable Congress leaders to annex more and more state to Indian
Union. As is evident from the fact that the clauses relating to
the accession issue were very vague and imprecise. 10 There is
ample circumstantial evidence to suggest that Congress leaders
were given “free hand” in this regard. Sardar’s Patel’s
confession in Indian parliament in 1949 amply corroborates this
contention. He revealed that “Congress only agreed to the
dominion status on the pre-condition that it should be given
free hand in the matter of accession of states”. 11 The manner in
which Nehru was allowed to manipulate state’s politics amply
exposed the contradiction in the British policy of accession of
Indian states. 12
According to a Pakistani historian, Sher Muhammad
Garewal, Mountbatten allowed Indian leaders such as Sardar
Patel, Acharya Kirplani, Nehru and Gandhi to visit Kashmir. In
fact Gandhi visited Kashmir twice but on the other Jinnah was
not allowed to visit Kashmir. 13 The visits of Indian leaders
were instrumental in changing the mindset of Maharaja.
Particularly Gandhi’s second visit to Kashmir had great bearing
on the politics of Kashmir “with in week of his visit Prime
Minister Ram Chander Kak was removed.” 14 The removal of
Kak cleared one of the major obstacle in the path of Kashmir’s
accession to India as he was the person who prevailed upon
Maharaja not to accede to any dominion and exercise
independence option. Kak was succeeded by Hindu Prime
Ministers like Janak Singh 15 and Mehar Chand Mahajan. 16 Thus
these extremist Hindus succeeded in getting access into the
inner cotrie of Maharaja and were able to influence decision-
making circles thus Maharaja was convinced to throw
Kashmir’s lot in favour of India.
India’s legal claim to Kashmir rests on the contention
that Hindu Maharaja on 27 October duly singed the instrument
of accession to join India and thus Kashmir became an integral
part of India. Accordingly India rushed it troops to Kashmir the
29
same day by claiming that Pakistani tribesmen, supported by

the Pakistan Government, had launched an invasion of Kashmir
which had become part of India. 17
It is argued by some analysts that either the signature
had been forged, the date changed or the whole document was
fabricated. Prominent British author, Alistair Lamb challenges
the Indian claims on the basis of his research into the
chronology of the events of days of the partition of sub-
continent in his books, Kashmiri Birth of Tragedy (1994),
Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy (1990), and Kashmir: An
Incomplete Partition (1997). Lamb has proved that Indian
military intervention on 27 Oct 1947 took place before
Maharaja had formally acceded to India. 18 In fact there remains
a mystery if the Maharaja ever did sign an Instrument of
Accession as this document is said to be “missing” from Indian
record. 19 Lamb shows that the record was falsified from the
very beginning by claiming that a top Indian official, V.P.
Menon had traveld to Jammu on 26 October to secure such an
instrument whereas Menon never visited Jammu on this date. 20
The succession of events also casts doubts about the
legality and nature of letter of succession, Lamb reveals that
Indian government made public the text of a pair letters one
form the Maharaja to Mountbatten bearing the date 26 October,
1947 and the other from Mountbatten to the Maharaja with the
date 27 October. Both were certainly drafted by V.P.Menon. 21
He argues that “we have no direct evidence as to when the
Maharaja’s letter was actually singed (if, indeed, it ever was),
but we can be sure that it was not on 26 October. 22 He even
suspects the very form of letter of accession. “Be that as it may
be the Maharaja’s letter dated 26 October 1947 gives us
absolutely no clue to what he ‘Instrument of Accession’ ”
actually look like Lamb 23 quotes the Indian White Paper on
Kashmir 1948 as having reproduced a sample text of an
Instrument of Accession such as was devised by the state
department on the eve of the transfer to power. He asserts that
this document was derived from the Indian Independence Act
1947, and the Government of India Act 1935. It was “in fact, a
printed form with spaces left for the name of state, the
signature of the ruler and the day of the month of August 1947.
There was also space for Governor General’s acceptance, again
with a blank for the day of month of August 1947.” 24 He
describes this document “singularly unsuitable” for the special
circumstances in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in October
1947.” 25 He also argues that the document presented in United
Nations Security Council in 1961 was different as compared
30
with the document included in Indian White Paper on Kashmir

published in 1948. He argues that:
It is interesting that in the document

reproduced in Pt.1 No.29 in the Indian 1948
White Paper, all the spaces are left blank. It is
not a representation of the document signed by
the Maharaja, merely an example of the kind of
document the might have signed. One may well
wonder why the government of India had it
indeed been in a possession of a properly
singed instrument, did not publish it as such in
1948. This White Paper would have been the
documentary Jewel in India's crown. 26
The circumstantial evidence of the course of events

also proves that the instrument of accession was got singed by
V. P. Menon on 27th October, 1947 while Maharaja had left
Srinagar from Jammu losing virtually the control of the
capital. 27
Moreover, India Army was sent before the accession
was actually singed. This fact has been highlighted in the works
of Justice Yousaf Sarf, 28 Alastair Lamb and the documents of
Patiala State, which reveal that the Indian troops had penetrated
into Kashmir through the adjacent East Punjab States.
Particularly, the gunners of Maharaja Patiala were present in
Kashmir before the tribal invasion 29 occurred. Since the early
days of October a battalion of infantry and a battery of
mountain artillery loaned to Maharaja Hari Singh by the Sikh
Maharaja of Patiala were present in Jammu and Kashmir.
Patiala gunners had taken up position at the Sirinagar airfield at
least by 17 October and they were there when the Indian troops
landed on 27 October. 30 Taking cue from this fact Ijaz Hussain
comes to the conclusion that whole of this exercise becomes
invalid in context of International Law. He is of the view that
in this case, article 49 of the Vienna Convention of Laws of
Treaties applies which states “A treaty is invalid if its
conclusion is procured by the threat or use of force in violation
of principles of the charter of the United Nation.” 31 Another
defect in this document which further lends credence to the
argument of invalidity is that the accession as agreed by both
parties was “provisional”. In reply to the Maharaj’s letter
Mountbatten wrote, “In consistence with their policy that in the
case of any state where the issue of accession should be
decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the
state…It is my government’s wish that as soon as law and order
31
have been restored in Kashmir her soil cleared off the invaders,
the question of state’s accession should be settled by reference
to the people.” 32
Sir Frank Messervy, the C-in-C of Pakistan Army,
asserted that there was much evidence to prove that the
accession had been deliberately planned for some weeks before
the events. 33 The view is further corroborated by “Thakore
Hariman Singh’s Plane episode.” Maharaja’s cousin and envoy
Thakore Hariman Singh’s plane made a forced landing at
Lahore. This plane was attacked by a mob and Thakore’s suit
cases were seized and in one of the suit cases a draft treaty
between India and Kashmir was discovered. 34
The interesting aspect of Maharaja’s accession letter is
that he did not accuse Pakistan of giving assistance or
organizing the invasion where as the Indian officials did not
hesitate to level such charges against Pakistan. 35 All these
controversies decisively helped to influence the mindset of
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy formulators as they now sought to
redress this situation by getting Kashmir liberated from Indian
occupation. Thus they assumed anti-status quo posture right
from the very out set. The other factors which may also be
counted amongst the formative influences behind Pakistan’s
Kashmir policy included: geo-strategic significance of Kashmir
in context of Pakistan’s Security, economic interests and the
ideological under-pinning.
S IGNIFICANCE OF K ASHMIR FOR P AKISTAN
Kashmir was always viewed as an integral part of the Pakistan

scheme. Its initial letter “K” forming part of the name chosen
for the new Muslim country in the subcontinent. Moreover,
there have been strong ethnic, cultural, geographical and
economic linkages. 36
Strategically India’s military presence in Kashmir
stretches Pakistan’s dangerously large defense parameters and
cuts it off from the source of its lifeline of rivers. 37 Pakistan’s
military establishment believes that inclusion of Kashmir into
Pakistan would give it a strategic depth that it otherwise does
not possess. 38 While the whole Pakistan is vulnerable to Indian
air attacks, the better part of India remains beyond the range of
Pakistani aircraft. From Pakistan’s point of view, the Indian
ground forces stationed in Southern Kashmir threaten the
Shakergarh salient, and more importantly, the Grand trunk
Road linking Lahore and Islamabad. 39 In this context Pakistani
authorities started believing that without Kashmir Pakistan
could not defend itself against an unscrupulous government that
32
might come in India. Veteran Kashmiri politician Sardar Abdul

Qayum contends “Pakistan could not exist as an Independent
entity by withdrawing its claim on Kashmir. It will be turned in
a virtual hostage to India and its lease of life will depend upon
the period which India will allow to exist. 40 Another factor
further enhancing Kashmir’s strategic significance for Pakistan
was its peculiar geo-strategic location as it is surrounded by
China to the north and east, the Central Asian republics and
Russia to the west and land mass of the subcontinent to the
South. 41 In this sense strategically Kashmir and Northern
territories provide that stability for Pakistan’s existence which
its four provinces do not possess. 42
The economic importance of Kashmir for Pakistan was
greater that for India. Mahnaz Ispahni explains why Kashmir…
“had numerous links to Pakistan’s territory. It separation has
meant economic disruption, since its waters were essential to
the irrigation and power supplies of (Pakistan) West Punjab; its
timber resources were rafted down West Punjab’s river; its
willow and resin were used in Pakistani Industry.” 43
Economically, Kashmir is of vital importance to the needs of
Pakistan producing timber and housing three rivers, Indus,
Jhelum and Chenab which flow from Kashmir region into
Pakistan and are vital for the agricultural growth. These rivers
are a potential source for a large-scale hydro electric power for
the country. 44
The chief significance of Kashmir for Pakistan also lay
in ideological factors such as a two nation theory, upon which
Jinnah based his demand for a separate Muslim homeland. 45
According to General Akbar Khan, “Kashmir’s accession to
Pakistan was not simply a matter of desirability but of absolute
necessary for our separate existence.” 46 While summing up the
significance we may conclude that “the conflict is as much as
clash between identities, imaginations and history as it is a
conflict over territory resource and peoples”. 47
33
PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY — A HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE

1947-88
Muhammad Ali Jinnah was supremely conscious of the

significance of Kashmir for Pakistan. He believed it should be a
part of Islamic Pakistan on account of its Muslim identity. 48
According to Raiz Ali Shah’s diary the Quaid-e-Azam said:
“Kashmir is the Jugular vein of Pakistan and no nation or
country could tolerate its Jugular vein remains under the sword
of the enemy.” 49 Jinnah wanted to resolve the Kashmir conflict
through negotiations by following a friendly policy towards
India. However, the inflexible attitude of India foreclosed all
the possibility of negotiated settlement and compelled
Pakistan’s authorities to go for a military solution by
organizing tribal incursion in Kashmir. It is ironic that he was
not informed about the plans of tribal invasion as is
corroborated by the circumstantial evidence. Ch. Mohammad
Ali has revealed that Liaquat Ali Khan informed him excitedly
about the advance of tribal lashkar on October 21. When Ch.
Muhammad asked Liaquat Ali Khan whether he had informed
Jinnah he reply “not yet”. 50 Jinnah’s biographer Stanley
Wolpert highlights the prompt reaction of Jinnah as he
instructed C-in-C of Pakistan General Gracey to dispatch two
brigades to invade Kashmir. One was to march through Murree-
Khohala road and advance towards Muzaffarabad. The other
was to move through Jammu via Sialkot and it was to be
assigned the task of arresting Maharaja and block the
reinforcement from reaching Kashmir. 51 Gracey defied the
orders and referred the matter to Field Marshal Auckenlick.
Aukenlick asked Jinnah to take his orders back otherwise all
the British officers serving in both armies would resign. 52
Moreover, Jinnah planned a conference between the Governor-
Generals and Prime Ministers of the two dominions which
could not take place due to the illness of Jawahar Lal Nehru
and reluctance of Sardar Patel to talk with Pakistani Leaders. 53
However, the meeting between two Governor-Generals was
held on November 1, 1947. In this one-to-one meeting Quaid’s
response to Mountbatten’s suggestion that the accession issue
should be decided by a plebiscite in the state was that following
the logic of partition. There could be no question that the state
“should go anywhere under the circumstances except to
Pakistan. 54
Jinnah impressed upon Mountbatten the need for
plebiscite in Kashmir under the joint auspices of the
government of India and Pakistan, a proposal to which
Mountbatten showed agreement just to put before the Indian
34
cabinet. This proposal was placed before the Indian Cabinet. 55

On second November Nehru declared in a Radio Broadcast that
Government of India after the restoration of peace and stability
in Kashmir, was prepared “to have a referendum held under the
international auspices like the United Nations” 56 . Thus the
demand for plebiscite remained a recurrent theme of Jinnah’s
Kashmir policy. But this does not mean that he was not in
favour of using UN platform to internationalize the issue.
Zafarullha and M.A. Hispani monitored the debate in the
United Nations. 57
Pakistan’s first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan also
considered Kashmir vital for the security of Pakistan. In a cable
message sent to Nehru he highlighted this fact that “The
security of Pakistan is bound up with that of Kashmir.” 58
Liaquat believed strategic significance of Kashmir was as such
that without it, Pakistan could not defend itself against an
“unscrupulous government that might come in India.” 59 In view
of its significance Liaquat Ali Khan always gave primacy to the
resolution of Kashmir dispute. In order to resolve this Kashmir
dispute his government adopted the following approaches
corresponding to the fluid situation in Kashmir:
1. The exercise of military option to thwart the Indian

conspiracies to annex Kashmir between October 1947
and 1 st January 1949. This policy was manifested in the
form of tribal invasion October 1947. This invasion
subsequently led to the outbreak of 1 st Kashmir war in
May 1948 which lasted till January 1 st 1948. It would
not be out of place to mention India’s policy viz-a-viz
Kashmir dispute India’s initial strategy seemed to
impose a quick military solution on Kashmir. In
pursuance of this strategy it sent its regular troops in
Kashmir on October 1947 but this policy failed to pay
dividends as it miserably failed to throw the tribesman
out of Kashmir territory and annihilate the Azad
Kashmir forces. It was this failure which prompted
India to take case to United Nations. 60 India took the
Kashmir case before the Security Council on 1 st
January 1948. It blamed Pakistan of assisting the
tribesmen and other invaders to violate her sovereignty.
Pakistan in its counter complaint, accused India of the
organized “genocide of Muslims in East Punjab Delhi
and other places in India”. It also charged India with
“forcible occupation of Junadagh and the “action taken
by India to secure the accession of Kashmir by fraud
35
and violence”. 61 The ceasefire was brought about by

UN arbitration on 1 st January 1949. 62
2. Another conspicuous plank of Liaqat’s Kashmir policy
was re-invocation of the UN resolutions as an
international dispute. The UN resolution of 13 August
1948, 5 January 1949 provided the overall framework
of the resolution of Kashmir dispute by ensuring the
rights of self-determination through plebiscite. Taken
together these resolutions provided for ceasefire and
demarcation of a ceasefire line, demilitarization of the
state and a free and impartial plebiscite under the
auspices of United Nation. 63 These resolutions formed
the basic resolutions for the solution of Kashmir
dispute. Consequently, these defined the main
postulates of Liaquat Ali Khan’s Kashmir policy and
the Kashmir policies of all the subsequent rulers of
Pakistan
3. Another conspicuous feature of Liaquat’s Kashmir
policy was that Pakistan’s government in her bid to
internalize the Kashmir dispute through United Nations
adopted a strategy by accepting the proposals of AGL
McNaughtan 64 and Owen Dixion. 65
When Nizamuddin assumed the office of Prime Minister, he

pledged to continue his predecessor’s foreign policy, during his
period Pakistan continued to pursue the same foreign policy
though his control over government machinery especially in the
realm of foreign policy was not as firm as of Liaquat Ali
Khan’s. 66
The Kashmir cause also figured prominently during
Mohammad Ali Bogra’s premiership. Bogara, stuck to the
traditional Kashmir policy. The most peculiar feature of
Bogar’s period concerning Kashmir was Bogra Nehru meetings.
The two Prime Ministers held meeting between 1953 and 1955.
During the first meeting which was held in 16 August a joint
statement of the two Prime Ministers reiterated that the
Kashmir dispute should be resolved according to the wishes of
people. “with a view to promoting their well-being and causing
the least disturbance of the life of the people of the state…The
most feasible method of ascertaining the people’s choice was
fair and impartial plebiscite.” 67 The two Prime Ministers agree
to resolve Kashmir dispute by adopting three pronged strategy
(i) resolution the preliminary issues directly (ii) appointment of
plebiscite administration by the end of April 1954. (iii) This
plebiscite administrator after his appointment and induction in
to office by Azad Kashmir government was to examine the
36
situation and submitted its report. After their first meeting they
had a long correspondence between September 1953 and
November 1954. The last meeting was held in May 1955 but
this meeting proved inconclusive. 68 Ch. Mohammad Ali after
assuming office, tried to re-activate the issue. After assuming
the office of the Prime Minister he termed the Kashmir issue as
a ‘great moral issue of our time’ On 26 November 1955, he
convened an all parties Kashmir Conference to devise a new
strategy to secure plebiscite in the state. In his bid to
internationalize Kashmir dispute he pursued a new strategy i.e.
recruitment of a “peace army” to organize a “liberation march”
in to the occupied Kashmir. 69
Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy’s government reacted
sharply to the Indian attempts to integrate Kashmir in to Indian
Union. As an initial step the Constituent Assembly of Indian
occupied Kashmir passed an amendment that which envisaged
that “state is and shall be an integral par to the union of
India” 70 . This provision was to come into effect on 26 January
1957. Pakistan government in its bid to counterpoise such
maneuvere decided to take up the Kashmir issue to the United
Nations. In order to make this resolution successful the
Suharwardy Government decided to approach the Security
Council. To entice International support the government sought
US help. The US administration showed reluctance in doing
any thing that might spoil its increasing cordiality with India. 71
Despite US reluctance Suhrawardy’s government approached
the Security Council with the request that India should be
prevented from implementing these new provision aimed at
altering the constitution status of Kashmir. It also maintained
that a UN emergency force should be established to supervise
plebiscite in consistent with the principles expressed in
resolution The Soviet Union abstained from voting on this
resolution, but vetoed another one on 20 February calling for a
UN force to supervise the plebiscite. However, the Security
Council in another resolution, on which the Soviet Union
abstained, asked its president, Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden to
continue to strive for a settlement within the framework of
previous UN resolutions. In the midst of this crisis 26 January
was observed as a “Black day” throughout Pakistan. 72
During this period Pakistan’s Kashmir stance
increasing became more inflexible, as is evident from the tone
of official and public statements. On 8 September 1957,
Foreign Minster Feroze Khan stated that Pakistan would
consider an attack on Kashmir by India as an attack on Pakistan
provided Prime Minister honoured his international
37
commitments with regard to the holding of a free and fair

plebiscite in Kashmir. 73
I.I. Chundriger during his premiership observed that
“we go all out to follow the West. But whenever problems
come up there is a certain amount of hesitation about
displeasing India.” 74 Prime Minister Noon staunchly reiterated
Pakistan Kashmir policy and unequivocally declared that: “Our
people if, they find themselves threatened by Bharat will break
all pacts and will shake hands with the people whom we have
made enemies because of others. Let there be no mistake about
it.” 75 These sentiments were also voiced by ex-prime minister
I.I. Chundrigar in a debate on foreign policy in National
Assembly in September 1958 called for a revision of foreign
policy. 76
Ayub Khan was also a great protagonist of Pakistan’s
Kashmir policy. He considered the resolution of Kashmir
dispute integral for the security of Pakistan. “The security of
Pakistan requires a fair solution of the Kashmir problem.” He
yearned to go down in history as the “liberator of the
Kashmir.” 77 Ayub considered the resolution of Kashmir dispute
integral for the security of Pakistan. “The security of Pakistan
requires a fair solution of the Kashmir problem.” 78 Before the
imposition of martial law, focus on the Kashmir issue had
created an emotionally charged atmosphere in which even
moderate elements started openly advocating war with India.
Military takeover diffused the situation. Ayub after assuming
power at first threatened ‘extreme action’ even war unless the
Indian leadership agreed to solve the Kashmir dispute. But soon
it initiated moves to cultivate India to resolve outstanding
bilateral disputes. It ignored “Indian leaders” unnecessarily
provocative remarks. 79 Among the reconciliatory steps Ayub
took included the demarcation of Pakistan India Boundaries.
The signing of the Indus Basin. Treaty which the political
governments had shelved. Ayub Khan made repeated offers of
joint defecne of the sub-continent to India despite the re-buffs
from the Indian leaders. 80 The primary objectives of all his
moves were to settle the Kashmir issue which, in his view as
the question “life and death” for Pakistanis and a key to
amicable Pakistan India relations. 81
This led some critics of believe that “he had made a
major shift from Pakistan’s principled stand on Kashmir
dispute.” 82 Stephen P. Colen provides a rather balanced
assessment of Ayub’s Kashmir policy “Pakistani authorities
believed that Kashmir was an important issue. They pursued the
cause of Kashmir with the ultimate goal of incorporating them
to Pakistan would fulfill the original vision of Pakistan.” 83
38
Cohen further asserts, “while the establishment was sometime

divided as how to deal with Kashmir, there, were tactical not
strategic differences”. 84 Despite Pakistan’s repeated over-tures
for peace India’s attitude became more and more hardened,
after the signing of Indus Basin Treaty. Particularly its leaders
became more and more aggressive in their pronouncements
after India’s occupation of Goa by a force in December 1961. 85
When the bilateral avenues closed and no one was
willing to mediate, Pakistan had no other option but to take the
Kashmir issue to the United Nations Security Council, although
a few months earlier it had not raised the issue in the General
Assembly at Kennedy’s request. 86 Pakistan raised this issue in
United Nation Security Council in 1962. The Security Council
debated this issue in the first half of 1962; finally, on 22 June,
the Irish representative at US suggestion presented a resolution
proposing that the UN Secretary General should sponsor direct
talks between Pakistan and India on the Kashmir dispute.
Pakistan was obviously disappointed. 87
This was towards the end of the year when the crisis in
India-China relations had escalated into an armed conflict.
During this crisis many Pakistanis were in favour of taking
advantage of India’s difficulties and considered the military
option a “calculated risk”. 88 This was widely seen both in
Pakistan and outside an “excellent opportunity”. It was a
common perception in Pakistan that the Sino-Indian war of
1962 had provided the best opportunity for Pakistan to retrieve
Kashmir. According to General Sher Ali Khan, had Ayub Khan
withstood American pressure Pakistan would have got the rare
chance of solving the Kashmir issue. 89
The Sino-Indian boarder clash opened new
opportunities for talks on Kashmir. On large measure, it was
the brain-child of the US and GBR which appeared to have
believed that the time was ripe for nudging the two rivals
towards a settlement of the Kashmir issue. 90 Washington and
London sent their respective high-level envoys Averell
Harriman and Duncan Sandys to work with the Indian and
Pakistani governments and ensure in accordance with their own
strategic interest, that Pakistan did not exploit the
opportunity. 91 According to Duncan Sundyas Ayub Khan did
not give this option the slightest thought partly because of the
level of western interest and pressure. He went for bilateral
negotiations. His main concern was to prevent western military
aid to India as it was linked with Kashmir dispute but
subsequently this condition was withdrawn on Nehru’s
objections. 92 After the end of their visit a “Joint Communiqué”
was issued simultaneously from Rawalpindi and New Delhi on
39
29 November 1962. In this communiqué Ayub Khan and Nehru

agreed to make ‘renewed efforts’ to resolve the Kashmir
dispute and other related matters and wish that end, in view
ministerial level backs were suggested to pave for an eventful
Ayub Nehru summit. 93
The renewed efforts for peace led to the search for
Kashmir through bilateral negotiations. This subsequently
culminated the Bhutto Swarn Singh talks. Six round of talks
were held because India and Pakistan at ministerial level
between December 1962 to May 1963. Pakistan’s Foreign
Minister Z.A. Bhutto and Indian Railway Minster Sardar Swarn
Singh led Pakistani and Indian delegations respectively. 94
There was little achievement in the first round the two
sides agreed to continue talks. The second round also resulted
in to stalemate. Pakistan stuck to its position on the plebiscite
but agreed to consider any alternative proposal. India came up
with a plan, supported by the US for the partition of Kashmir
based on existing ceasefire line without touching the valley,
followed by military disengagement and no war declaration. 95
According to one account of an Indian participant that Swarn
Singh was eager to achieve breakthrough over Kashmir,
actually included in his territorial offer to Bhutto “a toe-hold in
the connected valley of Kashmir”. 96 Swarn Singh was prepared
to concede up to 1,500 square miles of Indian held territory in
Kashmir in return for Pakistan’s acceptance of the modified
line as a permanent international boundary. 97 Discussion on this
plan continued in the third round. The Chief Pakistani
negotiator, then Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto, flatly rejected
the offer, telling Swaran Singh that Kashmir valley was
indivisible and that Pakistan had to have the whole of it. 98
Pakistan delegation rejected this offer as it was not in
accordance with the UN resolutions.
Thus nothing came out of these discussion but the two
sides agreed to resume talks at Calcutta. The fourth round was
dominated by discussions on Pakistan China Boundary
agreement. India skillfully exploited this agreement to increase
Pakistan-US differences.
A stalemate was reached in the fifth round both sides
sticking to their respective position. In the final round India
proposed a no war declaration which the Pakistani delegation
rejected as a device to side track the real issue and re-affirmed
its position on plebiscite as the only honourable and practical
basis for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It proposed that
for about one year the Kashmir valley should be put under
International Control and at the end of that period the wishes of
40
Kashmir’s be ascertained to decide their future. India rejected

the Pakistani proposal. 99 .
The collapse of these talks led to the sudden
deterioration of Indo-Pakistan relations. Another factor which
caused this deterioration was India’s bid to integrate Kashmir
in to the Indian Union. One Step was to change in the
designation of “Sadr-i-Riyasat (head of the state) of the
Kashmir state to ‘governor’ and ‘prime minister’ to ‘chief
minister’. Another move was to abrogate Article 370 of the
Indian constitution which granted a special status ‘to the
disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir’, different from the other
Indian states. This abrogation was meant to extend the powers
of the Lok Sabha to frame laws for the state’s administration. 100
This factor coupled with Indian Army’s intrusion into the
village of Azad Kashmir which further led to the estrangement
of relations between the two countries. 101
The stalemate over Kashmir increased the frustration of
Pakistani policy makers concerning the solution of Kashmir
dispute as per United Nations resolutions. The growing amity
between India and the West particularly the US during
Kennedy’s administration made Pakistan to look for a military
solution of the problem.
After 1962, Western aid to India arose the
apprehensions of the “nationalist bourgeoisie’ in Pakistan’s
foreign office and military establishment, 102 which, now began
to believe that this would eventually disturb the military
proportion between the two armies that stood at time 3:1. It
apprehend that any disturbance, in this proportion would
decisively tilt the balance of power in South Asia in favour of
India. More importantly it was felt that, this would render
Pakistan increasingly incapable of finding a military solution of
Kashmir dispute. Moreover, these weapons would ultimately be
used against Pakistan in the wake of Indo-Pakistan war. This
element also rued the opportunity which Pakistan squandered
during 1962, Sino-Indian conflict by not taking benefit of
India’s vulnerability during the war, for the final solution of
Kashmir dispute. This thinking provided the main rationale
behind ‘Operation Gibraltor’. 103 The idea was that if Pakistan
could in a quick move liberate important area in Kashmir
particularly Akhnur Indian forces in the valley would be
stranded. It was assumed that India’s position would be further
vulnerable in the wake of popular uprising. Such situation
combined with international pressure would also compel India
to honor its commitment concerning plebiscite in Kashmir. 104
This operation backfired owning to some operational
flaws and tactical mistakes. The most glaring blunder was the
41
wrong anticipation of the intensity of Indian response.

Pakistanis believed that like 1948 Indo-Pakistan war the
conflict would not escalate and remain confined to Azad
Kashmir. But India opened West Pakistan front as Indian troops
crossed International border and full-scale war was unleashed.
The 1965 war may be called a Kashmiri’s war as its
long term as well as immediate causes concerned Kashmir.
Even amid the hectic diplomatic activity to bring an end to this
conflict Pakistani authorities tried to impress on the US
officials the significance of Kashmir cause. According to de-
classified American papers Bhutto conceded to US envoy.
“We (are) not bartering over the piece of territory but
are concerned with (the) fate of 5 million people. If they want
India okay, if they wish to be part of Pakistan that’s fine. If
they wish something else, that’s all right too, what ever they
want”. 105 The war remained inconclusive and both accepted the
UN sponsored ceasefire. 106 In the subsequent months, the
Soviet Union made repeated offers for the arbitration between
Pakistan and India. The Tashkent Summit was the first Soviet
attempt to mediate between Indian and Pakistan. The
declaration dismissed the Kashmir problem in a few words
Kashmir was discussed (it was not mentioned even as a dispute)
and each side put faith its respective position. The other
provisions such as the withdrawal of troops, resumption of
diplomatic relations, stoppage of the hostile propaganda and
repatriation of Prisoners of Wars (POWs) were implemented. 107
Talks about economic and cultural ties also remained inclusive.
According to Absar Hussain, it was a perception among
many people that there was some kind of secret understanding
or a “deal’ had been struck at Tashkent. They held the view that
the war was on the battlefield had been lost on the negotiations
table. Bhutto emerged as the most vocal exponent of this
thinking. He promised to let the Tashkent cat out of bag at
proper time. 108 The Tashkent Declaration had far reaching
consequences, however, neither Ayub nor Shastri could accrue
benefits out of it.
During Yahya Period the Kashmir issue was over-
shadowed by deepening political turmoil and East Pakistan
crises. The most significant development concerning Kashmir
was Indian Prime Minster Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s proposal of
“normalization and improvement of Indo-Pakistan Relations on
the basis of easing travel between the two countries,
encouraging cultural exchanges and improving commerce. 109
She further offered that if Yahya agreed both countries could
setup a joint India-Pakistan body for this purpose at any level
42
which was acceptable to Yahya Khan. She also reiterated her

suggestion of no war pact between the two countries. 110
These proposal omitted mention of two most serious
disputes having an adverse effect on Indo-Pakistan relation,
Kashmir and Farkha Barrage. In his reply to Mrs. Indria Gandhi
President Yahah Khan tried to emphasize the resolution of two
outstanding issues (Kashmir and Water) first and then resort
towards the settlement of peripheral issues. He wrote a letter to
Indira Grandhi on 26, July 1969. In which he concluded that
‘It is our sincere conviction that the amity and
friendship will continue to elude India and Pakistan of our two
governments run after the shadow that the peripheral issues are
and evade the reality that our two outstanding disputes
regarding Jammu and Kashmir and the Ganges waters
represent.’ 111
The 1971 war and subsequent debacle of East Pakistan
was not the outcome of Kashmir. But once war started on West
Pakistan front. it soon spread to the Kashmir front as well.
During the war Pakistan lost 317 square kilometer territory to
India on Kashmir front. In this war Pakistan lost 5,000 miles of
territory on West Pakistan front as well as its 90,000 soldiers
were also taken as POWs by India. These issues were resolved
through Simla Accord with was concluded between Pakistani
President Z.A. Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
The salient features of this accord concerning Kashmir were as
follows.
Pakistan agreed to make a temporary arrangement on
the line of which without prejudice to its recognized position
on Kashmir. Both countries agreed to resolve Kashmir dispute
on the basis of principle of Bi-literalism. Para (VI) of the Sima
Agreement has no ambiguity as to the status of the Kashmir
issue. This agreement was a sort of re-affirmation by Pakistan
and Indian that Kashmir is an unresolved issue. 112
This agreement generated a very heated debate in
Pakistan and the divergent stance taken by India further cast
various doubts about Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. While
interpreting the Simla agreement. India often referred to the
second paragraph (dealing with the principles of bilateralism)
while Pakistan focuses on Paragraph one (referring to the
united Nations). 113 Z.A. Bhutto in a public speech tried to
remove the ambiguities concerning the interpretation of Simla
Agreements in these words:
There is nothing in the Simla Agreement that

we cannot go to United Nations. It is correct
that it emphasizes the resolution of Jammu and
43
Kashmir Dispute through bilateral approach.

But no where it stated that we can’t take up the
issue in United Nations we have not used the
word “exempted” or excluded. As I have stated
earlier that in it is maintained that the UN
charter recognized bilateral negotiations a
method of settlement of international disputes.
If (suppose) Simla agreement forecloses the
doors of United Nations as a result of which we
cannot take up this issue in the UN. Even the
UN charter contains provision 103 which, states
that under any other international treaty, what
their responsibility will be the obligations of
UN members under UN charter will hold
precedence in case of conflict between
obligations of UN members under UN charter
and their responsibilities under any other
international treaty. 114
Bhutto also maintained that the UN charter would prevail in

case of conflict between Simla agreement and the obligations
under the UN charter. Even if Simla accord prohibits, though
this has not been the case, even then the UN charter would hold
precedence. 115 Had UN charter not contained article 103, the
presence of article 34 also authorizes UN security council. It
stipulates that “UN may investigate any conflict or situation
which may cause international conflict in order to decide
whether the world peace is threatened by the persistence or
continuing of that conflict.” Security Council can itself take the
notice of this situation even in the case of those countries
which refuse to refer this matter to security council, it security
council may back up this issue on its own and discuss it. 116
Bhutto accorded great importance to Kashmir he
described Kashmir as “the handsome head of the body of
Pakistan” held by India “against all norms of morality” because
it wanted to keep a Muslim majority area of the Pakistan thus
negating the two nation theory. 117 During his premiership he
pressed on the one hand for the settlement of the Kashmir
dispute under the Simla Agreement and on the other pleaded for
the right for the self-determination of the people of Jammu and
Kashmir. This approach is reflected in one of his articles which
appeared in the Foreign Affairs which provides an insight into
his policy on Kashmir. “Indeed Simla agreement admits the
existence of the dispute by providing that the line of the control
in Jammu and Kashmir shall be respected by both sides without
prejudice to the recognized position of either side. A settlement
44
of this dispute has to be found, a settlement acceptable to the

people of Kashmir. They have the right of self-determination.
This is the position of the United Nations. This was also the
position at one time of India herself. And this is the position to
which Pakistan is pledged. 118
In 1973, Z.A. Bhutto in a top secret memo to Tikka
Khan, advocated people’s war against India to achieve
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy objectives. He said “In the new war
the enemies around us will be depending largely upon material
superiority and not human factor, upon technique and not force
proved, in China, in Korea, in Israel and in Vietnam that a
people’s war can withstand innumerable ups and down but that
no force can succeed in altering its general march towards
inevitable triumph…And we ourselves have ruled then for eight
centuries. All these are not ancient history. 119
Tensions once more increased between India and
Pakistan after India’s first nuclear explosion in May 1974.
From January 1974 onwards, Pakistan’s government began to
take strong exception of the moves by Indian government to
integrate Kashmir in Indian Union. Pakistani politician bitterly
criticized the negotiation prior to the conclusion of Indra-
Abdullah accord about Kashmir. The accord was concluded in
February 1975. In this accord the accession of Jammu and
Kashmir to India was reaffirmed by both the parties. After this
Sheikh Abdullah assumed the office of the Chief Minister of
the state and the plebiscite fourm was dissolved. 120
Bhutto termed this accord as a “sell out” because it
violated the terms of Simla and the UN requirements for a
plebiscite. 121 To him it was a shameful barter of the Kashmiris
which Sheikh Abdullah had pledged to support. He called for a
strike throughout Pakistan on 28 February, 1975. A complete
countrywide strike was observed in Pakistan on this day to
condemn the Indra Abdullah deal. 122
Zia’s Kashmir policy was quite ambivalent apparently
Zia’s government pursued two-pronged strategy i.e. on the one
hand Zia’s official stand towards India was openly
conciliatory. 123 On the other it envisaged a covert plan to train
Kashmir youth to launch an “armed crusade against India” in
the valley. General Zia ul Haq termed this strategy as a “peace
offensive” against India. Talking to Indian leader he stressed
that India-Pakistan dialogue for the normalization should begin
with Kashmir rather than contentious issues. 124 This ambivalent
policy of Zia led some critics to perceive that Kashmir dispute
was put in the cold storage. 125 Moreover, his government’s pre-
occupation with Afghan crisis further led credence to this
perception. 126
45
This view looks too simplistic in the light of other

sources (both Indian and Pakistani). Moreover, the dominance
of hawkish elements in the internal coterie of Zia’s government
further belie this view. While explaining Pakistan’s stance on
Kashmir Zia said: “Pakistan’s point of view is: let us talk…we
are not in favour of resorting to force. But we are not in favour
of being browbeaten by Indian point of view that since there is
a line of control there is therefore no issue involved”. 127
Indian commentators maintain that as early as 1982
almost immediately after Sheikh Abdulla’s death, General Zia
devised a plan to launch “armed crusade” in the valley. But it
did not meet with much success and it was not until the mid
1980s that the plan was again revived. 128 While India was busy
in “operation Pawn” in Srilanka Zia government planned
shrewd moves” in Indian Kashmir. According to Indian
perceptions Kashmir problem did not start in 1988 as is widely
believed but in 1984 when General Zia approved the plan to
destabilize India’s Northern Western border state. 129 Younas
Samad also seems to corroborate this view as he reveals that
“under Zia’s order in 1984 the Pakistan’s Army’s Field
Intelligence unit was helping to organize the insurgency.” 130
C ONCLUSION
While summing up this whole debate about Pakistan’s Kashmir

policy we may infer its following discernable trend: Pakistan’s
Kashmir policy may be divided into the following phases: 1 st
Phase from 1947-56, 2 nd Phase from 1957-65, 3 rd Phase from
1966-72, 4 th Phase from 1973-88.
The most crucial period of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy
was from 1947 to 1956. During this phase the struggle for
Kashmir was pursued with ideological favour to help Kashmiris
join Pakistan. Though Pakistan failed to obtain desired results
yet it was able to substantially pressurize India. Indian position
on Kashmir was considered more legal because of the
instrument of accession (although it was never accepted by
Pakistan). While Pakistan’s position drove its strength from
moral grounds as it championed the cause of right of self-
determination of Kashmir. Incidentally, the UN resolutions of
1948-49 were also favourable to both Pakistan and the
Kashmiris. In 1956, the Security Council rejected Indian claims
that local elections in Kashmir for Indian parliament were a
substitute for pledged plebiscite. During this period even Soviet
Union abstained to veto the resolutions in the Security Council.
By that time, Kashmir had not become a victim of the Cold War
politics.
46
The second phase (1957-65) was marked by two

conspicuous features: indifference of the UN towards Kashmir
issue and Pakistan quest for having a military solution of
Kashmir particularly after post-Sino Indian war. The policy of
alignment defeated the very purpose for which it was adopted.
It virtually froze the Kashmir dispute. As Pakistan drew closer
to Western Alliance, this issue was also engulfed by the Cold
War politics. Pakistan’s efforts to resolve it through the UNSC
were frustrated by the Soviet Union’s frequent use of veto
power.
In 1964, Pakistan failed to obtain a favourable Security
Council resolution on Kashmir. In 1965 the Security Council
refused to even mention Kashmir by name, speaking instead the
political problem underlying Indo-Pakistan conflicts. Frustrated
by the lack of support, Pakistan resorted to the military option
and that led to operation “Gibraler” which eventually
culminated in the outbreak of the 1965 war.
During the third phase (1966-72) though Pakistan
continued to stick to its traditional stance over Kashmir but
practically this issue was placed at the back burner. Pakistan
Governments plagued by other domestic crises could not high
light Kashmir cause as vigorously as they used to do prior to
1966.
The significance of Kashmir issue was further reduced
in the fourth phase (1972-89), but it remained alive primarily
due to occasional utterances. During 1980s, an insidious change
occurred in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy which involved two
mutually inclusive strategies viz. altering the status-quo with
adventurism along with pursuing the traditional policy. This
synoptic view also suggests that Pakistan’s Kashmir policy
remained consistent from 1947 to 1988 and the right of self
determination on the basis of UN resolution served as a main
pivot around which our Kashmir policy revolved.
47
E ND -N OTES
1
Mussarat Sohail, Partition and Anglo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-51 (Lahore:
Vanguard, 1992), p. 132.
2
Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (Lahore: Vanguard, 2004), p. 115.
3
S.M. Burke, Lawrance Ziring, Pakistan Foreign Policy: An Historical
Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 17-26.
4
Ibid., p.18.
5
Latif Ahmed Sherwani, “Kashmir’s Accession to India Re-examined”,
Pakistan Horizon 52 (October 1999), p.55.
6
As a result of Hindu British connivance direct land link with
created between Pakistan and Kashmir. The principles of partition
were not applied to the issue of accession states in order to
provide India with a pretext for the occupation of Kashmir.
Maharaja was influenced through his internal coterie. Particularly
Maharani Tara Devi consequently such situation was created
Maharaja was left with no choice but to accede to India.
7
They Corroborate their contention with these following arguments
they assert that Mountbatten was fully aware of the strategic
significance of Gurdaspur. For example at least on three occasions
he indicated the possibility of inclusion of Gurdaspur with the
Indian Union.
In his press conference in Delhi on June 4, 1947, he quoted
absolutely wrong figures regarding the proportion of Muslim
population in the Gurdaspur District. He said that the proportion
of non-Muslim and Muslim population was 49.6% and 50.4%
respectively and the different was only 0.8%, where as the 1941
population census showed the Muslim population in the district
was 51.41%. Thus the actual difference between Muslim and non-
Muslim population was 2.28% not 0.8 as wrongly quoted by
Mountbatten. During the press conference he was asked about his
categorical statement that the final boundaries of the divided
provinces “will almost certainly not be identified” with those in
the notional division. Mountbatten replied that “you will see at
once that it is unlikely that the boundary commission will throw
the whole of (Gurdaspur) district into the Muslim majority area.
This example amply testifies to the fact that how resolutely he was
contemplating about the throwing the lot of Gurdaspur district in
favour of India. For details see Mountbatten of Burma, Time only
to Look Forward (London: Nicholas Kaye, 1949), p.30. Also see
Sherwani, “Kashmir Accession to India re-examined,” p.58. On 4
August while talking to the Nawab of Bhopal and ruler of Indore
he indicated that Kashmir because of its geographical situation
could accede to India also, provided part of Gurdaspur district was
transferred to East Punjab. The Transfer of Power XII, p.509 cited
by S. M. Burke and Salim Al-Din Quraishi, The British Raj in
India: An Historical Review (Karachi, Oxford University Press,
2004), p. 555.
He also a wrote in his personal report on 16 August 1947 that the
Maharaja “now talks of holding a referendum to deicide whether to
48
join Pakistan or India, provided that the Boundary Commission

gives him land communication between Kashmir and India
See Transfer of Power XII, p. 769 cited by Burke and Quraishi,
The British Raj, p. 555. All these instances amply demonstrate that
he was pre-decided to hand over Gurdaspur to Indian Union.
8
Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir (London: Robert Hale,
1956), p. 74.
9
Andrew Roberts, Eminent Chruchillians (London: Weldenfeld
and Nicolson, 1994). cited by Sher Muhammad Garewal,
“Mountbatten and Kashmir Issue”, Journal of Research Society of
Pakistan, XXXIV (April 1997), pp.9-10. Despite these findings
Roberts has written “It is impossible accurately quantify the
personal responsibility for the tragedy of Kashmir as the
Mountbatten papers relating to the issue at the India Office
Library and records are closed to scholars for an indefinite period,
(Robert, Eminent Churchillans, p. 105.)
10
Mussarat Bano, Lord Mountbatten As a Viceroy 23 March-14 August 1947
(M.A Thesis, University of Punjab, 1997), p. 258-60.
11
See Durga Das, ed., Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 2-Vols. (Ahmedabad:
Niajivan Publishing House, 1971), pp.1-9. Also see Ch. Zafar Ullah Khan,
Almiya-i-Pakistan (trans. Ashraf Tanveer) (Lahore: Atishfishah Publishers,
1989), p. 89.
12
Bano, “Lord Mountbatten As a Viceroy 23 March-14 August 1947”, p. 89.
13
Sher Muhammad Garewal, “Mountbatten and Kashmir Issue”,
Journal of Research Society of Pakistan, XXXIV (April 1997). P.
11.
14
S.M. Burke, Lawrance Ziring, Pakistan Foreign Policy: An Historical
Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 23.
15
Janak Singh was the member of R.S.S.
16
M.C. Mahajan belonged to Judiciary. He was representative of
Congress in Punjab Boundary Commission.
17
Shahid M. Amin, “A Re-Evaluation of the Kashmir Dispute”,
Pakistan Horizon, 56 (April 2003), p. 29.
18
Alastiar Lamb, Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the
Kashmir Dispute 1947-48 (Herts: Oxford Books, 1995), p. 157.
19
Ibid., p.170.
20
Hence, Indian’s arguments that it had sent its forces to defend
its territory had not basis as by 27 October, no instrument of
Accession had been signed.
21
Alastair Lamb cited in Mohammad Riazuddin, “Solidarity with
Kashmiris”, News (5 February, 2004).
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy (Hertbirdbury: Oxford Books,
1994), p. 96.
49
28
See Yousaf Saraf, Kashmir’s Fight For Freedom, Vol. II,
(Lahore: Ferozesons, 1977), p. 907.
29
In order to thwart the conspiracies directed towards accession of
Kashmir to Indian Union Liaquat Ali Khan’s government
organized a tribal invasion. Brigadier Akbar Khan and Sardar
Shaukat Hayat were mastermind behind this invasion. Under this
operation tribal Lashkar was sent to Kashmir for liberating it from
Maharaja’s yoke as overt militancy operation was not possible.
30
Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, pp. 154-55.
While the presence of the Patiala men was commented upon often
enough, very few of the commentators appeared to have wondered
at its implication. These included firstly, not only the fact that
troops “in theory subordinate to the C-in-C of the Indian Army” In
other words troops were deployed in Kashmir and engaged in
fighting well before accession. Secondly, but the great likelihood
that since the Patiala men were in Kashmir also before the tribal
advance of 22 October. “the presence of these tribesmen was a
direct response to the arrival of Patiala troops.”
31
Ijaz Hussain, Kashmir Dispute: An International Law
Perspective (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies,
1998), p. 41.
32
Ibid., 75.
33
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan’ Defence Policy Early years
1947-58 (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), p. 42.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid., 41.
36
Shahid M. Amin, “A Re-Evaluation of the Kashmir Dispute”,
Pakistan Horizon, vol. 56 (April 2003), p.38.
37
Iqbal Ahmad, “A Kashmir solution for Kashmir”, Himal South
Asia, vol. 8 (Nov-Dec, 1996), p. 22.
38
P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohn,
Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia (London:
Routledge Curzen, 2003), p. 36.
39
Robert G. Wrising, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On
Regional Conflict and its Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1994),
p. 86.
40
Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, “Kashmir Problem an Appraisal” in Kashmir
Problem: Challenge and Response (Islamabad: Instittue of Policy Studies,
1990), p. 47.
41
Victoria Schafiled, Kashmir in Conflict: Pakistan and Unfinished War
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 225.
42
Further Kashmir’s significance is enhanced when it is perceived as the
meeting place of regional powers India, Afghanistan, China and Russia. Ishtiaq
Ahmed and Miss Rabia Khan, “Kashmir: Its strategic Importance for India and
Pakistan, The Journal of Political Science, vol. 12 (1999-2000), pp- 77-78.
43
Mahnaz Isphani, Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the
Boarder lands of Asia (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 184.
44
Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982), pp. 45-60.
50
45
Iffat Malik, Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict International Dispute (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2002), p. 267.
46
Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir (Delhi: Army Publishers, n.d.), p. 10.
The protagonists of such views even proclaim that “Jammu and Kashmir state
is a battleground, where, the national ideologies of India and Pakistan are being
tested”. Khan Zaman Mirza “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in 1990s with reference
to Kashmir dispute”, South Asian Studies, vol. 11 (July-1994), p. 70
Sharif-ul-Mujahid even equates Kashmir with ideology of Pakistan. He is of the
view “If Kashmir goes, the ideology goes. The liquidation of Pakistan as a state
may only be matter of time.” Sharif al Mujahid, “India-Pakistan Relations: An
Analysis”, in Foreign Policy of Pakistan An Analysis (Karachi: University of
Karachi, 1964), p. 43.
47
Chari, et.al., Perceptions, Politics and Security in South Asia, p.35.
48
Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982), pp-51-54.
49
Riaz Ali Shah, Dr. Riaz Ali Shah’s Diary (Lahore: Publishing House Bull
Road, 1950) quoted in Habibur Rehman, Kashmir: The Jugular view of
Pakistan (Rawalpindi: Kashmir Liberation Cell, 1998), p. 23.
50
Ch. M. Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (Lahore: Research Society
University of the Punjab, 1986), p.235.
This impression is lent further credence with the account of A.H. Khursheed
and General Gul Hasan in their memories. The former served as private
secretary of Quaid, where as the later was ADC.
51
Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: OUP, 1984), p. 349.
52
Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947 (Karachi:
Oxford Books, 1994), p.99. When Auckinlech met the Quaid on
28 t h October at Lahore and argued that the accession of the state
of Jammu and Kashmir to Indian Union sending of Pakistan troops
into state could result in an armed conflict between the two
dominions and would attract the “application of operation stand-
down”. According him in such an event all British officers serving
with the Government of Pakistan would have to be withdrawn.
Auchkinlech did not tell Quaid “operation stand down” applied
equally to Indian army whose British commanders were
masterminding the Indian operation in Kashmir. Nasim Hasan
Shah, The UN Settled State Some Legal Aspects (Rawalpindi:
Kashmir Liberation Cell, 1998), 11.
53
Farooq Ahmed Dar, “Jinnah’s Perception of Pakistan-India Relations.”
Regional Studies, vol. XVII. (Spring 1999), p.32.
54
Alastair Lamb quoted in A.H. Askari “India’s sensitivity on Kashmir,” Dawn
(29 October 1997).
55
Riaz Ahmed, “Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah’s Kashmir Policy as Governor-General
of Pakistan” in Papers presented at the International Seminar on Quaid-e-
Azam, Pakistan and Kashmir 8-9 May 1996 Islamabad 2 Vols, ed. Riaz Ahmed
(Islamabad: Quaid-e-Azam University, 1996), p.18.
The difference between Nehru’s and Jinnah’s approaches towards Kashmir was
easily discernable. Jinnah advised to have a plebiscite hold under the
arrangements made by Government of India and Pakistan were as Nehru
insisted that plebiscite should be held under the auspices like the United
51
Nations. This view is further corroborated by Ch. Muhammad Ali’s account.

