Miranda v.

Arizona (Self Incrimination)

Facts

The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving custodial
interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a
prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was
the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all
the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that were
admitted at trial.

 Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where he
was identified by the complaining witness. He was then interrogated by two police officers for two hours,
which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were presented to
the jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment
on each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not
violated in obtaining the confession.
 Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the robbery of a dress
shop that had occurred three days prior. He was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters. He
was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where he orally admitted the robbery and was placed under
formal arrest. He was then taken to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was questioned by an
assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and answers.
At trial, the oral confession and the transcript were presented to the jury. Vignera was found guilty of first
degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without opinion
by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.
 Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas
City robberies and taken to a local police station. A report was also received from the FBI that Westover was
wanted on a felony charge in California. Westover was interrogated the night of the arrest and the next
morning by local police. Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-half
hours of interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions, which had been prepared by one
of the agents during the interrogation, to each of the two robberies in California. These statements were
introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the California robberies and sentenced to 15 years’
imprisonment on each count. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
 California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the
victims died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks stolen in
one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at his home. Police also arrested Stewart’s wife and three other
people who were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next five days, was interrogated on
nine different occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had robbed the
deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At that time, police released the four other people arrested with
Stewart because there was no evidence to connect any of them with the crime. At trial, Stewart’s statements
were introduced. Stewart was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The
Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have been advised of his right to remain
silent and his right to counsel.

Issues

Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation” are
admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether “procedures which assure that the individual is
accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate
himself” are necessary.

Supreme Court holding

The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of
criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is
curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” As such, “the prosecution
may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.”

The Court further held that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so freely.” Therefore, a
defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that
if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the
judgment of the New York Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of California in Stewart.

Argued: Feb. 28, March 1 and 2, 1966

Decided: June 13, 1966

Vote: 5-4

Follow-Up

Miranda v. Arizona: After Miranda’s conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court, the State of Arizona
retried him. At the second trial, Miranda’s confession was not introduced into evidence. Miranda was once
again convicted and sentenced to 20-30 years in prison.

Olaguer v Military Commission No. 34 (Double Jeopardy)

GR No. L-54558 May 22, 1987

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.cralaw
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.cralaw
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing.cralaw
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.cralaw
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.cralaw
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.cralaw
FACTS:
· June 13. 1980 -the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 3 created the
respondentMilitary Commission No 34 to try criminal case filed against the petitioners.
· July 30, 1980 - an amended charge sheet was filed for seven (7) offenses, namely:
(1) Unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices;
(2) Conspiracy to assassinate President, and Mrs. Marcos;
(3) Conspiracy to assassinate cabinetmembers Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno;
(4) Conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. ArturoTangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus;
(5) Arson of nine buildings;
(6) Attempted murder of Messrs. LeonardoPerez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and
Fabian Ver; and
(7) Conspiracy and proposal tocommit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion.
· December 4, 1984 - pending the resolution of the Petition, the respondent Military Commission No. 34
passedsentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the penalty of death by electrocution.
· The thrust of petitioner’s arguments is that military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civiliansfor
offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law. They also maintain that
theproceedings before the respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of their
constitutional right todue process of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and
functioning

HELD:
WHEREFORE,

DISMISSED - the Petitions for habeas corpus are for having become moot and academic.
GRANTED - The Petitions for certiorari and prohibition.
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL - The creation of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try
civilians like the petitioners is hereby declared unconstitutional and all its proceedings are deemed null and
void. The temporary restraining order issued against the respondents enjoining them from executing the
Decision of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 is hereby made permanent and the said
respondents are permanently prohibited from further pursuing Criminal Case No. MC-34-1 against the
petitioners. The sentence rendered by the respondent Military Commission No. 34 imposing the death
penalty on the petitioners is hereby vacated for being null and void, and all the items or properties taken
from the petitioners in relation to the said criminal case should be returned to them immediately.

