AIRPORT SECURITY
S/G Raiiola, "Ate, itago mo na iyan, makukulong ako."[4]
[ G.R. No. 208755, October 05, 2016 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V.
MARIA NATIVIDAD GUMILAO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
For review is the April 18, 2013 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04560, which affirmed the July 7, 2010
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Manila, in
Criminal Case No. 09-272137 wherein accused-appellant Maria
Natividad Gumilao (Gumilao) was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5 in relation to Section 26, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
On November 9, 2009, an Information was filed against Gumilao,
charging her with violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The accusatory portion of said
Information reads:
The undersigned accuses MARIA NATIVIDAD GUMILAO, of a
violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26, Article II of
Republic Act [No.] 9165, committed as follows:
That on or about November 1, 2009, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with
another whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts is
still unknown and mutually helping each other, not being
authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver, give away to another or
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly dispatch in transit or
transport one (1) knot tied transparent bag sachet containing white
crystalline substance weighing ninety-eight point one zero one one
grams (98.1011) of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as
"shabu", a dangerous drug.[3]
During her arraignment on December 4, 2009, Gumilao pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged.
The prosecution established the facts from the testimonies of its
witnesses, i.e., (i) Forensic Chemist Jappeth M. Santiago (Forensic
Chemist Santiago); (if) Security Guard (S/G) Josephine Rafiola
(S/G Ranola); (Hi) S/G Clarence C. Garcia (S/G Garcia); (iv)
Investigation Agent (IA)1 Glenn C. Lagutan (IA1 Lagutan); and (v)
members of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), namely, Seaman
First Class (SN1) Feldimar Usman (SN1 Usman) and Ensign
(ENS) Janus Robinson Sabas (ENS Sabas).
On November 1, 2009, Gumilao was a passenger bound for Cebu
via the Super Ferry 12 at Pier 15, Eva Macapagal Terminal, South
Harbor, Manila, where S/Gs Garcia and Rafiola were on duty at the
frisking and baggage inspection areas, respectively. As part of the
routine security check-up at the gate, Gumilao was subjected to a
body search by S/G Garcia. While frisking Gumilao, S/G Garcia felt
something unusual in her brassiere. This prompted Gumilao to
immediately brush away S/G Garcia's hand and flee. As
S/G Garcia couldn't leave her post, her co-worker, who was the
male frisker on duty, ran after Gumilao and requested assistance
from ENS Sabas and SN1 Usman, who were then in front of the
terminal gate.
SN1 Usman, upon instruction from ENS Sabas, went after
Gumilao. SN1 Usman got hold of Gumilao, who requested to go to
the comfort room. SN1 Usman waited outside the comfort room
and escorted her over to S/Gs Garcia and Rafiola at the frisking
area to confirm if she was the one who fled after being frisked.
S/G Garcia, however, asked for S/G Rafiola's help when upon
frisking Gumilao again, felt nothing unusual in Gumilao's brassiere
area.
S/G Rafiola then brought Gumilao near the baggage inspection
area to frisk her. S/G Ranola felt something hard between
Gumilao's legs and told her, "Day, ilabas mo na, huwag mo na
akong pahirapan. " Gumilao complied, placed the item, which was
a hard transparent plastic sachet, on the table, and told
S/G Ranola thereafter turned over the plastic sachet to ENS
Sabas, who marked the item with: "012130H NOV 2009 eva
macapagal terminal JRS" to signify the time, date, place, and his
initials. Thereafter, Gumilao was brought to their office for proper
turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
On November 2, 2009, IA1 Lagutan, together with a fellow PDEA
officer, Ryan Reyes, proceeded to the PCG Office at the Eva
Macapagal Terminal after being informed that the PCG officers
stationed there apprehended someone for transportation and
seizure of suspected drugs. ENS Sabas and SN1 Usman turned
over the person of Gumilao, the evidence, and all the supporting
documents to IA1 Lagutan.
Gumilao was thereafter brought to the PDEA office by IA1
Lagutan, Officer Reyes, ENS Sabas, and SN1 Usman. Upon
reaching the office, IA1 Lagutan wrote a request for laboratory
examination[5] and submitted it together with the marked plastic
sachet confiscated from Gumilao to the laboratory of the PDEA.
Forensic Chemist Santiago received the request and the "knot-tied
transparent small plastic bag with markings '012130H NOV 2009
eva macapagal terminal JRS' containing white crystalline
substance with a net weight of 98.1011 grams" which tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride upon being subjected
to a qualitative examination.[6]
On the other hand, the defense presented Gumilao as its lone
witness who narrated a different set of circumstances: that she
was, indeed, bound for Cebu on that date, but a guard who frisked
her instructed her to stay in a corner, where three to four
coastguards approached her; that the coastguards asked if she
knew a certain person whose name she could not remember; that,
thereafter, she was told to go to the comfort room and when she
got out, she was brought to the office of the head of the security
guards, where she was again frisked by a guard, who also
searched her bag; that after the frisk and search, she was brought
to the PCG Office where a man was escorted inside; that she was
asked if she knew him, to which she replied in the negative; and
that they (she and the man) were both brought to the PDEA office
for inquest proceedings.
In a Decision dated July 7, 2010, the RTC found Gumilao guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. However, the RTC held that there was
nothing to show that Gumilao was conspiring with someone else to
transport illegal drugs, in violation of Section 26, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. The fallo of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered,
finding the accused, Maria Natividad Gumilao, GUILTY, beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, she is hereby sentenced to
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
The specimen is forfeited in favor of the government and the
Branch Clerk of Court, accompanied by the Branch Sheriff, is
directed to rum over with dispatch and upon receipt the said
specimen to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for
proper disposal in accordance with the law and rules. [7]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's judgment
convicting Gumilao of the crime charged in a Decision dated April
18, 2013.
Gumilao is now before this Court, assigning the same errors she
raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF HER ARREST.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH ALL THE
ELEMENTS THEREOF.
III
, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE NOTWITHSTANDING THE APPREHENDING
TEAM'S FAILURE TO PROVE THE INTEGRITY AND IDENTITY
OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED SHABU.[8]
This Court has reviewed the records of the case and has
found no reason to overturn the decision convicting Gumilao of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Warrantless Arrest and Search
