Symbiosis Institute of

Management Studies

GAME THEORY FOR STRATEGIC THINKING

ASSIGNMENT 2

MBA 2018-2020
4th SEMESTER

Submitted to: Mr. Sumit Roy

SUBMITTED BY:
Akshita Sharma; E-06
PRN: 18020441037
 PLOT
 The tension between the Hutu and Tutsi people lead to a war in Rwanda. Paul Ruesabagina (played
by Don Cheadle) is the manager of Sabena owned Hotel des Mille Collines. Paul is Hutu but his
wife Tatiana is Tutsi.
 Georges Rutaganda does not like Paul's marriage to Tatiana. Georges is a Hutu extremist, a goods
supplier to the hotel, and the local leader of Interahamwe, a brutal anti- Tutsi militia.
 As the situation worsens in Rwanda, Paul and his family observe neighbors being killed in ethnic
violence.
 Paul bribes people alcohol and money to try and keep his family safe. When Civil war erupts and
an officer threatens Paul and his neighbors, he takes them to the hotel. Soon more and more people
start coming to the hotel to find safety.
 People from the United Nations camp, the Red Cross, and orphanages. The UN Peacekeeping
forces are led by Canadian Colonel Oliver. They are unable to fight against the Hutus because they
cannot intervene with the genocide. The people who were there on vacation got evacuated but the
Tutsi were left behind.
 Then the UN tried to evacuate a group of people from the hotel, but the Hutu ambushed them. So
they had to turn back to the hotel. Paul then goes to plead with the Rwandan Army General
Augustin Bizimungu to help them.
 Soon after blackmailing the general, Paul, his family, and everybody in the hotel leave. They travel
the Tutsi rebel lines. While driving there they passed through retreating Hutu refugees. Paul saved
1, 268 people, and now lives with his family in Belgium. When the genocide ended in 2004 almost
one million people had died from it.

CHARACTERS:
• Paul Ruseabagina (Hutu): Manager of the
Hotel de Milles Collines during the
beginning of the Rwandan Genocide where
he helped save more than 1200 Hutu and
Tutsis refugees.
• Tatiana Rusesabagina (Tutsi): Paul’s
Wife who stood by his side while he helped
save many from the Hutu rebels.
• George Rutaganda (Hutu): A supplier
runs a warehouse. He wants Paul to come to
the rally to show support for the Hutu power,
and he gives him a shirt symbolizing the Hutu
power.
• General Bizimungu (Hutu): General of the
Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) during the
Rwandan Genocide. He makes Paul bribe
him with liquor.
• Colonel Oliver: Canadian from the United
Nations. He is the head of United Nations and
helped Paul save the refugees from the
Interhamwe Militia.
• Thomas and his wife (Tutsi): Tatiana’s
brother and sister-in-law.
• Jean and Odette: Neighbours and friends
of Paul and Tatiana.
• Desmond Dube (Tutsi): He is the porter
and friend of Paul.
• Gregoire (Hutu): Employee who stays in
the Presidential Suite.
• David: European Reporter. • Pat Archer: A Red Cross Worker who
brings over kids from Rwandan orphanages
• Jack Daglish: The reporter who comes to
to the Mille Collines to find refuge. Madame
Rwanda to report on the Rwandan Genocide.
Archer runs the orphanage.

A STORY OF CONFLICT: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

Between April and June 1994, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were killed in the space of 100
days. Most of the dead were Tutsis - and most of those who perpetrated the violence were Hutus.
Even for a country with such a turbulent history as Rwanda, the scale and speed of the slaughter
left its people reeling. The genocide was sparked by the death of the Rwandan President Juvenal
Habyarimana, a Hutu, when his plane was shot down above Kigali airport on 6 April 1994. Ethnic
tension in Rwanda is nothing new. There have always been disagreements between the majority
Hutus and minority Tutsis, but the animosity between them has grown substantially since the
colonial period. During the genocide, the bodies of Tutsis were thrown into rivers, with their killers
saying they were being sent back to Ethiopia. When the Belgian colonists arrived in 1916, they
produced identity cards classifying people according to their ethnicity. The Belgians considered
the Tutsis to be superior to the Hutus. Not surprisingly, the Tutsis welcomed this idea, and for the
next 20 years they enjoyed better jobs and educational opportunities than their neighbors.
Resentment among the Hutus gradually built up, culminating in a series of riots in 1959. More
than 20,000 Tutsis were killed, and many more fled to the neighboring countries of Burundi,
Tanzania and Uganda. When Belgium relinquished power and granted Rwanda independence in
1962, the Hutus took their place. Over subsequent decades, the Tutsis were portrayed as the
scapegoats for every crisis.

