Crisostomo vs Sandiganbayan would have been tenable if the murdered victim was not a

prisoner under his custody as a jail guard.

FACTS: Crisostomo, a member of the PNP and a jail guard was
charged with the murder of Renato Suba (Renato), a detention
prisoner at the Solano Municipal Jail. The Information alleged
that Crisostomo conspired with other co-accused. Accused
pleaded not guilty and so trial ensued.
The SB found sufficient circumstantial evidence to
convict Crisostomo et al of murder. The SB relied on the
autopsy and exhumation reports in disregarding the defense
theory that Renato committed suicide by hanging himself with
a blanket.
Hence, the case at bar. Accused continues to assail
the jurisdiction of the SB.
Crisostomo’s Argument: Crisostomo points out that the crime
of murder is not listed in Section 4 of PD 1606 as one of the
crimes that the Sandiganbayan can try. Crisostomo insists that
there is no direct relation between the commission of murder
and Crisostomos public office.
ISSUE: WON the SB has jurisdiction over the crime of murder
charged against Crisostomo
The function of a jail guard is to insure the safe
custody and proper confinement of persons detained in the
jail. In this case, the Information alleges that the victim was a
detention prisoner when Crisostomo, the jail guard, conspired
with the inmates to kill him.
A public officer commits an offense in relation to his
office if he perpetrates the offense while performing, though
in an improper or irregular manner, his official functions and
he cannot commit the offense without holding his public
office. In such a case, there is an intimate connection between
the offense and the office of the accused. If the information
alleges the close connection between the offense charged and
the office of the accused, the case falls within the jurisdiction
of the SB.
The Information alleged that Crisostomo a public
officer, being then a member of the PNP stationed at Solano
Police Station and a jailer thereat, taking advantage of his
public position and thus committing the offense in relation to
his office conspired, confederated and connived with his co-
accused who are inmates of the Solano Municipal Jail to kill
Renato, a detention prisoner.

RULING: YES. The SB has jurisdiction over the crime of murder Because of the very nature of the work of a jail guard,
he has access to the prisoner. Crisostomo, as the jail guard,
charged against accused. However, the prosecution failed to
could not have conspired with the inmates to murder the
prove Crisostomo and Calingayans guilt beyond reasonable detention prisoner in his cell if Crisostomo were not a jailer.
doubt. Thus, we acquit Crisostomo and Calingayan. (ang
jurisdiction ra akong i-tackle) The Information accused Crisostomo of murdering a
detention prisoner, a crime that collides directly with
The applicable provision reads: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. Crisostomo’s office as a jail guard who has the duty to insure
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: (a) Exclusive original the safe custody of the prisoner. Crisostomo’s purported act of
jurisdiction in all cases involving: xxx killing a detention prisoner, while irregular and contrary to
Crisostomo’s duties, was committed while he was performing
Other offenses or felonies committed by public his official functions.
officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in GOCC’s xxx where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for 6 years,
or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that
offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph
where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for 6
years or a fine of P6K shall be tried by regular courts.

Crisostomo was charged with murder, the penalty for

which is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, a
penalty within the jurisdiction of the SB.

Crisostomo would have the Court believe that being a

jail guard is a mere incidental circumstance that bears no close
intimacy with the commission of murder. Crisostomo’s theory
2.
De Lima vs. Guerrero (Topic: Kinds of Liability – Test to
determine if offense was committed in relation to
office)
Preamble: wala ni sa Tanya Notes. Wala poy case
digests online kay Oct 2017 ni nga case. Ako ra juy pag-
asa ninyo but don’t worry, im here. Sit back and
relaaxxxx.
Facts: Congress conducted several inquiries on the
proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New
Bilibid Prison. These legislative inquiries led to the filing
of four cases, later consolidated to one, against De Lima
(petitioner).
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
given her rank as the former Secretary of Justice with
Salary Grade 31. Even assuming that the crime
described in the Information is a violation of RA 9165,
the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to
try the case considering that the acts described in the
Information were intimately related to her position as
the Secretary of Justice.
Issues: WON the RTC or the Sandiganbayan has the
jurisdiction over the violation of R.A. 9165 averred in
the assailed Information
Ruling: RTC.

