Morfe v. Mutuc
It is only to
G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968
FACTS:
Congress enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public
officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the
tone of morality in public service. One of the specific provisions of the said act is
that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after
his assumption of office "and within the month of January of every other year
thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file
with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar." Said provision
was challenged for being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of
police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy,
implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together
with the prohibition against self-incrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the periodical submission of statement of assets and liabilities
of an official is violative of the petitioner’s constitutional rights.
HELD:
No. The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing
the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty
in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public
administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil
at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all.
When a government official accepts a public position, he is deemed to have
voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair,
not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he continues
to discharge public trust. While in the attainment of such public good, no
infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a showing,
clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the
statute allows. The due process clause is not susceptible to such a reproach.
There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power. It cannot also
be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of
information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy.
emphasize that in subjecting him to such compulsory revelation, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not
give freedom from testimonial compulsion. It appears clear that no violation of
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has been shown to exist
by such requirement. Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater
plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his invocation of the non-
incrimination clause. The court stresses that it is not aware of any constitutional
provision designed to protect a man's conduct from judicial inquiry or aid him in
fleeing from justice.
DAR vs Delia Sutton
FACTS:
• The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents
which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On
October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform
program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to
sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain
incentives under the law.
• On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect.
• In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a
formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was
devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the
coverage of the CARL.
• MARO inspected respondents’ land and found that it was devoted solely to
cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary
that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
• DAR ignored their request
• DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of
private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the
CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed
the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio.
• DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of
 respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Respondents
moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire
landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-
raising. Their motion was denied.
• Office of the President affirmed the order of DAR
• On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It
declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent
of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms
from the land reform program of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a
maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is
constitutional.
HELD:
• Assailed AO is unconstitutional.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes
the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them
in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit
for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively
devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising.
Randolf David vs President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch – Presidential
Proclamation 1017 – Take Care Clause – Take Over Power – Calling Out Power
Bill of Rights – Freedom of Speech – Overbreadth
Facts: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017
(PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law
was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring
down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the
same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to
his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided
by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups.
Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and
seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest
was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national
emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred
that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly
declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such
declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an
overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the
lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred
that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and
take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting
of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still
affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take
cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part
and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC
ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing
PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment
and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders.
There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any
contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to
prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at
bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017
shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing
the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial
overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct,
not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The
SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From
the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion
has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it
arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress.
They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’
The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that
the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to
promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out
of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On
the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not
limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a
distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her
exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such
exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be
based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount
to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the
president.
VERSION 2:
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare
War and Delegate Emergency Power]
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of
the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The
President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces
to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,― and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the
members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search”
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017
and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution
is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity
of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated
b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important
provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII
… do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the
decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it
becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration
allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance,
and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring
a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17,
Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-
owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017
calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation
cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise
of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in
preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power
by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a
state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first,
Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in
the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to
the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon
it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to
the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency
powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest
is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon
Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or
not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress
may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms
thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President
Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not
authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can
he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise,
without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of
businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the
AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and
made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional.