G.R. No. 80066 May 24, 1988 1.
1. The petitioner claims that the respondent judge erred in hooding that the possession of loose
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO ASUNCION, as Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Quezon City, and ROLANDO ABADILLA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Vicente G. Ericta for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution issued by the respondent Judge on 1
September 1987, which dismissed the Information filed in Criminal Case No. Q-53382 of the
Regional Trial Court, filing NCJR Quezon City, entitled: "People of the Philippines,
plaintiff, versus Rolando Abadilla, accused," for Violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition), and the Order issued on 25 September 1987, which
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Resolution.
On 30 July 1987, Rolando Abadina, a former colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
was charged before the Relations regional Trial Court, filing NCJR Quezon City, with the offense
of Violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 [Megal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition) in an
Information, docketed therein as Criminal Case filing N Q-53382, which reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses ROLANDO ABADILLA of the crime of Violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on about 27th day of July 1987, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, filing chd then
and there, filing wiuwly unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody
and control the following:
a. Sterling Assault Rifle, filing SMG 9mm, MK5, filing L34Al No. 1024 SN-Defaced filing
b. Armalite Rifle, M16 SN-RP137912 filing
c. Carbine, Cal. 30 M2, SN-1052937 filing
d. Cal 357 Revolver, Smith & Wesson SN-187K589 filing
e. Cal 45, Pistol, Colt, SNO-7OG26301
f. Ammunitions and magazines defiling bed as follows:
1. Two filing tho dfiling filing pes (2,000) of Cal. 5.56 filing mm ammos;
2. Seventy-four (74) filing rds of Cal. 50 ammos;
3. Thirty (30) filing rds of Cal. 9mm ammos;
4. Twenty-eight (28) filing rds of Cal. 30 ammos;
5. filing Rve (5) filing rds of 20 gauge ammos;
6. Two hundred-ninety (290) pcs. of spent shells for Magnum num 44 and 38 Special;
7. One hundred sixty-six (166) slugs for Magnum 44;
8. One (1) pcs. magazine for Sterling Rifle (long);
9. One (1) pcs. magazine for filing Ml 6 rifle (long); and
10. One (1) pcs. magazine for Carbine rifle (long)
without first securing the necessary license and/or permit from the lawful authority. 1
Upon motion of the accused, the respondent judge, as aforestated, in a Resolution dated 1
September 1987, dismissed the Information on the ground that it did not allege sufficient facts to
constitute an offense, since the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per
se, in view of Executive Order No. 107 which gives holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms
and ammunition a period of six (6) months from its effectivity, extended to 31 December 1987 by
Executive Order No. 222, within which to surrender the same to the proper authorities, without
incurring any criminal liability therefor, except if the unlicensed firearm or ammunition is carried
outside of one's residence, not for the purpose of surrendering the same, or used in the
commission of any other offense, and there is no allegation in said information that the firearms
and ammunition enumerated therein were carried outside the accused's residence or used in the
commission of some other crime. In support thereof, the respondent judge cited the decision
in People vs. Lopez, 79 Phil 658. 2
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration of said Resolution, but the motion was denied
in an Order dated 25 September 1987. 3
Hence, the present recourse by the prosecution.
firearms and explosives is not illegal per se during the period covered by Executive Orders Nos.
107 and 222. The petitioner argues that nothing is contained in said executive orders which
legalizes the possession of firearms and ammunition without a permit; that said executive orders
merely authorized holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition to surrender
the same within a specified filing perioki without incurring criminal liability; and that illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition is still penalized under Pres. Decree No. 1866 which
was not repealed by said Executive Order Nos. 107 and 222.
It may be true that there is nothing in Executive Orders Nos. 107 and 222 that expressly
legalizes the unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition, but this Court, applying
statutes 4 similar to the executive orders in question, and which also provided for a period within
which a holder or possessor of unlicensed firearms and ammunition may surrender the same to
the proper authorities without incurring criminal liability, had ruled that a criminal hability was
temporarily filing hfted for mere possession' of unlicensed firearms and ammunition during the
period covered, although such person is not exempt from criminal liability filing within the period
provided, he carries the firearm and ammunition (unless it is for the purpose of surrendering the
same) or he commits any other offense with the use of such unlicensed firearm and ammunition.