RATIO:
(1) Military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses when the civil
courts are open and functioning.Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the
accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial.
Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by
judicial process, not by executive or military process.
(2) Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have "exclusive power to hear and determine those
matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen.” In Toth v. Quarles, 40 the U.S. Supreme
Court furtherstressed that the assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial law.
(3) Following the principle of separation of powers underlyingthe existing constitutional organization of the
Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpretingthe laws as when an individual
should be considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot
be the function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil
courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the
period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts.
(4) Respondent Military Commission No. 34 appears to have been rendered too hastily to the prejudice to
the petitioners, and in complete disregard of their constitutional right to adduce evidence on their
behalf.Thus, even assuming arguendo that the respondent Military Commission No. 34 does have the
jurisdiction to try the petitioners, the Commission should be deemed ousted of its jurisdiction when, as
observed by the SolicitorGeneral, the said tribunal acted in disregard of the constitutional rights of the
accused. Indeed, it is well-settled that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the
tribunal that rendered the judgment in question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction.
 (5) Proclamation No. 2045 (dated January 17, 1981) officially lifting martial law in the Philippines and
abolishing all military tribunals created pursuant to the national emergency effectively divests the
respondent Military Commission No. 34 (and all military tribunals for that matter) of its supposed
authority to try civilians, including the herein petitioners. The said proclamation states:

"The military tribunals created pursuant thereto are hereby dissolved upon final determination of case's
pending therein which may not be transferred to the civil courts without irreparable prejudice to the state in
view of the rules on double jeopardy, or other circumstances which render prosecution of the cases difficult,
if not impossible."

(6) Certainly, the rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect because stability in jurisprudence is desirable.
Nonetheless, reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the
public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or modified should be
abandoned or modified accordingly. After all, more important than anything else is that this Court should
be right.GANCAYCO, J:

FACTS:
· June 13. 1980 -the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 3 created the
respondentMilitary Commission No 34 to try criminal case filed against the petitioners.
· July 30, 1980 - an amendedcharge sheet was filed for seven (7) offenses, namely:
(1) Unlawful possession of explosives and incendiarydevices;
(2) Conspiracy to assassinate President, and Mrs. Marcos;
(3) Conspiracy to assassinate cabinetmembers Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno;
(4) Conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. ArturoTangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus;
(5) Arson of nine buildings;
(6) Attempted murder of Messrs. LeonardoPerez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and
Fabian Ver; and
(7) Conspiracy and proposal tocommit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion.
· December 4, 1984 - pending the resolution of the Petition, the respondent Military Commission No. 34
passedsentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the penalty of death by electrocution.
· The thrust of petitioner’s arguments is that military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civiliansfor
offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law. They also maintain that
theproceedings before the respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of their
constitutional right todue process of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and
functioning

HELD:
WHEREFORE,

DISMISSED - the Petitions for habeas corpus are for having become moot and academic.
GRANTED - The Petitions for certiorari and prohibition.
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL - The creation of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try
civilians like the petitioners is hereby declared unconstitutional and all its proceedings are deemed null and
void. The temporary restraining order issued against the respondents enjoining them from executing the
Decision of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 is hereby made permanent and the said
respondents are permanently prohibited from further pursuing Criminal Case No. MC-34-1 against the
petitioners. The sentence rendered by the respondent Military Commission No. 34 imposing the death
penalty on the petitioners is hereby vacated for being null and void, and all the items or properties taken
from the petitioners in relation to the said criminal case should be returned to them immediately.

RATIO:
(1) Military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses when the civil
courts are open and functioning.Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the
accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial.
Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by
judicial process, not by executive or military process.
(2) Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have "exclusive power to hear and determine those
matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen.” In Toth v. Quarles, 40 the U.S. Supreme
Court furtherstressed that the assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial law.
(3) Following the principle of separation of powers underlyingthe existing constitutional organization of the
Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpretingthe laws as when an individual
should be considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot
be the function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil
courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the
period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts.
(4) Respondent Military Commission No. 34 appears to have been rendered too hastily to the prejudice to
the petitioners, and in complete disregard of their constitutional right to adduce evidence on their
behalf.Thus, even assuming arguendo that the respondent Military Commission No. 34 does have the
jurisdiction to try the petitioners, the Commission should be deemed ousted of its jurisdiction when, as
observed by the SolicitorGeneral, the said tribunal acted in disregard of the constitutional rights of the
accused. Indeed, it is well-settled that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the
tribunal that rendered the judgment in question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction.
(5) Proclamation No. 2045 (dated January 17, 1981) officially lifting martial law in the Philippines and
abolishing all military tribunals created pursuant to the national emergency effectively divests the
respondent Military Commission No. 34 (and all military tribunals for that matter) of its supposed
authority to try civilians, including the herein petitioners. The said proclamation states:

