Basher vs COMELEC – both candidates,
punong barangay comelec officer had no
authority to suspend or postpone the elections
FACTS: Petitioner Hadji Rasul Batador
Basher and Private Respondent Abulkair Ampatua
were both candidates for the position of Punong
Barangay in Barangay Maidan, Lanao del Sur
during the May 1997 barangay election.
The election was declared a failure and a
special one was set for June 1997. Again, the
election failed and was reset to August 30, 1997.
According to the Comelec, the voting
started only around 9:00 pm in August 30, 1997
because of the prevailing tension in the said
locality. The Election Officer reported that she was
allegedly advised by some religious leaders not to
proceed with the election because "it might trigger
bloodshed." She also claimed that the town mayor
yelled and threatened her to declare a failure of
election in Maidan. Subsequently, the armed
followers of the mayor pointed their guns at her.
The parties were then pacified at the PNP
headquarters.
1. Religious leaders told her not to proceed
2. Town mayor yelled at her and threatened
her to declare a failure of election
3. Armed followers of the mayor pointed guns
at her
- No election in place and time prescribed by
law
- Conducted elections and fill up election
returns on the house of former mayor
With the arrival of additional troops, the
election officer proceeded to Maidan to conduct the
election starting at 9:00 p.m. until the early morning
of the following day. The holding of the election
at that particular time was allegedly announced
"over the mosque. Private respondent was
declared the winner.
Petitioner then filed a Petition before the
Comelec praying that the election be declared a
failure. He alleged that no election was
conducted in the place and at the time
prescribed by law. It was also alleged that the
election officer had directed the Board of Election
Tellers to conduct the election and to fill up the
election returns and certificates of canvass on the
night of August 30, 1997 at the residence of the
former mayor.
The Comelec dismissed the petition hence
the case at bar.
ISSUE: WON the "election" held on the date, at the
time and in the place other than those officially
designated by the law and by the Comelec was
valid.
RULING: NO. The disputed “election” was
illegal, irregular and void.
1. Election Situs Was Illegal – First, the
place where the voting was conducted was
illegal. Section 42 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that “the chairman of the board of election
tellers shall designate the public school or any
other public building within the barangay to be used
as polling place in case the barangay has one
election precinct x x x." Petitioner, citing an Affidavit
supposedly executed by the members of the Board
of Election Tellers (BET) for Barangay Maidan,
alleges that the election of officials for said
barangay was held at the residence of former
Mayor Pukunun, which is located at Barangay
Pandarianao, instead of the officially designated
polling precinct at Cagayan Elementary School.
Such "election" cannot be valid as it was not
held within the barangay of the officials who were
being elected. On the other hand, it is admitted that
there was a public school or building in Barangay
Maidan -- the Cagayan Elementary School, which
was the earlier validly designated voting center.
2. Voting Time Was Likewise Irregular –
Second, as to the time for voting, the law provides
that “the casting of votes shall start at seven
o'clock in the morning and shall end at three
o'clock in the afternoon, except when there are
voters present within thirty meters in front of the
polling place who have not yet cast their votes, in
which case the voting shall continue but only to
allow said voters to cast their votes without
interruption.
 However, the "election" for Barangay
Maidan officials was supposed to have been
held after 9:00 p.m. of August 30, 1997 until the
wee hours of the following day. Certainly, such
schedule was not in accordance with law or the
Comelec Rules.
3. Election Date Was Invalid - Third, the
Comelec scheduled the special election on August
30, 1997. Any suspension or postponement of an
election is governed by Section 2 of RA 6679 which
authorizes only the Comelec to postpone the
elections provided the grounds therein are present.
The Election Officer practically postponed
the election in Barangay Maidan from the official
original schedule of 7 am to 3 pm of August 30,
1997 to 10 pm of August 30, 1997 until the early
morning of August 31, 1997. She attempted to
justify her postponement of the election by
citing threats of violence and bloodshed in the
said barangay.
However, as election officer, she has no
authority to declare a failure of election. Indeed,
only the Comelec itself has legal authority to
exercise such awesome power. An election
officer alone, or even with the agreement of the
candidates, cannot validly postpone or suspend the
elections.
4. Election Postponement Was Invalid -
Fourth, the election officer did not follow the
procedure laid down by law for election
postponement or suspension or the declaration
of a failure of election.
It clearly appears from the very report of the
election officer to the Comelec that she did not
conduct any proceeding, summary or
otherwise, to find out whether any of the legal
grounds for the suspension or postponement or
the declaration of failure of the election actually
existed in the barangay concerned.
5. Notice Was Irregular - Finally and very
significantly, the electorate was not given ample
notice of the exact schedule and venue of the
election. The electorate of Barangay Maidan was
not given due notice that the election would push
through after 9:00 p.m. that same day.
Arriving at Maidan, they allegedly proceeded to
conduct the election "after announcing it over the
mosque." Such abbreviated announcement "over
the mosque" at such late hour did NOT constitute
sufficient notice to the electorate. In the case at
bar, the announcement was made only
minutes before the supposed voting.
Mitmug vs COMELEC – petition to declare
failure of election on 49 precincts, voter turnout
was low on 49/67 precincts (2/9k)
FACTS: Petitioner SULTAN MITMUG and
private respondent DATU GAMBAI DAGALANGIT
were among the candidates for the mayoralty
position of Lumba-Bayabao during the May 11,
1992 election. There were 67 precincts in the
municipality.
However, on election day, voter turnout was
low on 49 precincts. Only 2k out of 9k registered
voters therein cast their votes. 5 of these precincts
did not conduct actual voting at all. Consequently,
COMELEC ordered the holding of a special election
on May 30, 1992 in the 5 precincts which failed to
function during election day.
In the interim, petitioner filed a petition
seeking the annulment of the special election
conducted on May 30, 1992 alleging various
irregularities. But COMELEC considered the
petition moot since the votes in the subject
precincts were already counted.
Other petitions seeking the declaration of
failure of election in some or all precincts of Lumba-
Bayabao were also filed with COMELEC by other
mayoralty candidates but to no avail.
Thereafter, a new board of Election
Inspectors was formed to conduct the special
election set for July 25, 1992. Petitioner impugned
the creation of this Board. Nevertheless, the new
Board convened and began the canvassing of
votes. Finally, private respondent was proclaimed
the duly elected Mayor of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao
del Sur.
Later, petitioner instituted the instant
proceedings seeking the declaration of failure of
election in 49 precincts where less than a quarter of
the electorate were able to cast their votes.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in denying motu proprio and
without due notice and hearing the petitions
seeking to declare a failure of election in some or
all of the precincts in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del
Sur.
RULING: NO. COMELEC did not act with
grave abuse of discretion. Under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, within 24 hours from the filing
of a verified petition to declare a failure to elect,
notices to all interested parties indicating therein
the date of hearing should be served through the
fastest means available. The hearing of the case
will also be summary in nature.
Based on the foregoing, the clear intent of
the law is that a petition of this nature must be
acted upon with dispatch only after hearing thereon
shall have been conducted. Since COMELEC
denied the other petitions without conducting any
hearing, it would appear then that there indeed
might have been grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petitions.
HOWEVER, a closer examination of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Sec. 2,
Rule 26, thereof which was lifted from Sec. 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, indicates
otherwise.
Sec. 2. Failure of election. — If, on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
or other analogous causes the election in
any precinct has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody of canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall,
on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation
of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty (30)
days after the cessation of the cause of
such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect. (LISOD SAD
SABTON OY)
Before COMELEC can act on a verified
petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two
conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken
place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed
by law or, even if there was voting, the election
nevertheless results in failure to elect; and, second,
the votes not cast would affect the result of the
election.
In the case before us, it is indubitable that
the votes not cast will definitely affect the outcome
of the election. But, the first requisite is missing,
i.e., that no actual voting took place, or even if
there is, the results thereon will be tantamount
to a failure to elect.
Since actual voting and election by the
registered voters in the questioned precincts
have taken place, the results thereof cannot be
disregarded and excluded. COMELEC therefore
did not commit any abuse of discretion, much less
grave, in denying the petitions outright. There was
no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged
therein did not constitute sufficient grounds to
warrant the relief sought.
Indeed, the fact that a verified petition is
filed does not automatically mean that a hearing
on the case will be held before COMELEC will act
on it. The verified petition must still show on its face
that the conditions to declare a failure to elect are
present. In the absence thereof, the petition
must be denied outright.
There can be failure of election in a political
unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled
and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be
determined, it must be accorded respect. After all,
there is no provision in our election laws which
requires that a majority of registered voters
must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a
winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of
valid votes, regardless of the actual number of
ballots cast.
Thus, even if less than 25% of the
electorate in the questioned precincts cast their
votes, the same must still be respected. There
is prima facie showing that private respondent was
elected through a plurality of valid votes of a valid
constituency.
Canicosa vs COMELEC (petition to declare
failure of election, widespread fraud)
FACTS: RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and
SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates for mayor in
Calamba, Laguna, during the May 1995
elections. After obtaining a majority of some 24,000
votes, Lajara was proclaimed winner by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Later, Canicosa filed
with the COMELEC a Petition to Declare Failure of
Election because of alleged widespread frauds and
anomalies in casting and counting of votes.
Canicosa particularly averred that: (a) the
names of the registered voters did not appear in the
list of voters in their precincts; (b) more than one-
half of the legitimate registered voters were not
able to vote with strangers voting in their stead; (c)
he was credited with less votes than he actually
received; (d) control data of the election returns
was not filled up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes
brought were unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor
self-locking metal seals; and, (f) there was delay in
the delivery of election returns.
- Names of reg voters did not appear in list of
voters
- One half of the registered voters were not
able to vote, they were actually strangers
- Credited with less votes than what he
actually received
- Ballot boxes were not secured
- Control data
But the COMELEC en banc dismissed the
petition on the ground that the allegations therein
did not justify a declaration of failure of election
hence the case at bar.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC was correct in holding
that the allegations did not justify a declaration of
failure of election.
RULING: YES. The goddamn COMELEC
was correct as fuck holding that the allegations
did not justify a declaration of failure of
election.
Indeed, the grounds cited by Canicosa do
not warrant a declaration of failure of
election. Section 6 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code, reads: (Refer to
the previous case, kadtong gi-cite ang
provision)
Clearly, there are only 3 instances where a
failure of election may be declared,
namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling
place had been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during
the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes.
None of the grounds invoked by Canicosa
falls under any of those enumerated.
1. Canicosa bewails that the names of the
registered voters in the various precincts did not
appear in their respective lists of voters. But this is
not a ground to declare a failure of election. The
filing of a petition for declaration of failure of
election therefore is not the proper remedy.
15 days before the regular elections, the
final list of voters was posted in each precinct
pursuant to RA No. 7166. Based on the lists thus
posted Canicosa could have filed a petition for
inclusion of registered voters with the regular
courts.
2. Canicosa also avers that more than one-half
(1/2) of the legitimate registered voters were not
able to vote, instead, strangers voted in their
behalf. Again, this is not a ground which warrants a
declaration of failure of election. Canicosa was
allowed to appoint a watcher in every precinct. The
watcher is empowered by law to challenge any
illegal voter.
3. The claim of Canicosa that he was credited
with less votes than he actually received and that
the control data of the election returns was not filled
up should have been raised in the first instance
before the board of election inspectors or board of
canvassers. Section 179, Art. XV, of the Omnibus
Election Code clearly provides for the rights and
duties of watchers - The watchers x x x shall
have the right to witness and inform themselves
of the proceedings of the board of election
inspectors x x x to file a protest against any
irregularity or violation of law which they
believe may have been committed by the board
of election inspectors or by any of its members
or by any persons xxx
It is clear that in case of inconsistency as to
the number of votes written in the election returns
and the certificate of votes, a petition for correction
of election returns must immediately be filed with
COMELEC by all or a majority of the members of
the board of election inspectors or any candidate
affected by the error or mistake. Canicosa never
mentioned that he petitioned for the correction
of the election returns before the COMELEC
4. Canicosa complains that the election
returns were delivered late and the ballot boxes
brought to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer
unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor self-locking
metal seals. These bare allegations cannot impel
us to declare failure of election. Assuming that
the election returns were delivered late, we still
cannot see why we should declare a failure to
elect. The late deliveries did not convert the
election held in Calamba into a mockery or farce to
make us conclude that there was indeed a failure of
election.
In fine, the grounds cited by Canicosa in his
petition do not fall under any of the instances
enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code. In Mitmug v. Commission on Elections we
ruled that before COMELEC can act on a verified
petition seeking to declare a failure of election, at
least two (2) conditions must concur: (a) no voting
has taken place in the precincts on the date fixed
by law, or even if there was voting, the election
nevertheless resulted in failure to elect; and, (b) the
votes that were not cast would affect the
result of the election. From the face of the instant
petition, it is readily apparent than an election
took place and that it did not result in a failure
to elect
Batabor v Comelec (petition to declare failure of
elections in 3 precincts, not resumed by 1pm)
Own Summary: Petitioner and respondent ran for the
position of Punong Barangay. Respondent won the
election. Petitioner filed a petition to declare a failure of
election in 3 of the precincts in its barangay and to
annul the proclamation of respondent as in those
precincts the election was not resumed at 1pm as the
Board of Election Inspectors tore all the unused ballots
and padlocked the ballot boxes, as alleged by petitioner,
hence around 100 of his relatives and supporters was
deprived to vote which would be enough make him the
winner as respondent only won by 29 votes. SC: No
failure of election. For there to be one, no voting has
been held due to fraud, force majeure, violence or
terrorism and that the votes not cast are sufficient to
affect the result of the election. In this case, while the
alleged 100 votes of petitioner's relatives and
supporters, if cast during the election, are sufficient to
affect its result, however, he failed to prove that the
voting did not take place. As around 69.62% of the
registered voters actually voted. This high turnout in the
number of registered voters who actually voted is clearly
not an indication of a failure of elections.
FACTS:
In the synchronized July 15, 2002 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections, Hadji Rasul Batabor, petitioner, and Mocasim