Thus, in People vs. Lopez, 5 the Court said:
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4, which is the last enactment on the subject, makes it unlawful to
manufacture, dispose, sell, acquire, possess, etc. firearms and ammunition. However, this
provision was qualified by section 2 which is as follows:
SEC. 2. The provisions of the foregoing section to the contrary notwithstanding, any person in
possession of any of the prohibited articles therein mentioned, may, without incurring any
criminal hability, surrender the same to such officer and within such period of time as the
President shall by proclamation designate and fix immediately upon the approval of this
Act: Provided, however, That this section shall not be interpreted to mean as in any way
exempting from such liability any person, without the requisite license, found, within the
aforementioned period of time, making use of any of said articles, except in self-defense, or
carrying them on his person except for the purpose of surrendering them as herein required:
Provided, further, That this section shall not in any way affect any case pending in court, on the
date of the passage of this Act, for violation of section twenty-six hundred and ninety-two of the
Revised Administrative Code; and Provided, lastly, That the President may authorize any officer
or agency of the Government to issue to the persons surrendering their firearms temporary
licenses therefor for period not exceeding three months at a time.
In pursuance of filing tws provision the President issued Proclamation No. 1, dated July 20,
1946, finding August 31, 1946, as the last day, in the provinces of Luzon on which to surrender
articles described in section 1 without incurring criminal liability.
It will be seen that section 2 excluded from the operation of section 1 up to August 31, 1946,
possession of firearms and ammunition so long as they were not used for any purpose other
than self-defense or carried for any purpose other than of surrendering them to the proper
authorities. The Government does not dispute this interpretation. Although the law does not
categorically state that criminal liability was temporarily lifted for mere possession of filing
firegems and ammunition, that is the only construction compatible with the spirit and purposes of
the enactment as revealed by its context.
Moreover, in People vs. Feliciano, 6 the Court ruled that Republic Act No. 482 legalized mere
unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition for the limited period specified in said law,
and punished only (1) the use of unlicensed firearm or ammunition, or (2) the carrying of such
firearm or ammunition on the person, except to surrender them. The Court said:
In the early morning of June 10, 1950, Constabulary Sergeant Roman Arao conducted a search
in the house of Mamba located in the poblacion of Tuazon Cagayan' in the course of which he
found under the pillow of the appellant a revolver, caliber .45, with three rounds of ammunition. It
is not necessary to take up appellant's argument that there is absolutely no proof that he had no
permit or license to possess the articles in question, because the other contention that the
appellant is not hable in view of Republic Act No. 482, is correct. This Act, in section 1, provides
that an unlicensed holder or possessor of any firearm or ammunition may, without incurring
criminal hability, surrender the same within the period of one year from the date the Act took
effect (June 10, 1950), but that such unlicensed holder or point filing r is not exempted if found
within said period making use of the firearm and ammunition or them on his person except for
purposes of surrender. The statute in effect, legalizing mere unlicensed possession for a limited allege and prove, if he had been prosecuted for ubing or carrying on filing hm person a was that
period, punishes only (1) using a firearm or ammunition or (2) carrying the same on the person he defended himself the arm or was on his way to give it up, as the case might be.
except to give them up. The appellant was not charged with any of these two acts. 3. Finally, the petitioner contends that under the allegation in the information filing t the accused
This rulling was reiterated in People vs. Tabunares, 7 wherein the Court said: without any authority of law, did then and there filing y unlawfully and filing feloiaiously have m.
In the very recent case of People vs. Feliciano (supra, p. 688) we ruled that Republic Act No. his posseamon and under his custody and control the firearms and ammunition enumerated
482, approved on June 10, 1950, in effect legalized mere unlicensed on within one year from therein, prosecution may prove that the accused earned the firearms and ammunition outside of
said date, and punished only (1) the use of a or ammunition or (2) the carriage thereof on the his residence.
person except for purpose of surrender. Appellant's conviction cannot stand, since it is rested The contention is without merit. As the Court had stated in People vs. Austria, 14 the presentation
solely on unlicensed possession on or about November 6, 1950. of evidence "cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or proving an offense which
Executive Order No. 107, as amended by Executive Order No. 222, is similar to Republic Acts does not legally exist. ... The information was not merely defective but it does not charge any
Nos. 4 and 482. We are not prepared, nor are we justified, to give it a different meaning because offense at all. Technically speaking, that information does not exist in contemplation of law."
there is no basis for such a difference. The Court is not unaware that accuse-respondent Abadilla, rightly or wrongly, is Identified with
2. The petitioner claims that it was not necessary for the prosecution to allege in the information the violent arm of the past regime. To many, he is regarded with unusual ease and facility as the
that the firearms and ammunition, subject matter of this case, were brought out of the residence "hit man" of that regime. The Court, however, is not swayed by appellations or approbriums. Its
of the accused or were used by him in the commission or another offense, since these duty, as a temple of justice, is to accord to every man who comes before it in appropriate
circumstances are not essential ingredients of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and proceedings the right to due process and the equal protection of the laws.
ammunition. The information, in this particular charge against accused-respondent Abadilla, is fatally
The contention is without merit. In People vs. Lopez, 8 the Court already ruled that, under defective. It would be fatally defective against any other accused charged with the same offense.
