BOOK VII

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section,
except the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters
relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state universities and
colleges.

(1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National
Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and
adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government corporations with respect
to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary
power as provided by law.

Section 9. Public Participation. -

(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of
proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any
rule.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

Section 10. Compromise and Arbitration. - To expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or
claims and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage amicable
settlement, comprise and arbitration.

Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. -

(1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall be served at least
five (5) days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the hearing.

(2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. If not precluded by
law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement or default.

(3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings.

Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case:
(1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent
men in the conduct of their affairs.
(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily
available. Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. If the
original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted.
 (3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal
evidence.
(4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable technical or scientific
facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to contest the
facts so noticed.
Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of
witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party
before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency
may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested
case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.
Section 14. Decision. - Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall
state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each case within
thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision personally or by registered
mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them.
Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days
after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative
appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may be filed, which shall
suspend the running of the said period.
Section 17. Licensing Procedure. -

(1) When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be preceded by notice and
hearing, the provisions concerning contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable.

(2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health, or
safety require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or annulled without notice and
hearing.

Section 18. Non-expiration of License. - Where the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the
renewal of a license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall not expire until
the application shall have been finally determined by the agency.

Section 19. Appeal. - Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal from a final decision of the
agency may be taken to the Department head.

Section 20. Perfection of Administrative Appeals. -

(1) Administrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a copy
of the decision complained of by the party adversely affected, by filing with the agency which adjudicated the
case a notice of appeal, serving copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the appellate agency, and paying
the required fees.

(2) If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the
remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed
on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal
within which to perfect his appeal.

(3) The agency shall, upon perfection of the appeal, transmit the records of the case to the appellate agency.
Section 21. Effect of Appeal. - The appeal shall stay the decision appealed from unless otherwise provided by
law, or the appellate agency directs execution pending appeal, as it may deem just, considering the nature and
circumstances of the case.

Section 22. Action on Appeal. - The appellate agency shall review the records of the proceedings and may, on
its own initiative or upon motion, receive additional evidence.

Section 23. Finality of Decision of Appellate Agency. - In any contested case, the decision of the appellate
agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt by the parties of a copy thereof.

Section 24. Hearing Officers. -

(1) Each agency shall have such number of qualified and competent members of the base as hearing officers
as may be necessary for the hearing and adjudication of contested cases.

(2) No hearing officer shall engaged in the performance of prosecuting functions in any contested case or any
factually related case.

BOOK II

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

Section 13. Vacancy in Office of the President. - In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case
of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the
President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or
resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected
and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President

ARTICLE III

Bill of Rights

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
G.R. No. 159694 January 27, 2006
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v AZUCENA T. REYES

Under the present provisions of the Tax Code and pursuant to elementary due process, taxpayers must be
informed in writing of the law and the facts upon which a tax assessment is based; otherwise, the assessment
is void. Being invalid, the assessment cannot in turn be used as a basis for the perfection of a tax compromise.

The Facts

In 1993, Tancinco died, leaving a 1,292 square-meter residential lot and an old house thereon located at
Dasmariñas Village, Makati City.

"On the basis of a sworn information-for-reward filed in 97 by a certain Abad RDC 50 conducted an
investigation on the decedent’s estate. Subsequently, it issued a Return Verification Order. But without the
required preliminary findings being submitted, it issued Letter of Authority No. 132963 for the regular
investigation of the estate tax case. Azucena T. Reyes one of the decedent’s heirs, received the Letter of
Authority on March 14, 1997.

"On February 12, 1998, the Chief, Assessment Division, Bureau of Internal Revenue (or ‘BIR’), issued a
preliminary assessment notice against the estate in the amount of P14,580,618.67. On May 10, 1998, the heirs
of the decedent (or ‘heirs’) received a final estate tax assessment notice and a demand letter, both dated April
22, 1998, for the amount of P14,912,205.47, inclusive of surcharge and interest.

"During the pendency of the [P]etition for [R]eview with the CTA, however, the BIR issued Revenue Regulation
(or ‘RR’) No. 6-2000 and Revenue Memorandum Order (or ‘RMO’) No. 42-2000 offering certain taxpayers with
delinquent accounts and disputed assessments an opportunity to compromise their tax liability.

"On November 25, 2000, [Reyes] filed an application with the BIR for the compromise settlement (or
‘compromise’) of the assessment against the estate pursuant to Sec. 204(A) of the Tax Code, as implemented
by RR No. 6-2000 and RMO No. 42-2000.

Issues

1 whether the assessment against the estate is valid; and,

2 whether the compromise entered into is also valid.

Ruling
Petition is unmeritorious.

The second paragraph of Section 228 of the Tax Code12 is clear and mandatory. It provides as follows:
"The taxpayers shall be informed in writing of the law and the facts on which the assessment is made:
otherwise, the assessment shall be void."

In the present case, Reyes was not informed in writing of the law and the facts on which the assessment of estate taxes
had been made. She was merely notified of the findings by the CIR, who had simply relied upon the provisions of former
Section 229 prior to its amendment by Republic Act (RA) No. 8424, otherwise known as the Tax Reform Act of 1997.
First, RA 8424 has already amended the provision of Section 229 on protesting an assessment. The old
requirement of merely notifying the taxpayer of the CIR’s findings was changed in 1998 to informing the
taxpayer of not only the law, but also of the facts on which an assessment would be made; otherwise, the
assessment itself would be invalid.

It was on February 12, 1998, that a preliminary assessment notice was issued against the estate. On April 22,
1998, the final estate tax assessment notice, as well as demand letter, was also issued. During those dates, RA
8424 was already in effect. The notice required under the old law was no longer sufficient under the new law.

To be simply informed in writing of the investigation being conducted and of the recommendation for the
assessment of the estate taxes due is nothing but a perfunctory discharge of the tax function of correctly
assessing a taxpayer. The act cannot be taken to mean that Reyes already knew the law and the facts on
which the assessment was based. It does not at all conform to the compulsory requirement under Section 228.
Moreover, the Letter of Authority received by respondent on March 14, 1997 was for the sheer purpose of
investigation and was not even the requisite notice under the law.

The procedure for protesting an assessment under the Tax Code is found in Chapter III of Title VIII, which deals
with remedies. Being procedural in nature, can its provision then be applied retroactively? The answer is yes.

The general rule is that statutes are prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take
away vested rights, , it can surely be applied retroactively.

Moreover, an administrative rule interpretive of a statute, and not declarative of certain rights and corresponding
obligations, is given retroactive effect as of the date of the effectivity of the statute.17 RR 12-99 is one such rule. Being
interpretive of the provisions of the Tax Code, even if it was issued only on September 6, 1999, this regulation was to
retroact to January 1, 1998 -- a date prior to the issuance of the preliminary assessment notice and demand letter.

Third, neither Section 229 nor RR 12-85 can prevail over Section 228 of the Tax Code.

No doubt, Section 228 has replaced Section 229. The provision on protesting an assessment has been amended.
Furthermore, in case of discrepancy between the law as amended and its implementing but old regulation, the former
necessarily prevails.18 Thus, between Section 228 of the Tax Code and the pertinent provisions of RR 12-85, the latter
cannot stand because it cannot go beyond the provision of the law. The law must still be followed, even though the
existing tax regulation at that time provided for a different procedure. The regulation then simply provided that notice be
sent to the respondent in the form prescribed, and that no consequence would ensue for failure to comply with that
form.

Although taxes are the lifeblood of the government, their assessment and collection "should be made in accordance with
law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself."21

Second Issue:

Validity of Compromise
 It would be premature for this Court to declare that the compromise on the estate tax liability has been
perfected and consummated, considering the earlier determination that the assessment against the estate was
void. Nothing has been settled or finalized. Under Section 204(A) of the Tax Code, where the basic tax involved
exceeds one million pesos or the settlement offered is less than the prescribed minimum rates, the compromise
shall be subject to the approval of the NEB composed of the petitioner and four deputy commissioners.

Finally, as correctly held by the appellate court, this provision applies to all compromises, whether government-
initiated or not. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish.

Petition DENIED
G.R. No. 164790 August 29, 2008
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and LORELIE B. SOLIDUM, v GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS

AN ESTRANGED wife who was not dependent upon her deceased husband for support is not qualified to be his
beneficiary.

The Facts

Antonio de los Santos and respondent Gloria de los Santos, both Filipinos, were married in1964 . Less than one
(1) year after, Gloria left Antonio and contracted another marriage with Domingo Talens in Nueva Ecija. Sometime
in 1969, Gloria went back to Antonio and lived with him until 1983. They had three children: Alain Vincent, Arlene,
and Armine.

In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went to the United States (US). she filed for divorce in 1986 with the Superior
Court of Orange, Sta. Ana, California. On May 21, 1983, she executed a document waiving all her rights to their
conjugal properties and other matters. The divorce was granted on November 5, 1986.

On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in Camalig, Albay. Their union produced one child, May-
Ann N. de los Santos, born on May 15, 1989. On her part, Gloria married Larry Thomas Constant, an American
citizen, on July 11, 1987, in the US.

On May 15, 1989, Antonio amended his records at the Social Security System (SSS). He changed his
beneficiaries from Mrs. Margarita de los Santos to Cirila de los Santos; from Gloria de los Santos to May-Ann de
los Santos; and from Erlinda de los Santos to Armine de los Santos.

Antonio retired from his employment on March 1, 1996, and from then on began receiving monthly pension. He
died of respiratory failure on May 15, 1999. Upon his death, Cirila applied for and began receiving his SSS pension
benefit, beginning December 1999.

On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for Antonio’s death benefits with the SSS Cubao Branch. Her claim
was denied because she was not a qualified beneficiary of Antonio. The SSS letter of denial dated September 1,
2000 stated:

Issues

The controversy revolves on who between respondent Gloria, the first wife who divorced Antonio in the US, or
Cirila, the second wife, is his primary beneficiary entitled to claim death benefits from the SSS.

Our Ruling

SECTION 12-B. Retirement Benefits. – (a) A member who has paid at least one hundred twenty (120) monthly
contributions prior to the semester of retirement and who (1) has reached the age of sixty (60) years and is
already separated from employment or has ceased to be self-employed or (2) has reached the age of sixty-five
(65) years, shall be entitled for as long as he lives to the monthly pension; Provided, That he shall have the option
to receive his first eighteen (18) monthly pensions in lump sum discounted at a preferential rate of interest to be
determined by the SSS.

(e) Dependents – The dependents shall be the following:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed
and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or
while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.

As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce obtained by respondent against the deceased Antonio was not binding in
this jurisdiction. Under Philippine law, only aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.15 The divorce was obtained by respondent Gloria while she was still a Filipino citizen and thus covered by the
policy against absolute divorces. It did not sever her marriage ties with Antonio.

However, although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased,

the Court defined a dependent as "one who derives his or her main support from another. Meaning, relying on, or
subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will,
power, or aid of someone else." It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise defines a dependent spouse as "the
legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the member or pensioner." In that case, the Court found it obvious
that a wife who abandoned the family for more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with other men,
was not dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that entire period. Hence, the Court
denied her claim for death benefits.
G.R. No. 148600 July 7, 2009
ATTY. EMMANUEL PONTEJOS, v HON. ANIANO A DESIERTO and RESTITUTO AQUINO

On August 26, 1998, the HLURB, received a Notice of Appeal filed by Rasemco, Inc., represented by its
president Aquino, decided by Arbiter Emmanuel Pontejos. Rasemco, , asked for the nullification of all the
proceedings conducted before Arbiter Pontejos for alleged extortion, bribery and graft and corruption committed
by Pontejos in conspiracy with Director Wilfredo Imperial and Ms. Carmen Atos, both of HLURB and one
Roderick Ngo, officer of Hammercon, Inc. Attached to the Notice of Appeal were a photocopy of Aquino’s letter
to President Joseph Estrada dated August 12, 1998 and his complaint-affidavit. The complaint-affidavit imputed
to the named officer and employee of HLURB the following acts, viz:

1. Demanding and receiving monetary consideration in exchange for offers of assistance in securing a
favorable decision in a pending case;

2. Inaction of Director Imperial of complainant’s opposition to the issuance of license to sell in favor of
Rasemco, Inc., and subsequently, his issuance of said license despite his supposed knowledge about the
existence of legal defect or impediment in applicant’s title;

3. Arbiter Pontejos’ preparing and/or editing pleadings such as draft petition for review as well as other legal
documents such as affidavits and contracts for Rasemco; and

4. Arbiter Pontejos and Ms. Atos’ (para-legal staff of Arbiter Pontejos meeting and conferring with Aquino and his
lawyer, Atty. Venturanza, outside of office premises.

this prompted the HLURB to conduct an investigation despite the absence of a formal administrative complaint.
petitioner and Ms. Atos submitted separate explanations denying the allegations in the complaint and giving
their own version of the events.

On September 8, 1998, HLURB (CEO) and Commissioner Fabul issued an order creating a fact-finding
committee to investigate the background and circumstances of Mr. Aquino’s complaint

While the fact-finding committee of the HLURB was conducting their investigation, Mr. Aquino filed an
administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against the same persons on alleged conspiracy to
extort money form him under a promise that a favorable decision will be rendered in a case pending before
HLURB.

Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee of the HLURB proceeded with their own investigation, limiting their
inquiry into the administrative aspect of the complaint. On January 29, 1999, the committee submitted its report
on the investigation proposing among others to indorse the report to the Office for the Ombudsman for its
consideration.

Office of the Ombudsman declared respondent Emmanuel Pontejos guilty of Grave Misconduct, and the
penalty of dismissal from the service is hereby meted on him.

Issue: petitioner’s liability for grave misconduct and the propriety of the penalty of dismissal imposed
upon him.
Petitioner contends that he was denied of his right to due process when he was not able to confront Aquino
who failed to appear in two hearings. He further avers that Aquino’s absence in those hearings constitutes
failure to prosecute and a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case against him. Petitioner insists that
no substantial evidence existed to hold him liable for grave misconduct as the Ombudsman merely relied on
the affidavits of Carmencita Atos and respondent Aquino’s subordinates

Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice.
Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand.

In the instant case, petitioner had ample opportunity to ventilate his case. because he had received sufficient
information which, in fact, enabled him to prepare his defense. He submitted his counter-affidavit denying the
allegations in the complaint. He was also able to seek reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s Order placing him
under preventive suspension for six (6) months. Finally, he was able to appeal the Ombudsman’s ruling to the
CA. Clearly, petitioner had all the opportunity to be heard, present his case and submit evidence in his defense.

Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion
for reconsideration.

The absence of Aquino in two hearings is not a sufficient ground to say that due process was not afforded
petitioner. Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in courts of law. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of
the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of
the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon
the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

The provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of administrative bodies
exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of the administrative agency
concerned.

However, even if Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court is applied to the subject administrative proceedings, petitioner’s
argument on the matter of failure to prosecute still lacks merit. Section 3, Rule 17 provides for three instances where the
complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear during a scheduled trial, especially on the
date for the presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;
and (3) if he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court.
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether,
under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense
with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.121avvphi1

Aquino, who initiated the complaint against petitioner, has not shown culpable negligence that would warrant
the dismissal of his complaint. records show that Aquino appeared at the clarificatory hearing called by the
EPIB.13 He even brought to the attention of the proper authorities petitioner’s misconduct. Likewise, the CA
noted that respondent had not manifested a lack of interest to prosecute. Besides, in an administrative case,
the complainant, like Aquino, is a mere witness. No private interest is involved in an administrative case as
the offense is committed against the government.14

there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of administrative liability on the part of petitioner. It has
been substantially established that petitioner demanded and received the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱100,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of a case15 then pending in the HLURB where
petitioner was an Arbiter. The money was given in installments from January to March 1998.16 The statements
of witnesses Atos, Adel and Atty. Venturanza are clear, categorical and replete with the details establishing how
the offense was perpetrated by petitioner.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of evidence required is only substantial. The gauge of substantial
evidence is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that petitioner is guilty of misconduct, even if
the evidence might not be overwhelming.

Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Under the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules, grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal from
service.

non prosequitur. : a judgment entered against a plaintiff for failure to appear to prosecute a suit.
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, vs CHR

The case started with a "Demolition Notice," signed by Carlos Quimpo ( petitioner)sent to, and received by, the priva
respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice,
respondents were given a grace-period of 3 days to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.Prior to their re
of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be remo
to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-
complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter
be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own
ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private responden
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of finan
assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and
food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with th
warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest."6

ISSUES:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolish
by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.

RULING
The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and politic
rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as we
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of hu
rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to
victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-jud
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rig
But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quas
judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is
a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. Because they are inherent, human
rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion,
academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials
be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an
education, employment, and social services.

The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are
connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, e
protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a
person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rig
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishmen
administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general,
rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.34

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned
Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. such areas a
"(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trial
cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious."
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court
take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise
simply ignored. cannot conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the
private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights"
intended by the Constitution.

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdict
on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution wou
have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implicatio

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and
judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on beha
the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issu
the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the actio
pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. .
G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN
and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT, v
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION
AND DEPORTATION

A petition for Habeas Corpus.

Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, are both American nationals
residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna, while Adriaan Van Elshout, 58 years old, is a Dutch citizen also residing at
Pagsanjan, Laguna.

The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their respective residences
by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by
respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the
CID Detention Center.

Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three
months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two (2) days after apprehension, or on
29 February 1988, seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and
have left the country. One was released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a
pedophile but for working without a valid working visa. Thus, of the original twenty two (22), only the three
petitioners have chosen to face deportation.

Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child
prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also
posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes.

The "Operation Report," on Andrew Harvey and Richard Sherman dated 29 February 1988 stated:

ANDREW MARK HARVEY was found together with two young boys.
RICHARD SHERMAN was found with two naked boys inside his room.

In respect of Van Den Elshout the "After Mission Report," dated 27 February 1988 read in part:
There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which subject readily accepted having been in his care and live-in
for quite sometime.

On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens
under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Deportation Case No. 88-13). The "Charge Sheet"
read inter alia:

Wherefore, this Office charges the respondents for deportation, as undesirable aliens, in that: they, being
pedophiles, are inimical to public morals, public health and public safety as provided in Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code.

On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections
37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code On the same date,
the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners.
On 14 March 1988, petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that their health
was being seriously affected by their continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of
Commissioners for their provisional release, respondent ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners,
who certified that petitioners were healthy.

On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent denied considering the
certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. To avoid congestion, respondent ordered
petitioners' transfer to the CID detention cell at Fort Bonifacio, but the transfer was deferred pending trial
due to the difficulty of transporting them to and from the CID where trial was on-going.

On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to
a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the
custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country." On 7 April 1988, the Board of Special
Inquiry — III allowed provisional release of five (5) days only under certain conditions. However, it appears
that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had
already filed the present petition.

On 4 April 1988, as heretofore stated, petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A
Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20
April 1988. A Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor
General.

Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds:

1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain
petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative
investigation.

2) Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as
required by the said provision.

3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners
that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal
grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further allege that being a
pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.

We reject petitioners' contentions and uphold respondent's official acts ably defended by the Solicitor
General.
There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article
III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime
or not (Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid
search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has
been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the
warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in
pursuance thereof." (People vs. Syjuco 64 Phil. 667 [1937]; Alverez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 [1937]).

The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a
peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113,
Section 5).

In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for
three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those
articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12,
Rule 126,1985 Rules on criminal Procedure).

But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show
that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988.
Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March 1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code." A hearing is presently being conducted by a
Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has
served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L-39823, February 25,
1975, 62 SCRA 543). "were a person's detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to
criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition for hebeas corpus becomes moot and
academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 717). "It is a fumdamental rule that a writ
of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal, although such
confinement was illegal at the beginning" (Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 [1947]).

That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with
young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those
circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed
"pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children" in which children are the preferred
sexual object" While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public
morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral,
spiritual, and social well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution).

At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of
any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity (Callanta v. Villanueva, L-
24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, L-61770, January 31, 1983, 120
SCRA 525).
The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section
37(a) provides in part:

Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562).
The specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2 Constitutions, which are substantially Identical,
contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are
administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is
preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court
proceedings.

It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. The order of
deportation is not a punishment, (Maliler vs. Eby, 264 U.S., 32), it being merely the return to his country of
an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U.S. vs.
De los Santos, 33 Phil., 397). The deportation proceedings are administrative in character, (Kessler vs.
Stracker 307 U.S., 22) summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the
ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155). It is essential, however, that the warrant of
arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges against him, relating the facts relied upon.
(U.S. vs. Uhl 211 F., 628.) It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel,
if he so desires, before unprejudiced investigators (Strench vs. Pedaris, 55 F. [2d], 597; Ex parte Jew You
On, 16 F. [2d], 153). However, all the strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to
be observed; only such as are fumdamental and essential like the right of cross-examination. (U.S. vs.
Hughes, 104 F. [2d], 14; Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155.) Hearsay evidence may even be admitted,
provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell vs. Baker, 270 F., 577; Sercerchi vs.
Ward, 27 F. Supp., 437). (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]).

Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it
may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an
act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]). It is a
police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious
to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco et al., 16 Phil. 534
[1910]). Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the tight of
children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the
interests of the State.
G.R. No. 160922 February 27, 2006

JEANY-VI G. KIANI, v. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION (BID); EDGARDO CABRERA,
ELISEO EXCONDE and JOSE VALE, JR.,

in 2002, Javed Kiani, a British national reported to the Rodriguez, Rizal Police Station that his friends, Iqbal Singh
and Balbir Singh, had been forcibly taken by four (4) armed men from their residence at Balita, Rodriguez, Rizal.3 A
couple of days later, then Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)
issued an order wherein appropriate officers of the Bureau were directed to conduct verification/validation of the
admission status and activities of Javed Kiani, and, if found to have violated the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,
as amended, to immediately place him under arrest.

A week later, Javed Kiani was arrested . The arresting officers, relied on information from Iqbal and Balbir Singh, who pointed t
Javed Kiani as the one who had furnished them with fake Alien Certificate Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate
Registration (ICR). Apparently, the forms used were not official BID forms.6

the Board of Commissioners (BOC) conducted a summary proceeding and issued a Summary Deportation Order
revoking the visa issued to Javed Kiani.

The next day, July 2, 2002, Javed Kiani’s wife, Jeany-Vi, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus10 for and in
behalf of her husband before the RTC of Manila, naming the BID and its intelligence officers as Respondents. She
prayed that the court issue a writ of habeas corpus directing respondents to produce the person of Javed Kiani
before it "in the soonest time possible and to show the cause or legal justification for the latter’s detention and
imprisonment, if any; and for such other or further reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises."
She further alleged that her husband had intervened in the arrest of Iqbal and Balbir Singh, and that the arresting
officers resented such intervention. She insisted that the arrest and detention of her husband were bereft of factual
and legal basis, since at the time, no deportation order had yet been issued against him.

On July 18, 2002, the RTC issued an Order14 granting bail for Javed Kiani on a bond of ₱50,000.00, and ordered
respondent BID Intelligence Officers to file their return on the writ. The respondents complied, and alleged in their
return that Javed Kiani had already been charged before the BOC and ordered deported; hence, the petition had
become moot and academic. They refused to release Kiani although the bond had already been posted.15 Instead,
the respondents,, filed an Omnibus Motion16 for the reconsideration of the Order on the following grounds: (1) under
Section 37(9)(e) of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended, it is the Commissioner of Immigration, and not the court,
who has authority to grant bail in a deportation proceeding; (2) the court has no authority to grant the petition
considering that Javed Kiani was lawfully charged with violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, before the BSI; and (3) the BOC has subsequently issued a Summary Deportation Order.

Petitioner avers that the Mission Order issued by the Immigration Commissioner for the investigation and arrest of
her husband, Javed Kiani, is null and void. She points out that when said Order was issued, the BOC had not yet
made a determination as to the existence of a lawful ground for his deportation. She further avers that the
Immigration Commissioner has no power to issue a Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest solely for the purpose of
investigation, and before a final order for deportation is issued by the BOC. She insists that an order of arrest is
proper only if the BOC has already issued an Order of deportation.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: (1) whether petitioner engaged in forum shopping; and (2)
whether the CA erred in (a) holding that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC was not the proper
remedy of petitioner; (b) upholding the validity of the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC; and (c)
declaring that such Order had become final and executory.

On the first issue, we agree with the contention of the OSG that the petitioner indulged in forum shopping. Forum
shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition th
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.

On the merits of the petition, we find and so rule that the CA acted in accord with jurisprudence when it affirmed the assailed
Order of the RTC dismissing the Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot
take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of
error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The
writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances.

Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that
habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the
questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human
life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed.

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed; or if the

jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defec
in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly
issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged
before any court. The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.35

In this case, the petitioner did not file any motion with the BOC for reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Orde
or appeal therefrom; neither did she appeal to the Secretary of Justice or to the Office of the President or file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

We note that under Section 3, Rule XIII41 of the Rules of Procedure to Govern Deportation Proceedings, the decisio
G.R. No. 196870 June 26, 2012
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., v THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN

In resolving this controversy, the Court took into consideration that all the parties involved share common goals in
pursuit of certain primordial State policies and principles that are enshrined in the Constitution and pertinent laws,
such as the protection of the environment, the empowerment of the local government units, the promotion of
tourism, and the encouragement of the participation of the private sector. The Court seeks to reconcile the
respective roles, duties and responsibilities of the petitioner and respondents in achieving these shared goals
within the context of our Constitution, laws and regulations.

Nature of the Case

This is an original petition for the issuance of an Environmental Protection Order in the nature of a continuing
mandamus under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
promulgated on April 29, 2010.

The Parties

Petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (petitioner) is a duly registered, non-stock domestic corporation. Its primary
purpose is "to foster a united, concerted and environment-conscious development of Boracay Island, thereby
preserving and maintaining its culture, natural beauty and ecological balance, marking the island as the crown
jewel of Philippine tourism, a prime tourist destination in Asia and the whole world."1 It counts among its members
at least sixty (60) owners and representatives of resorts, hotels, restaurants, and similar institutions; at least five
community organizations; and several environmentally-conscious residents and advocates.2

Respondent Province of Aklan (respondent Province) is a political subdivision of the government created pursuant
to Republic Act No. 1414, represented by Honorable Carlito S. Marquez, the Provincial Governor (Governor
Marquez).

Respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (respondent PRA), formerly called the Public Estates Authority
(PEA), is a government entity created by Presidential Decree No. 1084,3 which states that one of the purposes for
which respondent PRA was created was to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas. PEA
eventually became the lead agency primarily responsible for all reclamation projects in the country under
Executive Order No. 525, series of 1979. In June 2006, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order
No. 543, delegating the power "to approve reclamation projects to PRA through its governing Board, subject to
compliance with existing laws and rules and further subject to the condition that reclamation contracts to be
executed with any person or entity (must) go through public bidding."4

Respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources – Environmental Management Bureau (DENR-EMB), Regional

Summary of Antecedent Facts

Boracay Island (Boracay), a tropical paradise located in the Western Visayas region of the Philippines and one of
the country’s most popular tourist destinations, was declared a tourist zone and marine reserve in 1973 under
Presidential Proclamation No. 1801.6 The island comprises the barangays of Manoc-manoc, Balabag, and Yapak,
all within the municipality of Malay, in the province of Aklan.7
Petitioner describes Boracay as follows:

Boracay is well-known for its distinctive powdery white-sand beaches which are the product of the unique ecosystem dynamic

More than a decade ago, respondent Province built the Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal at Barangay Caticlan to be th

In 2005, Boracay 2010 Summit was held and participated in by representatives from national government
agencies, local government units (LGUs), and the private sector. Petitioner was one of the organizers and
participants thereto. The Summit aimed "to re-establish a common vision of all stakeholders to ensure the
conservation, restoration, and preservation of Boracay Island" and "to develop an action plan that [would allow] all
sectors to work in concert among and with each other for the long term benefit and sustainability of the island and
the community."10 The Summit yielded a Terminal Report11 stating that the participants had shared their dream of
having world-class land, water and air infrastructure, as well as given their observations that government support
was lacking, infrastructure was poor, and, more importantly, the influx of tourists to Boracay was increasing. The
Report showed that there was a need to expand the port facilities at Caticlan due to congestion in the holding
area of the existing port, caused by inadequate facilities, thus tourists suffered long queues while waiting for the
boat ride going to the island.12

Respondent Province claimed that tourist arrivals to Boracay reached approximately 649,559 in 2009 and 779,666 in 2010, and

The Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, Malay Municipality, issued Resolution No. 13, s. 200814 on April 25, 2008
stating that it had learned that respondent Province had filed an application with the DENR for a foreshore lease
of areas along the shorelines of Barangay Caticlan, and manifesting its strong opposition to said application, as
the proposed foreshore lease practically covered almost all the coastlines of said barangay, thereby technically
diminishing its territorial jurisdiction, once granted, and depriving its constituents of their statutory right of
preference in the development and utilization of the natural resources within its jurisdiction. The resolution further
stated that respondent Province did not conduct any consultations with the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan
regarding the proposed foreshore lease, which failure the Sanggunian considered as an act of bad faith on the
part of respondent Province.15

On November 20, 2008, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent Province approved Resolution No. 2008-
369,16 formally authorizing Governor Marquez to enter into negotiations towards the possibility of effecting self-
liquidating and income-producing development and livelihood projects to be financed through bonds, debentures,
securities, collaterals, notes or other obligations as provided under Section 299 of the Local Government Code,
with the following priority projects: (a) renovation/rehabilitation of the Caticlan/Cagban Passenger Terminal
Buildings and Jetty Ports; and (b) reclamation of a portion of Caticlan foreshore for commercial purposes.17 This
step was taken as respondent Province’s existing jetty port and passenger terminal was funded through bond
flotation, which was successfully redeemed and paid ahead of the target date. This was allegedly cited as one of
the LGU’s Best Practices wherein respondent Province was given the appropriate commendation.18

Respondent Province included the proposed expansion of the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan in its 2009
Annual Investment Plan,19 envisioned as its project site the area adjacent to the existing jetty port, and identified
additional areas along the coastline of Barangay Caticlan as the site for future project expansion.20

Governor Marquez sent a letter to respondent PRA on March 12, 200921 expressing the interest of respondent Province to rec
Sometime in April 2009, respondent Province entered into an agreement with the Financial Advisor/Consultant that won in the

Subsequently, on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent Province issued Resolution No. 2009–110,23 whic

Sometime in July 2009, the Financial Advisor/Consultant came up with a feasibility study which focused on the land reclamatio

Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay expressed its strong opposition to the intended
foreshore lease application, through Resolution No. 044,25 approved on July 22, 2009, manifesting therein that
respondent Province’s foreshore lease application was for business enterprise purposes for its benefit, at the
expense of the local government of Malay, which by statutory provisions was the rightful entity "to develop, utilize
and reap benefits from the natural resources found within its jurisdiction."26

In August 2009, a Preliminary Geohazard Assessment27 for the enhancement/expansion of the existing Caticlan Jetty Port and

Thereafter, Governor Marquez submitted an Environmental Performance Report and Monitoring Program
(EPRMP)28 to DENR-EMB RVI, which he had attached to his letter29 dated September 19, 2009, as an initial step
for securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). The letter reads in part:

With the project expected to start its construction implementation next month, the province hereby assures your good office t

Respondent Province was then authorized to issue "Caticlan Super Marina Bonds" for the purpose of funding the renovation o

Subsequently, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Aklan issued Provincial Ordinance No. 2009-
01532 on October 1, 2009, amending Provincial Ordinance No. 2009-013, authorizing the bond flotation of the
Province of Aklan through Governor Marquez to fund the Marina Project and appropriate the entire proceeds of
said bonds for the project, and further authorizing Governor Marquez to negotiate, sign and execute contracts or
agreements pertinent to the transaction.33

Within the same month of October 2009, respondent Province deliberated on the possible expansion from its original propose

In his letter dated October 22, 2009 addressed to respondent PRA, Governor Marquez wrote:

With our substantial compliance with the requirements under Administrative Order No. 2007-2 relative to our
request to PRA for approval of the reclamation of the [proposed Beach Zone Restoration and Protection Marine
Development in Barangays Caticlan and Manoc-Manoc] and as a result of our discussion during the [meeting with
the respondent PRA on October 12, 2009], may we respectfully submit a revised Reclamation Project Description
embodying certain revisions/changes in the size and location of the areas to be reclaimed. x x x.

On another note, we are pleased to inform your Office that the bond flotation we have secured with the Local
Government Unit Guarantee Corporation (LGUGC) has been finally approved last October 14, 2009. This will
pave the way for the implementation of said project. Briefly, the Province has been recognized by the Bureau of
Local Government Finance (BLGF) for its capability to meet its loan obligations. x x x.
With the continued increase of tourists coming to Boracay through Caticlan, the Province is venturing into such
development project with the end in view of protection and/or restoring certain segments of the shoreline in
Barangays Caticlan (Caticlan side) and Manoc-manoc (Boracay side) which, as reported by experts, has been
experiencing tremendous coastal erosion.

For the project to be self-liquidating, however, we will be developing the reclaimed land for commercial and tourism-related fa

Then, on November 19, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan enacted Resolution No. 2009-29936 authorizing
Governor Marquez to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with respondent PRA in the implementation
of the Beach Zone Restoration and Protection Marina Development Project, which shall reclaim a total of 40
hectares in the areas adjacent to the jetty ports at Barangay Caticlan and Barangay Manoc-manoc. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved the terms and conditions of the necessary agreements for the
implementation of the bond flotation of respondent Province to fund the renovation/rehabilitation of the existing
jetty port by way of enhancement and recovery of the Old Caticlan shoreline through reclamation of an area of
2.64 hectares in the amount of ₱260,000,000.00 on December 1, 2009.37

Respondent Province gave an initial presentation of the project with consultation to the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay38 on Dec

Respondent PRA approved the reclamation project on April 20, 2010 in its Resolution No. 4094 and authorized its General Man

On April 27, 2010, DENR-EMB RVI issued to respondent Province ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of th

On May 17, 2010, respondent Province entered into a MOA41 with respondent PRA. Under Article III, the Project was describe

The proposed Aklan Beach Zone Restoration and Protection Marina Development Project involves the
reclamation and development of approximately forty (40) hectares of foreshore and offshore areas of the
Municipality of Malay x x x.

The land use development of the reclamation project shall be for commercial, recreational and institutional and other applicab

It was at this point that respondent Province deemed it necessary to conduct a series of what it calls "information-education ca

a. June 17, 2010 at Casa Pilar Beach Resort, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan;44

b. July 28, 2010 at Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal;45

c. July 31, 2010 at Barangay Caticlan Plaza;46

d. September 15, 2010 at the Office of the Provincial Governor with Municipal Mayor of Malay – Mayor John P. Yap;47

e. October 12, 2010 at the Office of the Provincial Governor with the Provincial Development Council Executive Committee;48

f. October 29, 2010 at the Office of the Provincial Governor with Officials of LGU-Malay and Petitioner.49

Petitioner claims that during the "public consultation meeting" belatedly called by respondent Province on June 17, 2010, resp

In Resolution No. 046, Series of 2010, adopted on June 23, 2010, the Malay Municipality reiterated its strong opposition to resp
The Malay Municipality subsequently issued Resolution No. 016, Series of 2010, adopted on August 3, 2010, to request respon

In a letter53 dated October 12, 2010, petitioner informed respondent PRA of its opposition to the reclamation project, primari

Petitioner likewise transmitted its Resolution No. 001, Series of 2010, registering its opposition to the reclamation project to re

Petitioner alleges that despite the Malay Municipality’s denial of respondent Province’s request for a favorable endorsement, a

On July 26, 2010, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent Province set aside Resolution No. 046, s. 2010, of the Municipa

On July 27, 2010, the MOA was confirmed by respondent PRA Board of Directors under its Resolution No. 4130. Respondent PR

Petitioner likewise received a copy of respondent PRA’s letter dated October 19, 2010, which authorized
respondent Province to proceed with phase 1 of the reclamation project, subject to compliance with the
requirements of its Evaluation Report. The reclamation project was described as:

"[A] seafront development involving reclamation of an aggregate area of more or less, forty (40) hectares in two (2) separate si

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan, through Resolution No. 2010-034,59 addressed the apprehensions of petitioner embo

In the meantime, a study was commissioned by the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry-Boracay (PCCI-Boracay), fun

After noting the objections of the respective LGUs of Caticlan and Malay, as well as the apprehensions of petitioner, responden

On April 4, 2011, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan, through its Committee on Cooperatives, Food,
Agriculture, and Environmental Protection and the Committee on Tourism, Trade, Industry and Commerce,
conducted a joint committee hearing wherein the study undertaken by the MERF-UPMSI was discussed.62 In
attendance were Mr. Ariel Abriam, President of PCCI-Boracay, representatives from the Provincial Government,
and Dr. Cesar Villanoy, a professor from the UPMSI. Dr. Villanoy said that the subject project, consisting of 2.64
hectares, would only have insignificant effect on the hydrodynamics of the strait traversing the coastline of
Barangay Caticlan and Boracay, hence, there was a distant possibility that it would affect the Boracay coastline,
which includes the famous white-sand beach of the island.63

Thus, on April 6, 2011, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan enacted Resolution No. 2011-06564 noting the report on the su

During the First Quarter Regular Meeting of the Regional Development Council, Region VI (RDC-VI) on April 16, 2011, it approv

Subsequently, Mr. Abriam sent a letter to Governor Marquez dated April 25, 2011 stating that the study conducted by the UPM

On June 1, 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Ma

After receiving a copy of the TEPO on June 9, 2011, respondent Province immediately issued an order to the
Provincial Engineering Office and the concerned contractor to cease and desist from conducting any construction
activities until further orders from this Court.

The petition is premised on the following grounds:

 I.

The respondent Province, proponent of the reclamation project, failed to comply with relevant rules and
regulations in the acquisition of an ECC.

A. The reclamation project is co-located within environmentally critical areas requiring the performance of a full, or
programmatic, environmental impact assessment.

B. Respondent Province failed to obtain the favorable endorsement of the LGU concerned.

C. Respondent Province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as required by the Local
Government Code.

D. Respondent Province failed to perform a full environmental impact assessment as required by law and relevant
regulations.

II.

The reclamation of land bordering the strait between Caticlan and Boracay shall adversely affect the frail ecological balance of

Petitioner objects to respondent Province’s classification of the reclamation project as single instead of co-
located, as "non-environmentally critical," and as a mere "rehabilitation" of the existing jetty port. Petitioner points
out that the reclamation project is on two sites (which are situated on the opposite sides of Tabon Strait, about
1,200 meters apart):

36.82 hectares – Site 1, in Bgy. Caticlan

3.18 hectares – Site 2, in Manoc-manoc, Boracay Island69

Phase 1, which was started in December 2010 without the necessary permits,70 is located on the Caticlan side of
a narrow strait separating mainland Aklan from Boracay. In the implementation of the project, respondent
Province obtained only an ECC to conduct Phase 1, instead of an ECC on the entire 40 hectares. Thus, petitioner
argues that respondent Province abused and exploited the Revised Procedural Manual for DENR Administrative
Order No. 30, Series of 2003 (DENR DAO 2003-30)71 relating to the acquisition of an ECC by:

1. Declaring the reclamation project under "Group II Projects-Non-ECP (environmentally critical project) in ECA
(environmentally critical area) based on the type and size of the area," and

2. Failing to declare the reclamation project as a co-located project application which would have required the
Province to submit a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS)72 or Programmatic Environmental
[Performance] Report Management Plan (PE[P]RMP).73 (Emphases ours.)

Petitioner further alleges that the Revised Procedural Manual (on which the classification above is based, which
merely requires an Environmental Impact Statement [EIS] for Group II projects) is patently ultra vires, and
respondent DENR-EMB RVI committed grave abuse of discretion because the laws on EIS, namely, Presidential
Decree Nos. 1151 and 1586, as well as Presidential Proclamation No. 2146, clearly indicate that projects in
environmentally critical areas are to be immediately considered environmentally critical. Petitioner complains that
respondent Province applied for an ECC only for Phase 1; hence, unlawfully
evading the requirement that co-located projects74 within Environmentally Critical Areas (ECAs) must submit a PEIS and/or a P

Petitioner argues that respondent Province fraudulently classified and misrepresented the project as a Non-ECP
in an ECA, and as a single project instead of a co-located one. The impact assessment allegedly performed gives
a patently erroneous and wrongly-premised appraisal of the possible environmental impact of the reclamation
project. Petitioner contends that respondent Province’s choice of classification was designed to avoid a
comprehensive impact assessment of the reclamation project.

Petitioner further contends that respondent DENR-EMB RVI willfully and deliberately disregarded its duty to
ensure that the environment is protected from harmful developmental projects because it allegedly performed
only a cursory and superficial review of the documents submitted by the respondent Province for an ECC, failing
to note that all the information and data used by respondent Province in its application for the ECC were all dated
and not current, as data was gathered in the late 1990s for the ECC issued in 1999 for the first jetty port. Thus,
petitioner alleges that respondent DENR-EMB RVI ignored the environmental impact to Boracay, which involves
changes in the structure of the coastline that could contribute to the changes in the characteristics of the sand in
the beaches of both Caticlan and Boracay.

Petitioner insists that reclamation of land at the Caticlan side will unavoidably adversely affect the Boracay side
and notes that the declared objective of the reclamation project is for the exploitation of Boracay’s tourist trade,
since the project is intended to enhance support services thereto. But, petitioner argues, the primary reason for
Boracay’s popularity is its white-sand beaches which will be negatively affected by the project.

Petitioner alleges that respondent PRA had required respondent Province to obtain the favorable endorsement of
the LGUs of Barangay Caticlan and Malay Municipality pursuant to the consultation procedures as required by the
Local Government Code.75 Petitioner asserts that the reclamation project is in violation not only of laws on EIS but
also of the Local Government Code as respondent Province failed to enter into proper consultations with the
concerned LGUs. In fact, the Liga ng mga Barangay-Malay Chapter also expressed strong opposition against the
project.76

Petitioner cites Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code, which require consultations if the project or
program may cause pollution, climactic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, etc. According to
petitioner, respondent Province ignored the LGUs’ opposition expressed as early as 2008. Not only that,
respondent Province belatedly called for public "consultation meetings" on June 17 and July 28, 2010, after an
ECC had already been issued and the MOA between respondents PRA and Province had already been executed.
As the petitioner saw it, these were not consultations but mere "project presentations."

Petitioner claims that respondent Province, aided and abetted by respondents PRA and DENR-EMB, ignored the
spirit and letter of the Revised Procedural Manual, intended to implement the various regulations governing the
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) to ensure that developmental projects are in line with sustainable
development of natural resources. The project was conceptualized without considering alternatives.

Further, as to its allegation that respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA, petitioner argues that while it is
true that as of now, only the Caticlan side has been issued an ECC, the entire project involves the Boracay side,
which should have been considered a co-located project. Petitioner claims that any project involving Boracay
requires a full EIA since it is an ECA. Phase 1 of the project will affect Boracay and Caticlan as they are
separated only by a narrow strait; thus, it should be considered an ECP. Therefore, the ECC and permit issued
must be invalidated and cancelled.
Petitioner contends that a study shows that the flow of the water through a narrower channel due to the reclamation project w

Regarding its claim that the reclamation of land bordering the strait between Caticlan and Boracay shall adversely
affect the frail ecological balance of the area, petitioner submits that while the study conducted by the MERF-
UPMSI only considers the impact of the reclamation project on the land, it is undeniable that it will also adversely
affect the already frail ecological balance of the area. The effect of the project would have been properly
assessed if the proper EIA had been performed prior to any implementation of the project.

According to petitioner, respondent Province’s intended purposes do not prevail over its duty and obligation to
protect the environment. Petitioner believes that rehabilitation of the Jetty Port may be done through other means.

In its Comment78 dated June 21, 2011, respondent Province claimed that application for reclamation of 40
hectares is advantageous to the Provincial Government considering that its filing fee would only cost
Php20,000.00 plus Value Added Tax (VAT) which is also the minimum fee as prescribed under Section 4.2 of
Administrative Order No. 2007-2.79

Respondent Province considers the instant petition to be premature; thus, it must necessarily fail for lack of cause
of action due to the failure of petitioner to fully exhaust the available administrative remedies even before seeking
judicial relief. According to respondent Province, the petition primarily assailed the decision of respondent DENR-
EMB RVI in granting the ECC for the subject project consisting of 2.64 hectares and sought the cancellation of
the ECC for alleged failure of respondent Province to submit proper documentation as required for its issuance.
Hence, the grounds relied upon by petitioner can be addressed within the confines of administrative processes
provided by law.

Respondent Province believes that under Section 5.4.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 (DAO 2003-
30),80 the issuance of an ECC81 is an official decision of DENR-EMB RVI on the application of a project
proponent.82 It cites Section 6 of DENR DAO 2003-30, which provides for a remedy available to the party
aggrieved by the final decision on the proponent’s ECC applications.

Respondent Province argues that the instant petition is anchored on a wrong premise that results to petitioner’s unfounded fe

Respondent Province clearly does not dispute the fact that it revised its original application to respondent PRA from 2.64 hecta

Respondent Province goes on to claim that "[p]etitioner’s version of the Caticlan jetty port expansion project is a bigger projec

Respondent Province says that the Accomplishment Report86 of its Engineering Office would attest that the actual project con

Thus, respondent Province alleges that from its standpoint, its capability to reclaim is limited to 2.64 hectares
only, based on respondent PRA’s Evaluation Report87 dated October 18, 2010, which was in turn the basis of the
issuance of the Notice to Proceed dated October 19, 2010, because the project’s financial component is
₱260,000,000.00 only. Said Evaluation Report indicates that the implementation of the other phases of the project
including site 2, which consists of the other portions of the 40-hectare area that includes a portion in Boracay, is
still within the 10-year period and will depend largely on the availability of funds of respondent Province.88

So, even if respondent PRA approved an area that would total up to 40 hectares, it was divided into phases in order to determi
As far as respondent Province understands it, additional reclamations not covered by the ECC, which only approved 2.64 hecta

Respondent Province admits that it dreamt of a 40-hectare project, even if it had originally planned and was at present only fin

Respondent Province claims that it has complied with all the necessary requirements for securing an ECC. On
the issue that the reclamation project is within an ECA requiring the performance of a full or programmatic EIA,
respondent Province reiterates that the idea of expanding the area to 40 hectares is only a future plan. It only
secured an ECC for 2.64 hectares, based on the limits of its funding and authority. From the beginning, its
intention was to rehabilitate and expand the existing jetty port terminal to accommodate an increasing projected
traffic. The subject project is specifically classified under DENR DAO 2003-30 on its Project Grouping Matrix for
Determination of EIA Report Type considered as Minor Reclamation Projects falling under Group II – Non ECP in
an ECA. Whether 2.64 or 40 hectares in area, the subject project falls within this classification.

Consequently, respondent Province claims that petitioner erred in considering the ongoing reclamation project at
Caticlan, Malay, Aklan, as co-located within an ECA.

Respondent Province, likewise argues that the 2.64-hectare project is not a component of the approved 40-
hectare area as it is originally planned for the expansion site of the existing Caticlan jetty port. At present, it has
no definite conceptual construction plan of the said portion in Boracay and it has no financial allocation to initiate
any project on the said Boracay portion.

Furthermore, respondent Province contends that the present project is located in Caticlan while the alleged
component that falls within an ECA is in Boracay. Considering its geographical location, the two sites cannot be
considered as a contiguous area for the reason that it is separated by a body of water – a strait that traverses
between the mainland Panay wherein Caticlan is located and Boracay. Hence, it is erroneous to consider the two
sites as a co-located project within an ECA. Being a "stand alone project" and an expansion of the existing jetty
port, respondent DENR-EMB RVI had required respondent Province to perform an EPRMP to secure an ECC as
sanctioned by Item No. 8(b), page 7 of DENR DAO 2003-30.

Respondent Province contends that even if, granting for the sake of argument, it had erroneously categorized its
project as Non-ECP in an ECA, this was not a final determination. Respondent DENR-EMB RVI, which was the
administrator of the EIS system, had the final decision on this matter. Under DENR DAO 2003-30, an application
for ECC, even for a Category B2 project where an EPRMP is conducted, shall be subjected to a review process.
Respondent DENR-EMB RVI had the authority to deny said application. Its Regional Director could either issue
an ECC for the project or deny the application. He may also require a more comprehensive EIA study. The
Regional Director issued the ECC based on the EPRMP submitted by respondent Province and after the same
went through the EIA review process.

Thus, respondent Province concludes that petitioner’s allegation of this being a "co-located project" is premature
if not baseless as the bigger reclamation project is still on the conceptualization stage. Both respondents PRA and
Province are yet to complete studies and feasibility studies to embark on another project.

Respondent Province claims that an ocular survey of the reclamation project revealed that it had worked within the limits of th
With regard to petitioner’s allegation that respondent Province failed to get the favorable endorsement of the
concerned LGUs in violation of the Local Government Code, respondent Province contends that consultation vis-
à-vis the favorable endorsement from the concerned LGUs as contemplated under the Local Government Code
are merely tools to seek advice and not a power clothed upon the LGUs to unilaterally approve or disapprove any
government projects. Furthermore, such endorsement is not necessary for projects falling under Category B2
unless required by the DENR-EMB RVI, under Section 5.3 of DENR DAO 2003-30.

Moreover, DENR Memorandum Circular No. 08-2007 no longer requires the issuance of permits and certifications as a pre-requ

Respondent Province posits that the spirit and intent of Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code is to
create an avenue for parties, the proponent and the LGU concerned, to come up with a tool in harmonizing its
views and concerns about the project. The duty to consult does not automatically require adherence to the
opinions during the consultation process. It is allegedly not within the provisions to give the full authority to the
LGU concerned to unilaterally approve or disapprove the project in the guise of requiring the proponent of
securing its favorable endorsement. In this case, petitioner is calling a halt to the project without providing an
alternative resolution to harmonize its position and that of respondent Province.

Respondent Province claims that the EPRMP94 would reveal that:

[T]he area fronting the project site is practically composed of sand. Dead coral communities may be found along
the vicinity. Thus, fish life at the project site is quite scarce due to the absence of marine support systems like the
sea grass beds and coral reefs.

x x x [T]here is no coral cover at the existing Caticlan jetty port. [From] the deepest point of jetty to the shallowest
point, there was no more coral patch and the substrate is sandy. It is of public knowledge that the said foreshore
area is being utilized by the residents ever since as berthing or anchorage site of their motorized banca. There
will be no possibility of any coral development therein because of its continuous utilization. Likewise, the activity of
the strait that traverses between the main land Caticlan and Boracay Island would also be a factor of the coral
development. Corals [may] only be formed within the area if there is scientific human intervention, which is absent
up to the present.

In light of the foregoing premise, it casts serious doubt on petitioner’s allegations pertaining to the environmental effects of Re

Respondent Province prayed for the dissolution of the TEPO, claiming that the rules provide that the TEPO may
be dissolved if it appears after hearing that its issuance or continuance would cause irreparable damage to the
party or person enjoined, while the applicant may be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer and
subject to the posting of a sufficient bond by the party or person enjoined. Respondent Province contends that the
TEPO would cause irreparable damage in two aspects:

a. Financial dislocation and probable bankruptcy; and

b. Grave and imminent danger to safety and health of inhabitants of immediate area, including tourists and
passengers serviced by the jetty port, brought about by the abrupt cessation of development works.

As regards financial dislocation, the arguments of respondent Province are summarized below:

1. This project is financed by bonds which the respondent Province had issued to its creditors as the financing
scheme in funding the present project is by way of credit financing through bond flotation.
2. The funds are financed by a Guarantee Bank – getting payment from bonds, being sold to investors, which in
turn would be paid by the income that the project would realize or incur upon its completion.