Abangon Batondiang, private respondent, ran as opposing
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay
Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur.
The result of the election shows that private respondent won as
Punong Barangay, garnering 123 votes, as against petitioner's 94
votes, or a difference of 29 votes.
In due time, private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected
Punong Barangay of Barangay Maidan.
Not satisfied with the outcome of the election, petitioner filed with
the COMELEC a petition to declare a failure of election in Precincts
3A, 4A and 5A of Barangay Maidan. The petition alleges that during
the election, the voting started at around 8:30 o'clock in the
morning. It was temporarily suspended during the lunch break and
was to resume at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day. But after
lunch, the Chairwoman of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of
Precincts 3A, 4A and 5A suddenly tore all the unused official ballots.
Thus, the voting was not continued. The BEI then padlocked the
ballot boxes. At that time, petitioner was not present. Despite the
note of Election Officer Taha Casidar directing the BEI to resume the
voting, the latter did not allow the remaining voters to vote. Thus,
petitioner's relatives and followers, numbering more than 100, were
not able to cast their votes.
In his comment, private respondent averred that petitioner's
allegations are not supported by substantial evidence.
On October 9, 2003, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed
Resolution denying the petition.
Petitioner now contends in his petition for certiorari before us that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his petition
ISSUE:
WON there is failure of election
RULING:
NO. 'There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of
the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can
be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no
provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of
registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a
winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes,
regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than
25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their votes, the
same must still be respected. There is prima facie showing that private
respondent was elected through a plurality of valid votes of a valid
constituency.'"
We held in Benito vs. Commission on Elections that these
TWO (2) CONDITIONS MUST EXIST BEFORE A FAILURE
OF ELECTION MAY BE DECLARED: (1) no voting has been
held in any precinct or precincts due to fraud, force majeure,
violence or terrorism; and (2) the votes not cast therein are
sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of such
failure may arise before or after the casting of votes or on the
day of the election.
We find that the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioner's petition alleging a failure of
election. While the alleged 100 votes of petitioner's
relatives and supporters, if cast during the election, are
sufficient to affect its result, however, he failed to prove
that the voting did not take place in precincts 3A, 4A and
5A. As found by the COMELEC, the Statement of Votes and
the Certificate of Canvass of Votes show that out of the 316
registered voters in the questioned precincts, at least 220
actually voted. This simply shows that there was no failure of
election in the subject precincts. (note: 69.62% of the
registered voters actually voted. This high turnout in the
number of registered voters who actually voted is clearly not an
indication of a failure of elections)
[RE: Proper relief – election contest]
Moreover, petitioner's allegation that the voting was not
resumed after lunch break, preventing 100 of his relatives and
followers to vote, is better ventilated in an election contest.
These irregularities may not as a rule be invoked to declare a
failure of election and to disenfranchise the electorate through
the misdeeds of a relative few. Otherwise, elections will never
be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of
innocent voters as losers will always cry fraud and terrorism.
[RE: Grave abuse of discretion]
The familiar rule, as applied to this case, is that grave abuse of
discretion exists when the questioned act of the COMELEC
was exercised capriciously and whimsically as is equivalent to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Such exercise of judgment
must be done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that the COMELEC,
in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such
abuse must be grave.
[RE: Violation Of Equal Protection]
We cannot also help but notice that the instant petition seeks to
declare a failure of elections and to annul solely the proclamation of
respondent Batondiang, the elected punong barangay. The prayer for
annulment of proclamation does not extend to all the elected and
proclaimed candidates in Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur.
The Commission may not, on the ground of failure of elections,
annul the proclamation of one candidate only, and thereafter call
a special election failure of
therefor, because
elections necessarily affects all the
elective positions in the place where
there has been a failure of elections. To
hold otherwise will be discriminatory
and violative of the equal protection of
the laws
Sandea v Comelec (duplicate copy of election
returns with the MTC judge)
Own Summary: While the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) is
canvassing the election returns, certain gang stormed and destroyed
all election materials including the election returns. The MBC then
suggested to use the duplicate copy of the election returns in the
procession of the MTC Judge. Petitioner sought to stop such and filed
a petition to declare that there is a failure of election. SC: (1) copies
of the election returns were existing, and their authenticity was
not questioned, they may properly be used as basis for the
canvass. This is expressly authorized by Section 233 of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). The use by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of the election returns was in
fact the best possible recourse under the circumstances in
order to give life to the will of the electorate; and (2) there is no
failure of election as There is a failure of elections only when the
will of the electorate has been muted and cannot be
ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the same
must as far as possible be respected. In this case, there was
still the duplicate copy of the election return which could give
life to the will of the electorate.
FACTS:
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 13, 1992, while
the canvassing of the election returns was going on, some
sympathizers of petitioner Edwin Sardea, a defeated mayoralty
candidate of LAKAS-NUCD, "stormed the municipal building"
and "destroyed . . . all election materials and paraphernalia
including, among others, the copies of election returns
furnished to respondent Board . . . "
On May 14, 1992, the respondent Municipal Board of
Canvassers convened and assessed the extent of the damage
wrought by the demonstrators. It discovered that the election
returns (Duplicate Copies) in the possession of the MTC Judge
of Mauban were intact, so it ordered the retrieval of said
election returns for use in the canvass
[SKIP THIS PAR IF NOT FOR RECITS] Later, Atty. Romeo
Devera, filed a petition in behalf of petitioner
Edwin Sardea to stop the proceedings of the Board of
Canvassers on the ground that it had no authority from
the COMELEC to use the copies of the election returns
obtained from the MTC of Mauban. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers denied Sardea's petition to stop the proceedings,
citing the directive of the Provincial Election Supervisor. The
directive was based on the authority given by Acting Executive
Director of the COMELEC, "to order the Municipal Trial Court
Judge of Mauban, Quezon to make available the copy of
election returns, etc., in his possession for the use of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers" On May 22, 1992,
the COMELEC held a special meeting and resolved "to
authorize the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban,
Quezon to reconvene and use the copies of the election
returns of the Municipal Trial Court Judge" (p. 87, Rollo).
On May 26, 1992, Sardea filed a petition in the Office of the
Election Registrar in Mauban, Quezon, assailing the
composition of the Board of Canvassers and its proceedings.
He also filed an Amended Notice of Appeal.
[Important Fact] On May 27, 1992, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed the private respondents as the duly
elected Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mauban, Quezon.
On June 10, 1992, petitioners filed Special Action Case No.
SPA 92-331, seeking to declare a failure of election in Mauban,
Quezon.
ISSUE:
1. WON the petition for seeking to declare a failure of election can
proceed. (note: didn’t discuss re: there is ground for failure of
election)
2. WON attendant facts and circumstance constitute substantial
grounds to declare a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon
RULING:
1. No. Pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be
entertained by the COMELEC after the winning
candidates have been proclaimed and assumed office.
The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is an election
contest in the Regional Trial Court as provided in Sec.
250 of B.P. 881 and Sec. 2(2), Art. IX-C of the
Constitution. (Own note: Remember the paragraph in the
facts where I place “important”?)
The COMELEC correctly dismissed Sardea's petition on the
ground that it was proper for an election contest.
The facts show that Sardea's complaints/petitions involved
pre-proclamation controversies which are defined as:
"Sec. 241. Definition. — A
pre-proclamation controversy refers
to any question pertaining to or affecting
the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate or by any registered political
party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with
the Commission, or any matter raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236
in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns."
(Art. XX Omnibus Election Code;
emphasis supplied.)
2. No. Since in this case copies of the election returns
submitted to the MTC of Mauban, Quezon were
extant, and their authenticity was not questioned,
they were properly used as basis for the canvass.
This is expressly authorized by Section 233 of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881) which provides
that "if said returns have been lost or destroyed, the
board of canvassers, upon prior authority of
the Commission, may use any of the authentic copies of
said election returns or a certified copy of said election
returns issued by the Commission . . . ." The use by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon of
the election returns in the possession of the MTC Judge
of Mauban, was not contrary to law, and was in fact the
best possible recourse under the circumstances in order
to give life to the will of the electorate.
We held that the pre-conditions for declaring a failure of
election are: "(1) that no voting has been held in any precinct
or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism,
and (2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the
results of the elections. The language of the law clearly
requires the concurrence of the[se] two circumstances to justify
the calling of a special election."
The destruction and loss of the copies of the election returns
intended for the Municipal Board of Canvassers on account of
violence committed on May 13, 1992 is not one of the causes
that would warrant the declaration of a failure of election
because voting actually took place as scheduled on May 11,
1992 and other valid election returns still existed. Moreover,
the incident did not affect the result of the election.
The power to throw out or annul an election should be
exercised with the utmost care and only under circumstances
which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of
the law had been so fundamental or so persistent and
continuous that it is impossible to distinguish what votes are
lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result
whatsoever, or that the great body of the voters have been
prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising
their franchise (20 C.J., pars. 179-181; Capalla vs. Tabiana, 63
Phil. 95).
The election is to be set aside when it is impossible from any
evidence within reach, to ascertain the true result — when
neither from the returns nor from other proof, nor from all
together can the truth be determined (Law on Public Officers
and Election Law by Hector S. De Leon, p. 381, 1990 Ed.,
citing A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, by
F. MECHEM, note 1 at p. 143)
There is a failure of elections only when the will of the
electorate has been muted and cannot be ascertained. If the
will of the people is determinable, the same must as far as
possible be respected.
SIDETOPIC:
[RE: copies of the election returns may not be used for the canvass
but merely for comparison purposes to determine the authenticity
of other copies of said election returns as B.P. 881 has been
amended by R.A. 7166]
Since B.P. 881 and R.A. 7166 are statutes in pari materia, they
should be so construed as to harmonize with each other and
with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system Prior statutes
relating to the same subject matter are to be compared with
the new provisions, and if possible by reasonable construction,
both to be construed that effect may be given to every
provision of each
Benito v Comelec (gist: evidentiary matters is
beyond the province of a writ of certiorari
raman)
FACTS:
Petitioner ZAIPAL D. BENITO and private respondent
IBRAHIM PAGAYAWAN were two (2) of eight (8) candidates
vying for the position of municipal mayor in Calanogas, Lanao
del Sur during the May 11, 1998 elections.
On the day of the election, voting started peacefully at the
polling place. Shortly before noon, however, the proceedings
were interrupted when some thirty (30) armed men appeared
at the school premises and fired shots into the air. This sowed
panic among the voters and election officials, causing them to
scatter in different directions.
Both parties contest alleged events transpiring after the
interruption of the voting.
 Petitioner argued that the ballot boxes and other
election materials were taken to the municipal hall by
the military forces providing security. From then on,
the voting allegedly never resumed, even when voters
who had not yet cast their ballots returned to their
respective polling places after the lawless elements
had left.
 In direct opposition, private respondent avers that
voting in fact resumed when the armed men left at
about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As proof, private
respondent submitted a "Final Incident
Report" 3 issued by the same Captain Manquiquis
which states among others: “That about one (1) hour
thereafter, the voting resumed”
These turn of events, notwithstanding, the ballot boxes for
the five (5) precincts in Disimban Elementary School were
taken together with those from the nineteen (19) other
precincts of Calanogas, to Marawi City for counting. The
votes from precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A were excluded
upon objection by petitioner's counsel who, it is claimed,
arrived only after the ballots from the other nineteen (19)
precincts had already been tabulated. (Note: out of 5
precincts in the Elem School, only 3 were asked to be
excluded by petitioner)
After counting Private respondent won over petitioner by forty-
eight (48) votes.On the other hand, the total votes cast for the
three (3) excluded precincts numbered 41 only. Considering
that private respondent would still lead petitioner by seven (7)
votes even if all forty-one (41) votes from the three (3)
excluded precincts were counted in the latter's favor, private
respondent was proclaimed mayor of Calanogas.
Petitioner then filed an amended petition to declare failure of
election and to call a special elections in precincts 15A, 6A/6A1
and 17A. He also filed a separate petition for the annulment of
the proclamation of private respondent. COMELEC dismissed
the petition. Petition file petition for certiorari under Rule65.
ISSUE:
1. Who has the exclusive power to postpone, to declare a
failure of election, or to call a special election.
2. WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not
declaring that there is failure of election
RULING:
1. COMELEC en banc
2. NO. Grave abuse of discretion means "such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law." It is not sufficient that a tribunal,
in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such
abuse must be grave.
[Questions Of Fact Are Not Proper Subjects In Certiorari]
Petitioner unequivocally states that there was never any
resumption of voting since the ballot boxes and other election
materials were taken into custody by the military and brought
to the municipal hall. In contrast, it is private respondent's
contention that, in truth, voting resumed peacefully at about
one o'clock in the afternoon on election day or after the
departure of the armed men. It is clear to us that whether
there was a resumption of voting is essentially a question
of fact. Such are not proper subjects of inquiry in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
[Comelec Could Not Have Abused Its Discretion]
It is indeed odd that petitioner singles out only precincts 15A,
6A/6A1 and 17A as the subjects of his petition when there
were two (2) other precincts in the same school. 18It was only in
his reply with memorandum 19 did he signify his lack of
objection to a declaration of failure of election in precincts
2A/2A1 and 13A, as prayed for by candidate Amoran
Macaborod's answer with counter-petition. 20 Likewise, he
never objected to the inclusion of the two (2) other precincts
during the canvassing and counting of votes.
Petitioner attempts to overcome the oversight by alleging that
he had no opportunity to object thereto because his counsel,
Atty. Hussein N. Mambuay, was not present, allegedly
because the latter did not possess the prescribed identification
for lawyers. In this regard, we have reviewed the record and
we concur with private respondent that this claim of petitioner
appears to be a mere afterthought.