Republic Act No. 4, the use or the carrying of firearms and/or ammunition was an ingredient, if Respondent judge, in dismissal the information, committed no reversible error or grave abuse of
not the sole ingredient, of the offense; i.e. the very acts which were punished, subject to certain discretion. He acted correctly.
conditions, and hence, should be alleged and proved. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The orders appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED
In People vs. Austria, 9 the Court also ruled that in order that an information charging illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition, under Republic Act No. 482, may be deemed suffident, it
must allege that the accused was using the unlicensed firearm or carrying it in his person at the
time he was apprehended by the authorities with said firearm. Said the Court.
It should be noted that the court dismissed the first case for illegal possession of firearm upon
the sole ground that the information die not conceivable facts filing sufedent to constitute an
offense. Bear in mind that information was filed in connection with Republic Act No. 482 which
exempts from liability persons found in filing sion of unlicensed unless the firearm is used or
carried in his person by the possessor. And we already held in a recent case that in order that an
information under that Act may be deemed sufficient it must allege that the accused was the
unlicensed firearm or carrying it in his person at the time he was caught by the authorities with
the unlicensed weapon (People vs. Santos Lopez y Jacinto, G.R. No. L-1603, November 29,
1947, 79 Phil. 658). And these essential allegations not having been averred in the information,
the court rightly as the case on the ground that the information did not allege facts Buffident to
constitute an offense.
The cases of U.S. vs. Chan Toco, 10 People vs. Cadabia, 11 and People vs. San Juan 12 cannot
be on y invoked by the petitioner. The law involved in the case at bar is not of the same filing
elms of laws involved in said cases which referred to violation of the Opium Law and the filing
Elwdon Code. In People vs. Lopez, 13 the Court said:
Courts and text writers are not m. exact agreement on when the filing must negative the "options
in a penal law; that is, when 'it is necessary to in the indictment that the defendant does no filing
t come within the exception, or to negative the province it contains. "In U.S. vs. Chan Toco (12
Phil. 262), the Court this question and pertinent authorities at length. filing kt reached the filing
for filing smoking opium, that "whom one is charged with 'a violation of the general provisions of
the Opium Law, it is "more logical as well above more practical and convenient," if he did in fact
smoke opium under the advice of a physically that he should set up them fact by way of defense,
than that the on should be called upon to prove that every smoker, charged with a violation of
the law, does so 'without such advice or prescription.
However, that point is not here. The law involved in the case at bar is not of the class of laws
referred to in the foregoing decision. The matters which the information now before us has failed
to allege were not exceptions to a provision defining an offense. They were not such exceptions
as under the U.S. vs. Chan Toco doctrine should have been averred or proved as a defense.
Under filing Republic Act No. 4, the use or the carrying of firearms and/or ammunition was an
ingredient, if it was not the solement, of the offense, the very will which were punished subject to
certain conditions. It has been seen that mere possession or custody of any of the article
specified in the act filing viitjun the time designated m. the processes was not illegal unless filing
r made use of them or carried them on his person. What the accused could have been obliged to
G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, against respondent
Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated December 17, 2009 and
Resolution2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616. The assailed decision granted the
petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 27, to give due course to and receive evidence on respondent's motion to quash and
resolve the case with dispatch, while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina). 3 On October 28, 1993,
respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition
for annulment of his marriage with Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for
lack of a valid marriage license.6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June
2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage
with Modina.7She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information9 for Bigamy committed as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being
then legally married to JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law.10
On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be allowed to
present evidence to support his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that the case
be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1)
that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished.12
On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondent’s Omnibus Motion.
The RTC held that the facts alleged in the information – that there was a valid marriage between
respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent
contracted a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial court
further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has
been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the
modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied in an Order15 dated February 20, 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court16 before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact
that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the
bigamy case.17
On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
RTC, Branch 27, Manila is hereby ordered to give due course to and receive evidence on the
petitioner’s motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People, 19 and held that there is
cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would
establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential element of the crime of
bigamy would be lacking.20 The appellate court further held that respondent is even better off
than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such doctrine, considering that respondent
contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and he obtained the favorable declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed
against him.21 The CA thus concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
respondent’s motion to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the
information do not charge an offense.22
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition before
the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the
following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED ITS
DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009 GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL
THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.
