Ong v.

Alegre
FACTS: Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and
petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed
certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent
mayor.
terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully
served 3 consecutive terms.
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying
requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner
Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in
the 2004 elections.

Alegre filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Disqualify,
Deny Due Course and Cancel the COC of Francis. The petition to
disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule,
Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998,
and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as
mayor and discharged the duties thereof for 3 consecutive full terms
corresponding to those elections.
To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre
and Francis opposing each other for the office of mayor of San
Vicente with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC
winner. However, Alegre subsequently filed an election protest.
In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in
that 1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision came out only on
July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty
term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as
mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.
We hold that such assumption of office in 1998-2001
constitutes, for Francis, service for the full term, and should be
counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term
limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions,
barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for
more than three consecutive term for the same position.
It is true that the RTC declared Alegre as the one who won
the 1998 elections. However, that disposition was without practical
and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term
of the contested office has expired.
Francis’ proclamation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998
mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of
the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.

COMELEC first division dismissed Alegre’s petition to
disqualify and cancel Francis’ COC for the 2004 elections. However,
COMELEC en banc reversed this decision hence the case at bar.
ISSUE: WON petitioner Francis’ assumption of office as Mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001
should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-
term limit rule.
Petitioner invoked the cases of Lonzanida and Borja. In
those cases, there was an involuntary severance from office hence
there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service. As
such, those cases cannot be applied in the case at bar.
Rivera v. COMELEC

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: A proclamation subsequently declared
void is no proclamation at all and one assuming office on the
strength of a protested proclamation does so as a presumptive
winner and subject to the final outcome of the election protest.
Hence, the 1998-2001 term should not be included.
RULING: YES. Francis’ mayoralty term from 1998-2001 should be
considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit
rule.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found
in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: “The
term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.”
For the three-term limit for elective local government
officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive
FACTS: (2 related cases ni) In the May 2004 Synchronized National
and Local Elections, respondent Marino Boking Morales ran as
candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term
commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007.
Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera and Normandick De Guzman,
petitioners, filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel respondent
Morales Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected
and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of
Mabalacat.
In his answer to the petition, respondent Morales
admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term
commencing 1995 to 1998 (first term) and 2001 to 2004 (third
term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30,
2001 only as a caretaker of the office or as a de facto officer because
of the following reasons:
a. He was not validly elected for the second term 1998 to
2001 since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the RTC;
and
 b. He was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in
an anti-graft case from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999.
The COMELEC second division disqualified Morales to run
for the position of municipal mayor on the ground that he had
already served 3 consecutive terms. Accordingly, his COC was
cancelled. However, the COMELEC en banc reversed the decision
hence the case at bar.
Pending the above case, nadaog ang giatay nga Morales
hence ning serve na siya sa iyang 4th term. Mao to naa nasad new
case gi-file against niya nya same ra gihapon iyang arguments.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Respondent Morales argued and the
COMELEC held that the July 2003 to 2007 term is not his fourth
because his second term, 1998 to 2001 to which he was elected and
which he served, may not be counted since his proclamation was
declared void by the RTC
ISSUE: WON respondent Morales’ second term from 1998-2001
should be included in the computation for the purpose of the three-
term rule
RULING: YES. It should be included. Respondent Morales’
contention is wrong as fuck.
The same issue has been resolved in the case of Ong v.
Alegrewith identical facts.
It bears stressing that in Ong v. Alegre cited above, Francis
Ong was elected and assumed the duties of the mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms. But his
proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election was declared void
by the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte in its Decision dated July 4,
2001.
As ruled by this Court, his service for the term 1998 to
2001 is for the full term. Clearly, the three-term limit rule applies to
him. Indeed, there is no reason why this ruling should not also
apply to respondent Morales who is similarly situated.
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the
term 1998 to 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor
until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case
filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To
reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He
has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since
1995. Respondent Morales should be promptly ousted from the
position of mayor of Mabalacat.
Purpose of the 3 term limit rule: To avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.
Adormeo v Comelec
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were the only
candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for mayor of
Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent was
elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was
re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998 he lost to Bernard
Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and
served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
Petitioner filed a petition to disqualify Talaga from running for
Mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that the latter
was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive
terms in violation of Section 8, Article X of 1987
Constitution 4 and Section 43 (b) of R.A. 7160, known as the Local
Government Code.
Section 43. Term of Office. —
xxx xxxxxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three
(3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
On March 9, 2001, private respondent responded that he was
not elected City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for
two (2) consecutive terms. He pointed to his defeat in the 1998
election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat the consecutiveness of his
years as mayor was interrupted, and thus his mayorship was not for
three consecutive terms of three years each. Respondent added that
his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for 13 months and
eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the contemplation of the
law and the Constitution. He cites Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
135150, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), as authority to the effect that to
apply disqualification under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution,
two (2) conditions must concur, to wit: (a) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post, and (b) that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms.
ISSUE:
WON in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only
the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the
1998 election, is considered 1 term.
RULING:
NO.
The issue before us was already addressed in Borja, Jr. vs.
COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157, 169 (1998), where we held,
To recapitulate, THE TERM LIMIT FOR ELECTIVE LOCAL
OFFICIALS MUST BE TAKEN TOrefer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply. This point can be made
clearer by considering the following case or situation:
 xxx xxxxxx
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his
first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a
total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he
run for one moreterm in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms
successively.
xxx xxxxxx
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord
with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission
that while the people should be protected from the evils
that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care
should be taken that their freedom of choice is not
unduly curtailed.
Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602,
611 (1999), we said,
This Court held that the TWO CONDITIONS FOR THE
APPLICATION OF THE DISQUALIFICATION MUST
CONCUR:a) that the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and b) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
Accordingly, COMELEC's ruling that private respondent was not
elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly
two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship
was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. AED
Socrates v Comelec
FACTS:
Out of the 528 members of the then
incumbent barangay officials of Puerto Princesa, 312 convened
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to initiate
therecall of then Puerto Princesa Mayor Victorino Dennis Socrates.
The PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02, which declared their loss of
confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. Thereafter, the
COMELEC scheduled the campaign period and the recall election.
Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for
mayor in the recall election.
Adovo, Gilo, Ollave, Manaayfiled petitions before the
COMELEC to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall
election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. The petitions
were all anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified from
running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and
having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full
terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same
post."
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number
of votes in the recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates
Socrates and Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes.
ISSUE: WON Hagedorn was qualified to run for mayor despite
serving three consecutive full terms immediately prior to recall
election.
WON the unexpired term of Socrates which Hagedorn will be
assuming (for lack of better term) would be considered as the start
of his term, in other words, would be the reckoning point of the 9
continuous years of service (or 3 consecutive term)
RULING:
1. Yes.A recall election mid-way in a term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate re-election after the third term.
[RE: 3 CONSECUTIVE TERM]
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states: EHaCTA
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected."
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which
provides:
"Section 43. Term of Office. — (a) . . .
(b) No local elective official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected."
