THE SEMANTIC THEORY OF TRUTH

Alfred Tarski

This paper consists of two parts, the first has an expository character , and the second rather
polemical.

In the public first part 1 to want summarize an informal way the main results of my
investigations concerning the definition of truth and the more general problem of the foundation
of semantics. these result have been embodied in a work which appeared in the print several
years ago.

Although my investigation concern concept dealt with in classical philosophy, they happen
to be comparatively little known in philosophical circles, perhaps because of their strictly
technical character from this reason I hope I shall be excused for taking up the matter once again.

Since my work published various was published various objections of unequal value, have
been raised to my investigations, some of these appeared in print, and other were made in public
and private and private discussion in which I took part 3 in the second part of the paper I should
like to express my views regarding the objections. I hope that the remark which will be made in
this context will not be considered as purely polemical in character but will be found to contain
some constructive contribution to the subject.

In the second part of the paper I have made extensive use of material put at my disposal by
Dr. Marja Kokoszynska ( university of Lwow),I am especially indebted and grateful to
Professors Ernest Nagei ( Columbia university ) and David Rynin ( university of California,
Barkeley).for their help in preparing the final text and for various critical remarks.

EXPOSITION

1. The main problem – a satisfactory definition of truth

Our this discussion will be centered around the nation of truth. The main problem is that of
giving a satisfactory definition which is that. But such a formulation on the problem some
further comments.
 In the order the avoid any ambiguity we must first specify the conditions under which
the definition of truth of will be considered from the material point the view. The desired
definition does not aim to specify the meaning of familiar word used to denote a novel notion
Secondly, we must determine on what the formal correctness on the definition depends.
Thus, we must specify the words or concepts speaking more generally we must describe the
formal structure of the language in which the definition will be given the discussion of these
points will occupy a considerably portion of the first part of the paper.
2. The extension of the term “true”

We begin with some remarks regarding the extension on the concept of truth which we have
in mind here.

The predicate true such as judgment or belief sometimes to certain physical sentence we
understand here what is usually meant in grammar as regards the term proposition its meaning is
notoriously a subject we must always relate the notion of truth like that of language for it
obvious.

Of course the fact that we interested here primarily in the notions of truth of sentences does
not excluded the possibility of a extension of this notion to other kinds of objects.

3. The meaning of the term “true”

Much more serious difficulties are connected with the problem of the meaning of the
concept of truth.
The word serious like other words from our everyday language. And it does not seem
to me that the philosopher we meet many different conception of truth and falsity, and we must
and we must indicate which conception will be the basis of our discussion.
We should like our definition to do justice to the intuition which add here to say what of
is that it is not or of what is not that it is is false, while to say of what is that is of or is what is
not that it is not is true.
However all these formulations can I cad the formulation and any rate none of them can
be considered it is up to us to look for a more a precise expression to our intuitions.
4. A criterion for the material adequacy of the definition
 Lets us start with a consider the sentence snow in white we ask the question under what
conditions this sentences is true or false, it seems clear seems like clear that if the base ourselves
on the classical conception of the truth or false. it seems like and that it is false if snow is not its
is up to us for a more precise expression on our intuition.
Let me out that the phrase snow is white occurs on the side on this marks, and on the
right side we have the sentence and on the left the name of the sentence. Employing the logical
we could say that on the right side snow is white. From the of view of the grammar of our
language expression of the form ‘x” will not come a meaningful sentence if we replace in it “x”
by a sentence if we since the subject of the sentence may be only noun or an expression function
like a noun and in the second place the fundamental the use of any language self, re that in any
utterance make about an object is the name of the object which be employed , and not the object
about the sentence self.
The sentence constituted by three words the first of which consists of the
19th,14th,15th,and 23rd letter. the second of the English alphabet.
(T) X true if and only
We shall call any replaced by any sentence of the language to which the word true refers
the last remark calls for some comments. A language may admit the construction many sentences
of such a language will also infinite. Hence to give our remark a prices sense we should but this
would lead us too far into technical problems of modem logic.

5.Truth as a semantic concept

Semantics is a discipline which, speaking loosely, deals with certain relations between
expressions of a language of a language and the objects (or “states of affairs”) “referred to” by
those expression. As typical examples of semantic concepts we may mention the concepts of
designation, satisfaction, and definition as these occur in the following examples:

The expression the father of his country designates (donates) George Washington;

Snow satisfies the sentential function (the condition) “x is white”, the equation “2x = 1” defines
(uniquely determines) the number ½.

While the words ”designates;” satisfies;” and “defines “ express relations (between
certain expression and the objects” referred to” by these expression),the word “true”is of a
different logical nature: it expresses a property (or denotes a class) of certain expressions, viz., of
sentences. However, it is easily seen that all the formulations which were given earlier and which
aimed to explain the meaning of this word (cf. section 3 and 4) referred not only to sentences or
possibly to themselves, but also to object “talked about” by these sentences or possibly to “ states
of affairs” described by them. And moreover, it turns out that the simplest and the most natural
way of obtaining an exact definition of truth is of one which involves the use of other semantic
nations, e.g., the notion of satisfaction. It is for these reasons that we count the concept of truth
which is disproves to be closely related to the more general problem of setting up the foundations
of theoretical semantics.
26. The Method of Truth in Metaphysics

Donald Davidson

One way of pursuing metaphysics is therefore to study the general structure of our
language. This is not, of course, the sole true method of methaphysics; there is not much. But it
is one method, and it has been practiced by philosophers as widely separated by time or doctrine
as Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Russell, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, and Strawson.

The method I will describe and recommend is not new, every important feature of the
method can be found in one philosopher or another, and the leading idea is implicit in much of
the best work in philosophy of language.

I. Why must or language – any language – incorporate or depend upon a largely

correct, shared, view of how things are? First consider why those who can
understand one onothers speech must share a view of the world, wheter or not that
view is correct.. The reason is that we demage the intelligibility of our readings of
the utterences of others when our method of reading puts others into what we take
to be broad error. We can make sense of differences all right, but only against a
background of shared beliefe. What it shared does not in general vast common
ground, there is no place for disputants to have their quarrel. Of course, we can no
more agree with some one else without much mutuality, but perhaps this is
obvious.
Beliefs are identified and described only within a dense pattern of beliefs. Can
believe a cloud is passing before the sun, but only because I believe there is a sun,
that clouds are made of water vapour, that water can exist in liquid or gaseous
form; and so on without end. No particular list of further beliefs is required to
give substance to my beliefs that a cloud is passing before the sun. I suppose you
have the right short of pattern of beliefs to support that one belief, and these
beliefs I assume you have description of your belief that a cloud is passing before
the sun. If I am right in attributing the belief to you, than you must have a pattern
of beliefs much like mine. No wonder then, I can interpret your words correctly
only by interpreting so as to put us largely in agreement.
II. Language is an instrument of communication because of its semantic dimension,
the potentiality for truth or falsehood of its sentences, or better, of its utterances
and inscriptions. The study of what sentences are true is in general the work of the
various sciences; but the study of truth conditions is the province of semantics.
What we must attend to in language, if we want to bring into relief general
features of the world. Is what it is in general for a sentence in language to be true.
The suggestion is that if the truth conditions of sentences are placed in the context
of a comprehensive theory, the linguistic structure that emerges will reflect large
features of reality.
The aim is a theory of truth a reasonably powerful and significant part of natural
language. The scope of theory - how much of the language is captured by the
theory, and how convincingly – will be one factor on which the interest of any
metaphysical results depends. The theory must show us how we can view each of
a potential infinity of sentences as composed from a finite stock of semantically
significant atoms (roughly, words) by means of a finite number of applications of
a finite number of rules of composition. It must than give the truth conditions of
each sentence (relative to the circumstances of its utterance) on the basis of its
composition. The theory may thus be said to explain the conditions of truth of an
utterance of a sentence on the basis of the roles of the words in sentence.
Frege was concerned with the semantic structure of the sentences, and with
semantic relations between sentences, in so far as these generated entailments.
But he cannot be said to be have conceived the idea of a comprehensive formal
theory of truth for a language as a whole. One consequence was a lack of interest
in the semantic paradoxes. Another was an apparent willingness to accept an
infinity of meanings (senses) and referents for every denoting phrase in the
language.