Mass murder
In Kigali, the presidential guard immediately initiated a campaign of retribution. Leaders of the
political opposition were murdered, and almost immediately, the slaughter of Tutsis and moderate
Hutus began. Within hours, recruits were dispatched all over the country to carry out a wave of
slaughter. The early organizers included military officials, politicians and businessmen, but soon
many others joined in the mayhem. Encouraged by the presidential guard and radio propaganda,
an unofficial militia group called the Interahamwe (meaning those who attack together) was
mobilized. At its peak, this group was 30,000-strong. In some cases, Hutu civilians were forced to
murder their Tutsi neighbors by military personnel. Participants were often given incentives, such
as money or food, and some were even told they could appropriate the land of the Tutsis they
killed. On the ground at least, the Rwandans were largely left alone by the international
community. Most of the UN troops withdrew after the murder of 10 soldiers. The day after
Habyarimana's death, the RPF renewed their assault on government forces, and numerous attempts
by the UN to negotiate a ceasefire came to nothing.
THE ASPECT OF GAME THEORY
A recurring question in international politics is whether or not should third parties intervene in
ethnic civil wars.
This debate has been repeated throughout history, from the Rwandan genocide to the modern
Syrian conflict. Analysing these situations through the lens of Game Theory may provide some
not before seen insights. Rwanda consists of two major ethnic groups, Hutus and Tutsis.
In the early 1900’s the Tutsi minority held a disproportionate amount of political power and used
that power to oppress the Hutu majority. However, by the end of the century the Rwandan
government was controlled by Hutus and was fighting a civil war with the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF), a rebel group consisting mainly of Tutsis.
There was extreme tension between the Hutu government and the Tutsi population, with some
groups like the government backed Hutu militia Interahamwe wanting to “punish” Tutsis for their
actions in the early century.
These tensions boiled over in 1994 when a civil war broke out and Hutu militias started
slaughtering Tutsis. The violence 4 quickly spread and went on for three months, only stopping
when the RPF gained control of the country.
By the end of the genocide an estimated 800,000 Rwandans had been killed. One may wonder why
the civil war between the Rwandan government and the RPF lasted so long, since war is
destructive, and negotiation is almost always better for both players.
Why is Rwanda an exception? It’s easier to understand why if you look at the Rwandan conflict
through a game theory lens, specifically as a Deadlock Game. Deadlock is a game where the action
that is mutually most beneficial is also dominant. This is a sharp contrast with the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, where the mutually beneficial situation is dominated. The Deadlock matrix is shown as
below:
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
Government

Negotiate Fight
Rwandan

Negotiate (1,1) (0,3)

Fight (3,0) (2,2) *

The Rwandan government has a choice between: negotiation with the rebels and creating a state
where Tutsis and Hutus share power, or continuing to fight and attempt to maintain 100% of
political power. The RPF also has two choices: either continue fighting or create the state with
shared power.
Ø Both options are better for the RPF than doing nothing, and letting the government maintain the
status quo.
Ø If the government fights and the RPF negotiates, the government enjoys the benefit of full
political control. This is obviously highly preferred by them. If the government concedes and lets
the RPF take control, the payoffs are similar but just go to a different side, in this case the RPF
enjoys full political control.
Ø If the government views the different payoffs of its opponent, it will see that the RPF will always
fight. This is because if the government negotiates the RPF will fight because it has a payoff of 3
rather than 1. If the government fights, the RPF will also fight, because it has a payoff of 2 rather
than 0. The same logic applies to the government, since the game is symmetrical. The dominant
strategy for both sides is to fight. This choice is called the Nash Equilibrium (marked by an *).
Assuming everyone is rational, neither player will stray from their dominant strategy. The situation
will stay in its Nash Equilibrium, meaning the war will continue assuming no international
intervention. This explains different genocides throughout history, suggesting that they will
continue till a third party intervenes.
This Game Theory perspective can also explain why the Syrian 5 civil war has gone for 7 years
without sign of decline, and perhaps suggests third parties like Russia or the US may escalate
involvement in hopes of ending the conflict.