These constitutional (Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution) and statutory provisions (Section 43 (b) of the
Local Government Code) have two parts. The first partprovides that
an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive
terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second
partstates that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time does not interrupt the continuity of service.The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before
and after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official
cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall
election is no longer an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
 When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term For example, a special election is called for a
limit of elective local officials, the question asked was whether there Senator, and the Senator newly
would be no further election after three terms, or whether there elected would have to serve the
unexpired portion of the term.
would be "no immediate reelection" after three terms. The framers
Would that mean that serving the
of the Constitution used the same "no immediate reelection" unexpired portion of the term is
question in voting for the term limits of Senators and already considered one term? So,
Representatives of the House. half a term, which is actually the
correct statement, plus one term
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate would disqualify the Senator
reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. concerned from running? Is that the
The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent meaning of this provision on
reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not disqualification, Madam President?
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall DAVIDE:
election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is
a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there
third term. is a special election, he will serve
only for the unexpired portion of
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September that particular term plus one more
24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the term for the Senator and two more
terms for the Members of the Lower
same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is
House." 21
clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's service as
mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a Although the discussion referred to special elections for
legal prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive terms ended on June Senators and Representatives of the House, the same principle
applies to a recall election of local officials. Otherwise, an elective
30, 2001. Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to
local official who serves a recall term can serve for more than nine
June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the regular
consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's three full terms. A local official who serves a recall term should
previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than
term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and
involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to winning in the recall election.
September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive [SUMMARY]
character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in
[RE: HAGEDORN’S RECALL DOES NOT RETROACT TO INCLUDETHE the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa
TENURE IN OFFICE OF SOCRATES] because:

The period of time prior to the recall term, when another 1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate
elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity reelection following his three
of service. Clearly, Adormeo (own note: case quoted in support) consecutive terms as mayor which
established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be ended on June 30, 2001; HCITDc
charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of
2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor
counting the consecutiveness of an elective official's terms in office.
was involuntarily interrupted from
Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, June 30, 2001 to September 24,
2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the 2002 during which time he was a
people to choose their leaders through popular elections. The private citizen;
concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the
3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24,
people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must
2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be
be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the
made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to
sovereign will of the people.
make a fourth consecutive term
2. Yes.A necessary consequence of the interruption of because factually the recall term is
continuity of service is the start of a new term following not a fourth consecutive term; and
the interruption. An official elected in recall election 4. Term limits should be construed strictly to
serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This give the fullest possible effect to the
unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of right of the electorate to choose
counting the three-term limit. their leaders.
This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional
Commission:

"SUAREZ: 20
Mendoza vs. COMELEC
Preamble: Resolution ranina case (G.R. 149736, the one assigned)
peroakogipangita ang case nailanggi appeal from para
makasabot.Wala pod sa Tanya notes nina case.
Facts: Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of
Bataan during:
1) 1986 – 1988; 2) 1988 – 1992 (2 terms)
3) 1994 – 1995 but only a recall election
4) 1995 – 1998; 5) 1998 – 2001 (2 terms)
In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed for the same post in
the May 2001 regular elections.
Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek
to declare respondent Roman’s election as governor of Bataan as
null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the
Constitution (three-term rule).
Issue:WON Roman’s term during the recall election shall be counted
as one full term
Held:
No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an
incumbent elective local official merely serves the balance of the
latter's term of office; it is not a full three-year term.
The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term
before the proscription can apply, providing for only one exception,
i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If involuntary
severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s being
unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid
recall proceedings negates “one term” for purposes of applying the
three--term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term
assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election should
not also be held to be one term in reckoning the three--term limit.
In both situations, neither the elective local official who is
unable to finish his term nor the elected local official who only
assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official
following the recall election could be considered to have served a
full three--year term set by the Constitution.
The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from
serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it
excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of
service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary
renunciation of the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from
June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo
B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election
held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001
respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only
two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on
that day was actually only his third term for the same position.
Dom: the recall election in 1994-1995 was considered by the
Court to be a hiatus. Thus, when Roman ran for 1995, the
constitutional proscription did not apply since the 1994-1995
election was not considered to be one full term.
A recall term should not be considered as one full term,
because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the
elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his
constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power
should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters’ obvious
preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97
percent of the votes cast.
G.R. 149736 – Resolution
For resolution is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners
Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra, seeking to set aside the
resolution of the Commission on Elections, dated August 15, 2001, in
EPC No. 2001-5 and to declare respondent Leonardo B. Roman's
election as governor of Bataan on May 14, 2001 as null and void for
allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the Constitution.
VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to
dismiss the petition. He contended that as revealed by the records
of the Constitutional Commission, the Constitution envisions a
continuous and an uninterrupted service for three full terms before
the proscription applies. Therefore, not being a full term, a recall
term should not be counted or used as a basis for the
disqualification whether served prior (as in this case) or subsequent
(as in the Socrates case) to the nine-year, full three-term limit.
MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joined,
voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that, in accordance with
the ruling in Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639, Oct. 6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v.
COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999); and Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
147927, Feb. 4, 2002, a term during which succession to a local
elective office takes place or a recall election is held should not be
counted in determining whether an elective local official has served
more than three consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution
does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than
three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-
term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such
interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office
by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30,
1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as
governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should
not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously
served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms
(1995—1998 and 1998—2001), his election on that day was actually
only his third term for the same position.
PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss
the petition. He argued that a recall term should not be considered
as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect
cut short the elected official's service to less than nine years and
shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of
political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the
voters' obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who
received 97 percent of the votes cast. He explained that, in Socrates,
he also voted to affirm the clear choice of the electorate, because in
a democracy the people should, as much as legally possible, be
governed by leaders freely chosen by them in credible elections. He
concluded that, in election cases, when two conflicting legal
positions are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice should be
tilted in favor of the people's overwhelming choice.
AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss,
arguing that it is clear from the constitutional provision that the
disqualification applies only if the terms are consecutive and the
service is full and continuous. Hence, service for less than a term,
except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not count to
disqualify an elective local official from running for the same
position. This case is different from Socrates, where the full three
consecutive terms had been continuously served so that
disqualification had clearly attached.
ONGDOM, J., joined by Taron, J., also voted to dismiss. He
argued that the constitutional provision, disqualifying elective
officials to run for the fourth time, applies only if the elective official
has already been elected for three consecutive terms and that the
elective official has fully served those terms.Roman’s service during
1994-1995, being only for a recall election, cannot be considered as
one full term since he served only for the remaining portion.
Latasa vs. COMELEC (Topic: Three-term Limit)
Facts:Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of
Digos for three consecutive times. When the said municipality
became a city, he ran again as city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor, filed before the
COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's candidacy since the latter
had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms.
Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a
certificate of candidacy since this will be the first time that he will be
running for the post of city mayor.
The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate
of candidacy.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was
converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different
juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So
when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should
not be construed as vying for the same local government post.
Issue:
WON Latasa can run for city mayor despite being mayor for 3
consecutive terms as municipal mayor of Digos
Held:
1) No.