The DOJ Panel was directed to conduct the requisite RTC has jurisdiction over drug-related cases
preliminary investigation. But, petitioner filed an
First, A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will
Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to
reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is
the Office of the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of
exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no
the Panel of Prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice.
other. The designation of the RTC as the court with the
Petitioner argued that the Office of the Ombudsman
exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is
has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the
apparent in many provisions where it was expressly
complaints against her.
mentioned and recognized as the only court with the
Dom: Hearings on the Omnibus Motion was authority to hear drug-related cases.
conducted but petitioner belatedly filed her counter-
One of those provisions:
affidavit which led to submission of the case for
resolution. Petitioner moved to reconsider but was “Section 90. Jurisdiction. — The Supreme Court shall
denied. designate special courts from among the existing
Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to
Aggrieved, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a
exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of
Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari assailing (again)
this Act (RA 9165???)”
the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints
against her. Meanwhile, absent any restraining order Second, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the
from the CA, the DOJ Panel filed proceeded with the jurisdiction to "exclusively try and hear cases involving
conduct of preliminary investigation and later violations of [RA 9165]." This is an exception, couched
recommended the filing of Informations against in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general
petitioner and other co-accused for violation of R.A. rule under Section 4 (b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA
9165. 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a
special law prevails over a general law and the latter is
Dom: gist of the Informations – De Lima, by taking
to be considered as an exception to the general. To
advantage of her public office and in conspiracy with
reiterate for emphasis, Section 4 (b) of PD 1606, as
the co-accused, used proceeds from illegal drug
amended by RA 10660, is the general law on jurisdiction
trading in the bilibid to support De Lima’s senatorial
of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses
bid for the 2016 election amounting to P5,000,000
committed by high-ranking public officers in relation to
per week. High-profile inmates were also allowed to
their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law
use phones and whatnot for its proliferation.
excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan has the violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers.
jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She
Dom: klaro na aah. RTC ang nay jurisdiction over
posits that the Information charged her not with
drug-related cases (R.A. 9165), not Sandiganbayan.
violation of RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery — a felony
 Dagkan kaayog reasons gi cite ang SC pero namili conspiracy.
rakog nice :) best class rep ever #reelectDOMONG

Test to determine if offense was committed in relation

to office (Main Topic)

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case will

stand or fall on this test: Does the Information allege a
close or intimate connection between the offense
charged and the accused's public office?

The Information against petitioner clearly passes this

test. For indeed, it cannot be denied that petitioner
could not have committed the offense of Illegal Drug
Trading as charged without her holding her office as
DOJ Secretary. Her alleged complicity in the entire drug
conspiracy hinges on no other than her supposed Photo of Petitioner de Lima and her lover Dayan side-
authority to provide high-profile inmates in the NBP by-side. Taken in 2016.
protections and/or special concessions which enabled
them to carry out illegal drug trading inside the national
penitentiary. As the OSG itself acknowledges, "during
her tenure as Secretary of Justice, [petitioner] allowed
the drug trade to fester and flourish inside the walls of
the Bilibid so she can profit from the illicit commerce
and finance her political aspirations."

The OSG even labels petitioner's participation as a form

of "indispensable cooperation," without which the
inmates could not have plied their nefarious trade:

“[Petitioner], Ragos, Dayan, petitioner's admitted

lover, confabulated with the high-profile inmates of
the national penitentiary to commit illegal drug
trading through the use of mobile phones and other
electronic devices. These inmates could not have
plied their nefarious trade without the indispensable
cooperation of [petitioner] and her DOJ factotums.”