Gumilao argues that her arrest does not fall within the ambit of a
lawful warrantless arrest since there was no sufficient probable
cause to justify searching her person on that day. She insists that
the fact that she ran away while she was being subjected to the
routine search done on all the passengers was not enough reason
for her to be arrested and searched.
This Court disagrees.
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
However, one of the instances when a warrantless search is valid
is if it is incidental to a lawful inspection, such as those that are
routinely done on passengers at airports, ports, or terminals. In
other words, frisking done in airports, ports, or terminals is an
authorized form of search and seizure.[9]
Akin to the case at bar is People v. Johnson,[10] the ruling of which
was applied in Sales v. People[11] and People v. Canton.[12] In all
these cases, this Court sustained the conviction of the accused for
violation of Republic Act No. 9165 when they were found to be
hiding in their body illegal drugs which were obtained from them in
the course of a routine frisk at the airport, and were admitted in
evidence. We explained in these cases rationale for the validity of
the airport frisking, thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause
by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-
ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine
what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches
and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
Thus, we rule that there was nothing irregular with the search
conducted on Gumilao, who was only chased and searched again
after she ran away when S/G Garcia felt something unusual in her
brassiere during the routine frisk at the terminal gates. What was
felt unusual in her brassiere during her initial frisk and her action of
running away because of the discovery thereof gave the law
enforcement agents enough probable cause to subject her to a
more thorough body search, which yielded the transparent plastic
bag with crystalline substance that tested positive for shabu.
In People v. Mariacos,[13] we defined "probable cause" as follows:
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty
of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest. (Citations omitted).
Gumilao's arrest stemmed from the routine frisking she was
subjected to at the Eva Macapagal Terminal when she was about
to board the ferry bound for Cebu. Since the search conducted on
Gumilao was a valid search pursuant to routine port security
procedure, she was also lawfully arrested without a warrant for
being caught in possession of a contraband, thus, in flagrante
delicto.
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) as quoted above. The
authorities had all the reason to suspect that she was hiding
something in her person, as S/G Garcia had already felt something
unusual in Gumilao's brassiere, which prompted her to push away
S/G Garcia's hand and flee the frisking area in the first place. The
subsequent search conducted on Gumilao resulted in the
discovery and confiscation of a small transparent bag with a white
crystalline substance suspected to be a dangerous drug. Gumilao
was then apprehended and turned over to the PDEA pending the
outcome of the qualitative examination of the confiscated
substance found hidden in her person.
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
Gumilao was charged and convicted for transporting dangerous
drugs, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
The law provides:
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(PI0,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One
hundred thousand pesos (PI 00,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall
act as a broker in such transactions.
In the case at bar, Gumilao was caught with dangerous drugs in
her possession while trying to board a ferry bound for Cebu. She
was thus caught in flagrante delicto of transporting dangerous
drugs. The Court, in the Mariacos case, has defined transport of
drugs in this wise:
Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one
place to another." There is no definitive moment when an accused
"transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish
the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of
transportation itself, there should be no question as to the
perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual
conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of
transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the
place of destination is reached.[14] (Citations omitted.)
Gumilao was apprehended inside the port terminal, as she was
intending to board the ferry bound for Cebu with the dangerous
drugs in her person, concealed in a transparent plastic bag inside
her underwear. While it may be argued that she was yet to board
the ferry, it cannot be denied that her presence at the port area
was specifically for the purpose of transporting or moving the
dangerous drugs from one place to another, from Manila to Cebu.
The evidence in this case shows that at the time of her arrest,
Gumilao was caught in flagrante carrying in her person the small
transparent bag with white crystalline substance later on identified
as shabu.
Chain of Custody of Evidence
Gumilao also argues that the apprehending officers failed to
comply with the procedure in handling confiscated dangerous
drugs and that the corpus delicti of the crime was not proven.[15]
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
outlines the procedure on the chain of custody of confiscated,
seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs, viz.:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the ^ person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
The foregoing is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, to
wit:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items [.]
This Court elucidated on the concept of "chain of custody"
in People v. Llanita,[16] which, quoting People v. Kamad[17],
enumerated the different links that must be proven to establish it:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
In the case of People v. Kamad, the Court had the opportunity to
enumerate the different links that the prosecution must prove in
order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation,
namely:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to
the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized by the forensic chemist to the court. (Citations omitted.)
In the case at bar, this Court, like the courts a quo, finds that the
continuity in the chain of custody was sufficiently established, to
wit: (a) S/G Rafiola confiscated the dangerous drugs from
Gumilao; (b) S/G Ranola gave the confiscated item to ENS Sabas,
who then marked it with "012130H NOV 2009 eva macapagal
terminal JRS," signifying the time, date, place, and his initials; (c)
ENS Sabas thereafter turned over the seized item to IA1 Lagutan;
(d) IA1 Lagutan, upon reaching the PDEA office, wrote a request
for laboratory examination, which he sent to the PDEA Laboratory
Service together with the seized plastic sachet; (e) Forensic
Chemist Santiago received the request and the small knot-tied
transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance with
a net weight of 98.1011 grams; and (f) Forensic Chemist Santiago
testified in open court, that the white crystalline substance tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride after being subjected
to a qualitative examination.

It bears to stress that failure of the prosecution to strictly comply

with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not
render an arrest illegal or the items seized from the accused
inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items to be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.[18] Here, we hold that the prosecution sufficiently
established that the chain of custody was not broken.

Moreover, Gumilao failed to show that there was bad faith or ill will
on the part of the officers who apprehended her or that they had
tampered or meddled with the evidence. Thus, "the presumptions
that the integrity #f such evidence had been preserved and that the
police officers who handled the seized drugs had discharged their
duties properly and with regularity remain." [19]
This Court has always looked upon the defense of denial with
disfavor as such is easily fabricated, and is a standard defense in
prosecutions for violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act. Since Gumilao failed to give this Court anything but her
bare assertions and self-serving claims, her defense of denial must
necessarily be rejected.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court

hereby AFFIRMS the April 18, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04560 finding Maria Natividad
Gumilao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. SO ORDERED."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
EANNA O'COCHLAIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 229071 | 2018-12-10
At the time of his arrest, Eanna was a 53-year old Irish national
married to a Filipina and residing in Barangay Aring, Badoc, Ilocos
Norte. In an Information[4] dated July 15, 2013, he was charged
with illegal possession of marijuana, committed as follows:
That on or about [the] 14th day of July 2013 in the City of Laoag
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had in his possession, custody and control: two (2)
sticks of dried Marijuana Leaves, a dangerous drug, with an
aggregate weight of 0.3824 grams, without any license or authority
to possess, in violation of the aforesaid law. [5]
Version of the prosecution
While on his break time around 7:00 p.m. on July 14, 2013, SSO
Suguitan of the Department of Transportation - Office of
Transportation Security (OTS), assigned at the initial security
screening checkpoint of the Laoag City International Airport, was
told by CAAP[9] Security and Intelligence Flor Tamayo (CSI
Tamayo) that the parking space in front of the departure area
smelled like marijuana ("agat sa marijuana"). He suspected that
Eanna was the one who smoked the illegal drug, recounting that at
aroud 6:35 p.m. he saw a certain male Caucasian at the parking
area lighting something unrecognizable as he was covering it with
his palm. CSI Tamayo observed that whenever he would suck
what he seemed to be smoking, no visible vapor would come out
from his mouth.
However, SSO Suguitan dismissed CSI Tamayo's story as he
thought that it would be impossible for a passenger to smoke
marijuana at the airport. After a while, he returned to his post at the
initial check-in area. Meanwhile, CSI Tamayo reported what he
saw to PO2 Pancho Caole, Jr. (PO2 Caole, Jr.) and SSO Fidel
Bal-ot (SSO Bal-ot) , who were manning the final screening area.
Later on, SSO Bal-ot directed SSO Suguitan to proceed to the final
security checkpoint.[10] The latter was instructed to conduct a pat
down search on Eanna, who agreed. He was frisked while he
raised his hands by stretching sideward to the level of his
shoulders with palms open. When something was felt inside the
pocket of his upper garment, he was asked to take it out. He then
brought out a pack of Marlboro red from his left pocket, as well as
a matchbox and another pack of Marlboro red from his right
pocket. The pack of Marlboro red on his left hand contained
cigarettes but the one on his right hand contained two (2) rolled
sticks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SSO
Suguitan knew it was marijuana because that was what CSI
Tamayo earlier told him. He took the pack of Marlboro red
containing the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves and
showed it to PO1 Peter Warner Manadao, Jr. (PO1 Manadao, Jr.)
and other police personnel on duty. SSO Suguitan put them on the
nearby screening table in front of Eanna and PO1 Manadao, Jr.
The two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves were the only items
placed thereon.
PO1 Udel Tubon[11] then called the attention of PO3 Javier, who
was the investigator on duty of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) - Aviation Security Group (ASG). PO1 Manadao, Jr., PO2
Caole, Jr., SSO Suguitan, and SSO Bal-ot were at the final
checkpoint when he arrived. They told him that marijuana was
found in Eanna's pocket. SSO Suguitan turned over to PO3 Javier
the pack of Marlboro red containing the two rolled sticks of dried
marijuana leaves. PO3 Javier then placed them on a tray, together
with Eanna's other belongings. As the area started to become
crowded, the seized items were brought by PO3 Javier to the PNP-
ASG office. He was accompanied by SSO Suguitan and Eanna.
Together with PO3 Javier at the PNP-ASG office were Police
Superintendent Diosdado Apias (P/Supt. Apias), PO1 Manadao,
Jr., PO2 Caole, Jr., SSO Suguitan, SSO Bal-ot, and a certain
SPO3 Domingo. While waiting for the arrival of the barangay
officials, which took 15-20 minutes, the two rolled sticks of dried
marijuana leaves were placed on the investigation table where
everybody could look but not touch. Eanna was seated in front of
the table, while the others guarded him. PO3 Javier then prepared
the inventory. The two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves and
other seized items were listed. The check-in baggage of Eanna
was also inspected, but it only contained clothes and other
personal belongings. The confiscation/inventory receipts were
signed by PO3 Javier and SSO Suguitan, as well as two (2)
officials of Barangay Araniw, Laoag City (Barangay Chairman
Edilberto Bumanglag and Barangay Kagawad Benjamin Teodoro)
and an ABS-CBN cameraman (Juanito Badua), who acted as
witnesses. In their presence, as well as of Eanna, PO3 Javier
marked the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves as "EO-1"
and "EO-2" and, thereafter, placed them inside a Ziploc re-sealable
plastic bag. The guard of the PNP-ASG office, PO1 Terson, took
pictures during the inventory and marking, while P/Supt. Apias
prepared the requests for the medico-legal examination of Eanna
and the laboratory examination of the two rolled sticks of dried