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be
allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X,
Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it
limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running
again in for same local government post, unless two conditions
concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Territorial Jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the
Municipality
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence
separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not
mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would
now be construed as a different local government post as that of the
office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction
of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as
those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters
who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom
he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution wanted to establish some
safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result
of consecutive terms.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern
them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of
a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie
for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the
very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should
he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City
of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief
executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a
total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought
to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Dom: anasi sir na ang reason pod daw kay para dilii treat
samga politicians ang ilang offices as their “properties,” that is
why nay three-term limit peroakogipangitasa full text wala may
mention ana.>:/
Latasa vs. COMELEC (Topic: Conversion from Municipality to City
effects)
Facts: Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of
Digos for three consecutive times. When the said municipality
became a city, he ran again as city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor, filed before the
COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's candidacy since the latter
had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms.
Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a
certificate of candidacy since this will be the first time that he will be
running for the post of city mayor.
The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate
of candidacy.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was
converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different
juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So
when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should
not be construed as vying for the same local government post.
Issue:
WON Latasa can run for City mayor since a City acquires a new
corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality
WON Latasa was involuntary relinquished upon conversion of the
municipality to city
Ruling:
1) No.
As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes
that the delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did
not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the
Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective officials
of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and
functions until elections were held for the new city officials.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence
separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not
mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would
now be construed as a different local government post as that of the
office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction
of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as
those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters
who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom
he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
2) Yes, but only for a short period of time.
This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his office
as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished
due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his
office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor.
Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short
period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never
ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit.
He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as
chief executive of Digos.
Dom:Latasa rests his defense on being involuntarily relinquished
upon the conversion from City to Municipality. Recall that
whenever an elective official is involuntarily relinquished, the
same is considered as an interruption in his period. Thus, one
who is involuntarily relinquished may run for the fourth time
since the term in which he was involuntarily relinquished
wouldn’t count as one full term. Recall again that for an elective
official to be barred from running the fourth time, jurisprudence
require these two requisites: 1.) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
Latasa cited many cases (Borja, Lonzanida, among others)
involving elective officials who were able to run beyond the
three-term limit but the Court clarified that those cases
contemplated a situation where there was a “rest period.”
To delve deeper: “In Lonzanida, petitioner therein was a private
citizen a few months before the next mayoral elections.
Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents
therein lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months
respectively. Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period during
which the local elective official steps down from office and
ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of
the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.”
Abundo v. Comelec
FACTS: For 4 successive regular elections, namely the 2001, 2004,
2007, and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the
position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001
and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning
mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding
terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the
VigaMuncipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one
Jose Torres, who, in due time, performed the functions of the office
of mayor. Abundo protested it. Abundo was eventually declared the
winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-
2007 term on June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over a year and
one month.
Then came May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and
Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate
of candidacy for the seat, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s
disqualification to run, the petition predicated on the 3-consecutive
term limit rule. On June 16 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued
a resolution finding for Abundo, who bested Torres and was
accordingly proclaimed mayor-elect.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC
would resolve the adverted disqualification case Torres initiated
against Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto Vega
commenced a quo warranto action before thr RTC in Virac,
Catanduanes, to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds
Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.
RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal
mayor. COMELEC affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:WON Abundo is deemed to have served 3 consecutive terms
RULING:On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The
consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken when he
was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to
serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was
eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the
electorate.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local
official pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory
provisions, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same
local government post ; and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
TOPIC:
(5) Election Protest
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective
position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to
the rules on succession under the LGC,then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be
treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject
constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.).If the official
runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of
the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation
of law and is considered an involuntary severance or
interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three
consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for
what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had
an interruption in the continuity of the official's service. For, he had
become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the
recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the
conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to
interrupt the incumbent official's continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event
as the elective officer's continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is
barred from exercising the functions of his office during this
period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an
elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he
loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the
unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed(Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not
be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year
term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and
said decision becomes final after said official had served the full
term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does
not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the
term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should
be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification
of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term
(Ong and Rivera).
We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the
effects of an election protest, for which the rulings inLonzanida,
Ong, Rivera and Dizon appear to be more attuned than the case
of Aldovino Jr., the interrupting effects of the imposition of a
preventive suspension being the very lismota in the Aldovino,
Jr. case. But just the same, We find that Abundo's case presents a
different factual backdrop.
Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases
wherein the individuals subject of disqualification
werecandidates who lost in the election protest and each declared
loser during the elections, Abundo was the winner during the
election protest and was declared the rightful holder of the
mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who
were both unseated toward the end of their respective
terms,Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and
had assumed the remainder of the term.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not
only to abrogate the "monopolization of political power"and prevent
elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest in their
position" but also to "enhance the people's freedom of choice." In
the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "while people should be
protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about,
care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly
curtailed."
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo's case
meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his
opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an
interruption, which effectively removed Abundo's case from the
ambit of the three-term limit rule.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or
not Abundo had served for "three consecutive terms," as the phrase
is juridically understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately
before the 2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this issue
is of course the question of whether or not there was an effective
involuntary interruption during the three three-year periods,
resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundo's mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary
interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, means,
in a legal sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office." It also means the "time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right,
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another."
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten
months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006,Abundo cannot
plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of
the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the
same nor serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason
is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged
to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly,
Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as
mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the
protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for
only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the
legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3)
years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-
2007.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during
which Abundo's opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to
be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo's continuity of
service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of
the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term threshold.
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is
related to the concepts of interruption of serviceand voluntary
renunciation of service.The word interruption means temporary
cessation, intermission or suspension. To interrupt is to obstruct,
thwart or prevent. When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991speak
of interruption,the reference is to the obstruction to the
continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by
effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the
occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word
"renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a
known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or
resign. Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local
official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to the office
and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected
official is entitled to.
This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be
overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his
election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary
constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004
elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, for
almost two years or from July 1, 2004 — the start of the term —
until May 9, 2006 or during which his opponent actually assumed
the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his
heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest.Hence, even if
declared later as having the right to serve the elective position from
July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to
the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the
mayor's office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position.
We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive
suspension does not apply to the instant case.Verily, it is erroneous
to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to
exercise the functions of an elective post. For one, during the
intervening period of almost two years, reckoned from the start of
the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have retained title
to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly
proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and
serve such elective office. For another, not having been declared
winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office
since one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he
did not have.Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated
declaration in the election protest accords him title to the elective
office from the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled to the
elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his
favor.
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo's case differs
from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because
while Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he
was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his
constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an
imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not
possess the mandate to remedy such imperfections,
theConstitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a
fortress against the injustices it may bring.
In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work
damage and cause grave injustice to Abundo — an elected official
who was belatedly declared as the winner and assumed office for
only a short period of the term. If in the cases
of Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a losing
candidate — or the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to
hold the contested public office but held it anyway — We find more
reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by
popular vote, deserves title to the public office but whose
opportunity to hold the same was halted by an invalid proclamation.
