MALACAT v.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 123595 December 12, 1997
Facts: Petitioner was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 for having a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary
license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities. He was
apprehended by virtue of a warrantless arrest of “stop and frisk” when the
police noticed their suspicious acts. Upon being approached by the police
officers, the accused immediately run from different directions and was
chased by the police officers. Thereafter, they already arrested the suspects.
The said police officers was said to be already trying to apprehend the said
accused here, for almost 2 days.
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of
petitioner was akin to it a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can
be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose
object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer
seeks to obtain more information." Moreover, it ruled that the seizure of the
grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner
"[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the
purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that sufficient
evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
due to the loss of his case in the trial court, it was directly appealed to the
court of appeals who also affirmed the validity of the warrantless arrest.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid?
Ruling: No.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a
warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those
effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As
regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated
under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that
under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. 5(c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure
of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a
lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk."
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly,
the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a
lawful arrest.
Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the “stop-and-frisk” was
invalid: First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu’s claim that petitioner was a
member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days
earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report. Second, there
was nothing in petitioner’s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were “moving very fast”
– an observation which leaves us incredulous. Third, there was at all no
ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a
deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
grenade was “discovered” “inside the front waistline” of petitioner, and from
all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge,
assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been
visible to Yu.
Further, Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner
the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not
have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then
available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived
his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not
in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel. Thus, the
admission is inadmissible as evidence against the petitioner.
PEOPLE v. ROGELIO MENGOTE
G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
FACTS: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an
informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of
Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team
of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw
two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They
approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon
the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-
appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his
companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they
were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation.
An information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of
illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was
among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including
the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned
the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that
the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted
for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his
appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him
because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid?
Ruling: No.
Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of court requires that the person
be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is
at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting
officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At
the time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking
from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by
Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense
was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion
on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed
it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been
suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen"
and in a place not exactly forsaken?
PEOPLE v. COLLADO
SCRA 698 v. 628
Facts: PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses
Marcelino and Myra were engaged in selling shabu. After recording the report
in the police blotter, PO2 Noble relayed the information to his superior,
P/Insp. Castillo, who in turn ordered the conduct of a surveillance operation.
PO2 Noble, et al., conducted surveillance on the couple’s residence. A buy-
bust operation team was thereafter formed, and the team proceeded to
Marcelino’s and Myra’s residence. Upon reaching the target area, the asset
introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of shabu. During the
negotiation regarding the price, Marcelino then took from his pocket a small
metal container from which he brought out a small plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance and gave the same to PO2 Noble. While PO2
Noble was inspecting its contents, he noticed smoke coming from a table
inside the house of the couple around which were seven persons. When PO2
Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup team rushed to the scene.
The appellate court found the warrantless arrest of the appellants to
be lawful considering that they were caught in the act of committing a
crime.22 Thus, the CA affirmed the conviction of Marcelino and Myra for
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 (sale of dangerous drugs), as well as the
conviction of Marcelino for violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal
possession of dangerous drugs). It therefore affirmed with modification the
ruling of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not there were irregularities in the arrest of the appellant-
spouses?
Held: No, the arrest was valid.
Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this
type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: "(1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and,
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer." A common example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after
conducting a buy-bust operation.
The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in
pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was effected
after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble
the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal
drug paraphernalia.
Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of
appellants, they can no longer question the validity thereof as there is no
showing that they objected to the same before their arraignment. Neither did
they take steps to quash the Informations on such ground. They only raised
this issue upon their appeal to the appellate court. By this omission, any
objections on the legality of their arrest are deemed to have been waived by
them.
Anent their claim of unreasonable search and seizure, it is true that
under the Constitution, "a search and consequent seizure must be carried out
with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence
obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding." This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, one of which
is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court, "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." The factual
milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were
lawfully arrested.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
 vs.
 NG YIK BUN, KWOK WAI
CHENG, CHANG CHAUN SHI, CHUA SHILOU HWAN, KAN
SHUN MIN, and RAYMOND S. TAN
 ISSUE: Whether there was a valid warrantless search.
January 10, 2011; G.R. No. 180452
FACTS:
On August 24, 2000, around 9pm, Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana
received information from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment
of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Upon
instructions from his superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed
a team in coordination with a PNP detachment, and, along with the operative,
the team then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II,
Sariaya.
The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort
from a distance of around 50 meters. They spotted six Chinese-looking men
loading bags containing a white substance into a white van. Having been
noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua
Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied that it
was shabu and pointed to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A
total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated.
A laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo
on samples of the 172 confiscated bags showed the white substance to be
shabu.
On January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for violation of Sec. 16,
Article III of RA 6425 was filed against accused-appellants, who entered a
plea of not guilty upon re-arraignment.
RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. In questioning the
RTC Decision before the CA, accused-appellants alleged that the trial court
erred when it held as valid the warrantless search, seizure and subsequent
arrest of the accused-appellants despite the non-concurrence of the requisite
circumstances that justify a warrantless arrest. CA affirmed decision of RTC.
Hence this appeal to the SC. Accused-appellants claim that no valid in
flagrante delicto arrest was made prior to the seizure and that the police
officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even when there was no
evidence that an offense was being committed. Since there was no warrant of
arrest, they argue that the search sans a search warrant subsequently made on
them was illegal. They contend that a seizure of any evidence as a result of an
illegal search is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.
RULING:
YES. Art. III, SEC. 2 of the Constitution provides that “The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.”
A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is
that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not
require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid
under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
states:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;”XX
The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant case,
contrary to accused-appellants’ contention, there was indeed a valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto.
Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest
of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an
operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers,
with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II,
Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance
of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading
transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van.
The arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-
appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan,
upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and
pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-appellants––who
were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a
white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425 is valid.
In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds
at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of
Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed
in his presence or within his view. In the instant case, it can be argued that
accused-appellants were committing the offense of possessing shabu and were
in the act of loading them in a white van when the police officers arrested
them. As aptly noted by the appellate court, the crime was committed in the
presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic
containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers.
The Court also notes that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their
objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea.
Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal possession
of drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.
Accused-appellants were positively identified in court as the individuals
caught loading and possessing illegal drugs. They were found to be in
possession of prohibited drugs without proof that they were duly authorized
by law to possess them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is,
therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on the part of accused-
appellants. There is, thus, no merit to the argument of the defense that a
warrant was needed to arrest accused-appellants.
Accused-appellants were not able to show that there was any truth to their
allegation of a frame-up in rebutting the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. They relied on mere denials, in contrast with the testimony of Capt.
Ibon, who testified that he and his team saw accused-appellants loading plastic
bags with a white crystalline substance into an L-300 van at the Villa Vicenta
Resort. Accused-appellants, except for Tan, claimed that they were ordered
by the police officers to act like they were loading bags onto the van. Accused-
appellant Tan told a different tale and claims he was arrested inside a
restaurant. But as the trial court found, the persons who could have
corroborated their version of events were not presented in court. The only
witness presented by Tan, a tricycle driver whose testimony corroborated
Tan’s alone, was not found by the trial court to be credible.
As no ill motive can be imputed to the prosecution’s witnesses, we uphold the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and affirm the
trial court’s finding that the police officers’ testimonies are deserving of full
faith and credit. Appellate courts generally will not disturb the trial court’s
assessment of a witness’ credibility unless certain material facts and
circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.

G.R. No. 178039 January 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERNESTO UYBOCO y
RAMOS
FACTS: On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin
and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were abducted and brought to a house in Merville
Subdivision, Parañaque. Nimfa was able to recognized one of the kidnappers
as appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employer’s office. 14 The
kidnappers called Jepson and demanded for ransom of P26 Million. In one
of the calls of the kidnappers, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of
appellant because he had several business transactions. After, numerous
times of negotiation, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million,
some in ash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a
pistol. Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake House
in Magallanes Commercial Center and ordered him to put the bag in the
trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without
turning back. P/Insp. Escandor and P/Supt. Chan were assigned to proceed
to Magallanes Commercial Center and brought a camera to take photo and
video coverage of the supposed pay-off. He identified Macias together with
appellant and the latter as the one who took the ransom.
Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone.
Appellant then apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the
Shell Gasoline Station along South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went
to the place and found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas
station. P/Supt. Cruz and his group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio then
heard on their radio that the suspect’s vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was
heading in their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car and
tailed it until it reached Dasmariñas Village in Makati. When said car slowed
down, they blocked it and immediately approached the vehicle.23 They
introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who
turned out to be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver
and a scuffle took place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed
him. Appellant was requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was
found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid arrest and search without warrant?
DOCTRINE: The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5,
paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which provides: “A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: x x x; (b)
When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) x
x x.” A search incident to a lawful arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court which states: “A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.”
RATIONALE: The instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by
paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed;
and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Records show
that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers
present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off
which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping. Such knowledge
was then relayed to the other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio
where appellant was expected to pass by. Personal knowledge of facts must
be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting
officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own
eyes. It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-
off for a number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was
indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal
knowledge based on probable cause.
Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because
the latter consented to such. Even assuming that appellant did not give his
consent for the police to search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue
of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful
arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers
to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but
also in the permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is only but
expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it
when he was arrested.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from are AFFIRMED.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. VS. ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA,
G.R. NO. 186227, JULY 20, 2011, PERALTA, J.).
While it is true that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National
Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close
coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision does
not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua non for every
buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest
sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of the Court, which police
authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act
No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. A buy-bust operation is not invalidated
by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.