A SCENE FROM THE MOVIE: NASH EQUILIBRIUM

Paul needs to persuade General Bizimungu to control the Interhamwe until the Tutsi rebel army
arrive. Along with bribes of money, jewellery and alcohol, Paul uses threats. The first threat was
the Americans are watching everything happening in Rwanda with their satellites. The second time
is when Paul says the General will be considered a war criminal and goes on to say: “You are a
marked man, sir. You are on a list. The Americans have you on their list as a war criminal. How
do you think these people operate? You sit here with five stars on your chest. Who do you think
they are coming after? You need me to tell them how you helped at the hotel. They say you led
the massacres. Do you think they are going to believe you?”
In order to construct a Game Theory model of this standoff, we should assume that Paul and
General are the two players in the game that have to choose between two strategies: collaboration
or Resistance. The collaboration strategy means to resolve the issue through helping each other
out, and the resistance strategy means to maintain the existing positions no matter whatsoever
happens.
Ø When Paul and General both choose to collaborate; potential armed confrontation would be
avoided and both will gain from each other as Paul will help General in clearing his name and in
exchange the General will help Paul in saving his family. Also, an environment of confidence
would be created, along with a greater mutual benefit. However, General is at a more significant
disadvantage to choose to collaborate because it would show signs of weakness. In this case, we
can assume that the payoff of General is 4 and that of Paul is 6.
Ø If General chose to resist and Paul chose to collaborate, General would be able to take Paul with
him while Paul will lose his family at the same time. In this case, General’s payoff is 10 and Paul’s
payoff is 0.
Ø On the contrary, if General chose to collaborate and Paul chose to Resist, Paul will benefit from
this strategy and get a payoff of 10, while General’s payoff is 0.
Ø Lastly, if General and Paul both choose to resist, a confrontation may become inevitable. In this
case, the payoffs of both General and Paul are assumed to be 1.
GENERAL BIZIMUNGU

COLLABORATE RESIST
PAUL

COLLABORATE (6,4) (0,10)

RESIST (10,0) (1,1)

So, what is the likely outcome of the standoff according to this model? It can be easily verified
that there is no dominant strategy in this game. Hence there is no dominant strategy equilibrium.
• Let us consider the situation from the viewpoint of any one particular player. If this player is
convinced the other player is going to Collaborate, then he is likely to resist rather than Collaborate.
So, the (Resist, Resist) outcome is not a stable outcome.
• Since both players want to do the opposite of what the other player is doing the only stable
outcomes are where one player Collaborate and the other Resist.
• This means the conflict ends at the original Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
• But in the movie both the party agree on each other terms and help each other out by thing
collaborative strategy. This outcome, is the only equilibria in this game. This equilibrium is called
the Nash equilibrium
 CONCLUSION
 In the film Paul develops from a person who pursues his own interests to someone who risks his
life for the sake of others. To interpret his behaviour as heroic, it is assumed that he overcomes a
current reality too devastating to be confirmed as the ultimate in his striving for a better tomorrow.
 Such an interpretation of courage and sacrifice, hailed for being special in society, is devoid of a
relevant, and additional, perspective of an interconnected societal bond that needs to be affirmed
and restored for the sake of the spiritual wellbeing and worthwhileness of the individual as an
integral member of the community.
 Paul Rusesabagina’s character portrays both the positive and traumatic effects of a severely
damaged tapestry of society, where two existential paradigms, each with different sets of
aspirations and symbolic expressions, co-exist in incoherent ways as a result of centuries of
Western intervention.
 Hotel Rwanda portrays a haunting, true tragedy and the human potential to live with spiritual
integrity in the absence of hope for physical survival.