Also, more than the injustice that may be committed
against Abundo is the injustice that may likewise be committed
against the people of Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their
right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of the Constitution,
We bear in mind that We "cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right
to decide what the people want" and hence, should, as much as
possible, "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion
and rely on their own strength to curtail the power when it
overreaches itself." For democracy draws strength from the choice
the people make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to
protect.
Bagong Bayani-OFW v. Comelec
FACTS: With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received
several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec,
"[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these
parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and
night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these
petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural
requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations
takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result
the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution
and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous
petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of
the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001.
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline
prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22,
2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations
whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to
participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties
filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the
Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations,
but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26,
2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed
before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some of
herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said
certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be
counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth
also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents.
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition before this Court on
April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 147589, assailed
Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April
17, 2001, the Court directed respondents to comment on the
Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before
this Court a Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 147613, also challenging
Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May
9, 2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions
before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file
their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and
called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added
that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of
votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of
any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
ISSUE:4 issues pero topic raakoapilon
WON political parties may participate in the party-list elections
WON the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors’ and organizations
RULING: Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list
system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned
Resolution." For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of "major political parties." On the other hand, the
Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties,
submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties
to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list
system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations."
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA
7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of theConstitution provides that members of the
House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of
the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-
list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered
under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or
coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not
be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards
of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint
poll watchers in accordance with law."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a
party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section
3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law
defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to
the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We
quote the pertinent provision below:
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the
first five (5) major political parties on the basis
of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be
entitled to participate in the party-list system.
Indubitably, therefore, political parties — even the major
ones — may participate in the party-list elections.
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list
elections does not mean, however, that any political party — or any
organization or group for that matter — may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with
the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in
the Constitution and RA 7941, Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a
distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared
that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine
power to our people" in Congress.
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-
executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance
with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress
to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA
7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State
shall promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House
of Representatives through a party-list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end,
the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresentedto Become Lawmakers
Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of
promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-
style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House
of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized
andunderrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation
andenactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the
nation as awhole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional
representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack
[of] well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the
number of people in a particular district, because the party-list
election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical
strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
"labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because
representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list
organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in
Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the
absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a
congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine
power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have
less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, . . . , to become members of the House of
Representatives."
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be
represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5
of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group
of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC
not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or
sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, that the sector shall include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear
intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the
party-list system.
The Party-List System Desecratedby the OSG Contentions
The OSG admitted during the Oral Argument that even an
organization representing the super-rich of Forbes Park or
Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections.
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list
system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens — specifically those
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties — to be elected to the House of
Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system
is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented
disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-
rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the
party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar
disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by
the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two
sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat
them similarly defies reason and common sense.
 While the business moguls and the mega-rich are,
numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized
nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic
clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical
limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily
emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to
arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank
accounts.
In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers
the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it
invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past — the
farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement — to come out and participate, as indeed
many of them came out and participated during the last elections.
The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling
and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not
been able to win in the congressional district elections normally
dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent
of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the
party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in
the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and
the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision
was to open up the system, in order to enhance the chance of
sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the
House of Representatives through the simplest scheme
possible. Logic shows that the system has been opened to those
who have never gotten a foothold within it — those who cannot
otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the
"simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical
to open the system to those who have long been within it — those
privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional
district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more
vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory "open
house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities.
Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not
the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without
such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is
only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular
elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented
to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not
only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and
underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law
to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to
others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to
be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions (in case mag ask si sir dringa
part, mao rani impt. Ang uban kay statcon topics)
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list
system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall
be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In
understanding and implementing party-list representation, we
should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its
provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of
construction be resorted to.
ATONG PAGLAUM v COMELEC (giapil enumeration sa new
parameters so na 2 pages siya)
FACTS:These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups
and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the COMELEC
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under
the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations. The ground of COMELEC
was mainly anchored on the failure of the parties to represent a
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the
COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to
determine whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 7941 andAng Bagong Bayaniruling of the SC. The COMELEC
disqualified groups and organizations from participating in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court
issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs
only the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo
Ante Orders, namely:
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the May 2013
elections for failure to represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector and for following the SC ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayaniand BANAT.
RULING: We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court. However,
we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the
COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the
party-list systemunder the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list
system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is
intended to democratize political power by giving political parties
that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats
in the House of Representatives.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of
the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties
but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral
parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list
system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political
parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they
field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors
that we shall designate in this Constitution."
 Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear
that there shall be "a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after
the words "national[,]" and "regional[,]" separate national and
regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the
same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional
sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their
intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different
groups: (1)national parties or organizations; (2)regional parties or
organizations; and (3)sectoral parties or organizations. National and
regional parties or organizations need notbe organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7941(Party-List Act) defines a
"party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition
of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat,
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system.
In Sec 6 of RA 7941, none of the 8 grounds to refuse or
cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized
and underrepresented."
To harmonize Sec 2 of RA 7941 and the Constitution, the
phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to
the sectors in Section 5 of the Consti that are, by their nature,
economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors
are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
similar sectors.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where
those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and
ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own
members to the House of Representatives.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first
five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation
in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress"
from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.Thus, major
political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections
since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list
elections. However, major political parties should participate in
party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The
participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a
majority of whose members are "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.The
sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party,and is linked
to a major political party through a coalition.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the
COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the coming 13
May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not
be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v COMELEC
FACTS: The case has its roots in the COMELEC's refusal to
accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs).Incorporated in 2003, AngLadlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had
no substantial membership base. On August 17,
2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the
COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is
a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and
violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and
that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by
this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections.Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and
outlined its platform of governance.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner's evidence,
the COMELECdismissed the Petition on moral grounds based on the
Bible and the Koran. Comelec said that the definition of LGBT
tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it
justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the
Philippines' international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad's petition and argued that the
COMELEC erred in denying petitioner's application for registration
since there was no basis for COMELEC's allegations of immorality. It
also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and
concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a
separate classification.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not
have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the
nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds.
It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among
the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELEC's field personnel
ISSUE: Whether petitionershould be disqualified as a party list
organization.
RULING: No. Ang LadladLGBT partylist is qualified.
Compliance with the Requirements ofthe Constitution and
Republic Act No.7941
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong
Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors
(labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the
party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,"the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated,
but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide
existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The
COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it
was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country,
petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country."
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged its national existence" is a new one.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A
cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad's initial petition shows that it never
claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather,
petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was
estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had
16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044
members in its electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also
represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization
with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following
LGBT networks: *enumeration of networks all over PH*
Since the COMELEC only searched for the
names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that
they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these
regions. Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation.
Religionas the Basis for Refusal toAccept Ang Ladlad's Petition
forRegistration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "no law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in
religious matters." Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Public Morals as a Ground to DenyAng Ladlad's Petition for
Registration
We also find the COMELEC's reference to purported violations of
our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act,
omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the
remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt to support a criminal conviction.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest.
Equal Protection
The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and
in like circumstances.
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine
population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify
the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine
electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to
criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about
homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that
public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state
interest here — that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular
minority — is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to
satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause.