marijuana leaves. Based on the qualitative examination conducted
by Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Amiely Ann Luis Navarro
(P/Insp. Navarro), which was reduced into writing, the specimens
were found to be positive for the presence of marijuana.
RTC Decision: The search conducted on Eanna and his
subsequent arrest were upheld. According to the RTC, the search
upon his person was not unreasonable but was actually an
exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures. It was justified as it proceeded from a duty or right that
was enforced in accordance with the aviation rules and regulations
to maintain peace, order and security at the airports. In fact,
Eanna's plane ticket carried a proviso allowing airport authorities to
check on his person and baggage pursuant to the requirement of
Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235.[14] Moreover, another exception to the
rule is consented warrantless search and seizure. In this case,
Eanna agreed to the body pat down search that was requested by
SSO Suguitan.
CA Decision: Affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid search? - YES
RULING
Airport screening search is a constitutionally reasonable
administrative search.
While the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, [22] a
routine security check being conducted in air [23] and sea[24] ports
has been a recognized exception. This is in addition to a string of
jurisprudence ruling that search and seizure may be made without
a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible
in the following instances: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) customs search; (4)
seizure of evidence in "plain view"; (5) consented warrantless
search; (6) "stop and frisk" search; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstance.
Airport searches have received judicial sanction essentially
because of the magnitude and pervasiveness of the danger to the
public safety and the overriding concern has been the threat of
death or serious bodily injury to members of the public posed by
the introduction of inherently lethal weapons or bombs.
Airport security searches can be deemed lawful administrative
searches because (1) these searches constitute relatively limited
intrusions geared toward finding particular items (weapons,
explosives, and incendiary devices) that pose grave danger to
airplanes and air travelers; (2) the scrutiny of carry-on luggage is
no more intrusive (in both its scope and intensity) than is
necessary to achieve the legitimate aims of the screening process
(that is, to ensure air travel safety); (3) airline passengers have
advance notice that their carry-on luggage will be subjected to
these security measures, thus giving passengers the opportunity to
place their personal effects in checked luggage; (4) all passengers
are subject to the same screening procedures; and (5) passengers
are aware that they can avoid the screening process altogether by
electing not to board the plane.[37] Moreover, abuse is unlikely
because of its public nature.
The oft-cited case of United States v. Davis[41] sets the appropriate
standards for evaluating airport screening searches as
constitutionally reasonable administrative searches, thus:
1. [S]earches conducted as part of a general regulatory
scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose,
rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure
evidence of crime, may be permissible under the Fourth
Amendment though not supported by a showing of
probable cause directed to a particular place or person to
be searched.
2. As we have seen, screening searches of airline
passengers are conducted as part of a general regulatory
scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose,
namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives
aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings. The
essential purpose of the scheme is not to detect
weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who carry
them, but to deter persons carrying such material from
seeking to board at all.
3. Of course, routine airport screening searches will lead to
discovery of contraband and apprehension of law
violators. This practical consequence does not alter the
essentially administrative nature of the screening
process, however, or render the searches
unconstitutional. x x x.
4. There is an obvious danger, nonetheless, that the
screening of passengers and their carry-on luggage for
weapons and explosives will be subverted into a general
search for evidence of crime. If this occurs, the courts will
exclude the evidence obtained.
Nonetheless, there is a valid consented warrantless search in
this case.
The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. [77] A person may
voluntarily consent to have government officials conduct a search
or seizure that would otherwise be barred by the Constitution. The
question of whether a consent to a search was "voluntary" or was
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
In this case, the Court finds that there is a valid warrantless search
based on express consent. When SSO Suguitan requested to
conduct a pat down search on Eanna, the latter readily agreed.
Record is devoid of any evidence that he manifested objection or
hesitation on the body search. The request to frisk him was orally
articulated to him in such language that left no room for doubt that
he fully understood what was requested. Unperturbed, he verbally
replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the
nature and consequences of the request. He voluntarily raised his
hands by stretching sideward to the level of his shoulders with
palms open. His affirmative reply and action cannot be viewed as
merely an implied acquiescence or a passive conformity to an
authority considering that SSO Suguitan is not even a police officer
and cannot be said to have acted with a coercive or intimidating
stance. Further, it is reasonable to assume that Eanna is an
educated and intelligent man. He is a 53-year old working
professional (claimed to be employed or attached to a drug
addiction center) and a well-travelled man (said to have been in 22
different countries and spent hours in customs).[91] Indubitably, he
knew, actually or constructively, his right against unreasonable
searches or that he intentionally conceded the same. Having been
obtained through a valid warrantless search, the sticks of
marijuana are admissible in evidence against him. Corollorily, his
subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified
since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of an illegal
drug in his person in flagrante delicto.

Hence, an airport search remains a valid administrative search

only so long as the scope of the administrative search exception is
not exceeded; "once a search is conducted for a criminal
investigatory purpose, it can no longer be justified under an
administrative search rationale."

The instant case does not qualify as a legitimate

administrative search in an airport.
The OTS has to enforce R.A. No. 6235 or the Anti-Hijacking
Law.[69] It provides that an airline passenger and his hand-carried
luggage are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited
materials or substances and that it is unlawful for any person,
natural or juridical, to ship, load or carry in any passenger aircraft,
operating as a public utility within the Philippines, any explosive,
flammable, corrosive or poisonous substance or material.

In this case, what was seized from Eanna were two rolled sticks of
dried marijuana leaves. Obviously, they are not explosive,
flammable, corrosive or poisonous substances or materials, or
dangerous elements or devices that may be used to commit
hijacking or acts of terrorism. More importantly, the illegal drugs
were discovered only during the final security checkpoint, after a
pat down search was conducted by SSO Suguitan, who did not act
based on personal knowledge but merely relied on an information
given by CSI Tamayo that Eanna was possibly in possession of
marijuana.
JAIL SAFETY
People vs Conde (2002)
FACTS
On appeal is the decision dated December 15, 1993, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City finding accused
Oscar Conde, Allan Atis and Alejandro Perez, Jr., guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing
each of them to suffer the penalty of *reclusion perpetua *with the
accessory penalties under the law.
On May 25, 1992 at about 8:00 AM, the accused block the path of
the two Indian Nationals on a motorcycle. One of the men, later
identified as Oscar Conde, poked a gun at the two Indians while
his three companions approached and stabbed the Indians. Allan
Atis took the goods which were being sold by the two Indians on
installment. After the stabbing, the four men fled from the crime
scene. Of the four assailants, only three were identified.
On May 30, 1992, the police arrested the three accused. Police
recovered the weapons used in the robbery, when Felicidad
Macabare, Conde's wife, went to the police station to talk to the
accused. These weapons were discovered inside her bag after a
routine inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not
have a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the accused. Nor
did they have a search warrant when they inspected Felicidad's
bag and when they searched the house of a certain Jimmy where
they found the stolen items. The three denied the accusations and
presented alibis that Alejandro Perez, Jr. went to Pulang Lupa
Cemetery and visited the graves of his uncle and grandfather.
From the cemetery, they went home where they drank some beer
until late afternoon. Oscar Conde testified that he was mending his
fish net at Barangay Polo Street, Paranaque when the crime was
committed. Allan Atis stated that he was in MCU where he worked
as a construction worker for certain Romy Ramos when the
incident occurred.
were not committing any crime. Neither can it be said that the
crime had just been committed. Five days had already passed
from the time of the robbery with homicide. It cannot also be said
that the arresting officers had probable cause based on personal
knowledge. PO3 Sevillano admitted that they learned about the
suspects from Apollo Romero and certain unnamed informants.
The third circumstance is patently not present. The lapse of five
days gave the police more than enough time to conduct
surveillance of the appellants and apply for a warrant of arrest.
Clearly, appellants' rights provided in Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution were violated.
Unfortunately, appellants did not assert their constitutional rights
prior to their arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused is
estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to
move for the quashing of the Information against him before his
arraignment. When the appellants entered their pleas on
arraignment without invoking their rights to question any
irregularity, which might have accompanied their arrests, they
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
the judicial process. Any objection, defect, or irregularity attending
their arrests should had been made before they entered their
pleas. It is much too late for appellants to raise the question of
their warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the information upon
arraignment constitute clear waivers of their rights against unlawful
restraint of liberty.

ISSUE: WON the arrest of the appellants were illegal.

RULING
The records of the case will show that the arrests of the appellants
came after the lapse of 5 days from the time they were seen
committing the crime. At the time they were arrested, the police
were not armed with any warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of
Rule 113, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates
the instances when an arrest can be made without warrant,
namely:
(a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
None of the above circumstances is present in this case.
Appellants were merely walking along Tandang Sora Avenue and
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHECKPOINTS AND “AREAL
TARGET ZONINGS”
Valmonte vs De Villa (1989)
FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of
responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing
an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and
political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its
duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said
checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or
at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order
Petitioners contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents
a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not checkpoints searches and/or seizures
without search warrant or court order is in violation of the
Constitution.
RULING
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had
been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the
military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating
the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right
against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the
Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's
right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Valmonte vs De Villa (1990)
FACTS
In the Court's decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners'
petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints
as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was
dismissed. Petitioners have filed the instant motion and
supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision.
RULING
The Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
DENIED.
The routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorist's right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot
be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. 1 For as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's
right against unreasonable search.
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even
less intrusive.
Vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a
routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and
extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which
justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that
either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle
are or have been instruments of some offense.
The Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate
nor condone abuses committed by the military manning the
checkpoints. The Court's decision was concerned with power, i.e.
whether the government employing the military has the power to
install said checkpoints. Once that power is acknowledged, the
Court's inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its
abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a
different "ball game" to be resolved in the constitutional arena.
The Court, like all other concerned members of the community,
has become aware of how some checkpoints have been used as
points of thievery and extortion practiced upon innocent civilians.
Even the increased prices of foodstuffs coming from the provinces,
entering the Metro Manila area and other urban centers, are
largely blamed on the checkpoints, because the men manning
them have reportedly become "experts" in mulcting travelling
traders. This, of course, is a national tragedy.
But the Court could not a priori regard in its now assailed decision
that the men in uniform are rascals or thieves. The Court had to
assume that the men in uniform live and act by the code of honor
and they are assigned to the checkpoints to protect, and not to
abuse, the citizenry. 6 The checkpoint is a military "concoction." It
behooves the military to improve the QUALITY of their men
assigned to these checkpoints. For no system or institution will
succeed unless the men behind it are honest, noble and
dedicated.
In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint,
the citizen is not helpless. For the military is not above but subject
to the law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme.
Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who abuse their
authority act beyond the scope of their authority and are, therefore,
liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts; 7 This tenet
should be ingrained in the soldiery in the clearest of terms by
higher military authorities.
PEOPLE VS. EXALA
221 SCRA 494 (1993)
FACTS
On November 2, 1982, a private jeepney driven by the accused-
appellant, Restituto Bocalan,was stopped at a police checkpoint
for routing inspection regarding unlicensed firearms and other
prohibited items. Along with Bocalan were his co-accused Jaime
Fernandez and Rodelio Exala. Pfc. Ricardo Galang, a member of
the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the occupants if
there were firearms inside, and in which the occupants answered
in the negative. Pfc. Galang then noticed a black bag inside the
jeepney, as he became suspicious, he asked the occupants of
what the bag contained, but nobody answered. Pfc. Galang then
opened the bag and found a number of marijuana. Thereafter, the
accused were brought to the police station for further investigation.
The accused were all charged for violation of Section 4, Article II of
R.A. 6425, as amended. Bocalan now assails his conviction. He
contends that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence
against him since it was obtained through a warrantless search.
ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless search was valid and legal, thus
proper in using the marijuana as evidence for convicting the
accused (Bocalan) of the crime charged against him.
HELD
Yes. Since the search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan
argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest. This issue was
never raised in the proceedings. Bocalan never objected to the
admissibility of the evidence on the ground that the same was
obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to
have waived his objection on the legality of the search and the
admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view
of such waiver, the court is bound to admit the evidence. But even
assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, still appellant's
contention deserves scant consideration.
There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. The
instant case is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-
search" at a military or police checkpoint. The checkpoint in the
instant case was established in line with "Operational Bakal" the
main object of which was to search for unlicensed firearms and
other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized persons
passing through it. When the jeep carrying the contraband passed
through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the occupants
were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang
noticed a black leather bag the sides of which were bulging. He
asked what the contents of the bag were. None of the accused
answered. At that moment, the demeanor of the accused changed;
they became suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were
concealing something from Pfc. Galang. The accused clearly
appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered.
Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of the
accused, which did not appear normal, provided the probable
cause justifying a more extensive search that led to the opening of
the bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff. Significantly,
there was no sign of any protest or objection to the search. The
accused remained silent even after their arrest. Their submissive
stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the
absence of any protest on their part when arrested, not only casts
serious doubts on their professed innocence but also confirms
their acquiescence to the search. Clearly then, there was waiver of
the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
GUANZON vs. DE VILLA
181 SCRA 623 (1990)
FACTS
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to
prohibit the military and police officers represented by public
respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation
Drives" in Metro Manila. Petitioners allege that the saturation
drives abused their human rights. According to the petitioners, the
"areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in critical areas
pinpointed by the military and police as places where the
subversives are hiding. Raiders, without any search warrant or
warrant of arrest went destroying the doors of the houses of the
petitioners rousing them from their sleeps early in the morning. The
public respondents stressed two points, First, the respondents
have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they
allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate
disregard for human rights are total lies.
ISSUE
Whether or not the saturation drives were unconstitutional.
HELD
The case did not rule on the constitutionality of the saturation
drives. Instead, the case was remanded to the lower court for
further reception of evidence. The Constitution grants to
Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements
which would bring down constituted authority and substitute a
regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of
policy in the name of security of the State. However, all police
actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. Where
a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the
Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the
transgression and state where even the awesome power of the
state may not encroach upon the rights of the individual. It is the
duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the
present petition where the petitioners do not complain that they
were victims of the police actions, where no names of any of the
thousands of alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a
general one to stop all police "saturation drives," as long as the
Court is convinced that the event actually happened. On one hand,
Under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution it is stated that
“The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.” There can be no question that
under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the nature
described by the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly
violative of the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the
military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush
out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be consistent
with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected
by such actions. According to the court, Saturation drives and
other police measures are not illegal, the problem only arises in
the manner on which the police action is executed.
ABENES vs. CA
G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007
FACTS
Three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national and local elections,
the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pagadian City, created a
team composed of seven policemen with a directive to establish
and man a checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan, for the purpose of
enforcing the Gun Ban which was then being implemented by the
COMELEC.
The Team leader SPO3 Pascua coordinated with the Barangay
Chairman of Danlugan, and the team put up a road block with the
marking "COMELEC GUN BAN". Vehicles passing through the
road block were required by the team to stop and their occupants
were then politely requested to alight in order to allow routine
inspection and checking of their vehicles. Motorists who refused
the request were not forced to do so.
At about 10:30 in the morning of the same day, a red Tamaraw FX
trying to pass through the check point was stopped by the team
and directed to park at the side of the road. As the occupants
within the vehicle could not be seen through its tinted windows,
SPO1 Eliezer Requejo, a member of the team, knocked on the
vehicle’s window and requested the occupants to step down for a
routine inspection. The eight occupants, which included the
accused-appellant Rodolfo Abenes who is the Barangay Chairman
of Tawagan Norte, Labangan, Zamboanga Del Sur, alighted from
the vehicle.
SPO1 Requejo and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered firearm
was tucked at the right waist of Abenes. The firearm was readily
visible to the policemen; it was not covered by the shirt worn by
Abenes. Abenes was then asked by SPO3 Pascua whether he had
a license and authority to carry the firearm, and whether his
possession was exempted from the Gun Ban being enforced by
the COMELEC. Accused answered in the affirmative. The
policemen then demanded for the pertinent documents to be
shown to support Abenes’ claim. He could not show any. Hence,
SPO1 Requejo confiscated Abenes’ firearm, which was later
identified as a Norinco .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. 906347,
including its magazine containing seven live ammunitions.
Subsequently SPO3 Pascua brought Abenes to the PNP
Headquarters.
checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right
against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when
conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban
enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to
implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual
search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which
such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during
said period would know that they only need a car to be able to
easily perpetrate their malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and
seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars
they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are
heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying
guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the
cars they would stop, without opening the car’s doors or subjecting
its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in
this as this is what the situation demands.
In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when
in plain view, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered
by his shirt.
 Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the
"plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case. The
law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because
of the enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position
from which they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such
lawful intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a piece
of evidence incriminating the petitioner where they saw the gun
tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered
inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the vehicle.

A certification dated May 18, 1998 from the Firearms and

Explosives License Processing Section of the PNP, Pagadian City
disclosed that Abenes is not a registered nor a licensed firearm
holder.

ISSUE/S
1. Was the check-point validly established?

2. Was the petitioner’s constitutional right against unlawful search
and seizure violated?

RULING
The Court upheld the validity of the checkpoint.
 the production of
the mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that the
checkpoint was established three days before the May 11, 1998
elections; and, the circumstances under which the policemen
found the gun warranted its seizure without a warrant.

This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those
which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For,
admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorists’ right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot
be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travelers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine
WIRE TAPPING must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200
or others of similar nature. An extension telephone is not among
such devices or arrangements.
GAANAN vs.IAC

G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

FACTS
Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the
complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after
demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty.
Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico
so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an
entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty.
Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and
Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

ISSUE
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited
devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a
private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

RULING
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The petitioner was
acquitted of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti- Wiretapping Act.

Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of

electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone
cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often
encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizen who
happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of
a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that
he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own
telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the
would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such
mischievous results.

The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves

around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or
arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or
arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging
from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or
deportation for an alien?

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device

or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either
a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate
installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as

a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered
as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should
not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts.

Further, our lawmakers intended to discourage, through

punishment, persons such as government authorities or
representatives of organized groups from installing devices in
order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail
or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable
REMEDIES IN CASES OF VIOLATION “Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
A. Exclusionary Rule correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
STONEHILL vs DIOKNO
 business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967 sheets and related profit and loss statements.”

FACTS
Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants
against petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they
are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of
petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences to search for personal properties “books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the offense
for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations and on the respective residences of the petitioners,
there seized documents, papers, money and other records.
Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and
were constrained to question the legality of the searches and
seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence
against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction
and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some
documents and papers.
ISSUE
Whether or not the search warrant issue is valid.
RULING
The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al.
The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the
validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for
Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It
should be raised by the officers or board members of the
corporation.
The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable
search and seizure. It provides;
 power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was
issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a
“violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” In other words, no
specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent
proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications
involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by
herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order,
to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights —
that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the
right of the accused against a defective search warrant is
emphasized.
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter,
but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against
whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find
that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the
issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of
the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable
cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who
secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable
searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations
thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power,
for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly
abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds
itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight
of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility
of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning
committed.

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for

the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
PASTRANO vs. CA

G.R. No. 104504 October 31, 1997 The Court find that the prosecution clearly established the
elements of the crime charged and that the Court of Appeals and
FACTS the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
A group of students went to see Capt. Rodolfo Mañoza, then doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
intelligence operations officer of the Philippine Constabulary, at Ammunition.
Camp Naranjo, at Oroquieta City. They reported having seen
Clyde Pastrano beaten up by his father, petitioner Pedrito
Pastrano. The students were willing to testify but expressed fear of
the petitioner who, according to them, had firearms.

Clyde Pastrano had died and it was suspected he had been the
victim of foul play. Two sons of Pedrito Pastrano by his estranged
wife also saw Capt. Mañoza, seeking his assistance in connection
with the death of their brother Clyde. The brothers reported that
their father and his common-law wife were keeping unlicensed
firearms in their house. They executed a joint affidavit which they
stated that they had personal knowledge of the fact that their father
Pedrito Pastrano was keeping three (3) firearms of different
calibers in the bedroom of his house.

On the basis of the affidavit of the Pastrano brothers, Capt.

Mañoza applied for a search warrant on the same day.

After examining complainant and the two brothers, Judge

Teodorico M. Durias of the Municipal Trial Court of Oroquieta City
(Branch I) issued a search warrant which Capt. Mañoza and his
men later served at the residence of Pedrito Pastrano at Capitol
Drive, Oroquieta City. Seized from petitioner's dwelling was a sack
containing the following:

One (1) Revolver Cal. 22 Magnum with Serial No. 07345. Made in
Germany ROHMGMBH SONTHEM/BRENZ;
One (1) round ammunition for Cal. 22 Magnum;
 One (1) Revolver
Cal. 32 with Serial No. 233833 Colt Made in U.S.A.; Six rounds of
live Ammunition for Cal. 32 revolver.

On the basis of the evidence thus seized, petitioner Pedrito

Pastrano y Capapas and his common-law wife, Erlinda Ventir y
Sanchez, were charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition as penalized under P .D. No. 1866, §1.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Search Warrant issued by Judge Teodorico
Durias is invalid for failure to comply with the basic requirements of
the Constitution.

RULING
The Court held that petitioner waived any objection based on the
illegality of the search.

Petitioner assails the absence of a written deposition showing that

the judge had examined the complainant and his witnesses by
means of searching questions in writing and under oath as
required by Rule 126, §4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Rule 126, §4 indeed requires the examination of the complainant

and his witnesses to be put in writing and under oath. But although
this is a ground for quashing a search warrant in this case,
petitioner did nothing to this end. He did not move to quash the
information before the trial court. Nor did he object to the
presentation of the evidence obtained as being the product of an
illegal search.

Petitioner thus waived any objection based on the illegality of the

search. As held in People v. Omaweng, the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right,
can be waived and the waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly.
HONESTO OGAYON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R.
No. 188794, September 2, 2015
DOCTRINE: The courts should indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the
person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always
against the waiver. The relinquishment of a constitutional right has
to be laid out convincingly.
was issued in disregard of the constitutional requirements. The
courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. The court should not
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. In People
v. Decierdo, the Court declared that “whenever a protection given
by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that
protection, the presumption is always against the waiver.” The
relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out
convincingly.

FACTS
Petitioner Honesto Ogayon (Ogayon for brevity) was charged with
violation of Sections 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and 12
(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) of RA 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. During his
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.
Facts according to the Prosecution: Police Chief Inspector Elmer
Ferrera, together with the other members of the Albay Provincial
Police Office, proceeded to Ogayon’s house to enforce the search
warrant. Upon reaching the house of Ogayon, the police team
notice several persons inside a nipa hut located nearby.
Suspecting that a pot session was about to be held, the police
team restrained two of the five persons and immediately
proceeded to Ogayon’s house. SPO4 Caritos informed Ogayon
that they had a warrant to search his place and handed the same
to Ogayon, who allowed the police team to conduct the search.
During the search, they found two (2) small, heat-sealed
transparent sachets that the police team suspected to contain
shabu, four (4) disposable lighters, one (1) knife, used aluminum
foil, one (1) roll of aluminum foil and a “Dorco” blade. The aforesaid
items were all found in the comfort room located about five (5)
meters away from Ogayon’s house. The police team thereafter
arrested Ogayon and the two (2) other persons who had earlier
been restrained.
In this case, the only evidence that Ogayon waived his
constitutional right was his failure to make a timely motion during
the trial to quash the warrant and to suppress the presentation of
the seized items as evidence. This failure alone is not a sufficient
indication that Ogayon clearly, categorically, knowingly, and
intelligently made a waiver.
(2) NO. The Constitution requires the judge to conduct an
“examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce,” after which he determines the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
Personal examination by the judge of the applicant and his
witnesses is indispensable, and the examination should be probing
and exhaustive, not merely routinary or a rehash of the affidavits.
Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, the Court
found nothing in the records of the case indicating that the issuing
judge personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his
witnesses. The records bear no evidence from which the Supreme
Court can infer that the requisite examination was made, and from
which the factual basis for probable cause to issue the search
warrant was derived.

Facts according to the Defense: Ogayon disavowed any

knowledge of the prohibited drugs and claimed that he saw the
seized items for the first time only when they were being
inventoried. He claimed that the police team did not present any
search warrant before conducting the search, and it was only
during the trial that he saw a copy of the same. He recounted that
the police officers, splitting into two groups, conducted a
simultaneous search of his house and the comfort room located
nearby.

The RTC rendered a joint judgment convicting Ogayon of the two

criminal charges against him. Relying on the presumption of
regularity, the RTC rejected Ogayon’s frame-up defense. Ogayon
appealed to the CA. He questioned the validity of the search
warrant, claiming it was improperly issued. He argued that the
search warrant was defective for lack of transcript showing that the
issuing judge conducted an examination of the applicant for search
warrant and his witnesses. However, the CA upheld the search
warrant’s validity due to Ogayon’s failure to make a timely
objection against the warrant during the trial. The CA affirmed
Ogayon’s conviction for possession of drugs and drug
paraphernalia.

ISSUES
1) Whether or not Petitioner Ogayon waived his right to question
the legality of the search warrant.
2) Whether or not the search warrant had been validly issued.

RULING
(1) NO. The right against unreasonable search and seizures is one
of the fundamental constitutional rights. Given the significance of
this right, the courts must be vigilant in preventing its stealthy
encroachment or gradual depreciation and ensure that the
safeguards put in place for its protection are observed. Procedural
rules can neither diminish nor modify substantial rights; their non-
compliance should therefore not serve to validate a warrant that
People vs Salibad (2015)
[insert digest or case here]
B. Civil Action for Damages
ABERCA vs. VER
 was deported therefrom and sent to Amoy, China, by the aforesaid
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
FACTS
Petitioners brought suit alleging that General Fabian Ver had
ordered the Task Force Makabansa of the AFP to conduct
"preemptive strikes against known communist terrorists''
underground houses" in Metro Manila. The TFM raided some
places using defective warrants; they seized personal belongings
of petitioners; they had been interrogated in violation of their right
to silence and to counsel; they had been tortured and intimidated.
Petitioners asked for payment of damages for violations of their
constitutional rights.
ISSUE
Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.
RULING
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does
not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for
illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely
the right of the individual to seek release from detention through
the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his
liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of
action for damages are explicitly recognized in PD 1755 which
amended Art. 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or
for quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of
any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority
arising from martial law including the arrest, detention and/or trial
of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one year.
Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus suspends petitioners’ right of action for damages
for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend
their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of
respondents’ confiscation of their private belongings, the violation
of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and
against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
The question became moot and academic since the suspension of
the PWHC had been lifted with the issuance of then Pres. Corazon
Aquino of Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986.
Forbes vs Chuoco Tiaco (1910)
FACTS
April 1, 1910, the defendant Chuoco Tiaco filed a suit in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila against the plaintiffs alleging
that on the 19th of August, 1909, under the orders of the said W.
Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, he
J. E. Harding and C. R. Trowbridge, chiefs, as above stated, of the
police and of the secret service, respectively, of the city of Manila,
and that having been able to return to these Islands he feared, as
it was threatened, that he should be again deported by the said
defendants, concluding with a petition that a preliminary injunction
should be issued against the plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them
from deporting the defendant, Chuoco, and that they be sentenced
to pay him P20,000 as an indemnity.
Respondent argued that It is true that the said defendant Chuoco
Tiaco, was, with 11 others or his nationality, expelled from these
Islands and returned to China by the plaintiffs J. E. Harding and C.
R. Trowbridge, under the orders of the plaintiff W. Cameron
Forbes, but the said expulsion was carried out in the public interest
of the Government and at the request of the proper representative
of the Chinese Government in these Islands.
The said complaint having been filed with the defendant A. S.
Crossfield, he, granting the petition, issued against the plaintiffs
the injunction requested, prohibiting them from deporting the
defendant Chuoco Tiaco.
The plaintiffs filed a demurrer against the same and presented a
motion asking that the injunction be dissolved, the grounds of the
demurrer being that the facts set out in the complaint did not
constitute a motive of action, and that the latter was one in which
the court lacked jurisdiction to issue such an injunction against the
plaintiffs for the reasons set out in the complaint; notwithstanding
which, the defendant A. S. Crossfield overruled the demurrer and
disallowed the motion, leaving the complaint and the injunction
standing.
ISSUE
Whether or not the courts can take jurisdiction in any case relating
to the exercise of this inherent power in the deportation of aliens,
for the purpose of controlling this power vested in the political
department of the government.
RULING
It may be argued, that the present action is one to recover
damages against the Governor and the others mentioned in the
cause, for the illegal acts performed by them, and not an action for
the purpose of in any way controlling or restraining or interfering
with their political or discretionary duties. No one can be held
legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal
manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if
the Governor-General had authority, under the law, to deport or
expel the defendants, and the circumstances justifying the
deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then
he can not be held liable for damages for the exercise of this
power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in
any manner, for the purpose of controlling or interfering with the
exercise of the political powers vested in the chief executive
authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts can
not intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in
damages for the exercise of this authority.
If it be true that the Government of the Philippine Islands is a
government invested with "all the military,. civil, and judicial powers
necessary to govern the Philippine Islands until otherwise provided
by Congress" and that the Governor-General is invested with
certain important political duties and powers, in the exercise of
which he may use his own discretion, and is accountable only to
his superiors in his political character and to his own conscience,
and without authority to interfere in the control of such powers, for
any purpose, then it must follow that the courts can not take
jurisdiction in any case against him which has for its purpose the
declaration that such acts are illegal and that he is, in
consequence, liable for damages. To allow such an action would,
in the lost effective way possible, subject the executive and
political departments of the Government to the absolute control of
the judiciary. Of course, it will be observed that we are here
treating only with the political and purely executive duties in
dealing with the political rights of aliens. The conclusions herein
reached should not be extended to cases where vested rights are
involved. That question must be left for future consideration.