Tested against the standards set by jurisprudence,

petitioner evidently stands charged of an offense which
she allegedly committed in relation to her office.
Contrary to the OSG's assertions, this conclusion is not
merely derived from the generic phrases "as Secretary
of Justice" or "taking advantage of their public office,"
but rather, from the Information read as a whole, the
overall context of the determination of the probable
cause against her, and even the OSG's own
characterization of petitioner's role in the entire
Domingo v. Rayala
FACTS: On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo
(Domingo),then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary
Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE).
(naa ni affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual harassment, ako
lang e summarize)
In an affidavit executed by Domingo, she narrated how the
Chairman committed the alleged sexual harassment. It first started
with the Chairman telling her “Lot, gumaganda ka yata?” then on
another day “Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat” then
subsequently asking her questions regarding her personal life like
WON she has a boyfriend. The Chairman also asked her if she had
a live-in partner. In one instance, Chairman held her shoulder,
going up to her neck all the way to her ears. After this, Domingo
filed for a leave of absence and asked to be transferred. Thereafter
she filed a complaint for sexual harassment on basis of AO 250, the
IRR of RA 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act) in the DOLE.
Upon receipt, DOLE referred the complaint to the Office of the
President, Rayala being a presidential appointee. The OP ordered
Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the complaint
and create a Committee on Decorum and Investigation in
accordance with RA 7877. The Committee heard the parties and
received evidence. They found Rayala guilty and recommended the
imposition of the minimum penalty under AO 250 which they
erroneously stated as 6-month suspension. Secretary Laguesma
then submitted the recommendation to the OP, but stating that the
penalty should be 6 months and 1 day in accordance with AO 250.
The OP concurred with the findings of the Committee, but
disagrees with the penalty meted out. They instead dismissed
Rayala because they considered the offense to be grave,
considering that he took advantage of his position, it being the
highest position in the NLRC.
Rayala filed an MR, which was denied. He then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a TRO under rule 65. However, it
was dismissed for disregarding hierarchy of courts. Rayala filed MR,
and the Court referred the petition to the CA for action. The CA
held that there was sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty
that Rayala indeed committed the acts he was charged with. CA
held that the dismissal was proper, since he violated RA 6713, or
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. Rayala timely filed an MR, which the CA granted. The
CA modified the penalty from dismissal to a 1-year suspension.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review which was initially denied for
having a defective verification, but upon MR, the court reinstated
the petition. Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review with this
Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual
harassment. The Republic filed an MR from the CA decision, but it
was denied. Republic then filed its own petition for review. The
Court then directed the consolidation of the 3 petitions.
ISSUE: All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up
in two ultimate questions, namely:
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
(naa ni issue on forum shopping which the Court ruled that the OSG
did not commit forum shopping)
HELD: That Rayala committed the acts complained of — and was
guilty of sexual harassment — is, therefore, the common factual
finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the
Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that
when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect
and even finality by the courts. The principle, therefore, dictates
that such findings should bind us.
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears
no valid ground for this Court to review the factual findings of the
CA, the OP, and the Investigating Committee. These findings are
now conclusive on the Court. And quite significantly, Rayala himself
admits to having committed some of the acts imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual
harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that
there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as
a condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to
a higher position.
We find respondent's insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule,
which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer
may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action
for each can proceed independently of the others. This rule applies
with full force to sexual harassment.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala's culpability is not to be
determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is
charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal
infraction, of sexual harassment. It should be enough that the CA,
along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the
President, found substantial evidence to support the
administrative charge.
Akeem: In RA 7877, one of the elements to constitute sexual
harassment is that it is done as a condition for employment,
continued employment, or re-employment. Rayala invoked that this
element was lacking, however, the CA held that RA 7877 should not
be the only basis in determining whether there actually was sexual
harassment since Rayala is being charged with an administrative
offense.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayala's acts strictly by the standards
set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable.
It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in
a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with
equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and
squeezing Domingo's shoulders, running his fingers across her neck
and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her,
giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of
future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual
overtones — all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity
the unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala's claim, it is not essential that the
demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for
continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is
enough that the respondent's acts result in creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee.
That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile
environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual
finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that
Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last
incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to
another unit.
Rayala's invocation of Aquino v. Acosta is misplaced, because the With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala
factual setting in that case is different from that in the case at committed sexual harassment, we now determine the proper
bench. While in Aquino, the Court interpreted the acts (of Judge penalty to be imposed.
Acosta) as casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper
during festive or special occasions and with other people present,
disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a
in the instant case, Rayala's acts of holding and squeezing
valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This
Domingo's shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and
power, however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided
tickling her ear, and the inappropriate comments, were all made in
by law". Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed
the confines of Rayala's office when no other members of his staff
guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did
were around. More importantly, and a circumstance absent
not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the
in Aquino, Rayala's acts, as already adverted to above, produced a
penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the
hostile work environment for Domingo, as shown by her having
imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative
reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident,
offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral
filing for a leave of absence and requesting transfer to another unit.
conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. We find, year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to
however, that the question of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a