The COMELEC's differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim
that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of
legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate
state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored
group.
We disagree with the OSG's position that homosexuals are a class
in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We
are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class
meriting special or differentiated treatment.
Freedom of Expression andAssociation
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote
its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its
position through normal democratic means.
Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest,
it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an
approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint
nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its
members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of
expression or association.
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its
qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and — as
advanced by the OSG itself — the moral objection offered by the
COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent,
therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of
COMELEC's action, from publicly expressing its views as a political
party and participating on an equal basis in the political process
with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that
there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner's
fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and InternationalLaw
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international
obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular,
we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it
relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the
UDHR and the ICCPR.
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to
assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines'
international law obligations, the blanket invocation of
international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer
now to the petitioner's invocation of the Yogyakarta
Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In
Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), which
petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international
law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that
these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on
the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in
said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of
international law enumerated under Article 38 (1) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice.
CONSOLIDATED CASES
BA-RA 7941 VS. COMELEC (1ST CASE)
ROSALES VS. COMELEC (2ND CASE)
ONE LINER: Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups. The
people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of
an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed
about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot
be achieved in a system of blind voting.
FACTS: On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued a resolution
prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of
manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of
nominees under the party-list system of representation in
connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a
number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA (Bantay Republic Act) 7941 and UP-LR
(Urban Poor for Legal Reforms) filing with the Comelec an Urgent
Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees
of certain party-list organizations.
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the
individuals behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not,
as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors,
petitioner Rosales, addressed a letter to the Comelec’s Law
Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees.Neither the
Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to
petitioner Rosales’ requests.
The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the
front-page banner headline "COMELEC WON’T BARE PARTY-LIST
NOMINEES",7 with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list
polls not personality oriented."
AttyCapulong and ex-Senator Salonga, as counsels of Rosales,
forwarded a letter to Comelec to grant their request for disclosure
invoking the constitutional right to information. Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of a
Comelec en banc Resolution virtually declaring the nominees’ names
confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic
disclosure request.
Hence, the following petitions:
FIRST PETITION: BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR are assailing the COMELEC’s
resolution accrediting the private respondents BiyahengPinoy et al
to participate in the elections even without ascertaining whether the
nominees qualify under RA 7941 & whether they come from the As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people’s right to know is limited
marginalized and underrepresented sector. to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law.Too, there is also the need of
SECOND PETITION: Rosales et al impugn the Comelec resolution preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as
denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting
the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list national security.
groups.
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded
ISSUE: precise definition.At the end of the day, it is for the COURTS to
1.) Did COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it granted determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of
accreditations without simultaneously determining whether the interest or importance to the public.
nominees are qualified? Should the Supreme Court cancel such
accreditations? NO to both. If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if
certain persons employed as sanitarians of a health department of a
2.) Whether COMELEC has violated the constitutional right to city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a
information by failing to reveal the name of the nominees? YES. lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public
concern and interest. After all, no national security concerns are
RULING: involved in such disclosure.
On the first issue:
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA BONUS: ON THE INTERPRETATION OF SEC 7 RA 7941
7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941(Check nalangpud the
thus advanced in their petition. For, such course of action would
provision kytaas) reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees
entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups
shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying
or parties in question, particularly whether or not they indeed
card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the
represent marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise
prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited
would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter
in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified
which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil
list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling
action for certiorari.
places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to
the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941’s and UP-LR’s posture that the Comelec
As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits
committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed
the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing THROUGH
accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications
MEDIUMS OTHER THAN the "Certified List" the names of the party-
of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there
list nominees.
a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be
determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied as to the part where it seeks
nullification of the accreditation, but granted as to the part on the
On the 2nd issue (MAIN ISSUE):
disclosure of the names of the nominees.
According to Manila Bulletin, COMELEC chair Benjamin Abalos
contends that:
1. People are voting for the party-list, not the nominees
TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
2. Nowhere is it required under RA 7941
3. Party-list election not “personality oriented”
FACTS: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January
2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator
Sayupsi Benjamin Abalos. The Supreme Court cited Section 7 Article
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. ("Senator Guingona") as Vice-President.
III (the right of the people to information on matters of public
Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took
concern shall be recognized) and Section 28 Article II (the State
his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest) of the Constitution. (Please
Following Senator Guingona’s confirmation, the Senate on 8
check the provisions kytaasna)
February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84")
certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in
84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election
interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise.By weight of
to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May
jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the
2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be
exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by
elected in that election.1 Resolution No. 84 further provided that
mandamus.
the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of
votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004.2
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results
from all the provinces but one (LanaodelNorte), COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the
elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that "the first
twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the
thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3)
years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-
President."3 Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and Gregorio
Honasan ("Honasan") ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in
Resolution No. 01-005. Petitioners are contending that it is void
since there was no notice.
ISSUE: On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant
three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001? YES.
Would the ruling be the same if it were a vacancy in the House of
Representatives? NO, there must be a call and notice.
RULING: As discussed by sir, there was a statutory notice to the
People. And to nullify the special election held would put to waste
the votes given to the 13th senator.
“Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amendedSection
2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. – x xx In case
a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the
term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the
vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90)
days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such
vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. (Emphasis
supplied)”
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before
the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended,
requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of
the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days
nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in
case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2)
to give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or
offices to be voted for.
HOWEVER: Our conclusion might be different had the present case
involved a special election to fill a vacancy in the House of
Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special election is
subject to a condition precedent, that is, the vacancy should take
place at least one year before the expiration of the term. The time of
the election is left to the discretion of COMELEC subject only to the
limitation that it holds the special election within the range of time
provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes
mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, for COMELEC to "call x xx a special election x xx not earlier
than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the
vacancy" and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELEC’s
failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a
special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh
impossible for the voters in the congressional district involved to
know the time and place of the special election and the office to be
filled unless the COMELEC so notifies them. (Mao rajudni discussion
pre)
Mga pre, my understanding, as in thetranscript:
Date of special election-
A. District representatives – not earlier than 60 days nor longer than
90 days after the office is vacated (I think here dapat, naa’y notice
and call).
Exception: If it occurs within a year prior to the expiration of the
term. If so, it shall be simultaneous with the next regular elections.
B. Senators – simultaneous with the succeeding regular election.
DAVID VS COMELEC
FACTS:
2 petitions ni. Main question advanced: How long is the
term of office of barangay chairmen and other barangay officials
who were elected to their respective offices on the 2 nd Monday of
May 1994? 3 under LGC or 5 years under RA 6679?
GR 127116 (David’s Petition)
He is a barangay chairman in Kalookan City and president
of Ligangmga Barangay saPilipinas. He seeks to prohibit the holding
of the barangay election scheduled on the 2nd Monday of May 1997.
The OSG sided with David.
COMELEC on the other hand opposed the petition.
Nevertheless, the SC gave due course to the prohibition.