[Elections; Failure Of Election Present Only If The Will Of Majority

Cannot Be Ascertained]
In a sense, petitioner equates failure of elections to the low
percentage of votes cast vis-a-vis the number of registered
voters in the subject election precincts. However,
[t]here can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the
majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be
determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision
in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered voters
must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate
must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual
number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in
the questioned precincts cast their votes, the same must still be
respected . .

[Failure Of Election Declared In Other Precincts Does Not Warrant

Declaration Of The Same In Other Precincts Of The Province]
In the recently decided case of Pangandaman v. Commission
on Elections, 23 unanimously 24 upheld the very same Omnibus
Order 25 dated July 14, 1998 relied upon by petitioner, on these
premises:
Petitioner's argument that respondent
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion by
failing to declare a total failure of elections in the
entire province of Lanao del Sur and to certify
the same to the President and Congress so that
the necessary legislation may be enacted for
the holding of a special election, likewise fails to
persuade.

No less than the petitioner himself concedes that there was total failure
of elections in twelve (12) municipalities and partial failure in eleven
(11). Yet he now insists a total failure of elections should have been
declared in the entire province of Lanao del Sur. Suffice it to state that
the propriety of declaring whether or not there has been a total failure
of elections in the entire province of Lanao del Sur is a factual issue
which this Court will not delve into considering that the COMELEC,
through its deputized officials in the field, is in the best position to
assess the actual conditions prevailing in that area. Absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion, the findings of fact of the
COMELEC or any administrative agency exercising particular expertise
in its field of endeavor, are binding on the Court. There is no cogent
reason to depart from the general rule in this case.
Loong v COMELEC (Topics: Failure on Elections;
COMELEC’s power to enforce and administer laws;
Certiorari jurisdiction of SC)
Preamble: taas ni kay three topics ni sa syllabus
joined into one.
Facts: In a bid to improve our elections, Congress
enacted R.A. No. 8436 prescribing the adoption of
an automated election system. The new system
was used in the 1998 regular elections held in
ARMM which includes the Province of Sulu.
The voting in Sulu started during the automated
counting of votes for the local officials. At about 6
a.m., some election inspectors and watchers
observed discrepancies between the election
returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty
candidates in the municipality of Pata (i.e. ALL
votes for one candidate transferred to another – as
such, one candidate got 0% votes while his
opponent had 100% votes). As a result, the
automated counting of ballots in Pata was
suspended. Thereafter, they found that the error
was in the printing of the local ballots, as a
consequence of which, the automated machines
failed to read them correctly.
Dom: 6 municipalities had problems. Pata, for
one, had misaligned ovals. The remaining five
had wrong sequence codes which were
programmed to be rejected by the automated
machines.
At 12:30 p.m. of the same day, an emergency
meeting of the local candidates was called. Those
who attended were the various candidates for
governor, namely, petitioner Loong, private
respondent Tan.
The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata
should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals.
There was lack of agreement. Consequently,
COMELEC issued Minute Resolution ordering a
manual count but only in the municipality of Pata.
Dom: case stated a tedious discussion on how
to implement the manual counting (e.g.
appointing of Inspectors, Board of Canvassers,
escort of the candidate’s representatives in
counting etc.) but I decided to omit those since I
think those are irrelevant.
Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
He contended that: 1) the order for manual
counting violated R.A. No. 8436; and 2) manual
counting gave opportunity to the following election
cheating to:
(a) The counting by human hands of the
tampered, fake and counterfeit ballots which the
counting machines have been programmed to
reject.
(b) The opportunity to substitute the ballots all
stored at the PICC. (aka possible bribery of the
watchers of petitioner)
(c) With the creation by the COMELEC of only 22
Boards of Election Inspectors to manually count
the 1,194 precincts, the manipulators are given
sufficient time to change and tamper the ballots to
be manually counted.
(d) There is the opportunity of delaying the
proclamation of the winning candidates.
Dom: What petitioner essentially was trying to
say was that if a manual counting of votes were
to be allowed, there would now be a travel of
ballots from destination A to B (Sulu to Manila;
Sulu to PICC, among others) which could be an
opportunity for ballot-tampering and thus may
hinder its integrity.
Subsequently, private respondent Tan was
proclaimed governor-elect of Sulu on the basis of
the manual count. Private respondent garnered
43,573 votes. Petitioner Loong was third with
35,452 votes or a difference of 8,121 votes.
Issues:
1) WON Certiorari was the proper remedy by
petitioner (Topic: Certiorari jurisdiction of
SC)
2) WON the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it ordered a manual count
in light of R.A. No. 8436
3) WON petitioners were denied due process;
WON the manual counting of votes is
unreliable
4) WON the COMELEC was powerless to
issue resolutions resulting to manual
counting of votes since the law did not
expressly give it the power to provide a
remedy in the event there is an error in
counting that is not machine-related. (Topic:
COMELEC’s power to administer and
enforce laws)
 5) WON a special election can be held (Topic:
Failure on Elections)
Ruling:
1) Yes. Supreme Court held that certiorari is the
proper remedy of the petitioner.
Section 7, Article IX (A) of the 1987 Constitution
states that "unless provided by this Constitution or
by law, any decision, order or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof." We have
interpreted this provision to mean final orders,
rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers. Contrariwise, administrative orders of the
COMELEC are not, as a general rule, fit subjects of
a petition for certiorari. The main issue in the case
at bar is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it ordered a manual count of the
1998 Sulu local elections. A resolution of the issue
will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on
automated election in relation to the broad power of
the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of
the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election . . ." The issue is not only legal but one of
first impression and undoubtedly suffused with
significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of
the right of the petitioner, the private respondent
and the intervenor to the position of governor of
Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for
an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this
Court.
2) No. The post-election realities on ground will
show that the order for a manual count cannot be
characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.
Based on the facts, it is plain that to continue with
the automated count in these five (5) municipalities
would result in a grossly erroneous count.
3) No. Petitioner Loong, among others, were not
denied due process. The facts clearly show that
they were given every opportunity to oppose the
manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were
orally heard. They later submitted written position
papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer
of the ballots and the automated machines from
Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the
manual count from beginning to end. Moreover, the
evidence is clear that the integrity of the local
ballots was safeguarded when they were
transferred from Sulu to Manila and when they
were manually counted. The ballot boxes were
consistently under the watchful eyes of the parties'
representatives. They were placed in an open
space at the PICC. The watchers stationed
themselves some five (5) meters away from the
ballot boxes. They watched 24 hours a day and
slept at the PICC.
From beginning to end, the manual counting was
done with the watchers of the parties concerned in
attendance. Thereafter, the certificates of canvass
were prepared and signed by the City/Municipal
Board of Canvassers composed of the Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, and Secretary. They were also
signed by the parties' watchers.
The correctness of the manual count cannot
therefore be doubted. There was no need for an
expert to count the votes. The naked eye could see
the check marks opposite the big ovals. Indeed,
nobody complained that the votes could not be
read and counted. The COMELEC representatives
had no difficulty counting the votes.
4) No.
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously
failed to provide a remedy where the error in
counting is not machine-related for human foresight
is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the
vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC
from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of
Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the
COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and
intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve
the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent to this
intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining
the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the
conduct of our elections.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a
manual count was not only reasonable. It was the
only way to count the decisive local votes in the six
(6) municipalities. The bottom line is that by means
of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu
was honestly determined. We cannot kick away the
will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to
R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual clearly involve questions of fact. It is for this reason
counting when machine count does not work. that they can only be determined by the COMELEC
Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an en banc after due notice and hearing to the parties.
election which is under the control and supervision In the case at bar, petitioner never asked the
of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that COMELEC en banc to call for a special election in
the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that Sulu. Even in his original petition with this Court,
cannot count the result of an election. petitioner did not pray for a special election. His
plea for a special election is a mere afterthought.
5) No, we cannot order a special election unless
Too late in the day and too unprocedural. Worse,
demanded by exceptional circumstances. The plea
the grounds for failure of election are inexistent.
can only be grounded on failure of election.
The records show that the voters of Sulu were able
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us
to cast their votes freely and fairly. Their votes were
when there is a failure of election, viz:
counted correctly, albeit manually. The people have
"Sec. 6. Failure of Election. — If, on account of spoken. Their sovereign will has to be obeyed.
force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other
Dom: to reiterate, the grounds for failure of
analogous causes, the election in any polling
election can only be determined by the
place has not been held on the date fixed, or
COMELEC en banc and since petitioner never
had been suspended before the hour fixed by
asked the COMELEC en banc to call for special
law for the closing of the voting or after the
election, it follows that his plea for special
voting and during the preparation and the
election was only a mere afterthought.
transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election There is another reason why a special election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special
cases the failure or suspension of election election only for the position of Governor will be
would affect the result of the election, the discriminatory and will violate the right of private
Commission shall on the basis of a verified respondent to equal protection of the law. The
petition by any interested party and after due records show that all elected officials in Sulu have
notice and hearing, call for the holding or been proclaimed and are now discharging their
continuation of the election, not held, powers and duties. Thus, two (2) congressmen, a
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect vice-governor, eight (8) members of the
but not later than thirty days after the cessation Sangguniang Panlalawigan and eighteen (18)
of the cause of such postponement or mayors, numerous vice-mayors and municipal
suspension of the election or failure to elect." councilors are now servicing in their official
capacities. These officials were proclaimed on the
To begin with, the plea for a special election must
basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu.
be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this
If manual counting is illegal, their assumption of
Court. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
office cannot also be countenanced. Private
should be read in relation to Section 4 of R.A. No.
respondent's election cannot be singled out as
7166 which provides:
invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
"Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and
Special Elections. — The postponement,
declaration of failure of elections and the calling
of special elections as provided in Sections 5,
6, and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be
decided by the Commission en banc by a
majority vote of its members. The causes for
the declaration of a failure of election may occur
before or after casting of votes or on the day of
the election."
The grounds for failure of election — force majeure,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes —
Carlos v. Angeles (Topic: Failure of Elections)
Facts: Petitioner Jose Emmanuel L. Carlos and
respondent Antonio M. Serapio were candidates for
the position of mayor.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
petitioner as the duly elected mayor having
obtained 102,688 votes, the highest number of
votes in the election returns. Respondent Antonio
M. Serapio, who obtained 77,270 votes, the second
highest number of votes, filed with the Regional
Trial Court an election protest challenging the
results.
The trial court conducted a pre-trial conference of
the parties but it did not produce a substantial
result. The pre-trial was then concluded and the
parties agreed to the creation of seven (7) revision
committees consisting of a chairman designated by
the court and two members representing the
protestant and the protestee.
The Revision Results final tally showed that
protestee Carlos garnered 83,609 votes, winning
him a margin of 17,007 votes.
RTC Ruling – ruled as failure of elections (take
note!)
The trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes
because of its finding of "significant badges of
fraud," namely:
1. The keys turned over by the City Treasurer to
the court did not fit into the padlocks of the ballot
boxes that had to be forcibly opened;
2. Seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any
ballot and two (2) ballot boxes out of the seven
(7) ballot boxes did not contain any election
returns;
3. Some schools where various precincts were
located experienced brownouts during the
counting of votes causing delay in the counting
although there was no undue commotion or
violence that occurred;
4. Some of the assigned watchers of
protestant were not in their posts during the
counting of votes.
Notwithstanding the plurality of valid votes in favor
of the protestee, the trial court declared protestant
Antonio M. Serapio as the duly elected mayor.
Petitioner appealed to COMELEC
Issues: WON the RTC has the power to declare
failure of election
Ruling: No. The trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rendering its decision proclaiming
respondent Serapio the duly elected mayor.
The trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure
of election. It is the Commission (Comelec) sitting
en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to
declare a failure of election.
The proper remedy is an action before the
Commission on Elections en banc to declare a
failure of election or to annul the election.
However, the case below was an election protest
case involving an elective municipal position which,
under Section 251 of the Election Code, falls within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the appropriate
regional trial court.
Nonetheless, the annulment of an election on the
ground of fraud, irregularities and violations of
election laws may be raised as an incident to an
election contest. Such grounds for annulment of an
election may be invoked in an election protest case.
However, an election must not be nullified and the
voters disenfranchised whenever it is possible to
determine a winner on the basis of valid votes cast,
and discard the illegally cast ballots. In this case,
the petitioner admittedly received 17,007 valid
votes more than the protestee, and therefore the
nullification of the election would not lie. The power
to nullify an election must be exercised with the
greatest care with a view not to disenfranchise the
voters, and only under circumstances that clearly
call for such drastic remedial measure.
Even if RTC has jurisdiction to declare failure of
elections, no ground exists to support it
The commission of fraud cannot be attributed to the
protestee. There was no evidence on record that
protestee had a hand in any of the irregularities that
protestant averred. It is wrong for the trial court to
state that the protestee had control over the
"election paraphernalia" or over electric services.
The Commission on Elections has control over
election paraphernalia, through its officials and
deputies. On the other hand, electric utility services
in Metro Manila, including Valenzuela are under the
control of its franchise holder, particularly the majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
Manila Electric Company, a public service analogous causes; or
company, certainly not owned or controlled by the
(c) after the voting and during the preparation
protestee. In fact, during election period, Comelec
and transmission of the election returns or in
has control over such utilities as electric and even
the custody or canvass thereof, such election
telephone service.
results in a failure to elect on account of force
Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
declare a failure of election, the extent of that analogous causes.”
power is limited to the annulment of the election
and the calling of special elections. The result is a
failure of election for that particular office. In such
case, the court can not declare a winner. A
permanent vacancy is thus created. In such
eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall
succeed as provided by law.

Petition to annul an election; Failure of election,

when declared.
In a petition to annul an election under Section 6,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, two conditions must be
averred in order to support a sufficient cause of
action. These are: (1) the illegality must affect more
than 50% of the votes cast and (2) the good votes
can be distinguished from the bad ones. It is only
when these two conditions are established that the
annulment of the election can be justified because
the remaining votes do not constitute a valid
constituency.
We have held that: "To declare a failure of election,
two (2) conditions must occur: first, no voting has
taken place in the precincts concerned on the date
fixed by law or, even if there were voting, the
election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect;
and, second, the votes not cast would affect the
result of the election." Neither of these conditions
was present in the case at bar.
More recently, we clarified that, "Under the
pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election
Code, there are only three (3) instances where a
failure of elections may be declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force
Pangandaman vs. COMELEC (Topic: Special
Elections; fixing date of special elections)
Facts: Because of partial/total failure of
elections in several municipalities of Lanao del
Sur, COMELEC set the dates for the holding of
special elections in said municipalities during
the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.
The COMELEC in the assailed order scheduled
the holding of the special elections on July 18
and 25, 1996.
Dom: In case mu ask si Sir, reasons for
Failure of Elections - armed confrontation
of opposing political groups and
vehement disagreement on the clustering
of precincts; husband of mayoralty
candidate terrorized the Acting Municipal
Treasurer thus preventing the distribution of
ballots; candidates could not agree on
the venue of the distribution of the
election supplies, among others.
Petitioner asserted that the COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in ordering the holding of
special elections on July 18 and 25, 1998, more
than 30 days after failure to elect in said
municipalities.
"SECTION 6. Failure of elections. — xxx the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after
due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election…which
resulted in a failure to elect (in) not later
than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause of such postponement or suspension
of the election or failure to elect."
postponement, suspension or failure to elect
may still be considered "reasonably close to the
date of the election not held."
In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be
faulted for tardiness. The dates set for the
special elections were actually the nearest
dates from the time total/partial failure of
elections was determined, which date fell on
July 14, 1998, the date of promulgation of the
challenged Omnibus Order. Needless to state,
July 18 and 25, the dates chosen by the
COMELEC for the holding of special elections
were only a few days away from the time a
total/partial failure of elections was declared
and, thus; these were 'dates reasonably close'
thereto, given the prevailing facts herein.
Furthermore, it bears stressing that in the
exercise of the plenitude of its powers to protect
the integrity of elections, the COMELEC should
not and must not be straitjacketed by
procedural rules in the exercise of its discretion
to resolve election disputes.
Dom: SC applied liberal construction in this
case citing Loong v. COMELEC: "[O]ur
elections are not conducted under
laboratory conditions. In running for public
offices, candidates do not follow the rules of
Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to
make snap judgments to meet unforeseen
circumstances that threaten to subvert the
will of our voters. In the process, the actions
of COMELEC may not be impeccable,
indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot,
however, engage in a swivel chair criticism
of these actions often taken under very
difficult circumstances."