is of no real consequence. The events of this case unmistakably penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second
show that the administrative charges against Rayala were for offense.
violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed jurisdiction
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took
over the administrative case; that the participation of the DOLE,
advantage of his high government position, it still could not validly
through the Committee created by the Secretary, was limited to
dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on
initiating the investigation process, reception of evidence of the
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, taking undue advantage of
parties, preparation of the investigation report, and
a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating
recommending the appropriate action to be taken by the OP. AO
circumstance and where only aggravating and no mitigating
250 had never really been applied to Rayala.
circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual imposed. Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on
harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He argues that intent Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.
is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank
imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he should be
equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not unavailing that rigid
absolved of the charges against him.
standards of conduct may be demanded of him.
We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for
It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how
sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment
his employees should conduct themselves in public office, so that
is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
they may work efficiently in a healthy working atmosphere.
We also reject Rayala's allegations that the charges were filed Courtesy demands that he should set a good example.
because of a conspiracy to get him out of office and thus constitute
Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to
merely political harassment. A conspiracy must be proved by clear
effect his exoneration. He even puts Domingo's character in
and convincing evidence. His bare assertions cannot stand against
question and casts doubt on the morality of the former President
the evidence presented by Domingo.
who ordered, albeit erroneously, his dismissal from the service.
Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due Unfortunately for him, these are not significant factors in the
process. He accuses the Committee on Decorum of railroading his disposition of the case. It is his character that is in question here
trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OP's decision and sadly, the inquiry showed that he has been found wanting.
finding him guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under
the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877.
Considering that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral
conduct", he argues that the verdict is a "sham and total nullity".
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In
previous cases, this Court held that in administrative proceedings,
due process has been recognized to include actual or constructive
notice, a real opportunity to be heard personally or with assistance
of counsel, a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction hears the
case, and a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence.
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these
procedural due process safeguards. Although in the beginning he
questioned the authority of the Committee to try him, he
appeared, personally and with counsel, and participated in the
proceedings.
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to
disgraceful and immoral conduct. Thus, any finding of liability for
sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for
disgraceful and immoral conduct.
OP and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION v
CATAQUIZ
FACTS: Respondent Cataquiz was appointed as General
Manager of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA). A
majority of the members of the Management Committee and
the rank-and-file employees of the LLDA submitted to then
DENR Secretary Gozun their Petition for the Ouster
of Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager on the grounds of
corrupt and unprofessional behavior and management
incompetence.
In her Memorandum for the President dated May 23,
2003, Secretary Gozun reported that there is prima
facie evidence to support some accusations
against Cataquiz which may be used to pursue an
administrative or criminal case against him. It was further
noted that respondent lost his leadership credibility. In light of
these, she recommended that Cataquiz be relieved from his
position and that he be investigated by PAGC.
Thereafter, Concerned Employees of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (CELLDA) formally filed its Affidavit
Complaint before PAGC charging Cataquiz with violations of
RA 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), EO 292
(The Administrative Code) and RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), to wit:
“a. That respondent directly transacted with 35
fishpen operators and authorized payment of fishpen
fees based on negotiated prices; b. That respondent
allegedly approved additional fishpen areas in the
Lake without the approval of the Board; c. That
respondent allegedly condoned or granted
reductions of fines and penalties imposed by the
Public Hearing Committee; d. That on June 4, 2002,
respondent allegedly appropriated and disbursed
P500,000 LLDA funds” (daghan ni nag butang lang ko
gamay in case mangayo si sir example)
PAGC issued a Resolution recommending to the President that
the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory
penalties of disqualification for re-employment in the public
service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits be
imposed upon Cataquiz.
Thereafter, on December 8, 2003, Cataquiz was replaced by
Fatima A.S. Valdez, who then assumed the position. In its
Decision, the OP adopted by reference the findings and
recommendations of PAGC.
The OP issued an Amended Resolution, imposing
on Cataquiz the penalties of disqualification from re-
employment in the government service and forfeiture of
retirement benefits, in view of the fact that the penalty of
dismissal was no longer applicable to him because of his
replacement as General Manager of the LLDA.
The CA reversed and set aside the Amended Resolution of the
OP.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the CA made an incorrect determination of the
facts of the case warranting review of its factual findings by the
Court;
(2) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges
against Cataquiz serves as a bar to the decision of the OP;
(TOPIC)
(3) Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory
penalties of disqualification from re-employment in the public
service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits,
despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior to the issuance by the
PAGC and the OP of their decision and resolution, respectively;
and
(4) Whether Cataquiz can be charged with a violation of
Board Resolution No. 28, despite the clerical error made by the
PAGC in indicating the Board Resolution number to be No. 68.
RULING:
1. Findings of fact of the appellate court can be
reviewed since it was contrary to those of the trial
court.
After a diligent review of the evidence presented
and the pleadings filed, this Court finds that there is
substantial evidence to justify the conclusion of PAGC
that Cataquiz should be punished with the penalty of
dismissal, along with its accessory penalties, for
committing acts prejudicial to the best interest of the
government and for giving undue advantage to a private
company in the award of fishpens.
2. The dismissal of the criminal case against
Respondent does not bar the finding of
administrative liability. (TOPIC)
At the outset, the Court would like to highlight
the fact that Cataquiz never raised this issue before the
CA, despite having had ample time to do so.
Even if the Court were to overlook this
procedural lapse, Cataquiz' argument would still fail. The
Ombudsman Resolution dated November 30, 2004
recommending the dismissal of the charges against him
pertains only to the criminal case against him and not the
administrative case, which is the subject matter of the
case at bench. As can be gleaned from the Resolution, the
charges referred to by the Ombudsman were for
respondent's alleged violation of Section 3 (b) and (c)
of RA 3019 or for malversation of public funds and fraud
against the public treasury.
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public
officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a
violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission,
such that they may be held civilly, criminally and
 administratively liable for the same act. Obviously,
administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal
and civil liability. In the case of People v.
Sandiganbayan, the Court elaborated on the difference
between administrative and criminal liability:
The distinct and independent nature of
one proceeding from the other can be
attributed to the following: first, the
difference in the quantum of evidence
required and, correlatively, the procedure
observed and sanctions imposed; and
second, the principle that a single act may
offend against two or more distinct and
related provisions of law, or that the same
act may give rise to criminal as well as
administrative liability.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by
the Ombudsman does not foreclose administrative action
against Cataquiz. His absolution from criminal liability is
not conclusive upon the OP, which subsequently found
him to be administratively liable. The pronouncement
made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the
respondent from further administrative prosecution. A
contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would undermine
the very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to
protect the public service and uphold the time-honored
principle that a public office is a public trust.
3. Respondent can be imposed with the accessory
penalties.
Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to
a finding of administrative liability. Despite his removal
from his position, Cataquiz can still be held
administratively liable.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the
accessory penalties of disqualification from re-
employment in public service and forfeiture of
government retirement benefits can still be imposed on
the respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of
effecting the principal penalty of dismissal because of his
removal from office.
4. PAGC's typographical error can be corrected.
It is clear from the pleadings submitted before PAGC —
particularly in the Affidavit Complaint filed by CELLDA
against Cataquiz and in the Counter-Affidavit submitted by
the latter — that the resolution referred to as having been
violated by the respondent was Board Resolution No. 28, and
not No. 68, as was erroneously indicated in the PAGC
Resolution. Thus, pursuant to the rule that the judgment
should be in accordance with the allegations and the
evidence presented, the typographical error contained in the
PAGC Resolution can be amended. Clerical errors or any
ambiguity in a decision can be rectified even after the
judgment has become final by reference to the pleadings
CHAVEZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: The Solicitor General once filed specific charges against
Juan Ponce Enrile due to his alleged linkage with the illegal
activities of President Marcos and his wife. However, the
PCGG, speaking through Honorable Jovito Salonga (who then
became Senate President), found and declared that "not one
of the documents left by then President and Mrs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos including the 2,300-page evidence turned over to the
PCGG by the US State Department implicates Enrile."
However, notwithstanding the previous findings of the PCGG
that there was absolutely no evidence linking Defendant to the
illegal activities of former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, the PCGG (this time with a different composition of
commissioners), filed the Complaint against Defendant,
among others, on or about 22 July 1987 for reconveyance,
restitution and damages. The same Solicitor General assisted,
cooperated or instigated in filing such case, hence “impeding
his constitutional rights and liberties.”
Upon denial of his motion to dismiss, Enrile filed a
counterclaim for damages to which the Republic replied. Later,
with leave of court, Enrile sought to implead Solicitor General
Chavez and the PCGG officials for instituting this “harassment”
suit. The Sandiganbayan, via resolution, granted Enrile’s
request to implead such officials. In another resolution, it
denied the motion for reconsideration of the officials.
The PCGG officials filed their answer, invoking their immunity
from suit as provided in E.O. #1. However, the petitioner
Solicitor General went to the Supreme Court and assailed both
resolutions. Petitioner invoked Borja vs Borja stating that the
counterclaim is not proper since: “the appearance of a lawyer
as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such
counsel does not make him a party to the action.” Moreover,
he said that he is covered by the immunity under E.O. 1 stating
that "No civil action shall lie against the Commission (PCGG) or
any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the
discharge of the task contemplated by this order.”
ISSUE: The lone issue in this petition is the propriety of
impleading the petitioner as additional party defendant in the
counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile.
RULING: He cannot be impleaded in the same case. Though
general rule is that public officials can be held personally
accountable for official acts which are ultra vires or where
there is a showing of bad faith, it must be raised in a separate
case. Hence, the Supreme Court said that:
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in
connection with official duties where they have acted ultra
vires or where there is a showing of bad faith.
Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the
immunity proviso under E.O. 1 also extends to him is not well-
taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. Chief
Justice Teehankee stated in PCGG vs Pena: The immunity
granted to PCGG officials under EO 1 is not an absolute
immunity; it merely refers to immunity from liability for
damages in the official discharge of their tasks.
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and
non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by
any other official of the Republic. (id., at page 586)
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General
acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the private respondent,
"maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in
persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an
evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's
constitutional rights and liberties", there can be no question
that a complaint for damages may be filed against him. High
position in government does not confer a license to persecute
or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles
19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may
be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The
issue is not the right of respondent Enrile to file an action for
damages. He has the right. The issue is whether or not that
action must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case
filed against him.
HOWEVER: Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that
the charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged
harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not
constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights,
Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action
for damages against the Solicitor General.
To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint
for his clients, who is merely their representative in court and
not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to
mischievous consequences. A lawyer cannot properly attend
to his duties towards his client if, in the same case, he is kept
busy defending himself. As earlier stated, we do not suggest
that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from damage suits.
However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should not
be sued on a counterclaim in the very same case he has filed
only as counsel and not as a party. Any claim for alleged
damages or other causes of action should be filed in an entirely
separate and distinct civil action.
(NOTE: Transcript - Atty Guji: “Mischievous consequences” =
harass or intimidate the lawyer.)
7.
8.
Fernandez V. Ledesma this Court also said: "Congress can legally and constitutionally make
One Liner: The tenure of an appointed officer is dependent with the the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure of the
pleasure of the appointing officer the revocation of which is one of President."
the modes of terminating official relations.
When an officer holds office without fixed term and is just merely
Facts: Petitioner was appointed ad interim as chief of police of appointed by a higher authority, his appointment maybe revoked
Basilan City. On June 8, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia, in an anytime without violation of the law.ty
administrative order, suspended Fernandez for one month for
having been found guilty of gross negligence, violation of law, and
dereliction of duty. Subsequently, (2) two criminal charges were filed
against him one for disobedience of an order of his superior officer
and another one for oral defamation. However, petitioner was
acquitted for both offenses.