He has revealed on 8th November, Mountbatten and Sardar Patel agreed to the
urgency of withdrawal both the tribal lashkar and the Indian troops from the
valley, to be followed up by a free and fail plebiscite to be arranged by
government of India and Pakistan as desired by the Quaid, but Nehru disagreed.
Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, pp.297-98.
56
Sir Grafftey Smith the British High Commissioner’s Report also sheds light
on the main postulates of Jinnah’s Kashmir policy. (Grafftey Smith waited on
Quaid-e-Azam in Karachi on 9 December and discussed with him among other
things the Kashmir issue) These included
(I). He did not personally favour the intervention of the United Nations
Organization or of any other outside authority. He still preferred the solution
suggestion by him to India on 1st Nov. 1947, that the two Governor-General
duly authorized by their respective dominions should accept responsibility for
the task of setting up a neutral administration in Kashmir and organizing a
plebiscite. (II). He emphatically believed that the movement in Kashmir was
the inevitably natural result of cruelty and repressive action taken again the
Muslims of Poonch by Kashmir state forces as punishment for their attitude
favouring the state accession to Pakistan. (III). He considered the very notion of
partition of Kashmir on the basis of communal ground as absurd and spoke
“sarcastically of the ignorance which inspired talk of the partition of Kashmir
on the basis that Jammu is a predominantly Hindu state”. Sir Graffay Smith to
Noel-Baker a December 1947, received in Commonwealth Relations officers,
31 December 1947, POL/12010/47 in India office Library L/1/1/1419 cited by
Ahmed, “Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah’s Kashmir Policy”, p.13.
57
Lawrence Ziring, “Quaid-e-Azam on the Kashmir issue as Governor
General” in Papers Present at International Seminar on Quaid-e-Azam,
Pakistan and Kashmir, vol. 01, pp-10.
58
p. 86.
59
David Litenthal’s Interview with Wirsing (1951) cited by Iffat Malik,
Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict International Dispute (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. 207.
60
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan’ Defence Policy Early years
1947-58 (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), p. 44.
61
Ibid. The efforts of the Indian governments attempted to discuss Kashmir
case in isolation where as Pakistan government tried to expand the conflict-
canvas in order to bring India to negotiating table.
62
The ceasefire decision was by and large welcomed in Pakistan however some
military leaders termed it as a “great blunder” they contended that this decision
deprived Pakistan of military victory in Kashmir. Liaquat was criticized as
being pro-west and pro-British mainly due to his failure to entice substantial
international support over Kashmir. This resentment found expression in form
of “Pindi Conspiracy Case”. The plot was to over throw the Liaquat’s
government and replace it with military government. The common detonator
of most of the military officers involved in Pindi conspiracy was that mostly all
of them had taken active part in the Kashmir war 1948 and all of them greatly
resented the decision of cease-fire. Liaquat Ali Khan tried to pacify these
52
sentiments by arguing that Pakistan’s objective was not to decide the fate of
Kashmir by force but to guarantee their right of self-determination through
plebiscite. Sohail, Partition and Anglo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-51, pp. 213-
214. Also see Irfan Waheed Usmani, Kashmir Ki Jung 1948 Aur Rawalpindi
Sazish Case (Lahore: University of the Punjab, M.A. Thesis, 1996), p. 353.
63
The ceasefire was quickly attained but the issue of demilitarization proved to
be insoluble. Even today it defies all direct and indirect efforts. Since 2nd stage
was not completed the third stage of plebiscite could not be reached. Pervaiz
Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan’ Defence Policy Early years 1947-58
(London: Macmillan Press, 1990), p. 45.
64
MC Naughtan was a Canadian General, MC Naughtan Mission was sent by
Security Council in 1949. It tried to bridge the difference by laying down these
recommendations withdrawal of Pakistani troops and of all Indian forces other
than those required for civil administration and the reduction of the state forces
on one hand and the Azad Kashmir forces on the other. These
recommendations were accepted by Pakistan but rejected by India. Rafique
Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 200),
p.75.
65
On 12th April the United Nations Security Council appointed Sir Owen
Dixion a Judge (later Chief Justice) of Australia. His recommendations
included: demilitarization seeking withdrawal of Pakistani forces first and that
of Indian forces afterwards. Proposal of regional plebiscite. This arbitration
could not make any head way as these proposal were rejected by India.
66
Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics, p.78.
67
Khawaja Sarwar Hasan ed. Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan:
The Kashmir Question (Karachi: Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p.26.
68
69
Ibid., 175. This policy did revive public enthusiasm in Pakistan for the
liberation of Kashmir but failed to achieve anything concrete.
70
Ibid., p. 186.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Dawn, (9 September, 1957).
74
New York Times, 19 October, 1957, cited by Afzal, Pakistan History and
Politics, p.212.
75
Dawn, (9 March, 1958).
76
77
Absar Hussain Rizvi, “Remembering Tashkent Declaration”, The Muslim
(Islamabad, January 1, 1991).
78
Ayub Khan, Friend not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967),
p.123.
79
Pakistan Times (31 October, 1958).
80
Pandit Nehru had termed Ayub’s takeover as a “naked military dictatorship”
Two Indian Canberra Reconnaissance fights intruded in to Pakistan’s territory
one aircraft was shot down near Rawalpindi.
Dawn, (26 September, 1959) and Dawn, (27 July, 1960).
81
Field Marshal M. Ayub Khan, Speeches and statements October 1958—June
1959, Vol.I (Karachi: n.p.), p.69.
53
82
Mirza, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in 1990s with reference to Kashmir
dispute”, p.72.
83
Stephen P. Cohen, The idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005),p.
71.
84
Ibid.
85
Krishna Menon, a former Indian Defence Minister, declared that India had
not ‘abjured violence’ and would solve the ‘Pakistan problem’ as it had done
the ‘Goa problem’ Sanjiva Reddy, President of the Indian National Congress,
advocated a forcible ‘liberation of Azad Kashmir’ leaving the time of such
venture to the Indian government. Nehru stated that the use of force was a
question of ‘suitability and opportunity’
86
87
Ibid.
88
Hamid Yusaf, Pakistan: A study of Political Developments 1947-77 (Lahore:
Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1997), p.91.
The Indian Army was under tremendous pressure and many observers believed
that a military move as Pakistan’s part might as Alastiar Lamb has put it
“brought on an Indian debacle of the first magnitude”, However, Washington
and London sent their representatives exercise restrain on Pakistan.
89
Nawabazada Sher Ali Khan, Story of Soldering and Politics in India and
Pakistan (Lahore: Wajidahs, 1978), p.130. Also see Y.D Gundevia, Outside the
Archives (Hyderabad: Sangam Books, 1984), p.293. The Indian side had just
experienced military defeat and humiliation at the hands of Chinese communist
army in the border war of October-November 1962; and its pressing need for
arms provided the west with an obvious opening.
90
M.A. Askari, “India’s Sensitivity on Kashmir”, Dawn (29 October 1997).
91
Kessing’s Contemporary Archives 1963-64, quoted in Afzal, Pakistan History
and Politics, p. 302.
92
Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.68.
93
Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics, p. 299.
These takes were held in Rawalpindi (27-29 December 1962), New Delhi (16-
19 January 1961), Karachi (8-10 February 1963), Calcutta (12-14 March 1963),
Karachi (22-25 April 1963), New Delhi (15-16 May 1963)
94
Morris Jones, Pakistan Chronicle, pp. 93-95.
95
p. 194.
For details see, D.K Palit, War in High Himalayan: The Indian
Army in Crisis 1962 (New Delhi: Lance International, 1991), pp.
368-407.
96
Gundevia, Outside the Archives, p.248. Gundevia at that time secretary of
Commonwealth and a participant in the talks, provides a highly detailed and
illuminating account of these talks.
97
Ibid., 293.
98
Bhutto, Foreign Policy in Pakistan, pp. 77-78. Altaf Guhar, Ayub Khan: The
First Military Ruler of Pakistan (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 1994),
pp.220-32. Morris Jones, Pakistan Chronicle, p. 93.
99
Dawn, (2 December, 1963).
100
Ibid.
54
101
According Farhat Mahmud it was represented by Aziz Ahmed, General
Akhtar Malik. They also found a vocal exponent of this cause in Z.A. Bhutto
the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. See Farhat Mahmud, History of Pakistan-US
Relations 1947-1990 (Lahore: Vanguard, 1990).
102
Ibid., pp.225-237.
103
Absar Hussain Rizvi, “Remembering Tashkent Declaration”, Muslim,
(Islamabad, 11 January, 1991).
104
American Papers cited by I.A Rehman “Review Article: American Papers”,
Newsline, (December 1999).
105
Rizvi, “Remembering Tashkent Declaration”.
106
Absar Hussain provides very penetrating insight in to the developments in
Tashkent which led to the signing of this declaration. “For seven days Presidnet
Ayub Khan, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shashtri and the Soviet Prime
Minister Plekses Kosygin talked and talked to come to some understanding for
the solution of Kashmir dispute and the normalization of the situation created
by the 1965 war…For six days Mr. Kosygin shuttled between the “datchas” of
Shashtri and Ayub in a bid to produce some document acceptable to both”…[In
his speech at the inaugural session on January 4 Ayub emphasized the need for
peace between Indian and Pakistan. He even offered no war pact to India. But it
was conditional on the solution of Kashmir issue. Shastri on his part also
stressed the need for peace but said nothing about Kashmir. The talks were
initially held at the official level to finalize the agenda but difference cropped
over Kashmir. The Indians insisted that Pakistan should agree through a step by
step approach. This boiled down to taking small measures to improve relations.
Ayub and Shastri held face to face talks at a “neutral datchas” as they would
not visit other’s residence. No progress was made at the exchanges. It were the
Soviets who ultimately produces a draft. Mr. Kosiygin in a dramatic midnight
meeting with Ayub and Shastri on January, 9 and succeeded in getting their
approval for a draft declaration.” Rizvi, “Remembering Tashkent Declaration”.
American Papers also provide in depth insight in to the hidden details of
Tashkent agreement. It has been recorded in American Papers that “Ayub
hoped by not insisting on “Kashmir first” and Shastri did so by not insisting on
making the ceasefire line the permanent border. The Pakistani delegation was
also satisfied that India’s plan for a no war pact had failed and that the
declaration was a step forward.” I.A. Rehman, “Review Article: American
Papers”, p.89.
107
Bhutto was not altogether happy with Tashkent. Though initially he praised
the Soviet-move to hold Indo-Pakistan summit he described it as “a great
initiative” But he was not happy with the way negotiations proceeded in that
direction. He was very glum during these negotiations. According to American
papers Ayub stated his point of view frankly and Bhutto did not disagree at that
time though Shoaib reported the latter’s ill-conceived reserve.” Rehman,
“Review Article: American Papers”. According to insiders information: “It was
said in the corridors of Ayub’s dacha that Ayub asked F.M. Bhutto to go and
deliver it to Indian Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh and discuss related
matter’s with him. Bhutto just went to Sardarji’s dacha and handed it over to
whosoever was there…it clearly indicated that Bhutto was not happy with the
declaration”. Rizvi, “Remembering Tashkent Declaration”, pp. 51-52.
108
Ibid. Also See India News, (1st August, 1969).
55
109
“Indra Gandhi’s letter to Yahya” dated 22 June, 1969. cited by Burke and
Ziring, Pakistan Foreign Policy, pp. 250-52.
110
For details see Pakistan Affairs, (30 August, 1969).
111
See K. Sarwar Hasan (ed.), The Simla Accord: Pakistan Horizon’s Special
Issue, Vol.XXV. No.3 (1972).
112
Its supporter’s term it as a great diplomatic victory for Pakistan and they
attribute to the skilful diplomacy of Z.A. Bhutto, particularly, in the context
that Pakistan was in a weaker position but Bhutto’s skillful diplomacy secured
from India the recognition of Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory. There
is not other pact Pakistan has maintained its critics argue that it has localized
the Kashmir dispute between the two states and diminish its international
significance. Through it India has legitimized its territorial grains of 1971 war.
Its critics also contend that it tempers with the internationally recognized and
accepted ceasefire line under a bilateral arrangement with unavoidable
implication it accords the line of control (L.O.C) sanctity generally not
associated with the ceasefire or truce lines. It enjoins upon high contacting
parties to refrain altering the line of control unilaterally irrespective of mutual
differences and legal interpretations. It has no relevance in finding a solution of
the Kashmir dispute. It provides no means of settling it, nor it lays down any
broad principles even in this regard. The consistency, morality and legality of
the Pakistani position on Kashmir is derived from and enshrine in the UN
resolutions, while the Simla Agreement is merely a reaffirmation by Pakistan
and India that Kashmir is an unresolved issue.
113
Chari, et.al, Perceptions, Politics and Security in South Asia, p.
42.
114
Ahmed Saleem (ed.), Bhutto aur Kashmir (Lahore: Jhasssng Publications,
1992), p.273.
115
Ibid.
116
Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, p.32.
Bhutto made a statement in UNSC “The people of Jammu and Kashmir are part
of the people of Pakistan in blood, in flesh in culture, in geography, in history
an in every way and in every from…If necessary Pakistan would fight to the
end” cited by Ajit Bhattacharjea, “Z.A. Bhutto’s Double Speak: Turning defeat
in to victory”, The Times of India, (3 May, 1995).
117
Z.A. Bhutto, “Pakistan Builds Anew”, Foreign Affairs cited by Hameed
A.K. Roy, Reading in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Vol.I (Lahore: Aziz
Publishers, 1981), p. 145.
118
P.M. Bhutto to the Chief of Army Staff, June 23, 1973. as cited in Wolpert,
Zulfi: Bhutto of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 186.
119
M. Hanif, “The Kashmir Dispute and Pakistan-India Relations 1972-1992”,
Pakistan Horizon, vol. 47(1). (January 1994), p. 38. see the text of India
Abdullah Agreement in Nawa-e-Waqat (Lahore, 7 March, 1975).
120
Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, p. 123.
121
Mussawat (Lahore, 2 March 1975).
122
Rajendra Sareen, Pakistan: The Indian Factor (New Delhi: Vikas
Publishers, 1984), p. 40.
123
M.H. Askari, “Kashmir: A New Phase”. Dawn (24 January 1990).
124
Mirza, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy in 1990s,” p. 73.
125
Ibid.
56
126
Sareen, Pakistan: The Indian Factor, p. 40.
127
P.S. Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Cross Roads (New Delhi,
1994), p.229; also see Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, p.140.
128
Girital Jain, Hindustan Times (27 July, 1990).
129
Yunus Samad, “Kashmir and imagining of Pakistan”, Contemporary South
Asia, vol. 4 (1: 1995), p.73.
130
Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics, p. 134.
57
Basharat Hussain, Jinnah-Mountbatten Relations
JINNAH– MOUNTBATTEN RELATIONS

BASHARAT HUSSAIN
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LAHORE
PAKISTAN
ABSTRACT
Partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 was an

event of momentous significance. Its process was
determined in the final months by the triumvirate
consisting of the last British Viceroy Lord
Mountbatten, the Congress President Jawaharlal
Nehru and All-India Muslim League’s head M. A.
Jinnah. This paper explores how the relationship
between Jinnah and Mountbatten shaped the outcome
of a number of critical issues related to partition such
as the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Partition Plan itself,
the issue of joint governor-general, Pakistan’s entry
into the Commonwealth, the communal violence in
Punjab and the accession of the Princely state of
Kashmir.
KEY WORDS: Lord Mountbatten, Jawaharlal Nehru, M. A. Jinnah, All-

India Muslim League, Cabinet Mission Plan, Partition Plan,
Commonwealth, Punjab, India, Pakistan.
Lord Mountbatten, in his capacity as the last viceroy of British Raj

reached India on March 22, 1947. His was an uphill task as he was to
command over the destinies of over 350 million people : 255 million
Hindus, 92 million Muslims, 6 million Indian Christians and 5.5
million Sikhs, speaking in all, about 370 different languages.1 From the
beginning Mountbatten gave the impression of being a different type of
viceroy- independent and a complete master of his self. It is said that
Nehru was so struck by the air of authority with which Mountbatten
spoke, that a few days after latter’s arrival in India, Nehru enquired
him: Have you by some miracle got plenipotentiary power?" "Suppose
I have", Mountbatten replied, "What difference would it make?" To
which Nehru answered: "Why then, you will succeed where all others
have failed."2 Mountbatten stated that he was in the position of a
testator on behalf of His Majesty's government.3 The plight of Britain
was like a testator on his death bed, possessed of vast dominions,
properties, power and privileges, and the Congress and the Muslim
59
League were the heirs apparent.

The fact of the matter is that Mountbatten didn't want to go to India.4
He had put the condition that on his return from India, he should be
taken back into the navy without loss of seniority and in equivalent
position to that which he was holding at the time of departure to India.
The British Admiralty had objected but he had his way.5 Moreover,
Mountbatten had demanded plenipotentiary powers i.e. he must be
allowed to act on his own and without interference from London and
over the secretary of state for India. The British Cabinet was astonished
at his demand but Premier Atlee personally granted his demand.6 It is
true that he did send his partition Plan through his Chief of Staff
General Ismay to London for the approval of the British Cabinet but
when he withdrew it to the utter confusion of Ismay and the Cabinet, he
refused to accept a ministerial visitation, as the Cabinet proposed, for
that would have undermined his authority in India and instead himself
went to London to persuade Cabinet to accept his revised plan.7 Few
would doubt that negotiations could have been carried out and
decisions taken as they were in India, if he, like every of his
predecessors had been obliged to consult with and seek authority from
Whitehall at every turn.
His mandate was to fulfill Premier Atlee's historic February
20th 1947 statement in the House of Commons which clearly
enunciated His Majesty government’s intention to transfer power to
Indians by a date not later than June 1948.8 Here, it will be of interest to
note that Mountbatten wrote his own ticket because the Feb. 20th
statement though not dictated by him but it was agreed word by word
with him by Atlee when the former was invited by the latter at the end
of 1946 to go to India to end the Raj, and it was Mountbatten who had
insisted on a terminal date.9 Mountbatten liked to get on with his
assignment and therefore, on his first day, he wrote two letters, each to
Gandhi and Jinnah asking them to see him soon.10 Jinnah and
Mountbatten had their first meeting on April 5, 1947. Both of them
might not have realized this fact but subsequent events proved that their
first encounter set the tone of their relations in the weeks and months to
follow. It didn't turn out to be a pleasant experience for either of them.
Jinnah started the conversation saying, "I'll enter into discussion on one
condition only", Mountbatten interrupted him and said, "I am not
prepared to discuss conditions or indeed present situation until I have
had the chance of making your acquaintance and knowing more about
yourself".11 Jinnah was completely taken aback by Mountbatten's
attitude and for a while didn't respond remaining reserved, haughty and
aloof.12 After the interview Mountbatten's first reaction was "My God,
he was cold. It took most of the interview to unfreeze him. "13
Jinnah had met Mountbatten with an open mind while the
60
latter had pre-determined notions about Jinnah. Lord Pethick-Lawrence

had already warned him that Jinnah would be his "toughest
customer",14 the others being Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel
and Liaquat Ali. In fact before seeing Jinnah, Mountbatten had a
detailed meeting with Nehru on March 24, 1947. Nehru, who had
already met the viceroy in Malaya, when Mountbatten was the Supreme
Allied Commander of South-East Asia Command, struck, Mountbatten
as "the most sincere".15 When asked for his views on Jinnah, Nehru had
described his rival as "one of the most extraordinary men in history, the
key to whose success was his ability to 'avoid taking any positive action
which might split his followers'.16 In another remark, Nehru had
contemptuously said that Jinnah was a mediocre lawyer with an
obsession for Pakistan.17 By the end of their first three-hour talk, Nehru
was completely won over and Mountbatten had full measure of him as
he had realized that Nehru could be flattered and persuaded.18 Nehru
found it easy to talk to the viceroy without any reservation. Viceroy
being shrewd had spotted Nehru's weakness that when encouraged
Nehru could be gossipy and malicious about his friends and colleagues,
and it was from him that the viceroy obtained much of the information
about Congress leaders and Jinnah.19 At the time of departure
Mountbatten said to Nehru, "I want you to regard me not as the last
viceroy winding up the British Raj, but as the first to lead the way to
the new India," and Nehru was intensely moved, "Now I know, what
they mean about your charm being so dangerous".20 Nehru was
Mountbatten's man from that moment on, and his attachment to
Mountbatten menage was much increased by his subsequent contact
with Lady Mountbatten. Nehru and Mountbatten had much in common.
Both were proud men. Both were aristocrats who had supported
popular causes and believed in public welfare rather than inherited
privilege.
Keeping in view the fact that Mountbatten was relying to a
very great extent on Nehru's assessment of Jinnah, it would be pertinent
to further explore and investigate about Nehru's opinions on Jinnah. On
Nehru's speeches in Malaya, Duckworth, a British official in a secret
dispatch to India office had reported, "He was a little scornful of Jinnah
and doubted very much whether he had either the intention or the
power to start a revolt in India if he didn't secure Pakistan ... Jinnah, he
said, 'rather reminds me of the man who was charged with the murder
of his mother and father and begged the clemency of the court on the
ground that he was an orphan'.21 Giving another negative analysis of
Jinnah to Mountbatten, Nehru had said, "The essential thing to realize
about Jinnah is that he is a man to whom success has come very late in
life-at over sixty. Before that he had not been a major figure in Indian
politics ... He knew that Pakistan could never stand up to constructive
61
criticism, and he had ensured that it should never be subjected to it."22

Paradoxically, Mountbatten viewed Jinnah through Nehru's
eyes strangely when the latter two men had nothing in common except
disregard and hatred. Nehru, the Harrow and Oxford, educated
intellectual, lover of poetry, writer of books despised Jinnah as a
narrow-minded racialist. He held that Jinnah had no real education, had
read law books and an occasional work of fiction but never read any
real book whereas Jinnah being intensely proud, constantly on the look-
out for snubs, was unlikely to bend to Nehru, whom he once described
as "an arrogant Brahmin who covers his Hindu trickiness with a veneer
of western education, and when he makes promises, always leaves a
loophole, and when he cannot find a loophole, he just lies."23
After his first tete-e-tete with Jinnah the viceroy might have
imagined to have unfrozen him but the icicles were still visibly clinging
to Jinnah, when he emerged from the Viceroy House to say to the
reporters, "The viceroy just does not understand."24 Mountbatten had
quickly discovered that this was a man completely impervious to his
charm. Mr. Jinnah at seventy had reached a stage when he was not
prepared to lower the drawbridge to anyone, least of all to someone
whom he suspected of being a playboy, a pro-Hindu and an anti-
Muslim.25 To break the ice and to develop a working relationship,
Mountbatten invited Jinnah and his sister Fatima Jinnah to dinner, the
next day, April 6, 1947. During the conversation, Jinnah tried to
impress upon the viceroy that the only solution of the Indian problem
was a "surgical operation" but quipped that he had not made up his
mind on that score and had added that an 'anaesthetic' must precede any
"surgical operation". Jinnah informed the viceroy about the history of
his dealings with the Congress, and claimed that while there was only
one man to deal from the Muslims' side but the same was not true for
the Congress. Jinnah lamented that Gandhi had enormous authority
without responsibility whereas Nehru and Patel represented different
points of view within Congress's constantly shifting stance.26 Jinnah's
criticism of Gandhi, Nehru, the Congress and the appalling treatment of
the Muslims at the hands of the Hindus led Mountbatten to conclude
that the top leader of the League was "infirm" in mind and body, and
therefore, didn't trust his judgment and dismissed his narration
symptomatic of senility.27
Although Mountbatten gave the impression of being
independent and all powerful in his dealings with the Indian leaders yet
to a great extent he was bounded by the "Governor-General's
Instrument of Instructions" – specifying the British Government's terms
of reference regarding the transfer of power - handed in the form of a
letter to Mountbatten by Premier Atlee.28 Viceroy's all political
juggling with the Indian leaders hinged on that "Instrument of
62
Instructions", whose major points are noteworthy:

(i) the definite objective of the British Government was to
obtain a unitary government for British India and the
Indian States, if possible within the British
Commonwealth, through the medium of the Constituent
Assembly set up and run in accordance with the Cabinet
Mission Plan. Instruction to Mountbatten was to do the
utmost in his power to persuade all parties to work
towards this end;
(ii) he was to work on making the Cabinet Mission operative
in respect of British India only by agreement between the
two major parties and there was no question of
compelling either party to accept it, and in case of no
prospect of a unitary government in India, the viceroy was
to report to the British government about the steps he
considered needed to be taken to affect the transfer of
power on the due date;
(iii) as regards the princely states, the viceroy was to do his best
to persuade the rulers towards the formulations of fair and
just arrangements with the leaders of British India as to
their future relationships;
(iv) he was to transfer power keeping in view the Indian
defence requirements with emphasis on the indivisibility
of the Indian army, and continued Anglo-Indian
collaboration for the security in the Indian Ocean;
(v) lastly, in his administration of British India, the keynote
aspect was to be the closest cooperation with Indians.29
A TRY AT THE CABINET MISSION PLAN
Mountbatten had a daunting task. He was to secure Britain's both short

term and long term objectives with regard to India. The short-term
objective was to extricate Britain out of India through a velvet-break;
and the long term objective was to secure Britain's future commercial
and security interests in the region by keeping independent India within
the Commonwealth. Mountbatten was fully prepared for the task, well-
equipped as he was with the art of diplomacy, guile, arrogance of chief
representative of a great power, speed and exuberance of his youthful
enthusiasm, royal pedigree, last but not the least, his "dangerous
personal charm". Nehru was in his pocket and so were Gandhi and the
Congress leadership in principle, owing to their demand of United
India, totally in conformity with the British plans. Mountbatten had
reason to be more than satisfied about his mission. He was anticipating
a smooth sailing but for one man – Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the thin
63
statured, immaculately dressed, British accented Barrister from

Bombay, who by insisting for the division of India, was proving to be
the biggest stumbling bloc in viceroy's designs.
Nehru had tipped him that "it might be possible to frighten
Jinnah into cooperation on the basis of the short length of the
timetable" and this appealed to viceroy's plan of swift transfer of power
in India.30 Consequently, Mountbatten instructed his staff to prepare a
list of "Awkward Questions to Ask Jinnah" to justify his cause of
Pakistan.31 The two leaders had several meetings. In their meeting of
April 7, Mountbatten "tried by every means" to get Jinnah to say he
"would accept the Cabinet Mission plan and enter the Constituent
Assembly", however, Jinnah remained adamant.32
While making the Cabinet Mission plan to work Mountbatten
confronted two problems: the claim of the Congress that the interim
government should be treated as a Dominion Cabinet with the viceroy
as its constitutional head; and the claim for "parity" at the centre made
by the Muslim League. The demand of the Congress that Interim
Government be treated as a Dominion Cabinet was not conceded by
His Majesty's Government since the Muslim League was stoutly
opposed to that demand till the two Dominions were actually
established.33 Jinnah had hinted at accepting the Cabinet Mission Plan
provided League was given a real say at the Centre but V. Patel in his
meeting with the viceroy on April 25 had stated in unambiguous terms
that Congress would not accept any suggestion for a further degree of
parity for the present Central Government and if the Muslim League
did not accept the Cabinet Mission's Plan then Congress desired
partition because it had reached the maximum limit of its concession.34
In fact, V. Patel was quite blunt in saying that if Mountbatten raised the
question of parity, he would incur the everlasting enmity of Congress
as parity at Centre with the Muslims was the one thing, they had been
fighting against and would never agree to it. Mountbatten knew that if
he fell foul of Congress it would be impossible to continue to run the
country. In other words, it was Congress that insisted on partition and it
was Jinnah who was against it.35
In view of Patel's stiff attitude Mountbatten was left with
literally nothing to offer the Muslim League to accept the Cabinet
Mission Plan. However, with all powers of his charm and persuasion,
he decided to have a final shot at Jinnah in their meeting of April 26.
He explained the League's leader that there was a provision in the plan
under which all communal questions were to be decided by separate
majorities of both the communities, and in view of that provision, there
was no reason for the League to be afraid of the Congress majority at
the Centre but Jinnah had already examined this provision in some
depth and explained that the relevant provision laid down that
64
differences of opinion about communal matters in the Constituent

Assembly were to be referred to the Federal Court. The President of the
Assembly was not bound to accept the ruling of the court. He then
startled the viceroy by revealing that he had a talk with the Chief
Justice of India and had enquired what would the Court do in case the
President of the Assembly did not accept its ruling and the Chief
Justice had replied that in that event the Court would refuse to give
rulings on the issues referred to it. It would have certainly enabled the
Congress to impose its majority rule. This must have greatly
embarrassed Mountbatten.36 Subsequently, in his Miscellaneous
Meeting on May 1, the viceroy commented that even though he
considered Jinnah "the most difficult and unreasonable man with whom
he had ever to deal", however, he and his senior staff members felt that
Jinnah's fears that the Congress did not intend to implement the plan
faithfully had "some foundation" and hence it should be considered as
"dead". The same day, in his Personal Report, he noted that in view of
Patel's stand that Assam could opt out of its group if the new
constitution was not acceptable to it, Jinnah was justified in his fear that
the Congress leaders had no intention of adhering to their acceptance of
the Cabinet Mission Plan.37 Earlier on, Jinnah had told Mountbatten
that the Cabinet Mission had failed because it pleaded for agreement
among the Hindus and the Muslims instead of laying down a solution.
He told that Muslim India was up in arms and no solution could be
imposed on them which didn't have his endorsement as he was the one
man to deal with; and had demanded a settlement by a British award
accepting Pakistan in principle.38
MAKING THE PARTITION PLAN
In view of the rapidly deteriorating law and order situation in India, the
viceroy told the secretary of state, on April 17, that a decision had to be
made in near future "if we are to avert civil war and the risk of a
complete breakdown of administration", and expected to have a plan
ready within ten days, to be sent to London through Ismay by the end
of the month. To realize the plan a special committee was set up
consisting of the viceroy, Lord Ismay (Viceroy's Chief of Staff),
George Abell (Viceroy's Private Secretary) and Sir Eric Mieville
(Viceroy's Principal Secretary). These associates of Mountbatten along
with Captain R.V. Brockman (Viceroy's Personal Secretary.) and Lt.
Col. V.F. Erskine-Crum (Viceroy's Conference Secretary) were
popularly called "Dickie Birds".39
Incredible though it might seem, it was Nehru's friend Krishna
Menon who first suggested to Mountbatten that the League's demand of
partition might be conceded in some form. Way back on 13 March
65
1947, Krishna Menon, when attached to the Indian High Commission

in London, had sent a letter to Mountbatten suggesting that in order to
satisfy the League, 'Pakistans' might be established in those areas where
the Muslims were predominant in the population, and where the League
held an appreciable majority of elected seats in the provincial
assemblies. This in effect, meant that "Pakistans" would exclude not
only the non-Muslim majority parts of the Punjab and Bengal but also
the whole Muslim majority North-West Province.40
In his meeting with the viceroy, Jinnah emphasized on the
complete inclusion of Punjab and Bengal in Pakistan and denounced
their division as a "sinister" move.41 However, Mountbatten told the
League's chief that either the League would have to accept the
Mission's Plan or would have to take its Pakistan carved out by a
division of Punjab and Bengal, which, Jinnah termed as a "threat" and a
Congress "bluff" intended to frighten him off of his Pakistan.42 The
"two-nation theory" with which Jinnah hoped to get the League a share
of power at the Centre was turning out to be the sword which was now
cutting his Pakistan down to size. Jinnah had threatened to demand a
partition of Assam if Congress insisted on the partition of Punjab and
Bengal, and the viceroy had given his threat a short shrift by saying that
League's claims on Assam would be considered on same merits as
Congress's claims on parts of Punjab and Bengal.43 In a bid to soften
Mountbatten's opposition to keeping Punjab and Bengal united, Jinnah
made a reasonable proposal that the issue might be decided by
referendums in these provinces but even this proposal was not
acceptable to the aristocratic viceroy.44
Earlier on, Mountbatten had convened a Governor's
Conference on April 15 to estimate the viability of Pakistan. The
governor of Punjab predicted the partitioning of his province as an
"immediate blow-up" not to be acceptable to the Hindus, Sikhs and the
Muslims. The governor of Bengal informed that the division of his
province would reduce East Bengal into a "rural slum" and
Mountbatten was delighted to learn that Sohrawardy was against any
link-up with the North-Western Muslim provinces and might ditch
Jinnah's Pakistan. The governor of NWFP told that it cost Delhi two
and a half crores of rupees to keep the tribes at bay and one crore to
sustain the people economically and there were demands of more.45 If
Mountbatten's plan was to cut Jinnah down to size, things were going
his way. Not only would Punjab have to be partitioned, and Bengal too,
if it didn't go its independent way, but NWFP would either remain in
Congress pocket or be a poisoned and expensive gift which even the
League might be reluctant to receive, and the separate independent state
of Pakistan would end up consisting simply of the mutilated rump of
West Punjab and Sindh.46 Even the governor of Sindh thought that if
66
this Pakistan-hanged, drawn and quartered had to be conceded, 'nobody

could really say that this Pakistan was seriously destroying the unity of
India. The combined population of the two areas would be 15 million,
less than 4% of the total population of India, and such a Pakistan might
simply be regarded as just a large Indian state opting out of the Indian
Constituent Assembly."47 The viceroy therefore concluded that he
could go ahead giving Jinnah his truncated Pakistan whilst keeping a
strong centre for the rest of India at Delhi, all this on assumption that
NWFP retained a Congress government and that the League would not
like to take a province which needed three and a half crores spent on it
over and above its income, and that Sohrawardy would not agree to
partition of Bengal throwing his lot with Congress. Naturally, Jinnah
would have none of this - he impassively handed back the package to
the viceroy saying, "This is your scheme not mine."48
To dissuade Jinnah from insisting on a separate Muslim state,
Mountbatten told him on April 10 that he could agree only to a
truncated (a word suggested by V.P. Menon) Pakistan, which would be
"almost unworkable".49 Jinnah was opposed to "truncated" Pakistan but
to show that he was really earnest about a completely sovereign
country, he had told Ismay that a "moth-eaten" (a phrase coined by
Jinnah himself) Pakistan was better than no Pakistan at all.50 Similarly,
he had communicated to Mountbatten, "I do not care how little you
give me as long as you give it to me completely," and from this both
Ismay and Mountbatten had concluded that the League's invincible
leader had reconciled to the partition of Punjab and Bengal.51
Mountbatten Papers reveal the sadistic pleasure, he enjoyed by
annoying Jinnah. In one document, he mischievously recorded, "... I
drove the old gentleman quite mad, because whichever way his
argument went I always pursued it to a stage beyond which he did not
wish it to go."52 In one of his weekly reports that he wrote to his Prime
Minister and the Secretary of State on April 9, he summed up his
estimate of Jinnah in these words: "I regard Jinnah as a psychopathic
case, in fact until I had met him I would not have thought it possible
that a man with such a complete lack of administrative knowledge or
sense of responsibility could achieve or hold down so powerful a
position".53
To bring Congress and League out of emotionalism,
Mountbatten prepared "Plan Balkan" i.e. giving provinces the power to
decide their future - a prospect displeasing to both the Congress and the
League.54 He was unable to establish a warm relationship with Jinnah
as the latter was as self-confident as the former was and infinitely more
rigid. Jinnah was partly convinced that viceroy was pro-Congress, and
absolutely convinced that he was not to be trusted. It would have made
no difference to Jinnah whoever had been sent as the viceroy. It was the
67
British whom he distrusted, and the viceroy's blandishments seemed

only a variation on the old attempts to force him to accept a Congress-
dominated central government. Jinnah was now quite unapproachable
and it was not long before the viceroy realized that chances of handing
over power to united India were remote, at least within the present time
limit of June 1948. Mountbatten's instructions were precise as by that
date or near it Britain must quit India, united or divided. For the first
time the actual strength of Jinnah seems to have been properly
appreciated by someone in authority and the conclusion was of
overwhelming importance because until then practically everyone in
Britain had deluded themselves into believing that the British could
somehow hand over the inheritance intact.55
As early as April 11, Ismay had handed V.P. Menon
(Viceroy's Constitutional Adviser) "the bare bones of a possible plan
for the transfer of power and asked him for his comments on how, for
example to divide Punjab, Bengal and Assam. Menon's reply included a
number of suggestions for dealing with most of the problems that might
possibly arise.56 Menon enjoyed viceroy's confidence in spite of the fact
that in Mountbatten's own words, Menon was "very much in Patel's
pocket" and was virtually his "mouth-piece".57 After holding several
rounds of mind-boggling talks with the top Indian leaders eliciting
views on the transfer of power, Mountbatten and his "birds" hammered
out- a "plan" - called the "Dickie Bird" plan, which was sent through
Ismay and Abell to London for the approval of Whitehall. The plan
which Ismay presented in London on 3 May provided for partition,
with Punjab and Bengal having the option of being split between India
and Pakistan, joining in entirety with either state or go it alone. The
position of the princely states was left obscure enabling them to decide
their own future. Without introducing any new element London, after
approval, cabled the plan back to the viceroy by May 10. He had
planned it to be shown to the Indian leaders twenty-four hours before
the scheduled meeting on May 17. He took days off to Simla to recoup
his energies and also invited Nehru and Krishna Menon to join him.
Although he was quite confident about the acceptability of his plan
among Indian leaders but under the hunch that Nehru might not like it,
he gave the paper to Nehru to read during the course of an after-dinner
whiskey – and – soda at the Viceregal study.58 To those of his staff who
objected that it was unfair to give the draft of the plan to one party and
not the other, he replied that the issue was too important for such
niceties to be observed.59 After reading the plan, Nehru tossed it on the
viceroy's desk saying, "It won't do. I'll never accept a plan like this!
Congress will never accept it! And India will never accept it, either!"
Nehru argued that the plan would lead to the balkanization of India and
would provoke violence and disorder. Mountbatten was flabbergasted
68
as he thought that he knew what was in Nehru's mind. Later on, he

confided to L. Mosely, the author of "The last days of the British Raj",
"But the Hindus are strange. You can never tell. I had talked to all of
them, and then I sat down and drafted a plan which I thought expressed
their ideas. I was completely wrong."60
Close to panic, Mountbatten was not without resilience,
bounce and audacity. With the mud still plastered in his hair, he
decided to fight out of the crisis, not ready to admit defeat. After
discussions with his staff he directed his constitutional advisor V.P.
Menon to prepare a new plan before Nehru left for Delhi in evening.
Meanwhile, he instructed his press attaché to postpone the May 17
meeting scheduled with the Indian leaders and sent urgent cipher cables
to London. One of them to Premier Atlee said, "The Draft Plan which
you have approved is hereby cancelled. Please stand by for revised
plan." Another came back from Ismay saying, in effect, "What in hell is
going on?"61 With Mountbatten's instructions, V.P. hurried to his hotel,
it was 2 p.m. He got down to work. At 6p.m., he finished the last
sentence of his Draft Plan. 62 With Nehru's acceptance in his pocket, the
viceroy had to rush to London to explain his position. The revised plan
was accepted by Atlee and his Cabinet in a meeting which lasted
exactly five minutes and in this way the destiny of India was
determined in four hours and five minutes without Jinnah and the
Muslims having an iota of knowledge about these behind-the-scene
maneuvers and manipulations.63 During his short visit to London, when
Mountbatten had asked Churchill to advise him as to how he should
proceed if Jinnah was intransigent, Churchill had said, "To begin with
you must threat. Take away all British officers. Give them military
units without British officers. Make it clear to them how impossible it
would be to run Pakistan without British help".64 After his return to
India on May 30, the viceroy planned to give all sides the least amount
of time possible. London had a fortnight; the Indian leaders were to
have twenty-four hours to consult their Working Committees before the
plan was announced on June 3. On June 2 at 10a.m. the viceroy met the
"Big Seven" -- Nehru, Patel, Kripalani (the Congress president), Jinnah,
Liaquat, Nashtar and Baldev Singh-handed them copies of the plan; and
informed them that in view of the "terrific sense of urgency" power
would be transferred to two separate states as soon as the British
Parliament had passed the Indian Bill.65 The Viceroy had planned the
last moves to force Jinnah into submission with great care. His staff had
drawn up a detailed plan for his talk with Jinnah. The League's leader
was to be told that he was getting the partition for which he had been
fighting for so many years, and reminding him of the words that he had
once said to Liaquat that he would "sooner have a few acres of the
Sindh desert" provided that it was his "very own, rather than have a
69
united India with a majority rule". But the crux of the matter was
Jinnah had to accept the partition of Punjab and Bengal whether he
liked or not. On June 2, one hour before the deadline at midnight,
Jinnah reached back the viceroy to persuade him not to announce the
partition plan publicly as the League's Council might not accept the
plan. The viceroy warned that this would lead to chaos and in the
process he would lose his Pakistan, probably for good, to which Jinnah
had simply shrugged his shoulders and said: "What must be, must be".
Mountbatten had anticipated such prevarication on Jinnah's part and as
a precaution had taken the British Government's authority to make an
award. In an audacious manner, he threatened: "Mr. Jinnah! I do not
intend to let you wreck all the work that has gone into this settlement.
Since you will not accept for the Muslim League, I will speak for them
myself. I will take the risk of saying that I am satisfied with the
assurances you have given me, and if your Council fails to ratify the
agreement, you can place the blame on me." The next day, when the
viceroy announced the partition plan, Jinnah meekly nodded his head in
acquiescence.66
Mountbatten's press attaché Alan Campbell-Johnson described
the acceptance of the partition plan by all parties as Mountbatten's
"moment of personal triumph." It was no such thing. Given the time
that the British government had calculated, the Mountbatten mission
would have pulled off what Cripps had come within an ace of doing a
year earlier; and given the time, Wavell might have pulled it off as he
was greatly respected by everyone for his honesty and truthfulness but
the destroyer captain rang down "Full Speed Ahead" from the moment
he put to sea his Operation Transfer. Nehru and Congress were battered
into accepting partition with the gunfire still echoing in the ears. No
one really had time to think, except Jinnah who got ninety per cent of
what he wanted.67 Mountbatten's decision to transfer power earlier than
1948 was due to his secret collaboration with the Congress leaders
because they believed that an early transfer of power would create
enormous problems for Pakistan forcing her to appeal for a merger with
Hindustan.68
THE ISSUE OF JOINT GOVERNOR-GENERAL
Another issue which became a contest of will between these two

figures was the common governor-generalship of the two independent
dominions of India and Pakistan. Menon's discussion of this topic in
"The Transfer of Power in India" is unsatisfactory and incorrect, as is
clear from the documents now published whereas lively and dramatic,
but a substantially accurate account can be found in Mosley's "Last
Days of the British Raj".69 It was V.P. Menon, who can be credited for
70
starting this controversy, when he explained, to the viceroy that the

Draft Bill on Indian independence sent by the India office seemed to
contain the assumption that Mountbatten would be asked by both India
and Pakistan to become the governor - general, and the India office
expected both Nehru and Jinnah to write letters asking the viceroy to
accept the post.70 Congress leadership, desperate to grab power, was
prepared to agree to anything and therefore, had agreed to have
Mountbatten as the first governor-general of India as well as to the
principle of sharing governor-general with Pakistan.71 After formally
receiving their offer from the Congress, Mountbatten told Nehru and
Patel that he was happy to have received their offer but found it
difficult to serve as governor-general of one country, and added that he
hoped to receive a similar invitation from the League. On May 17, the
viceroy called Jinnah and Liaquat. He informed them that he was
taking the transfer of power plan to London recommending speedy
independence for India and Pakistan, and wanted clarification whether
Jinnah would prefer Pakistan to have its own governor general or, share
a common governor-general with India.72 Sensing rush on the part of
the viceroy, the calculating barrister became suspicious. Probed by the
viceroy, Jinnah said he had three governors-general in mind: one for
Pakistan, one for India, and one Mountbatten himself, in an overall
position as the Supreme Arbitrator for the division of assets.73
Mountbatten rebuffed saying it would be an untenable position if a so
called "Arbitrator" was junior in rank to the governors - general, who
would be the King's representatives.74 Jinnah promised to send Mieville
a letter by May 19 with a full description of his proposal for a Supreme
Arbitrator and two governors - general to be cabled to the viceroy in
London. After his return, Mountbatten was determined to persuade the
League's leader for his (viceroy's) appointment as the joint governor-
general without ever realizing that it would cause an embarrassment for
him in the sensitive and complicated business of transfer of power. The
whole idea appealed to him tremendously as it gave him the pleasure to
contemplate that the future books of history would not only adulate him
as "the man who discovered how to give India independence, but also
as the one who taught the two infant dominions how to "walk and talk".
Despite his several visits to Jinnah and Liaquat, Mieville could not get
the letter. Jinnah brooded over the issue. Days ticked by. On June 23,
the viceroy again called Jinnah and tried to impress upon him the
advantages for Pakistan of having a common governor - general but
Jinnah did not commit. Explaining his position, Jinnah said, "So far as
the decision I shall reach is concerned, I hope it will not be interpreted
as not wanting your Excellency, in whom I have implicit trust and
confidence. But it is a rule of my life that I must always consider the
interests of my people. At various times in my life, I have had to pass
71
over those nearest and dearest to me. But I have my duty to do."75
Finally, Jinnah drew the curtain on Mountbatten on July 2, when the
information was conveyed by the League that Jinnah would be the first
Governor-General of Pakistan. This greatly wounded the viceroy's ego.
Chaudhri Muhammad Ali has described in some detail what happened
between them on July 3, in the Viceroy's House: "He (Mountbatten) ...
burst into the room ... where the Quaid-i-Azam was working on the
Indian Independence Bill with Liaquat Ali Khan and me. He
belaboured the Quaid-i-Azam with arguments and appeals and bluster...
without him as common governor - general, Pakistan would put itself at
the gravest disadvantage. It was with the greatest difficulty that he was
securing for Pakistan what was due to her and, unless it was known that
he would continue in this position even after partition, his power to
help Pakistan would rapidly diminish. The responsibility for the
immeasurable loss to Pakistan would rest on the shoulders of Jinnah.
He threatened to make all this public and let the world judge. He was
sure that the verdict of history would uphold him and go against Jinnah.
He said again and again that he was most surprised that the objection to
his continuance and common governor-general should have come from
Pakistan and not from the Congress. Jinnah bore this onslaught with
great dignity and patience; ... assured Mountbatten that he fully trusted
his sincerity and impartiality, and reiterated his proposal for making
Mountbatten super governor-general."76 The following day, the viceroy
summed up the situation in his Personal Report to the Secretary of
State: "He (Jinnah) is suffering from megalomania in its worst form, for
when I pointed out to him that if he went as a constitutional Governor-
General his powers would be restricted but, as Prime Minister, he really
could run Pakistan, he made no bones about the fact that his Prime
Minister would do what he said, ‘ In my position it is I who will give
the advice and others will act on it’. ... I asked him, ‘do you realize
what this will cost you?’ He said sadly, ‘It may cost me several crores
of rupees in assets’, to which I replied somewhat acidly, ‘It may well
cost you the whole of your assets and the future of Pakistan.”77 This
whole episode is unfortunate and should never have been allowed to
arise, for it is incredible that the same person could be the constitutional
governor-general of two states. The constitutional head of a dominion
must act on the advice of his ministry. The two independent dominions
would be entitled to pursue their own policies, policies which may
conflict, and a constitutional head of two dominions would be in an
impossible position if his two ministers gave him conflicting advice.
V.P. Menon's explanation that the only way of giving effect to Jinnah's
suggestion of a super governor-general was to provide for a common
governor-general is special pleading. Mountbatten correctly understood
Jinnah's proposal when he asked Jinnah to give a full description of his
72
"suggestion of a supreme arbitrator and two governors - general". This

episode left an unfortunate legacy behind. Jinnah's refusal to agree to
Mountbatten becoming the governor-general of India and also of
Pakistan inflicted a wound on Mountbatten which time did not heal and
which led him to say in public, harsh and unkind things about Jinnah
such as a "clot", a "psychopathic case", an "evil genius" and a
"megalomaniac".78 On 24 July Ismay saw Jinnah at the instruction of
the viceroy and mentioned several grievances which Mountbatten had
told him, he had against Jinnah, the most important being Jinnah's "no"
to Mountbatten's proposal for a common governor-general. When
Ismay was leaving, Jinnah put his hand on Ismay's shoulder and said,
according to Ismay himself, with great sincerity, "I beg you to assure
the viceroy that I am his friend and yours for now and always. I beg
that he should judge me by deeds and not by words."79
PAKISTAN’S ENTRY INTO COMMONWEALTH
Another issue which strained Mountbatten's relations with Jinnah,

though quite unnecessarily, and mainly because of Mountbatten's own
unreasonable attitude and irrational thinking, was Pakistan's entry in the
Commonwealth. It was Mountbatten's wish to keep independent India
within the Commonwealth as it was at his own suggestion that the letter
of instruction which Premier Atlee gave him included a direction that
he should make efforts to keep India in the Commonwealth.80 On April
9 Jinnah told Ismay that Pakistan could not stand alone and that Britain
was Pakistan's "natural friend".81 On April 11, Liaquat told the Viceroy
that Pakistan would like to become a dominion.82 On April 17,
Mountbatten wrote in his Personal Report that when Jinnah saw him
last time and said that "the new Pakistan is almost certain to ask for
Dominion status in the British Commonwealth", he told the League's
leader that he should discuss the matter with the British High
Commissioner in India, Sir Terence Shone, and that, as far as he
himself was concerned, he could not possibly recommend to the British
Government to take over such a serious liability as a moth-eaten
Pakistan would be.83 While on one hand, Mountbatten's reaction to
Jinnah's request was lackluster and on the verge of coldness and
antipathy, on the other hand, in his April 22, meeting with Nehru's
confidant and mouth-piece Krishna Menon, he tried, by design, to make
Congress to agree to join the Commonwealth: "He (Mountbatten) said
that although he had told Jinnah that he would probably advise the
British Government not to accept Pakistan's request but if the Muslim
League leader’s request went "over our heads" to the peoples of the
Commonwealth, in spite of his advice it would be too strong to be
resisted. He warned Krishna Menon that he must now reckon with the
73
extreme likelihood of Pakistan becoming a Dominion. If that happened,

argued Mountbatten, Pakistan would have "complete call" in British
officers who wished to remain in India. Besides, Pakistan would be
able to do a great deal better than India in as much as she would get
equipment not available to anybody outside the Commonwealth. Also,
Pakistani officers could go to our schools and make use of our
experimental establishments. In fact backed by British and American
arms and technique, Pakistan in no while has armed forces immensely
superior to those of Hindustan. Mountbatten asked Krishna Menon how
he would like to see that happen. Krishna Menon "absolutely
shuddered" at that possible development and (sic) enquired, "How can
we prevent it?" Mountbatten replied, "By the simple expedient of being
in the commonwealth yourselves..."84 The viceroy presented a
"doomsday scenario" to Krishna Menon because earlier on, the Indian
Constituent Assembly, boycotted by its Muslim League members had
already passed a resolution declaring that free India would be a
sovereign independent republic, implying that India would leave the
Commonwealth. Moreover, when Mountbatten had met the King of
England, George VI, also his cousin, the latter had remarked that it
would be a pity if an independent India were to turn its back on the
Commonwealth.85 According to Larry Collins and Dominique in their
book entitled, "Freedom at Midnight" as quoted by Latif Ahmed
Sherwani in his book entitled, "The Partition of India and
Mountbatten", "There could be no task to which India's new Viceroy
would devote more thought, more persuasiveness, more cunning than
that of maintaining a link between India and his cousin's Crown".86
The Viceroy's strategy coupled with his charm bore fruit,
when after "a long and satisfactory meeting", on May 10, with Nehru
on the possibility of the early transfer of power on the basis of
dominion status, he told Ismay that "the best chance of obtaining our
long term object" lay in grant of dominion status to India during 1947.
He also observed that Britain would gain several advantages from
India's association with the Commonwealth, and added, "... speed is the
essence of the contract. Without speed we will miss the
opportunity..."87 Earlier on, in his Personal Report on May 1,
Mountbatten admitted that he found himself in a very difficult situation
because Jinnah in a press statement had said that there was indeed no
need for Pakistan to apply for the membership of the Commonwealth
because Pakistan would automatically start as a member and therefore,
the real question was whether there was anything in the Statue of
Westminster which permitted the expulsion of a member on the ground
that its neighbour was against its membership.88 The viceroy
acknowledged that although he had told Jinnah that Pakistan was likely
to be refused membership of the Commonwealth, the League's leader
74
was relying on the power of public appeal and was confident that it
would succeed. Outsmarted by Jinnah's constitutional expertise, the
viceroy told Jinnah and Liaquat that as Congress leaders had expressed
their wish to be in the Commonwealth, he would pass on the requests
of both the dominions to the British Premier.89 No doubt the viceroy
was within his right to ensure India's membership but to achieve this
end he went to the extent of conveying to the Congress that as a
Commonwealth member, Pakistan, in spite of being "truncated" and
motheaten" would pose "A very serious threat to Hindustan", and as the
then Secretary of State for India admitted that it was this threat which
ultimately forced Congress to "take the plunge" for the
Commonwealth. The entire handling of this issue made a mockery of
the basic philosophy on which the Commonwealth works i.e. goodwill
and cooperation amongst the dominions. The minimum criticism
evoked is that his tactics were certainly unworthy of his position as a
representative of the King of Britain, Ireland, and the British
Dominions Beyond the Seas, Defender of Faith, and Emperor of India!
COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN PUNJAB
The communal massacres in Punjab resulting out of unjust and delayed

announcement of the Boundary Awards also soured Jinnah-
Mountbatten relationship. The rising violence had perturbed Jinnah and
in a meeting with Mountbatten on June 23, he pointed out that Jenkins,
the governor of Punjab had adopted a weak attitude towards the
menacing situation, and emphasized, "I don't care whether you shoot
Muslims or not, it (the violence) had got to be stopped".90 On August 5,
Captain Savage, a police officer in the Punjab C.I.D. (coordinating the
investigation of disturbances) was sent by Jenkins to brief the viceroy
on the brewing situation. Mountbatten discussed with Savage the
situation in Punjab in the presence of Jinnah, Liaquat and Patel. The
officer revealed that Tara Singh was collecting arms through Sikh
Officers of the army and was dumping them in states; four or five
young Sikhs in knowledge of Tara Singh were planning to blow up the
Pakistan special train; Tara Singh had also stated that Jinnah would be
killed during the independence day celebrations at Karachi on August
15; and that the Sikh leader was also involved in the production of
bombs and in a plan to attack the river head works.91 Jinnah stressed on
the immediate arrest of the Sikh leaders but Patel opposed. As a
compromise Jinnah agreed that the Sikh leaders should be arrested
simultaneously with the announcement of the award which was then
expected on August 10. Mountbatten decided to recommend to Jenkins
that the Sikh leaders be arrested at the time of announcement of the
award but when he consulted the governor-designate of East Punjab,
75
Trivedi, the latter opposed the arrests on advice of Patel. When

Mountbatten sent Abell to Jinnah to find out if he had any objection to
the postponement of the arrests, Jinnah reiterated his previous stand.92
Khalid Bin Sayed in his article" Jinnah and his political strategy" has
quoted page no. 34 of Cunnigham's diary revealing Jinnah's resentment
towards Mountbatten on the communal massacres: "Jinnah says this
was known in June 1947, that Mountbatten was aware of it and decided
in July to round up all leaders, but put it off and off, and finally said he
would do it simultaneously with the publication of the Border
Commission Report; so he was able to play out time after the 15
August and thus did nothing. Jinnah says he has documentary proof
that report was in Mountbatten's hands by 7 August and could have
been published then if Mountbatten had not held it up. Jinnah very
bitter about whole thing."93
Amazingly, Jinnah was quite informed. On August 9, the
viceroy was told that the Punjab award was ready. Problem for
Mountbatten was should the awards be made public as soon as they
were received or held up for a few days until the celebrations for
independence were over? Abell argued merits of immediate release to
enable troops to move into affected areas before the transfer of power
and avoid possible accusation of jiggery-pockery if it became known
that viceroy had suppressed the news for his own ends. Other advisers
suggested that August 14 would be the proper day. Mountbatten
favoured a third possibility. No announcement should be made until
August 16 when celebrations were over. Consequently, on August 9, he
sent A. Campbell-Johnson and Christie to ask Radcliffe to postpone
delivery of awards till after the transfer of power. Christie noted in his
diary, "C.R. refused flat too many people know it's ready." Radcliffe
said that all awards of Punjab, Bengal and Sylhet would be handed over
in one package to the viceroy on August 13, by which time the viceroy
would be on point of leaving for Independence Day Celebrations in
Karachi. All went according to the plan.94 Henry V. Hodson in his
article, "The Role of Lord Mountbatten" has defended the delay on part
of the viceroy in announcing the Boundary Awards as an example of
his political flair and not an act of deception as is generally believed in
India and Pakistan. The awards could have been announced two or
three days before but why have the hangover before celebrations? For
India and Pakistan, no less for the last viceroy, the day of independence
had to be one of triumph, not of lamentation and strife.95 When the
Kashmir issue was being discussed in the security council, the foreign
minister of Pakistan implicated Mountbatten for the carnage in Punjab
at the time of partition and to avoid the possible embarrassment the
British Secretary of State for Commonwealth relationship Philip Noel-
Baker persuaded the Pakistan Minister not to refer to this matter again
76
in his speeches at the Security Council.96 Interestingly, the over

confident Mountbatten in a March 2, 1984 letter to Noel-Baker
defended his position: "I have such a cast iron reply-viz., that the
decision not to arrest the Sikh leaders was taken by the Government of
the Punjab and in consultation with the Governors designate of East
and West Punjab and was against my own advice..."97 His statement
has been found to be misleading. H. A. F. Rumbold then Assistant
Security Commonwealth Relations office wrote to B. R. Carson of the
British Delegation to the United Nations on March 25, 1948: “His case
is not so cast iron as he suggests because until 14 August the governor
of the Punjab was subject to the general control and particular
directions of the Governor - GeneraL.."98 However, most revealing are
the comments of the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Sir Arthur
Carter, submitted to the Secretary of State on 9 June 1948: "Somewhat
curiously Lord Mountbatten, in the covering letter of 2nd March with
which he sent the brief, says that the decision to take no action (against
the Sikhs) was against his own advice. Even if this be true, he cannot
avoid responsibility for the decision. Before Lord Mountbatten came to
the conclusion on Jenkin's advice, to take no action, Jinnah and the
Muslim portion of the Interim Government had withdrawn to Karachi.
They, not unnaturally, say that Mountbatten went back on the policy
decided upon at the meeting of 5th August as soon as the Muslim backs
were turned. It is easy to be wise after the event. Nevertheless, it does
seem to me that in a matter of this importance Lord Mountbatten
sought to have let Jinnah know of the change in policy.99 The
horrendous toll of communal frenzy, according to one conservative
estimate is over half a million died, over one crore lost their homes and
everything and over one hundred thousand young girls kidnapped.100 L.
Mosley's comments are terse but apt: "This is a matter for
Mountbatten's conscience." Even P. Ziegler has admitted: "It is
certainly possible to criticize the decision".101
ACCESSION OF PRINCELY STATE OF KASHMIR
The accession of the princely states, Kashmir in particular also strained