3. While the project is under construction, respondent Province is appropriating a portion of its Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) budget from the 20% development fund to defray the interest and principal amortization due to
the Guarantee Bank.

4. The respondent Province’s IRA, regular income, and/or such other revenues or funds, as may be permitted by
law, are being used as security for the payment of the said loan used for the project’s construction.

5. The inability of the subject project to earn revenues as projected upon completion will compel the Province to
shoulder the full amount of the obligation, starting from year 2012.

6. Respondent province is mandated to assign its IRA, regular income and/or such other revenues or funds as permitted by law

As to the second ground for the dissolution of the TEPO, respondent Province argues:

1. Non-compliance with the guidelines of the ECC may result to environmental hazards most especially that
reclaimed land if not properly secured may be eroded into the sea.

2. The construction has accomplished 65.26 percent of the project. The embankment that was deposited on the
project has no proper concrete wave protection that might be washed out in the event that a strong typhoon or big
waves may occur affecting the strait and the properties along the project site. It is already the rainy season and
there is a big possibility of typhoon occurrence.

3. If said incident occurs, the aggregates of the embankment that had been washed out might be transferred to
the adjoining properties which could affect its natural environmental state.

4. It might result to the total alteration of the physical landscape of the area attributing to environmental
disturbance.

5. The lack of proper concrete wave protection or revetment would cause the total erosion of the embankment that has been d

Respondent Province claims that petitioner will not stand to suffer immediate, grave and irreparable injury or
damage from the ongoing project. The petitioner’s perceived fear of environmental destruction brought about by
its erroneous appreciation of available data is unfounded and does not translate into a matter of extreme urgency.
Thus, under the Rules of Procedure on Environmental Cases, the TEPO may be dissolved.

Respondent PRA filed its Comment98 on June 22, 2011. It alleges that on June 24, 2006, Executive Order No. 543 delegated th

Section 4 of respondent PRA’s Administrative Order No. 2007-2 provides for the approval process and procedures for various re

Respondent PRA contends that it was only after respondent Province had complied with the requirements under the law that r

The issue for respondent PRA was whether or not it approved the respondent Province’s 2.64-hectare reclamation project prop

Respondent PRA claims that its approval of the Aklan Reclamation Project was in accordance with law and its rules. Indeed, it i

One of the conditions that respondent PRA Board imposed before approving the Aklan project was that no reclamation work c
(a) Land-form plan with technical description of the metes and bounds of the same land-form;

(b) Final master development and land use plan for the project;

(c) Detailed engineering studies, detailed engineering design, plans and specification for reclamation works,
reclamation plans and methodology, plans for the sources of fill materials;

(d) Drainage plan vis-a-vis the land-form approved by DPWH Regional Office to include a cost effective and
efficient drainage system as may be required based on the results of the studies;

(e) Detailed project cost estimates and quantity take-off per items of work of the rawland reclamation
components, e.g. reclamation containment structures and soil consolidation;

(f) Organizational chart of the construction arm, manning table, equipment schedule for the project; and,

(g) Project timetable (PERT/CPM) for the entire project construction period.104

In fact, respondent PRA further required respondent Province under Article IV (B)(24) of the MOA to strictly comply with all co

In its August 11, 2010 letter,106 respondent PRA referred for respondent Province’s appropriate action petitioner’s
Resolution 001, series of 2010 and Resolution 46, series of 2010, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay. Governor
Marquez wrote respondent PRA107 on September 16, 2010 informing it that respondent Province had already met
with the different officials of Malay, furnishing respondent PRA with the copies of the minutes of such
meetings/presentations. Governor Marquez also assured respondent PRA that it had complied with the
consultation requirements as far as Malay was concerned.

Respondent PRA claims that in evaluating respondent Province’s project and in issuing the necessary NTP for Phase 1 of Site 1

Respondent PRA alleges that prior to the issuance of the NTP to respondent Province for Phase 1 of Site 1, it
required the submission of the following pre-construction documents:

(a) Land-Form Plan (with technical description);

(b) Site Development Plan/Land Use Plan including,

(i) sewer and drainage systems and

(ii) waste water treatment;

(c) Engineering Studies and Engineering Design;

(d) Reclamation Methodology;

(e) Sources of Fill Materials, and,

(f) The ECC.109

Respondent PRA claims that it was only after the evaluation of the above submissions that it issued to respondent Province the
Respondent PRA, being the national government’s arm in regulating and coordinating all reclamation projects in the Philippine

In its Comment112 dated July 1, 2011, respondent DENR-EMB RVI asserts that its act of issuing the ECC certifies
that the project had undergone the proper EIA process by assessing, among others, the direct and indirect impact
of the project on the biophysical and human environment and ensuring that these impacts are addressed by
appropriate environmental protection and enhancement measures, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586, the
Revised Procedural Manual for DENR DAO 2003-30, and the existing rules and regulations.113

Respondent DENR-EMB RVI stresses that the declaration in 1978 of several islands, which includes Boracay as tourist zone and

Respondent DENR-EMB RVI claims that the issues raised by the LGUs of Caticlan and Malay had been
considered by the DENR-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), Aklan in the issuance
of the Order115 dated January 26, 2010, disregarding the claim of the Municipality of Malay, Aklan of a portion of
the foreshore land in Caticlan covered by the application of the Province of Aklan; and another Order of Rejection
dated February 5, 2010 of the two foreshore applications, namely FLA No. 060412-43A and FLA No. 060412-43B,
of the Province of Aklan.116

Respondent DENR-EMB RVI contends that the supporting documents attached to the EPRMP for the issuance of an ECC were m

Although petitioner insists that the project involves 40 hectares in two sites, respondent DENR-EMB RVI looked at the docume

Respondent DENR-EMB RVI admits that as regards the classification of the 2.64-hectare reclamation project under "Non ECP in

Respondent Province submitted to respondent DENR-EMB RVI the following documents contained in the
EPRMP:

a. The Observations on the Floor Bottom and its Marine Resources at the Proposed Jetty Ports at Caticlan and
Manok-manok, Boracay, Aklan, conducted in 1999 by the Bureau of Fisheries Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Central
Office, particularly in Caticlan site, and

b. The Study conducted by Dr. Ricarte S. Javelosa, Ph. D, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Central Office
and Engr. Roger Esto, Provincial Planning and Development Office (PPDO), Aklan in 2009 entitled "Preliminary
Geo-hazard Assessment for the Enhancement of the Existing Caticlan Jetty Port Terminal through Beach Zone
Restoration and Protective Marina Development in Malay, Aklan."

Respondent DENR-EMB RVI claims that the above two scientific studies were enough for it to arrive at a best
professional judgment to issue an amended ECC for the Aklan Marina Project covering 2.64
hectares.120 Furthermore, to confirm that the 2.64-hectare reclamation has no significant negative impact with the
surrounding environment particularly in Boracay, a more recent study was conducted, and respondent DENR-
EMB RVI alleges that "[i]t is very important to highlight that the input data in the [MERF- UPMSI] study utilized the
[40-hectare] reclamation and [200-meter] width seaward using the tidal and wave modelling."121 The study showed
that the reclamation of 2.64 hectares had no effect to the hydrodynamics of the strait between Barangay Caticlan
and Boracay.

Respondent DENR-EMB RVI affirms that no permits and/or clearances from National Government Agencies (NGAs) and LGUs a
Respondent DENR-EMB RVI concludes that in filing this case, petitioner had bypassed and deprived the DENR Secretary of the

After receiving the above Comments from all the respondents, the Court set the case for oral arguments on
September 13, 2011.

Meanwhile, on September 8, 2011, respondent Province filed a Manifestation and Motion124 praying for the
dismissal of the petition, as the province was no longer pursuing the implementation of the succeeding phases of
the project due to its inability to comply with Article IV B.2(3) of the MOA; hence, the issues and fears expressed
by petitioner had become moot. Respondent Province alleges that the petition is "premised on a serious
misappreciation of the real extent of the contested reclamation project" as certainly the ECC covered only a total
of 2,691 square meters located in Barangay Caticlan, Malay, Aklan; and although the MOA spoke of 40 hectares,
respondent Province’s submission of documents to respondent PRA pertaining to said area was but the first of a
two-step process of approval. Respondent Province claims that its failure to comply with the documentary
requirements of respondent PRA within the period provided, or 120 working days from the effectivity of the MOA,
indicated its waiver to pursue the remainder of the project.125 Respondent Province further manifested:

Confirming this in a letter dated 12 August 2011,126 Governor Marquez informed respondent PRA that the Province of Aklan is

In his reply-letter dated August 22, 2011,127 [respondent] PRA General Manager informed Governor Marquez that the [respon

It is undisputed from the start that the coverage of the Project is in fact limited to 2.64 hectares, as evidenced by the NTP issue

Based on the above contentions, respondent Province prays that the petition be dismissed as no further justiciable controversy

The Court heard the parties’ oral arguments on September 13, 2011 and gave the latter twenty (20) days
thereafter to file their respective memoranda.

Respondent Province filed another Manifestation and Motion,130 which the Court received on April 2, 2012 stating that:

1. it had submitted the required documents and studies to respondent DENR-EMB RVI before an ECC was
issued in its favor;

2. it had substantially complied with the requirements provided under PRA Administrative Order 2007-2, which
compliance caused respondent PRA’s Board to approve the reclamation project; and

3. it had conducted a series of "consultative [presentations]" relative to the reclamation project before the LGU of
Malay Municipality, the Barangay Officials of Caticlan, and stakeholders of Boracay Island.

Respondent Province further manifested that the Barangay Council of Caticlan, Malay, Aklan enacted on February
13, 2012 Resolution No. 003, series of 2012, entitled "Resolution Favorably Endorsing the 2.6 Hectares
Reclamation/MARINA Project of the Aklan Provincial Government at Caticlan Coastline"131 and that the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay, Aklan enacted Resolution No. 020, series of 2012, entitled
"Resolution Endorsing the 2.6 Hectares Reclamation Project of the Provincial Government of Aklan Located at
Barangay Caticlan, Malay, Aklan."132
Respondent Province claims that its compliance with the requirements of respondents DENR-EMB RVI and PRA
that led to the approval of the reclamation project by the said government agencies, as well as the recent
enactments of the Barangay Council of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay
favorably endorsing the said project, had "categorically addressed all the issues raised by the Petitioner in its
Petition dated June 1, 2011." Respondent Province prays as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due
proceedings, the following be rendered:

1. The Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) it issued on June 7, 2011 be lifted/dissolved.

2. The instant petition be dismissed for being moot and academic.

3. Respondent Province of Aklan prays for such other reliefs that are just and equitable under the premises.
(Emphases in the original.)

ISSUES

The Court will now resolve the following issues:

I. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic

II. Whether or not the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing this case

III. Whether or not respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA as required by laws and regulations based on
the scope and classification of the project

IV. Whether or not respondent Province complied with all the requirements under the pertinent laws and
regulations

V. Whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project

DISCUSSION

On the issue of whether or not the Petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic

Respondent Province claims in its Manifestation and Motion filed on April 2, 2012 that with the alleged favorable
endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of Malay, all the issues raised by petitioner had already been addressed, and this petition should
be dismissed for being moot and academic.

On the contrary, a close reading of the two LGUs’ respective resolutions would reveal that they are not sufficient to render the

Resolution No. 020, series of 2012, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay134 is even more specific. It reads in part:
WHEREAS, noble it seems the reclamation project to the effect that it will generate scores of benefits for the
Local Government of Malay in terms of income and employment for its constituents, but the fact cannot be denied
that the project will take its toll on the environment especially on the nearby fragile island of Boracay and the fact
also remains that the project will eventually displace the local transportation operators/cooperatives;

WHEREAS, considering the sensitivity of the project, this Honorable Body through the Committee where this
matter was referred conducted several consultations/committee hearings with concerned departments and the
private sector specifically Boracay Foundation, Inc. and they are one in its belief that this Local Government Unit
has never been against development so long as compliance with the law and proper procedures have been
observed and that paramount consideration have been given to the environment lest we disturb the balance of
nature to the end that progress will be brought to naught;

WHEREAS, time and again, to ensure a healthy intergovernmental relations, this August Body requires no less
than transparency and faithful commitment from the Provincial Government of Aklan in the process of going
through these improvements in the Municipality because it once fell prey to infidelities in matters of governance;

WHEREAS, as a condition for the grant of this endorsement and to address all issues and concerns, this
Honorable Council necessitates a sincere commitment from the Provincial Government of Aklan to the end that:

1. To allocate an office space to LGU-Malay within the building in the reclaimed area;

2. To convene the Cagban and Caticlan Jetty Port Management Board before the resumption of the reclamation
project;

3. That the reclamation project shall be limited only to 2.6 hectares in Barangay Caticlan and not beyond;

4. That the local transportation operators/cooperatives will not be displaced; and

5. The Provincial Government of Aklan conduct a simultaneous comprehensive study on the environmental
impact of the reclamation project especially during Habagat and Amihan seasons and put in place as early as
possible mitigating measures on the effect of the project to the environment.

WHEREAS, having presented these stipulations, failure to comply herewith will leave this August Body no choice but to revoke

The Sangguniang Bayan of Malay obviously imposed explicit conditions for respondent Province to comply with
on pain of revocation of its endorsement of the project, including the need to conduct a comprehensive study on
the environmental impact of the reclamation project, which is the heart of the petition before us. Therefore, the
contents of the two resolutions submitted by respondent Province do not support its conclusion that the
subsequent favorable endorsement of the LGUs had already addressed all the issues raised and rendered the
instant petition moot and academic.

On the issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies

Respondents, in essence, argue that the present petition should be dismissed for petitioner’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and even to observe the hierarchy of courts. Furthermore, as the petition questions the
issuance of the ECC and the NTP, this involves factual and technical verification, which are more properly within
the expertise of the concerned government agencies.

Respondents anchor their argument on Section 6, Article II of DENR DAO 2003-30, which provides:

Section 6. Appeal

Any party aggrieved by the final decision on the ECC / CNC applications may, within 15 days from receipt of such
decision, file an appeal on the following grounds:

a. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the deciding authority, or

b. Serious errors in the review findings.

The DENR may adopt alternative conflict/dispute resolution procedures as a means to settle grievances between
proponents and aggrieved parties to avert unnecessary legal action. Frivolous appeals shall not be
countenanced.

The proponent or any stakeholder may file an appeal to the following:

Deciding Authority

EMB Regional Office Director

EMB Central Office Director

DENR Secretary

(Emphases supplied.)

Respondents argue that since there is an administrative appeal provided for, then petitioner is duty bound to
observe the same and may not be granted recourse to the regular courts for its failure to do so.

We do not agree with respondents’ appreciation of the applicability of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies in thi
The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable (1) where
the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by
him, or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, - Gonzales vs.
Hechanova, L-21897, October 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230; Abaya vs. Villegas, L-25641, December 17, 1966, 18
SCRA; Mitra vs. Subido, L-21691, September 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 127.

Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (Cipriano vs. Marcelino

As petitioner correctly pointed out, the appeal provided for under Section 6 of DENR DAO 2003-30 is only applicable, based on

Although petitioner was not a party to the proceedings where the decision to issue an ECC was rendered, it stands to be aggrie

The new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a relief for petitioner under
the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance
of an act specifically enjoined by law"140 and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO "as an auxiliary remedy
prior to the issuance of the writ itself."141 The Rationale of the said Rules explains the writ in this wise:

Environmental law highlights the shift in the focal-point from the initiation of regulation by Congress to the
implementation of regulatory programs by the appropriate government agencies.

Thus, a government agency’s inaction, if any, has serious implications on the future of environmental law
enforcement. Private individuals, to the extent that they seek to change the scope of the regulatory process, will
have to rely on such agencies to take the initial incentives, which may require a judicial component. Accordingly,
questions regarding the propriety of an agency’s action or inaction will need to be analyzed.

This point is emphasized in the availability of the remedy of the writ of mandamus, which allows for the enforcement of the co

The writ of continuing mandamus "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful imp

According to petitioner, respondent Province acted pursuant to a MOA with respondent PRA that was conditioned
upon, among others, a properly-secured ECC from respondent DENR-EMB RVI. For this reason, petitioner seeks
to compel respondent Province to comply with certain environmental laws, rules, and procedures that it claims
were either circumvented or ignored. Hence, we find that the petition was appropriately filed with this Court under
Rule 8, Section 1, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, which reads:

SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.—When any agency or instrumentality of the government or
officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or
regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence,
specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent,
under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
SECTION 2. Where to file the petition.—The petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred or with the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court.

Petitioner had three options where to file this case under the rule: the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred, the Court of Appeals, or this Court.

Petitioner had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to determine the
questions of unique national and local importance raised here that pertain to laws and rules for environmental
protection, thus it was justified in coming to this Court.

Having resolved the procedural issue, we now move to the substantive issues.

On the issues of whether, based on the scope and classification of the project, a full EIA is required by laws and
regulations, and whether respondent Province complied with all the requirements under the pertinent laws and
regulations

Petitioner’s arguments on this issue hinges upon its claim that the reclamation project is misclassified as a single
project when in fact it is co-located. Petitioner also questions the classification made by respondent Province that
the reclamation project is merely an expansion of the existing jetty port, when the project descriptions embodied
in the different documents filed by respondent Province describe commercial establishments to be built, among
others, to raise revenues for the LGU; thus, it should have been classified as a new project. Petitioner likewise
cries foul to the manner by which respondent Province allegedly circumvented the documentary requirements of
the DENR-EMB RVI by the act of connecting the reclamation project with its previous project in 1999 and claiming
that the new project is a mere expansion of the previous one.

As previously discussed, respondent Province filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that the ECC issued by respondent DENR

The Court notes such manifestation of respondent Province. Assuming, however, that the area involved in the
subject reclamation project has been limited to 2.64 hectares, this case has not become moot and academic, as
alleged by respondents, because the Court still has to check whether respondents had complied with all
applicable environmental laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to the actual reclamation project.

We recognize at this point that the DENR is the government agency vested with delegated powers to review and evaluate all EI

Being the administrator of the EIS System, respondent DENR-EMB RVI’s submissions bear great weight in this
case. However, the following are the issues that put in question the wisdom of respondent DENR-EMB RVI in
issuing the ECC:

1. Its approval of respondent Province’s classification of the project as a mere expansion of the existing jetty port
in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new project;

2. Its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located project;

3. The lack of prior public consultations and approval of local government agencies; and
4. The lack of comprehensive studies regarding the impact of the reclamation project to the environment.

The above issues as raised put in question the sufficiency of the evaluation of the project by respondent DENR-
EMB RVI.

Nature of the project

The first question must be answered by respondent DENR-EMB RVI as the agency with the expertise and
authority to state whether this is a new project, subject to the more rigorous environmental impact study
requested by petitioner, or it is a mere expansion of the existing jetty port facility.

The second issue refers to the classification of the project by respondent Province, approved by respondent
DENR-EMB RVI, as single instead of co-located. Under the Revised Procedural Manual, the "Summary List of
Additional Non-Environmentally-Critical Project (NECP) Types in ECAs Classified under Group II" (Table I-2) lists
"buildings, storage facilities and other structures" as a separate item from "transport terminal facilities." This
creates the question of whether this project should be considered as consisting of more than one type of activity,
and should more properly be classified as "co-located," under the following definition from the same Manual,
which reads:

f) Group IV (Co-located Projects in either ECA or NECA): A co-located project is a group of single projects, under
one or more proponents/locators, which are located in a contiguous area and managed by one administrator, who
is also the ECC applicant. The co-located project may be an economic zone or industrial park, or a mix of projects
within a catchment, watershed or river basin, or any other geographical, political or economic unit of area. Since
the location or threshold of specific projects within the contiguous area will yet be derived from the EIA process
based on the carrying capacity of the project environment, the nature of the project is called "programmatic."
(Emphasis added.)

Respondent DENR-EMB RVI should conduct a thorough and detailed evaluation of the project to address the
question of whether this could be deemed as a group of single projects (transport terminal facility, building, etc.) in
a contiguous area managed by respondent Province, or as a single project.

The third item in the above enumeration will be discussed as a separate issue.

The answer to the fourth question depends on the final classification of the project under items 1 and 3 above
because the type of EIA study required under the Revised Procedural Manual depends on such classification.

The very definition of an EIA points to what was most likely neglected by respondent Province as project
proponent, and what was in turn overlooked by respondent DENR-EMB RVI, for it is defined as follows:

An [EIA] is a ‘process that involves predicting and evaluating the likely impacts of a project (including cumulative impacts) on th

Thus, the EIA process must have been able to predict the likely impact of the reclamation project to the
environment and to prevent any harm that may otherwise be caused.

The project now before us involves reclamation of land that is more than five times the size of the original
reclaimed land. Furthermore, the area prior to construction merely contained a jetty port, whereas the proposed
expansion, as described in the EPRMP submitted by respondent Province to respondent DENR-EMB RVI
involves so much more, and we quote:
The expansion project will be constructed at the north side of the existing jetty port and terminal that will have a
total area of 2.64 hectares, more or less, after reclamation. The Phase 1 of the project construction costing
around ₱260 million includes the following:

1. Reclamation - 3,000 sq m (expansion of jetty port)

2. Reclamation - 13,500 sq m (buildable area)

3. Terminal annex building - 250 sq m

4. 2-storey commercial building – 2,500 sq m (1,750 sq m of leasable space)

5. Health and wellness center

6. Access road - 12 m (wide)

7. Parking, perimeter fences, lighting and water treatment sewerage system

8. Rehabilitation of existing jetty port and terminal

xxxx

The succeeding phases of the project will consist of [further] reclamation, completion of the commercial center building, bay w

As may be gleaned from the breakdown of the 2.64 hectares as described by respondent Province above, a
significant portion of the reclaimed area would be devoted to the construction of a commercial building, and the
area to be utilized for the expansion of the jetty port consists of a mere 3,000 square meters (sq. m). To be true to
its definition, the EIA report submitted by respondent Province should at the very least predict the impact that the
construction of the new buildings on the reclaimed land would have on the surrounding environment. These new
constructions and their environmental effects were not covered by the old studies that respondent Province
previously submitted for the construction of the original jetty port in 1999, and which it re-submitted in its
application for ECC in this alleged expansion, instead of conducting updated and more comprehensive studies.

Any impact on the Boracay side cannot be totally ignored, as Caticlan and Boracay are separated only by a
narrow strait. This becomes more imperative because of the significant contributions of Boracay’s white-sand
beach to the country’s tourism trade, which requires respondent Province to proceed with utmost caution in
implementing projects within its vicinity.

We had occasion to emphasize the duty of local government units to ensure the quality of the environment under Presidential

Section 15 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, defines a local government
unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it
performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are those that concern the health,
safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally. Proprietary functions
are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private
advantage and benefit. When exercising governmental powers and performing governmental duties, an LGU is
an agency of the national government. When engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the
community in the administration of local affairs.
Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the people’s right to a
balanced ecology. Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, can not claim exemption from the coverage of
PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of
the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.

xxxx

Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that "no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any
such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative." The Civil Code defines a person as
either natural or juridical. The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are juridical
persons. Undoubtedly therefore, local government units are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.

Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to implement the policy of the state to achieve a balance betwee

The Court chooses to remand these matters to respondent DENR-EMB RVI for it to make a proper study, and if it
should find necessary, to require respondent Province to address these environmental issues raised by petitioner
and submit the correct EIA report as required by the project’s specifications. The Court requires respondent
DENR-EMB RVI to complete its study and submit a report within a non-extendible period of three months.
Respondent DENR-EMB RVI should establish to the Court in said report why the ECC it issued for the subject
project should not be canceled.

Lack of prior public consultation

The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in the maintenance of
ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and approval of local government units
for the projects described therein.

In the case before us, the national agency involved is respondent PRA. Even if the project proponent is the local
government of Aklan, it is respondent PRA which authorized the reclamation, being the exclusive agency of the
government to undertake reclamation nationwide. Hence, it was necessary for respondent Province to go through
respondent PRA and to execute a MOA, wherein respondent PRA’s authority to reclaim was delegated to
respondent Province. Respondent DENR-EMB RVI, regional office of the DENR, is also a national government
institution which is tasked with the issuance of the ECC that is a prerequisite to projects covered by environmental
laws such as the one at bar.

This project can be classified as a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities, and is covered by the requirements found in the Local Government Code provisions that are quoted
below:

Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. - It shall be the
duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the
planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of
non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species,
to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and
explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms
of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the
adverse effects thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to
be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution.

In Lina, Jr. v. Paño,150 we held that Section 27 of the Local Government Code applies only to "national programs
and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community"151 and that it should be read in
conjunction with Section 26. We held further in this manner:

Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects

During the oral arguments held on September 13, 2011, it was established that this project as described above falls under Secti

Our ruling in Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary154 is instructive:

We reiterated this doctrine in the recent case of Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas, where we held that there was
no statutory requirement for the sangguniang bayan of Puerto Galera to approve the construction of a mooring
facility, as Sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to projects which are not environmentally critical.

Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the municipality, grants
the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e)
Code." These include:

(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for
acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal
logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and
fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of
rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]

(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the municipality,
adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction of the city,
subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the
approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or
zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of buildings within
said fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code; [Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]
(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities
as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, …providing for the
establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks,
greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects …and, subject to existing laws, establishing
and providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the
inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance, repair and use
of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the water supply of the
municipality and, for this purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the
drainage area of said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal,
aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the
consumption, use or wastage of water." [Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]

Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environme

Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior approval are required by law to have been conducted
and secured by the respondent Province. Accordingly, the information dissemination conducted months after the
ECC had already been issued was insufficient to comply with this requirement under the Local Government Code.
Had they been conducted properly, the prior public consultation should have considered the ecological or
environmental concerns of the stakeholders and studied measures alternative to the project, to avoid or minimize
adverse environmental impact or damage. In fact, respondent Province once tried to obtain the favorable
endorsement of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay, but this was denied by the latter.