"The military tribunals created pursuant thereto are hereby dissolved upon final determination of case's
pending therein which may not be transferred to the civil courts without irreparable prejudice to the state in
view of the rules on double jeopardy, or other circumstances which render prosecution of the cases difficult,
if not impossible."

(6) Certainly, the rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect because stability in jurisprudence is desirable.
Nonetheless, reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the
public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or modified should be
abandoned or modified accordingly. After all, more important than anything else is that this Court should
be right.

TAN V BARRIOS (Double Jeopardy)

On the basis of Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order No. 8 dated September 27,
1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to
them."

In General Order No. 21 dated September 30, 1972, the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts," were
vested with jurisdiction among others, over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were
directly related to the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security of the Republic.

In General Order No. 12-b dated November 7, 1972, "crimes against persons . . . as defined and penalized in
the Revised Penal Code" were added to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions.

Subsequently, General Order No. 49, dated October 11, 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals.
The enumeration of offenses cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and
penalized in the Revised Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over
such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of G.O. No. 49, Section 2 of the same general order provided that "the
President may, in the public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the civil courts" and vice versa.

On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners, with twelve (12) others, were arrested and charged in Criminal Case No.
MC-1-67 entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc, et al." before the Military
Commission No. 1, for the crimes of:
(1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally possessed firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General Order No. 49, for the killing on August 25, 1973
of Florentino Lim of tile wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City; and

(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 9.

The accused were: 1. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc 2. Ang Tiat Chuan alias Chuana 3. Mariano Velez, Jr. 4. Antonio
Occaciones 5. Leopoldo Nicolas 6. Enrique Labita 7. Oscar Yaun 8. Joaquin Tan Leh alias Go Bon Huat alias Taowie 9. Eusebio
Tan alias Go Bon Ping 10. Vicente Tan alias Go Bon Beng alias Donge 11. Alfonso Tan alias Go Bon Tiak 12. Go E Kuan alias
Kunga 13. William Tan alias Go Bon Ho 14. Marciano Benemerito alias Marcing alias Dodong 15. Manuel Beleta, and 16. John Doe

Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the
recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier order (issued in response to the
requests of the defendants' lawyers) to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the
military court (Annexes A to C of Supplemental/Amended Petition, pp. 72-88, Rollo). All the accused were
detained without bail in the P.C. Stockade in Camp Crame.

Upon arraignment on May 6, 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was discharged to be
used as a state witness. He was released from detention on May 5, 1975 (p. 4, Rollo).

Almost daily trials were held for more than thirteen (13) months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses
and 35 defense witnesses filled up twenty-one (21) volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages (p.
75, Rollo).

On June 10, 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military Commission
finding five (5) of the accused namely: 1. Luis Tan 2. Ang Tiat Chuan 3. Mariano Velez, Jr. 4. Antonio
Occaciones, and Leopoldo Nicolas guilty of MURDER. Each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of from seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and twenty-one (21) days, to twenty (20) years.

A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both MURDER and ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARM, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by electrocution (Annex B, Petition).

Eight (8) of the accused, namely: 1. Oscar Yaun 2. Enrique Labita 3. Eusebio Tan 4. Alfonso Tan 5. Go E Kuan
6. William Tan (petitioner herein) 7. Joaquin Tan Leh (petitioner herein) and 8. Vicente Tan (petitioner herein)
were acquitted of the charges, and released on June 11, 1976 (p. 8, Rollo).

On January 17, 1981, Proclamation No. 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military tribunals and
commissions.