Nevertheless, Fernandez continued suspended even if no formal

administrative charge were instituted against him, or any
administrative investigation conducted of said charges.

Subsequently, petitioner was informed that the President has

terminated his service as Chief of Police of Basilan City and that
Respondent was the one to replace him in his office.

Petitioner then filed a quo warranto proceeding against respondent

against respondent seeking to be reinstated on the ground that
petitioner was removed from office without cause provided by law.

Issue: WON petitioner was terminated lawfully?

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner was terminated in accordance with law.

Section 17 of Republic Act 288, known as the Charter of the City of

Basilan, which reads as follows:

SEC. 17. Appointment and removal of officers and

employees — Compensation.— The President shall appoint with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, the municipal judge and auxiliary
municipal judge, the city engineer, the city treasurer-assessor, the city
attorney, the chief of police and the other chiefs of departments of the city
which may be created from time to time, and the President may remove at
his discretion any of said appointive officers with the exception of the
municipal judge, who may be removed only according to law

When the law says that the President may remove at his discretion
any of the appointive officers of the city with the exception of the
municipal judge who may be removed only according to law, it is
evident that the legislative intent is to make the continuance in
office of any of said appointive officers dependent upon the
pleasure of the President. If such were not the case, it would not
have made a distinction in point of removal between appointive
officers in general and the municipal judge. This distinction verily is
predicated upon the fact that nowhere in Republic Act No. 288 is
there any mention that the term of office of the chief of police, and
for that matter of any appointive officer, with the exception of the
municipal judge, should be for a fixed period. The fact no term of
office is fixed for that position is indicative of an intention to make it
dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of the appointing power.
And Congress is not wanting in power to do so for, as it was aptly
said: "A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign function of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public"