Moreover, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides:

5.3 Public Hearing / Consultation Requirements

For projects under Category A-1, the conduct of public hearing as part of the EIS review is mandatory unless
otherwise determined by EMB. For all other undertakings, a public hearing is not mandatory unless specifically
required by EMB.

Proponents should initiate public consultations early in order to ensure that environmentally relevant concerns of
stakeholders are taken into consideration in the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan. All public
consultations and public hearings conducted during the EIA process are to be documented. The public
hearing/consultation Process report shall be validated by the EMB/EMB RD and shall constitute part of the
records of the EIA process. (Emphasis supplied.)

In essence, the above-quoted rule shows that in cases requiring public consultations, the same should be initiated
early so that concerns of stakeholders could be taken into consideration in the EIA study. In this case, respondent
Province had already filed its ECC application before it met with the local government units of Malay and Caticlan.

The claim of respondent DENR-EMB RVI is that no permits and/or clearances from National Government
Agencies (NGAs) and LGUs are required pursuant to the DENR Memorandum Circular No. 2007-08. However,
we still find that the LGC requirements of consultation and approval apply in this case. This is because a
Memorandum Circular cannot prevail over the Local Government Code, which is a statute and which enjoys
greater weight under our hierarchy of laws.
Subsequent to the information campaign of respondent Province, the Municipality of Malay and the Liga ng mga
Barangay-Malay Chapter still opposed the project. Thus, when respondent Province commenced the
implementation project, it violated Section 27 of the LGC, which clearly enunciates that "[no] project or program
shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2(c) and 26
hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained."

The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the
reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan on February 13, 2012, and the Sangguniang Bayan
of the Municipality of Malay on February 28, 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and
insistence of respondent Province. As we have established above, the respective resolutions issued by the LGUs
concerned did not render this petition moot and academic.

It is clear that both petitioner and respondent Province are interested in the promotion of tourism in Boracay and
the protection of the environment, lest they kill the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg. At the beginning of this
decision, we mentioned that there are common goals of national significance that are very apparent from both the
petitioner’s and the respondents’ respective pleadings and memoranda.

The parties are evidently in accord in seeking to uphold the mandate found in Article II, Declaration of Principles
and State Policies, of the 1987 Constitution, which we quote below:

SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

xxxx

SECTION 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise,
and provides incentives to needed investments.

The protection of the environment in accordance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate is the aim, among
others, of Presidential Decree No. 1586, "Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System, Including
Other Environmental Management Related Measures and For Other Purposes," which declared in its first Section
that it is "the policy of the State to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance between socio-economic
growth and environmental protection."

The parties undoubtedly too agree as to the importance of promoting tourism, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 9593, or "The Tourism Act of 2009," which reads:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State declares tourism as an indispensable element of the national
economy and an industry of national interest and importance, which must be harnessed as an engine of
socioeconomic growth and cultural affirmation to generate investment, foreign exchange and employment, and to
continue to mold an enhanced sense of national pride for all Filipinos. (Emphasis ours.)

The primordial role of local government units under the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 in
the subject matter of this case is also unquestionable. The Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No.
7160) pertinently provides:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of
As shown by the above provisions of our laws and rules, the speedy and smooth resolution of these issues would
benefit all the parties. Thus, respondent Province’s cooperation with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in the Court-
mandated review of the proper classification and environmental impact of the reclamation project is of utmost
importance.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.1âwphi1 The TEPO issued by
this Court is hereby converted into a writ of continuing mandamus specifically as follows:

1. Respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Environmental Management Bureau Regional

Office VI shall revisit and review the following matters:

a. its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located project;

b. its approval of respondent Province’s classification of the project as a mere expansion of the existing jetty port
in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new project; and

c. the impact of the reclamation project to the environment based on new, updated, and comprehensive studies,
which should forthwith be ordered by respondent DENR-EMB RVI.

2. Respondent Province of Aklan shall perform the following:

a. fully cooperate with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in its review of the reclamation project proposal and submit to
the latter the appropriate report and study; and

b. secure approvals from local government units and hold proper consultations with non-governmental
organizations and other stakeholders and sectors concerned as required by Section 27 in relation to Section 26 of
the Local Government Code.

3. Respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority shall closely monitor the submission by respondent Province of
the requirements to be issued by respondent DENR-EMB RVI in connection to the environmental concerns raised
by petitioner, and shall coordinate with respondent Province in modifying the MOA, if necessary, based on the
findings of respondent DENR-EMB RVI.

4. The petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. and the respondents The Province of Aklan, represented by Governor
Carlito S. Marquez, The Philippine Reclamation Authority, and The DENR-EMB (Region VI) are mandated to
submit their respective reports to this Court regarding their compliance with the requirements set forth in this
Decision no later than three (3) months from the date of promulgation of this Decision.

5. In the meantime, the respondents, their concerned contractor/s, and/or their agents, representatives or persons
acting in their place or stead, shall immediately cease and desist from continuing the implementation of the
project covered by ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 until further orders from this Court. For this purpose, the respondents
shall report within five (5) days to this Court the status of the project as of their receipt of this Decision, copy
furnished the petitioner.

This Decision is immediately executory.

MB), Regional Office VI (respondent DENR-EMB RVI), is the government agency in the Western Visayas Region authorized to issue environm
tem dynamics of the area. The island itself is known to come from the uplifted remnants of an ancient reef platform. Its beaches, the sand

aticlan to be the main gateway to Boracay. It also built the corresponding Cagban Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal to be the receiving end

6 in 2010, and this was expected to reach a record of 1 million tourist arrivals in the years to come. Thus, respondent Province conceptualiz

rovince to reclaim about 2.64 hectares of land along the foreshores of Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay, Province of Aklan.
hat won in the bidding process held a month before, to conduct the necessary feasibility study of the proposed project for the Renovation/

–110,23 which authorized Governor Marquez to file an application to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan

nd reclamation of 2.64 hectares by way of beach enhancement and recovery of the old Caticlan coastline for the rehabilitation and expans

etty Port and Passenger Terminal through beach zone restoration and Protective Marina Developments in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan was comp

good office that it will give preferential attention to and shall comply with whatever comments that you may have on this EPRMP.30 (Emp

renovation of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal Building, and the reclamation of a portion of the foreshore lease area for com

ginal proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its resources and as a respon
 sm-related facilities and for other complementary uses.35 (Emphasis ours.)

alay38 on December 9, 2009.

General Manager/Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to enter into a MOA with respondent Province for the implementation of the reclamation

Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port.40

was described therein as follows:

other applicable uses.42 (Emphases supplied.)

n-education campaigns," which provided the venue for interaction and dialogue with the public, particularly the Barangay and Municipal offi

ommittee;48 and

17, 2010, respondent Province presented the Reclamation Project and only then detailed the actions that it had already undertaken, particu

osition to respondent Province’s project and denied its request for a favorable endorsement of the Marina Project.51
 quest respondent PRA "not to grant reclamation permit and notice to proceed to the Marina Project of the [respondent] Provincial Govern

oject, primarily for the reason that, based on the opinion of Dr. Porfirio M. Aliño, an expert from the University of the Philippines Marine Sc

n project to respondent Province, respondent PRA, respondent DENR-EMB, the National Economic Development Authority Region VI, the M

dorsement, as well as the strong opposition manifested both by Barangay Caticlan and petitioner as an NGO, respondent Province still con

the Municipality of Malay and manifested its support for the implementation of the aforesaid project through its Resolution No. 2010-022

espondent PRA wrote to respondent Province on October 19, 2010, informing the latter to proceed with the reclamation and developmen

2) separate sites both in Malay Municipality, Aklan Province. Site 1 is in Brgy. Caticlan with a total area of 36.82 hectares and Site 2 in Brgy.

titioner embodied in its Resolution No. 001, s. 2010, and supported the implementation of the project. Said resolution stated that the appr

-Boracay), funded by the Department of Tourism (DOT) with the assistance of, among others, petitioner. The study was conducted in Nove

er, respondent Province issued a notice to the contractor on December 1, 2010 to commence with the construction of the project.61

port on the survey of the channel between Caticlan and Boracay conducted by the UPMSI in relation to the effects of the ongoing reclamati

011, it approved and supported the subject project (covering 2.64 hectares) through RDC-VI Resolution No. VI-26, series of 2011.65

d by the UPMSI confirms that the water flow across the Caticlan-Boracay channel is primarily tide-driven, therefore, the marine scientists b

ontinuing Mandamus. On June 7, 2011, this Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the responden
al balance of the area.68
EIS and/or a PEPRMP.
ation project will likely divert sand transport off the southwest part of Boracay, whereas the characteristic coast of the Caticlan side of the s

unfounded fears and baseless apprehensions. It is respondent Province’s contention that its 2.64-hectare reclamation project is considered

om 2.64 hectares to 40 hectares. However, it claims that such revision is part of its future plan, and implementation thereof is "still subject

bigger project which is still at the conceptualization stage. Although this project was described in the Notice to Proceed issued by responde

al project consists of 2.64 hectares only, as originally planned and conceptualized, which was even reduced to 2.2 hectares due to some co

er to determine the period of its implementation. Each phase was separate and independent because the source of funds was also separat
ed 2.64 hectares, should undergo another EIA. If respondent Province intends to commence the construction on the other component of t

esent only financially equipped and legally compliant to undertake 2.64 hectares of the project, and only as an expansion of its old jetty po

he limits of the ECC.92

s as a pre-requisite for the issuance of an ECC. Respondent Province claims to have conducted consultative activities with LGUs in connectio

l effects of Respondent-LGU’s 2.64 hectares reclamation project. The alleged environmental impact of the subject project to the beaches o
mitted by law; if project is stopped, detriment of the public welfare and its constituents.96

hat has been dumped on the accomplished area.97

delegated the power "to approve reclamation projects to respondent PRA through its governing Board, subject to compliance with existing

for various reclamation projects to be undertaken. Respondent PRA prepared an Evaluation Report on November 5, 200999 regarding Akla

the law that respondent PRA, through its Board of Directors, approved the proposed project under its Board Resolution No. 4094.100 In th

n project proposal in willful disregard of alleged "numerous irregularities" as claimed by petitioner.101

es. Indeed, it issued the notice to proceed only after Aklan had complied with all the requirements imposed by existing laws and regulation

mation work could be started until respondent PRA has approved the detailed engineering plans/methodology, design and specifications of
ply with all conditions of the DENR-EMB-issued ECC "and/or comply with pertinent local and international commitments of the Republic of

se 1 of Site 1 (2.64 hectares) of the Caticlan Jetty Port expansion and modernization, respondent PRA gave considerable weight to all pertin

t Province the NTP, limited to the 2.64-hectare reclamation project. Respondent PRA even emphasized in its evaluation report that should
he Philippines – a mandate conferred by law – manifests that it is incumbent upon it, in the exercise of its regulatory functions, to diligentl

rist zone and marine reserve under Proclamation No. 1801, has no relevance to the expansion project of Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger

an ECC were merely for the expansion and modernization of the old jetty port in Barangay Caticlan covering 2.64 hectares, and not the 40-h

t the documents submitted by respondent Province and saw that the subject area covered by the ECC application and subsequently grante

r "Non ECP in ECA," this does not fall within the definition of a co-located project because the subject project is merely an expansion of the

s) and LGUs are required pursuant to the DENR Memorandum Circular No. 2007-08, entitled "Simplifying the Requirements of ECC or CNC A
retary of the opportunity to review and/or reverse the decision of his subordinate office, EMB RVI pursuant to the Revised Procedural Man

nce of Aklan is no longer "pursuing the implementation of the succeeding phases of the project with a total area of 37.4 hectares for our in

at the [respondent] PRA Board of Directors has given [respondent] PRA the authority to confirm the position of the Province of Aklan that t

the NTP issued by respondent PRA. The recent exchange of correspondence between respondents Province of Aklan and [respondent] PRA

e controversy exists since the feared adverse effect to Boracay Island’s ecology had become academic all together.129
to render the petition moot and academic, as there are explicit conditions imposed that must be complied with by respondent Province. In
but to revoke this endorsement, hence faithful compliance of the commitment of the Provincial Government is highly appealed for[.]135 (E
 Where to
file the
appeal

Office of
the EMB
Director
Office of
the
DENR
Secretar
y
Office of
the
Presiden
t

emedies in this case. We are reminded of our ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals,136 which summarized our earlier decisions on the proced
vs. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291), when there is no due process observed (Villanos vs. Subido, 45 SCRA 299), or where the protestant has no oth

ble, based on the first sentence thereof, if the person or entity charged with the duty to exhaust the administrative remedy of appeal to th

s to be aggrieved by the decision,139 because it claims that the reclamation of land on the Caticlan side would unavoidably adversely affec

ment of the conduct of the tasks to which the writ pertains: the performance of a legal duty.142 (Emphases added.)

uccessful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision" and, in order to do this, "the court may compel the submissi
pondent DENR-EMB RVI covered an area of 2,691 square meters in Caticlan, and its application for reclamation of 40 hectares with respond

evaluate all EIA reports, and to grant or deny ECCs to project proponents.145 It is the DENR that has the duty to implement the EIS system.
mpacts) on the environment during construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes designing appropriate prev
uilding, bay walk commercial strip, staff building, ferry terminal, a cable car system and wharf marina. This will entail an additional estimat

r Presidential Decree No. 1586 in Republic of the Philippines v. The City of Davao,148 wherein we held:
alance between socio-economic development and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable development. The abo
whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic c

lls under Section 26 because the commercial establishments to be built on phase 1, as described in the EPRMP quoted above, could cause
he environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities
ubdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-relian
n authorized to issue environmental compliance certificates regarding projects that require the environment’s protection and management
platform. Its beaches, the sandy land strip between the water and the area currently occupied by numerous establishments, is the primary

rminal to be the receiving end for tourists in Boracay. Respondent Province operates both ports "to provide structural facilities suited for lo

pondent Province conceptualized the expansion of the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan.13

lay, Province of Aklan.

ed project for the Renovation/Rehabilitation of the Caticlan Passenger Terminal Building and Jetty Port, Enhancement and Recovery of Old

area in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan with respondent PRA.

the rehabilitation and expansion of the existing jetty port, and for its future plans – the construction of commercial building and wellness

aticlan, Malay, Aklan was completed.

y have on this EPRMP.30 (Emphasis added.)

he foreshore lease area for commercial purposes in Malay, Aklan through Provincial Ordinance No. 2009-013, approved on September 10, 2

f its resources and as a response to the findings of the Preliminary Geohazard Assessment study which showed that the recession and retre
ementation of the reclamation project.39

the existing jetty port.40

the Barangay and Municipal officials of the Municipality of Malay, the residents of Barangay Caticlan and Boracay, the stakeholders, and the

had already undertaken, particularly: the issuance of the Caticlan Super Marina Bonds; the execution of the MOA with respondent PRA; the
 [respondent] Provincial Government of Aklan located at Caticlan, Malay, Aklan."52

ty of the Philippines Marine Science Institute (UPMSI), which he rendered based on the documents submitted by respondent Province to o

ment Authority Region VI, the Malay Municipality, and other concerned entities.54

O, respondent Province still continued with the implementation of the Reclamation Project.55

gh its Resolution No. 2010-022.56

reclamation and development of phase 1 of site 1 of its proposed project. Respondent PRA attached to said letter its Evaluation Report da

82 hectares and Site 2 in Brgy. Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island with a total area of 3.18 hectares. Sites 1 and 2 are on the opposite sides of T

resolution stated that the apprehensions of petitioner with regard to the economic, social and political negative impacts of the projects we

e study was conducted in November 2010 by several marine biologists/experts from the Marine Environmental Resources Foundation (MER

ruction of the project.61

ffects of the ongoing reclamation to Boracay beaches, and stating that Dr. Villanoy had admitted that nowhere in their study was it pointed

VI-26, series of 2011.65

erefore, the marine scientists believe that the 2.64-hectare project of respondent Province would not significantly affect the flow in the cha

O) and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.67
ast of the Caticlan side of the strait indicate stronger sediment transport.77 The white-sand beaches of Boracay and its surrounding marine

lamation project is considered as a "stand alone project," separate and independent from the approved area of 40 hectares. Thus, petition

ntation thereof is "still subject to availability of funds, independent scientific environmental study, separate application of ECC and notice to

to Proceed issued by respondent PRA to have two phases, 36.82 hectares in Caticlan and 3.18 hectares in Boracay [Island,] it is totally diffe

o 2.2 hectares due to some construction and design modifications.

ource of funds was also separate. The required documents and requirements were also specific for each phase. The entire approved area of
n on the other component of the 40 hectares, then it agrees that it is mandated to secure a new ECC.90

an expansion of its old jetty port.91

ctivities with LGUs in connection with Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code. The vehement and staunch objections of both the

bject project to the beaches of Boracay Island remains unconfirmed. Petitioner had unsuccessfully proven that the project would cause im
ect to compliance with existing laws and rules and further subject to the condition that reclamation contracts to be executed with any pers

ember 5, 200999 regarding Aklan’s proposal to increase its project to 40 hectares.

Resolution No. 4094.100 In the same Resolution, respondent PRA Board authorized the General Manager/CEO to execute a MOA with the

by existing laws and regulations. It further contends that the 40 hectares involved in this project remains a plan insofar as respondent PRA i

gy, design and specifications of the reclamation. Part of the required submissions to respondent PRA includes the drainage design as appro
mmitments of the Republic of the Philippines to ensure environmental protection."105

onsiderable weight to all pertinent issuances, especially the ECC issued by DENR-EMB RVI.108 Respondent PRA stresses that its earlier app

evaluation report that should respondent Province pursue the other phases of its project, it would still require the submission of an ECC fo
gulatory functions, to diligently evaluate, based on its technical competencies, all reclamation projects submitted to it for approval. Once t

ticlan Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal for the very reason that the project is not located in the Island of Boracay, being located in Baranga

2.64 hectares, and not the 40-hectare reclamation project in Barangay Caticlan and Boracay. The previous letter of respondent Province dat

ation and subsequently granted with ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 consists only of 2.64 hectares; hence, respondent DENR-EMB RVI could not co

ct is merely an expansion of the old Caticlan Jetty Port, which had a previously issued ECC (ECC No. 0699-1012-171 on October 12, 1999). T

Requirements of ECC or CNC Applications;" that the EPRMP was evaluated and processed based on the Revised Procedural Manual for DE
to the Revised Procedural Manual for DENR DAO 2003-30. There is no "extreme urgency that necessitates the granting of Mandamus or iss

area of 37.4 hectares for our inability to comply with Article IV B.2 (3) of the MOA; hence, the existing MOA will cover only the project area

of the Province of Aklan that the "Aklan Beach Zone Restoration and Protection Marine Development Project will now be confined to the

of Aklan and [respondent] PRA further confirms the intent of the parties all along. Hence, the Project subject of the petition, without doub
with by respondent Province. In Resolution No. 003, series of 2012, of the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan it is stated that "any vertical str
is highly appealed for[.]135 (Emphases added.)
earlier decisions on the procedural requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to wit:
here the protestant has no other recourse (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 637).137 (Emphases supplied.)

strative remedy of appeal to the appropriate government agency has been a party or has been made a party in the proceedings wherein th

uld unavoidably adversely affect the Boracay side, where petitioner’s members own establishments engaged in the tourism trade. As noted

ourt may compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to moni
on of 40 hectares with respondent PRA was conditioned on its submission of specific documents within 120 days. Respondent Province cla

y to implement the EIS system. It appears, however, that respondent DENR-EMB RVI’s evaluation of this reclamation project was problemati
des designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these consequences to protect the environment a
will entail an additional estimated cost of ₱785 million bringing the total investment requirement to about ₱1.0 billion.147 (Emphases adde
tainable development. The above-quoted first paragraph of the Whereas clause stresses that this can only be possible if we adopt a compr
 (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-lan

MP quoted above, could cause pollution as it could generate garbage, sewage, and possible toxic fuel discharge.153
the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory require
llest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end,
s protection and management in the region.5
establishments, is the primary draw for domestic and international tourists for its color, texture and other unique characteristics. Needless

structural facilities suited for locals, tourists and guests and to provide safety and security measures."9
ancement and Recovery of Old Caticlan Coastline, and Reclamation of a Portion of Foreshore for Commercial Purposes (the Marina Project)

mercial building and wellness center. The financial component of the said study was Two Hundred Sixty Million Pesos (₱260,000,000.00). I

, approved on September 10, 2009. The said ordinance authorized Governor Marquez to negotiate, sign and execute agreements in relation

ed that the recession and retreat of the shoreline caused by coastal erosion and scouring should be the first major concern in the project s
racay, the stakeholders, and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The details of the campaign are summarized as follows43 :

MOA with respondent PRA; the alleged conduct of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study for the reclamation project; and the ex
ed by respondent Province to obtain the ECC, a full EIA study is required to assess the reclamation project’s likelihood of rendering critical a

letter its Evaluation Report dated October 18, 2010.57

2 are on the opposite sides of Tabon Strait, about 1,200 meters apart. x x x." 58 (Emphases added.)

tive impacts of the projects were mere perceptions and generalities and were not anchored on definite scientific, social and political studie

tal Resources Foundation (MERF) of the UPMSI. The study was intended to determine the potential impact of a reclamation project in the h

re in their study was it pointed out that there would be an adverse effect on the white-sand beach of Boracay.

antly affect the flow in the channel and would unlikely impact the Boracay beaches. Based on this, PCCI-Boracay stated that it was not opp
cay and its surrounding marine environment depend upon the natural flow of the adjacent waters.

a of 40 hectares. Thus, petitioner should have observed the difference between the "future development plan" of respondent Province fro

application of ECC and notice to proceed to be issued by respondent PRA."84

oracay [Island,] it is totally different from the [ongoing] Caticlan jetty port expansion project."85

se. The entire approved area of 40 hectares could be implemented within a period of 10 years but this would depend solely on the availabi
 staunch objections of both the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay, according to respondent Province,

hat the project would cause imminent, grave and irreparable injury to the community.95
ts to be executed with any person or entity (must) go through public bidding."

CEO to execute a MOA with the Aklan provincial government to implement the reclamation project under certain conditions.

an insofar as respondent PRA is concerned. What has been approved for reclamation by respondent PRA thus far is only the 2.64-hectare r

s the drainage design as approved by the Public Works Department and the ECC as issued by the DENR, all of which the Aklan government
RA stresses that its earlier approval of the 40-hectare reclamation project under its Resolution No. 4094, series of 2010, still requires a seco

re the submission of an ECC for each succeeding phases before the start of any reclamation works.110
mitted to it for approval. Once the reclamation project’s requirements set forth by law and related rules have been complied with, responde

racay, being located in Barangay Caticlan, Malay, which is not a part of mainland Panay. It admits that the site of the subject jetty port falls

tter of respondent Province dated October 14, 2009 addressed to DENR-EMB RVI Regional Executive Director, would show that the reclama

nt DENR-EMB RVI could not comment on the excess area.118

2-171 on October 12, 1999). Thus, only an EPRMP, not a PEIS or PEPRMP, is required.119

ised Procedural Manual for DENR DAO 2003-30 which resulted to the issuance of ECC-R6-1003-096-7100; and that the ECC is not a permit
e granting of Mandamus or issuance of TEPO that put to balance between the life and death of the petitioner or present grave or irreparab

will cover only the project area of 2.64 hectares."

ct will now be confined to the reclamation and development of the 2.64 hectares, more or less.

ct of the petition, without doubt, covers only 2.64 and not 40 hectares as feared. This completely changes the extent of the Project and, co
t is stated that "any vertical structures to be constructed shall be subject for barangay endorsement."133 Clearly, what the barangay endor
in the proceedings wherein the decision to be appealed was rendered. It has been established by the facts that petitioner was never made

in the tourism trade. As noted earlier, petitioner contends that the declared objective of the reclamation project is to exploit Boracay’s tou

s avail of other means to monitor compliance with its decision."143

days. Respondent Province claims that its failure to comply with said condition indicated its waiver to pursue the succeeding phases of the

mation project was problematic, based on the valid questions raised by petitioner.
es to protect the environment and the community’s welfare.146 (Emphases supplied.)
.0 billion.147 (Emphases added.)
e possible if we adopt a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program where all the sectors of the community are invo
lt in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) othe
her of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal.155 (Emphasis added.)
ational goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted throug
ique characteristics. Needless to state, it is the premier domestic and international tourist destination in the Philippines.8
Purposes (the Marina Project), in Malay, Aklan.22

ion Pesos (₱260,000,000.00). Its suggested financing scheme was bond flotation.24

execute agreements in relation to the issuance of the Caticlan Super Marina Bonds in the amount not exceeding ₱260,000,000.00.31

major concern in the project site and nearby coastal area. The study likewise indicated the vulnerability of the coastal zone within the prop
mmarized as follows43 :

eclamation project; and the expansion of the project to forty (40) hectares from 2.64 hectares.50
ikelihood of rendering critical and lasting effect on Boracay considering the proximity in distance, geographical location, current and wind d

ntific, social and political studies.

f a reclamation project in the hydrodynamics of the strait and on the coastal erosion patterns in the southern coast of Boracay Island and a

acay stated that it was not opposing the 2.64-hectare Caticlan reclamation project on environmental grounds.66
an" of respondent Province from its "actual project" being undertaken.83

d depend solely on the availability of funds.89

ording to respondent Province, were not rooted on its perceived impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or
rtain conditions.

us far is only the 2.64-hectare reclamation project. Respondent PRA reiterates that it approved this reclamation project after extensively re

f which the Aklan government must submit to respondent PRA before starting any reclamation works.103 Under Article IV(B)(3) of the MO
ies of 2010, still requires a second level of compliance requirements from the proponent. Respondent Province could not possibly begin its
been complied with, respondent PRA is mandated to approve the same. Respondent PRA claims, "[w]ith all the foregoing rigorous and det

e of the subject jetty port falls within the ECA under Proclamation No. 2146 (1981), being within the category of a water body. This was wh

, would show that the reclamation project will cover approximately 2.6 hectares.117 This application for ECC was not officially accepted du

nd that the ECC is not a permit per se but a planning tool for LGUs to consider in its decision whether or not to issue a local permit.122
er or present grave or irreparable damage to environment."123

e extent of the Project and, consequently, moots the issues and fears expressed by the petitioner.128 (Emphasis supplied.)
early, what the barangay endorsed was the reclamation only, and not the entire project that includes the construction of a commercial build
hat petitioner was never made a party to the proceedings before respondent DENR-EMB RVI. Petitioner was only informed that the projec

oject is to exploit Boracay’s tourism trade because the project is intended to enhance support services thereto; however, this objective wou
e the succeeding phases of the reclamation project and that the subject matter of this case had thus been limited to 2.64 hectares. Respon
tors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and the private sectors. The local government units, as part of the machinery of th
face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality w
ent structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, respon
Philippines.8
ding ₱260,000,000.00.31

he coastal zone within the proposed project site and the nearby coastal area due to the effects of sea level rise and climate change which w
al location, current and wind direction, and many other environmental considerations in the area. Petitioner noted that said documents ha

n coast of Boracay Island and along the coast of Caticlan.60

y in terms of environmental or ecological balance, but due to an alleged conflict with their "principal position to develop, utilize and reap b
on project after extensively reviewing the legal, technical, financial, environmental, and operational aspects of the proposed reclamation.1

nder Article IV(B)(3) of the MOA between respondent PRA and Aklan, the latter is required to submit, apart from the ECC, the following req
ce could not possibly begin its reclamation works since respondent PRA had yet to issue an NTP in its favor.
the foregoing rigorous and detailed requirements submitted and complied with by Aklan, and the attendant careful and meticulous technic

y of a water body. This was why respondent Province had faithfully secured an ECC pursuant to the Revised Procedural Manual for DENR DA

was not officially accepted due to lack of requirements or documents.

to issue a local permit.122

asis supplied.)
struction of a commercial building and wellness center, and other tourism-related facilities. Petitioner’s objections, as may be recalled, per
only informed that the project had already been approved after the ECC was already granted.138 Not being a party to the said proceeding

to; however, this objective would not be achieved since the white-sand beaches for which Boracay is famous might be negatively affected b
mited to 2.64 hectares. Respondent PRA, for its part, declared through its General Manager that the "Aklan Beach Zone Restoration and Pro
, as part of the machinery of the government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the scope of the EIS system.149 (Emphases supplied
eople residing in the locality where these will be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of lott
more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the
se and climate change which will greatly affect the social, economic, and environmental situation of Caticlan and nearby Malay coastal com
noted that said documents had failed to deal with coastal erosion concerns in Boracay. It also noted that respondent Province failed to com
n to develop, utilize and reap benefits from the natural resources found within its jurisdiction."93 Respondent Province argues that these co
of the proposed reclamation.102

rom the ECC, the following requirements for respondent PRA’s review and approval, as basis for the issuance of a Notice to Proceed (NTP) f
careful and meticulous technical and legal evaluation by respondent PRA, it cannot be argued that the reclamation permit it issued to Akla

Procedural Manual for DENR DAO 2003-30 by submitting the necessary documents as contained in the EPRMP on March 19, 2010, which w
ctions, as may be recalled, pertain not only to the reclamation per se, but also to the building to be constructed and the entire project’s pe
 a party to the said proceedings, it does not appear that petitioner was officially furnished a copy of the decision, from which the 15-day p

s might be negatively affected by the project. Petitioner’s conclusion is that respondent Province, aided and abetted by respondents PRA an
each Zone Restoration and Protection Marine Development Project will now be confined to the reclamation and development of the 2.64
ystem.149 (Emphases supplied.)
uced by the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.152 (Emphasis added.)
he national government to the local government units.156 (Emphases ours.)
n and nearby Malay coastal communities.34
spondent Province failed to comply with certain mandatory provisions of the Local Government Code, particularly, those requiring the proj
t Province argues that these concerns are not within the purview of the Local Government Code. Furthermore, the Preliminary Geohazard
of a Notice to Proceed (NTP) for Reclamation Works:
 mation permit it issued to Aklan is ‘founded upon numerous irregularities;’ as recklessly and baselessly imputed by BFI."111

MP on March 19, 2010, which were the bases in granting ECC No. R6-1003-096-7100 (amended) on April 27, 2010 for the expansion of Catic
ted and the entire project’s perceived ill effects to the surrounding environment.
ision, from which the 15-day period to appeal should be reckoned, and which would warrant the application of Section 6, Article II of DENR

abetted by respondents PRA and DENR-EMB RVI, ignored the spirit and letter of our environmental laws, and should thus be compelled to p
and development of the 2.64 hectares, more or less."144
ularly, those requiring the project proponent to conduct consultations with stakeholders.
re, the Preliminary Geohazard Assessment Report and EPRMP as well as Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution Nos. 2010-022 and 2010-03
ted by BFI."111

2010 for the expansion of Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal, covering 2.64 hectares.114
of Section 6, Article II of DENR DAO 2003-30.

should thus be compelled to perform their duties under said laws.

on Nos. 2010-022 and 2010-034 should address any environmental issue they may raise.
G.R. No. 171624 December 6, 2010

BF HOMES, INC. and the PHILIPPINE WATERWORKS AND CONSTRUCTION CORP., Petitioners,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision1 dated October 27, 20
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82826, nullifying and setting aside (1) the Order2 dated November 21, 2003 of the Regio
(RTC), Branch 202 of Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. 03-0151, thereby dissolving the writ of injunction against resp
Electric Company (MERALCO); and (2) the Resolution3 dated February 7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals denying the
Reconsideration of petitioners BF Homes, Inc. (BF Homes) and Philippine Waterworks and Construction Corporation

MERALCO is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the distribution and sale o
Metro Manila. On the other hand, BF Homes and PWCC are owners and operators of waterworks systems deliverin
12,000 households and commercial buildings in BF Homes subdivisions in Parañaque City, Las Piñas City, Caloocan
Quezon City. The water distributed in the waterworks systems owned and operated by BF Homes and PWCC is dra
wells using pumps run by electricity supplied by MERALCO.

On June 23, 2003, BF Homes and PWCC filed a Petition [With Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunct
Immediate Issuance of Restraining Order] against MERALCO before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0151.

In their Petition before the RTC, BF Homes and PWCC invoked their right to refund based on the ruling of this Court in Republic
Company4:

7. It is of judicial notice that on November 15, 2002, in G.R. No. 141314, entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Man
Company, and G.R. No. 141369, entitled Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) et al. vs. Manila Electric C
(MERALCO), (both cases shall hereafter be referred to as "MERALCO Refund cases," for brevity), the Supreme Co
MERALCO to refund its customers, which shall be credited against the customer’s future consumption, the excess a
₱0.167 per kilowatt hour starting with the customer’s billing cycles beginning February 1998. The dispositive portion
Court Decision in the MERALCO Refund cases reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
No. 46888 is REVERSED. Respondent MERALCO is authorized to adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of ₱0.017
effective with respect to MERALCO’s billing cycles beginning February 1994. Further, in accordance with the decisio
dated February 16, 1998, the excess average amount of ₱0.167 per kilowatt hour starting with the applicant’s billing
February 1998 is ordered to be refunded to MERALCO’s customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for futu

x x x x.
8. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by MERALCO in the MERALCO Refund cases was DENIED WITH FINALIT
letters were used by the Supreme Court) in the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated April 9, 2003.

9. The amount that MERALCO was mandated to refund to [BF Homes and PWCC] pursuant to the MERALCO Refund cases is in
₱11,834,570.91.5

BF Homes and PWCC then alleged in their RTC Petition that:

10. On May 20, 2003, without giving any notice whatsoever, MERALCO disconnected electric supply to [BF Homes
sixteen (16) water pumps located in BF Homes in Parañaque, Caloocan, and Quezon City, which thus disrupted wat
areas.

11. On June 4, 2003, [BF Homes and PWCC] received by facsimile transmission a letter from MERALCO, x x x, in w
demanded to [BF Homes and PWCC] the payment of electric bills amounting to ₱4,717,768.15.

12. [MERALCO] replied in a letter dated June 11, 2003, x x x, requesting MERALCO to apply the ₱4,717,768.15 ele
the ₱11,834,570.91 that MERALCO was ordered to refund to [BF Homes and PWCC] pursuant to the MERALCO Re

13. Displaying the arrogance that has become its distinction, MERALCO, in its letter dated June 16, 2003, x x x, den
and PWCC’s] request alleging that it has not yet come up with the schedule for the refund of large amounts, such as
Homes and PWCC].

14. Even while MERALCO was serving its reply-letter to [BF Homes and PWCC], MERALCO, again, without giving a
power supply to [BF Homes and PWCC’s] five (5) water pumps located in BF Homes Parañaque and BF Resort Villa
Las Piñas City.

15. In its letter dated June 4, 2003 (Annex A), MERALCO threatened to cut off electric power connections to all of [BF Homes an
pumps if [BF Homes and PWCC] failed to pay their bills demanded by MERALCO by June 20, 2003.6

BF Homes and PWCC thus cited the following causes of action for their RTC Petition:

16. In refusing to apply [MERALCO’s] electric bills against the amounts that it was ordered to refund to [BF Homes a
pursuant to the MERALCO Refund cases and in making the implementation of the refund ordered by the Supreme C
upon its own will and caprice, MERALCO acted with utmost bad faith.

17. [BF Homes and PWCC] are clearly entitled to the remedies under the law to compel MERALCO to consider [BF
PWCC’s] electric bills fully paid by the amounts which MERALCO was ordered to refund to [BF Homes and PWCC]
MERALCO Refund cases, to enjoin MERALCO to reconnect electric power to all of [BF Homes and PWCC’s] water
order MERALCO to desist from further cutting off power connection to [BF Homes and PWCC’s] water pumps.

18. MERALCO’s unjust and oppressive acts have cast dishonor upon [BF Homes and PWCC’s] good name and bes
reputation for which [BF Homes and PWCC] should be indemnified by way of moral damages in the amount of not le
₱1,000,000.00.

19. As an example for the public good, to dissuade others from emulating MERALCO’s unjust, oppressive and merc
MERALCO should be directed to pay [BF Homes and PWCC] exemplary damages of at least ₱1,000,000.00.
20. MERALCO’s oppressive and inequitable conduct forced [BF Homes and PWCC] to engage the services of counsel to defend
thereby incur litigation expenses in the amount of at least ₱500,000.00 for which [BF Homes and PWCC] should be indemnified

BF Homes and PWCC additionally prayed that the RTC issue a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order co

21. As indicated in its letter dated June 4, 2003 (Annex A), unless seasonably restrained, MERALCO will cut off elec
connections to all of [BF Homes and PWCC’s] water pumps on June 20, 2003.

22. Part of the reliefs herein prayed for is to restrain MERALCO from cutting off electric power connections to [BF Ho
PWCC’s] water pumps.

23. Unless MERALCO’S announced intention to cut off electric power connections to [BF Homes and PWCC’s] wate
restrained, [BF Homes and PWCC] will suffer great and irreparable injury because they would not [be] able to supply
customers.

24. [BF Homes and PWCC] therefore pray that a writ for preliminary injunction be issued upon posting of a bond in a
be determined by this Honorable Court.

25. [BF Homes and PWCC] further pray that, in the meantime and immediately upon the filing of the above captioned Petition,
be issued before the matter of preliminary injunction can be heard.8

On August 15, 2003, MERALCO filed before the RTC its Answer with Counterclaims and Opposition to the Application for Writ o
Injunction9 of BF Homes and PWCC.

According to MERALCO:

2.2. Both petitioners BF Homes, Incorporated and Philippine Waterworks Corporation are admittedly the registered c
[MERALCO] by virtue of the service contracts executed between them under which the latter undertook to supply ele
the former for a fee. The following twenty-three (23) Service Identification Nos. (SINs) are registered under the name
Incorporated: x x x. While the following twenty-one (21) Service Identification Nos. (SINs) are registered under the n
Waterworks Construction Corporation: x x x

xxxx

2.4. The service contracts as well as the terms and conditions of [MERALCO’s] service as approved by BOE [Board
ERC [Energy Regulatory Commission], provide in relevant parts, that [BF Homes and PWCC] agree as follows:

DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE:

The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the customer is in arrears in the payment of bills or fo
the adjusted bills in those cases where the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy consume
comply with any of these terms and conditions, or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company. Before disconne
the case of, or to prevent fraud, the Company may adjust the bill of said customer accordingly and if the adjusted bil
Company may disconnect the same." (Emphasis supplied)
2.5. This contractual right of [MERALCO] to discontinue electric service for default in the payment of its regular bills
approved by the rules and regulations of ERB (now the ERC). This right is necessary and reasonable means to prop
enable [MERALCO] to perform and discharge its legal and contractual obligation under its legislative franchise and t
service for non-payment by the customers of the regular monthly electric bills is the only practical way a public utility
[MERALCO], can ensure and maintain efficient service in accordance with the terms and conditions of its legislative
law.

xxxx

2.14. Instead of paying their unpaid electric bills and before [MERALCO] could effect its legal and contractual right to
Homes and PWCC’s] electric services, [BF Homes and PWCC] filed the instant petition to avoid payment of [MERAL
legal claim for regular monthly electric bills.

2.15. [BF Homes and PWCC’s] unpaid regular bills totaled P6,551,969.55 covering the May and June 2003 electric

xxxx

2.17. [BF Homes and PWCC] knew that [MERALCO] is already in the process of implementing the decision of the Supreme Cour
case. But this refund has to be implemented in accordance with the guidelines and schedule to be approved by the ERC. Thus [
PWCC’s] filing of the instant petition is merely to evade payment of their unpaid electric bills to [MERALCO].10

Hence, MERALCO sought the dismissal of the RTC Petition of BF Homes and PWCC on the following grounds:

3.1 The Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to award the relief prayed for by [BF Homes and PWCC] because:

a) The petition is in effect preempting or defeating the power of the ERC to implement the decision of the Supreme C

b) [MERALCO] is a utility company whose business activity is wholly regulated by the ERC. The latter, being the reg
the government having the authority over the respondent, is the one tasked to approve the guidelines, schedules an
refund.

c) The decision of the Supreme Court, dated November 15, 2002, clearly states that respondent is directed to make
customers in accordance with the decision of the ERC (formerly ERB) dated February 16, 1998. Hence, [MERALCO
the schedule and details of the refund to be approved by the ERC before it can comply with the Supreme Court deci

3.2. [MERALCO] has the right to disconnect the electric service to [BF Homes and PWCC] in that:

a) The service contracts between [MERALCO] and [BF Homes and PWCC] expressly authorize the former to discon
disconnect electric services of the latter for their failure to pay the regular electric bills rendered.

b) It is [MERALCO’s] legal duty as a public utility to furnish its service to the general public without arbitrary discrimination and
[MERALCO] is obligated to discontinue and disconnect electric services to [BF Homes and PWCC] for their refusal or failure to p
energy actually used by them.11

For its compulsory counterclaims, MERALCO prayed that the RTC orders BF Homes and PWCC to pay MERALCO
actual damages (representing the unpaid electric bills of BF Homes and PWCC for May and June 2003), ₱1,500,000
damages, ₱1,500,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Lastly, MERALCO opposed the application for writ of preliminary injunction of BF Homes and PWCC because:

[MERALCO] HAS THE LEGAL AND CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO DEMAND PAYMENT OF THE ELECTRIC BILLS A
NON-PAYMENT, TO DISCONTINUE THE ELECTRIC SERVICES OF [BF HOMES and PWCC]

II

[BF HOMES and PWCC] HAVE NO CLEAR RIGHT WHICH WARRANTS PROTECTION BY INJUNCTIVE PROCES

After hearing,12 the RTC issued an Order on November 21, 2003 granting the application of BF Homes and PWCC for the issuan
preliminary injunction. The RTC found that the records showed that all requisites for the issuance of said writ were sufficiently
Homes and PWCC. The RTC stated in its Order:

Albeit, this Court respects the right of a public utility company like MERALCO, being a grantee of a legislative franchise under R
9029, to collect overdue payments from its subscribers or customers for their respective consumption of electric energy, such r
succumb to the paramount substantial and constitutional rights of the public to the usage and enjoyment of waters in their com
there is an urgent need for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in order to prevent social unrest in the community f
deprived of the use and enjoyment of waters flowing through [BF Homes and PWCC’s] water pumps.13

The RTC decreed in the end:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, [BF Homes and PWCC’s] prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
Respondent Manila Electric Company is permanently restrained from proceeding with its announced intention to cut-off electr
connection to [BF Homes and PWCC’s] water pumps unless otherwise ordered by this Court. Further, [BF Homes and PWCC] ar
post a bond in the amount of ₱500,000 to answer for whatever injury or damage that may be caused by reason of the prelimin

The Motion for Reconsideration of MERALCO of the aforementioned Order was denied by the RTC in another Order issued on J
2004.15 The RTC reiterated its earlier finding that all the requisites for the proper issuance of an injunction had been fully com
Homes and PWCC, thus:

Records indubitably show that all the requisites for the proper issuance of an injunction have been fully complied wit
case.

It should be noted that a disconnection of power supply would obviously cause irreparable injury because the pumps that supp
community will be without electricity, thereby rendering said community without water. Water is a basic and endemic necessit
its enjoyment and use has been constitutionally safeguarded and protected. Likewise, a community without water might creat
which situation this Court has the mandate to prevent. There is an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the inju
prevent serious damage to the guaranteed rights of [BF Homes and PWCC] and the residents of the community to use and enjo

The RTC resolved the issue on jurisdiction raised by MERALCO, as follows:

As to the jurisdictional issue raised by respondent MERALCO, it can be gleaned from a re-evaluation and re-assessment of the r
Court has jurisdiction to delve into the case. This Court gave both parties the opportunity to be heard as they introduced evide
propriety of the issuance of the injunctive writ. It is well-settled that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to its issu
was not deprived of its day in court as it was heard and had exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses. (National M
Workers Union vs. Valero, 132 SCRA 578, 1984.)17

Aggrieved, MERALCO filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, do
G.R. SP No. 82826. MERALCO sought the reversal of the RTC Orders dated November 21, 2003 and January 9, 20
of preliminary injunction in favor of BF Homes and PWCC. MERALCO asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction ove
BF Homes and PWCC for issuance of such a writ.

In its Decision dated October 27, 2005, the Court of Appeals agreed with MERALCO that the RTC had no jurisdictio
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 03-0151, as said trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the c
It ratiocinated in this wise:

For one, it cannot be gainsaid that the ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Explicitly, Section 4
Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act," (RA 9136), states that the ERC shall ha
and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines and penalties imposed by the ERC in the exerc
functions and responsibilities and over all cases involving disputes between and among participants or players in the
Section 4(o) of Rule 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9136 likewise provides that the ERC shall a
empowered to issue such other rules that are essential in the discharge of its functions as an independent quasi-jud

For another, the respondent judge, instead of presiding over the case, should have dismissed the same and yielded
ERC pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It is plain error on the part of the respondent judge to determine
otherwise, a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially s
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion.

Needless to state, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where the administrative agency, as in the case of ERC
quasi-judicial and adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer
administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not dete
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of
the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fac
of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered.

Verily, the cause of action of [BF Homes and PWCC] against [MERALCO] originates from the Meralco Refund Decis
the perceived right of the former to compel the latter to set-off or apply their refund to their present electric bill. The i
the right of the private respondents to collect their refund without submitting to the approved schedule of the ERC, a
unto themselves preferential right over other equally situated consumers of [MERALCO]. Perforce, the ERC, as can
the afore-stated legal provisions, has primary, original and exclusive jurisdiction over the said controversy.

Indeed, the respondent judge glaringly erred in enjoining the right of [MERALCO] to disconnect its services to [BF H
on the premise that the court has jurisdiction to apply the provisions on compensation or set-off in this case. Althoug
recognizes the right of [BF Homes and PWCC] to the refund as provided in the Meralco Refund Decision, it is the ER
authority to implement the same according to its approved schedule, it being a dispute arising from the exercise of it
Moreover, it bears to stress that the Meralco Refund Decision was brought into fore by the Decision dated 16 February 1998 of
Energy Regulatory Board) granting refund to [MERALCO’s] consumers. Being the agency of origin, the ERC has the jurisdiction t
Besides, as stated, it is empowered to promulgate rules that are essential in the discharge of its functions as an independent qu

The dispositive portion of the judgment of the appellate court reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders REVERSED and SET AS
the writ of injunction against [MERALCO] is hereby DISSOLVED. No costs.19

In a Resolution dated February 7, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of BF Homes a
failing to raise new and persuasive and meritorious arguments.

Now, BF Homes and PWCC come before this Court via the instant Petition, raising the following assignment of error

1. The Court of Appeals ERRED in saying that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion by issuing
of injunction pending the merits of the case including the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

2. The Court of Appeals ERRED in saying that the ERC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction has the original an
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a petition for injunction to prevent electrical disconnection to a customer entitled to

3. The Court of Appeals ERRED in NOT SAYING that the ERC as a quasi-judicial body under RA 9136 has no powe
injunctive relief or remedy to prevent disconnection.

4. The Court of Appeals ERRED in not resolving the issue as to the violation of MERALCO of a standing injunction order while th
undecided.20

At the core of the Petition is the issue of whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 03-0151 lies w
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). If it is with the RTC, then the said trial court also has jurisdiction to issue the
injunction against MERALCO. If it is with the ERC, then the RTC also has no jurisdiction to act on any incidents in C
0151, including the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of BF Homes and PWCC therein.

BF Homes and PWCC argued that due to the threat of MERALCO to disconnect electric services, BF Homes and P
recourse but to seek an injunctive remedy from the RTC under its general jurisdiction. The merits of Civil Case No. 0
yet in issue, only the propriety of issuing a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent an irreparable injury. Even grantin
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 03-0151, the ERC by enabling law has no injunctive pow
disconnection by MERALCO of electric services to BF Homes and PWCC.

The Petition has no merit.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.21 Republic v. Court of Appeals22 als
only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies.
Related to the foregoing and equally well-settled is the rule that the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof, as wel
agency of the government has jurisdiction over the same, are determined by the material allegations of the complaint in relatio
involved and the character of the reliefs prayed for, whether or not the complainant/plaintiff is entitled to any or all of such rel
demand for relief is not part of the petition of the cause of action; nor does it enlarge the cause of action stated or change the
is alleged. In determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, the better policy is to consider not only the status or relation
but also the nature of the action that is the subject of their controversy.23

In Manila Electric Company v. Energy Regulatory Board,24 the Court traced the legislative history of the regulatory agencies wh
ERC, presenting a summary of these agencies, the statutes or issuances that created them, and the extent of the jurisdiction co
viz:

1. The first regulatory body, the Board of Rate Regulation (BRR), was created by virtue of Act No. 1779. Its regulator
Section 5 of the law was limited to fixing or regulating rates of every public service corporation.

2. In 1913, Act No. 2307 created the Board of Public Utility Commissioners (BPUC) to take over the functions of the
provision of Act No. 2307, the BPUC was vested with jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public utilities and
and franchises.

3. On November 7, 1936, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 146, or the Public Service Act (PSA), was passed creating
Commission (PSC) to replace the BPUC. Like the BPUC, the PSC was expressly granted jurisdiction, supervision an
public services, with the concomitant authority of calling on the public force to exercise its power, to wit:

"SEC. 13. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Commission shall have general supervision and regulation of, ju
control over, all public utilities, and also over their property, property rights, equipment, facilities and franchises so fa
necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act, and in the exercise of its authority it shall have th
powers and the aid of the public force x x x."

Section 14 of C.A. No. 146 defines the term "public service" or "public utility" as including "every individual, copartne
corporation or joint-stock company, . . . that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or control within the Philipp
compensation, any common carrier, x x x, electric light, heat, power, x x x, when owned, operated and managed for
service within the Philippines x x x." Under the succeeding Section 17(a), the PSC has the power even without prior

(a) To investigate, upon its own initiative, or upon complaint in writing, any matter concerning any public service as r
under its jurisdiction; to require any public service to furnish safe, adequate and proper service as the public interest
warrant, to enforce compliance with any standard, rule, regulation, order or other requirement of this Act or of the Co

4. Then came Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1, reorganizing the national government and implementing the Integrat
Plan. Under the reorganization plan, jurisdiction, supervision and control over public services related to electric light,
heretofore vested in the PSC were transferred to the Board of Power and Waterworks (BOPW).

Later, P.D. No. 1206 abolished the BOPW. Its powers and function relative to power utilities, including its authority to
relief, were transferred to the newly-created Board of Energy (BOE).
5. On May 8, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 172 reconstituting the BOE into the ERB, transferring the
and powers under P.D. No. 1206 to the latter and consolidating in and entrusting on the ERB "all the regulatory and adjudicator
covering the energy sector." Section 14 of E.O. No. 172 states that "(T)he applicable provisions of [C.A.] No. 146, as amended, o
the ‘Public Service Act’; x x x and [P.D.] No. 1206, as amended, creating the Department of Energy, shall continue to have full fo
except insofar as inconsistent with this Order."25

Thereafter, on June 8, 2001, Republic Act No. 9136, known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), was ena
framework for restructuring the electric power industry. One of the avowed purposes of the EPIRA is to establish a strong and
regulatory body. The Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) was abolished and its powers and functions not inconsistent with the prov
were expressly transferred to the ERC.26

The powers and functions of the ERB not inconsistent with the EPIRA were transferred to the ERC by virtue of Secti
the EPIRA, which read:

Sec. 44. Transfer of Powers and Functions. – The powers and functions of the Energy Regulatory Board not inconsi
provisions of this Act are hereby transferred to the ERC. The foregoing transfer of powers and functions shall include
funds and appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel as may be necessary.

Sec. 80. Applicability and Repealing Clause. – The applicability provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amend
known as the "Public Service Act." Republic Act 6395, as amended, revising the charter of NPC; Presidential Decree
amended, referred to as the National Electrification Decree; Republic Act 7638, otherwise known as the "Departmen
1992"; Executive Order 172, as amended, creating the ERB; Republic Act 7832 otherwise known as the "Anti-Electr
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994"; shall continue to have full force and effect except insofar as the
with this Act.

The provisions with respect to electric power of Section 11(c) of Republic Act 7916, as amended, and Section 5(f) of
7227, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Presidential Decree No. 40 and all laws, decrees, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Ac
repealed or modified accordingly.

In addition to the foregoing, the EPIRA also conferred new powers upon the ERC under Section 43, among which ar

SEC. 43. Functions of the ERC. – The ERC shall promote competition, encourage market development, ensure cus
penalize abuse of market power in the restructured electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC is authorized t
desist order after due notice and hearing. Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the following key functions in t
industry:

xxxx
(f) In the public interest, establish and enforce a methodology for setting transmission and distribution wheeling rates
for the captive market of a distribution utility, taking into account all relevant considerations, including the efficiency o
the regulated entities. The rates must be such as to allow the recovery of just and reasonable costs and a reasonab
base (RORB) to enable the entity to operate viably. The ERC may adopt alternative forms of internationally-accepted
methodology as it may deem appropriate. The rate-setting methodology so adopted and applied must ensure a reas
electricity. The rates prescribed shall be non-discriminatory. To achieve this objective and to ensure the complete rem
subsidies, the cap on the recoverable rate of system losses prescribed in Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7832, is he
and shall be replaced by caps which shall be determined by the ERC based on load density, sales mix, cost of servi
voltage and other technical considerations it may promulgate. The ERC shall determine such form of rate-setting me
shall promote efficiency. x x x.

xxxx

(u) The ERC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines and penaltie
ERC in the exercise of the abovementioned powers, functions and responsibilities and over all cases involving dispu
among participants or players in the energy sector.

All notices of hearings to be conducted by the ERC for the purpose of fixing rates or fees shall be published at least
successive weeks in two (2) newspapers of nationwide circulation.

A careful review of the material allegations of BF Homes and PWCC in their Petition before the RTC reveals that the
matter thereof is the off-setting of the amount of refund they are supposed to receive from MERALCO against the el
to pay to the same company. This is squarely within the primary jurisdiction of the ERC.

The right of BF Homes and PWCC to refund, on which their claim for off-setting depends, originated from the MERA
cases. In said cases, the Court (1) authorized MERALCO to adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of ₱0.017 per kil
effective with respect to its billing cycles beginning February 1994; and (2) ordered MERALCO to refund to its custom
said customers’ favor for future consumption ₱0.167 per kilowatthour, starting with the customers’ billing cycles that
1998, in accordance with the ERB Decision dated February 16, 1998.

It bears to stress that in the MERALCO Refund cases, this Court only affirmed the February 16, 1998 Decision of th
(predecessor of the ERC) fixing the just and reasonable rate for the electric services of MERALCO and granting refu
consumers of the amount they overpaid. Said Decision was rendered by the ERB in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
the just and reasonable rate of power utilities such as MERALCO.

Presently, the ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Rule 43(u) of the EPIRA over all cases contesting ra
and penalties imposed by the ERC in the exercise of its powers, functions and responsibilities, and over all cases in
between and among participants or players in the energy sector. Section 4(o) of the EPIRA Implementing Rules and
provides that the ERC "shall also be empowered to issue such other rules that are essential in the discharge of its fu
independent quasi-judicial body."

Indubitably, the ERC is the regulatory agency of the government having the authority and supervision over MERALC
to approve the guidelines, schedules, and details of the refund by MERALCO to its consumers, to implement the jud
Court in the MERALCO Refund cases, also falls upon the ERC. By filing their Petition before the RTC, BF Homes an
to collect their refund without submitting to the approved schedule of the ERC, and in effect, enjoy preferential right
equally situated MERALCO consumers.
Administrative agencies, like the ERC, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such as are specifically
the enabling statutes. In relation thereto is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction involving matters that demand the special comp
administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in nature. Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy
question within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially when the question demands the sound exercise of adm
discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intric
The court cannot arrogate into itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction of which is initially lodged with the
of special competence.27

Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Petition of BF Homes and PWCC in Civil Case No. 03-0151, then it was also devoid of
on the application of BF Homes and PWCC for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction contained in the same Petition. T
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction cannot exist except only as an incident of an independent action or proceeding.28

Incidentally, BF Homes and PWCC seemed to have lost sight of Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172 which explicit
ERB, as an incident of its principal function, the authority to grant provisional relief, thus:

Section 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief. — The Board may, upon the filing of an application, petition or comp
stage thereafter and without prior hearing, on the basis of supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, grant pro
motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after hearing, should the Bo
pleadings, together with such affidavits, documents and other evidence which may be submitted in support of the m
support the provisional order: Provided, That the Board shall immediately schedule and conduct a hearing thereon w
days thereafter, upon publication and notice to all affected parties.

The aforequoted provision is still applicable to the ERC as it succeeded the ERB, by virtue of Section 80 of the EPIR
preliminary injunction is one such provisional relief which a party in a case before the ERC may move for.

Lastly, the Court herein already declared that the RTC not only lacked the jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary
MERALCO, but that the RTC actually had no jurisdiction at all over the subject matter of the Petition of BF Homes a
Case No. 03-0151. Therefore, in addition to the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, th
deems it appropriate to already order the dismissal of the Petition of BF Homes and PWCC in Civil Case No. 03-015
jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the same. Although only the matter of the writ of preliminary injunct
before this Court in the instant Petition, the Court is already taking cognizance of the issue on the jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the Petition. The Court may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction. The Court has discretio
whether the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 03-0151 since, to reiterate, jurisdiction over the sub
conferred only by law. Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omis
parties. Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer jurisdiction on the RTC wh
none over a cause of action.29 Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has
action.30

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of App
SP No. 82826 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 202 of Las Piñas City, is
dismiss the Petition [With Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and for the Immediate Issuance o
Order] of BF Homes, Inc. and Philippine Waterworks and Construction Corporation in Civil Case No. 03-0151. Costs
Homes, Inc. and Philippine Waterworks and Construction Corporation.
G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS, ISIDRO GILBOLING
AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents.

Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner.

Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this petition — the correct application of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within
the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring
on September 31, 1992.

On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of
forestry laws and regulations.

The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for injunction wi
damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian
City.

The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complain
2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited
by section 1 of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987, 1 and the motion for reconsideration on
February 15, 1988. 2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained th
trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988, 3 and in its resolution of September 27, 1988, denying the motion for
reconsideration. 4

The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and
pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court foun
that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention, which it explained
thus:
The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City Council of Pagadian in its Resolution No. 111
requested the Bureau of Forest Development to reserve 1,000 hectares in Lison Valley. This request remained
unacted upon. Instead in 1982, a TLA covering 29,500 hectares, including the area requested, was given to petitione

Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its resolution became reality.

"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging operations of the defendant has caused heavy
siltation not only in the Labangan River (as predicted by the City Council of Pagadian City in 1981) but also in the
Tukuran River, Salug River, Sindangan River, and Sibuguey River. In other words, the adverse effects of the logging
operations of the defendant have already covered a wider area than that feared to be adversely affected by the City
Council of Pagadian City.

Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas years back, particularly in the Island of Mindanao. When
the grant of logging concessions started, so was the denudation of forests. . . . It is common knowledge that heavy
floods have occurred in areas/places adjoining logging concessions. (Resolution dated December 11, 1987, p. 5).

Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable damage would ensue unless the court
intervenes. Reliance on the DENR may not be enough, judging from its inaction on the council's request seven year
back.

The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara v. Cloribel, 5 where "irreparable damage
and injury" was allowed as an exceptional ground, and Arrow Transportation Corporation v. Board of
Transportation, 6 where the doctrine was waived because of "the strong public interest in having the matter settled" a
soon as possible.

The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:

Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval,
revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions,
licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization,
exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.

This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts by Article VIII,
Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 7 where several
presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just
compensation in expropriation cases.

The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was no
correctly applied and that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authoritie
in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of
justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds
allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke
operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the
case as if the doctrine had been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming
policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other
departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their
particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a
chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil
actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a
considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets. 9

As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be
dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the
question raised is purely legal; 10 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 11 3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; 12 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 13 5) when the claim involved is small; 14 6)
when irreparable damage will be suffered; 15 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 16 8) whe
strong public interest is involved; 17 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; 18 and 10) in quo
warranto proceedings. 19

The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry laws do not
require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question they are raising is purely
legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and public interest is involved.

We rule for the petitioner.

Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative remedies, the
reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such reason
were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and
function "to regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of the public domain," 20 and in the
Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of th
forestry laws aid regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies a
the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under its
express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.

The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private responden
have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court
Pagadian City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws
and regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such eviden
is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and
the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review.
As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the national
interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these extraordinary
circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort t
the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flat against the petitioner's uncontested contention
that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the DENR.

In the Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner alleged that its logging operations had been
suspended pursuant to a telegram 22 received on February 23, 1988, by the District Forester from the Regional Executive
Director of the DENR, Zamboanga City; reading as follows:

DISTRICT FORESTER
PAGADIAN CITY

QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1988 FROM SECRETARY FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR. QUOTE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY CMA SUSPEND ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS OF SUNVILL
IN VIEW OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FOREST PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION UNQUOTE SUBMIT
REPORT ASAP.

RED BATCAGAN

The petition now before us contains the allegations that the "petition for cancellation of petitioner's TLA is still pending up to
this date and that petitioner's logging operations (were) ordered suspended by the Secretary of the DENR pending further
investigation." 23

In the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed that "the Secretary of the DENR suspended
petitioner's logging operations until further investigation. The suspension is still in force up to this date after the lapse of almos
3 years." 24

These statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their pleadings before the respondent court
and this Court and are therefore deemed admitted.

There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as
the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the
petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had
indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the Fore
Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of
the issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a
court of justice.

In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to declare the unconstitutionality
Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of constitutionality must be avoided where the case can be decided on some
other available ground, 25 as we have done in the case before us. The resolution of this same question must await another cas
where all the indispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily established. In such a
event, it will be time for the Court "to make the hammer fall, and heavily," in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated July 4, 1988, and its resolution
dated September 27, 1988, as well as the resolutions of the trial court dated December 11, 1987 and February 15,
1988, are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City is hereb
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 103953. March 25, 1999.]

SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG KAPDULA, INC., Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PONCIANO
AQUILINO DUCUSIN, EUFEMIO CABINGAN, LEONARDO DIAZ, REYNALDO PEREZ, SERAPIO FIRME, RICARDO BRAZA, ANTONIO
ROMULO BUILT-IN, EULOGIO PARAÑAQUE, JR., AGAPITO DUCUSIN, DELFIN DUCUSIN, REYNALDO GARCIA, MARTIN SALAZAR
LAYON, CIRIACO ABEJERO, BASILIO BUILT-IN, FERLITA BUILT-IN, RUFINA BUILT-IN, BONIFACIO BUILT-IN, LUNINGNING BU
LEONARDO BEJESON, REGENTOR COTONER, DANILO GONZALES, EMILIO DUCUSIN, GERMAN DUCUSIN, MARCIANO BACAY
DUCUSIN, LEONARDO DUCUSIN, ALEJANDRO DUCUSIN, SERGIO DUCUSIN, WILLIE CADESALE, MARTIN DE LA CUESTA, DO
ORENSE, CRESENCIANA LOPEZ, PONCIANO BELTRAN, JUN DOYOLA, DONATO CRUZ, MIGUEL BUGAGAO, LUCIO ILAO, AL
COSTACIO, HILARION CARAIG, LARRY DE LA VEGA, RAYMUNDO SOBEJANO, AVELINO DUCUSIN, RESENDO DUCUSIN, VICENT
BONGBONG BACAY, DONATO CASCANO, EDGARDO DUCUSIN, OLIVER DUCUSIN, ARMANDO BEJESON, ROMEO OBIAS, JO
LALAGON, ROGELIO SEVILLA, MICHAEL DUCUSIN, MAURA BUILT-IN, ERNESTO MOGAR, FILEMON ANARNA, RUPERTO ILAO,
MENDOZA, CARLOS MENDOZA, ALFREDO DRIZ, MARIO CABINGAN, JUAN SOMBILLO, EUGENIO MERCADO, CECILIO BENIG,
LUYAS, ALFONSO BULAHAN, ADAM CARBADILLA, PEPITO CADESALE, LIWAYWAY CAPARAS, EVARISTO CREUS, RAUL GONZAG
GONZAGA, SANO ADION, REYNALDO ZORINO, WILFREDO ALILING, and BERNARDO ASUNCION, Respondents-Appell

DECISION

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of A
CA-G.R. SP No. 26173.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

The facts that matter are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Macario Aro was the former owner of two (2) parcels of agricultural land with an aggregate area of 168.7 hectares, more or les
Barangay Malinta, Dasmariñas, Cavite. The members of petitioner Samahang Magbubukid Ng Kapdula, Inc. were the tenants o
(2) parcels of land.

Sometime in 1979 or 1980, Mr. Aro sold the said parcels of land to Arrow Head Golf Club, Inc., which was founded by Ricardo S
envisioned to establish a car assembly plant within the area. In the process, the members of petitioner were evicted. But the
establishment of a car assembly plant in the place never materialized.

The parcels of land in question were later leased to the spouses, Ruben Rodriguez and Gloria Bugagao, for a term of seven (7) y
July 8, 1983 to July 8, 1990, 2 and were then developed into a sugarcane plantation, with the herein private respondents as the
farmworkers.

On July 13, 1984, the same property was acquired by the Philippine National Bank ("PNB") at a Sheriff’s auction sale. 3
In 1986, the members of petitioner sought the assistance of the former Ministry of Agrarian Reform ("MAR"), now Departmen
Agrarian Reform ("DAR"), through then Minister Heherson Alvarez, for their reinstatement as farmworkers thereon, but nothin
of such efforts.

The ownership of subject parcels of land was later transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust ("APT") which conveyed the same
19, 1991 to the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DAR. 4

On March 26, 1991, in furtherance of its objective of instituting agrarian reform in the country, the DAR issued Certificate of La
Ownership ("CLOA") Nos. 1116 5 and 1117 6 for the said parcels of land in favor of the petitioner.

On September 27, 1991, the private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the issuance
CLOAs to the petitioner.

On January 30, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, disposing thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in that the respondent Department of Agrarian Reform be directed to conduct
and/or investigation, with due notice to the herein petitioners, to determine the rightful beneficiaries of the subject parcels of
accordance with R.A. No. 6657 or the CARP; and to cause the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. CLOA-1116 a
the name of private respondent, should private respondent be found not entitled to the subject parcels of land." 7

Dissatisfied therewith, the petitioner has come to this Court to assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals, contending that:cha
virtual 1aw library

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRAT
REMEDIES.

I-A

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO BE
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED PRECEDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE AWARDS.

I-B

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT DETERMINATION OF QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES IS A DECISION OF THE S
AND THAT RESORTING TO THE DAR ADJUDICATION BOARD TO QUESTION SUCH DECISION IS UNAVAILING.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THERE WAS FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS IN THE ISSUANCE OF TC
CLOA-1116 AND CLOA-1117 IN THE NAME OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
II-A

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFOR
ABSENT EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.

III

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE DAR TO CONDUCT A HEARING AND/OR INVESTIGATION, WITH DUE NOTIC
HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, TO DETERMINE THE RIGHTFUL BENEFICIARIES OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND IN ACCORD
R.A. NO. 6657, AND TO CAUSE THE CANCELLATION OF TCT NOS. CLOA-1116 AND CLOA-1117 IN THE NAME OF HEREIN PETITIO
SHOULD IT BE FOUND NOT ENTITLED THERETO.

III-A

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING RESPECT AND REGARDING WITH FINALITY THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF DAR.

IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ITS FINDING
WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.

Petitioner-appellant’s submissions boil down to two pivotal issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Whether or not there was observance of due process by the Department of Agrarian Reform prior to the issuance of CLOA N
and 1117 in favor of petitioner; and

2. Whether there was a need for the private respondents to exhaust administrative remedies before filing their petition for cer
the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner contends that before taking recourse to the Court of Appeals, the private respondents should have first exhausted al
administrative remedies available to them. On the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, the respondent court
have dismissed the petition of private respondents. To buttress its stance, petitioner cited Section 50 8 of Republic Act No. 665
6657") and Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of DAR Adjudication Board 9 vesting the DAR and DAR Adjudication Board ("D
with jurisdiction to resolve agrarian reform disputes, including the issuance of CLOAs.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, opined that determination by Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform as to t
beneficiaries has the effect of a final ruling or award by the DAR itself and therefore, resort to DARAB to question the ruling of
Secretary would be improper. There is thus no need to exhaust administrative remedies, under the premises.

From the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure, it can be gleaned that decisions of the DAR Secretary cannot be questioned befo
Pertinent rules, provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
"SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdic
original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involvin
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 a
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their imp
rules and regulations.

Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x

(c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or decisions of DAR officials other than the Secretary, lease contrac
of sale or their amendments under the administration and disposition of the DAR and LBP;" (Rule II, DARAB Revised Rules of Pr
(Emphasis ours)

From the foregoing, it is decisively clear that DARAB may only entertain appeals from decisions or orders of DAR officials other
Secretary. It is also irrefutable that the issuance of subject CLOAs constituted a decision of the Secretary, who issued and signe
10

Consequently, the propriety of the recourse by private respondents to the respondent court on a petition for certiorari, to assa
issuance by the DAR of the CLOAs in question, is beyond cavil. Under Section 54 of RA 6657, decisions and awards of the DAR m
brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari. 11

Time and again, this court has ruled that in cases of denial of due process, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is u
12 The aggrieved party may seek judicial relief outright.

But was there a denial of due process under the attendant facts and circumstances? Respondent court found that herein privat
respondents were denied the opportunity to ventilate their stance before the DAR. But according to the petitioner, during the
investigation and conferences conducted on the question of inclusion of subject properties in the Comprehensive Agrarian Ref
Program of the government, Mr. Ruben Rodriguez was notified of the same, as evidenced by Annexes "E," 13 "F," 14 "F-1," 15 a
16

Records show, however, that the letter (Annex "E"), which was supposed to be the notice to the private respondents regarding
inclusion of subject properties in the CARP, was ineffective. First of all, the letter of Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Serapio T
to Mr. Ruben Rodriguez indicates no receipt of the same by Mr. Rodriguez nor was it signed by Mr. Magpayo. Secondly, if it was
it was sent too late, the same being dated June 5, 1991, when the said parcels of land had already been awarded to the memb
petitioner. (The CLOAs under controversy were issued on March 26, 1991.) Thirdly, the letter was addressed to Mr. Ruben Rodr
no longer possessed the said properties as his lease thereover ended on July 8, 1990.

There is thus a need for further hearings to determine the beneficiaries of subject parcels of land. In such hearings, the private
respondents, who were deprived of an opportunity to be heard before the DAR, should participate. This is in pursuance of the
of Section 40(4), 17 in relation to Section 22 18 of RA 6657, providing for the order of priority of the qualified beneficiaries of C

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 26173 AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

Romero, Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera and concurred by Associate Justices Alfredo L. Beni
Cancio C. Garcia.

2. See Contract of Lease, Rollo, pp. 212-216.

3. See Deed of Transfer, Rollo, pp. 276-279.

4. Ibid.

5. Rollo, pp. 280-283.

6. Rollo, pp. 284-286.

7. Rollo, pp. 21-26.

8. "SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdic
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over a
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jur
of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (D

x       x       x

9. "SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Boa
have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disput
cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Ag
Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Ac
3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and
implementing rules and regulations.

Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:chanrob1es virtual
library

x       x       x
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of Landownership Aw
(CLOA) and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof;

x x x."cralaw virtua1aw library

10. Supra, footnotes 4 and 5.

11. "SECTION 54. Certiorari. — Any decision, order, award, or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian disp
any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act a
pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari except as oth
provided in this Act within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.

The findings of fact of the DAR shall be final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence."cralaw v
library

12. Reyes v. Subido, 66 SCRA 203.

13. Rollo, p. 31.

14. Rollo, p. 32.

15. Rollo, p. 33.

16. Rollo, p. 34.

17. "SECTION 40. Special Areas of Concern. — As an integral part of the Comprehensive Agrarian Re
Program, the following principles in these special areas of concern shall be observed:chanrob1es virtu
library

x       x       x

(4) Idle, Abandoned, Foreclosed and Sequestered Lands — Idle, abandoned, foreclosed and sequeste
shall be planned for distribution as home lots and family-size farmlots to actual occupants. If land are
permits, other landless families shall be accommodated in these lands."cralaw virtua1aw library

18. "SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. — The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as m
possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of t
municipality in the following order of priority:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;

(b) regular farmworkers;

(c) seasonal farmworkers;

(d) other farmworkers;

(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;

(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and

(g) others directly working on the land.

x       x       x

A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, attitude, and ability to cultivate and mak
land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the record or performanc
beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extende
shall forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the
performance of the beneficiaries to the PARC.

If, due to the landowner’s retention rights or to the number of tenants, lessees, or workers on the lan
is not enough land to accommodate any or some of them, they may be granted ownership of other la
available for distribution under this Act, at the option of the beneficiaries.

Farmers already in place and those not accommodated in the distribution of privately-owned lands wi
given preferential rights in the distribution of lands from the public domain."
G.R. No. 131641 February 23, 2000

NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NAPOLEON V. DILAG, Presiding Judge, RTC-Cavite, Branch XV, ROMEO P.
NAZARENO and ELIZA NAZARENO, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

A writ of execution must conform to the judgment to be executed; it may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks
enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in
harmony with the judgment which gives it life, and in fact exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity. To maintain otherwis
would be to ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property without due process of law.

Adjudication of ownership necessarily includes delivery of possession. Indeed, it would be defeating the ends of just
should we require that for the parties to obtain possession of the property duly adjudged to be theirs from those who
have no right to remain therein, they must submit to court litigations a new.2 An exception however exists where the
actual possessor has shown a valid right over the property enforceable even against the owner thereof.3

On 15 March 1985 Natividad Nazareno filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Damages against spouses
Romeo and Eliza Nazareno. Natividad avers in her complaint that she is the sole and absolute owner of a parcel of
land located in Naic, Cavite, covered by TCT No. 51798 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. Sometime in April 1981
Natividad's brother, Romeo, and his wife Eliza convinced Natividad to lend them TCT No. 51798 to be used as
collateral to a loan the proceeds of which would be used in the completion of the construction of the Naic Cinema on
the subject property. Natividad agreed on the condition that title to her property would be returned within one (1) yea
from the completion of the construction of the cinema. Accordingly, Natividad executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of spouses Romeo and Eliza over the lot covered by TCT No. 51798. The sale, however, was simulated becau
Natividad did not receive any consideration therefor.

The cinema was completed in November 1981 but despite several demands by Natividad, spouses Romeo and Eliz
failed and refused to return Natividad's title to the property; instead, they had the property transferred in their name.
Consequently, TCT No. T-118276 was issued in their name in lieu of TCT No. 51798.

Spouses Romeo and Eliza denied that the property belonged to Natividad. On the contrary, they averred that it
originally formed part of the estate of the late Maximino Nazareno, Jr., father of Romeo and Natividad. According to
Romeo, the property was his share in their inheritance. As regards the deed of sale, he explained that it was only
resorted to for the purpose of carrying out and implementing the transfer of the property forming part of the estate of
Maximino Nazareno Jr., the distribution of which was entrusted to Natividad.

The trial court found for the spouses Romeo and Eliza and ruled that although the Deed of Absolute Sale was
simulated, the same could be treated as an adjudication and a conveyance to Romeo of his share in the estate of hi
father.
But the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise. It found that during pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the Deed of Absolut
Sale between Natividad and spouses Romeo and Eliza was simulated as there was in fact no money consideration.
Consequently, the burden of proof was shifted to Romeo to prove that the transfer was in reality a conveyance of his
share in the estate of his father. But during trial, Romeo failed to prove this so-called conveyance of his share. On th
other hand, Natividad satisfactorily showed that the property was previously sold to her by their late father. Romeo
failed to disprove this fact. Neither did he successfully cause the deed of sale executed by Maximino Nazareno Jr. in
favor of Natividad to be declared null and void. Resultingly, its authenticity and validity remained unrebutted.

In short, the Court of Appeals did not sustain the trial court and set aside its Decision. The Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Natividad in favor of the spouses Romeo and Eliza as well as TCT No. 118276 was declared null and
void. Hence, the Register of Deeds was ordered to restore TCT No. 51798 under the name of Natividad. The case
was brought to us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari but we denied the petition after having ascertained that the
appellate court committed no reversible error. Thus, the Court of Appeals' decision became final and executory on 1
June 1996.

On 7 November 1996 Natividad filed a Manifestation and Motion with the Regional Trial Court of Naic praying for the
issuance of a writ of execution as well as a writ of possession. The spouses Romeo and Eliza filed an Opposition
contending that in her Complaint Natividad never prayed that she be placed in possession of the subject premises.
Neither did the Court of Appeals order that petitioner be placed in possession of the property.

On 21 February 1997 the trial court granted the writ of execution prayed for but denied the issuance of a writ of
possession as it was not included in the decision of the Court of Appeals. Natividad's Motion for Reconsideration wa
denied. Hence, recourse was made to the Court of Appeals.

On 9 September 1997 the Court of Appeals denied the petition thus —

Execution not in harmony with the judgment has no validity. It must conform more particularly to that ordained or
decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision, as the only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of
execution.

Therefore, to issue a writ of possession in favor of petitioner in this case where possession was never decreed in
favor of petitioner, would be void . . .

Moreover, it is a settled rule that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from possession unless sought
connection with (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property; (3) in a judicial
foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in
execution sales.

It is an undisputed fact that this case is for the annulment of a private sale made by petitioner to private responde
This action is not land registration case nor a foreclosure of mortgage whether judicially or extrajudicially nor was
the subject property sold in execution. Petitioner sought for the issuance of a writ of possession in connection with
decision in civil action for annulment of a private sale and damages.4

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition.