On May 22, 1987, this Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al. (150
SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on December 4, 1984 by Military Commission No. 34 against
Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period
of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those
courts are open and functioning as they did during the period of martial law. This Court declared unconstitutional
the creation of the military commissions to try civilians, and annulled all their proceedings as follows:

Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either
his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the
due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process,
not by executive or military process, Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called,
are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander in-
Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized
under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives. Following the principle of separation
of powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the
power and the duty of interpreting the laws (as when an individual should be considered to have violated
the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive
 Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and
are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period of martial law in the
country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by
them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a violation of
the constitutional right to due process of the civilian concerned. (Olaguer, et al. vs. Military Commission
No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, 158-160.)

In October 1986, several months after the EDSA revolution, six (6) habeas corpus petitions were filed in this
Court by some 217 prisoners 1 in the national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and convicted
by the military commissions during the nine-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599-
79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al.,
160 SCRA 700). The petitioners asked the Court to declare unconstitutional General Order No. 8 creating the
military tribunals, annul the proceedings against them before these bodies, and grant them a retrial in the civil
courts where their right to due process may be accorded respect.

Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, this Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings
leading to the conviction of non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice as
their offenses were totally unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule.

The Court — (1) granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of those of some who had fully
served their sentences, or had been acquitted, or had been granted amnesty;

(2) dismissed the petitions of those who were military personnel; and

(3) nullified the proceedings against those who were convicted and still serving the sentences meted to them by
the military courts, but, without ordering their release, directed the Department of Justice to file the necessary
informations against them in the proper civil courts. The dispositive part of the decision reads:

Wherefore the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as petitioners Virgilio Alejandrino, 2Domingo Reyes,
Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patono, Andres Parado, Daniel Campus, 3Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de
los Santos, 4 are concerned. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is hereby ordered to effect the
immediate release of the abovementioned petitioners, unless there are other legal causes that may
warrant their detention.

The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio Cacho, William Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino,
Getulio G. Braga, Jr., Tomas C. Amarte, Rogelio L. Caricungan, Ernesto Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F.
Pichay, Pablo Callejo, Russel A. Paulino, Laurel Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera, Edulino Lacsina
(Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz, Elpidio Urbano, Sofronio Galo, Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando
Tudin Rosendo I. Ramos Pacifico Batacan, Edilberto Liberato, Jimmy C. Realis. Democrito Lorana who
are all military personnel.

As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is hereby DIRECTED TO FILE the necessary
informations against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the offenses involved, within one hundred
eighty (180) days from notice of this decision, without prejudice to the reproduction of the evidence
submitted by the parties and admitted by the Military Commission. If eventually convicted, the period of
the petitioners' detention shall be credited in their favor.

The Courts wherein the necessary informations are filed are DIRECTED TO CONDUCT with dispatch
the necessary proceedings inclusive of those for the grant of bail which may be initiated by the accused.
(Cruz, et al. vs. Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700, 711-712.)

On September 15, 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued Department Order No. 226 designating
State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the
investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants, to prosecute the case
in the court of competent jurisdiction" (Annex C, Petition). On November 15, 1988, State Prosecutor Barrios was
designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in hell of the regular fiscal who inhibited himself (p. 66,
Rollo).

Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on December 9, 1988, in the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2) informations for:
1. Illegal Possession of Firearm docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-824; and

2. Murder docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-825 against all the 15 original defendants in Criminal Case No. MC-1-
67 including those who had already died 5 (Annexes D and E, Petition)

The State Prosecutor incorrectly certified in the informations that:

this case is filed in accordance with the Supreme Court Order in the case of Cruz, et al. vs. Ponce
Enrile in G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599, 79600, 79862 and 80565 as all accused are detained 6 except
those that are already dead. (p. 7, Rollo.)

He recommended bail of P50,000 for each of the accused in the two cases (p. 8, Rollo). Later, he increased the
recommended bail to P140,000 for each accused in the firearm case (Crim. Case No. 88-824). In the murder
case (Crim. Case No. 88-825), he recommended that the bail be increased to P250,000 for each of the accused,
except Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan, and Mariano Velez, Jr., for whom he recommended no bail. Still later, on
October 28, 1988, he recommended no bail for all the accused (pp. 8-9, Rollo) because of the presence of two
aggravating circumstances; (1) prize or reward; and (2) use of a motor vehicle (p. 65, Rollo).

Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the sala of
RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo
issued an order on October 26, 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified copies of "the
supporting affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is
the basis of filing the above-entitled cases, within five (5) days from receipt" of his said order (Annex F, Petition).
The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order for, as a matter of fact, there is no Supreme Court order
to re-file the criminal cases against the herein petitioners and their twelve (12) coaccused in Crim. Case No. MC-
1-67 of the now defunct Military Commission No. 1, because none of them, except Antonio Occaciones, were
parties in the Cruz vs. Enrile habeas corpus cases (160 SCRA 700).

On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition praying that the informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of respondent
Judge dated October 26, 1988 be annulled, and that the public respondents or any other prosecution officer "be
permanently enjoined from indicting, prosecuting and trying them anew for the offenses charged therein because
they had already been acquitted of the same by Military Commission No. 1 in Crim. Case No. MC-1-67" (p. 23,
Rollo).

On November 23, 1988, the First Division of this Court dismissed the petition for being premature as:

... the petitioners have not yet filed a motion to quash the allegedly invalid informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 88-824 and 88825 (Annexes D and E) whose annulment they seek from this Court (Sec. 3, Rule
117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). The filing in the lower court of such motion is the plain, speedy
and adequate remedy of the petitioners. The existence of that remedy (which they have not yet availed
of) bars their recourse to the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition in this Court (Sec. 1, Rule
65, Rules of Court (p. 41, Rollo.)

Upon the petitioners' filing a motion for reconsideration informing this Court that the lower court had issued
warrants for their arrest (p. 48, Rollo), we issued a temporary restraining order on January 16, 1989 enjoining
the respondents from implementing the orders of arrest and ordering them to comment on the petition (p. 50,
Rollo).

The petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Barrios exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion
in reprosecuting them upon the supposed authority of Cruz vs. Enrile for the following reasons:

1. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not in fact direct the filing of informations by the Secretary of Justice
against THOSE who, like the petitioners, WERE ACQUITTED after court martial proceedings during the period
of martial law.

2. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not apply to the petitioners who were not parties in that case, who were
not heard, and over whom the court did not acquire jurisdiction.

3. The reprosecution of the petitioners would violate their right to protection against double jeopardy.
4. The State is estopped from reprosecuting the petitioners after they had been acquitted by the military tribunal
which the State itself had clothed with jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal cases against them. The State
may not retroactively divest of jurisdiction the military tribunal that tried and acquitted them (pp. 14-15, Petition).

5. The retroactive invalidation of the jurisdiction of the military court that acquitted the petitioners would amount
to an ex post facto ruling (p. 81, Rollo, Supplemental Petition).

6. The information against the petitioners in Crim. Case No. 88-825 is null and void because it was filed without
a prior preliminary investigation, nor a finding of probable cause, nor the written approval of the Chief State
Prosecutor (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).

In his Comment dated February 1, 1985 (should be 1989), Fiscal Barrios disclosed that the information in
Criminal Case No. 88-824 for illegal possession of firearm was "already withdrawn by the prosecution at a
hearing on January 27, 1988" (should be 1989?) (pp. 66-68, Rollo). The reason for dropping the charge is not
stated. It may be because Benemerito, the gunman who was convicted of this felony and sentenced to death by
the Military Commission, is already dead-possibly executed. Hence, only the information for murder (Crim. Case
No. 88-825) against the petitioners and twelve (12) others, including those already dead, is pending in the lower
court (p. 37, Rollo). He defended the reprosecution of the petitioners on the ground that it will not constitute
double jeopardy because the nullity of the jurisdiction of the military tribunal that acquitted them prevented the
first jeopardy from attaching, thereby nullifying their acquittal. For the same reason, res judicata is not applicable.
Neither prescription, because "it had been interrupted by the filing of the earlier charge sheets with the Military
Commission" (p. 67, Rollo).