GR 128039 (Rillon’s Petition)
He is the president of the Ligangmga Barangay Quezon
City Chapter. He prays that Sec. (43) of LGC be declared
unconstitutional as it decreases the term of office of barangay
officials and members of the SK to 3 years. Likewise, 2 resolutions
issued by Comelec be unconstitutional for fixing the date of the
holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997. Lastly, the
appropriation of P400M for the conduct of the election be
unconstitutional.
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTIONS:
The term of office of barangay officials should be 5 years
as contained under RA 6653, and reiterated in RA 6679. Moreover,
while the LGC decreased the term to 3 years, it does not apply to
barangay officials because:
1) RA 6679 is a special law while LGC is a general law;
2) LGC does not expressly or impliedly repeal 6679
with respect to the term of barangay officials;
3) Sec. 8 Art. X of the 1987 Consti states that while the
term of elective local officials at 3 years, the term of
barangay officials “shall be determined by law”; and
4) The constitutional intentionthen is to grant
barangay officials any term except 3 years.
 5) The P400M appropriation is unconstitutional and a
waste of public funds.
COMELEC’S CONTENTIONS:
1) The repealing clause of LGC includes all laws, general
or special, inconsistent with the provisions of the
LGC.
2) Estoppel – since petitioners were elected under the
aegis of the LGC, then their term prescribes after 3
years.
3) No grave abuse of discretion in appropriating P400M.
ISSUES:
1) What law governs the term of office of the barangay officials?
LGC or RA 6679?
2) Is the LGC constitutional for shortening the term to 3 years?
3) Are petitioners estopped considering that they have been
elected under the LGC?
RULING: PETITIONS HAVE NO MERIT
BACKGROUND OF THE BARANGAY ELECTIONS:
➢ Antedated the Spanish conquest. Barangay is derived from the
Malay word “balangay” – boat. Ruled by a Datu – but was later
stripped of power by the Spanish government and centered on
the gobernadorcillo.
➢ American conquest – barangay became known as “barrios” –
later granted autonomy and formally recognized as quasi-
municipal corporations.
➢ Martial Law regime – barrios were renamed to “barangay”
➢ BP 222 – Punong Barangay and 6 kagawads were first elected
on May 17, 1982, and had a term of 6 years.
➢ LGC OF 1983 – term is 6 years and the chief officials of the
barangay were composed of the punong barangay, 6 kagawads,
SK chairman, secretary and treasurer
➢ Omnibus Election Code – reiterated that the term is 6 years and
election to be held on 2nd Monday of May 1988
➢ RA 6653 – reset the election to 2nd Monday of November 1988.
Term was cut to 5 years
➢ RA 6679 – reset the date to March 28, 1989. Term to begin at
May 1, 1989 and end on May 31, 1994. There shall be a regular
election of barangay officials on 2nd Monday of May 1994.
Term of office is 5 years. 7 kagawads were to be elected and
the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes shall be
the punong barangay. In case of tine, draw of lots under the
Comele’s supervision.
➢ LGC OF 1991- reduced the term to 3 years for barangay
officials. Barangay chairman was to be elected separately by
the electorate. One Punong barangay and 7 kagawads are to be
elected. Elections to be held on May 9, 1994.
1ST ISSUE – LGC is the governing law and the Constitutional Intent is
to limit the term to 3 years.
➢ LGC was enacted later than RA 6679. In case of an
irreconcilable conflict between 2 laws of different vintages,
the latter prevails (stat con). Rationale is a later law repeals an
earlier one because it is the later legislative will.
➢ RA 6679 is inconsistent with LGC coz the latter mandates 8
officials to be elected (1 punong barangay and 7 kagawads),
while the latter has 7 electives and the candidate having the
highest votes being the punong barangay.
➢ If the contentions be accepted, if follows that David cannot
claim to be a validly elected under RA 6679 as the barangay
chairman because he did not obtain the highest number of
votes when he was elected.
➢ the P400M budget was intended by Congress the be
appropriated for the elections pursuant to sec 43 of LGC.
➢ The decision in Paras v Comelec stating that the next regular
election involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away,
being scheduled in May 1997, is now part of the legal system.
2nd issue: shortening of the term to 3 years is not repugnant to the
constitution.
The contention of petitioners that barangay officials are
exempted from the 3 term limit because the constitution states that
their term should be determined by law is NO MERIT.
The Constitution did not expressly prohibitCongress from
fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It merely left the
determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any
specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmaker’s
full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of
public service. This is pursuant to the discussions of the
constitutional commission, as an amendment introduced by
HilarioDavide, which was out rightly accepted by the commission.
3rd issue: Petitioners are ESTOPPED.
Being elected under LGC, they are estopped from claiming
the term provided under RA 6679. Moreover, if their contention be
accepted, specifically David, he could not have been the punong
barangay under 6679 because it was not him who obtained the
highest number of votes. It was rather Ruben Magalona. Moreover,
his election and the composition of the 2 ligas were illegal, taking
into account that only 7 officials are to be elected under 6679.
PETITIONS DENIED.
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
FACTS:
GR 123755 (Raul vsComelec and Frivaldo)

Frivaldo filed his COC for the office of governor of
Sorsogon. Raul Lee, another candidate for the same position, filed a
petition before the Comelec for Frivaldo to be disqualified because
he is not yet a citizen of the Philippines. 2 ndDiv of Comelec granted
said petition. Reconsideration of Frivaldo remained unacted until the
election, so his candidacy continued. He later won as governor.
Nevertheless, the Comelec en banc proclaimed Raul as the
duly elected candidate. So Frivaldo filed a petition for Raul’s
proclamation to be annulled. He argued that on June 30, 1995 at
2:00pm,he took his oath of allegiance as a Phil. Citizen pursuant to
his petition for repatriation. When the June 21, 1995 order
proclaiming Raul as the duly elected governor was released and
received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30pm, there was no
more legal impediment to proclaim him as governor.
The Comelec 1st division gave due course to Frivaldo’s
petition. Raul’s reconsideration was denied.
GR 120295 (FrivaldovsComelec and Raul)
Essential same facts as above, but the ground relied upon
by Frivaldo in assailing the Comelec decision declaring Raul as the
duly elected governor is founded upon Sec 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. He argues that since the Comelecfailed to act upon
his petition within the period allowed by Law “not later than 15
days before the election”, said resolutions of the Comelec are null
and void.
ISSUE:
1) Was Frivaldo’s repatriation valid and legal? If yes, did it cure his
lack of citizenship? If no, may it be given retroactive effect?
2) Is Frivaldo’s judicially declared disqualification for lack of
Filipino Citizenship a continuing bar to his candidacy for
governor of Sorgsogon?
3) Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up, valid and legal?
4) Did the Comelec exceeded its jurisdiction by promulgating the
resolutions which prevented Frivaldo from assuming
governorship of Sorsogon?
RULING:
1) REPATRIATION WAS VALID. IT CURED FRIVALDO’S CITIZENSHIP.
ITS GRANT IS GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO THE DATE OF
FRIVALDO’S APPLICATION.