Issues: WON petitioner was correct

Ruling: No. In fixing the date for special
elections the COMELEC should see to it that:
1.] it should not be later than thirty (30) days
after the cessation of the cause of the
postponement or suspension of the election or
the failure to elect; and, 2.] it should be
reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in the failure
to elect. The first involves a question of fact.
The second must be determined in the light of
the peculiar circumstances of a case. Thus, the
holding of elections within the next few months
from the cessation of the cause of the
Hassan v. Comelec
FACTS: Petitioner Hadji Hassan and private
respondent Mangondaya Buatan were candidates
for Vice Mayor while the other private respondents
were candidates for councilor in Lanao Del Sur in
May 1995 elections. However, due to threats of
violence and terrorism, there was a failure of
elections in 6 out of the 24 precincts in Madalum.
The ballot boxes were burned and there were
threats by unidentified persons. Thus, the
COMELEC Team headed by Virgilio Garcillano
recommended to the COMELEC the holding of
special elections. It was to be set on May 27 1995.
On said date, however, the members of BEI again
failed to report for duty in their respective polling
places. COMELEC again rescheduled to May 29 at
Liangan Elementary, which is 15 kms away from
the designated polling places, but again the
members of BEI did not again report for duty.
Hence, the COMELEC team was constrained to
appoint police and military personnel to act as
substitute members so as to push through with the
elections. In the final results, nadaog si
Mangondaya Buatan.
Hadji Hassan filed a petition with the COMELEC on
June 10, assailing the validity of the re-scheduled
special elections. At the same time, Mangondaya
assailed the inaction of the municipal board in not
proclaiming him yet as the winning vice mayor
candidate.
On Feb 21, 1996, COMELEC en banc denied the
petition for declaration of failure of elections. Thus,
petitioner went up to this Court assailing the
aforesaid resolution with a prayer for TRO to enjoin
the proclamation. The Court issued a TRO as
prayed for.
ISSUE: WON the rescheduled special election was
valid
RULING: In several cases, the Court has ruled that
the pre-conditions for declaring a failure of election
are: (1) that no voting has been held in any precinct
or precincts because of force majeure, violence or
terrorism, and (2) that the votes not cast therein
suffice to affect the results of the elections. The
concurrence of these two (2) circumstances are
required to justify the calling of a special election.
Mindful of these two (2) requirements, we rule in
favor of the petitioner.
While we are aware of the aforesaid rule,
the COMELEC can not turn a blind eye to the fact
that terrorism was so prevalent in the area,
sufficient enough to declare that no voting actually
occurred on May 29, 1995 in the areas concerned.
It must be recalled that elections had to be set for
the third time because no members of the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEI) reported for duty due to
impending threats of violence in the area. This then
prompted COMELEC to deploy military men to act
as substitute members just so elections could be
held; and to thwart these threats of violence,
the COMELEC Team, moreover, decided to
transfer the polling places to Liangan Elementary
School which was 15 kilometers away from the
polling place. Nonetheless, voting on May 29 had to
be suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting because of threats of violence,
grenade launching and gunfires.
We cannot agree with the COMELEC that
petitioner, his followers or the constituents must be
charged with notice of the special elections to be
held because of the failure of the two (2)
previous elections. To require the voters to come to
the polls on such short notice was highly
impracticable. In a place marred by violence, it was
necessary for the voters to be given sufficient time
to be notified of the changes and prepare
themselves for the eventuality.
It is essential to the validity of the election that the
voters have notice in some form, either actual or
constructive of the time, place and purpose thereof.
The time for holding it must be authoritatively
designated in advance. The requirement of notice
even becomes stricter in cases of
special elections where it was called by some
authority after the happening of a condition
precedent, or at least there must be a substantial
compliance therewith so that it may fairly and
reasonably be said that the purpose of the statute
has been carried into effect. The sufficiency of
notice is determined on whether the voters
generally have knowledge of the time, place and
purpose of the elections so as to give them full
opportunity to attend the polls and express their will
or on the other hand, whether the omission resulted
in depriving a sufficient number of the qualified
electors of the opportunity of exercising their
franchise so as to change the result of the election.
From the foregoing, it is not difficult for us to rule
that there was insufficiency of notice given as to the
time and transfer of the polling places. The low
turnout of voters is more than sufficient proof that
the electionsconducted on that day was vitiated. A
less than a day's notice of time and transfer of
polling places 15 kilometers away from the original
polls certainly deprived the electors the opportunity
to participate in theelections.
Respondents argue that since voting actually
occurred on May 29, the substantial requirement of
notice was complied with, which should not
necessarily invalidate the elections; more so, if the
votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of
the elections.
We disagree. It was quite sweeping and illogical for
the COMELEC to state that the votes uncast would
not have in any way affected the results of
the elections. While the difference between the two
candidates is only 219 out of the votes actually
cast, the COMELEC totally ignored the fact that
there were more than a thousand registered voters
who failed to vote. Aside from Precinct 7-A where
the ballot box had been burned and which had 219
voters, the COMELEC failed to consider the
disenfranchisement of about 78% of the registered
voters in the five (5) precincts of Madalum. Out of
the 1,546 registered voters, only 328 actually voted
because of the insufficient and ineffectual notice
given of the time and place of elections. Whether or
not another special election would turn the tide in
petitioner's favor is of no moment because what is
more important is that the electors should not have
been deprived of their right to vote which was
rather apparent in the case at bar.
The re-scheduling of the special elections from May
27 to May 29, was done in uncommon haste and
unreasonably too close for all voters to be notified
of the changes, not only as to the date but as to the
designated polling place. We must agree with the
dissenting opinion that even in highly urbanized
areas, the dissemination of notices poses to be a
problem. In the absence of proof that actual notice
of the specialelections has reached a great number
of voters, we are constrained to consider the May
29 elections as invalid. If only to ascertain the will of
the people and to prevent that will from being
muted, it is necessary that a special election be
held in view of the failure of elections in Madalum,
Lanao del Sur.
Lucero v. COMELEC
FACTS:
The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers
(PBC) of Northern Samar credited Jose L. Ong, Jr.
with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with
24,068 votes, or a lead by Ong of 204 votes.
However, this tally did not include the results of
Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of Silvino Lobos,
where the submitted election returns had not been
canvassed because they were illegible; of Precinct
No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes
were snatched and no election was held; and of
Precinct No. 16, also Silvino Lobos, where all
copies of the election returns were missing.
On 22 May, Lucero asked
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), to
suspend proclamation as well as ask for a special
election and recanvassing of votes. On 2 June,
the COMELEC, acting on Lucero's urgent
manifestation, directed the PBC to desist from
reconvening until further orders.
On June 8, Ong moved to lift the suspension, which
Lucero opposed to on the ground that the canvass
could not be completed because there were no
elections held in the precincts enumerated above.
On 13 June 1993, the COMELEC en
banc promulgated a resolution, ordering the
Provincial Election Supervision of Northern Samar
to bring the ballot boxes to COMELEC and for the
BEI officers to appear before them.
Lucero then filed an urgent motion to constitute a
Special Board of Election Inspectors to count the
votes in Precinct 7 and 16. Ong, in a special civil
action for certiorari, filed with this Court, questioned
the order for the recount of ballots. Despite the
pendency of this petition, COMELEC ordered the
recount of ballots in Precinct 16.
This Court promulgated a decision granting the
prayer and directed COMELEC to cease and desist
from directing the PBC to desist from reconvening.
Both Lucero and Ong have come to this Court by
way of separate special civil actions for certiorari to
challenge the Resolution.
In G.R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1) the
count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino
Lobos must be unconditional because the election
returns therefrom are invalid; and (2) his chances in
the special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino
Lobos would be spoiled if the returns for Precinct
No. 7 were to be included beforehand in the
canvass.
In G.R. No. 113509, Ong questions the authority of
the COMELEC to call for a special election in
Precinct No. 13 almost two years after the regular
election.
ISSUE: main issue regarding requisites for special
election
WON the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in calling for a special election in precinct
13 after almost 2 years or more specifically, after 1
year and 10 months following the day of
synchronized elections
RULING: There are two requisites for the holding of
special elections under Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code, viz., (1) that there is a failure of
election, and (2) that such failure would affect the
results of the election. The parties admit that the
failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 was due to
ballot-box snatching and do not dispute the finding
of the COMELEC as to the necessity and
inevitability of the holding of a special election in
said precinct, even if the result of Precinct No. 7
should be based on the questionable
"Comelec Copy" of its election returns.
On the basis of the additional votes credited so far
to the parties, the following computation is in order:
to Ong's 24,272 votes will be added 2 more from
Precinct No. 16, to make a total of 24,274, while
to Lucero's 24,068 votes will be added 20 more
from Las Navas and 43 from Precinct No. 16, for a
total of 24,131. Ong's earlier lead will thus be
reduced to 143, which is admittedly less than the
213 registered voters in Precinct No. 13.
The two requirements for a special election under
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code have
indeed been met.
In fixing the date of the special election,
the COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause of the postponement or suspension of the
election or the failure to elect, and (2) it should be
reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to
elect. The first involves questions of fact. The
second must be determined in the light of the
peculiar circumstances of a case. In the instant
case, the delay was not attributable to the poor
voters of Precinct No. 13 or to the rest of the
electorate of the Second Legislative District of
Northern Samar. The delay was, as stated in the
opening paragraph of this ponencia, primarily
caused by the legal skirmishes or maneuvers of the
petitioners which muddled simple issues. The Court
takes judicial notice of the fact that G.R. No.
113509 is the third case Ong has brought to this
Court. Considering then that the petitioners
themselves must share the blame for the delay,
and taking into account the fact that since the term
of office of the contested position is only three
years, the holding of a special election is Precinct
No. 13 within the next few months may still be
considered "reasonably close to the date of the
election not held." Ong's postulation should then be
rejected.
Macalintal v. Comelec
FACTS: Petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, sought to declare
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 entitled,
"An Act Providing for A System of Overseas
Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the
Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor,
and for Other Purposes" as unconstitutional.
Petitioner contended that Section 5(d) is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires
that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place where he
proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cited
the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court
held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the
United States is deemed to have abandoned his
domicile and residence in the Philippines.
ISSUE: 3 main issues, only 1 regarding suffrage
for overseas voters
Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing
the registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries by their
mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their
intention to return to the Philippines, violate the
residency requirement in Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution?
RULING: Taking issue with the petitioner's
contention that "green card" holders are considered
to have abandoned their Philippine domicile, the
Solicitor General suggests that the Court may have
to discard its ruling in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals in
so far as it relates to immigrants and permanent
residents in foreign countries who have executed
and submitted their affidavits conformably with
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. He maintains that
through the execution of the requisite affidavits, the
Congress of the Philippines with the concurrence of
the President of the Republic had in fact given
these immigrants and permanent residents the
opportunity, pursuant to Section 2, Article V of the
Constitution, to manifest that they had in fact never
abandoned their Philippine domicile; that
indubitably, they would have formally and
categorically expressed the requisite intentions, i.e.,
"animus manendi" and "animus revertendi"; that
Filipino immigrants and permanent residents
abroad possess the unquestionable right to
exercise the right of suffrage under Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution upon approval of their
registration, conformably with R.A. No. 9189.
As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise
overseas qualified Filipinos, it behooves the Court
to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of
both the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a
basic rule in constitutional construction that the
Constitution should be construed as a whole.
In Chiongbian vs. De Leon, the Court held that a
constitutional provision should function to the full
extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself
alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of
that great document. Constitutional provisions are
mandatory in character unless, either by express
statement or by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest. The intent of the
Constitution may be drawn primarily from the
language of the document itself. Should it be
ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its
framers through their debates in the constitutional
convention.
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the
mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall
provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not
provide for the parameters of the exercise of
legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in
the absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed
to have duly exercised its function as defined in
Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the
Constitution.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice
versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a
resident and an absentee. However, under our
election laws and the countless pronouncements of
the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee
remains attached to his residence in the Philippines
as residence is considered synonymous
with domicile.
With regards to the execution of an affidavit under
Section 5(d):
The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only
proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent
resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an
explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not
correct to say that the execution of the affidavit
under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that
proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by
a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote
in a political exercise."
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants
and permanent residents abroad because by their
status in their host countries, they are presumed to
have relinquished their intent to return to this
country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption
of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not
only require an affidavit or a promise to "resume
actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three years from approval
of his/her registration," the Filipinos abroad must
also declare that they have not applied for
citizenship in another country. Thus, they must
return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to
return "shall be cause for the removal" of their
names "from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to
vote in absentia."
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by
which a Filipino voter permanently residing abroad
who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise
disqualified by law, who has not relinquished
Philippine citizenship and who has not actually
abandoned his/her intentions to return to his/her
domicile of origin, the Philippines, is allowed to
register and vote in the Philippine embassy,
consulate or other foreign service establishments of
the place which has jurisdiction over the country
where he/she has indicated his/her address for
purposes of the elections, while providing for
safeguards to a clean election.
Contrary to petitioner's claim that Section 5(d)
circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the
law prescribing a system of overseas absentee
voting in compliance with the constitutional
mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that
Congress provide a system of absentee voting that
necessarily presupposes that the "qualified citizen
of the Philippines abroad" is not physically present
in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and
11 are components of the system of overseas
absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The
qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit
is deemed to have retained his domicile in the
Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his
domicile by his physical absence from this country.
His having become an immigrant or permanent
resident of his host country does not necessarily
imply an abandonment of his intention to return to
his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore,
under the law, he must be given the opportunity to
express that he has not actually abandoned his
domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit
required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would
renege on his undertaking to return to the
Philippines, the penalty of perpetual
disenfranchisement provided for by Section 5(d)
would suffice to serve as deterrence to non-
compliance with his/her undertaking under the
affidavit.
Petitioner argues that should a sizable number of
"immigrants" renege on their promise to return, the
result of the elections would be affected and could
even be a ground to contest the proclamation of the
winning candidates and cause further confusion
and doubt on the integrity of the results of the
election. Indeed, the probability that after an
immigrant has exercised the right to vote, he shall
opt to remain in his host country beyond the third
year from the execution of the affidavit, is not
farfetched. However, it is not for this Court to
determine the wisdom of a legislative exercise. As
expressed in Tañada vs. Tuvera, the Court is not
called upon to rule on the wisdom of the law or to
repeal it or modify it if we find it impractical.
Congress itself was conscious of said probability
and in fact, it has addressed the expected problem.
Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which
is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised
stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under Section
9, should a registered overseas absentee voter fail
to vote for two consecutive national elections, his
name may be ordered removed from the National
Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters.
In fine, considering the underlying intent of the
Constitution, the Court does not find Section 5(d)
of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.
YRA v MAXIMO ABANO (1928 case) ISSUE: Whether the phrase “qualified elector”
means that a candidate must be a registered voter
FACTS: These are proceedings in the nature
at the time of the election.
of quo warranto instituted by virtue of the provisions
of section 408 of the Election Law, as amended, in RULIG: NO.
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan by the
The Election Law, as amended, in section 404
petitioner, Marcos Yra, the vice-president elect of
provides that " Said certificate shall declare . . . that
Meycauayan, Bulacan, who challenges the right of
he is a resident of the . . . municipality, . . . in which
the respondent, Maximo Abano, the municipal
his candidacy is offered; that he is a duly qualified
president elect of Meycauayan, to the position to
elector therein, and that he is eligible to the office."
which elected on the ground that the respondent is
The Administrative Code in section 2174, in giving
ineligible. The decision in the lower court, Judge
the qualifications of elective officers, also provides
Anastasio R. Teodoro presiding, was in favor of the
that "An elective municipal officer must, at the time
respondent and declared the complaint as without
of the election, be a qualified voter in his
merit.
municipality and must have been resident therein
Maximo Abano is a native of the municipality of for at least one year . . . ."
Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the proper age, he
The question before us has arisen in a slightly
transferred to Manila to complete his education.
different form in the other departments of the
While temporarily residing in Manila, Abano
Government. In the early days of the Philippine
registered as a voter there. Shortly after qualifying
Assembly, the election of Honorable Fernando Ma.
as a member of the bar and after the death of his
Guerrero as a member of the Assembly from
father, Abano returned to Meycauayan to live. From
Manila was contested on the ground that he was
May 10, 1927, until the present, Abano has
not registered in his electoral district. The
considered himself a resident of Meycauayan.
Committee of the Philippine Assembly reached the
When the 1928 elections were approaching, he
conclusion that the words "qualified elector" meant
made an application for cancellation of registration
a person who had all of the qualifications
in Manila which was dated April 3, 1928, but this
provided by law to be a voter and not a person
application was rejected by the city officials for the
registered in the electoral list. So also the
reason that it was not deposited in the mails on or
Executive Bureau has been of the opinion that the
before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless Abano
term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not
presented himself as a candidate for municipal
necessarily mean that a person must be a
president of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and
registered voter. Senator Jose P. Laurel in his
was elected by popular vote to that office.
Law of Elections of the Philippine Islands, pages
The error assigned is found to assail the eligibility 32, 33, summarizes the law on the subject in the
of the respondent because it is alleged that he had following language:
not been a resident of Meycauayan for at least one
One of the qualifications required by law of
year previous to the election. In this connection, it is
a person who announces his candidacy is
sufficient to point out that the question of residence
that he must be a duly qualified elector. The
is largely one of intention. At least since May 190,
Executive Bureau has held that the term
1927, Abano has been a resident of Meycauayan
"qualified" when applied to a voter does not
or more than the one-year period fixed by the law
necessarily mean that a person must be a
as a prerequisite to election.
registered voter. To become a qualified
As we see it, the issue in the case is suggested by candidate a person does not need to
the second error, and centers on the alleged non- register as an elector. It is sufficient that he
eligibility of the respondent to hold a municipal possesses all the qualifications prescribed
office for the reason that he was not a "qualified in section 431 and none of the
voter in his municipality" — not a "qualified elector disqualifications prescribed in section 432.
therein." The fact that a candidate failed to register
 as an elector in the municipality does not
deprive him of the right to become a
candidate to be voted for.
It is but fair to say that if the question were strictly
one of first impression in this jurisdiction, we would
be more impressed with the potent points made by
the appellant. In view, however, of the authorities
herein- before mentioned, we are loath to depart
from them, particularly as the language which goes
to make up these authorities, on close examination,
is found to rest on reason. The distinction is
AKBAYAN v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS: Invoking this right, herein petitioners -
representing the youth sector - seek to direct the
COMELEC to conduct a special registration before
the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters
ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four
million youth failed to register on or before the
December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent
COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189 (Voter's
Registration Act of 1996).
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic
leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman if the
Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and
People's Participation, through a Letter dated
January 25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a public
hearing for the purpose of discussing the extension
of the registration of voters to accommodate those
who were not able to register before the COMELEC
deadline.
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued a
resolution to deny the request to conduct a two-
day additional registration of new voters on
February 17, and 18 2001.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-
Youth et. al. filed before this Court the instant
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which seeks
to set aside and nullify respondent COMELEC's
Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R.A. 8189
unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively
causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and
others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray
for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing
respondent COMELEC to conduct a special
registration of new voters and to admit for
registration petitioners and other similarly situated
young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May
14, 2001 General Elections.
between a qualified elector and the respondent is
such, and a registered qualified elector and the
respondent is such although not in his home
municipality. Registration regulates the exercise of
the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such
right.
It should not be forgotten that the people of
Meycauayan have spoken and their choice to be
their local chief executive is the respondent. The
will of the electorate should be respected.
ISSUE: Whether respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the request for
the conduct of a two-day additional registration of
new voters.
RULING: NO. This Court is of the firm view that
respondent COMELEC did not commit an abuse of
discretion
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by
herein petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needles to
say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the
enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing
substantive and procedural requirements embodied
in our Constitution, statute books and other
repositories of law.
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen
to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain
procedural requirements he must undergo: among
others, the process of registration. Specifically, a
citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right
to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements
set by fundamental charter, is obliged by law to
register. Stated differently, the act of registration is
an indispensable precondition to the right of
suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the
right to vote and an indispensable element in the
election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners'
argument, registration cannot and should not be
denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory
requirement.
On the legal score, Section 8 or R.A. 8189, which
provides a system of continuing registration, is
explicit, to wit:
"SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration
of Voters. - The Personal filing of application
of registration of voters shall be conducted
daily in the office of the Election Officer
 during regular office hours. No registration
shall, however, be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120)
days before a regular election and ninety
(90) days before a special election,"
(Emphasis Ours)
Perhaps undaunted by such scenario, petitioners
invoke the so called "standby" powers or "residual"
powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the
relevant provisions of Section 28 of Republic Act
No. 8436, thus:
"SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for
Certain Pre-election Acts - if it should no
longer be possible to observe the periods
and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-
election acts, the Commission shall fix other
periods and dates in order to ensure
accomplishments of the activities so voters
shall not be deprived of their right to
suffrage."
At this point, it bears emphasis that the provision of
Section 28 of RA 8436 invoked by herein
petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered
by respondent COMELEC, far from contradicting
each other, actually share some common ground.
True enough, both provisions, although at first
glance may seem to be at war in relation to the
other, are in more circumspect, perusal, necessarily
capable of being harmonized and reconciled.
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present
case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed
COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant
petitions, considering that the aforesaid law
explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election.
In more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A
8436 is, to our mind, anchored on the sound
premise that these certain "pre-election acts" are
still capable of being reasonably performed vis-a-
vis the remaining period before the date of election
and the conduct of other related pre-election
activities required under the law.
In its Comment, respondent COMELEC- which is
the constitutional body tasked by no less that the
fundamental charter to decide, except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including registration of voters
painstakingly and thoroughly emphasized the
"operational impossibility of conducting a special
registration, which in its own language, "can no
longer be accomplished within the time left to (us)
the Commission."
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law
does not require that the impossible be done. The
law obliges no one to perform an impossibility,
expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad
impossible.
Further, petitioners' bare allegation that they were
disfranchised when respondent COMELEC pegged
the registration deadline on December 27, 2000
instead of the day before the prohibitive period
before the May 14, 2001 regular elections
commences - is, to our mind, not sufficient. On
this matter, there is no allegation in the two
consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of
any showing that anyone of herein petitioners has
filed an application to be registered as a voter
which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a
complaint before the respondent COMELEC
alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of
the Election Officer to register between the period
starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13,
2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred
by respondent COMELEC from filing his application
for registration. Stated in a different manner, the
petitioners in the instant case are not without fault
or blame. They admit in their petition that they
failed to register, for whatever reason, within the
period of registration and came to this Court and
invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to
speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus
nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court
with unclean hands.
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST v COMELE
FACTS: On November 12, 2008, respondent
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8514 which,
among other things, set December 2, 2008 to
December 15, 2009 as the period of continuing
voter registration using the biometrics process in all
areas nationwide, except in the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao. Subsequently, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585 on
February 12, 2009 adjusting the deadline of voter
registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local
elections to October 31, 2009, instead of December
15, 2009 as previously fixed by Resolution No.
8514.
The intense public clamor for an extension of the
October 31, 2009 deadline notwithstanding, the
COMELEC stood firm in its decision not to extend
it, arguing mainly that it needs ample time to
prepare for the automated elections. Via the
present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed
on October 30, 2009, petitioners challenge the
validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and
seek a declaration of its nullity.
Petitioners contend that the serious questions
involved in this case and potential
disenfranchisement of millions of Filipino voters
justify resort to this Court in the first instance,
claiming that based on National Statistics Office
(NSO) data, the projected voting population for the
May 10, 2010 elections is 3,758,964 for the age
group 18-19 and 8,756,981 for the age group 20-
24, or a total of 12,515,945.
Petitioners further contend that COMELEC
Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional
encroachment on the legislative power of Congress
as it amends the system of continuing voter
registration under Section 8 of RA 8189, otherwise
known as The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.
They thus pray that COMELEC Resolution No.
8585 be declared null and void, and that the
COMELEC be accordingly required to extend the
voter registration until January 9, 2010 which is the
day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting
on January 10, 2010.
The COMELEC maintains in that, among other
things, the Constitution and the Omnibus Election
Code confer upon it the power to promulgate rules
and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and
honest elections, citing Akbayan-Youth v.
COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether extension should be granted.
RULING: YES.
The right of suffrage lies at the heart of our
constitutional democracy. The right of every Filipino
to choose the leaders who will lead the country and
participate, to the fullest extent possible, in every
national and local election is so zealously guarded
by the fundamental law that it devoted an entire
article solely in the Constitution.
It is against this backdrop that Congress mandated
a system of continuing voter registration in Section
8 of RA 8189 which provides:
Section 8. System of Continuing
Registration of Voters. The personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be
conducted daily in the office of the Election
Officer during regular office hours. No
registration shall, however, be conducted
during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a
special election. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters
be allowed to register daily during regular offices
hours, except during the period starting 120 days
before a regular election and 90 days before a
special election.
By the above provision, Congress itself has
determined that the period of 120 days before a
regular election and 90 days before a special
election is enough time for the COMELEC to make
ALL the necessary preparations with respect to the
coming elections including: (1) completion of
project precincts, which is necessary for the proper
allocation of official ballots, election returns and
other election forms and paraphernalia; (2)
constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors,
including the determination of the precincts to
which they shall be assigned; (3) finalizing the
Computerized Voters List; (4) supervision of the
campaign period; and (5) preparation, bidding,
printing and distribution of Voter’s Information
Sheet. Such determination of Congress is well
within the ambit of its legislative power, which this
Court is bound to respect. And the COMELEC’s
rule-making power should be exercised in
accordance with the prevailing law.
Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No.
8436, Section 28 (same provisions verbatim) grant
the COMELEC the power to fix other periods and
dates for pre-election activities only if the
same cannot be reasonably held within the period
provided by law. This grant of power, however, is
for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise
the right of suffrage – the common underlying
policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436.

In the present case, the Court finds no ground to

hold that the mandate of continuing voter
registration cannot be reasonably held within the
period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 – daily during
office hours, except during the period starting 120
days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections.
There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to
exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines
therefor.

The present case differs significantly from

Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC. In said case, the
Court held that the COMELEC did not commit
abuse of discretion in denying the request of the
therein petitioners for an extension of the
December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration
for the May 14, 2001 elections. For the therein
petitioners filed their petition with the Court within
the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of
voter registration under Section 8 of RA 8189, and
sought the conduct of a two-day registration on
February 17 and 18, 2001, clearly within the 120-
day prohibitive period.

The clear import of the Court’s pronouncement in

Akbayan-Youth is that had the therein petitioners
filed their petition – and sought an extension date
that was – before the 120-day prohibitive period,
their prayer would have been granted pursuant to
the mandate of RA 8189. In the present case, as
reflected earlier, both the dates of filing of the
petition (October 30, 2009) and the extension
sought (until January 9, 2010) are prior to the 120-
day prohibitive period. The Court, therefore, finds
no legal impediment to the extension prayed for.
ROMUALDEZ VS RTC
FACTS: Philip Romualdez is the son of former
Leyte Governor Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and
the nephew of Imelda Marcos. In the 1980s, he
made his decision to establish his legal residence
in Brgy. Malibog, Tolosa, Leyte. He also once
served as Brgy. Captain and Campaign Manager of
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan.
During the People Power Revolution, some
relatives and associates of President Marcos “fled”
the country because of the fear of their personal
safety. Hence, they sought asylum in the United
States. There he studied international business
finance.
He attempted to come back to the Philippines in
1987, but the flight was aborted. Later, he received
a letter from Mr. Charles Cobb, District Director of
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
informing him that he should depart from the U.S.
at his expense on or before 23 August 1992 (No
reason stated in the case). Hence, on December 23
1991, he came back. He did not delay his return to
his residence. During the registration of voters on
February 1 1992 for the Synchronized Elections, he
registered as a voter. However, Donato Advincula
filed a petition questioning Romualdez’s residency.
ISSUE: Is Romualdez a resident?
RULING: YES. In election cases, the Court treats
domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election
law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention". "Domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. That residence, in
the case of the petitioner, was established during
the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malibog, Tolosa,
Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be
lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In
order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice,
there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence
in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there,
and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In
other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change
of residence must be voluntary; and the residence
at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
The political situation brought about by the
"People's Power Revolution" must have truly
caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as
well as a serious concern over the safety and
welfare of the members of their immediate families.
Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable
to them would have somehow stabilized is
understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure
from the country cannot be described as
"voluntary", or as "abandonment of residence" at
least in the context that these terms are used in
applying the concept of "domicile by choice."
PUNGUTAN VS ABUBAKAR
FACTS: Respondent Abubukar and the other
candidates for the delegates of the Constitutional
Convention filed a petition in COMELEC alleging
that in the towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk,
no elections were in effect held in view of massive
violence, terrorism and fraud. Petitioner Pungutan
denied such allegations. The case was duly heard
by oral testimonies from chairmen and teachers
and by examining the precinct book. COMELEC
then issued a resolution stating:
“Actually no elections were held in said
municipalities as the voting was done by persons
other than the registered voters while armed men
went from precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots
and dictated how the election returns were to be
prepared.”
Hence, the resolution excluded from the canvass
for election of the delegates the returns from the
above mentioned towns. Such resolution is now
assailed by petitioner since such resolution was
based merely on oral testimonies and examination
of fingerprints. Unless set aside then, petitioner
Abdulgafar Puñgutan, who otherwise would have
been entitled to the last remaining seat for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, there
being no question as to the election of the other two
delegates, would lose out to respondent Benjamin
Abubakar. Petitioner would thus (1) dispute the
power of respondent Commission to exclude such
returns and (2) the other principal question raised is
whether the recognition of such prerogative on the
part of respondent Commission would contravene
the constitutional provision that it cannot pass on
the right to vote.
ISSUE: WON the resolution issued by COMELEC
infringed the right to vote?
RULING: NO. There is no merit to the contention
that respondent Commission is devoid of power to
disregard and annul the alleged returns from 107
precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67
precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for
being spurious or manufactured. It goes without
saying that what is contemplated in the law is that
the electors in the exercise of their free will can go
to the polls and exercise their right of suffrage, with
the boards of inspectors crediting each candidate
with the votes duly obtained after an honest count.
"The Commission on Elections is a constitutional
body. In the discharge of its functions, it should not
be hampered with restrictions that would be fully
warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this
Court also. It should be allowed considerable
latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for
which it was created — free, orderly and honest
elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of
means, but unless these are clearly illegal or
constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court
should not interfere."
The right to votes is a constitutional right. The
exercise of the right is regulated by the Election
Code. It's enforcement under the Constitution is,
vested in respondent Commission. Such a power,
however is purely executive or administrative. So it
was characterized by the Chief Justice in Abcede
vs. Imperial,as the branch of the executive
department — although independent of the
President — to which the Constitution has given the
'exclusive charge' to the 'enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections,' the power of decision of the Commission
is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'
It becomes obvious then why the right to vote, a
denial of which should find redress in the judiciary
as the guardian of constitutional rights, is excluded
from the authority vested in respondent
Commission. If the exclusion of the returns from the
four towns in Sulu involved a question as to such a
right, then, clearly, what the Commission did was
beyond its competence. Such is not the case
however. What is deemed outside such a sphere is
the determination of whether or not a person can
exercise or is precluded from exercising the right of
suffrage. Thus, the question of inclusion or
exclusion from the list of voters is properly
judicial. HOWEVER, as to whether or not an
elect on has been held is a question of a
different type. It is properly within the
administrative jurisdiction of respondent
Commission.
UTUTALUM VS COMELEC (mga pre, libog jud)
TOPIC: Annulment of Voter’s list
CONCEPT: Subsequent annulment of the voting
list in a separate proceeding cannot retroactively
and without due process result in nullifying
accepted election returns in a previous election.
FACTS: Petitioner Ututalum (Utut) and respondent
Anni were candidates in the 1987 Congressional
elections. The election returns of Siasi showed that
Utut garnered only 482 votes Anni garnered 35,
581. If the returns of Siasi would be excluded, Utut
would lead by 5, 301 votes. At first he filed written
objections contending that the returns were
tampered owing to the great excess of votes. The
Board of Canvassers dismissed it since it was filed
out of time.
Hence, he filed his first petition seeking the
declaration of failure of elections in Siasi and asked
the COMELEC to conduct another election.
COMELEC resolve that there was no failure. The
Board of Canvassers then declared Anni as the
winner. This prompted Utut to file his second
petition praying for the annulment of Anni’s petition
and for Utut’s proclamation as Congressman.
During the pendency of such petitions, Lupay
Loong, a candidate for Governor of Sulu, filed a
verified petition to annul the list of voters in Siasi,
for purposes of the election of local government
officials, to which COMELEC granted and the
Supreme Court affirmed in a separate case.
Immediately after having been notified of such, Utut
filed a supplemental pleading entreating that such
annulment be considered and applied by the
Commission in resolving his two Petitions against
Respondent Anni.
CONTENTION BY UTUT: the election returns from
Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the
results since its original List of Voters had already
been finally annulled. His cause of action is that
there was padding of the list of voters.
COMELEC’CONTENTION: The annulment of the
list cannot be made to disenfranchise the voters.
Padding of voter’s list, like fraud and terrorism, is
not a proper issue to be raised in a pre-
proclamation controversy, but in an election
protest.
ISSUE: WON the annulment of the voters list may
be used to annul a previous election and hence
applied retroactively? Whether padding of the
voter’s list is a pre-proclamation controversy?
RULING: NO. Petition dismissed due to the
following reasons:
1. His cause of action, which is the padding of Siasi
List of Voters, is not a pre-proclamation controversy
since it is not enumerated under Sec 243 of
Election Code. If indeed the padding of the list
constituted fraud, the proper recourse is an election
protest.
2. Annulment cannot be retroactively applied, as
enunciated in Bashier vs COMELEC.
CITING BASHIER VS COMELEC: "The
subsequent annulment of the voting list in a
separate proceeding initiated motu proprio by
the Commission and in which the protagonists
here were not parties, cannot retroactively and
without due process result in nullifying
accepted election returns in a previous election
simply because such returns came from
municipalities where the precinct books of
voters were ordered annulled due to
irregularities in their preparation."
It is true that in Lagumbay vs. COMELEC, relied
upon heavily by Petitioner Ututalum, this Court
ruled that the returns are obviously manufactured
where they show a great excess of votes over what
could have been legally cast. The Siasi returns,
however, do not show prima facie that on the basis
of the old List of Voters, there is actually a great
excess of votes over what could have been legally
cast considering that only 36,000 persons actually
voted out of the 39,801 voters. Moreover, the
Lagumbay case dealt with the "manufacture" of
returns by those charged with their preparation as
shown prima facie on the questioned returns
themselves. Not so in this case which deals with
the preparation of the registry list of voters, a matter
that is not reflected on the face of said returns.
To allow the COMELEC to do so retroactively,
however, would be to empower it to annul a
previous election because of the subsequent
annulment of a questioned registry in a proceeding
where petitioner himself was not a party. This
cannot be done.
The voter’s list in the previous elections is valid and
unquestioned prior to and on the day of election. It
was the only legitimate roster used as basis for
voting. In the absence of prior petition to set it
aside, it is considered conclusive evidence of
persons who could vote in that particular election.
Since the winning candidate was already
proclaimed, the pre-proclamation case dies, the
next remedy is an election protest before a proper
forum, which is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. Moreover, the preparation of a
voter's list is not a proceeding before the Board of
Canvassers. A pre-proclamation controversy is
limited to challenges directed against the Board of
Canvassers, not the Board of Election Inspectors.
That the padding of the List of Voters may
constitute fraud, or that the Board of Election
Inspectors may have fraudulently conspired in its
preparation, would not be a valid basis for a pre-
proclamation controversy either. For, whenever
irregularities, such as fraud, are asserted, the
proper course of action is an election protest.
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M.
SARANGANI and HADJI NOR HASSAN,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and HADJI ABOLAIS R. OMAR,
MANAN OSOP and ATTY. NASIB D. YASSIN,
respondents.
FACTS:
Private Respondents filed a petition for
annulment of several precincts and annulment of
book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur with the
COMELEC. Among the precincts was Padian
Torogan, subject matter of the petition.
Petitioner, incumbent mayor of Madalum,
together with oppositors who were allegedly
barangay chairmen f the 23 barangays sought to be
abolished opposed the petition. They attested the
petition was a move to diminish the bailiwicks of the
incumbent mayor.
COMELEC directed the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Marawi City to conduct an
investigation on the alleged ghost precincts. The
Task force later found that in Padian Torogan, there
is only a concrete house with no roof and another
structure without walls and roof. The name Padian-
Torogan likewise means a cemetery, nor a
residential place. Also, the Madalum police chief
arrived at the scene, angrily insisted that they stop
the inspection.
The COMELEC en banc then issued an
order finding Padian Torogan as ghost precinct,
hence shall be excluded from the special
election to be conducted in Madalum. Hence,
the petition.
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost
precint.
RULING: PADIAN-TOROGAN IS NOT A GHOST
PRECINCT BUT SC STILL UPHELD COMELEC
DECISION
It must be noted that under the Omnibus
Election Code, there should be at least one precinct
per barangay. In designating election precincts, the
COMELEC usually refers to them by number.
Nevertheless, the determination of whether a
certain election precinct actually exists or not and
whether the voters registered in said precinct are
real voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a
time-honored precept that factual findings of the
COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly
supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this
Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated
attack on the validity of the same.
It is not impossible for a certain barangay
not to actually have inhabitants considering that
people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on
record and the fact that nobody resides in the
place does not result in its automatic cessation
as a unit of local government. Under the Local
Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local
government unit (LGU) may be done by Congress
in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any
other political subdivision. In the case of a
barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area
and in cultural communities, it may be done by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang
Panglungsod concerned subject to the
mandatory requirement of a plebiscite
conducted for the purpose in the political units
affected.
The findings of the administrative agency
cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorari
particularly when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked
or disregarded which when considered would have
substantially affected the outcome of the case. The
COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true
results of an election by means available to it. The
assailed order having been issued pursuant to
COMELEC's administrative powers and in the
absence of any finding of grave abuse of discretion
in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said order
shall stand. Judicial interference is unnecessary
and uncalled for.
No voter is disenfranchised because no
such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage
guaranteed by the Constitution is not tampered
when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from an
electoral exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the
Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to
vote and are not otherwise disqualified by law. On
the contrary, such exclusion of non existent voters
all the more protects the validity and credibility of
the electoral process as well as the right of suffrage
because the "electoral will" would not be rendered
nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost votes.
Election laws should give effect to, rather than
frustrate the will of the people.
PETITION DENIED.
RENATO L. CAYETANO, petitioner, vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
FACTS:
This petition revolves around what is meant
by “members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years”. This is in relation to the majority
composition of COMELEC.
Monsod was nominated by Pres Cory to the
position of COMELEC Chairman. Petitioner
opposed saying that Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in
the practice of law for at least 10 years.
nevertheless, the nomination was confirmed.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
What is “practice of law”?
WON Monsod have indeed practiced law
RULING:
Definitions:
1) Black
The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with
his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected
with the law.
2) Land Title Abstract and Trust Co v Dworken
one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law."
3) Philippine Lawyers Association v Agrava
a. The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying
b. All advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the
law where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and
conditions."
c. Embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering
an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they
are always subject to become involved
in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill.
Summarized by SC:
Means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in
the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM
“PRACTICE OF LAW” IS SHOWN BY THE
CONSTI COMMISSION:
Mr Foz said that: “To avoid any
misunderstanding which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to
make the clarification that this provision on
qualifications regarding members of the Bar does
not necessarily refer or involve actual practice
of law outside the COA. We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who
are
employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission
on Audit.”
2. MONSOD MEETS THE QUALIFICATION, “10
YEARS PRACTICE OF LAW”
BIO OF MONSOD:
Is a member of the Bar. He worked in the
law office of his father, but later on worked in the
World Bank Group from 1963 to 1970 as an
operations officer for 2 years in Consta Rica and
Panama. Upon his return to the Phil, he worked
with the Meralco Group as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate, and had since rendered
services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or CEO.
He then later worked as National Chairman
of NAMFREL, which involved being knowledgeable
in election law. He likewise was a member of the
Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings.
SC SAID:
Interpreted in the light of the various
definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly
the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
naay discussion on appointment, wan a nako gi
apil. . .
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner, vs.
HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as ACTING
CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS:
Sixto is challenging the designation of Yorac
as the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC, in place
of Chairman Davide, who had been named
chairman of the fact-finding commission to
investigate the Dec. 1989 coup d’etat.
The qualifications of Yorac is not questioned
by Sixto. Rather, he questions the appointment of
Yorac in acting capacity, pursuant to Art. IX-C Sec
1(2) of the Consti, that "(I)n no case shall any
Member (of the Commission on Elections) be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Sixto contends that the choice of the Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an
internal matter that should be resolved by the
members themselves and that the intrusion of the
President of the Philippines violates their
independence.
OSG counters that there is no such
arrangement, however, in the case of the
Commission on Elections. The designation made
by the President of the Philippines
should therefore be sustained for reasons of
"administrative expediency," to prevent disruption
of the functions of the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
WON the appointment of Yorac in acting
capacity is unconstitutional
RULING: UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Expediency is a dubious justification. It
may also be an overstatement to suggest that the
operations of the Commission on Elections would
have been disturbed or stalemated if the President
of the Philippines had not stepped in and
designated an Acting Chairman. There did not
seem to be any such problem. In any event, even
assuming that difficulty, we do not agree that
"only the President (could) act to fill the hiatus,"
as the Solicitor General maintains.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution
expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as "independent." Although
essentially executive in nature, they are not under
the control of the President of the Philippines in
the discharge of their respective functions.
Each of these Commissions conducts its own
proceedings under the applicable and its own rules
and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its
decisions, orders and rulings are subject only
to review on certiorari by this Court as provided
by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the
absence of the regular chairman comes under that
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised
for it, even with its consent, by the President of
the Philippines. A designation as Acting Chairman
is by its very terms essentially temporary and
therefore revocable at will. No cause need be
established to justify its revocation. Assuming its
validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting
Chairman of the Commission on
Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the
Philippines at any time and for whatever reason
she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having
accepted such designation, will not be estopped
from challenging its withdrawal. (sa gi.ingon pa ni
sir, at the mercy of the President)