The Solicitor General, in his separate comment, argued that the proceedings involving civilians before a military
commission were null and void because we ruled in Olaguer that military tribunals are bereft of jurisdiction over
civilians, hence, their decisions, whether of conviction or acquittal, do not bar re-prosecution for the same crime
before a civil court (p. 102, Rollo).

The petition is meritorious. The public respondents gravely abused their discretion and acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction in misconstruing the third paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court's decision
in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority to refile in the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners who had been
tried and acquitted by Military Commission No. 1 during the period of martial law. It is an unreasonable
application of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decision therein will be searched in vain for such authority to reprosecute
every civilian who had ever faced a court martial, much less those who had been acquitted by such bodies more
than a decade ago like the petitioners Tan, et al. herein.

The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile would be an instrument of oppression and injustice unless given a limited
application only to the parties/petitioners therein who sought the annulment of the court martial proceedings
against themselves and prayed for a retrial in the civil courts of the criminal cases against them. They alone are
affected by the judgment in Cruz vs. Enrile, not all and sundry who at one time or another had been tried and
sentenced by a court martial during the period of martial law.

Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt. "Matters adjudged in a cause do not prejudice those
who were not parties to it." (54 C.J. 719.) It is a cardinal rule of procedure that a court's judgment or order in a
case shall not adversely affect persons who were not parties to the self same case (Icasiano vs. Tan, 84 Phil.
860). Hence, this court's pronouncement in Cruz vs. Enrile nullifying the proceedings in military courts against
the civilian petitioners therein and ordering the refiling of informations against them in the proper civil courts, may
not affect the rights of persons who were not parties in that case and who, not having submitted to the court's
jurisdiction, did not have their day in court (Busacay vs. Buenaventura, 94 Phil, 1033). Their reprosecution,
based on the decision in Cruz vs. Enrile in which they took no part and were not heard, would be violative of
their right to due process, the same right of the petitioners in Cruz vs. Enrile that this Court endeavored to
protect when it nullified the proceedings against them in the military tribunals by applying the Olaguer doctrine
that the trial of civilians by military process was not due process. 7

There is, however, a perceptible lack of consistency in the application of the Olaguer doctrine to Cruz vs.
Enrilewhich needs to be rectified. For, although the Court nullified the proceedings against the civilians-
petitioners who were still serving their sentences after conviction by the military courts and commissions, and we
directed the Secretary of Justice to file the necessary informations against them in the proper civil courts, we did
not nullify the court martial proceedings against the other civilians petitioners who: (1) had finished serving their
sentences; (2) had been granted amnesty; or (3) had been acquitted by the military courts. We did not order
their reprosecution, retrial, and resentencing by the proper civil courts. We set them free.
In effect, the Court applied one rule for those civilians who were convicted by the military courts and were still
serving their sentences, and another rule for those who were acquitted, or pardoned, or had finished the service
of their sentences. The Court applied a rule of retroactive invalidity to the first group (whom the Court ordered to
be reprosecuted before the proper civil courts) and another of prospective invalidity for the others (whom the
Court ordered to be released from custody).

In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only
to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should
be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts
against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed
by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious
denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be
ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a
retrial, is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account
of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.

It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a court martial which sentenced him to death without receiving
evidence in his defense. It would be a cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as authority for
reprosecuting civilians regardless of whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial and regardless
of whether they have already been acquitted and released, or have accepted the sentences imposed on them
and commenced serving the same. Not everybody who was convicted by a military court, much less those who
were acquitted and released, desires to undergo the ordeal of a second trial for the same offense, albeit in a civil
court. Indeed, why should one who has accepted the justness of the verdict of a military court, who is satisfied
that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of
another hearing in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty? Even
if there is a chance of being acquitted the second time around, it would be small comfort for the accused if he is
held without bail pending the completion of his second trial which may take as long as, if not longer than, the
sentence he has been serving or already served.

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals and commissions during the ten-
year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in
the exercise of his legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The belated declaration
in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their
consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us
from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus, did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27
SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the declaration of nullity of the creation of a municipality by
executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government thus abolished:

In Norton vs. Shelby Count, Mr. Justice Field said: 'An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed.' Accordingly, he held that bonds issued by a board of
commissioners created under an invalid statute were unenforceable.