QUALIFICATIONS FOR ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS (LGC 1991)
➢ Citizen of the Phil
➢ Registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province, or in the case of a member of the
sangguniangpanlalawigan, sangguniangpanlungsod,
sangguiniangbayan, the district where he intends to be elected
➢ Resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding the
day of the election
➢ Able to read and write
➢ Age – at least 23 years on election day for candidates for the
position of Gov, Vice-gov, member of the
sangguniangpanlalawigan, mayor, vice-mayor, member of the
sangguniangpanlungsod of highly urbanized cities.
REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP:
➢ By direct act of Congress, Naturalization, or Repatriation
IN FRIVALDO’S CASE:
Reacquisition through direct act of Congress did not
materialize despite endorsement of HREP members because of the
maneuvers of his political rivals.
Reacquisition through naturalization was rejected by SC
because of jurisdiction, substantial and procedural defects.
So he comes for the 3rd time to the SC, arguing that he
reacquired his citizenship through Repatriation. In fact, the OSG,
who opposed his 2 previous cases, now argues the validity of his
claim. To strengthen his claim, he argues that he was
overwhelmingly elected as governor, as opposed to Raul.
RAUL’S OPPOSITION TO FRIVALDO’S REACQUISITION OF PHIL
CITIZENSHIP THROUGH REPATRIATION:
1) PD 725 (Repatriation Law), has been effectively repealed by
then Pres Cory, since she forbade the grant of citizenship by
Presidential Decree or executive issuances as the same poses a
serious and contentious issue of policy, which should best be
left to the judgment of Congress. This is pursuant to a
Memorandum to the Special Committee on Naturalization to
cease and desist from undertaking their proceedings.
SC DECISION:
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, express or
implied. The Memorandum did not categorically or impliedly state
that PD 752 was being repealed or rendered without legal effect.
This is even more so that repeals by implication are not favored,
unless convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated.
2) The repatriation proceedings was seriously irregular because it
was just approved in one day (filed June 29, approved June 30,
1995). Moreover, the sudden reconstitution of the Special
Committee on Naturalization was mainly intended for Frivaldo’s
personal interest.
SC DECISION:
As claimed by Frivaldo application was filed on Aug. 17,
1994. It was also confirmed by the OSG that the Special Committee
was reactivated on June 8, 1995, to start processing his application.
He re-submitted the Form that the Committee required on June 29,
1995. We are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee.
The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not
a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily
tainted.
After all, the requirements in PD 752 are not cumbersome
to comply, taking into account that unlike in naturalization where
the alien converts to Phil citizenship for the 1st time, in repatriation
the already Filipino citizen merely reacquires his citizenship.
Moreover, Frivaldo was already a natural-born citizen, but was
forced to obtain US citizenship to escape the dictatorship – and
after it ceased, wasted no time to reacquire his citizenship.
3) Assuming that Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid, it could only be
effective at 2:00 pm of June 30, 1995, whereas the citizenship
qualification must exist on the date of his election, if not when
the certificate of candidacy is filed.
SC DECISION:
Under Sec. 39 of the LGC (qualifications of an elective local
official) – it will be noted that it did not specify any particular date
or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that
for residence (which must consist of at least 1 year’s residency
immediately preceding the day of election), and age (at least 23 on
election day)
Moreover, an oficial begins to govern or to discharge his
functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his
citizenship on June 30, 1995 — the very day 32 the term of office of
governor (and other elective officials) began — he was therefore
already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.
In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native
Sorsogon
ON RETROACTIVITY:
Tracing the legislative intent of PD 752, it was manifest
that the commission intended that the statute was meant to "reach
back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise
covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. This is because
citizenship is a political and civil right equally important as all the
rights and guarantees under the Bill of Rights.
A question is asked: how can retroactivity of PD 752
benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5,
1975, while Frivaldo lost his citizenship on Jan. 20, 1983, and
applied on Aug. 17, 1994?
SC said what is given retroactive effect is the repatriation
granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is deemed to have retroacted
to the date of his application on Aug. 17, 1994.
2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS NOT A CONTINUING BAR TO FRIVALDO’S
1995 CANDIDACY
RAUL’S CONTENTION:
The Comelec resolutions declaring that Frivaldo is not a
Filipino citizen has became final and executory because no TRO has
been prayed by Frivaldo, nor issued by the SC.
SC DECISION:
It should be noted that the rulings disqualifying Frivaldo
were rendered in connection with the 1988 and 1992 elections
Take note that, decisions declaring the acquisition. or
denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequentlyreacquire, or for
that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized
bylaw for the purpose
3. RAUL’S PROCLAMATION WAS NOT VALID
➢ He was a second placer, not the choice of the sovereign will.
o To rebut, Raul cites the Labo Case, in which the SC
declared that Labo would have been disqualified if
the electorate was fully aware of his disqualification.
(same situation with Frivaldo)
o But this pronouncement was qualified in the next
paragraph which states that Labo was not
notoriously known as an ineligible candidate. In fact,
the Comelec allowed Labo to run. (again, same
situation with Frivaldo)
▪ There has been no suficient evidence
presented to show that theelectorate of
Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in
law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as
to "bring such awareness within the realm
of notoriety.
➢ Since Frivaldoseasonably reacquired his citizenship, then Raul’s
proclamation was invalid.
4. THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN MOOTED BY SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTIONS
AFFIRMING FRIVALDO’S ELECTION.
➢ Just take note langngaSection 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
is merely directory as Section 6 ofR.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
Commission to try and decide petitions fordisqualifications
even after the elections.
Labovs COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1
Facts: Petitioner ran for the position of Baguio city mayor and was
proclaimed as mayor elect in 1988. His opponent in the elections
who is the respondent in this case filed a petition for quo warranto
alleging that he is a foreigner supporting it with a proof that he was
married to an Australian citizen.
Previously there were two administrative cases filed against
petitioner regarding his citizenship one was with COMELEC and the
other with Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The former
found petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines while the latter
found that he was not.
Petitioner argued that he was not divested of his Philippine
Citizenship by virtue of his marriage to an Australian citizen and that
he claimed he was naturalized as an Australian citizen and thus, he
was a dual-citizen.
Issue: WON petitioner qualified as mayor.
Held: No, he was not a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local
elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he
was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because
of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for
mayor of Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local Government
Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — (1) An elective local official must
be a citizen of thePhilippines, at least twenty-three years
of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such
in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he
 proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one
year at the time of the filling of his certificate of candidacy,
and able to read and write English, Pilipino, or any other
local language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile
technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of
Baguio City who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous
majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead
over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the
people of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed
the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner
owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a
stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens
of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may
have done so in the belief that he was quali􀀽ed only strengthens
the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications
are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the
case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not
subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on
the day of the election. The petitioner was disquali􀀽ed from
running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to
serve as such.
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made
him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his
Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand
against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these
are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation
ofcitizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which
are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this
connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present
Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his
marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance
alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His
divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is
a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must
consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected
Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the
citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have
been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not
mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the
Philippines. Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record,
nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by any of these methods.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filedthe quo warranto petition, can replace the
petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simplereason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,he
was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
Garvidavs Sales, GR No. 124893
Facts: Petitioner initially applied as member and voter of the
KatipunanngKabataanwhich was denied by the board of election
tellers ruling that petitioner was 21 years and 10 months old, thus
he exceeded the age limit. Determined, he filed with the MCTC a
petitioner for inclusion as registered kabataang member and voter
and this time it was approved.
