ARTICLE III

BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

SEC. 1 – DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

Facts:

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180
entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:

(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and

(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that:

 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue/s:

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Discussions:

A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty
would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the
police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a
treaty.

Ruling/s:

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court
saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

Philippine Phospate Fertilizer Co. v Torres 231 SCRA 335 (1994)

Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that
as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to
represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter
Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical
employees. However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to
represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential
employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended
petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued
an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory,
professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential
employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a
decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part
of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.

Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.

Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard
or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper
with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers
filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was
afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted
on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to
submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its
arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Javier v Comelec 144 SCRA 194 (1986)
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 – 144 SCRA 194 – Political Law – Due Process – impartial and competent court

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in
May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-
buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching
of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the
AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board
of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning
candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately
convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On
certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature,
having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made.
Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner.
Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be
proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The
Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s
death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen. The SC has repeatedly and
consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must
believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice
where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made
and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to
make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain
the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 148 SCRA 659, 1987

FACTS

Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said
order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the
case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal
Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo. These were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery, which the
RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be produced, directed the confiscation
of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of want of
authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional
insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed
without giving the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due
process.

ISSUE

Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

HELD

YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests of the
public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled
that EO 626 complies with the above requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak,
has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order, and that the method chosen
is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the
slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of a permit
adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their
improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second
requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their
movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how the
interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill them
there. Even if assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid
as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case,
here, no trial is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared as forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing
can be validly dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of
pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons of
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no
such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated property also presents a
case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the
NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines
that said officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go
about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even
corruption.

ALONTE VS. SAVELLANO, 287 SCRA 245

Mayor Alonte of Binan, Laguna was charged of rape before Branch 25, RTC of Laguna. However, as
a result of a petition for a transfer of venue filed by the prosecution and granted by the SC, his case was
transferred to RTC Branch 53, Manila, presided over by the respondent judge.

After the petitioner’s arraignment, the prosecution submitted an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE

signed by the private complainant JUVIE-LYN PUNONGBAYAN where she prayed for the withdrawal of
the case because she is no longer interested in pursuing the same with no intention of re-filing the said case
in the future.

Pending resolution of the said motion to withdraw, the petitioner filed a motion for bail. The same
was not resolved despite several motions filed by the petitioner to resolve the same.
 On December 17, 1997, counsel for the petitioner, ATTY. PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN, received a
notice from the respondent judge notifying him of the promulgation of the decision in this case despite the
fact that the prosecution and the defense have not presented their evidence in court.

On December 18, 1997, the respondent judge issued a Decision convicting the petitioner of rape and
sentenced to suffer a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to due process of law.

Held:

In order that an accused in a criminal proceedings is deemed to have been given the right to due
process of law, the following requisites must be complied with before a decision is rendered:

1. the court or tribunal trying the case is clothed with jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter
before it;

2. that jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;

3. that the accused is given the opportunity to be heard; and

4. that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing (PEOPLE VS. DAPITAN, 197 SCRA 378)

The act of the respondent judge in rendering a decision without even giving the petitioner the right to
adduce evidence in his behalf is a gross violation of his right to due process of law. The Decision rendered is
NULL AND VOID for want of due process.

Aniag Jr. v Comelec 237 SCRA 424 (1994)

“Driver underwent illegal search and seizure on check pt. – petitioner charged in violation of Omnibus Election Code (gun
ban)– invokes deprivation of Constitutional right on due process of law.”

Facts: Upon the issuance of declaration of gun ban by the Comelec in connection to the national & local election, the
Sgt-at-Arms of the House of Representatives requested petitioner to return the 2 firearms issued by the House to him.
In compliance, petitioner ordered his driver Arellano to pick up the firearms in his house to return them to Congress.
On his way back to the Batasan Complex, Arellano was flagged down in a check point and police search the car. Upon
finding the guns, he was apprehended and detained and his case was referred for inquest to the City prosecutor office.
Petitioner was not made a party to the charge but was invited to shed light on the incident. Petitioner explained the
purpose how Arellano came to have the firearms boarded on the car and wrote the prosecutor to exonerate Arellano
from the charges. The prosecutor recommended dismissing the case. The Comelec however issued a resolution filing
information in violation of the gun ban against petitioner. Petitioner moves for reconsideration to the Comelec which
was denied hence this petition contending that the search on his car was illegal and that he was not impleaded as
respondent in the preliminary investigation and his constitutional rights for due process was violated.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process of law.

Held: The court held that as a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate
authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had
been upheld in cases of (1) moving vehicles (2) the seizure of evidence in plain view and (3) search conducted at
police or military checkpoints which are not illegal for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search, and (4) Stop-and-
search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were
reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters is also recognized by the court to be legal. An extensive search
without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. Because there was no sufficient
evidence that would impel the policemen to suspect Arellano to justify the search they have conducted, such action
constitutes an unreasonable intrusion of the petitioner’s privacy and security of his property in violation of Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless
search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against
petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among
those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor
to a preliminary investigation for such offense. Thus the court declared the warrantless search and seizure of the
firearms as illegal hence inadmissible to court as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.

Ang Tibay v CIR 69 PHIL 635 (1940)

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the
supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all
the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of
the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union
of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an
illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by
the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive
organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear
from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers,
and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance
with, the provisions of CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does
not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected
by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record
of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be
relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.
Ateneo de Manila University v Capulong 222 SCRA 644 (1993)

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese
General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol
Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same
occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee
which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of
Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie
case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent
students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary
Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule
No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in
view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal
on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This
was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration
of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing
against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued
that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process.
This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School,
notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were
adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65
considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter
and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is
when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have
been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as
petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of
Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive
office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their
CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the
government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and
certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution,
contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to
arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.

Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause

Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the
filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the
law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between
those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential
treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be
complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes
treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a
real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its
classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created
equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second
requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as
long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the
classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes
of the law.
 The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure
is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the
danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the
welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the
electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because
they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the
classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or
an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive
Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-
President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents
were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local
government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid
justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of
our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position
during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his
appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate
of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the
position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure
encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66
of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
_____

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first,
third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential
treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because
"whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure
remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the
deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign
power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably
be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the
mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate
that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is
no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
 The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes
of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public
service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to
balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’
Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision;
DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
_____

The ruling basically paves the way for justices, judges, election officials, military and police officers, members of the
cabinet and all appointed civil servants to continue exercising the functions of, and holding on to, their appointive office while
campaigning to get elected for an elective position.

The legal ramifications are of great significance. As Justice Carpio pointed out in his dissenting opinion, imagine if the
Provincial Commander of the AFP files his COC for governor on 1 December 2009 for the 10 May 2010 elections. If he is not
considered automatically resigned from office, he has until the start of the campaign period on 26 March 2010 to remain in his
post, in command of hundreds, if not thousands, of fully-armed personnel. The same is true for judges, cabinet secretaries, and
other heads of offices who have some kind of influence and control over certain personnel and government resources. There are
even reports that some Comelec officials themselves have filed their COCs for certain elective positions.

Next elections, it would then be possible that the Chief Justice, the Comelec Chairperson or the AFP Chief of Staff
become a candidate for President, Vice-President or Senator while serving the office to which they were appointed.

The decision does not seem to prevent the evil that the Constitution, in so many words, seeks to prevent. In fact, Article
IX(B), Section 2(4) of the Constitution expressly provides that “No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.”

Furthermore, if they lose, they just continue occupying their appointive posts. This is illogical because Section 6, Art.
IX(B) of the Constitution provides that “No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the Government of any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of its subsidiaries.”

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 193036

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. ---
Justice Jose P. Laurel
Facts:

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when
then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan,
"Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out
this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo
(Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the
legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of
the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners
Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as
incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order
No. 1;

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Held:

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are
of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be
resolved for the guidance of all.Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the
President’s first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not
due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands
firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating
team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.

Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in
Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ
have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not
deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for
violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They
contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous
administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with
validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that
of former President Arroyo.

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions
cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions
of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"only. The intent to single out
the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the
questioned executive order.

Decision

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the
executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector
of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and
again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once
again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nation’s thrust to
progress.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1.

SO ORDERED.

Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)

Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and
signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be
employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of
Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.
Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens generally to be
employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor
involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory
in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue
measure.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the
people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not
obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process
of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City
Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.

Dumlao v Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980)

Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary
to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.

Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received retirement benefits and is
65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local elective office from which he has retired.

Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection and due process rights.

Held: No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on reasonable and real
differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age have been classifieddifferently from younger
employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter are not.

Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be retirees who are even
younger and a 65year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official who is not a retiree. But there is reason to
disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for office because there is the “need for new blood to
assume relevance”. When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same
government work.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.

Philippine Asso. of Service Exporters v Drilon 163 SCRA 386 (1988)

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply
to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the
right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of
the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted
the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism
providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.
Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics
working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no
question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel
does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as
may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power
as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

Himagan v People 237 SCRA 538 (1994)

Facts: Petitioner, a policeman assigned w/ the medical co. of the PNP HQ at Camp Catitigan, Davao City was
implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the
informations for murder and attempted murder were filed w/ the RTC, the trial court issued an order suspending
petitioner until termination of the case on the basis of Sec. 47 of RA 6975, w/c provides:
Sec. 47.Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient
in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6)
years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated.
Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension relying on Sec. 42 of PD 807, that his suspension
should be limited to 90 days and also, on our ruling in Deloso v. SB, and Layno v. SB. The motion and the subsequent
MFR were denied. Hence, this petition forcertiorar i andma nda mus.

HELD: We find the petition to be devoid of merit.

(1) The language of the first sentence is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. xxx The second sentence xx
providing the trial must be terminated w/in 90 days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The 2
can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The 2nd deals w/ the time frame
w/in w/c the trial should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated w/in the 90day period, should the suspension of accused be lifted? Certainly
no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" bef. the phrase "be terminated w/in 90 days," there is nothing in the
law that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated w/in that
period. But this is w/o prejudice to the administrative sanctions, and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to
criminal or civil liability of the judge. Should the trial be unreasonably delayed w/o the fault of the accused, he may
ask for the dismissal of the case. Should this be refused, he can compel its dismissal bycer tiorari, prohibition orma nda
mus, or secure his liberty by
(2) Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to
the lifting of the preventive suspension in pending admin. investigation, not in crim. cases, as here. xxx Sec. 91 of RA
6975 w/c states that the CS law and its implementing rules shall apply to members of the PNP insofar as the
provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent w/ RA 6975.
(3) The petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. xxx Sec. 13 of RA 3019 upon w/c the
preventive suspension of the accused in Layno and Deloso was based was silent w/ respect to the duration of the
preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time
raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged w/ murder under the RPC and it is
undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 RA 6975 w/c categorically states that hissuspension shall last until the
case is terminated.
(4) The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that
became RA 6975 reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged w/ grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six yrs. of imprisonment and w/c suspension continues until the
case against him is terminated.
Himagan v People 237 SCRA 538 (1994)

FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of and attempted
murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that
“Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from
office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree,
that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is
contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD: No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and
the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending,
his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact
that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does
not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. v Treasurer of Ormoc City 22 SCRA 603 (1968)

Facts: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing
"on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal
tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries."
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7, 087.50 and
on April 20, 1964 for P5, 000, or a total of P12, 087.50.

On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy
upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and
Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause
(Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution).

Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local
Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and
submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld
the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local
Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause under Sec. 1[1],
Art. III, Constitution.

(2) Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation under the Bill of Rights, Sec. 22[1], Art. VI,
Constitution.

Held: The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification
is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should
not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff,
for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax
because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector
of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude
arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and
the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs.
So ordered.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration and (2) motion to annul the Decision of 21
December 2009 filed by petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. and (3) the ad cautelam motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City,
and Oroquieta City.

On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16 Cityhood
Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009,
the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents' first motion for reconsideration. On 28
April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents' second motion for reconsideration.
Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the
Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.

However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and compelling
reason, the Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the
constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21 December 2009.

Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstates the
18 November 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.

C. Equal Protection Clause

As the Court held in the 18 November 2008 Decision, there is no substantial distinction between
municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending
bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with
pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did
not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill
in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally
non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a
specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen
again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only. In fact, the minority concedes that "the conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills)
adverted to can no longer be repeated."

Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique
advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress -
as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
 In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent
municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the
exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Conclusion

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that "no x x x city shall be created x x x
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." This provision can
only be interpreted in one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively
in the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the
Local Government Code, provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of
cities under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood
Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution does not cripple
Congress' power to make laws. In fact, Congress is not prohibited from amending the Local Government
Code itself, as what Congress did by enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises
an integral part of the Legislature's law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in
the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution that "[n]o
x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code." In other words, Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged
Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the 21 December 2009 Decision and
REINSTATE the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws,
namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434,
9435, 9436, and 9491.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

FACTS:
Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for reconsideration which was denied by the Honorable
Court. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied until on the 18th of November 2008, the
judgement became final and executory.

The Court then on the 19th of December 2009, unprecedentedly reversed its decision upholding the
constitutionally of the Cityhood Laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court could reverse the decision it already rendered.

RULING:
Yes, The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under
the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity
and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional
law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
 Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain
unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the
implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries
and supplies by the “new cities” or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as
valid and effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the
effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair
play to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
Court’s declaration of their unconstitutionality.