Obviously, we have no choice but to deny the petition. Section 49 (c) of Rule 39 (now Sec. 47 (c) of Rule 39) of the
Rules of Court provides:
 Sec. 49. Effect of judgments. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have be
adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

From the aforestated, it is clear that a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also
those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.5 Thus although the dispositive portion of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 12856 provides —

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the Decision appealed from and another is hereby
rendered as follows:

1. The "Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land" (Exhibit "B") and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 118276 (Exhi
"F") under the name of the appellees are hereby declared null and void;

2. The Register of Deeds is hereby ordered to restore Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51798 under the name of th
appellant.6

it is clear that the same resulted from the adjudication of ownership over the disputed lot which is necessarily include
in the discussion. Thus, as explained by the Court of Appeals —

In sum, then, Lot 504-A-3 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51798 was owned by the appellant in her ow
right as vendee and not appellee's share in the estate of their deceased father. Consequently, appellee's claim th
the appellant executed the "Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "B") for the purpose of conveying to the appellee the
latter's share in the estate of their deceased father is utterly bereft of factual basis . . .

Evidently, the decision of the Court of Appeals required writ of possession as the writ of execution would suffice to
place Natividad in possession of Lot 504-A-3. A case in point is Perez v. Evite7 wherein the lower court declared Evit
as owner of the disputed land. When the judgment became final and executory, Evite moved for the issuance of a w
of execution which the trial court granted. Perez moved to quash the writ arguing that the writ was at variance with th
decision as the decision sought to be executed merely declared Evite owner of the property and did not order its
delivery to him. Perez argued citing the cases of Jabon v. Alo8 and Talens v. Garcia9 which held that adjudication of
ownership of the land did not include possession thereof. In resolving in favor of Evite this Court held —

. . . Considering that herein plaintiff-appellants have no other claim to possession of the property apart from their
claim of ownership which was rejected by the lower court and, consequently, has no right to remain thereon after
such ownership was adjudged to defendant-appellees, the delivery of possession of the land should be considere
included in the decision. Indeed, it would be defeating the ends of justice should we require that for herein
appellees to obtain possession of the property duly adjudged to be theirs, from those who have no right to remain
therein, they must submit to court litigations anew.
In the instant case, spouses Romeo and Eliza could not use Jabon v. Alo and Talens v. Garcia to support their
contention that the adjudication of ownership over the land does not necessarily include possession. As already
decreed in Perez v. Evite —

It may be observed that in both decisions (Jabon v. Alo and Talens v. Garcia), this Court underscored the possibili
that the actual possessor has some rights which must be respected and defined. It is thus evident that the
pronouncement was made having in mind cases wherein the actual possessor has a valid right over the property
enforceable even against the owner thereof. As example, we gave the cases of tenants and lessees. However, it
our view that above doctrine may not be invoked in instances where no such right may be appreciated in favor of
the possessor. In the instant case there appears in the appealed order of June 30, 1959, the specific finding of th
trial court that "the plaintiffs have not given any reason why they are retaining the possession of the property" . . .
This factual finding cannot be reviewed in this instance as the appeal has been taken to us directly on a question
law . . . .

The same ruling would apply in the instant case. The Court of Appeals categorically declared that the claim of spous
Romeo and Eliza over the disputed lot has utterly no factual basis. Therefore, they have no reason to remain in
possession of the property.

But the same could not be said of the Naic Cinema. The matter of ownership and possession of the Naic Cinema wa
never put in issue. Consequently, petitioner cannot ask for a writ of possession to place her in physical occupancy o
the Naic Cinema. Being declared owner of subject lot does not also mean that she is automatically entitled to
possession of all the improvements therein. Otherwise, the actual possessor would be deprived of his property witho
due process of law.

Finally, petitioner cannot validly claim possession over the Naic Cinema since in her complaint and subsequent
pleadings, she has admitted not being the owner thereof. On the contrary, she claims that the Naic Cinema belongs
the estate of her father. On the other hand, respondent spouses have asserted dominion over the Naic Cinema.
Plainly, petitioner cannot wrest possession of the moviehouse from respondent spouses through a mere writ of
possession as she herself even disclaims being the owner thereof. Ownership over the Naic Cinema must be thresh
out in a proper proceeding. A mere prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession will not suffice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals denying the issuance of a writ of
possession is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 91551 August 16, 1991

U.P. BOARD OF REGENTS, DR. JOSE V. ABUEVA, in his capacity as U.P. President, DR. ERNESTO O. DOMIN
capacity as Chancellor of U.P. Manila, and the Nomination Committee for the Director of the U.P.-P.G.H. Med
Center, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JAINAL D. RASUL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 69 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, M
DR. FELIPE A. ESTRELLA, JR., respondents.

Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The principal issue in this case is whether or not respondent Dr. Felipe A. Estrella who holds the position of Director
General Hospital (PGH) can invoke security of tenure during his term of office notwithstanding the abolition of the sa
University of the Philippines Board of Regents.

Petitioners seek to annul and set aside the decision dated August 28, 1989 and the order dated October 23, 1989 is
rendered by respondent Judge, Honorable Jainal D. Rasul of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Pasig, Metro Man
dispositive portion of the decision in question reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and by virtue of preponderance of evidence, this Court hereby renders judgm
the plaintiff and against the defendants.

1. Permanently enjoining the Defendants Dr. Jose V. Abueva, in his capacity as UP President; Dr. Ernesto Domingo,
Chancellor of UP-Manila; the Nomination Committee for the Director of the UP-PGH Medical Center and the UP Boa
from proceeding with the nomination of a Medical Director, until the expiration of the term of office of the plaintiff, Dr.
Jr., in his capacity as Director of the PGH or unless sooner removed, for cause provided by law;

2. Permanently enjoining the UP Board of Regents from implementing the so-called Reorganization Plan of UP-PGH
a prior legislative enactment of enabling law authorizing it and finally,

3. Ordering the defendants to pay attorney's fees and litigation expenses for P50,000.00 and the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.1

In an order dated October 23, 1989, the respondent Judge denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the deci
mentioned.

Assailing the above-mentioned rulings, petitioners allege as errors the following:

REASONS FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT

I
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTIO
THAT RESPONDENT ESTRELLA IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTIVE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUA
SECURITY OF TENURE

II

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTIO

THAT THE REORGANIZATION OF U.P. MANILA INCLUDING THE PGH, WAS DONE IN BAD FAITH

III

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTIO

THAT RESPONDENT ESTRELLA NEED NOT EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE HE CAN BRING
THE U.P. BOARD OF REGENTS, ET AL.

IV

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTIO

THAT THE REORGANIZATION PLAN FOR THE U.P. PGH MEDICAL CENTER CANNOT YET BE IMPLEMENTED

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTIO

THAT THE U.P. BOARD OF REGENTS HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REORGANIZE

VI

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTIO

THAT HE CAN SUBSTITUTE HIS OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE U.P. BOARD REGENTS.

VII

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT N
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REORGANIZATION PLAN WILL NOT CAUSE CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO U.P. IN GENERAL AND TO PG

The petition is devoid of merit.

The facts and background of the case as narrated by the trial court are as follows—

That on June 26, 1986, plaintiff Dr. Felipe A. Estrella, Jr., was appointed by the defendant Board of Regents BOR as
Philippine General Hospital, to take effect "1 September 1986 until 30 April 1992"(Exh. "A-14");that the defendant U.
Regents speaking thru its then University Secretary Professor Martin Gregorio intended to have the plaintiff serve hi
Director, since any other arrangement would impede the hospital's development, not to mention the continuity of its
operations (Exh. "A"); that the duties and responsibilities, under Chapter 29, of the Revised Administrative Code, as
Director, inter alia, to direct and manage various activities within the hospital; formulate and implement regulations; d
institutional plans and policies; approve/recommend budget proposals of the hospital; execute contracts; represent t
proper functions; approve and sign warrants, checks, vouchers and recommend or endorse appointments of person
authorities (Exh. "M").
On September 16, 1987, barely two (2) weeks after assuming the presidency of the University of the Philippines def
Abueva submitted a memorandum to the Board of Regents to reorganize the U.P. Manila including the Philippine Ge
with a draft resolution for approval of the Board of Regents, recommending that certain key positions of UP Manila in
plaintiff be declared vacant (Exhs. "C" to "C-3"): that on March 20, 1988, the defendant Board of Regent upon recom
defendants Abueva and Domingo approved the so-called reorganization plan for the Philippine General Hospital.

On April 29, 1988, defendant Dr. Ernesto Domingo acting on instruction of defendant Dr. Jose v. Abueva, U.P. Presid
memorandum creating the Nomination Committee for the UP-PGH Medical Center Director; that on May 10, 1988, d
members of the Nomination Committee thus created, are scheduled to nominate plaintiff s replacement as Director;
on May 2, 1988, plaintiff filed with this Court, his complaint for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction of temporary res
seeking to enjoin defendants Abueva, Domingo, the Nomination Committee and the ITP Board of Regents from proc
nomination of UP-PGH medical Center Director, in order to forestall the consequent removal/dismissal of the plaintif
Estrella, Jr., incumbent PGH Director, even before the expiration of his term of office on April 30, 1992 without any c
law.

On May 2, this Court issued the Restraining Order and on May 30, After due hearing this Court, thru its then Presiding Judge Ho
issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, enjoining defendants from implementing the reorganization plan for the UP-PGH me
"A" Affidavit of plaintiff Dr. Felipe A. Estrella, Jr.; Exh. "10" Affidavit of defendant Dr. Ernesto O. Domingo; TSN pp. 1-23, June 1,
106, June 1, 1989; TSN pp.1-52, June 1, 1989).3

Respondent Judge, based on the evidence presented, concluded that the reorganization of PGH was done in bad fa
the lower court ruled that respondent Dr. Estrella cannot be removed from office as a result of such defective abolitio
to which he was appointed. Significant in this regard is the following pronouncement of the lower court:

Going over the organizational structure of present set-up of the PGH and proposed reorganizational structure, it app
are other minor differences aside from changes of designations and enlargement of functions and powers, namely: (
of Assistant Director for Administration and Assistant Director for Fiscal matters in the present set-up are combined i
position of Assistant Director for Administrative and Fiscal Matters in the reorganization plan; (2) The position of Ass
Health Operation in the present set-up was changed to position of Director of Health Services, directly under the UP
Center Director with one Assistant Director for Allied Medical Services, under it, in the reorganization plan and (3) Th
Departments of Oncology, Out-Patient Department, Emergency Room, Charity Ward and Pay Ward under the prese
converted into Institute of Oncology, Out-Patient Hospital, Emergency Hospital, Charity Hospital and Non-Charity Ho
reorganization plan.

In other words, these five (5) units were merely enlarged, expanded and called hospitals headed each by a Director. The Direct
under the present set-up became Director of UP-PGH Medical Center. Aside from the three changes above and change of desig
transfers of duties, the structure remains substantially the same. The leadership element which the defendant Abueva wants to
Court, encourages reorganization and justifies abolition of positions. But the whole reorganization set-up under our law cannot
the effect of abolishing the position of the plaintiff unless legal requirements are complied with.(Brallo vs. Enage, 94 Phil. 732)
reorganization plan results in abolishing the position of the plaintiff and in putting in his place another one, with substantially t
to say qualifications, in the name of leadership, it will surely be considered a device to unseat the incumbent and to circumven
and statutory prohibition of removal from office of a civil service officer even without cause provided by law. Plaintiffs position
therefore be deemed abolished by mere implication. (Cuneta vs. CA, 1 SCRA 663, 111 Phil. 249) If the abolition of office is mad
constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees, our Supreme Court, has ruled that such abolition is null and void. (G
25972, 2 /26 / 68, 26 SCRA 32)4
Respondent Dr. Estrella was appointed Director of PGH on June 26, 1986 by the LTP Board of Regents.1âwphi1 His
was to be effective September 1, 1986 until April 30, 1992 or unless sooner terminated. Appointees of the LTP Board
enjoy security of tenure during their term of office. In Tapales v. President of the University of the Philippines,5 We he
Tapales who was appointed by the UP Board of Regents as Director of the Conservatory of Music for a term of five (
entitled to security of tenure during his term of office. Likewise, in Sta. Maria v. President Salvador P. Lopez, et. al.,6
removal of Professor Sta. Maria as dean of the College of Education. In that case, Professor Sta. Maria was appoint
Board of Regents as dean of the College of Education effective May 16,1967 until May 17,1972 or unless sooner ter
the expiration of his term of office, President Salvador P. Lopez removed him as dean of the College of Education an
to the office of the UP President. Upholding the right of Professor Sta. Maria to security of tenure, We explained out
dean holding an appointment with a fixed term ... cannot, without his consent, be terminated before the end of his te
asked to give up his post. Nor may he be appointed as dean of another college. Much less can he be transferred to
even if it be dignified with a dean's rank."

Petitioners argue, however, that the abolition of the position of respondent Dr. Estrella Jr. negates his claim to secur
argument is devoid of merit.

It is clear from the record that the PGH itself was not abolished in the reorganization plan approved by the UP Board
PGH was merely renamed "UP-PGH Medical Center" and some of it functions and objectives were expanded or con
is no substantial distinction, in terms of functions, between PGH and the proposed UP-PGH Medical Center.

While PGH itself was not abolished, the position of PGH Director was abolished and in its place, the position of UP-P
Center Director was created. After abolishing said position, it was proposed to be reclassified as Director, Charity ho
five (5) hospital director positions proposed to be created in the reorganized PGH.

The UP Board of Regents acted within the scope and limitations of its charter, Act No. 1870, as amended when it ap
reorganization plan renaming the PGH and expanding and consolidating some of its functions and objectives. The U
Regents did not and could not have abolished PGH. And rightly so. The PGH and one of its component units, the Ca
creations of special laws, the old Administrative, Code (Chapter 29, Secs. 706-707) and Commonwealth Act No. 398
The authority of the UP under Act No. 1870 as amended, to combine two or more colleges in the interest of econom
does not empower UP to abolish offices created by special laws. Section 6(b) of Act No. 1870, al amended, reads as

(b) To provide for the establishment of one or more Colleges of Liberal Arts; a College of Law; a College of Social an
Science; a College of Medicine and Surgery; a College of Pharmacy; a College of Dentistry; a College of Veterinary
College of Engineering; a College of Mines; a College of Agriculture; a College of Education; a School of Fine Arts; a
Forestry; a Conservatory of Music, and such other colleges and schools as the Board of Regents may deem necess
That the Board of Regents may establish these colleges, or any of them, in Manila or in any other place in the Archip
as in its judgment conditions shall favor their opening and finds shall be available for their maintenance: And provide
Board of Regents shall have the power to combine two or more of the colleges authorized by this Act, in the interest
efficiency And provided finally, That the Philippine Medical School as established by Act Numbered Fourteen Hundre
amended, shall become the College of Medicine and Surgery of the Philippine University as soon as two or more co
University of the Philippines shall have been established and in actual operation.

It is therefore clear that the authority of the UP is limited to what is expressly provided in Act No. 1870 as amended,
combine or merge colleges. that is all the law speaks of in such instance.
On the other hand, the power to create and abolish offices carries with it the power to fix the number of positions, salaries, em
provide funds for the operation of the office created.7 This power is inherently legislative in character. The UP Board of Regent
such power. Hence, the abolition of the position of respondent Dr. Estrella is not valid.

It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an office denies to the incumbent the right to security of tenure.8 Howe
the renaming and restructuring of the PGH and its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolitio
of PGH Director. This is because where the abolished office and the offices created in its place have similar function
lacks good faith.9 We hereby apply the principle enunciated in Cesar Z. Dalio vs. Hon. Salvador M. Mison10 that abol
changes the nomenclature of positions is invalid and does not result in the removal of the incumbent.

The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the position of the PGH Director and the creation of a UP-PGH
Director are valid the removal of the incumbent is still not justified for the reason that the duties and functions of the two posi
the same. The UP-PGH Medical Center is essentially the same PGH hence, the Medical Center Director will be performing dutie
the present PGH Director. It cannot be invoked to sustain the argument that respondent is not entitled to security of tenure. In
v. de la Paz,11 the abolition of the position of "Chief of Clinic" and the creation of the position of "Assistant Director, Profession
set aside for the reason that the two positions are basically one and the same except for the change of nomenclature.

The proposal to establish five hospitals within the UP-PGH Medical Center, and with it, the proposal to create five hospital direc
militate against the propriety of giving due course to this petition. As presently organized, there is only one hospital director po
plantilla of positions of the PGH, the PGH Director. In the proposed reorganization, such number will be increased to six, one U
Center Director and five directors for each of the five hospitals proposed to be established namely, the Out-Patient Hospital, Em
Charity Hospital, Non-Charity Hospital and Institute of Oncology. In Guerrero vs. Arizabal,12 We held that the creation of additi
positions in a proposed reorganization is evidence of bad faith and is in violation of Republic Act No. 6656. We hold that the sa
PGH reorganization.

Finally, the admission by petitioner Dr. Jose V. Abueva that the staffing pattern for the reorganized PGH has not been prepared
petitioners' cause. In Dario v. Mison,13 We made the observation that no reorganization of the Bureau of Customs actually too
staffing pattern which could have been the basis for hiring and g was lacking. In this case, petitioners were poised to nominate
PGH Medical Center Director inspite of the absence of a staffing pattern. The absence of such an important element in the reo
contradicts the petitioners' claim of good faith and only proves that petitioners were unreasonably in a hurry to remove respon
his office.

Anent the issue regarding respondent Estrella's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies, We hold that this case
circumstances that made it fall under the jurisprudentially accepted exceptions to the rule. As the facts show, respon
was about to be replaced by the Nomination Committee. He must have believed that airing his protest with the Boar
would only be fruitless and that unless he goes to the courts, irreparable damage or injury on his part will be caused
implementation of the proposed reorganization.

Respondent Judge did not commit any reversible error much less grave abuse of discretion.1âwphi1 The facts as su
evidence established may no longer be disturbed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 28, 1989 and Order dated Octob
respondent Judge are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH
DIMAANO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed
petitioner’s Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano,
while the second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the
reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power
"(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order"
and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP
Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the
active service or retired.2

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a
Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant
part of the Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La
Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of
3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at ₱700,000.00.
The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano
and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in
the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in
the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to
confiscate money in the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at
Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That
respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay
Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent.
That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with
four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and
is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.

Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized in
her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the ₱2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an
intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth.
Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los
Baños, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known.

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the
Board’s consultant. Although the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still
it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of ₱104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth in the amount of ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA
3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise
known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property."3

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No.
1379") 4 against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended
Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and
Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano ("Dimaano") as co-
defendant.

The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On
the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-
typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that
Ramas "acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his
other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his
power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close
associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos."5

The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to
believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379.6 The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the
forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the
Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential
house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at ₱700,000, which was not out of proportion to his
salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.

Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in
the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary
raiding team.

After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.

On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for trial
and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17
and 18 April 1989.

On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order "to charge the delinquent
properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."8

Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioner’s presentation
of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when petitioner would
file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter of the amended
complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held
that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner should proceed to present its
evidence.

After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to
trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present. Instead, petitioner
reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already presented or to change the
averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or properties subject of the
forfeiture.

The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because of
its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when
in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for
presentation of its additional evidence, if any.

During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence. Giving
petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its
evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the
re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take under the circumstances.

However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no
further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days
within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that failure to
act would constrain the court to take drastic action.

Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.9 The Court held in Migrino
that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position
held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos.

On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement
as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary
jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to
which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.

On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11 which involve the same issues.

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against
Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE

CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY,
COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN
RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH
CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR
TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.

B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE
PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not
applicable to this case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or waived
by respondents with the filing of their respective answers with counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they were filed after
commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even before the latter was allowed
to formally offer its evidence and rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY,
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT
DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.12

The Court’s Ruling

First Issue: PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v. Migrino.14

The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing
of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.

We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.

The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the
necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken based on its
findings.16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGG’s power under Section 3 of
EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the
purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following
matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of
their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission
from time to time.

x x x.

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are:
(1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President
Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue
advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x;17 or (2) AFP personnel involved in
other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.18

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas’ case to the PCGG. Therefore,
Ramas’ case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its
jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President
Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that
Ramas’ position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making
him a subordinate of former President Marcos.

We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under
EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is
used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the
term ‘subordinate.’ The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten
wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close
associates both here and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes ‘all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his
wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or
nominees have any interest or participation.’

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

‘[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd.
vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].’

[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.

xxx

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during
the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or
his wife. (Emphasis supplied)

Ramas’ position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General19 does not
suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The
PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the
same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him.
Such close association is manifested either by Ramas’ complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation
of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos’ acquiescence in Ramas’ own
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.

This, the PCGG failed to do.

Petitioner’s attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues
that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted
the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that
there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases
of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former President. However, the same
AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends
with the following recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA
3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise
known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property."20

Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation
to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to
petitioner’s case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its
powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.

Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the
properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his
commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested
that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without showing that
Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact,
admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth
because of his close association with former President Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines did not
categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of
his close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was
not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the
objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in
relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;21 (Emphasis supplied)

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was
accumulated by a "subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 122 clearly
premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was
not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG
pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,24 14,25 14-A:26

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of
Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute
covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic
Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or sequestration of
all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority
and influence, connections or relationships; and

(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth
as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the
foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to
investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise,
jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating
agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor
and his assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions
not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth
amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority
to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General.27 The Ombudsman Act or
Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February
1986.28

After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of a
prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture
filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate
respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to
respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are violations
of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas’ case to the Ombudsman
who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft
cases. As stated in Migrino:

[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private
respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from
proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory
agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers
granted to it.

Petitioner’s argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition
by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.

Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The
PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGG’s powers are specific and
limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGG’s sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.29 Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a
case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute
their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in
Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only filed their
Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of
jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.30 Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this
case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an action.31

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for
violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to
prescription, laches or estoppel.33

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioner’s evidence.

We disagree.

Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only itself to
blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years before
the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to
present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this
sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for
postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13
April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.34 The motion sought "to charge the delinquent properties
(which comprise most of petitioner’s evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired
by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."

The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioner’s evidence since petitioner did
not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the
continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving petitioner
ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested its inability to
proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on
the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case has been ready
for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the government to produce on
scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military to
supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court
has been held to task in public about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage,
when, in view of the developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case
already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate action
could have been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic.35
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation on the
unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.36 The PCGG prayed for an
additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request
and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the scheduled date,
petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly
conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation
of its evidence and to inform the court of "what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x
x."37 Still on the date set, petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its
Re-Amended Complaint.38 The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already pending for years
would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.

Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioner’s delays and yet petitioner ended
the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more
the disposition of the case.

Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss
the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private
respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
forfeiture case against private respondents.

Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioner’s evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaano’s
house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on
petitioner’s case since these properties comprise most of petitioner’s evidence against private
respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if
these properties are inadmissible in evidence.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant
captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid but
Dimaano’s cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt
together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one
baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45;
communications equipment, cash consisting of ₱2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure
"on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution."39 Petitioner argues that a
revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino
people."40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the
1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning
2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under
the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the
government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence
against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No.
3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution."41 The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or
legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the
Philippines, assumed under international law.

The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the
revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986
(immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded
to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because
no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973
Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a
Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court
explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:42

A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or
state by those who were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the
government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence." In Kelsen's
book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal order of a
community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself."

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the
"people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This
revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a people
to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or
institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such
change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It has been said that "the locus
of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state" and from there is derived "the right of the
people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing
constitution."

xxx

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was
met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other
key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and
the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the
Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would
render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government ("PCGG")
before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and
even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the
due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights
of the Freedom Constitution.

In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government,43 petitioner Baseco,
while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, questioned the continued validity of the
sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of
Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the
validity of sequestration orders, thus:

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety of
sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies
and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional approbation and sanction. As
already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution recognizes the power and duty of the
President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties
amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people
through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." And as also already adverted to,
Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the "authority to issue sequestration
or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the
sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to
include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse by
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:

FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the
present amendment.

For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salonga’s lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the
Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga
spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On the other hand, almost as an
afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not the legal niceties, thus
suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or
exceptions.

Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection? The
answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are asking
for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not
say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not
give the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give three reasons:

First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten
constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity
of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the same time
ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of constitutionalism. That would be
hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of law. The New
Society word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when we begin to backslide even before we get there.

Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report asks
for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of Congress, and
Congress may even extend this longer.

Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee report is
asking for is that we should allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.

Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to think
that they have a vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That
would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that is very
disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated
verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing and even
discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction
block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will be sold. "Open your Swiss bank account to us
and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe."

Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth.
The hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of
Rights, specifically the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something positively
revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the highest bidder nor can it be used to
ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it would become convinced of the
values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.

For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of
the committee report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the
PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument — that what the PCGG
has been doing has been completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and
should be able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has
only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.

The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what another
Christian replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give
the devil benefit of law for my nation’s safety sake." I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit of law for
our nation’s sake. And we should delete Section 8.

Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting sequestration orders from
the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section 26,44 Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders
would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of Rights.

Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum,
absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly
render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the
Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found
in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s
good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires
each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights45 recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government
had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a
legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.46 Thus, the revolutionary
government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights47 of individuals under the
Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.
Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the
Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the
Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects
of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not
repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de
jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith
compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives
and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.48 The
Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute
powers entrusted to it by the people.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the
revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application,
specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioner’s witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

AJ AMORES

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside from the
weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land
titles, sir.

Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do
you know the reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why they also
brought the other items not included in the search warrant was because the money and other jewelries
were contained in attaché cases and cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron", and I think three (3) vaults or
steel safes. Believing that the attaché cases and the steel safes were containing firearms, they forced open
these containers only to find out that they contained money.

xxx

Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized this
money instead of weapons?

A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along also the money
because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that because they might be
suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor.49

Cross-examination

Atty. Banaag

Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the
Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles
M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx

AJ AMORES

Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?

A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your Honor.

Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or contraband
which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the communications
equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the application for search warrant considering that
we have not established concrete evidence about that. So when…

Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons were in the
house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes, your Honor.50

xxx

Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many
ammunition?

A. Forty, sir.

Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscal’s office who
charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know what happened to that case?

A. I think it was dismissed, sir.

Q. In the fiscal’s office?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in
the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?

A. I think that was the reason, sir.

Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance,
jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?

A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the jewelries
and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do
not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken because they
might get lost if they will just leave this behind.

xxx

Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be contained in
attaché cases.1âwphi1 These attaché cases were suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered
firearms, but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team leader also
decided to take this considering that they believed that if they will just leave the money behind, it might get
lost also.

Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team, like
Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?

A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.51

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly
describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal
basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and
seizure.52 Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,53 and they are not,
they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such
person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to
seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately
to Dimaano.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to
the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77976 November 24, 1988

MAXIMO GABRITO, ROGER LIBUT, CARMELITA UY, LIZA DE VERA, thru her Attorney-in-Fact, JESUS DE LO
SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NINTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. NICIAS O. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge Branch
Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, ET AL., respondents.

Cornelio C. Cardenas and Valeriano S. Peralta for petitioners.

Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary injunction and restraining order of the decision of the Court
Appeals * dated March 4, 1987 in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 08710, "Maximo Gabrito et al. vs. Hon. Nicias O. Mendoza a
Roberto Tan et al.," affirming the April 2, 1986 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City ** which also aff
decision of MTCC, Branch V, Olongapo City, and the Resolution of respondent court dated March 30, 1987 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The appeal originated as an unlawful detainer complaint filed by herein private respondents with the Municipal Trial
Branch V, Olongapo City.

The antecedent facts as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

The spouses Roberto Tan and Benita Ching-Tan filed a complaint in the Municipal Trial Court against defendants Ma
Gabrito, et al., alleging that they are the possessors and legal owners of the property situated at No. 107 Gordon Av
Kalalake, Olongapo City as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 4-2046. The defendants are leasing portions of this pa
land, each paying the corresponding monthly rentals due thereon.

On the leased portion, the defendants constructed buildings and have allowed other persons to sublease the same f
commercial purposes.

As the spouses Tan have no other property where they could construct their residential house, the spouses Tan noti
defendants (in January 1984) that they intend to personally use the land to build their house thereon and gave defen
three (3) months to vacate the premises and remove the structures and improvements which defendants had constr
thereon.

In April 1984, defendants requested for an extension of time within which to vacate, which was granted by the spous
However, from that time on, defendants also stopped paying monthly rentals due on the land they leased.

In view of this, in July 1984, defendants were told to leave the premises and to pay rentals in arrears. As defendants
to comply with both demands, the matter was brought to the Barangay Council for settlement. As no agreement was
a certification to file action was issued to the spouses Tan. Hence, the Tans filed an action for unlawful detainer with
against Gabrito, et al.
In answer to the complaint, defendants Gabrito, et al. denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged th
are builders in good faith over the land as provided in Article 448 of the Civil Code; the land where the houses of def
were built is a public land, not yet awarded nor titled to anybody; plaintiffs's alleged predecessor-in-interest not being
owner thereof could not have passed nor transferred ownership thereof to them (plaintiffs) considering that Gloria C
Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (X-4-4320) has not yet been acted upon by the Bureau of Lands; plaintiffs and
predessors-in-interest are absentee applicants over the land, hence, are disqualified to own the same; plaintiffs have
been in possession of the land while the defendants are in actual physical possession thereof; the sale of plaintiffs' a
predecessor-in-interest in favor of plaintiffs is null and void for being in violation of P.D. No. 1517 as defendants bein
of the land have the right of first refusal thereof.

Defendants brought a counterclaim for damages against the plaintiffs. (Rollo, Annex "C", pp. 39-40).

Respondent Municipal Trial Judge applied the rule on summary procedure in this case, rendered its decision dated N
22, 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for all the defendants to vacate the parcel of land described in par. 3 o
complaint, removing therefrom the buildings and any other improvements respectively owned by them; and to pay p
following as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises:

Maximo Gabrito—at
P250.00 per month from April 1984 until he vacates the premises;
Roger Libut—at
P150.00 per month from May 1984 until he vacates the premises;
Liza de Vera—at:
P150.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises; Carmelita Uy—at
Pl 70.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises.

for all defendants to pay, in equal shares, damages by way of attorney's fees in the amount of ONE THOUSAND PE
( P1,000.00 ) as well as costs.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35).

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (Civil Case No. 450-08-5), the decision of the Municipal Trial Court was affirme
decision dated April 2, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premised on all the foregoing consideration and finding no prejudicial and reversible error was ever
by the lower Court, the Court affirms in toto the decision being appealed, with costs against the defendants-appellan

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex 'B' p. 38).

On review, herein respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court Branch
and ruled;

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review herein is DISMISSED for lack of merit. (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 44).
On March 16, 1987, the petitioner filed their "Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to the Motion for Immediate
Execution Pending Further Proceedings" which was denied by the Ninth Division of respondent Court of Appeals in i
Resolution dated March 30, 1987 and granted the Motion for Immediate Issuance of a Writ of Execution filed by priv
respondents (Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 57-58).

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed on April 13, 1987.

On April 21, 1987, Acting Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, authorized the grant of Temporary Restraining Order in this
which was confirmed by the Second Division of this Court in its Resolution dated April 27, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 86, 87, 88

In a Resolution dated June 8, 1987, petitioners were required to comment on the motion dated April 26, 1987 (Rollo
counsel for respondents, praying to set aside the temporary restraining order issued on April 21, 1987 and to issue a
execution pending appeal or to allow the Court of Appeals to proceed with the execution of the decision pending app
p. 115), which was complied with by petitioners on July 22, 1987 (Rollo, p. 143).

In the resolution of October 5, 1987 (Rollo, p. 187) the petition was given due course and the parties were required t
their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice. Petitioners' memorandum was submitted on Decem
1987 (Rollo, p. 196). Respondents submitted their memorandum on April 12, 1988 (Rollo, p. 235). Petitioners raised
following issues:

1. That a Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case for Unlawful Detainer under Sec. 1 of
of the Rules of Court, where the plaintiffs are merely the legal possessors and recent transferees of a public land, an
defendants are the absolute owners of the building existing on the same land, for a number of years already.

2. That the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXIV, Olongapo City, ought to have dismissed the action for U
Detainer and as the same was also heard on appeal by the said Court on this jurisdictional challenge.

3. The market value of the residential houses or buildings of the defendants on the said land is approximately P170,
and it was with plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest, one Gloria Carillo-Potente that defendants caused said structures
erected on said land plaintiffs having only acquired from said predecessor, by means of a Deed of Sale of such right
sometime on January 5, 1984.

4. Upon this frame of facts which are admitted in the Decision of both Courts, only a Court of General Jurisdiction, a
Trial Court, can have the competence to try and decide the same: the Court of Special Limited Jurisdiction, cannot ta
cognizance of such facts as an action for Unlawful Detainer.

5. Arguendo, that the Court of Origin has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause of action for Unlawful Detainer,
have not heard the case in accordance with the Rules of Summary Proceedings, and based its Decision on an Affida
hearing, as the question of ownership was being contested between plaintiffs and defendants, with respect to whom
preferred grantee to the same land, and which falls under the complete administration and control of the Bureau of L

6. In fact, the Court of Origin, Branch V, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo, should have suspended the proce
there was an Administrative Protest being heard by the District Land Office of Olongapo City.
7. On the question of suspension of proceedings denied by the Court of Origin, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branc
Olongapo City, an action for certiorari was filed before Branch LXXIII of Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, Civil Ca
399-0-85, and although a Restraining Order against Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch V, City of Olongapo, was
the same was already academic as by that time said Municipal Trial Court, Branch V, Olongapo City, has already ren
Decision in favor of private respondent hereat, plaintiff therein.

8. Branch LXXIV, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo, in its Decision rendered on appeal, did not pass upon such matter
specified supra, so as to reverse the Decision of the Court of Origin: the subject Decisions, have not considered the
process rights of petitioners toward their residences and structures, the same are facing the risk of condemnation an
destruction without fair hearing, and such improvements have an aggregate value of Pl70,000.00, more or less.

9. Respondent Honorable Judge Mendoza of Branch LXXIV, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo, may have been misled
citation of authority, case of Vda. de Bocaling vs. Laguna, et al., 54 SCRA, 243, relied upon by appellees, said case
totally inapplicable to the facts of this case.

10. Respondent Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Lumanlan, without regard to the fif'teen (15) days period finality of the Order
Writ of Demolition, harrassed herein petitioners, notwithstanding the pendency of matters involved to their extreme d
and anxiety.

11. The Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Annex "C", sustained the Decision of the Regional Trial Court a
the vital issues posed for resolution: A Motion For Reconsideration, copy is hereto attached as Annex "D", was prese
precisely to stress the same but, a pointed or precise ruling upon such issues was avoided in the Resolution dated 3
March, 1987, true copy attached herein as Annex "E".

12. On the other (sic) upon Motion of private respondents, the Tans, despite Opposition thereto, Writ of Execution pe
appeal was issued and respondent Deputy Sheriff Lumanlan enforced the same, copy of which is hereto attached as
"F": true copy of Notice to Vacate served by said respondent Deputy Sheriff to petitioners is attached as Annex "G" h

13. Per Annex "D" Motion For Reconsideration a constitutional point, was reared forth, on first impression, per provis
10, Art. XIII-new, 1986 Constitution, relevant to demolition and resettlement, and, Resolution, dated 30th March, 198
"E", of the Honorable Appellate Authority, avoided said constitutional question, without passing upon the same.

14. Of Jurisdictional matters: Decision dated March 4, 1987, of the Honorable Court of Appeals was, received on Ma
1987, Motion For Reconsideration was filed on March 16, 1987, and Resolution dated 30th of March, 1987, denying
Reconsideration was received on April 1, 1987: thus, this Petition is filed within the 15 day period. (Rollo, pp. 4-8).

All of which boil down to the main issue of whether or not an action for unlawful detainer is the proper action to oust
from their occupation of the land in dispute.

There is no question as to the ownership of the land in litigation as both petitioners and private respondents admit th
same is a public land and owned by the government. The bone of contention is, who has a better right to possess th
which definitely falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and the rule of summary procedure may prope
applied.
In a preliminary conference held pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, defendants admitted tha
entered the premises as lessees and had been paying rentals for the use of the land to Gloria Carillo, private respon
predecessor-in-interest (Order dated May 15, 1985 in Civil Case No. 2511, MTC, Olongapo City, Branch V; Rollo, pp
73).<äre||anº•1àw> When requested to vacate the premises, petitioners asked for an extension of time which reques
granted. However, petitioners failed to vacate the premises and also stopped paying rentals. In view of said admissio
petitioners had unquestionably recognized private respondents' prior right of possession over the questioned proper

Petitioners' allegation in their answer that they are builders in good faith over the land as provided for in Article 448 o
Code is untenable. As ruled by this Court, Article 448 of the Civil Code, applies only where one builds on land in the
he is the owner of the land, but does not apply where one's interest in the land is that of a lessee under a rental con
(Balucanag v. Francisco, 122 SCRA 498 [1983]). More than that, it has been settled that the mere fact that, in his an
defendant claims to be the exclusive owner of the property from which plaintiff seeks to eject him is not sufficient to d
Municipal Trial Court of jurisdiction (Vivar v. Vivar, 8 SCRA 847, 849 [1963]; De Santa vs. Court of Appeals, 140 SCR
[1985]).

In addition, this Court held in Bocaling v. Laguna, et al (54 SCRA 243, 250 [1973]) that:

The rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith because he knew that their occu
the premises continues only during the life of the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of the
improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed. Their rights are governed by
1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their improvements if th
so elects.

Petitioners contend that the above cited case is "completely inapplicable to the case at bar, because the genesis cas
Ejectment therein was subjected to a compromise Agreement" (Rollo, p. 18). Such contention is, however, untenable
the issues raised in the above-cited case was whether or not lessees are builders and/or possessors in good faith e
reimbursement for the value of their improvements. The Court categorically resolved the issue in the negative withou
qualification nor even a reference to the compromise agreement alluded to by the petitioner.

In a later development, petitioners filed a supplemental memorandum submitting the decision of the Bureau of Land
June 7, 1987, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Miscellaneous Sales Application No. 4320 of Benita Ching Tan should be,
as it is rejected forfeiting to the government whatever amount had been paid on account thereof. The miscellaneous
application of Maximo Gabrito, Carmelita Uy, Roger Libut and Liza de Vera shall continue to be given due course aft
subdivision survey of the portion occupied by them shall have been made at their pro-rata expense.

SO ORDERED.

In view thereof, petitioners maintain that they are the lawful owners of the buildings and the legal possessors of subj
and that the records of the court proceedings show the pendency of the administrative protest before the Bureau of
between the same litigating parties (Rollo, pp. 166-167).

Respondents countered that the decision of the Bureau of Lands granting preferential right to the petitioners to apply for the s
parcel of land is still on appeal before the Department of Natural Resources.1 Hence, said decision which is not yet final, canno
outcome of this case because the authority given to the land department over the disposition of public land does not exclude t
from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the character of the land notwithstanding (Rollo, pp. 246-247).
The contention of private respondents is well taken.

This issue has long been laid to rest by this Court. As early as the case of Pitarque v. Sorilla (92 Phil. 55 [1952]), this
ruled that:

The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose of, and alienate public lands must not be
understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of the exercise of their respective functions of power
such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of peace by the police and the authority on the part of the
take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposit

Said ruling was reiterated in Bahayang v. Maceren, 96 Phil 390 (1955); in Molina v. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 56 (1967) a
in Rallon v. Ruiz, Jr., 28 SCRA 331 (1969). In the latter case, the Court specifically ruled on the jurisdictional questio
follows:

Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public lands to determine the issue of physical possession
forcible entry cases before the inferior court) on the better right of possession (in accion publiciana cases before cou
instance). And this is because the issue of physical possession raised before the courts is independent of the questi
disposition and alienation of public lands which should be threshed out in the Bureau of Lands.

The above ruling was further reiterated in Francisco v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (121 SCRA 3
and in a recent case of National Development Co., et al. v. Hervilla, G.R. No. 65718, June 30, 1987 (151 SCRA 520
was held that:

It is now well settled that the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of La
primarily, and ultimately to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lan
confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants of public lands or to cases which involve disp
and alienation of public lands. The jurisdiction of courts is limited to the determination of who has the actual, physica
possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right
possession (in accion publiciana, in cases before the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court).

And even more recently in the case of Guerrero v. Amores, et al., G.R. No.
L-34492 promulgated on March 28, 1988, the Court clearly stated that "pending final adjudication of ownership by th
of Lands, the Court has jurisdiction to determine in the meantime the right of possession over the land." Corollary th
power to order the sheriff to remove improvements and turn over the possession of the land to the party adjudged e
thereto, belongs only to the courts of justice and not to the Bureau of Lands.

In the same case, the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies with reference to public la
further clarified by this Court as follows:

On the other hand, the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent
filing of a juridical action is confined to controversies arising out of the disposition of public lands (Geukoko vs. Arane
Phil. 706 (1957); Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil. 128 (1957), alienation of public lands (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra) or to
determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands (Pitarque vs. Sorilla, supra) and not to posses
actions involving public lands which are limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical possession or oc
of the land in question (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra).<äre||anº•1àw>
In fact, the Bureau of Lands in its decision of June 7, 1987, admitted the jurisdiction of the courts to decide the case
question of physical possession, although not on the question of ownership (Rollo, p. 179).

Under the circumstances, a careful study of the records failed to show any cogent reason to disturb the findings of th
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and of the Regional Trial Court, both of Olongapo City, and finally of the Court of Appe

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the temporary restraining order is lift
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 87687 December 26, 1989

ISABELO T. SABELLO, petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this petition filed by a non-lawyer by reason of alleged poverty, We are called upon to decide a unique issue of wh
importance the legal technicalities of the law or the fundamental principles of justice and fairness.

The facts are not in dispute, as follows:

Petitioner, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay H
Gingoog City. The barangay high school was in deficit at that time due to the fact that the students could hardly pay
at that time also, the President of the Philippines who was earnestly campaining was giving aid in the amount of P 2
council through proper resolutions alloted the amount of P 840.00 to cover up for the salaries of the high school teac
mind that the barrio high school was a barrio project and as such therefore, was entitled to its share of the RICD fun
the herein petitioner played was his being authorized by the said barrio council to withdraw the above amount and w
in the City Treasurer's Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio High School. That was a grave error on the part of the
very intricacies in the disbursement of government funds and of its technicalities. Thus, the herein petitioner, togethe
charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suffer a sentence of one year and disquali
herein petitioner appealed his case to the Court of appeals, Manila. The Court of appeals modified the decision by e
imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being involved. The herein petitioner, b
longer hire a lawyer to proceed to the highest court of the land.

Finally, the herein petitioner was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of the Republic of the Philippines, restoring h
With this instrument on hand, the herein petitioner applied for reinstatement to the government service, only to be reinstated
classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Principal I.1

Petitioner now prays to this Court for the following relief:

1. (that he be) Reinstated to his former position as Elementary School Principal I;

2. His government services be made continuous since September 10, 1948 which is his original appointment until th

3. (that he be) Given his back salaries corresponding to the period from September 1, 1971 to November 23,1982;

4. That all his service credits duly earned be restored;

5. And, that all other rights and privileges not mentioned herein shall also be granted. (Petition, p. 2) 2

The Solicitor General comments that there is no justiciable controversy in this case because the issue involved is wh
reappointment to the position he held prior to his conviction that of Elementary Principal I. The Division of City Schoo
Department of Education and Culture, did not act on petitioner's request. Hence, the present petition.
We believe otherwise. There is here a justiciable controversy. Petitioner claims he must be restored to the same pos
convicted on a mere technical error and for which he was given an absolute pardon.

This is not a hypothetical or abstract dispute. It is not academic or moot for, to our mind, there is a definite and conc
relations of parties having adverse legal relations. This is a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific reli
conclusive in character. The case does not call for a mere opinion or advise, but for affirmative relief .

As a general rule, the question of whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his former position is a matter o
authority, but under the circumstances of this case, if the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of' what is rightfully hi
requirements of giving justice to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the appointing pow
fairness and justice.

As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports cannot be sued, the only answer is that its
grave errors in their official acts. Again, We ignore technicality by considering this a suit against the officials of this g

Taking into consideration that this petition is filed by a non-lawyer, who claims that poverty denies him the services o
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies and resolved to go direct to the merits of the petition.

In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., 3 this Court held that the absolute disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office fo
prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores h
pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappoin

In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to the service as a classroom teacher by the
and Sports.

As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity dictate that he be ret
Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher.

However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto 4
automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully separated from the government service upon his conviction for an offense. Th
been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is afforded only to those who have been illegally d
reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them.

In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his government service be made continuous from September 10, 194
any rate when he reaches the compulsory age of retirement, he shall get the appropriate retirement benefits as an E
not as a mere classroom teacher.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports a
representative is hereby directed to appoint petitioner to the position of Elementary School Principal I or it equivalen
cost. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-20031 November 28, 1964

MAGDALENA RULLAN ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. BERNARDO O. VALDEZ, Defendant-A

Bienvenido L. Garcia for plaintiffs-appellants.

Benjamin P. Cardenas for defendant-appellee.

On November 24, 1961, Bernardo O. Valdez filed with the Bureau of Mines an application for the lease of certain pu
comprising the amended locations of the SILICA and SELECTA placer Mining Claims which was ordered published a
publication was made on December 3, 1961.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

During the period of the publication of the application, Magdalena Rullan and George Alabanza filed with the Bureau
the form of adverse claim to the application alleging, among other things, the following: Sometime in February, 1958
his associates executed certain documents stating that they are the members of the Baguio-Loakan Placer Mining A
interest of which is divided in 10,000 units and each unit being valued at P5.00. The interest of Valdez is only 4,000
the Association located two placer mining claims, namely, MORNING GLORY containing an area of 45 hectares, an
of 8 hectares. Then, sometime in January or February, 1959, Magdalena Rullan bought 1,000 units of the Associatio
300 units, thereby becoming members thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After some associates had sold their participation in the Association to third persons, Valdez, without the knowledge
associates, reduced the area comprising the SILICA PLACER Mining Claim from 8 to 6.1284 hectares by excluding
portion leaving an area of 1.8716 hectares which he added to the original area of 4 hectares that comprises the SEL
which he located and the lease of which he applied for with the Bureau of Mines. And pending consideration of their
the Bureau of Mines, Magdalena Rullan and George Alabanza commenced the present action on January 10, 1962
Instance of Baguio setting forth the foregoing facts and praying that their rights and interests as co-lessees of the 8
land originally comprising the SILICA Placer Mining Claim be declared and recognized irrespective of the amended l
insofar as the SELECTA Placer Mining Claim is concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Defendant Valdez filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that, not having alleged that they are locators, holders or o
in question, plaintiffs cannot be considered adverse claimants within the purview of Section 73 of Commonwealth Ac
this motion plaintiffs filed their opposition. On February 13, 1962, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss. On F
defendant filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the court a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the case
Mines had not given due course to the adverse claim of plaintiffs for which reason they filed a motion for reconsidera
not yet been acted upon. And on February 26, 1962, the court a quo issued an order declaring itself without jurisdict
Director of Mines had not yet acted on the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs. And when their motion fo
denied, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The only issue to be determined is whether the court a quo has jurisdiction to act on the case considering that action
herein involved is still pending in the Office of the Bureau of Mines. It appears that the Director of Mines has not yet
on the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The law applicable to the issue before us is Section 73 of Commonwealth Act No. 137, as amended by Republic Act
 SEC. 73. At any time during the period of application, any adverse claim may be filed under oath with the Director
full detail the nature, boundaries, and extent of the adverse claim, and is based: ... Upon the filing of any adverse
except the making and filing of the affidavit in connection therewith, as herein prescribed, shall be stayed until the
been settled or decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, or the adverse claim waived. It shall be the duty of th
thirty days after filing his claim, to commence proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction to determine the co
the same with reasonable diligence to final judgment, and failure to do so shall be considered is a waiver of his ad

The above statutory provision prescribes the method by which a person having an adverse claim to a certain minera
court. If he fails to file an adverse claim within the time therein provided for or fails to commence the proceeding with
claim is deemed waived. Any person who has an adverse interest to the whole or to a portion of the surface of a min
is applied for by another may file in adverse claim which must state in full the nature, boundaries and extent thereof,
necessary plans, documents and agreements upon which the same is based. The filing of said adverse claim produ
the proceedings on the application filed with the Bureau of Mines, except only in relation to the publication and proof
controversy shall have been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. Since then the functions of the Bureau of M
await the action of the court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

This is the situation herein obtained. After plaintiffs had filed their adverse claim with the Bureau of Mines with regard
certain mining claims filed by defendant, they at the same time commenced the present action wherein they squarel
issue of ownership over the mining claim controverted. The question, therefore, comes well within the jurisdiction of
of whether the action of the Director of Mines on the adverse claim filed in his office is still pending. This is the rever
involving the ownership of a portion of public land wherein exhaustion of administrative remedies is required, for her
question of ownership affecting an adverse claim must be determined by the competent court before administrative
termination. It is, therefore, for the court a quo to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs have not exhaus
remedies before coming to court. The situation obtained herein is just the contrary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside. This case should be remanded to the court a quo for further pr
Appellee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989
RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIG
GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,

Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and p
be directed:

(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNID
who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/ma
then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the letter in 1986

requesting that he be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa
secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel
was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents
loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by us.

If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?

We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Constitution of the present regi

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen s
limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).

To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:

My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow f
they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be
GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.

On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent a
saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary w
to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."

On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.

On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim a
Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidat
petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, th
deemed submitted for decision.

In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is tha
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS.
however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative reme
exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.

To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are en
documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case fa
the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is e
exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and con
entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the principle of exhausti
administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is inv
raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information
can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involvin
purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of ad
remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of whether
hes to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to informa

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the constitutional right to inf
In Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service
No. 72119, May 29, 1987,150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters
and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the petitioners.

The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official recor
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by la

The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:

The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official recor
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subjec
limitations as may be provided by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to th
exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Con
cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system
agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to informa
workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had
The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the pe
governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied,
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the acc
information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exe
professions. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the gover
monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogu
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free po
be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dia
effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.

Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's r
is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Simila
policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions p

Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public con
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p

The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern". As observed in

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be ap
concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of s
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters natura
interest of an ordinary citezen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis wh
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. [Ibid. at p. 541]

In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to information was the need for ad
the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citezens. In Legaspi, it was the "legitim
citezensof ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are e
p. 539.]

The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pamb
the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election th
intercession of th eformer First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insur
the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D.
(the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions
interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the R
Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its r
utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons
revision of the old GSIS law (C.A. No. 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial sol
administered by the System" [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself admits
supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that th
managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees
supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the
therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity an
transactions were above board.

In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowe
information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus procee
the information sought must not be among those excluded by law.

When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict betwe
information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this c
the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private ca
public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the G
case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its nam
basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no
relief.

Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The
personal in nature and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.

It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been
be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those
responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their
subject to closer public scrutiny

Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and
covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.

It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the
people's right of access to official records.

It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function, then its l
are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable on
transactions.
First of all, the "constituent — ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated. I
Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29
6441, the Court said that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, di
function of service to the people.

Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclus
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.

Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include government-owned and c
corporations and transactions entered into by them within the coverage of the State policy of fun public disclosure is
records of the proceedings:

Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nev
persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performin
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right t
pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasona
that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of
be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the rig
persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quotin
Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners,

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the lis
the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans im
the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records
does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
to acquire information on matters of public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and
to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding
respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 2
203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to m
there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the Government Service I
is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the for
Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of inspection, no
this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.

SO ORDERED.