Jinnah-Mountbatten relationship was On October 27, 1947, as soon as
Jinnah learned of India's airlift to Srinagar, he ordered the acting C-in-
C General Sir Douglas Gracey (as General Messervy was on leave) to
send Pakistani forces into Kashmir but Gracey refused to accept
Governor-General Jinnah's orders informing that he was not prepared
to issue instructions which would inevitably lead to armed conflict
between the two Dominions and the withdrawal of British officers,
without the approval of the Supreme Commander Auchinleck.
Jinnah having flown from Karachi to Lahore was with
77
Punjab's Governor Sir Francis Mudie, who was "most aggressive and
abusive" to Gracy over the phone, wanting to know "Why the hell
Gracey was not carrying out Mr. Jinnah's orders? What had it got to do
with the Supreme Commander? What did it matter if the British
officers were withdrawn? Could he not send the troops on without
British Officers? Mr. Jinnah insisted on the orders being issued at
once."102 On November 1, 1947, Mountbatten and Ismay flew to
Lahore to have a meeting with Jinnah on the developments in Kashmir.
In a three and half hours meeting Jinnah expressed surprise at the
remarkable speed at which the Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar
and complained that the Indian government had failed to give timely
information to Pakistan Government, and when Mountbatten clarified
that Nehru had informed Liaquat, Jinnah looked up his files and said
that the telegram had arrived after the troops had landed. Jinnah argued
that the accession of Kashmir was not bonafide since it rested on "fraud
and violence" and would never be accepted by Pakistan. Mountbatten
counter argued that the Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh was fully
entitled in accordance with Pakistan's own official statement about
Junagarh to make such accession, and therefore, Kashmir's accession
was the end of a long intrigue but Jinnah insisted that it had been
brought about by violence. Mountbatten countered by saying that he
agreed that the accession had been brought about by violence and
admitted that the Mahraja wanted to remain independent and nothing
but the terror of violence could have made him to accede, but insisted
that the violence originated from tribals for whom Pakistan was
responsible. The continued recriminations greatly enraged Jinnah.103
When "The Statesman" (from India) denounced in its editorial
comment, the injection of Indian troops into Kashmir, Mountbatten
called its editor, Ian Stephens on the evening of October 26, 1947 and
alleged that Jinnah was sitting at Abbotabad expecting to ride in
triumph into Kashmir and had been frustrated by the Indian
intervention.104 Subsequent enquiries by Ian Stephens revealed that
Mountbatten was wrong as Jinnah spent all the later part of October in
Karachi or Lahore.105 Mountbatten's anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan role
in the whole affair has been well-exposed by Khalid Bin Sayed in his
article, "Jinnah and his political strategy". Quoting from page no. 23 of
Cunnigham's diary, he has written, "Messervy came up from Pindi for a
talk; just back from England. He was in Delhi two days ago and was
surprised to find Mountbatten directing the military operation in
Kashmir. Mountbatten is daily becoming an anathema to our Muslims,
and it certainly seems as if, he could see nothing except through Hindu
eyes."106
Mountbatten's tall claim that Indian forces were airlifted to
Kashmir on Oct. 27, 1947, after the Maharaja had signed the accession
78
was a big lie bringing bad name to the British ideals of fair play and
justice. Muhamamd Tariq in his' researched article on Kashmir, in the
second issue of "Mujalla Tadrees-o-Tehqeeq" has quoted "Crisis in
Kashmir"-the latest research on the issue by Alastair Lamb, which has
established that under his "Operation Rescue", Mountbatten had sent
four commando platoons of Indian Army's 50th Parachute Brigade and
batteries of Patialla Artillery in civvies in Kashmir on October 17,
1947, and Muhammad Tariq has further confirmed this revealing fact
by an account of this episode written in "Heir Apparent" by Karan
Singh, who was the son of the last Maharaja of Kashmir.107 The
presence of Indian troops in Srinagar before October 26, 1947 can be
further confirmed from V.P. Menon's book, "Integration of Indian
States."108
After discussing in detail Jinnah-Mountbatten relationship
with reference to different issues, a very interesting picture emerges.
Both are either loved by their admirers or hated by their critics. The
tragedy with both of them is that so far the historians have failed to pen
down a balanced analysis of the two rivals. So far more pro-
Mountbatten works have been written mainly because more accounts of
the partition of India have been appended by British writers. Many
Pakistani works on Jinnah lack historical detachment and can be termed
as emotional and spirited tributes or eulogies.
Mountbatten was over-confident and believed that he could do
anything. After his early encounters with Jinnah, he recorded: "Jinnah
can negotiate with me, but my decision goes."109 But after six meetings,
when he realized that he could not mould or break Jinnah, out of sheer
annoyance bordering to helplessness, he termed him psychopathic etc.
He came to India to "win" because he believed that he possessed the
courage, the radical experimental mind and the power to persuade and
browbeat the triumvirate in Indian politics - Gandhi, Jinnah and Nehru.
The Hindu leaders fell to his charm but Muhammad Ali Jinnah beat
him.110 Lord Butler (who served as Under-Secretary of State at the
India Office) believed Jinnah to be "an inflexible, tough and ruthless
man, a terrifying chap" but he, too, acknowledged that Mountbatten's
greatest mistake was that he couldn't understand Jinnah.
Even Mountbatten's sympathetic official biographer Philip
Ziegler has admitted that at first Jinnah did not resent Mountbatten's
attitude and spoke about the Viceroy's integrity and good will in
"unusually warm terms" but this limited enthusiasm dwindled, because
by the time Montgomery met Jinnah towards the end of June 1947, the
League's leader freely spoke of his hatred of Mountbatten, whom, he
believed was in pocket of Nehru.111 On the other hand, Mountbatten
saw Jinnah through Nehru's eyes (dubbed as "Peter-Pan" by Jinnah)
who had presented him as a monster of negativism but Jinnah used his
79
negativism to achieve positive ends because by saying "no" to

Mountbatten's various proposals, he calculatedly closed all avenues
except the one leading to the only affirmative he would accept i.e.. an
independent Pakistan.112 In this backdrop the viceroy never got any
pleasure from his meetings with Jinnah. While Mountbatten argued
endlessly for the case of a United India, Jinnah gave the impression as
if he was not listening. The viceroy found Jinnah's attitude as an affront
to his conviction that everyone was susceptible to reason. Till he had
met Jinnah, he had not thought it possible that "a man with such a
complete lack of sense of responsibility could hold the power which he
did."113 This was Mountbatten at its wits end.
Jinnah might have been inflexible and strong-headed but he
was straight-forward, principled and true to his word. On the contrary,
Mountbatten's "faults were on the grandest scale. His vanity ... was
monstrous, his ambition unbridled: the truth in his hands, was swiftly
converted from what it was to what it should have been. He sought to
rewrite history with cavalier indifference to the facts to magnify his
own achievements. There was a time when I became so enraged by
what I began to feel was his determination to hoodwink me that I found
it necessary to place on my desk a notice saying: REMEMBER IN
SPITE OF EVERYTHING, HE WAS A GREAT MAN".114 Jinnah
always believed in calling a spade, spade and never resorted to ruse or
under-hand tactics, while Mountbatten's tactics included manipulation
as well as chicanery and sometimes verged on the unethical, and he
believed that sleight of hand was justifiable to achieve the greater good:
the lie direct was to be avoided and the lie circumstantial was
acceptable.115
Lastly, it is generally said that Mountbatten's charm carried
everything before it. However, charm dies with the person but the
actions which charm leave behind, remain, and must be judged on their
merits. A reading of Ziegler's 'Mountbatten’ documents on the Transfer
of Power and Larry Collins and Dominique Lapiere's "Mountbatten and
the Partition of India" it becomes clear that no statement made by
Mountbatten can be accepted as true, unless it is corroborated by a
reliable independent evidence because not only did he say things which
were untrue in order to glorify his own achievements, but he also did
not hesitate to run down others in the process.116 The mere fact that the
events of the last weeks of Mountbatten's viceroyalty as they happened,
have come to the light, the verdict on him seems to be in reverse. Now,
history will pronounce on Mountbatten the dreadful sentence: "Thou art
weighed in the balance and found wanting".117
80
CONCLUSION
Jinnah and Mountbatten didn’t enjoy a cordial relationship from the

beginning. This was because the latter was influenced by Nehru, who
didn’t hold a high opinion of Jinnah. The viceroy wanted to transfer
power to a united India but Jinnah was insistent upon the carving of an
independent homeland for the Indian Muslims. This annoyed
Mountbatten which is evident from the harsh words he used against the
League’s head.
Due to their tense relationship while the important partition
plan was made and re-made to the satisfaction of Nehru, Jinnah was
forced by the viceroy to accept the plan. Similarly, on one hand,
Mountbatten made desperate efforts to convince Congress to join
Commonwealth but when Jinnah stated that Pakistan was keen to join
the it, the viceroy bluntly retorted that he could not recommend the
British government to consider the inclusion of a moth-eaten Pakistan,
as it would be a serious liability. Jinnah also felt bitter when the last
viceroy in spite of agreeing with Jinnah to arrest the threatening Sikh
leaders to stem the communal violence in early July did not arrest them
and played out time till August 15. Moreover, the League’s leader was
resentful that the viceroy delayed the announcement of the Boundary
Award despite the fact that the same was ready by 7 August. The sour
relations between the two had implications on the issue of the Kashmir
war between the two countries. When Jinnah complained that the
Indian government had sent forces in Kashmir without intimating
Pakistan, Mountbatten insisted that Nehru had informed Liaquat but
Jinnah showed the telegram from Nehru which was sent after the Indian
troops had landed in Kashmir. In addition, Mountbatten wrongly
propagated that Jinnah was monitoring the Kashmir war from
Abbotabad and was expecting to triumphantly ride in Kashmir but
throughout October 1947, Jinnah was either in Karachi or Lahore. I’ll
conclude the acrimonious nature of their relationship by quoting a piece
of conversation between them. When Jinnah refused to approve
Mountbatten’s request to become the joint governor-general of India
and Pakistan, the latter threatened, “ ‘Do you realize what this will cost
you?’ Jinnah had replied, ‘It may cost me several crores of rupees in
assets,’ to which Mountbatten acidly said, “It may well cost you the
whole of your assets and the future of Pakistan.’ ”
81
END-NOTES
_____________________________
1. Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay (London: Heinemann, 1960), fn. p. 414.
2. H.M. Seervai, Partition of India (Legend and Reality) (Bombay: Emmenem
Publications Private Limited, 1989), p. 90.
3. Ibid., p. 93.
4. C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright, eds., The Partition of India
(Policies and Perspectives 1935-47) (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
1970), p. 119.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. S.M. Burke and Salim AI-Din Quraishi, The British Raj in India: An
Historical Review (Karachi:Oxford University Press), p. 470.
9. Philips and Mary, eds., The Partition of India, p. 118.
10. Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1986), p.41.
11. Ibid., p. 57.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 56.
14. Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the
Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.250.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Leonard Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj (London: Wedenfeld and
Nicholson, 1961), p. 94.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), p. 258
22. Ibid., p. 315.
23. Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj, p. 30.
24. Ibid., p. 96.
25. Ibid.
26. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, pp. 317-318.
27. Ibid., p. 318.
28. Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, p. 30.
29. Ibid. p.31.
30. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, p. 250.
31. Ibid.
32. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, p. 318.
33. H.M. Seervai, Partition of India (Legend and Reality), pp. 95-96.
34. Ibid., pp. 97-98.
36. Latif Ahmed Sherwani, The Partition of India and Pakistan
(Karachi:Council for Pakistan Studies, 1986), p. 23.
82
37. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

39. Ibid., fn. no. 58, p. 262.
40. Sherwani, The Partition of India and Paksitan, p. 27.
41. Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British India (London: Cassell and
Company, 1963), p. 155.
43. Ibid., p. 253.
44. Sherwani, The Partition of India and Pakistan, p. 54.
45. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, p.256.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., p. 257.
49. Sherwani, The Partition of India and Pakistan, p.18.
50. Ibid., p. 51.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., pp.14-15.
53. Ibid., p.15.
55. Edwardes, The Last Years of British India, p. 150.
56. Ibid., p. 154.
57. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, p.268.
58. Mosley, The Last Days of The British Raj, p. 122.
59. Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (Glasgow: Collins,
1985), p. 379.
61. Ibid., p. 125.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., pp. 126-127.
66. Ibid., pp. 284-285.
67. Richard Hough, Mountbatten: Hero of Our Time (London:Wedenfeld and
Nicolson, 1980), p. 228.
68. S.Qalb-i-Abid, Jinnah, Second World War and the Pakistan Movement,
(Multan: Beacon Books, 1999), p. 361.
69. Seervai, Partition of India, p. 102.
71. Edwardes, The Last Years of British India, p. 172.
72. Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj, pp. 151-152.
73. Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, p. 115.
75. Ibid., p. 155.
76. Sherwani, The Partition of India and Pakistan, pp. 93-94.
77. Ibid., pp. 94-95.
78. Seervai, Partition of India (Legend and Reality), f.n. 70. p.104.
80. Ibid., p. 66.
81. Ibid., p. 68.
83
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., p. 70.
84. Ibid., p. 71.
85. Ibid., p. 66.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., p. 78.
88. Ibid., p. 74.
89. Ibid., p. 78.
90. Ibid., p. 185.
91. Ibid., p. 188.
92. Ibid.
93. Philips and Wainwright, eds., The Partition of India, p.292.
94. Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.417.
95. Philips and Wainwright, eds., The Partition of India, p. 121.
96. Sherwani, The Partition of India and Pakistan, p. 195.
97. Ibid., pp. 195-196.
98. Ibid., p. 196.
99. Ibid.
101. Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.417. .
103. Ibid., p. 352.
104. Ian Stephens, Pakistan (Old Country / New Nation) (London: Penguin
Books Ltd. 1964), p. 247.
105. Ibid., f.n. no. 4, p. 247.
106. Philips and Wainwright, eds., The Partition of India, p.292.
107. Basharat Hussain Qizilbash, Questioning the Heroes (Lahore: The Arts
Company, 1998), p. 151.
108. Ibid.
110. Hough, Mountbatten, p. 271.
111. Ziegler, Mountbatten, p. 369.
112. Ibid., p. 357.
113. Ibid., p. 368.
114. Seervai, Partition of India, p. 91.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid., p. 153
117. Ibid., p. 161.
84
Umber Bin Ibad, Assertiveness in Inter Subjective Environment
ASSERTIVENESS IN INTER-SUBJECTIVE
ENVIRONMENT: HEIDEGGERIAN PERSPECTIVE
UMBER BIN IBAD

GC UNIVERSITY, LAHORE,
PAKISTAN
Wherever I find form of life,

There I find will to power….(Nietzche)
ABSTRACT
Assertiveness is an important element in the inter-

subjective environment triggered to reach truth and
therefore consensus. It is through modes of human-
being’s behavior that assertiveness shows itself.
Heidegger’s understanding regarding human-being
through which assertiveness shows itself, throws light
upon the phenomenon of assertiveness. For
Heidegger, human being can not be understood but
only through its engagement in the world. He shows
human being as an active and caring being. For
Heidegger, the understanding and knowledge are the
very elements of being human and do not lie external
to it. The language for Heidegger is a social act.
Austin maintains, like Heidegger, that language’s
ability to put forward truth is embedded in another
structure called ‘performative’. For Austin, the
human language is not primordially structured to put
forward truth but enables human being to engage
with each other. For both Austin and Heidegger,
language is more a social reality than an individual
faculty. Heidegger maintains, however that truth
remains important for human being because of its
consistent taking care of “itself”. Only after attaining
sight of one’s own-self the search for truth attains
authenticity. The sight of oneself is a sight of
nothingness, an indefinite depth of presuppositions.
In communication process this sight of indefinite
depth of presuppositions keeps the ground of
communication open and reduces the moments of
conflict.
85
KEY WORDS: Heidegger, Performative, Human Language,

Nothingness, Indefinite, Modes of Human Behaviour.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this inquiry is to trace the phenomenon of assertiveness

in the environment populated by persons engaged in communication.
Assertiveness is a mode of human attitude that has its basis in the
structure of human constitution and it plays very important role in
communication process. It makes players in the communication process
define their truth statements and achieve a consensus through agreed
truth claims. If a consensus in communication process is to be achieved
transparently the concept of assertiveness, more than anything else,
must be explored.
The attitude of assertiveness makes participants of
communication process put forward their truth claims as assertions.
The whole communication process then revolves around accepting or
refuting the presented claim by making more assertions in the form of
statements to support either point. Whether right, or wrong, each
participant intends to prove its point by using available supporting
modes in making its assertions right. The supporting modes are already
embedded in the participant’s unique perspective, tradition or
“contextualized assessment.” The participant’s unique perspective,
tradition or “contextualized assessment” may be supported from the
social positions that have already pegged into hierarchy of power.
Domination then starts playing its role and the free play of reason to be
abandoned. The purpose of communication, that is to reach consensus
through free play of reason, is defeated.
For the consensus to be reached seamlessly it is not only
pertinent to trace the basis of truth as such but also the basis of the
attitude of the person who is holding the truth claims during
communication process. It is only through such inquiry that the process
of reaching consensus during communication process can be illumined.
To follow this inquiry is, therefore, the purpose of this effort.
Following Heideggerian line of thinking, especially his Being and Time
(1928) this inquiry will assume that human being always finds itself in
a position with truth and in the process of holding truth. Therefore, it is
pertinent to inquire the human attitude of assertiveness before any
inquiry of truth. It is also assumed that if the right basis could be found
out of the assertiveness this would already be illumined us regarding
the nature of truth.
The phenomenon of assertiveness is the phenomenon founded
on the attitude of human being. It is human being who shows the mode
of assertiveness by asserting first itself and then its point of view in
communication environment. The communication is considered to be a
86
process of sending and receiving “expressions” in inter-subjective

environment. The expressions should be, here, understood as “Life
expressions”. This term, in history of philosophy, was first coined by
Dilthey who maintained that Life expresses in three modes; verbal,
non-verbal and actions. 1 What he meant by “life expressions” we take
it as general means of communication process and interplay of “life
expressions” as communication process.
Human being finds itself during most of his life time
surrounded by people, already integrated into social groups, engaged in
expressing thoughts, wishes, intentions, objectives, etc., through verbal
or non-verbal means. We term this environment, loosely, as
communicative environment. Keeping its engagements with the non-
living beings aside, with which it does not remain engaged as it does
with beings of its like, human being spends the remaining time of its
life till death with the beings like it in expressing and sharing mode.
This discerns the difference between being human, i.e., being-it-self
and the beings that are not like him, i.e., the beings-themselves.
The inquiry from this point on takes turn and follows
Heidegger to explicate the concept of human being. “This being, i.e.,
human-being, is unique in its being because of its concern for its
being.” 2 For him the being that relates to its being and that has a
concern for its being is a being of a human. For this being he coins the
term Dasein. To demonstrate the being of Dasein phenomenologically,
Heidegger brings out the structure of Dasein that explains its
constitution. Being-in-the-world, for Heidegger, provides a
fundamental structure of Dasein. It grants various perspectives on the
factors which constitute it. Factors like, being-with, being-in as such,
the world as in worldliness explicate the fundamental structure. But one
must beware that “this “a priori” of the interpretation of Dasein is not a
structure which is pieced together”. 3 This structure is from the very
start or primordially and constantly a whole.
On the foundation of the analysis of this fundamental
structure, a demonstration of the being of Dasein is possible. It makes
us see that Dasein finds itself as being-in-the-world. This being-in-the-
world is the fundamental structure of Dasein that makes it relate to
other beings, like or unlike it. For beings like itself Dasein as being-in-
the-world relates as being-with, in the mode of “I-they”. For Dasein
inter-subjectivity is not an alien phenomenon in which it enters at some
point of time of its existence and does not enter at some other time.
Being-with is not a predicate but a constitution of Dasein. The being-
in-the-world of Dasein, in its facticity, is already dispersed in definite
way of being-in. The being of Dasein is always found in the taking-
care-of mode. This mode is not an occasional mode that can be attained
and left for some other mode of being. In fact, “the being of Dasein
itself is made visible as care”. 4
87
Knowing for Dasein is not something external to it. It is its

way of being-in-the-world. Through knowing Dasein relates to beings
at hand in the Environment and transforms them as beings taken care
of. To speak and express is a way of taking care of. In communication
the articulation of being-with-one-another is constituted in the
environment of mutual understanding. All communication takes place
in language through discourse. Reaching so far we will have already
explained the terms: assertiveness, inter-subjectivity, Environment and
Communication, which are involved in our topic. And while doing so
I’ll describe, following Heidegger, the unique nature of being-human
and its structure, though briefly. To explicate the theory of language,
that will enhance our understanding of the nature and purpose of
language, we’ll follow Austin. Though Heidegger and Austin are of
totally different philosophical traditions, yet, surprisingly, both show
some affinities in their views regarding language by considering it as a
socially entangled phenomenon.
Language for Austin is fundamentally a “performative” act.
Language gives information but this information is always embedded in
a social context and performs an act. The communication in an inter-
subjective environment always manifests through verbal or non-verbal
expressions. The meanings of both the expressions show themselves as
performatives, i.e., rooted in tradition and social processes. Information
content, though always there in the performatives, yet it acts as one of
the performative itself. Following Heidegger and Austin we develop
the understanding that communication is considered to be a shared
interaction among human beings. Language, the medium through
which communication takes place, is it-self a mode of action. The
functioning of language assimilates with the primordial foundation of
Dasein, that is, Care. The third life expression of Dilthey, that is,
Action, finds its presence in the communication process but only as an
extension of verbal or non-verbal communicative expressions.
Understanding is its (Dasein’s) basic defining mode and
through language it expresses and performs. For Heidegger, “Dasein is
in the truth.” Skepticism as negation of the possibility of truth is
unacceptable. To exist, Dasein is bound to express and share its truth.
Dasein has to take a stand point that is the foundation of assertiveness.
For existing in its thrown-ness, it has already taken a stand point
towards its potentiality and the possibility of the world. In the same
way it stands out as disclosed-ness on the presupposition of truth. Each
truth that Dasein holds and asserts is presupposed on the previous
truths it has already assimilated in its understanding. Each
presupposition is always based on some other presupposition. Dasein,
always, understands in the form of interconnected indefinite statements
that are articulated in meaningful truth claim.
Can assertiveness find some self-evident basis in a way that it
does not need to stand on other presupposed truth? For Heidegger the
88
answer lies in yes and the answer is “the sight of ones authentic
existence.” Dasein knows it exists. But this existence will terminate one
day, in fact, can end any moment. Why doesn’t Dasein end its existence
when it comes to know that it exists? It is because Dasein decides to
take its existence to the point of its “natural” termination. This is the
most primordial decision Dasein takes. And the truth of ones existence
and ones death are the most presupposed truths. This understanding
does not come from outside but arises only from the sight of ones
existence in temporality, that is, it arises from the inside. Assertiveness
that keeps this truth always in sight and lets every other assertion relate
with it must be understood as the truest mode of being.
EXPLAINING THE POINT OF VIEW
ASSERTIVENESS
Assertiveness means lexically, the act of asserting, the mode of saying

emphatically, to put forward ones point strongly. Assertiveness is a
noun. Its transitive verb is “to assert”. Assertiveness composes of
Assert-ive-ness. When “ive” comes at the end of Noun or Verb it acts
as placing definitiveness. When “ness” comes at the end of Noun or
Verb it defines the word as the property of the acting being.
Assertiveness, therefore, is the definitive property of “Assert” as a
property of the acting being, that is, human being.
Etymologically the roots of the word Assert are in Latin. It
composes of two Latin words, “ad” and “serere.” “Ad” means in
English “to” and “serere” means “join”. Thus it becomes “to join.”
The word “to assert” lexically 5 gives following meanings:
1. To state or declare positively and often forcefully or

aggressively
2. To demonstrate the existence of
3. To make statement
4. To make judgement
The first meaning “To state or declare positively and often forcefully or
aggressively” is what is commonly considered to be the meaning of “to
assert”. “To make statement” & “to make judgment” both can easily
join with the first meaning and in fact reinforce the first meaning. “To
make statement” means to bring out ones point of view in a concise but
structured way and usually in a way to use a sentence for the
expression. “To make judgment”, most of the time, comes synonymous
to the “to make statement”. It might be added that the judgment
includes the sense of truth significantly. Thus to make judgment may
be meant to be a statement with the clear and significant or avowed
truth claim. But how can the second meaning “To demonstrate the
89
existence of” can be understood. What does it mean “to demonstrate”

and what this “existence of” denotes? To demonstrate means to bring
out ones point of view clearly in the open, in the public, in a way that
the point seems to be necessarily true. By “the existence of” one may
mean the “existence of what is the case” or “existence of one-self, i.e.,
human being.”
To demonstrate the existence of what is the case means to
demonstrate truth, i.e., to bring out clearly in the open what is the case.
This meaning corresponds with the meaning of stating a judgment. To
demonstrate the existence of something in this first sense, therefore,
conjoins with the already explained meaning of to assert. The second
possible sense of “to demonstrate the existence of one-self” shows
difficulty, at-least at surface, to join with the already explained
meaning of “to assert.” How can we relate the “demonstration of one’s
existence” with the “to state or declare positively and often forcefully
or aggressively in a manner to state with the clear and avowed truth
claim?” The difficulty arises out of two directions. One is to link
human being with the expression of “judgment and/or statement” and
the other is the introduction of “Action” into this debate.
Truth is to know what the case is. Who holds truth? Is it
human being or any other being, like an absolute being, which holds
truth? “What is the case”, from a common sense point of view that is
also a positivist’s point of view, must be independent from its human
perception. Human being can only have the “knowledge” of whatever
is the case, whatever exists. Knowledge must be other than what is the
case. It may correspond to the world in some respect but both will
remain independent of each other. But there is also another point of
view that ventures to differ from positivists. This point of view
maintains that “what is the case” remains meaningless “something” and
becomes meaningful only when human being, with its active
participation with it, makes this “what is the case” meaningful. This
point of view maintains that the laws of nature that science attributes to
nature may not exist in this way or it may be that there is no law of
nature at all. It is only human being who introduces law into the world
around.
I don’t want to go into detail of these different points of views.
My purpose is only to highlight the difficulty involved in linking truth
with human existence. To assert is simply to judge or state though with
certain force. It is not clear that when human being is linked with this
activity of judging and stating what will be the outcome.
The other difficulty arises with its practical dimension. To
state or judge means verbal expressions while “to demonstrate the
existence of human being” seems more like an activity might be
supported by both verbal and nonverbal expressions. For example to
demonstrate its existence a patient may waive its hand (here we
understand existence in the sense of alive). To quote another example
90
an army general may give order to attack on the “enemies” to

demonstrate its and its army’s existence (here we understand existence
in the sense of holding power). A rebel may raise his voice with a
march on the road against the atrocities of the rulers (here we
understand existence in the sense of the urge for freedom & justice). A
philosopher may start arguing amid the multiple stubborn truth claimers
in order to create doubt in their stand points (here we understand
existence in the sense of an urge to improve truth).
It is not easy to relate “to demonstrate the existence of ones-
self” with “to make a statement with the avowed truth claim.” To
understand meaning of “to assert” in its wholeness we again move to its
Latin roots instead of indulging directly into philosophical debates that
we’ll do at later stage. The word “Assert” is formed in English
language with two Latin words, “ad” & “serere”, as it is already
mentioned. “Ad” means “to” and “serere” means “join” or “relate with
force.” It is also very clear that “serere” relates with human being. It is
with human being that this joining takes place in a way of an
attachment. But what is this “serere” that joins with human being and in
what mode this joining expresses it-self.
In Latin, “serere” gives rise to another word “series” meaning
“things arranged or coming one after the other in an uninterrupted
succession.” The word “serere” also becomes the part of other English
words like “desert”. In this word de-sert the suffix “sert” is the past
participle of “serere” comes in Latin as “de-sertus.” The prefix “De”
comes in Latin as expressing negative result or reverse meaning. The
meanings of de-sertus are “to let go” “to abandon” “to detach one self
from.” Now reverse the meanings of de-sertus and the outcome may be
“to hold”, “to dwell”, “to attach one self with.” Before concluding the
above discussion I want to explore one more word, i.e., “Dissert.” In
English language it means to discourse formally or to discuss while
maintaining some distance. The word “dis-sert” composes of two Latin
words “dis” and “sert”. The prefix “dis” in Latin means “separation”,
“apart” and “asunder”. The meaning of “sert” is already explained.
What is here in “sert” that “dis” separates from it? It seems that the
relation that “serere” makes between the expressed “statement” and
“one-self” that “dis” separates here. With this the “serere” loses its
relational intensity and attains soberness and thus becomes “formal
discussion” in the form of “dissert.” From here it may become
“dissertation”, the better known form of “formal discussion.”
It comes out that “serere” means “to hold” and “to dwell” in a
discourse in a way that one-self couldn’t move away while expressing
its point. In fact human being relates with its expression as one remains
in one’s house like a dwelling. It is not necessary that the position that
one-self holds should come out as a verbal expression, like statement in
certain language. What is essential here is “to hold” and “to dwell”.
Both can express in non-verbal forms in discourse as activities. To
91
assert, therefore, comes out comprehensively as to take strong position,

like holding, in the discourse to state certain point of view in a way to
maintain clearly its truth claims and to relate with the stated point of
view in certain mode of one’s being, like dwelling. To assert is not only
a simple verb but it is inextricably bound up with the mode of the being
of the self holding it, that is, assertiveness.
The assertiveness comes out of a being that can understand
and express it-self in certain communicative context. In communication
process when different situations arise during communicating, i.e., the
situation of emphasizing, declaring, questioning, affirming,
maintaining, these are all expressions of assertiveness in general.
Assertiveness, thus, makes communication process possible and defines
its direction. Assertiveness manifests itself only in certain discourse or
“logos” that remains at the base of each communication process. To
achieve consensus in communication process, without using force, the
assertiveness has to use the ways hidden in discourse. It looks
rewarding to clarify the concept of Logos (speech) and the being that
manifests this phenomenon.
DISCOURSE (LOGOS)
The concept of logos has many meanings in philosophical traditions.