She then filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
chairman in the SangguniangKabataanwhich was initially denied by
COMELEC but upon reconsideration, it was approved. Later,
respondent, who is her rival in the elections sought to disqualify her
alleging that she exceeded the age limit. With this, the COMELEC
issued an order on May 2, 1996 directing the authorities to suspend
her proclamation should she win in the elections.
Petitioner won in the elections but despite such order petitioner was
proclaimed on June 2, 1996 the winner for the position of SK
chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, IlocosNorte but it was
qualified to be as "without prejudice to any further action by the
Commission on Elections or any other interested party."
Petitioner now questions the order of COMELEC suspending her
proclamation on May 2, 1996
Issue:WON petitioner was qualified.
Held: No, because she exceeded the age limit.
Membership in the KatipunanngKabataan is subject to specific
qualifications laid down by the Local Government Code of 1991, viz:
"Sec. 424. KatipunanngKabataan. — The
katipunanngkabataan shall be composed of all citizens of
the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least
six (6) months, who are fiffteen (15) but not more than
twenty one (21) yearsof age, and who are duly registered
in the list of the sangguniangkabataan or in the official
barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary."
A member of the KatipunanngKabataan may become a candidate for
the SangguniangKabataan if he possesses the following
qualifications:
"Sec. 428. Qualifications. — An elective official of the
sangguniangkabataanmust be a citizen of the Philippines, a
qualified voter of the katipunanngkabataan, a resident of
the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to
election, at least fifteen (15) years but not more than
twenty-one (21) years of age on the day of his election,
able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect,
and must not have been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude."
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the
KatipunanngKabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual
resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more
than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the
SangguniangKabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of
the Code requires that an elective official of the
SangguniangKabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified
voter in the KatipunanngKabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15
years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election;
(e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of
any crime involving moral turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections
424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution
No. 2824 and defned how a member of the KatipunanngKabataan
becomes a qualified voter and an elective official. Thus:
"Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. — To be qualified to
register as a voter inthe SK elections, a person must be:
a) a citizen of the Philippines;
b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day that is, he must have been born
between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and
c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and
actually residing in the barangay wherein he proposes to
vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
elections."
"Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. — An elective
official of the SKmust be:
a) a qualified voter;
b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year
immediately prior to the elections; and
c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine
language or dialect or English.
Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be
decided by the city/municipal Election Officer (EO) whose decision
shall be final."
A member of the KatipunanngKabataan may be a quali􀀽ed voter in
the May 6, 1996 SK elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but
not-more than 21 years of age on election day, i.e., the voter must
be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a
resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual
resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately
preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the
foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c)
able to read and write.
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications
of a member and voter in the KatipunanngKabataan and a
candidatefor the SangguniangKabataan. Petitioner's age is
admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824.
Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No.
2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424
and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991. She contends that
the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21
years of age on election day. She urges that so long as she did not
turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years of age
on election dayand therefore qualified as a member and voter in the
KatipunanngKabataan and as candidate for the SK elections. C
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more
than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The
Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When
the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days
each. One born on the 􀀽rst day of the year is consequently deemed
to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of
the year. In computing years, the first year is reached after
completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day
of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second
cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a
lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st365-
day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the
entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day
cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is the
􀀽rst day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the
365thday.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21
years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not
mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because
that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21
years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to
petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less
than 22 years on election day.The general rule is that an elective
official of the SangguniangKabataan must not be more than 21 years
of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the
official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section
423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the
term for which he was elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the
youth leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st birthday.
Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21 years old
before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] together with Section
428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns
21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a
youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day.
Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No.
2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an
elective SK official on the day of his election.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March
16, 1996, the day she registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK
elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months
old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5
days old. When she assumed of􀀽ce on June 1, 1996, she was 21
years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days
away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a
member of the KatipunanngKabataan but de􀀽nitely, petitioner was
over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the
Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the
May 6, 1996 SangguniangKabataan elections.
The requirement that a candidate possess the age quali􀀽cation is
founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the
election, he can be declared ineligible. In the same vein, if the
candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election,
he isineligible.
Valles V. CA
Facts: Petitioner sought respondent to be disqualified from running
the position of governor of Davao Oriental. Respondent was born in
Australia to a Filipino father and Australian mother. Upon reaching
the age of 15, respondent left Australia to settle in the Philippines.
Petitioner relies his contention on the ff: 1. Respondent’s Alien
Certificate Registration in the bureau of immigration as an Australian
2. Immigrant Certificate Residence and 3. Australian Passport and by
reason of that, respondent renounced her Filipino Citizenship.
Issue:WON respondent is disqualified from running?
Ruling:Petitioner is a Filipino Citizen by virtue of the principle of jus
sanguinis since the constitution provides that all those born from
Filipino Fathers shall be deemed as Filipino Citizens.
(Main issue;renunciation of Filipino Citizenship)
Under CA 63 a Filipino loses his citizenship:
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2. by express renunciation
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express. As held by jurisprudence, mere
holding of an alien certificate of registration is not tantamount to
renunciation of Philippine Citizenship.
to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states.
In resolving the case, the Supreme Court relied on the deliberations
made by the framers which explained the meaning of dual
citizenship as a ground for disqualification.
As what was explained in the deliberations, what the constitution
prohibits is dual allegiance and not dual citizenship that would bar a
person from running from office since dual citizenship may just be a
product of laws beyond the person’s control while dual allegiance is
caused by his acts, further there is a need to subject persons with
dual allegiance to strict process as such may result in conflicting
interest especially when their obligation to rise and defend the state
arises which is a matter of national security. Thus,

The application of the herein private respondent for an alien Art. IV Sec. 5 provides:
certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport,
Dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano,were mere acts of assertion
with by law.
of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the
same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship —
Respondent renounced his allegiance to US
she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.|||
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
With respect to her Australian citizenship, there was enough
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
evidence to prove her renunciation of such. First, she filed for a
another country; that he will defend and support
certificate of candidacy where she declared that she is a Filipino
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
citizen and swore to defend the Constitution and maintain true faith
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
and allegiance thereto and respondent also executed a Declaration
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
of renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
Immigration in Australia.
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance
to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has
Mercado V. Manzano spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced
his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
Facts: Edu manzanonina case (Eduardo Barrios Manzano). He ran for country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
the position of vice-mayor in Makati city. Respondent got the
highest number of votes however, his proclamation was suspended
due to a pending disqualification case. Petitioner contended that
respondent was disqualified from running the position on the
ground that he has a dual citizenship (he was born in US to a Filipino
couple) which is provided under the Local Government Code
(Section 40 Par. D).

Those disqualified from running any elective local position HST

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(d) Those with dual citizenship

Issue: WON he is disqualified from running?

Ruling:Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former

arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres