14. Meyers vs.

United States

KEYWORDS: TTs (Testimony and Transcript); Perjury; Best Evidence Rule

DOCTRINES:

 The best evidence rule does not apply in the case because there was no dispute over the contents of the
transcript. The best evidence rule is limited to cases where the contents of writing are to be proved.
 Statements alleged to be perjurious may be proved by any person who heard them, as well as by a reporter
who recorded them in shorthand.

FACTS:

Bleriot H. Lamarre and the appellant, Bennett E. Meyers, were jointly indicted for violating the District of
Columbia statute which denounces perjury and subornation. Meyers was an officer in the United States Army.
In 1939, while stationed at Wright Field, near Dayton, Ohio, he organized under the laws of Ohio a corporation called
Aviation Electric Corporation. Meyers had become acquainted with Lamarre and his wife as early as 1936 or 1937.
Late in 1939, he went to see Lamarre in California and suggested that the latter come to Dayton to become associated
with Aviation Electric (a corporation organized by Meyers). The invitation was accepted and in January, 1940, Lamarre
was made secretary-treasurer of the corporation, and a certificate for 224 shares was transferred to him without
valuable consideration. A few months thereafter he became President of the company.

From its modest beginning in 1939 the operations of Aviation Electric Corporation expanded substantially and rapidly.
It obtained contracts to furnish parts to large corporations engaged in producing aircraft for the United States Army.
Meyers advanced considerable sums for working capital and took therefor the company's promissory notes which were
secured by the pledge and delivery to him of certificates, endorsed in blank, evidencing all its capital stock. Large
profits were earned as long as the war continued, until it was dissolved.

The United States Senate created the investigating committee to ascertain whether there had been instances of waste,
fraud, corruption, mismanagement, excessive profits or inefficiency in the nation's war effort. In the course of an
inquiry into government contracts with a large airplane supplier, the appellant (Meyers) testified before that
committee. It developed during the hearing that Aviation Electric Corporation had been a sub-contractor on
government work and that Lamarre had been its President from 1940 until its dissolution in 1946.

The subcommittee subpoenaed Lamarre, who testified. Appellant's insistence that Lamarre committed the perjury is
based on the fact that Lamarre was asked this question, "So you understood all of the time that for all practical
purposes, he [Meyers] owned the business?"; and that Lamarre answered by saying, "That is right," and then
continued with other statements to that effect. Yet, in the course of the subcommittee counsel's examination, Lamarre
made the opposite statements, upon which the appellant now relies as a defense to the first count.

The setting in which the statement appears shows that in making it, Lamarre was referring to the occasion in 1940
when a large part of the stock had just been transferred to him and endorsed back to Meyers to serve as collateral.
When Lamarre was asked, "It [the stock] belonged to Meyers all the time?", he answered, "No, sir, it did not."
He was then asked, "Well, then, when did it become yours, actually yours?" and he replied, "When the notes
were paid off." He added, "It had always been mine as a matter of fact." Thus, Lamarre testified under
oath that Mr. Meyers had no financial interest or has no connection to Aviation Electric Corporation. At
other point of his testimony, he also made a contradictory claim that indeed Mr. Meyer had financial interest in the
corporation or otherwise has substantial interest in the corporation.

Because of the allegedly perjurious testimony of Mr. Lamarre, he was charged with three counts of perjury for falsely
denying that Mr. Meyers had interest in the company when in truth and in fact, Mr. Meyers has financial interest in the
corporation.

During the arraignment, Lamarre pleaded guilty to the charge of perjury made against him. Moreover, he also testified
fully and freely at Meyers' trial that he had knowingly and willfully falsified in that respect before the subcommittee,
and that in fact Meyers was at all times the real owner of the company.
Meyers' subordination of this perjury was proved by the evidence of Lamarre that on the day before his first
appearance before the subcommittee, Meyers instructed him (Lamarre) to swear that "Meyers had no financial
interest or any other interest other than the money that he had loaned to the corporation and which had been repaid
to him by the middle of 1942." The evidence showed that Lamarre actually made the statements and representations
to the subcommittee; that his testimony was false and was given knowingly and willfully; and that Meyers suborned
the perjury.

In relation to the best evidence rule (BER), a certain Justice of the present case argued that the testimony of the
special counsel on the perjurious statement of Mr. Lamarre should not have been admitted under the BER. The
testimony given by the special counsel came about during trial of Mr. Meyers—in order to prove that the crime of
subordination of perjury was committed. To prove this fact, the prosecution presented the special counsel
namely, William P. Rogers (Rogers), the chief counsel to the senatorial committee, who had examined
Lamarre before the subcommittee and consequently had heard all the testimony given by him before
that body. He was permitted to testify as to what Lamarre had sworn to the subcommittee. Later in the
trial, the government introduced in evidence a stenographic transcript of Lamarre's testimony at the
senatorial hearing. No party objected to the testimony of the special counsel and this was not raised as
a defense by the accused. In his brief here the appellant characterizes this as a "bizarre procedure" but does not
assign as error the reception of Rogers' testimony.

The dissenting opinion, however, asserts it was reversible error to allow Rogers to testify at all as to what
Lamarre had said to the subcommittee, on the theory that the transcript itself was the best evidence of
Lamarre's testimony before the subcommittee.

ISSUE: WON the testimony of the special counsel is inadmissible under the best evidence rule?

RULING: The testimony of the special counsel was admissible.

The majority of the Justices disagreed with the dissenting justice. The best evidence rule does not apply in the
case because there was no dispute over the contents of the transcript. As applied generally in federal courts,
the best evidence rule is limited to cases where the contents of writing are to be proved.

Here, there was no attempt to prove the contents of a writing; the issue was what Lamarre had said, not
what the transcript contained. The transcript made from shorthand notes of his testimony was, to be sure, evidence
of what he had said, but it was not the only admissible evidence concerning it.

Rogers' testimony was equally competent, and was admissible whether given before or after the
transcript was received in evidence. Statements alleged to be perjurious may be proved by any person who heard
them, as well as by a reporter who recorded them in shorthand.

A somewhat similar situation was presented in Herzig v. Swift & Co., 146 F.2d 444, decided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1945. In that case the trial court had excluded oral testimony concerning the
earnings of a partnership on the ground that the books of account were the best evidence. After pointing out the real
nature and scope of the best evidence rule, the court said:

“Here there was no attempt to prove the contents of a writing; the issue was the earnings of a partnership,
which for convenience were recorded in books of account after the relevant facts occurred. The federal
courts have generally adopted the rationale limiting the best evidence rule to cases where the
contents of the writing are to be proved. We hold, therefore, that the district judge erred in
excluding the oral testimony as to the earnings of the partnership."

With the best evidence rule shown to be inapplicable, it is clearly seen that it was neither "preposterously
unfair", as the appellant asserts, nor unfair at all, to permit the transcript of Lamarre's evidence to be
introduced after Rogers had testified. Since both methods of proving the perjury were permissible, the prosecution
could present its proof in any order it chose.

There is also no substance in the criticism, voiced by the appellant and in the dissent, of the fact that Rogers testified
early in the unduly protracted trial and the transcript was introduced near its close. Appellant's counsel had a copy of
the transcript from the second day of the trial, and had full opportunity to study it and to cross-examine Rogers in the
light of that study. The mistaken notion that, had the transcript been first put in evidence, Rogers'
testimony would have been incompetent is, of course, based on the erroneous idea that the best
evidence rule had application. Since the Court perceives no prejudicial error in appellant's trial, the judgment
entered pursuant to the jury's verdict will not be disturbed.

15. Seiler vs. Lucas Film LTD

Keywords: Copycat; striders; best evidence rule; original document

Doctrine: The best evidence rule embodied in Rules 1001-1008 represented a codification of longstanding common
law doctrine. Dating back to 1700, the rule requires not, as its common name implies, the best evidence in every case
but rather the production of an original document instead of a copy.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Seiler, a graphic artist and a science fiction character creator, claims that he created and published in 1976
and 1977 science fiction creatures called Garthian Striders. In 1980, George Lucas released The Empire Strikes Back,
a motion picture that contains a battle sequence depicting giant machines called Imperial Walkers. In 1981 Seiler
obtained a copyright on his Striders, depositing with the Copyright Office "reconstructions" of the originals as they had
appeared in 1976 and 1977.

Seiler claims that George Lucas copied his “Striders” which he published in 1976 and 1977, while Lucas claims that
Seiler only obtained copyright protection one year after the release of “The Empire Strikes Back”; Lucas further
contends that Seiler cannot produce documents that antedate “The Empire Strikes Back”.

During trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Seiler proposed to exhibit his
Striders in a blow-up comparison to Lucas' Walkers at opening statement, the district judge held an evidentiary hearing
on the admissibility of the "reconstructions" of Seiler's Striders. Applying the "best evidence rule," Federal Rules of
Evidence 1001-1008, the district court found at the end of a seven-day hearing that Seiler lost or destroyed the
originals in bad faith under Rule 1004(1) and that consequently no secondary evidence, such as the post-Empire Strikes
Back reconstructions, was admissible. In its opinion the court found specifically that Seiler testified falsely, purposefully
destroyed or withheld in bad faith the originals, and fabricated and misrepresented the nature of his reconstructions.

The district court granted summary judgment to Lucas after the evidentiary hearing.

Seiler now contends 1) that the best evidence rule does not apply to his works, 2) that if the best evidence rule does
apply, Rule 1008 requires a jury determination of the existence and authenticity of his originals, and 3) that 17 U.S.C.
410(c) of the copyright laws overrides the Federal Rules of Evidence and mandates admission of his secondary
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the best evidence rule applies in this case?

HELD:
1. Application of the best evidence rule.
The best evidence rule embodied in Rules 1001-1008 represented a codification of longstanding common law doctrine.
Dating back to 1700, the rule requires not, as its common name implies, the best evidence in every case but rather
the production of an original document instead of a copy. Many commentators refer to the rule not as the best evidence
rule but as the original document rule.

Rule 1002 states: "To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress." Writings and recordings
are defined in Rule 1001 as "letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting,
printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data
compilation."

The Advisory Committee Note supplies the following gloss:

Traditionally the rule requiring the original document is centered upon accumulations of data and expressions affecting
legal relations set forth in words and figures. This meant that the rule was one essentially related to writings. Present
day techniques have expanded methods of storing data, yet the essential form which the information ultimately
assumes for usable purposes is words and figures. Hence the considerations underlying the rule dictate its expansion
to include computers, photographic systems, and other modern developments.
Some treatises, whose approach seems more historical than rigorously analytic, opine without support from any cases
that the rule is limited to words and figures.

We hold that Seiler's drawings were "writings" within the meaning of Rule 1001(1); they consist not of "letters, words,
or numbers" but of "their equivalent." To hold otherwise would frustrate the policies underlying the rule and introduce
undesirable inconsistencies into the application of the rule.

In the days before liberal rules of discovery and modern techniques of electronic copying, the rule guarded against
incomplete or fraudulent proof. By requiring the possessor of the original to produce it, the rule prevented the
introduction of altered copies and the withholding of originals. The modern justification for the rule has expanded from
prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. When the contents of a writing
are at issue, oral testimony as to the terms of the writing is subject to a greater risk of error than oral testimony as to
events or other situations. The human memory is not often capable of reciting the precise terms of a writing, and when
the terms are in dispute only the writing itself, or a true copy, provides reliable evidence. Viewing the dispute in the
context of the concerns underlying the best evidence rule, we conclude that the rule applies.

McCormick summarizes the rule as follows:

[I]n proving the terms of a writing, where the terms are material, the original writing must be produced unless it is
shown to be unavailable for some reason other than the serious fault of the proponent.

The contents of Seiler's work are at issue. There can be no proof of "substantial similarity" and thus of copyright
infringement unless Seiler's works are juxtaposed with Lucas' and their contents compared. Since the contents are
material and must be proved, Seiler must either produce the original or show that it is unavailable through no fault of
his own. Rule 1004(1). This he could not do.
The facts of this case implicate the very concerns that justify the best evidence rule. Seiler alleges infringement by The
Empire Strikes Back, but he can produce no documentary evidence of any originals existing before the release of the
movie. His secondary evidence does not consist of true copies or exact duplicates but of "reconstructions" made after
The Empire Strikes Back. In short, Seiler claims that the movie infringed his originals, yet he has no proof of those
originals. Seiler argues that the best evidence rule does not apply to his work, in that it is artwork rather than "writings,
recordings, or photographs." He contends that the rule both historically and currently embraces only words or numbers.
Neither party has referred us to cases which discuss the applicability of the rule to drawings.

To recognize Seiler's works as writings does not, as Seiler argues, run counter to the rule's preoccupation with the
centrality of the written word in the world of legal relations. Just as a contract objectively manifests the subjective
intent of the makers, so Seiler's drawings are objective manifestations of the creative mind. The copyright laws give
legal protection to the objective manifestations of an artist's ideas, just as the law of contract protects through its
multifarious principles the meeting of minds evidenced in the contract. Comparing Seiler's drawings with Lucas'
drawings is no different in principle than evaluating a contract and the intent behind it. Seiler's "reconstructions" are
"writings" that affect legal relations; their copyrightability attests to that.

A creative literary work, which is artwork, and a photograph whose contents are sought to be proved, as in copyright,
defamation, or invasion of privacy, are both covered by the best evidence rule. We would be inconsistent to apply the
rule to artwork which is literary or photographic but not to artwork of other forms. Furthermore, blueprints, engineering
drawings, architectural designs may all lack words or numbers yet still be capable of copyright and susceptible to
fraudulent alteration. In short, Seiler's argument would have us restrict the definitions of Rule 1001(1) to "words" and
"numbers" but ignore "or their equivalent." We will not do so in the circumstances of this case.
Our holding is also supported by the policy served by the best evidence rule in protecting against faulty memory.
Seiler's reconstructions were made four to seven years after the alleged originals; his memory as to specifications and
dimensions may have dimmed significantly. Furthermore, reconstructions made after the release of the Empire Strikes
Back may be tainted, even if unintentionally, by exposure to the movie. Our holding guards against these problems.
2. Rule 1008.
As we hold that the district court correctly concluded that the best evidence rule applies to Seiler's drawings, Seiler
was required to produce his original drawings unless excused by the exceptions set forth in Rule 1004. The pertinent
subsection is 1004(1), which provides:
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if-
-
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed
them in bad faith ...

In the instant case, prior to opening statement, Seiler indicated that he planned to show to the jury reconstructions of
his "Garthian Striders" during the opening statement. The trial judge would not allow items to be shown to the jury
until they were admitted in evidence. Seiler's counsel reiterated that he needed to show the reconstructions to the jury
during his opening statement. Hence, the court excused the jury and held a seven-day hearing on their admissibility.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge found that the reconstructions were inadmissible under the best
evidence rule as the originals were lost or destroyed in bad faith. This finding is amply supported by the record.

16. Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo Alvarez

Keywords: Quieting of title; best evidence rule

Doctrine: The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject of the inquiry.
In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly
cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not
precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document.

FACTS:

The Heirs of Alvarez and Valentina Clave claimed that they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
84797 pertaining to the land they inherited from their parents, that the entry of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
on the original TCT did not exist, and that the entry ad been maliciously done by Prodon. Prodon claimed otherwise
that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed the deed of sale with right to repurchase, registered and duly annotated
in the TCT. Also, she had become the absolute owner thereof due to its non-repurchase.

The custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with the right of repurchase
could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

The RTC ruled in favor of Prodon, finding that although the deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court, its
contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, upon proof of its execution or existence and of the cause of its unavailability being without bad faith when
Prodon swore that she purchased the land and her testimony has been confirmed by the Notarial Register and the
Primary Entry Book of the RoD of Manila.

The CA reversed the decision; “…a party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation
for non-production of the original instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss,
contents, although the court in its discretion may change this order if necessary.”

ISSUE: Whether the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had been complied with.

HELD:

Yes. This action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with right of repurchase. The principal issue
was whether or not it had really existed.

The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the original of the document must
be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the contents thereof,
unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original,
or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offer or to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed.

The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before the
court, considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than
average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts,
because a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy
in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting
to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally. The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud. Verily, if a party is in the
possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption
naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and
defeat. Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional
introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings.

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be
introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its
terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without
accounting for the original. This case involves an action for quieting of title which may be based on the fact that a deed
is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be material to an action for
quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff.

17. De Vera v. Aguilar

Keywords: “Siblings fight over a piece of land”

Doctrine: Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to
the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must first establish the existence, execution, loss, and
contents of the original document.

Facts:

Petitioners and respondent Leona are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe. In her lifetime, Marcosa
Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land situated in Bulacan.

The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe to a certain Atty. Bordador. When the mortgage
had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Bordador and in turn Marcosa sold the same to them
as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. The respondents then registered the deed resulting in the cancellation of the
tax declaration in the name of Marcosa and the issuance of another in the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to
the present, the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land. Later on, respondent Mariano was issued a free patent
to the land on the basis of which an OCT was issued in his name.

Petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of Marcosa, they were co-owners of the property and
demanded partition thereof on threats that the respondents would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. The
petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to Marcosa. Respondents replied that they were
the sole owners of the disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was resold to Marcosa.

True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case against the respondents but the fiscal recommended dismissal
of the charge of falsification of public document against the respondents for lack of a prima facie case. Petitioners then
filed a suit for reconveyance of the disputed lot.

RTC: In favor of petitioners. RTC admitted as evidence a photocopy of the alleged deed of sale by the respondents
selling the disputed lot to Marcosa.

CA: Reversed the RTC’s decision. It found that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly
proven by the petitioners. Hence, secondary evidence, i.e., presentation of the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of
sale is inadmissible.
Issue:
W/N the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of
the xeroxed copy of the same.

Ruling:

No. Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the Rules of Court on Secondary Evidence states:
Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the original writing has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by the recollection of witnesses.

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must first establish the existence, execution, loss, and contents
of the original document.

ITCAB, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the presentation of a xeroxed copy of the
alleged deed of absolute sale.

In establishing the execution of a document the same may be established by the person or persons who executed it,
by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed
or who, after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument
had previously confessed the execution thereof.

The trial court’s findings show that there was preponderance of evidence that clearly disclosed the facts that Atty.
Ismael Estela prepared the alleged deed of sale. Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., the notary public who ratified the document,
also positively identified the signatures appearing therein to be that of the spouses and witnesses Luis de Vera and
Ismael Estela.

The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any
person who knew the fact of its loss, or by any one who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination
in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.

However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies since no excuse for non-production
of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable.

ITCAB, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr. testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five original copies. Hence,
all originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. This petitioners failed to do.
Records show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies. Also, when asked on the
witness stand as to the whereabouts of the original document, Luis answered that it was with the Provincial Assessor
of Malolos; that his sister, Maria, borrowed it from him and brought it to the Registry of Deeds to have it registered.

Indeed, upon the appellees' own evidence, the original of the deed of sale in question has not been lost or destroyed.
It was submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos for registration. The appellees, therefore, should
have asked the office to produce it in court and if it could not be produced for one reason or another should have
called the Register of Deeds or his representative to explain why. That they failed to do. The loss or destruction of the
original of the document in question has not, therefore, been established. Hence, secondary evidence of it is
inadmissible.