Executive Order 386 'created no office.' This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the
municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive
order is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.' For the existence of
Executive Order 386 is 'an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.' As Chief Justice Hughes
explained in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:

'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. vs. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status,
of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the
light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and
 federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity, cannot be justified.

There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order
creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of
the creation of that municipality. (Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533)

The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-accused before
Military Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over
civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of the petitioners, the
proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that
the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of
martial law, had been affirmed by this Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before
the Olaguer case arose and came before us.

Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against the petitioners would place
them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic.

The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the strong arm of the State:

The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single prosecution for any offense is all the law
allows. It protects an accused from harassment, enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed
chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is
a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming and expense-producing for the state as well. It
has been referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only
once, not whenever it pleases the state to do so. (Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Ed.,
pp. 722-723.)

Furthermore, depriving the petitioners of the protection of the judgment of acquittal rendered by the military
commission in their particular case by retroactively divesting the military commission of the jurisdiction it had
exercised over them would amount to an ex post facto law or ruling, again, in sharp reality if not in strict
constitutional theory. An ex-post facto law or rule, is one which —

1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;

2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;

3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;

4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense;

5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right
for something which when done was lawful; and,

6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (In re: Kay Villegas
Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428, 431)

Article IV, Section 22, of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the enactment of an ex post facto law or bill of attainder.

We need not discuss the petitioners' final argument that the information against them is invalid because there
was no preliminary investigation, no finding of probable cause by the investigating fiscal and no prior approval of
the information by the City Fiscal before it was filed.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. Respondent State Prosecutor and the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, at Cagayan de Oro City, are hereby ordered to
discharge the petitioners from the information in Criminal Case No. 88-825. The temporary restraining order
which we issued on January 16, 1989 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
REPUBLIC V SAGUN (Citizenship)