The lack of a statutory rule covering the

situation at bar is no justification for the President of
the Philippines to fill the void by extending the
temporary designation in favor of the
respondent. This is still a government of laws and
not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be
corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action. The situation could have
been handled by the members of the
Commission on Elections themselves without
the participation of the President.

PETITION GRANTED.
Filipinas Eng’g Machine Shop vs Ferrer, 135
SCRA 25
Facts: Respondent COMELEC issued an Invitation
to Bid call for the manufacture and delivery of
11,000 units of voting booths for the coming
election to which petitioner Filipinas and
respondent ACME participated, submitting therein
their respective bids.
It was ACME who offered a lower bid of P78 per
unit then Filipinas’ P128 sample 1 or P123 sample
2 bid. The bidding committee of the COMELEC
recommended the acceptance of Filipinas’ bid
because it stated that ACME’s materials were not
rust proof and was too heavy. Issue came when the
COMELEC issued a purchase order in favor of
ACME.
With this, petitioner filed an injunction suit at CFI
Manila. COMELEC sought to dismiss such
complaint arguing that CFI has no jurisdiction over
such suit and that the complaint states no cause of
action. The judge then dismissed the complaint.
Issue: WON CFI has jurisdiction over an order of
COMELEC dealing with an award of contract
arising from its invitation to bid.
Held: Yes, the CFI has jurisdiction.
By constitutional mandate —
"The Commission on Elections shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections and shall exercise all
other functions which may be conferred
upon it by law. It shall decide, save those
involving the right to vote, all administrative
questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number of location of
polling places, and the appointment of
election inspectors and of other election
officials . . . The decisions, orders and
rulings of the Commission shall be subject
to review by the Supreme Court." (Section
2, Article X, 1935 Philippine Constitution,
which was then in force)
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code (Republic
Act No. 180, approved June 21, 1947, the election
law then enforced) provided that, "(a) any
controversy submitted to the Commission on
Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it
within fifteen days counted from the time the
corresponding petition giving rise to said
controversy is filed," and that, "any violation of any
final and executory decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission shall constitute contempt of court."
Likewise, the same section provided that, "any
decision, order or ruling of the Commission on
Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the
Rules of Court or with such rules as may be
promulgated by the Supreme Court."
Similarly, Section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948
(Republic Act No. 296), as amended, provides that,
"final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the
Commission on Elections . . ." fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way
of certiorari. Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court prescribed the manner of appeal
by certiorari to the Supreme Court from a final
order, ruling or decision of the Commission on
Elections, among ther administrative bodies.
Hence it has been consistently held that it is the
Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance,
which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on
certiorari; final decisions, orders or rulings of the
COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and
enforcement of election laws.
We are however, far from convince that an order of
the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private
party, as a result of its choice among various
proposals submitted in response to its invitation to
bid comes within the purview of a "final order"
which is exclusively and directly appealable to this
court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the
term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court as provided by law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and
taken cognizance of by the said body in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the
Constitution and the law on the Commission on
Elections may either be classified as those
pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
functions, or those which are inherently
administrative and sometimes ministerial in
character.
Thus in the case of Masangcay vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. L-13827, September 28, 1962
(6 SCRA 27, 2829), We held that —
". . . (W)e had the occasion to stress in the
case of Guevarra vs. Commission on
Elections (G.R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958)
that under the law and theconstitution, the
Commission on Elections has not only the
 duty to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of elections, but also
the power to try, hear and decide any
controversy that may be submitted to it in
connection with the elections. In this sense,
We said, the Commission, although it
cannot be classified as a court of justice
within the meaning of the Constitution (Sec.
30, Article VIII), for it is merely an
administrative body, may, however,
exercise quasijudicial functions insofar as
controversies that by express provision of
law come under its jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order
of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is
not an order rendered in a legal controversy before
it wherein the parties filed their respective
pleadings and presented evidence after which the
questioned order was issued; and that this order of
the commission was issued pursuant to its authority
to enter into contracts in relation to election
purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution
awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not
issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but
merely as an incident of its inherent administrative
functions over the conduct of elections, and hence,
the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final
order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court.
Baytan vs COMELEC, GR No. 153945
Facts: Petitioners sought for their registration as
voters for the 1998 elections. They were led by a
certain Ignacio to Barangay 18, Zone II and there,
they were registered and were issued with voter’s
registration records. Wondering why the registrants
in such place were unfamiliar to them, they studied
the geography of the area and they found out that
their residence was situated in barangay 28 instead
of barangay 18. With this, they went to barangay 28
and registered again and they were again issued
with another voter’s registration records.
The election officers of Cavite found out about the
double registration and a resolution then was
issued recommending the filling of an information
for double registration against petitioners after a
recommendation from the executive director.
(criminal case)
Petitioners argued that COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion grounding it on the fact
that they did not intend to perpetrate the act
prohibited and that it was an honest mistake
registering twice.
COMELEC argued that the offense is malum
prohibitum, hence, intent is inconsequential.
Issue: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Held: No, there was no grave abuse of
discretion.
Article XXII, SEC. 261 (y) (5) of the Election Code
which reads:
"SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The
following shall be guilty of an election
offense: (y) On Registration of Voters: (5)
Any person who, being a registered voter,
registers anew without filing an application
for cancellation of his previous registration."
The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of
the power to investigate and prosecute election
offenses is intended to enable the COMELEC to
assure the people of "free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections." This grant is an
adjunct to the COMELEC's constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all election laws. Failure by
the COMELEC to exercise this power could result
in the frustration of the true will of the people and
make an idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty
of every qualified citizen to vote. Petitioners lose
sight of the fact that the assailed resolutions
were issued in the preliminary investigation
stage. A preliminary investigation is essentially
inquisitorial and is only the means to discover
who may be charged with a crime, its function
being merely to determine probable cause. All
that is required in the preliminary investigation is
the determination of probable cause to justify the
holding of petitioners for trial.(admin. function only)
There is no question that petitioners registered
twice on different days and in different precincts
without canceling their previous registration.
All told, a reasonably prudent man would readily
conclude that there exists probable cause to hold
petitioners for trial for the offense of double
registration.
Moreover, petitioners' claims of honest mistake,
good faith and substantial compliance with the
Election Code's requirement of cancellation of
previous registration are matters of defense best
ventilated in the trial proper rather than at the
preliminary investigation. The established rule is
that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence
only as may engender a well-grounded belief that
an offense has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable
cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests
in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The
COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases for violation of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offense and
malpractices. Generally, the Court will not interfere
with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle
emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under the election laws and to
prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be
provided by law.
Petitioners rely on Section 3, Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution which states:
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may
sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc."
Petitioners assert that this constitutional provision
serves as basis to nullify the proceedings
conducted and orders issued by the COMELEC en
banc in E.O. Case No. 97-503. Petitioners cite
Sarmiento v. Comelec 17 a n d Zarate v. Comelec
to support their stand that the COMELEC en banc
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it assumed original jurisdiction over
the case without first referring the same to any of its
divisions. In Sarmiento an d Zarate, the Court
similarly held that "election cases must first be
heard and decided by a Division of the
Commission," and that the "Commission, sitting en
banc, does not have the authority to hear and
decide the same at the first instance."
In its Comment for the COMELEC, the Solicitor
General points out that the rulings in Sarmiento and
Zarate were clarified in Canicosa v. COMELEC to
mean that —
"[I]t is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC
is mandated to hear and decide cases first
by division and then, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc.
This is when it is jurisdictional."
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both
administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The
COMELEC's administrative powers are found in
Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of
Article IXC. The 1987 Constitution does not
prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its
administrative powers, whether en banc or in
division. The Constitution merely vests the
COMELEC's administrative powers in the
"Commission on Elections," while providing that the
COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions."
Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act directly on
matters falling within its administrative powers.
Indeed, this has been the practice of the
COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC's quasi-judicial
powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to
wit:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections
shall exercise the following powers and
function:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices
shall be final, executory, and not
appealable."
The COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-judicial
powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which
expressly requires that all election cases, including
preproclamation controversies, shall be decided by
the COMELEC in division, and the motion for
reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC
en banc. It follows, as held by the Court in
Canicosa, that the COMELEC is mandated to
decide cases first in division, and then upon motion
for reconsideration en banc, only when the
COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers.
In sum, the second sentence of Section 3, Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable in
administrative cases, like the instant case where
the COMELEC is determining whether probable
cause exists to charge petitioners for violation is
determining whether probable cause exists to
charge petitioners for violation of the provision of
the Election Code prohibiting double registration.
Sandoval vs COMELEC, GR No. 133842
Facts: Petitioner and respondent were among the
candidates for congressmen. COMELEC Chairman
then issued a verbal order to the effect of
suspending the canvassing and proclamation of the
winning candidate. Despite this, petitioner was
proclaimed by the board of canvassers after the
votes were canvassed. He then later took his oath
of office on the same day.
With this, respondent sought the annulment of
petitioner’s proclamation invoking such order.
Futher he alleged that there was non-inclusion of
19 election returns in the canvass, which would
result in an incomplete canvass of the election
returns.
Later, the Comelec en banc issued an order setting
aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the
proclamation as void which prompted petitioner to
file the present petition. SC then issued a TRO
mandating COMELEC to cease in implementing its
order.
The COMELEC filed its comment on August 11,
1998. It invoked its power of direct control and
supervision over the board of canvassers, allowing
it to review, revise and reverse the board's actions.
It said that it rendered the questioned order upon
finding that petitioner's proclamation was illegal and
therefore void ab initio.
Issue: WON COMELEC had jurisdiction.
WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Held: Yes, it had jurisdiction but there was
grave abuse when it failed to comply with
procedural due process.
As a general rule, candidates and registered
political parties involved
in an election are allowed to file pre-proclamation
cases before the COMELEC. Preproclamation
cases refer to any question pertaining to or
affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate
or by any registered political party or coalition of
political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections
233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns. The COMELEC
has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation
controversies. As an exception, however, to the
general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166
prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-
presidential, senatorial and congressional elections
from filling preproclamation cases.
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the
proclamation of the winner in the election, which
delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive
posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception
to the exception. The second sentence of Section
15 allows the filling of petitions for correction of
manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns even in elections for president,
vice-president and members of the House of
Representatives for the simple reason that the
correction of manifest error will not prolong the
process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation
of the winner in the election. This rule is consistent
with and complements the authority of the
COMELEC under the Constitution to, "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an, election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall" and its power to "decide,
except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections."
Applying the foregoing rule, we hold that the
Commission has jurisdiction over SPC No. 98- 143
and SPC No. 98-206, both filed by private
respondent seeking to correct the alleged manifest
error in the certificate of canvass issued by the
Malabon municipal board of canvassers. These
petitions essentially allege that there exists a
manifest error in said certificate of canvass as the
board failed to include several election returns in
the canvassing. Private respondent prays that the
board be reconvened to correct said error. Section
15 of RA 7166 vests the COMELEC with
jurisdiction over cases of this nature. We reiterate
the long-standing rule that jurisdiction is conferred
by law and is determined by the allegations in the
petition regardless of whether or not the petitioner
is entitled to the relief sought.

The authority to rule on petitions for correction of
manifest error is vested in the COMELEC en banc.
Section 7 of Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure provides that if the error is discovered
before proclamation, the board of canvassers may
motu proprio, or upon verifed petition by any
candidate, political party, organization or coalition
of political parties, after due notice and hearing,
correct the errors committed. Although in Ong, Jr.
v. COMELEC it was said that 'By now it is settled
that election cases which include pre-proclamation
controversies must first be heard and decided by a
division of the Commission' — and a petition for
correction of manifest error in the Statement of
Votes, like SPC 95 198 is a pre-proclamation
controversy — in none of the cases cited to support
this proposition was the issue the correction of a
manifest error in the Statement of Votes under Sec.
231 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881)
or Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 7166. On the other hand,
Rule 27, Sec. 5 of the 1993 Rules of the
COMELEC expressly provides that pre-
proclamation controversies involving, inter alia,
manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the
results may be filed directly with the COMELEC en
banc.
Petitioner nonetheless contends that SPC No. 98-
143 and SPC No. 98-206 must be dismissed
because private respondent failed to raise the issue
of manifest error before the appropriate board of
canvassers in accordance with the second
sentence of Section 15 of RA 7166.
We disagree.
The issue of manifest error in the certificate of
canvass for Malabon has been raised before the
district board of canvassers before petitioner could
be proclaimed and said board has in fact ruled on
the issue. We find this as sufficient compliance with
the law.
We now go to the second issue. Although the
COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the
subject matter and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and
SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its
jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that
its order to set aside the proclamation of
petitioner is invalid for having been rendered
without due process of law. Procedural due
process demands prior notice and hearing.
Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that
the tribunal show substantial evidence to
support its ruling.
"SECTION 242. Commission's exclusive
jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation
controversies. — The Commission shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all
preproclamation controversies. It may motu
proprio or upon written petition, and after
due notice and hearing, order the partial or
total suspension of the proclamation of any
candidate-elect or annul partially or totally
any proclamation, if one has been made, as
the evidence shall warrant in accordance
with the succeeding sections."
The phrase "motu proprio" does not refer to the
annulment of proclamation but to the manner of
initiating the proceedings to annul a
proclamation made by the board of canvassers.
The law provides two ways by which annulment
proceedings may be initiated. It may be at the own
initiative of the COMELEC (motu proprio) or by
written petition. In either case, notice and hearing is
required. This is clear from the language of the law.
We likewise reject private respondent's assertion
that the hearing held on June 9, 1998 substantially
satisfies the due process requirement. The law
requires that the hearing be held before the
COMELEC rules on the petition. Here, the public
respondent first issued an order annulling the
proclamation of petitioner and then set the date of
the hearing.
Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions
for annulment of petitioner's proclamation,
COMELEC was not merely performing an
administrative function. The administrative powers
of the COMELEC include the power to determine
the number and location of polling places, appoint
election officials and inspectors, conduct
registration of voters, deputize law enforcement
agencies and government instrumentalities to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections, register political parties, organizations or
coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission, prosecute election offenses, and
recommend to the President the removal of or
imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any
officer or employee it has deputized for violation or
disregard of its directive, order or decision. In
addition, the Commission also has direct control
and supervision over all personnel involved in the
conduct of election. However, the resolution of the
adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner
as regards the existence of a manifest error in the
questioned certificate of canvass requires the
COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the
Commission to hear both parties to determine the
veracity of their allegations and to decide whether
the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the
resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by
the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has
been said that where a power rests in judgment
or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of
functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an
officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed
quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting
as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the
requirements of procedural due process in
resolving the petitions filed by private
respondent.
Santiago V. COMELEC
Facts: On 6 December 1996, private respondent
Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a
Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative
wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said
Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of
general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in
all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in
establishing signing stations at the time and on
the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a
founding member of the Movement for Peoples
Initiative, a group of citizens desirous to avail of the
system intended to institutionalize people power;
that he and the members of the Movement and
other volunteers intend to exercise the power to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution
granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall
be conducted in proceedings under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature
stations shall be established all over the country,
with the assistance of municipal election registrars,
who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual
signatories; that before the Movement and other
volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary
that the time and dates to be designated for the
purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by
the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the
people of the electoral process involved, it is
likewise necessary that the said order, as well as
the Petition on which the signatures shall be
affixed, be published in newspapers of general and
local circulation, under the control and supervision
of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the
provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4
and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached
to the petition is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution[10] embodying the proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the
aforecited sections of the provisions concerning
term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM
LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4
OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE
X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein --
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special
civil action for prohibition raising the following
arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on
peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact,
Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing
and Regulating Constitutional Amendments by
Peoples Initiative, which petitioner Senator
Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still
pending before the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three
systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike
in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and
Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that
the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former
Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in
the law in his privilege speech delivered before the
Senate in 1994: There is not a single word in that
law which can be considered as implementing [the
provision on constitutional initiative]. Such
implementing provisions have been obviously left to
a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the
effectivity of the law after publication in print media.
This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments because the latter take
effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16
January 1991 to govern the conduct of initiative on
the Constitution and initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the
right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass
the implementing law.
Senator Raul Roco acting as an interevenor
contends that the respondent Commission is
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin
Petition and to order its publication because the
said petition is not the initiatory pleading
contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC
in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a
petition for initiative which is signed by the required
number of registered voters. He also submits that
the proponents of a constitutional amendment
cannot avail of the authority and resources of the
COMELEC to assist them is securing the required
number of signatures, as the COMELECs role in an
initiative on the Constitution is limited to the
determination of the sufficiency of the initiative
petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite,
if warranted.
(The gist of the issue related to the topic is WON
the initiative to which the delfin petition is anchored
is what the constitution envisions; since here,
respondent delfin wanted COMELEC to assist him
in collecting signatures for purposes of peoples’
initiative)
Issue: 1. WON COMELEC can take cognizance of
the petition?
2. WON there was an enabling law that is
applicable to peoples’ initiative?
Ruling: 1. NO. COMELEC CANNOT TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE PRESENT PETITION.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a
petition for initiative on the Constitution must be
signed by at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district
is represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not
contain signatures of the required number of
voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet
gathered signatures and that the purpose of his
petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required
signatures, the petition cannot be deemed
validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a
petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition
then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its
filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en
banc.The only participation of the COMELEC or its
personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to
prescribe the form of the petition;(2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a
certificate on the total number of registered voters
in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its
election registrars, in the establishment of signature
stations; and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters
identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory
petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or
given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter
knew that the petition does not fall under any of the
actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
which reason it did not assign to the petition a
docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing
more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not
have been dignified by the Order of 6 December
1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the
order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time,
energy, and resources.
2. NO. RA 6735 is not sufficient.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest
an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The said section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of
the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative
body upon compliance with the requirements of this
Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(Underscoring supplied).
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein
was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and
resolutions. That section is silent as
to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out
earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only
to proposals to AMEND. The people are not hierarchy of values, the right of the people to
accorded the power to directly propose, enact, directly propose amendments to the Constitution is
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the far more important than the initiative on national
Constitution through the system of initiative. They and local laws.
can only do so with respect to laws, ordinances, or
resolutions. Lambino V. COMELEC
Facts: On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under
to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act
three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act
(Requirements) restates the constitutional (RA 6735).
requirements as to the percentage of the registered
voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in The Lambino Group alleged that their
the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act petition had
does not provide for the contents of a petition for the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered
(c) requires, among other things, statement of voters, with each legislative district represented by
the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved at least three per centum (3%) of its registered
or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that
be. It does not include, as among the contents of COMELEC election registrars had verified the
the petition, the provisions of the Constitution signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on
the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as The Lambino Groups initiative
follows: petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
(c) The petition shall state the following: Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII
be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or entitled Transitory Provisions. These
repealed, as the case may be; proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
c.2 the proposition; Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor; form of government. The Lambino Group prayed
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided that after due publication of their petition, the
therein; COMELEC should submit the following proposition
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered in a plebiscite for the voters ratification:
voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT
than one hundred (100) words which shall be OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM
the petition. (Underscoring supplied). OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
The use of the clause proposed laws PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
amended or repealed only strengthens the SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE
conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and
for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an
This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply Amended Petition with the
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed
and referendum on national and local laws. If Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of
Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide their initiative.
for the implementation of the initiative on Issue: 1. WON Such initiative complies with what
amendments to the Constitution, it could have the constitution envisions as peoples’ initiative?
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in 2. WON such amendment is valid?
the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
Ruling: 1. NO. The initiative does not comply with
the provision of the Constitution on Direct Proposal
of the People.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters
therein. x x x x
Based on the deliberations of the
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, the initiative
requires that the petition must contain the specific
amendments that it seeks to be made. Petitioner
failed to substantiate such. Even assuming
arguendo that petitioner was able to attach the
FULL TEXT OF THE AMENDMENTS, it cannot
be assumed that the supposed 100,000 copies
of the full text of amendments would suffice to
inform the 6 million people who signed the
petition. Based on American jurisprudence, such is
an important requirement to avoid fraud and
misrepresentation on the part of the people who
drafted the petition. Further, petitioner failed to
show that the people were informed of important
provisions that they sought to insert:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature
will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can
be re-elected indefinitely;
2.The interim Parliament can continue to
function indefinitely until its members, who
are almost all the present members of
Congress, decide to call for new
parliamentary elections. Thus,
the members of the interim Parliament
will determine the expiration of their own
term of office;
3. Within 45 days from the
ratification of the proposed changes, the
interim Parliament shall convene to
propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution
Further, petitioner is guilty of committing logrolling
which is defined as when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the
same petition. This is because the insertion of the
provision that mandates the the interim parliament
should the amendment be allowed, to propose
further amendment or revision or amendment to
the Constitution.
2. NO. The amendment is invalid as it is
tantamount to revision.
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three
modes of amending the Constitution. The first
mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote
of all its Members. The second mode is through a
constitutional convention. The third mode is through
a peoples initiative.
(Meaning of AMENDMENT AND REVISION)
AMENDMENT- refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic
principle involved. For example, a change
reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15
years is an amendment and not a
revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino
ownership of mass media companies from 100
percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree
as an additional qualification for election to the
Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.
REVISION- broadly implies a change that alters a
basic principle in the constitution, like altering
the principle of separation of powers or the system
of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if
the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution.
In the case at bar, An amendment envisages an
alteration of one or a few specific and separable
provisions. The guiding original intention of an
amendment is to improve specific parts or to add
new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditions or to suppress specific portions that may
have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original
intention and plan contemplates a re-examination
of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the
entire document, to determine how and to what
extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a
switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from
a bicameral system to a unicameral system
be because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution
Domino V. COMELEC
Facts:
(Mubo lang ako facts ani ha, since mana man ta ani
and main issue man gyud ani na nga case is
residency)
Petitioner filed a certificate of candicacy for the
position of Representative of the lone district of
Saranggani contending that he had resided in such
place for 1 yr and 2 months immediately preceding
the election. Respondents filed for a cancelation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy contending that
petitioner failed to comply with the residency
requirement being a registered voter in Quezon
City.
Petitioner presented among others, a decision of
the Municipal Trial court ordering the exclusion of
his name in the voters’ list in Quezon City and its
transfer to the voter’s list in Sarangani.
Subsequently, COMELEC 2ND division,
promulgated a resolution declaring petitioner to
have failed to comply with the residency
requirement and thereafter cancelled his certificate
of candidacy. COMELEC also issued a subsequent
supplemental resolution prohibiting the declaration
of petitioner to be the winner in case he garners the
highest possible votes since. The resolution
disqualifying him has not yet attained finality in.
Petitioner, after the elections garnered the highest
votes.
Petitioner then filed a case against respondent
contending that COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in disqualifying him on the grounds that
he failed to satisfy the 1-year residency
requirement.
Issue: 1. WON respondent COMELEC has
jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the
disqualification of petitioner.
2. WON the exclusion proceedings are
binding upon the COMELEC
Ruling: 1. YES. COMELEC has jurisdiction.
The COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the
Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate
of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after
election, if for any reason no final judgment of
disqualification is rendered before the election, and
the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes and provided
further that the winning candidate has not been
proclaimed or has taken his oath of office.
It has been repeatedly held in a number of
cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunals sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress as provided
under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution
begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives.
The fact of obtaining the highest number of
votes in an election does not automatically vest the
position in the winning candidate. A candidate must
be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of
office before he can be considered a member of the
House of Representatives.
In the instant case, DOMINO was not
proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani
by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution
issued by the COMELEC on the day of the election
ordering the suspension of DOMINOs proclamation
should he obtain the winning number of votes. This
resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of
the non-finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution
disqualifying DOMINO as candidate for the
position.
Considering that DOMINO has not been
proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani
he cannot be deemed a member of the House of
Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not
the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over
the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
2. No. The exclusion proceedings are not
binding upon the COMELEC.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the
right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from
the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial
jurisdiction, does not preclude the COMELEC, in
the determination of DOMINOs qualification as a
candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance
with the residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion
of voters in the list of voters are summary in
character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial
court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion
proceedings on matters other than the right to vote
in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not
conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court
in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass
upon any question necessary to decide the issue
raised including the questions of citizenship and
residence of the challenged voter, the authority to
order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of
voters necessarily caries with it the power to inquire
into and settle all matters essential to the exercise
of said authority. However, except for the right to
remain in the list of voters or for being excluded
therefrom for the particular election in relation to registration record from the corresponding book of
which the proceedings had been held, a decision in voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and
an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final thereafter place the record in the inactive file.
and unappealable, does not acquire the nature
of res judicata. In this sense, it does not operate as
a bar to any future action that a party may take
concerning the subject passed upon in the
proceeding. Thus, a decision in an exclusion
proceeding would neither be conclusive on the
voters political status, nor bar subsequent
proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter
in any other election.
Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar we
ruled that:

xxx It is made clear that even as it is here held that

the order of the City Court in question has become
final, the same does not constitute res
adjudicata as to any of the matters therein
contained. It is ridiculous to suppose that such an
important and intricate matter of citizenship may be
passed upon and determined with finality in such a
summary and peremptory proceeding as that of
inclusion and exclusion of persons in the registry
list of voters. Even if the City Court had granted
appellants petition for inclusion in the permanent
list of voters on the allegation that she is a Filipino
citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino
citizenship would still have been left open to
question.

Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of

Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its
jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of
the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered
the transfer of his voters registration from Precinct
No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to
precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel,
Sarangani. It is not within the competence of the
trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare
the challenged voter a resident of another
municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over
exclusion cases is limited only to determining the
right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to
declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to
vote in the precinct in which he is registered,
specifying the ground of the voters
disqualification. The trial court has no power to
order the change or transfer of registration from
one place of residence to another for it is the
function of the election Registration Board as
provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189. The
only effect of the decision of the lower court
excluding the challenged voter from the list of
voters, is for the Election Registration Board, upon
receipt of the final decision, to remove the voters