Logos is taken to be speech most of the time. Philosophers also used it
in a sense of putting judgment or proposition. It also gives meaning of
“ground” or “ratio” in Greek Philosophy. It also gives meaning of
letting something be seen, therefore, must be true or false. To get a
clear picture of Logos we follow Heidegger in his classic explanation
of the concept of Logos.
The concept of Logos, apparently, has multiple meanings in
Aristotle and Plato. This is, though, only appearance because as soon as
one gets the articulated interpretation of their writings one gets its basic
meaning in its primary content. One of the meanings of Logos, that is
speech, and most of the theorists believed it is the most appropriate
meaning of Logos, can only be accepted if one interprets first the
meaning of speech itself properly. The concept of speech, Heidegger
maintains, has a meaning of “letting be seen”, if interpreted properly
but most of the
“later history of the word logos, and especially the

manifold and arbitrary interpretations of subsequent
philosophy, conceal consequently the real meaning of
speech…Logos is translated and that always means
interpreted, as reason, judgment, concept, definition,
ground, relation.” 6
92
A word like speech should not have so many meanings attached to it.
And if it has it should be clear as how these meanings stand with each
other. As speech may consist of statements and statements as
judgments, this apparently correct translation can still miss the point, if
by judgment we mean “connecting two things” or “taking a position”
by endorsing or rejecting. 7
Logos, rather, should be understood as “to make manifest
what is being talked about”. 8 Its Greek sense comes from deloun. In
Greek Philosophy, especially Aristotle
…explicates this function of speech more precisely as

apophainesthai. Logos lets something be seen
(phainesthai), namely what is being talked about, and
indeed for the speaker (who serves as the medium) or
for those who speak with each other. Speech lets us
see, from itself, apo…, whats being talked about. In
speech (apophansis), in so far as it is genuine, what is
said should be derived from “what is being talked
about”. In this way spoken communication, in what it
says, makes manifest what it is talking about and thus
makes it accessible to another. 9
For Heidegger such is the structure of speech (apophansis). The act of

“letting be seen” though exist in some form of speech situation but in
others it won’t. Requesting, during speech, though manifest the sense
by indicating, yet this sense of indicating is different from the speech as
apophansis.
Because Logos lets something be seen, it can be true or false.
But everything depends on staying clear of any

concept of truth construed in the sense of
correspondence or accordance…The being true of
logos as aletheuin means: to take beings that are
being talked about in legein as apophanesthai out of
their concealment; to let them be seen as something
unconcealed; to discover them. Similarly “being
false”, pseudesthai, is tantamount to deceiving in the
sense of covering up: putting something in front of
something else (by way of letting it be seen) and
thereby passing it off as something it is not. 10
Though logos can “let something be seen” yet it should not be

identified as a primary place for truth and falsehood. And Logos,
therefore, should not be considered a situation formed of judgment or
propositions. For Heidegger Greeks have a broader meaning of Logos
93
and they never identified Logos with judgment. In the Greek sense
what is “true”, in fact more originally true than the sense of truth
mentioned above, is “aesthesis”, the simple sense perception of
something.
To the extent that an aesthesis aims at an idia [what is

its own]-the beings genuinely accessible only through
it and for it…What is in the purest and original sense
“true”-that is, what only discovers in such a way that
it can never cover up anything-is pure noein,
straightforwardly observant apprehension of the
simplest determinations of the being of beings as
such. This noein can never cover up, can never false;
at worst it can be a non-apprehending, agnoein, not
sufficing for the straightforward, appropriate
access. 11
In the complex speech form, however, multiple types of statements

exist. The complexity of life makes it very difficult to use language that
is so simple that it retains such simple a concept of truth, that is, to
observe straightforwardly the simplest of the determinations of the
being of beings as such. Statements have to conjoin with each other and
simplicity has to be replaced by complexity. Logos acquires the
structure of Synthesis. But Heidegger though allows translating
synthesis as conjoining of statements yet he disgusts to interpret
synthesis as to connect and conjoin representations…which then gives
rise to the “problem” how these connections, as internal, correspond to
what is external and physical. 12 The syn [of synthesis], for him, here
has a purely apophantical meaning: to let something be seen in its
togetherness with something, to let something be seen as something.
This way the truth of synthesis leaves its purity and acquires the danger
of the possibility of covering up with its tendency to indicate something
to something.
However, truth of judgment is only the opposite of

this covering up; it is a multiply-founded
phenomenon of truth. Realism and Idealism alike
thoroughly miss the meaning of the Greek concept of
truth from which alone the possibility of something
like “the theory of ideas” can be understood as
philosophical knowledge. 13
It is clear by now that the meaning of Logos as judgment and a place of

truth and falsehood can be understood but in strictly Greek sense and
that is always “letting be seen” or “discovering and covering up”. The
sense of Logos can also be understood as Reason because the function
94
of logos lies in letting something be seen straightforwardly, in letting

beings be apprehended. 14
Moreover, because logos is used in the sense not only of
legein but also of legomenon-what is pointed to as such; and because
the latter is nothing other than the hypokeimenon-what always already
lies present at the basis of all relevant speech and discussion; for these
reasons logos qua legomenon means ground, ratio. Finally because
logos as legomenon can also mean what is addressed, as something that
has become visible in its relation to something else, in its relatedness,
logos acquires the meaning of relation and relationship. This
interpretation brings out the primary function of Logos as an
“apophantic speech”. It also gives insight to understand the multiple
meanings of Logos. The primary relation of Discoveredness and Logos,
that comes out here, in the light of Greek understanding will help us
understand assertiveness and its relation with truth later. For now we
should turn to understand Dasein that manifests assertiveness.
DASEIN AS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD
Human being is different from other beings in it that it relates to its

own being. “As the being of this being, it is entrusted to its own being.
It is being about which this being is concerned.” 15 The essence of
Dasein, Heidegger maintains, lies in its existence. The characteristic of
this existence is not to be understood as that of objectively present
things. The existence of Dasein is different in kind. Dasein exists in its
possible ways of ‘to be’. For Heidegger, the being which this being is
concerned about in being is always my own being. 16 This being which
is always my own being is different from other beings that are neither
indifferent nor non-indifferent regarding their being. My own being is
always in a being of this or that way. Dasein is always as its own
possibility.
And because Dasein is always essentially its own

possibility, it can “choose” itself in its being, it can
win itself, it can lose itself or it can never and only
“apparently” win itself. It can only have lost itself
and it can only have not yet gained itself because it is
essentially possible as authentic, that is, it belongs to
itself. 17
Dasein always defines itself and understands its being in terms of the
possibility which it is. This is not to be considered as an abstract idea. It
is how the Dasein exists. This self-understanding may not be clear in
Dasein but it does not mean that it does not exist. It always exists and
only through it Dasein exists and only toward it goes back.
95
Dasein exists by defining itself as its own being. This own-ness belongs
to the existing Dasein as the condition of the possibility of authenticity
and in-authenticity. Dasein that defines itself always define itself in-
the-world.
The compound expression being-in-the-world

indicates…….that it stands for a unified
phenomenon. … But while being-in-the-world can’t
be broken up into components that may be pieced
together, this does not prevent it from having several
constitutive structural factors. 18
The structural factors of the compound expression Being-In-The-World

are:
• In-the-world
• Being in the way of being-in-the-world
• Being-in as such
IN-THE-WORLD OR THE WORLDLINESS OF THE WORLD:
For Heidegger the phenomenon of the World is not given due attention.
Most of the philosophers take it as self evident. It is in the world that
being-in-the-world first becomes visible. World is every thing around:
Tables, chairs, computer, automobiles, etc. These are the beings one
finds around in the world. But for Heidegger these beings presuppose
the idea of world. Or ontologically speaking to define these beings one
has to presuppose the being that is the being of these beings. This is the
being of mathematicians, a natural being as a World. But, for him, even
this being does not explain properly the being-in-the-world or the world
of Dasein. The beings of this world should give themselves as valuable
things. The world must be such in which Dasein lives. Heidegger,
therefore take another route in Being and Time (1928):
Being-in-the-world and thus the world as well must

be the subject of our analytic in the horizon of
average everydayness as the nearest kind of being of
Dasein. We shall pursue everyday being-in-the-
world. With it as a phenomenal support, something
like world must come into view. 19
Heidegger followed three stages for this phenomenal explanation:
1. An analysis of environmentality and worldliness in general
96
2. An illustrative contrast between our analysis of worldliness and

Descartes’ ontology of the world.
3. The aroundness of the surrounding world and the spatiality of
Dasein.
4. An analysis of Environmentality and worldliness in general
In his analysis of Environmentality and Worldliness in general

Heidegger clears the concept of World as the world of Dasein. It is in
which Dasein lives in association with the beings around. Dasein
develops this association during its active involvement in the world. In
this involvement “things” appears not as an object for perception but as
valuable or useful things for doing work. Greeks appropriately termed
things as Pragmata, that is, that with which one has to do in taking care
of things in association (praxis). One does not find this or that useful
thing occasionally. Instead the useful thing is already in the totality of
useful things. A totality of useful things is always already discovered
before the individual useful thing. 20
Our relation with things gets strong when we associate with it
more frequently by using it. We discover it thus in a better way. This
discovering is not like perception as this or that color of thing. Instead
it is the utility of the thing revealed during actively using it.
Hammering of the hammer reveals itself during hammering and this
revealing comes out as the handiness of the hammer. When we just
look at things theoretically, we lack an understanding of handiness. But
association which makes use of things is not blind, it has its own way
of seeing which guides our operations and gives them their thingly
quality. Our association with useful things is subordinate to the
manifold of the references of the “in-order-to”. The kind of seeing of
this accommodation of to things is called circumspection. 21
The being of useful thing is its handiness. Handiness is the
ontological categorical definition of beings as they are in themselves. 22
But there are handy things only on the basis of what is objectively
present. This is true yet the handiness seems to get discovered earlier
than the objective presence. It seems but not demonstrated yet. We
have, after all, always “presupposed” world in our interpretation of
these inner-worldly beings. Joining these beings together does not
result as a sum something like “world.” Is there then any path at all
leading from the being of these beings to showing the phenomenon of
world?
THE WORLDLY CHARACTER OF THE SURROUNDING WORLD MAKING

ITSELF KNOWN IN INNER-WORLDLY BEING
The beings in the World appear to us in our taking care of mode. It

means before knowing beings as objectively present things they were
there and we were absorbed in using them for fulfilling some purposes.
97
When they lose their utility they stop being valuable and thus appear as
un-handiness.
When we discover its un-usability the thing becomes
conspicuous. Conspicuousness presents the thing at hand in certain un-
handiness. 18 The conspicuousness makes thing at hand appear as an
objectively present being. This also makes it to act as a kind of
thrusting forward on us, that is, to show its presence more clearly and
emphatically with our urgency. Sooner we need this thing to get
repaired or replaced due to the urgency of our work than it forces its
presence on us. The conspicuous objective presence of a thing takes the
mode of Obstrusiveness.
In our taking care of things we get notice of things from also
another angle. It happens often that something that is not needed at
certain time enters in our working. It was not a thing required in
working yet its there. It shows its presence as an objectively present
being needed to be removed from our surrounding. Heidegger termed
this as a mode of obstinacy. The modes of conspicuousness,
obstrusiveness, and obstinacy have the function of bringing to the fore
the character of objective presence in what is at hand. The thing at hand
loses its character of utility yet they are still perceived as having value
(in this sense no value) for defining their being. The thing’s usefulness
or un-usefulness is defined through its reference to certain working.
“The structure of being of what is at hand as useful thing is determined
by references…in a disturbance of reference-in being usable for...-the
reference becomes explicit”. 23
CONTRAST BETWEEN OUR ANALYSIS OF WORLDLINESS AND

DESCARTES’ ONTOLOGY OF THE WORLD
Heidegger explained the Cartesian ontology of the world and concluded

that Descartes avoided the main question of being of the beings that
make the world. Instead he started as a basis for his philosophy RES
EXTENSIA and gave the being of substantiality to the beings of the
world.
Descartes narrowed down the question of the world to that of
the thingliness of nature as that innerworldly being which is initially
accessible. He strengthened the opinion that the supposedly strictest
ontic knowledge of a being is also the possible access to the primary
being of the being discovered in such knowledge. But we must at the
same time realize that the “roundings-out” of ontology of things are
fundamentally on the same dogmatic basis as that of Descartes. 24
It is dogmatic to start ones inquiry from the attributes of
beings while ignoring the problematic of being of beings and its
relation to Dasein. The ontological basis of Descartes can only find its
validation if it does not ignore these fundamental points and found it on
the structure of Dasein. The world as a being of beings is taken as a
98
problematic and must be understood first of all in association with

Dasein, being-in-the-world.
DASEIN AS BEING-WITH (INTER-SUBJECTIVITY)
Descartes based his certitude on Cogito Ergo Sum (I think , I am). For
him this certitude was the opening for the certitude of his existence and
with it the existence of the world. 25 For Heidegger this fact is not that
simple. For him this being which is always mine is not something like
being-in-itself. It is always mine but not like a being objectively present
all the time. This “I” not all the time provides self-evident sort of
certitude. It can disclose itself differently. It may not be “I” when its
claiming to be, in fact, it is at the time “not itself”. From another
perspective Dasein, in everyday experience, discloses itself both
positively and negatively, that is, Dasein says “I am this and this…”
and “I am not this and this…” How can in this case we understand this
“I”? Should we think that at that time it is not “I”. For Heidegger,
The “I” must be understood only in the sense of a
noncommittal formal indication of something which perhaps reveals
itself in the actual phenomenal context of being as that being’s
“opposite”. Then “not-I” by no means signifies something like a being
which is essentially lacking “I-hood”, but means a definite mode of
being of the “I” itself; for example, having lost itself.” 26
To understand Dasein in phenomenological way Heidegger
places Dasein back to the Being-in-the-world. Only in the world of
Dasein can we understand Dasein itself and its association with the
beings like it. In the explication of being-in-the-world Dasein finds
itself all the time with the beings useful for its working. But in this
“workshop like environment” we also find beings like Dasein.
These beings are neither objectively present nor at hand, but
they are like the very Dasein which frees them-they are there, too, and
there with it. 27 The beings like Dasein encountered in the world are not
like the being objectively present. The “I” does not stand alone and
distinguish it-self from the “others”. The others…are, rather, those
from whom one does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one
is too…On the basis of this like-with being-in-the-world, the world is
always already the one that I share with the others. The world of Dasein
is a With-World. Being-in is Being-with others. The inner-worldly
being-in-itself of others is Mit-da-sein. 28 Descartes was not right in
putting “I” as a self-evident starting point of certitude. The structure of
“I” explicates that this “I” is not something unique and can know itself
directly. Instead of “I” it is first of all “they”. It is with the “others” in
such a way that its “I-ness” is formed by “they”. 29 It does not reach
them as one “subject” meets other “subject” but already have this
“they” within itself.
99
The disclosedness of the Mitda-sein of others which belongs

to being-with means hat the understanding others already lies in the
understanding of being of Dasein because its being is Being-
with…Knowing oneself is grounded primordially understanding being-
with. 30 Inter-subjectivity, therefore, is not a relation between or among
“subjects”. As a Dasein each Dasein already, in a sense has an
understanding of other Dasein. This does not happen through
empathy. 31 In fact empathy is possible through this primordial being of
being-with-towards-others.
Being-toward-others is ontologically different from the being
toward objectively present things…in being with and toward others,
there is a relation of being from Dasein to Dasein.But, one would like
to say, this relation is, after all, already constitutive for one’s own
Dasein, which has an understanding of its own being and is thus related
to Dasein. The relation of being to others then becomes a projection of
one’s own being toward oneself “into another”. The other is a double of
the self. 32 The inter-subjectivity, existentially, should be translated now
“being-with-towards-others”. Dasein, in everyday existence, knows
itself as “they”, for whom it works, for whom it gives responsibility of
act, from whom it takes its own-understanding. If the understanding of
“I” is, in everydayness, only the understanding of “they” then where
one can find that “I” that is a unique self of Descartes’ certitude. That
self, for Heidegger will be found, by separating a gap from the identity
of the “I” maintaining itself in the multiplicity of its experiences. 33
BEING-IN AS SUCH OR “I” IN ITS UNIQUENESS
The inquiry into being of that being that relates with its being, i.e.
Dasein, placed Dasein in an absorbed heedfulness in its world and then
manifests Dasein’s own understanding as a disguised understanding of
“they”. Where is that human being that we all consider as unique and
responsible person? For Heidegger, the being which is essentially
constituted by being-in-the-world is itself always its there. He furthered
this point as:
I-there points to here and over-there. The here of an

I-here is always understood in terms of an “over-
there” at hand in the sense of being toward it which
de-distances, is directional and takes care. The
existential spatiality of Dasein which determines its
place for it in this way is itself based upon being-in-
the-world. The over-there is the determinateness of
something encountered within the world. Here and
Over-there are possible only in a there, that is, when
there is a being which has disclosed spatiality as the
being of the there. This being bears in its own-most
100
being the character of not being closed. The

expression there means this essential disclosedness.
Through disclosedness this being (Dasein) is there for
itself together with the Dasein of the world. 34
Finally Heidegger gives the clear picture of Dasein, as the being that
discloses. Dasein can only be Dasein if it throws light upon him, only if
it illuminates itself. If it does not illuminate itself it will remain in
darkness as in the mode of concealment. By its very nature, Dasein
brings its “there” along with “it”. If it lacks its there, it is not only
factically not of this nature, but not at all a being. Dasein is its
disclosure. 35
DASEIN AS ATTUNMENT
Though Dasein is its disclosure yet for most of the life time of Dasein
its being remains closed to it. Why? Because Being manifests as a
Burden, replies Heidegger. Dasein can’t face this kind of revelation of
ones being to oneself. It tries its best to evade. Dasein notices or gets
familiarity of its being there as music notes coming out of it, though in
a severest form. To encounter this being Dasein produces a kind of
harmonizing effect as it attunes these severe and burdensome notes.
Heidegger terms this phenomenon Attunement. For him Dasein is its
there in the existential and fundamental way as Attunement.
In attunement, Dasein is always already brought before itself ,
it has always already found itself, not as perceiving oneself to be
there, but as one finds one’s self in attunement. 36 How does Dasein
cope with this situation? How it bears this burden of its being? Dasein
takes a very ingenuine way; it flees away. Dasein takes step to run
away through moods. Mood does not turn toward the burdensome
character of Dasein revealed in it, least of all as the alleviation of this
burden in an elevated mood. This turning away is always what it is in
the mode of attunement. 37
Attunement discloses Dasein not only in its thrown-ness and
dependence on the world already disclosed with its being, it is itself the
existential kind in which it is continually surrendered to the world and
lets itself to be concerned by it in such a way that it somehow evades its
very self. The existential constitution of this evasion becomes clear in
the phenomenon of the entanglement.
DASEIN AS UNDERSTANDING:
Attunement discloses Dasein in its being there but as burden and then
invents the way of evading it through moods. At the same time, in its
everydayness, the possibility of its being through its potentiality what it
is not confront Dasein strikingly. The conflict between what it is and
101
what it can be, the conflict of its facticity and its potentiality set forth
its being there before Dasein. Understanding enters at this point to save
this perplexity of Dasein and makes it comprehensible for itself and for
the environment around. Understanding is always attuned. And
attunement is always understood. The facticity of Dasein ordained it its
thrownness. But this thrownness is where bound it in a certain world, at
the same time, opens up possibilities for it. The possibilities are
articulated through understanding and become projects of Dasein. The
project is understood possibility of the potentialities of Dasein. As
projecting, understanding is the mode of being of Dasein in which it is
its possibilities as possibilities. This projecting constitutes the “sight”
of Dasein. Dasein is equi-primordially the sight existentially existing
together with the disclosedness of the there. 38 The sight of Dasein is
what Dasein is for it. It constitutes its “Transaparency” or the self-
knowledge as we may say it. Heidegger provides clear insight here that
knowing oneself does not depend upon ones perceiving oneself only
but only in the light of being-in-the-world "…grasping and
understanding the full disclosedness of being-in-the- world throughout
all its essential constitutive factor." Existent being glimpses itself when
"they have become transparent to themselves…in their being with the
world, in being together with others as the constitutive factors of their
existence." 39 The opposite of this is self-deception.
The understanding, because it is the projection of possibilities
of Dasein as its potentiality, it-self becomes a project. The project of
understanding has its own possibilities of development. The
development of understanding is termed by Heidegger as
“Interpretation”. The interpretation comes out as appropriating what is
understood in an understanding way. In interpretation understanding
does not become something different, but rather itself. The mode of
interpretation is articulation and what is articulated as such in
interpretation and is prefigured as articulable in understanding in
general is meaning. 40 The interpretation manifests itself through mode
of statements. And this mode can take different routes. The mode of
statements can be expressed as “pointing to”, predicative and speaking
forth or communication. For Heidegger first two of these modes are too
narrow and does not explain all the dimensions of the statements as
interpretation. The mode of speaking forth or communication
completely explains the multi-dimensionality of disclosed-ness as
statements in the derivation of understanding. At this point speaking
forth or communication takes the importance and “language” enters
into discussion.
COMMUNICATION OR SPEAKING FORTH
Communication takes the mode of Discourse and discoursing is the

significant articulation of the intelligibility of the being-in-the-world, to
102
which belongs being-with, and which maintains itself in a particular

way of being-with-one-another. 41 Being-with-one-another talks in
assenting, refusing, inviting, as talking things through, as getting back
to someone, as making statements and as only talking for the talk. It is
not necessary that discourse takes place in well defined statements and
underlying proper rules. Discourse can be anything that is talked about
but must be of something. In this something said discourse
communicates.
The Communication always takes place within being-with-
one-another that are already involved in the world as taking care of
mode. This environment brings about the sharing of being attuned
together and of the understanding of being-with. Communication never
takes place from the inside of one being to the inside of another.
Mitda-sein is essentially already manifest in attunement-with
and understanding-with. Being-with is explicitly shared in discourse,
that is, it already is, only unshared as something not grasped and
appropriated. 42
Inter-subjective communication takes place with the mode of
language. Only in and through language the participants of inter-
subjective communication could express themselves. The mode of
attunement, understanding and Discourse, the essential structures of
Dasein, all three modes express themselves through Language. It is
imperative now to understand the structure of language itself. For it we
now turn to another philosopher, Austin, the philosopher of ordinary
language as he called himself. He belongs to the analytic tradition of
Russell, Frege and Wittgenstein. Though he moved away from their
point of views by consistent and elaborative analyzing of the
foundation arguments of this tradition yet his style remains analytical.
To use him in support of my point of view and assimilate his views
with Heidegger is obvious to invite many objections. Yet the
similarities of views regarding the understanding of language are so
striking that I couldn’t resist.
HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (AUSTIN’S CONCEPT OF

LANGUAGE)
Austin’s philosophy of ordinary language came out in the shape of a

book, a collection of his lectures, named, "How to do things with
words". Incidentally, the meaning of this title exactly shows the
underlying thread of the whole philosophy. The book devotes lot of
intellectual and rhetorical energy to combating the belief that
language’s value is determined uniquely by its connection to our
disconnection from objective reality. This belief was most strongly
advocated by Russel taking help of Frege and early Wittgenstein. The
belief, that to find out the meaning of a “synthetic” statement, one
should analyze the statement further into atomic statements, and relate
103
each atomic statement to reality as picture relates to reality. Just to

remind this is the very same confrontation of Heidegger with the mode
of philosophy that considers “pointing out” is the only mode of
grasping truth in discourse. The proponents of this view also claimed
that the only meaningful function of language is “informative”.
Language works only to inform “what is the case”.
SAYING VERSUS DOING
Austin, confronting with this background, finds out that language also
performs. He maintains that though to provide information, that he
termed as “constative”, is very important function of language yet the
language also makes very important processes of society possible. And
to ignore that action of language, that he termed as “performative”, is to
make meaningless a lot of processes of society itself.
Austin has given many examples to put forward his point of
view clearly. Marriage, betting, president’s pronouncement, a judgment
by jury are all such functions of society that do things with words. As
marriage, that is far more public and structured, normally entails a
rigidly defined set of words, and in our society it always requires
official inscription in compliance with strict communal protocol.
Marriage thus demonstrates the collective nature of the performative
with great clarity. Moreover, social enforcement of the responsibilities
imposed by marriage vividly demonstrates the importance collectivities
attach to the things done by the words they empower to act. 43
How one enters into the marital status? By saying, Austin
says, “I do”. How the priest, maulvi or the magistrate completes this
process? By saying, I do pronounce you husband and wife in-front of
this or that witness. The marriage, in this way, Austin maintains, takes
place. What does it mean to say that marriage takes place? The words
used in this manner have provided no information yet they do
something through a relation formed between a male and a female.
Where is to find the reason? Austin gives us a rule here to understand
this process. Rule A.1: There must exist an accepted conventional
procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to
include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain
circumstances. 44 `Taking into account this rule the words do things at
marriage can be understood as there must exist a conventional
procedure known as marriage with conventional effects accepted by
the newly-weds and their fellow citizens. Moreover, the conditions
imposed by the conventional procedure-the qualifications participants
must display, the words they must utter, the documents they must
complete-all have to be met in prescribed manner. 45
Austin puts understanding back to conventions, accepted
procedures and context. To understand through language is more like
an interpretive activity than to state what is true. To be informative or
104
constative is still very important a function of language yet words also

do play a role in performative.
If words perform, what are, then, their objectives of
achievement? Words that represent objectively present being are either
right or wrong. What are we concerned here with if not with right or
wrong words? It is success. The performatives are either successful or
not. For Austin performatives are either “felicitous”, happy, or
infelicitous, unhappy. The concept of an utterance’s felicity is closely
connected to what Austin called illocutionary force. 46
The illocutionary force is a combination of language and
society. Though this illocutionary force is not a real “thing”, yet it has a
being of conventionality. It takes its force through conventions. The
distinction between Constative and Performace and their related
objectives to be achieved in speech situation, that is, felicitous or
infelicitous through locution and illocutionary force is really
impressive. But this distinction soon melts away when Austin pursues
his already elaborated thought.
SAYING EQUALS DOING
“On Denoting”, one of the most famous article of Bertrand Russell, he

states a problem that how can a statement like “The present king of
France is bald” describe the truth condition. Russell analyzed it further
into component statements and brings out the conclusion that it is false.
Austin took the same statement and viewed it from his categories of
illocutionary act. He maintains that the statement like above is like a
statement of “I present you the key of the city”, while “I” do not have
the key in actuality. He maintains that this statement is neither false nor
true. It does not pursue the goal of keeping truth conditions intact. The
statement is to make an act and if it does not make an act it is an
unhappy act. And if it is successful in completing the act it is a happy
act. It will not fall under the validity criterion of truth/falsity.
Therefore, Russell’s statement must be understood as void instead of
false.
The constative statements have the performative content. At
the same time the performative statements have constative content. The
statement “I present you the key of the city” has the constative content
along-with the performative content. It can only be verified through
truth validity conditions that whether I present you the key or not, even
symbolically. Austin: “considerations of the happiness and un-
happiness type may infect statements (or some statements) and
considerations of the type of truth and falsity may infect performatives
(or some performatives).”
The distinction between Constative/Performative formed and dissolved.
105
Now let us consider where we stand for a moment:

beginning with the supposed contrast between
performative and constative utterances, we found
sufficient indications that unhappiness nevertheless
seems to characterize both kinds of utterance, not
merely the performative; and that the requirement of
conforming or bearing some relation to the facts,
different in different cases, seems to characterize
performatives, in addition to the requirement that
they should be happy, similarly to the way which is
characteristic of supposed constatives. 47
Pursuing further this mode of thought, Austin contextualized his

statement. Instead of looking abstractly like a logician he put even such
simple, constative, statement as “The cat is on the mat”, in the context
of everyday communication environment. This every day
communication environment remains populated by persons interacting
with each other for fulfilling their purposes, demands, needs, goals, etc.
In this environment even the simplest of the statement like “The cat is
on the mat” loses its apparently self-evident constative content. The
statement must have been made by someone for someone to tell him for
something in regard to his interest. Let’s suppose the statement was
made by Lucy in response to having asked by Harry who wanted to
give milk to the cat. In the affirmative reply of Lucy now Harry could
perform his purpose to feed the cat. Lucy could tell a lie. In that case
she must be deceiving Harry and Harry could not feed his cat. But
Lucy, out of her sincerity, told where he could find cat to feed her.
Though constative content is still there in the statement yet the
statement is to perform certain action in the complex communicative
environment.
Take another example to make it clearer. In reply to the
question regarding cat Lucy said it is here in the room on the mat.
When Harry gets in the room he couldn’t find the cat on the mat in the
room. On asking Lucy said she was viewing a picture in the book in
which a cat is on the mat in the room. Lucy was right but also wrong.
Harry did not want to know the cat in the picture. He wanted to know
his cat to which he was to feed. Lucy was not wrong because she didn’t
tell a lie but didn’t tell a truth that Harry interested to know.
Following Austin we reach a point where “Constative”
statement loses its priority in fact it becomes a factor into
“Performatives”. Words do not represent things they are first and
foremost conventions to fulfill certain conventional goals in certain
context. Even truth is not a primary objective for any statement because
even truth is conditional. How we want to understand a statement in
certain situation. For Austin:
106
…is the constative, then, always true or false? When

a Constative is confronted with the facts, we in fact
appraise it in ways involving the employment of a
vast array of terms which overlap with those that we
use in the appraisal of Performatives. In real life, as
opposed to the simple situation envisaged in logical
theory, one can not answer in a simple manner
whether it is true or false. 48
How do we contextualize truth? In the above example it is shown.

Austin gives examples like to state a cliché of geography: France is
hexagonal. It can be understood, he maintains from a certain approach
that is more a figurative one than a representational one. The
correspondence or representational approach will make this statement
meaningless. Only from the certain geography’s back ground can this
statement be understood properly in which France is considered to have
borders with six different countries.
It is essential to realize that “true” and “false”, like

“free” and “unfree”, do not stand for anything simple
at all; but only for a general dimension of being a
right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong
thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for
these purposes and with these intentions…The truth
or falsity of a statement depends not merely on the
meanings of words but on what act you were
performing in what circumstances. What then finally
is left of the distinction of the Performative and
Constative utterance? 49
Little further again he maintains
Truth and falsity are (except by an artificial

abstraction which is always possible and legitimate
for certain purposes) not names for relations,
qualities, or what not, but for a dimension of
assessment- how the words stand in respect of
satisfactoriness to the facts, events, situation, &c., to
which they refer. 50
Truth loses its universal status. It assimilates into the dimension of

assessment. The criterion of truth can not be searched out and applied
on a universal basis. It’s inherent in the different dimension of
assessments. It is the approach or the certain communicative
environment decides which truth criterion is to follow.
107
What do we get after such a detailed analysis? Language

works either Constatively or Performatively. Constative content is not
the primary purpose of the statement. A statement takes its validity not
from certain criterion of truth but from the society or community
around in which it has to do one more thing, i.e., performs.
Performative content takes its rules for accomplishment from the social
conventions, history and context. Truth too is a verbal performance that
succeeds or fails according to the stance adopted by a specific
collectivity. It too is happy or unhappy not in and of itself but in
function of those among whom it hits or misses.
What do we get? After analyzing language in “everyday-ness”
we lost the ground through which discourse can reach agreement.
Though we succeeded in liberating language from the shackles of
logical abstractness yet in freedom we lost the way to truth. How can
we find our way back to truth? How can different assessments or
approaches during discourse reach consensus? Are there general
universal principles or meta-narratives underlying discourse? Or it is
only the play of force and power that decides which approach is to be
taken right? The structure of being of human, that is so laboriously
taken out by Heidegger, that is very clearly contrasted with the world
and the community, that is revealed into the burdensome existence, that
is clearly demonstrated into authentic and inauthentic mode by
understanding itself properly or improperly by understanding
community around, is thrown back by the language analysis into
“jungle of assessments”. Can assertiveness, now, manifest only as the
assertiveness of “they”? Is only re-phrasing the criteria of truth of the
“they” can the assertiveness achieve success in discourse?
The answer, rightly, seems no where. We should, therefore, go
back to Heidegger’s analysis and find out whether he could save Dasein
from this impasse. Does he have any “approach” to clear the concept of
“approaches”? Can he show us the way through which assertiveness
becomes the assertion of authentic and true assertion? Can he provide
us with any basis where truth can reside and from which it arises
“truly”? Only from such true basis can the attitude of assertiveness in
communicative environment can be shown as the “right” or authentic
attitude.
BEING AND TRUTH (AN EFFORT TO RESIDE TRUTH IN BEING)
To find out the relation of “Truth” and “Dasein” Heidegger takes us

again to the primordial foundation of being of Dasein. So far, following
Heidegger, we have explored different structural aspects of the
constitution of Dasein. Here and there, though, we insisted that the
Dasein should not be understood as being grouped together of different
attributes, instead it should be seen as a whole. Yet the complete
picture of this whole has not yet supplied by Heidegger. To find out
108
this wholeness Heidegger takes us to explore a significant human

phenomenon, Angst. It is where the being of Dasein comes to know
itself. It gets acquainted with itself and shows itself.
Angst, the sever anxiousness, reveals the being of Dasein in its
nakedness. It shows the being of the being that concerns its being in its
total potentiality. It shows this in threatening way. It appears as a fear
or a severe-fire-like burden that makes being oblivious of the world
around. It stands its being out strikingly with the “other”.
It individuates Dasein to its own-most being-in-the-

world which, as understanding, projects itself
essentially upon possibilities. Thus along with that
for which it is anxious, Angst discloses Dasein as
being-possible, and indeed as what can be
individualized in individuation of its own accord. 51
Angst reveals in Dasein its being toward its own-most potentiality of

being, that is being free for the freedom of choosing and grasping itself.
Angst brings Dasein before its being free for …, the authenticity of its
being as possibility which it always already is. But at the same time, it
is this being to which Dasein as being-in-the-world is entrusted.
There is no easy way out of Angst. Dasein tries to evade but it
remains there, hidden or concealed. It keeps on disclosing like “peeping
through” the potentiality of the being. Dasein keeps on evading through
different means like absorbing back into the world or taking refuge in
“they”. But it individuates slowly, occasionally. It makes what it is
destined to make to familiarize Dasein with its potentiality in its
thrown-ness. The fundamental possibilities of Dasein, which is always
my own, show themselves in Angst as they are, undistorted by inner-
worldly beings to which Dasein, initially and for the most part,
clings. 52
The complete phenomenon of Angst thus discloses Dasein in its
wholeness. As attunement being anxious is a way of being-in-the-
world; that for which we have Angst is our potentiality-for-being-in-
the-world. 53 For Heidegger the fundamental ontological characteristics
of this being are “existentiality, facticity, and falling prey.” These
existential determinations are not pieces belonging to something
composite, one of which might sometimes be missing, but a primordial
content is woven in them which constitute the totality of the structural
whole.
Dasein is a being which is concerned in its being about that
being. It is a self-projective being toward its own potentiality-for-being.
This potentiality is that for which any Dasein is as it is. Dasein has
always already compared itself with the possibility of its being. It
discloses for it the dimensions hitherto concealed. It opens for him the
possibility of being free, being free for its own-most potentiality-for-
109
being. It paves the way for the authentic and inauthentic mode of being-
in-the-world. Ontologically it means the being already ahead of itself.
“Dasein is always already “beyond itself”, not as a way of behaving
toward beings which it is not, but as being toward the potentiality-for-
being which it it-self is.” 54 But being-in-the-world belong the fact that
it is entrusted to itself. The being that discloses itself as being-ahead-of
enacts at the same time as a responsibility towards its own being.
Dasein finds itself free toward its own potentiality-for-being in its
thrown-ness. It discloses the foundational structure of Dasein in its
whole-ness. Heidegger termed its structure as being ahead of itself
means being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world as being-
together-with and understood it as a Care. 55
Now the task to lay bare the foundational structure of Dasein
in its wholeness is completed. The matter will be explicated further if
we are able to explicate properly the relation of Truth and Being. It will
give us that ground that is required for the Assertiveness to play
authentic role in the communicative environment.
Heidegger in Being Time (1928) maintains that the traditional
concept of truth can be defined as:
1. The locus of truth is the proposition (judgment).

2. The essence of truth lies in the “agreement” of the
judgment with its object.
3. Aristotle, the father of logic, attributed truth to
judgment as its primordial locus, he also started the
definition of truth as “agreement”.
After critically analyzing the traditional concept, Heidegger maintains

that this concept is based upon the insufficient analysis of the Dasein,
the being that asserts. While keeping in view the totality of the structure
of Dasein the statement that expresses truth means discovering the
beings in themselves. It asserts, it shows, it lets beings be seen
(apophansis) in their discoveredness. The being true of the statement
must be understood as discovering. It is (remember the earlier
discussion of Logos) “letting be seen in their un-concealment
(discoveredness), taking them out of their concealment.”
Discovering is a way of being of being-in-the-world. This
being is always already in the mode of Care in the world. It is always
already in the mode of “disclosing itself”. Disclosedness is constituted
by attunement, understanding and discourse, and pertains equi-
primordially to the world, being-in, and the self… Dasein is “in the
truth. 56 Dasein is in the truth can be summarized by the following
considerations:
1. Disclosedness in general belongs essentially to the
constitution of being of Dasein. It comprehends the total structure of
the being shown through phenomenon of Care. The being of Dasein
110
and its disclosedness belong equiprimordially to the discoveredness of

innerwordly beings.
2. Thrownness belongs to the constitution of the being of
Dasein as a constituent of its disclosedness. In it is revealed that the
Dasein is my own, is always already in a definite world with a definite
range of definite innerworldly beings.
3. Project belongs to the constitution of the being of Dasein as
a being toward the potentiality of its being. Dasein can, as an
understanding being, understand itself in terms of the world and the
others, or else in terms of its own potentiality of being. This possibility
means that Dasein discloses itself to itself in and as its own most
potentiality of its being. This disclosed-ness shows the most primordial
truth in the mode of authenticity in which it is its truth of existence.
4. Falling prey belongs to the constitution of the being of
Dasein. For the most of his life Dasein remains involved in the world of
“they”. The mode of its understanding and the concept of its truth take
justification from “they”. Its projects are “given” and the responsibility
is “taken” already by “they”. “They” show themselves but in the mode
of illusion. “They” conceal the truth and un-cover the truth only that is
permitted by “they”. “Because it essentially falls prey to the world,
Dasein is in “untruth” in accordance with its constitution of being.”
If “falling prey” is in the constitution of Dasein, to “rise
above” is also the foundation of its being. To have a sight of the being
of oneself is not a mystical value to be followed. It is a kind of every
day experience that is evaded through different modes. Yet it is like
telling a lie to one-self. It is like denying the most primordial of truth
though can only succeed in fleeing away.
TRUTH & PRESUPPOSITIONS
At the end of the essay on Logical Positivism, Bertrand Russel

maintains “…I assume that science is broadly speaking true, and arrive
at the necessary postulates by analysis. But against the thorough-going
sceptic I can advance no argument except that I do not [believe] him to
be [sincere].” 57 Russell maintained that the primordial place of
assertiveness is to found truth in ones belief. But he never liked to
dissect the “belief” though he “believes” that his belief is true. He
presupposes a truth as a belief and makes other claims on this
presupposition.
What does “presuppose” mean? Why should we presuppose
that there is truth? Heidegger illuminates us that Dasein is in the truth.
We do not adopt it as a value imposed upon us but it arises out of us. It
is in our basic constitution. We do not presuppose truth, but truth
makes it ontologically possible that we can be in such a way that we
presuppose something. Truth first makes something possible something
like presupposition. 58
111
To understand something is always possible only at the ground

of something. [We can recall the meaning of Logos as a ground here.]
Such understanding of being in its context of being is possible only on
the basis of disclosedness, that is, dis-covering of being. To presuppose
truth then means for the sake of which Dasein is. But, keeping the
primordial structure of Dasein, always-already-ahead-of-itself-towards-
being-in-the-world as being towards other, the most primordial
structure on which every other truth bases itself is Dasein itself as its
own being. I must presuppose truth, it must be as the disclosedness of
Dasein, just as Dasein itself is always be as my own. In itself we can’t
see why beings should be discovered, why truth and Dasein must be. 59
In formal skepticism what one shows is that in each statement
one puts in during discourse is always presupposed by some other
statement and we can never reach a primordial truth statement that is
very clear as self-evident. Though it is quite evident from the above
explications that to disclose is to open one-self for the discourse and to
let logos do its work; let logos clear the presuppositions in the light of
un-restricted reason at the ground of discourse. In disclosedness there is
no final self-evident presupposition but only the clearing of the
primordial structure of the being of Dasein and the depth of discourse.
This primordial structure and its relation to discourse are always
embedded in the truth.
CONCLUSION
In each communicative event that takes place in inter-subjective

environment there remains two active elements; 1) Truth claims
(arising out and embedded in contextualized assessment) 2)
Assertiveness (the mode of the attitude of the human being).
The criteria for maintaining truth whether remain hidden or
disclosed during communication process always comes out from the
unique perspective or contextualized assessments that the participant
brings in with him in communication process. Following Austin we can
see that there may be multiplicity of “contextualized assessments” that
form the unique perspective of each participant in communication
process. Each “contextualized assessment” manifests through itself the
criteria of its own truths, i.e. the criteria to reach consensus
successfully. Any effort that tries to impose single generalized standard
or criteria of truth on communication process that is already pervaded
with more than one “contextualized assessments” seems to be a futile
effort and may lead to either compelled acceptance of certain truth or
conflict.
The other element in communication process is the mode of
the attitude of the participant. The way the participant brings in its
mode of its whole being. The way the participant confronts the problem
112
during communication process. The way the participant relates with

other participants involved in the communication process. Whether the
participant opens it-self and shows all the participants involved in
communication process its presupposed truths and the criteria of
holding those truths or remained closed and tries to evade disclosing its
truths.
The whole communication process, therefore, depends more
upon the mode of the attitude of the participant than upon the truth
claims themselves. If the participant enters into the communication
process with the sight of its own existence that has already been
revealed not as an object receiving knowledge from the outside but
always already holding truths, always already immersed in discourse,
this sight knows that its truth always already depends upon the multiple
presupposed statements.
The authentic way to reach consensus, therefore, lies not in
concealing presupposed statement. The way, instead, points toward
opening one-self during the communication process. Do not conceal
things but dis-cover them in discourse. This is the only true way lying
open for the authentic way of spending life and for purposeful
discourse. This is the only true mode of being, i.e. assertiveness, in
communication environment, that can make participants of
communication process to reach consensus felicitously.
113
END-NOTES
1
Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (NY: MIT
Press, 1994), p.7.
2
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, trans. by Joan Stanbough (New York:
SUNY Press, 1996), p.10.
3
Ibid., p.11.
4
Ibid, p.102.
5
All of the meanings have been taken from online Encyclopedia
Brittanica;http://www.brittanica.com
6
Ibid., p.28.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
For Aristotelian understanding see Aristotle’s Metaphysics, also Heidegger,
Being and Time, p.29.
10
Heidegger, Essence of Truth, trans. by Ted Sadler (London: Continuum
Books, 2002), also see Heidegger, Being and Time. p.29
11
Ibid
12
Heidegger, On the Essence of Truth, trans. by John Sallis in Basic Writings,
ed. David F. Krell. (New York: Harper & Row, 1990)
13
Heidegger, Being and Time. p.29
14
Ibid
15
Ibid., p.40.
16
Ibid.
17
Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom: an Introduction to Philosophy,
trans. by Ted Sadler (London: Continuum Books, 2002). Also see Heidegger,
Being and Time, p.40.
18
Heidegger, Being and Time, p.49.
19
Ibid,. p.60.
20
Clark Timothy, Martin Heidegger (London: Routledge Press, 2002).
21
22
Timothy, Martin Heidegger.
23
24
Ibid., p.85.
25
Descartes, Discourse on Meditation (1642) or for commentary see John
Cottingham, Descartes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
26
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 108
27
Ibid., p.109.
28
Ibid., p.110.
29
30
Heidegger, Being and Time, p.110
31
Here Heidegger is refusing Dilthey’s famous concept of empathy for
understanding others hermeneutically. For details see Paul Hamilton,
Historicism (New York: Routledge, 1996), p.75.
32
Heidegger, Being and Time, p.112
33
Ibid,. p.112.
34
Ibid..
35
Ibid., p.113.
36
Ibid., p.128.
37
114
38
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 136
39
Ibid.,p.124
40
For this see Heidegger, The Way to Language, transl. by David F. Krell. in
Basic Writings, ed., David F. Krell.
41
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 151.
42
Ibid., p. 135
43
Petrey Sandy, Speech Acts and Literary Theory (London: Routledge, 1990),
p.6.
44
Ibid., p.7.
45
Ibid., p.13.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid., pp.26,27.
48
JL Austin, How To Do Things With Words (1962 Lecture XI Cambridge)
(Cambridge: Cambridge Universiy Press, 1990), pp.142-143.
49
Ibid.,p.145.
50
Ibid.,p.149.
51
52
Ibid.,p.200
53
Ibid.,p.178.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.,p.190
57
Russell, Bertrand, Logic and Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1994)
58
59
Ibid.
115
Taimur-ul-Hassan, Failure of Pakistani Press
CONCEPT PAPER
FAILURE OF PAKISTANI PRESS IN

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY: A CASE OF
ARTICLE 58 (2B)
TAIMUR-UL-HASSAN
BEACON HOUSE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, LAHORE
PAKISTAN
ABSTRACT
The media is supposed to provide a public sphere for

a free exchange of ideas in order to promote
democracy. It is also expected to set the agenda of
democracy for people to follow. It is therefore
understandable that a country’s media will be
deemed to have compromised its pro democracy role
if it fails to take up issues central to democracy. In
this context, in Pakistan, the role of the media,
especially that of the press, in promoting
parliament’s sovereignty is extremely important.
Pakistan’s press has however failed to play this role.
A case in point is its coverage of dissolution of
assemblies through Article 58 (2B) by the presidency.
Article 58 (2B), which was inserted in the
Constitution as part of the 8th Amendment by
General Ziaul Haq in 1985, has dissolved four
governments and parliaments, thereby weakening
parliamentary democracy in the country. In order to
know about the role of Pakistan’s press with regard
to Article 58 (2B), the researcher used the cases of
dismissal of Benazir Bhutto’s government in 1990
and Nawaz Sharif’s in 1993. One–month coverage
in Daily Jang and Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, starting from
the day of the dismissal of each government, was
analyzed after setting indicators. The aim was to find
whether these dailies mobilized public opinion
against Article 58 (2B) or implicitly or explicitly
justified it by adopting the arguments of the
presidency.
117
KEY WORDS: Democracy, Parliament, Authoritarianism,

Establishment, Dissolution, Public sphere, Agenda following, Agenda
setting, Gate-keeping, Statement journalism.
INTRODUCTION
The media is regarded as an engine of democracy. If it is allowed to

play this role, it can help usher in sustainable democracy. This role it
assumed following the advent of printing press in 15th century. For a
developing democracy, the media’s role in strengthening the sinews of
democracy is very important. A lot of literature and work exists on the
subject of the causes of failure of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan
and a general view has been taken with regard to the issue of press
freedom in the country. But no research has focused on finding a
relationship between the press and democracy by using a specific case
involving an issue relevant to the growth of democracy in the country.
This research attempts to do that and is therefore different from the
previous work.
The article analyzes Pakistan’s press role in promoting
parliamentary democracy, which the country’s character under the 1973
Constitution. The researcher has taken the case of dissolution of 1990
and 1993 assemblies through Article 58 (2B), and analyzed the press
coverage for one month each to know about the direction of the press
with regard to those events. The article begins with the role the press in
democracy and includes the related mass media theories. It then moves
to Article 58 (2B) and discuses it in a historical context, before
presenting the analysis of one-month coverage of Daily Jang and Daily
Nawa-i-Waqt of the dissolution of Benazir Bhutto’s government in
1990 and that of Nawaz Sharif in 1993. Conclusion is given in the end.
1 - PRESS’S ROLE IN DEMOCRACY
Liberal theorists from Milton through Locke to John Stuart Mill have
argued that a free and independent press can play a vital role in the
democratization of a country. 1. From the national development
perspective, mass media researchers like Wilbur Schramm and Daniel
Lerner have argued in favor of media’s role in national development. 2.
From the political communication perspective, the media is supposed to
provide a public sphere for a free exchange of ideas in order to promote
democracy.3.
After the advent of the printing press in the 15th century,
communication media gradually led to the democratization of society.
It has emphasized on voter participation. 4 Starting from the industrial
age, the development of modern democracy is largely because of the
press’s role in informing, educating and building the public opinion in
118
favor of the attributes of a democratic culture. From the controlled

information, as exercised by the papacy, the printing press made it
possible to spread information and revival of knowledge. The mass
circulation newspapers in the mid 1800s became the single source of
daily dialogue about political, cultural and socials studies.5. This
enhanced the power of the press in society, as at the it became a site for
battles for the control of society. 6. It can be understood in this context
that for the press of country has to function in such a way as to
strengthen democracy which requires providing freedom to it. And this
freedom is only available in a democratic society. “Press freedom
provides the oxygen in a climate of a healthy democracy.” 7.
The press’s role in promoting democracy is vital in Pakistan,
given that it came into being as a result of a democratic movement led
by a lawyer Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The Pakistan
Movement was based on his political and constitutional efforts and
supported by a Muslim press that shared the dream of securing
independence from the British. In the middle 40s, Dawn, Morning
News, Nawa-i-Waqt and other newspapers played a notable role the
Pakistan Movement. 8. It was therefore not wrong to hope that the post-
independence press in Pakistan, following that great tradition, would
help strengthen parliamentary democracy in the country. It was
expected that rather than adopting an agenda following role under
pressure from Pakistan’s authoritarian setups and establishment, it
would promote democracy by setting an agenda based on its values.
The press and democracy are inter-wined and as such it is possible to
have a free press and good responsive and democratic government at
the same time.9 But the press has to wage struggle to earn its freedom
in a despotic setup, as evidenced in the history of press freedom in
Pakistan. Historically, at the world level, the winning of press freedom
is attributed partly to a heroic struggle against the state.10 Where press
freedom is curtailed or the press faces various pressures, its role in
promoting democracy is undermined.
Agenda setting theory proposes that the public agenda-or what
kinds of things people discuss, think, and worry about. 1. Public
opinion is powerfully shaped and directed by what the news media
choose to publicize (Larson, 1994). This means that if the news media
decides to give the most of time and space to an issue, it will become
the most important item on the audience’s agenda. Agenda setting
research examines the relationship between the media priorities and
audience priorities in the relative importance of news topics. In recent
years the most popular subjects in agenda-settings research are (1) how
the media agenda is set and whether the media follow the agenda (2)
how the media choose to portray the issues they cover. 11. Pakistan
press’s performance in respect of promotion of parliamentary
democracy does not inspire confidence, and needs to be judged by
applying the case study of Article 58 (2B).
119
2- BACKGROUND OF ARTICLE 58 (2B)
After his takeover in 1977, General Ziaul Haq issued the Proclamation
of Martial Law and CMLA Order 1 of 1977 on July 5. Pakistan was
thereby subject to any orders by the CMLA. However, according to the
usurper, Pakistan was to be ‘governed as closely as possible in
accordance with the Constitution!’ The president later prevailed upon
the party-less parliament to pass the Constitution (Eighth Amendment)
Act 1985 on November 11, 1985. This was aimed at ratifying all
constitutional deviations the General committed before setting Pakistan
on the road to constitutional rule. He was criticized by a large section
of society mainly on the ground that Article 58 (2 B) of the
Amendment, which armed the president with the power to dismiss the
elected government of a political party, served to undermine
parliamentary democracy and weaken political parties.
The manner in which the Eight Amendment was passed was
blatantly undemocratic. The validation of the Amendment was
described as a ‘result of a bargain struck between the usurper, who held
the coercive apparatus of the state and the members of the parliament,
who did not have the backing of political parties. 1 Ziaul Haq’s
ambition to assume all powers was increasingly condemned, and he
was charged with harboring the desire to hold absolute power. 2
There existed another viewpoint based the need to ensure
balance between the power of president and the prime minister. One
section of opinion held that the constitution must evolve according to
the situation, and called the process of amendment a healthy process. 3
In this same vein, another opinion held that constitutions must have the
flexibility to meet changing circumstances and political realities. 4 And
yet another section supported giving powers to the president and
endorsed the wisdom of allowing the president to retain the power of
dissolving assemblies in specific circumstances. 5 There was also talk of
evolving a consensus on removing any inconsistencies and bringing
about certain improvements in the Constitution. 6 The debate on the 8th
Amendment, particularly Article 58 (2B), escalated. A large section
was of the view that it was wrong to confer exaggerated power on the
president in a parliamentary democracy. It held that it was impossible
to have two parallel poles of power in a parliamentary system. 7 It
called for strengthening the institution of parliamentary democracy
based on popular mandate. 8
But then in doing that act of constitutional engineering,
General Ziaul Haq had merely followed the tradition of his military
predecessors, General Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan, who
resorted to constitutional gimmickry to meet their political ends. Ayub
1- Ishaque, M., Khalid, ‘The 8th Amendment – A case against Repeal’, The Nation, February 3, 19 89
2- Butt, Bashir, Muhammad, ‘Eight Constitutional Amendment’, The Muslim, February 13, 1989.
3- Zafar , SM, ‘Eight Amendment – The debate’ , The Nation, February 8, 1989
4- Elahi, Rehmat, ‘The Eight Amendment’, The Nation, February 25, 1989
5- Bhandara, M.P., Dawn, April 26, 1989
6- Aziz, Sartaj, ‘8th Amendment- The real issues’, The Nation, February 25, 1981.
7- Ahmad, Khurshid, ‘Eight Constitutional Amendment Bill: A critical appraisal’, The Muslim 13, 15,1985
8- Ahmad Sabihuddin, ‘The Eight Amendment Syndrome’, Dawn, February 20-21, 1989.
120
Khan’s constitution was a personal document deriving its authority

from him and not from a constituent assembly. By undermining the
Constitution and establishing the supremacy of the presidency, both
military rulers paved the ground for the disintegration of the federation
in the form of losing East Pakistan. 9
In Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government the Constitution of 1973
was unanimously passed by the National Assembly. Yet the generals
remained active in their bid to make parliament subservient to all-
powerful president who by virtue of his office is also supreme
commander of Pakistan the armed forces. They succeeded when
General Ziaul Haq revived the Constitution of 1973 but included in it
Eight Amendment. The party-fewer legislatures did not put up any
resistance (see first paragraph). The 8th Amendment, with Article 58
(2B), continues to plague the body politic. It was brought by a General
who wanted to repress the representative political forces. General Ziaul
used the 8th Amendment once in the case of Muhammad Khan Junejo
but the Amendment did away with three politically-elected
governments of the PPP and Muslim League in 1990, 1993 and 1996. It
is a truism that the 8th Amendment opened the floodgate for political
opportunists and laid the groundwork for a hung parliament. 10
In this backdrop, the removal of Eight Amendment, with Article 58
(2B) is essential to ensure parliamentary democracy and strength
political parties. The role of Pakistan’s press is important in this regard.
3-PRESS COVERAGE OF DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENTS IN 1990 AND

1993
Coverage of the dissolution of Benazir Bhutto’s government and

Nawaz Sharif’s by Daily Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt was divided into
‘supportive’ and ‘non supportive’. For supportive, the researcher
looked for ‘Article 58(2B) is harmful for parliamentary system’,
‘Article 58 (2B) has harmed political parties’, ‘Article 58 (2B) should
go’, ‘dismissal has strengthened the presidency’; for ‘non-supportive,
the researcher has looked for ‘sacked government was corrupt’,
‘political parties are incompetent’, ‘politicians are corrupt’, ‘democracy
does not suit Pakistan’ and statements reflecting the presidency’s
viewpoint.
The press coverage of the dismissal of the PPP and PML-
governments in 1990 and 1993 reveals that the issue of Article 58 (2B)
as being an anti-democracy article was largely downplayed and the
establishment’s line of argument and charges leveled against the
deposed government were followed by the press. Surely, the press
followed the agenda of the powers that toppled the elected governments
and the gate-keeping was tilted in favor of the establishment.
9- Jamil, Qazi , ‘ Reviving the Constitution’, Dawn May 21, 2002

10- Shamim-ur-Rahman, ‘Shoguns of Pakistan versus Parties’, daily Dawn, August 28, 2002
121
After the PPP government's dismissal in 1990, in leading two

Urdu newspapers, Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt, 78 stories were found in
their Lahore on their front and back pages. Out of 78 stories, 60 carried
the official line in the sense that contained allegations and the
establishment’s argument against the deposed PPP government. Out of
the 60, 29 were statements, establishing the newspapers’ reliance on
statement journalism, without verifying the facts or attempting to
balance the story.
In Jang 42 stories were found out of which 32 were against the
deposed government. Out of these 32, 17 were statements against
deposed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. In Nawa-i-Waqt 36 stories
were found, out of which anti-PPP were 28. Out of 28, 12 were
statements against the deposed prime minister, who in fact had become
a victim of Article 58 (2b). These stories found the place in the
newspapers through the filter of gate-keeping, which shows the staff’s
ideological and political inclination.
Nawa-i-Waqt operated within a narrow framework. On
August 6, Arif Nizami gave the news of the plan to dissolve assemblies
and holding of fresh elections. The editor of the Nation, of the same
group, even divulged the names of persons to be entrusted with the
running of the caretaker setup. The newspaper also carried six stories
featuring the opposition while only two related to the Benazir Bhutto
government. This amply shows the tilt of the newspaper and the
direction of its policy vis-à-vis the imminent departure of a civilian
government through the sword of Article 58 (2B).
In its editorial on the same day, Nawa-i-Waqt took a view of
the no-trust motion against the PPP government. It accepted that the
no-trust was a constitutional right of the opposition, but regretted that
Mr Jatoi, the mover of the no-trust, announced it without taking Mian
Nawaz Sharif into confidence. The assemblies were dissolved and on
August 7, Nawa-i-Waqt splashed the news. Eight stories were carried
involving1) Ghulam Ishaq Khan, 2) Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, 3) Junejo:
fateh khawni on assemblies death, 4) Army’s control of capital, 5)
General Aslam Beg, who was reportedly chewing gum and involved in
a tit a tat with Jatoi in isolation, 6) Jatoi’s thunderous announcement
that he would not allow any corrupt part in the next general elections,
7) Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s declaration that he would not allow any ’non-
democratic’ protest over a ‘ democratic’ and ‘constitutional’ decision,
8) Mian Azhar and Mahmood Haroon , of Dawn, made governors of
Punjab and Sindh.
Nawa-i-Waqt in its August 7 editorial expressed its concern
about the dismantling of the system, while reviewing the role of
political parties and the establishment. It urged that polls be held in 90
days, and not postponed on the plea of accountability. In its second
editorial, it rendered its advice to Pakistan Muslim League, especially
referring to former Prime Minister Junejo’s faction, to forge unity to be
122
able to face the PPP in the next elections. Though the editorial
expressed a formal concern at the dissolution of the assemblies, it failed
to vigorously challenge the existence and use of 8th Amendment, given
the said clause (since it is still a part of our Constitution) has bestowed
extraordinary powers to the president, which is not acceptable in a
parliamentary democracy.
The August 14 editorial of Nawa-i-Waqt welcomed the
government’s decision to hold accountability of the parliamentarians
elected in 1988. It, however, failed to question the decision on the score
that it there ever was a need to hold accountability by the caretakers,
which was unadvisable considering their bias, why it had to remain
confined to politicians, leaving other institutions out of its loop, and
also why 1988 had to be taken as the cutoff date.
The August 16 Nawa-i-Waqt carried a lead story which
featured the army chief Aslam Beg as thundering that they ( the army)
were not afraid of the PPP returning to power, accompanied by his
stern resolve to hold ‘ quick elections’ to ‘clear the filth’. Five stories
on the same day related caretaker prime minister, his cabinet, etc. Only
one related to Benazir Bhutto, carrying his statement. One story related
to the petition filed in the apex court against the dissolution of
assemblies.
The issue of August 17 carried five stories, mostly related to
‘accountability’. Only one related to Benazir Bhutto. The main editorial
on the same day as usual advised the PML to forge unity among its
ranks. The second editorial took exception to Benazir Bhutto’s
criticism of the army. The newspaper, referring to Mirza Aslam Beg’s
statement, wrote she even did not know the difference between ‘army
intelligence’ and ‘army’. On the op/ed page, Ibnul Hassan, in his
article, made a scathing criticism against Benazir Bhutto, implicitly
absolving the army of any wrongdoing.
The August 18 issue carried seven stories, mostly related to
preparation of elections and forming of election alliances. A three-
column story, from the monitoring desk, told the readers about deposed
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s plan, during her government, to
replace General Mirza Aslam Beg with Masood Sharif. Though
published with the intent to berate the former prime minister on account
of her alleged plan to replace the army chief, the story contained an
element of the army chief’s personal vendetta behind his all-out support
to the president to remove a political party government in sheer
violation of democratic principles. A comment, a query could have
been raised by the newspaper , if it had indeed viewed this issue from
the perspective of demolition of democratic principles, which provide
for voting as the only kosher means to remove government, rather than
going by the line paraded by the establishment.
The August 19 issue of Nawa-i-Waqt shifted to election
activities. The editorial of that day asked Ijazul Haq, son of Ziaul Haq,
123
the architect of the notorious anti-democracy 8th Amendment, not to

turn politics into family fiefdom. In principle, Nawa-i-Waqt’s
viewpoint was correct, only that it was colored by its support to Mian
Nawaz Sharif, with whose family elders the chief editor of the
newspaper, Mr Majid Nizami, had personal relations, and whom he so
dearly wanted to propel to the prime minister house as the son of
Punjab as well as the savior of Muslim League and advocate of its
chauvinist policy.
Nawa-i-Waqt’s views on Benazir’s demand for government by
the speakers could not be found, which was astonishing as the deposed
Prime minister had expressed her mistrust in the government holding
elections. August 21, however, carried the main story that told that
Benazir Bhutto had assured President Ishaq Khan that she would
respect ‘awami faisla’.
The remaining stories carried routine election activities.
Nawa-i-Waqt’s 23 August editorial favored interim Prime Minister
Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi’s proposal of holding elections after every three
years. One interestingly part of the editorials is where the newspaper
expressed the view that on May 29 and August 6 due to 8th
Amendments martial law was not clamped proving that the 8th
Amendment, which had put parliamentary democracy under the
presidency/army, was the guarantor of political system.
August 25 main story concerned the filing of references
against 50 ex-ministers and parliamentarians in the nest few days. Five
stories concerned statements and activities regarding elections. In the
case of Jang, like Nawa-i-Waqt, the newspaper chose to take many
statements against the deposed government and the coverage, including
comments, was almost in line with the establishment’s agenda; the
newspaper did not take up the issue of the government dissolution
within the context of Article 58(2B) being detrimental to the growth of
political parties and a drain on their ability to run governments without
any fear of being struck by the presidency.
Daily Jang in its a month coverage on its front and back pages
after the dissolution of PPP’s first government in August 1990
demonstrated that it relied on ‘statement journalism’ and thereby
largely followed the agenda of the establishment and the forces
supporting it rather than setting the agenda for the public by
highlighting the issue of Article 58 (2B) as being anti-democracy and
anti-political parties and build opinion for its removal from the
Constitution.
Daily Jang on August 6, 1990, carried three statements,
welcoming the PPP government’s dismissed. In one statement, Ghulam
Mustafa Khar stated that Benazir Bhutto wasted her time and she did
not enjoy the support of the army, bureaucracy and masses of Pakistan.
Jang reporter filed this statement. Jang’s Karachi correspondent filed a
story, carrying MQM’s Altaf Hussain’s statement, who stated that
124
those who wanted to become all–powerful had met their fate. Meraj
Muhammad Khan, filed by APP, stated Benazir Bhutto lost her power
because she depended on the forces of establishment.
In August 8 story told about confiscation of all record
belonging to the period of the PPP government as a measure to expose
its ‘corruption’ and mis governance. This story was filed by Jang’s
special correspondent in Islamabad. A Jang special report on August 8
curtained remarks of PPP’s opponents in Sindh, Pir Pagara, who said
that Benazir Bhutto became a victim of her family corruption.
Caretaker Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi an August 9
asked Benazir Bhutto’s father in law Hakim Ali Zardari to return home
and face inquires against him. The same day Mr Jatoi condemned
Benazir Bhutto for throwing mud at the army. This story was again
filed by Jang’s special correspondent in Islamabad. The statement was
highlighted in the form of a headline Mr. Jatoi also directed the
authorities to collect records against the PPP
Malik Meraj Khalid, in a supportive statement, stated on
August 11 that Benazir Bhutto became a victim of conspiracy. And
Mirza Aslam Beg, former army chief stated Benazir Bhutto did not
deserve to be the prime minister because she did not even know the
difference between Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) and Military
Intelligence (MI).
On August 19, some former members of parliament advised
Benazir Bhutto not to make statements against the army. This was filed
by Jang’s special correspondent from Islamabad. And Ejaz Jatoi
accused Asif Zardari of issuing 30,000 Kalashnikov licenses to his
tribesmen. This statement was filled by Jang’s Hyderabad
correspondent on August 19. Statements about Benazir Bhutto’s
conflict with the army, corruption, mis governance and incompetence
as well as the allegation of issuance of arm licenses were not
investigated by daily Jang and were taken as they came. The researcher
did not find any evidence of any effort by the newspaper to balance the
story by providing the viewpoint of the party being accused of the
wrongdoing. If anything, Jang continued to give space to statements, all
pointing to PPP’s corruption, inefficiency, conflict with the army, etc.
On August 25, a statement appeared that Benazir Bhutto
wanted to remove General Mirza Aslam Baig as army chief. An August
28 story carried president Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s remarks in which he
expressed his concerns over ‘horse trading’. Zahid Sarfraz claimed in a
statement published on August 29 that the PPP would not be able to get
more then 50 seats in the next general elections. This was filed by
Jang’s Karachi correspondent. Ironically, all these statements and
remarks made during the course of press conference appeared on front
and back pages of Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt
During research on the PML government dismissal in 1993,
67 stories were found in these newspapers on their front and back pages
125
in one month. Out of the 67, 36 were against the deposed PML
government, making more than 50 percent of the total stories.
In Jang, 34 stories were found, out of which 21 were anti-
PML; out of 21, 13 were anti-Nawaz Sharif statements. Like Benazir
Bhutto the theme of corruption and mis-governance was repeated
through these stories. In Nawa-i-Waqt, 33 stories were found, out of
which 15 were anti-PML, including 13 statements. Total statements
were 26 out of 36 anti-PML stories.
In Jang, 34 stories were found, out of which 21 were non
supportive, out of 21, 13 were anti-Nawaz Sharif statements. Like
Benazir Bhutto the theme of corruption and mis-governance was
repeated through these stories. In Nawa-i-Waqt, 33 stories were found,
out of which 15 were anti PML, including 13 statements, which formed
above 90 percent of the negative stories. Total statements were 26 out
of 36 anti-PML stories.
On April 19 the story about the dissolution of Nawaz Sahrif
led PML (N) government was covered by Nawa-i-Waqt. The same day,
Nawa-i-Waqt’s Lahore reporter filed a story, headlined, ‘victim of 8th
Amendment’. This was the departure from the tendency of carrying
stories and statements close to the establishment’s view point and
argument.
Wasim Sajjad’s statement that the president did not commit
any unlawful act by dismissing the PML government was published in
Nawa-i-Waqt on April 24. The newspaper’s Islamabad correspondent
reported on April 25 that the president was not ready to dissolve the
assemblies but he was not left with no other option but to dismiss
Nawaz Sharif after the latter’s speech. Implicated in it was the
newspaper’s defense of the presidential use of Article 58 (2B), which is
an aberration in a parliamentary system of democracy.
Zahid Sarfraz allegation appeared. Filed by its staff reporter,
Nawa-i-Waqt on May 8 reported that Nawaz Sharif caused the national
treasure a loss of Rs 1 billion by reducing the duty on iron scrap. On
May 15, ‘corruption’ was again projected, even without the production
of evidence, in the form of a statement made by Zahid Sarfraz. He
alleged that Nawaz Sharif withdrew 83 crore, 58 lakh rupees for
personal use from the national exchequer.
During the course of the hearing of the petition against the
dissolution of assemblies, Nawa-i-Waqt continued to highlight
observations and statements raising concerns about the co-existence
between the president and the prime minister. On the other hand, daily
Jang on April 20, 1993, carried Balkh Sherbaz Mazari’s statement that
Nawaz Sharif stabbed his own friends. Nusrat Bhutto of PPP
condemned Nawaz Sharif the statement was carried by the daily Jang
April 25. Daily Jang’s correspondent reported from Islamabad on April
25 that the anti Nawaz Sharif group had gained majority in the senate.
126
In order to protect the alleged corruption of the deposed Prime

Minister, Jang special correspondent in Islamabad reported that a
committee had been set up to pursue accountability of Nawaz Sharif.
The same day Jang’s correspondent in Jehlum reported that first case of
corruption of case against Nawaz sharif would be filed that day.
On May 7, Zahid Sarfraz’s statements were carried by Jang, in
which he alleged that the Nawaz family plundered and turned all
powerful in Nawaz Sharif’s government. Jang’s Hamid Mir reported on
May 12 that Nawaz Sharif would be tried in special court over the
charge of misuse of official power and resources.
On May 15, daily Jang’s correspondent in Islamabad reported
that Nawaz Sharif illegally withdrew Rs 84 crore, 40 lakh from state
exchequer by using his discretionary power. Zahid Sarfraz in a
statement carried by the daily Jang on May 17, in which he stated that
he would form unions in the factories and mills of Nawaz Sharif.
CONCLUSION
During the research on the press coverage of the dissolution of Benazir

Bhutto government in 1990 using the one-month files of Daily Jang
and Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, the researcher found a total of 78 stories in
their Lahore issues from April to May 18 on the front and back pages.
Out of 78 stories, 60 were non-supportive as they did not bring to the
fore the negative effects of Article 58 (2B) on parliamentary democracy
in Pakistan. Out of the 60 non supportive, 29 were in the shape of
statements, proving the prevalence of statement journalism in
Pakistan’s media. .
In Jang, 42 stories were found out of which 32 were non
supportive in the sense that they carried the presidency’s line of
argument against the deposed government of Benazir Bhutto. Out of
these 32, 17 were statements against the deposed prime minister. In
Nawa-i-Waqt, 36 stories were found, out of which the number of non
supportive were 28. Out of 28, 12 were statements against the deposed
prime minister, who had in fact become a victim of Article 58 (2B).
The non supportive stories found a place in the newspaper through the
filter of gate-keeping role a newspaper's staff - those on the news-desk
in particular- are supposed to play.
The analysis of the coverage by Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt of the
dissolution of Benazir Bhutto’s government in 1990 and Nawaz
Sharif’s in 1993 through anti-democracy Article 58 (2B) shows the
national press did not build public opinion against the said Article and
relied more on statement journalism carrying the presidency’s or
establishment’s arguments rather than making an effort to highlight the
pitfalls of having an anti-democracy Article in the Constitution. It
largely followed the agenda of the presidency or establishment rather
than setting the agenda of democracy for the people to follow in the
127
form of bringing to the fore the damage caused by Article 58 (2B) and
calling for its removal from the Constitution. This role of the national
press must be revised if Pakistan is to evolve into a true parliamentary
democracy.
128
END-NOTES
1- Pippa Norris, Good Governance, ‘Human Development, and Mass

Communication’, Comparing Political Communication (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.117.
2- Jan Servas (ed), Communication for Development and Social Change
(London: Sage, 2004), p. 167-8.
3- Denis McQuail. Mass Communication theory.
4 Jean Folkerts, Stephen Lacy, The Media in Your Life (London: Pearson
Education. 2005), p. 3.
5- Shirely Biagi, Media/Impact: An Introduction to Mass Media (NY: Thomson
Wadsworth, 2005), p. 274.
6- Douglas Kellner, Media Culture (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 35.
7- AN Shamsi, Mass Media in New World Order (London: SBS Publishers,
forthcoming), p. 49.
8- Mehdi Hasan, Survey of Journalism (Lahore: Aziz Book Depot, n.d.), p. 48.
9- Shamsi, Mass Media in New World Order, p.50.
10-James Curran and Jean Seaton, Power without Responsibility (London:
Routledge, forthcoming), p.1.
11. McCombs, Maxwell E and Donald H. Shaw, “The Agenda Setting
Function of the Mass Media”, Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 36, pp. 176-87.
12. M. Khalid Ishaque, “The 8th Amendment – A Case against Repeal”, The
Nation (February 3, 1989).
13. Bashir Muhammad Butt, ‘Eight Constitutional Amendment’, The Muslim
(February 13, 1989).
14. SM Zafar , ‘Eight Amendment – The Debate’ , The Nation (February 8,
1989).
15. Rehmat, Elahi, ‘The Eight Amendment’, The Nation (February 25, 1989).
16. M.P., Bhandara, Dawn, April 26, 1989
17. Sartaj Aziz, ‘8th Amendment- The real issues’, The Nation, February 25,
1981.
18. Khurshid Ahmad, ‘Eight Constitutional Amendment Bill: A critical
appraisal’, The Muslim 13, 15,1985
19. Ahmad Sabihuddin, ‘The Eight Amendment Syndrome’, Dawn,
February 20-21, 1989.
20. Qazi Jamil, ‘ Reviving the Constitution’, Dawn May 21, 2002
21. Shamim-ur-Rahman, ‘Shoguns of Pakistan versus Parties’, daily
Dawn, August 28, 2002
129
Notes for Authors
1. Research papers, notes, review articles, comments, rejoinders and book reviews-in
English only should be sent in duplicate together with floppy in MS-Word to:
Dr Tahir Kamran, The Editor, The Historian, Department of History, GC University,

Lahore (e-mail: tahirkamran_gcu@yahoo.com, history_department_gcu@yahoo.com).
2. Papers will be accepted for consideration on the understanding that they are original
contributions to the existing knowledge in the fields of History, International Relations,
International Political Economy, Current Affairs, Strategic Studies, Women Studies,
Sociology Journalism, Political Science, Statistics, Psychology, Philosophy, etc.
3. Each paper should be typed and should carry a margin of an inch and a half on the left-
hand side of the typed page.
4. The first page of the research article should contain the title of the paper, the name(s),
abstract and any acknowledgements.
5. Tables for the main text and each of its appendices should be numbered serially and
separately. The title of each table should be given in a footnote immediately below the
line at the bottom of the table.
6. Endnotes should be numbered consecutively.
7. All references used in the text should be listed in alphabetical order of the author's
surnames at the end of the text. References in the text should include the name(s) of
author(s) with the year of publication in parentheses. Attempt should be made to conform
to the style of the Journal. Further information on questions of style may be obtained
from the Editor of this Journal.
8. Each author will receive two copies of The Historian.
9. Book Reviews should give a description of the contents of the volume and a critical
evaluation of the book. It should not exceed 05 or 06 typewritten pages. Each request for
a book review in the journal must be accompanied by one copy of the book concerned.

The Historian 2005

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

The Historian 2005

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

The Historian

Volume 3 July-December 2005 Number 2

© The Historian is published by the Department of History, GC

No potion of this journal may be reproduced by any mechanical,

Price: 250 PKR

Associate Editors: Hussain Ahmad Khan, Noor Rehman

Design & Production Incharge: Shifa Ahmad

Editorial Advisory Board

Farhat Mahmud - Department of History, GC University, Lahore, Pakistan

TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF PARALLEL CULTURE

HISTORICIZING PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY…. IRFAN WAHEED USMANI

JINNAH–MOUNTBATTEN RELATIONS …. BASHARAT HUSSAIN 59

ASSERTIVENESS IN INTER-SUBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT: HEIDEGGERIAN

FAILURE OF PAKISTANI PRESS IN STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY: A CASE

NOTES FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS AND BOOK REVIEWERS

TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

This paper seeks to cast a fresh look on

repercussions in respect of our

KEY WORDS: Culture, Subcontinent, Sufism, Mahmud of

Islam penetrated into India in the eleventh century 1 as a

imply that it intended to replace or impose its hegemony by

The world is bound by serious law and order,

skies would have collapsed. When the Lord of

himself in the movement of spirit, and sheds his given

The sinners repent from their sins

The arif (gnostic) repents from worshipping since the

God is known only by means of God. The

Here Ibn Arabi conceives the knowledge of God essentially as

Sufi path. The orthodox tendency, however, failed to draw the

When Sufism arrived in India, it had already reached its

spiritual but wider public socio-culture activity. Out of the

Is it really to adventurous to say that the agent

The central figure of this culture was individual, the individual

context that the pioneer position of faqir/dervish or

Muinaddin Chishti, born in Sijistan, east Persia, had travelled

transcendence from externals and coming into grips with the

all the institutions of the state. In a time when Muslims were

the autonomous character of Sufi culture. So when he was

Faridaa it sarhaana, bhoen son, kiraa lario

O Farid! A brick under your head, lying on the

It is this immobility, inability to move, to act, in the death that

Faridaa galien chikkar dur ghar naal piaare

Bhijjo sijjo kambli Allaah verso menh

The movement that Fariduddin organized found its finest

One [attitude ] is that of world [worship] in

that which is world in form but not in content

Nizamuddin Aliya was the embodiment of Sufi liberality and

remarkable to be ignored. Whereas previously the figure of the

the common Hindu folk he thought only a fine example could

ideologues of Islam, while taking pride in the egalitarian

They looked upon all religions as different

Such recognition of the truth in the other and readiness to

The implications of the findings and hypothesis presented

he would sooner or later destroy himself, for there was after

HISTORICIZING PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY

I RFAN W AHEED U SMANI

This article makes an historical analysis of Pakistani

K EY W ORDS : UN Resolutions, Kashmir, Pakistan, India.

Pakistan’s Kashmir policy cannot be comprehended without

The Kashmir dispute need never have arisen

Muslims and the Hindus also been applied to

The immediate roots of the Kashmir tragedy lie in the

consequently paved the way for state’s accession with India. As