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, seeking the reversal of the April 3, 2009 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, of
Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R.The RTC granted the petition[2] filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun
entitled In re: Judicial Declaration of Election of Filipino Citizenship, Nora Fe Sagun v. The Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City.
The facts follow:
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino
citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City[3] and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of
Allegiance[4] to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on
December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied
due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected
Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship
and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.
In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog fluently
and attended local schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and the Saint Louis
University. Respondent claimed that despite her part-Chinese ancestry, she always thought of herself as a
Filipino. She is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had
voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification[5] issued by Atty. Maribelle Uminga of
the Commission on Elections of Baguio City.
She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such
fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
On August 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic
of the Philippines and authorized the City Prosecutor of Baguio City to appear in the above mentioned
case.[6] However, no comment was filed by the City Prosecutor.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the petition
and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y
Chan is hereby DECLARED [a] FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino
citizenship.
Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby
directed to annotate [on] her birth certificate, this judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of
said petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]
Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant
recourse via a petition for review on certiorari before us. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I
Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is
procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible; and,
II
Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the
age of majority, is considered to have been made within a reasonable time as interpreted by
jurisprudence.[8]
Petitioner argues that respondents petition before the RTC was improper on two counts: for one, law and
jurisprudence clearly contemplate no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of Philippine citizenship;
and for another, the pleaded registration of the oath of allegiance with the local civil registry and its annotation
on respondents birth certificate are the ministerial duties of the registrar; hence, they require no court order.
Petitioner asserts that respondents petition before the trial court seeking a judicial declaration of her election of
Philippine citizenship undeniably entails a determination and consequent declaration of her status as a Filipino
citizen which is not allowed under our legal system. Petitioner also argues that if respondents intention in filing
the petition is ultimately to have her oath of allegiance registered with the local civil registry and annotated on
her birth certificate, then she does not have to resort to court proceedings.
 Petitioner further argues that even assuming that respondents action is sanctioned, the trial court erred
in finding respondent as having duly elected Philippine citizenship since her purported election was not in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and was not made within a reasonable time. Petitioner points
out that while respondent executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her
election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered with the nearest
local civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of
majority. Accordingly, it was made beyond the period allowed by law.
In her Comment,[9] respondent avers that notwithstanding her failure to formally elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, she has in fact effectively elected Filipino citizenship by her
performance of positive acts, among which is the exercise of the right of suffrage. She claims that she had voted
and participated in all local and national elections from the time she was of legal age. She also insists that she is a
Filipino citizen despite the fact that her election of Philippine citizenship was delayed and unregistered.
In reply,[10] petitioner argues that the special circumstances invoked by respondent, like her continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, her having been educated in schools in the country, her choice of
staying here despite the naturalization of her parents as American citizens, and her being a registered voter,
cannot confer on her Philippine citizenship as the law specifically provides the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondents petition for declaration of election
of Philippine citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; (2) whether respondent has
effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final
resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other
hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is
correct or not, is a question of law.[11]
In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the trial court declaring respondent
a Filipino citizen after finding that respondent was able to substantiate her election of Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner contends that respondents petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is
procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has raised questions of law as the resolution of
these issues rest solely on what the law provides given the attendant circumstances.
In granting the petition, the trial court stated:
This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate her petition regarding
her election of Filipino citizenship, and the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City should be ordered
to annotate in her birth certificate her election of Filipino citizenship. This Court adds that the
petitioners election of Filipino citizenship should be welcomed by this country and people
because the petitioner has the choice to elect citizenship of powerful countries like the United
States of America and China, however, petitioner has chosen Filipino citizenship because she
grew up in this country, and has learned to love the Philippines. Her choice of electing Filipino
citizenship is, in fact, a testimony that many of our people still wish to live in the Philippines, and
are very proud of our country.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y
Chan is hereby DECLARED as FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino
citizenship.[12]
For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.[13] There is no specific legislation authorizing the
institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. [14] This was our ruling
in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic[15] citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of the Philippines,[16] where we
clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies,
which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of
said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident
only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and
make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond
judicial power. x x x
 Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts competence.
As to the propriety of respondents petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is required under the law to make an election
and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares
as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the
child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973
Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines.[17]Likewise, this recognition by
the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that [t]hose born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine
citizens.[18]It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of
Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition
of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge
under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not
been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.[19]
Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching
the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the
citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow
her nationality.[20] An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights
and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself.[21] But in the
case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,[22] enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4),
[S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be
filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with
the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of
election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3)
registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.[23]
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless
the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of
1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien.[24] Pertinently, the person electing
Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now
Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election
of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or
invalidity of said election.[25] Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for
final determination and review.[26]
It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct
filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding
provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil
registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent.
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that
respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent
failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a
sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by
respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she
reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even
assuming arguendothat respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time
after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required
under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election
should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. [27] Moreover, there was no
satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local
civil registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the
exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The
mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing
exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent
cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when
clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching,[28] the prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the
elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the
trial court must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3 of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for
judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity
for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the
accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and
repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”

FACTS:

On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his
purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus
Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was
issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his
advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he
is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable byreclusion
perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.

a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be punishable
by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

HELD:

1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on
bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably calculated
to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong.Where
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides: Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it
has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with
and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the
pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or
his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court
after notice to the adverse party in either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetuasubject to judicial
discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine
whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application
for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra)
Otherwise petition should be denied.

2. YES. Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community arising from its
commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting fromGovernment of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC
emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. (emphasis in decision)

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail.It acted whimsically and capriciously
and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

SALONGA vs PAÑO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985

Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the
due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an
information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of
the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months
of August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing,
implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary
Investigation” in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating
that “the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on
December 12, 1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and
the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the
time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not
received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero
Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA
1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed
a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima
facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he
(Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-
Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge
dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is
the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify
the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the
lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme
Court

Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment
had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if
any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent
City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions
of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of
petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned
resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the
draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the
Court’s crowded agenda for further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned,
this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it has
on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly
apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection
given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language
clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command
of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly
be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center’s new
charter pursuant to the President’s legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court
discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for
national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot
and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one
of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.