II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENT’S FIRST MARRIAGE
VOID AB INITIO DID NOT EXTINGUISH RESPONDENT’S CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH
ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.23
The petition is meritorious.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montañez v.
Cipriano,24 Teves v. People,25 and Antone v. Beronilla.26
In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of
their marriage on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a
petition for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of psychological
incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for
bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the information and
dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that her first marriage had already been declared
void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their
marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a
declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the ground that the latter is physically
incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy
was filed against petitioner. The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage,
respondent contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a
declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became final and executory on May 15,
2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an information for bigamy against respondent
which the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above
cases. As in Antone and Montañez, respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds
that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal liability has been
extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The RTC refused to
quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails
the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It is a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the
sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged
therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime
defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be
considered.27 To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information
which is evident on its fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the
court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. 29 If the motion to quash is sustained,
the court may order that another complaint or information be filed30 except when the information
is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. 31
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not
the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by
crime as provided for in Article 34932 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts
(1) That the offender has been legally married; contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, during the presentation of evidence.43
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent.
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 33 him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. Respondent’s evidence showing the Branch 27 for further proceedings.
court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning because of
the absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to
that alleged in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted
the second marriage. This should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot
be raised in a motion to quash.34It is notproper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very
outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would
be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the
information on the basis of the document presented by respondent.35 With the presentation of
the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded
to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof.
Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his marriage with
Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the
crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do not charge the offense of bigamy, or
at the very least, such court decree extinguished his criminal liability. Both respondent and the
CA heavily relied on the Court’s pronouncement in Morigo v. People36where the accused therein
was acquitted because the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the
first marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract
without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to
speak of when the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was
acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter.1âwphi1 A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 37 It has been held in a number of cases that a
judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or
else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. 38
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 40 If we allow respondent’s line of
defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution
by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a
favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. 41
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him,
because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for
bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion
above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission
of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law
and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining
prescription.42
Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for
G.R. No. 216920
GIRLIE M. QUISAY, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October 10, 2014 and
the Resolution3 dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
131968, which affirmed the denial of petitioner Girlie M. Quisay's (petitioner) Motion to Quash
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144 (RTC).
The Facts
On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati) issued
a Pasiya4 or Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7610,5otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid Sakdal6 or Information was
filed before the RTC on January 11, 2013 charging petitioner of such crime.
On April 12, 2013, petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground
of lack of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support of her motion,
petitioner pointed out that the Pasiya issued by the OCP-Makati was penned by Assistant City
Prosecutor Estefano H. De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz) and approved by Senior Assistant City
Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang (SACP Hirang), while the Pabatid Sakdal was penned by ACP De
La Cruz, without any approval from any higher authority, albeit with a Certification claiming that
ACP De La Cruz has prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor in filing the said
Information. In this regard, petitioner claimed that nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid
Sakdal would show that ACP De La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had prior written authority or
approval from the City Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the Information against her. As
such, the Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot
be cured.7
In its Comment and Opposition,8 the OCP-Makati countered that the review prosecutor, SACP
Hirang, was authorized to approve the Pasiya pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No.
32.9 Further, it maintained that the Pabatid Sakdal was filed with the prior approval of the City
Prosecutor as shown in the Certification in the Information itself.10
The RTC Ruling
In an Order11 dated May 8, 2013, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit. It
found the Certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal to have sufficiently complied with Section
4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the prior written authority or approval by,
among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of Informations. 12
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,13 which was, however, denied in an Order14 dated July 10,
2013. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari.15
The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated October 10, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that pursuant to
Section 9 of RA 10071,17 otherwise known as the "Prosecution Service Act of 201 O," as well as
OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, the City Prosecutor of Makati authorized SACP Hirang to
approve the issuance of, inter alia, resolutions finding probable cause and the filing of
Informations before the courts. As such, SACP Hirang may, on behalf of the City Prosecutor,
approve the Pasiya which found probable cause to indict petitioner of violation of Section 10 of
RA 7610.18
Further, it held that the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz in the Pabatid Sakdal clearly
indicated that the same was filed after the requisite preliminary investigation and with the prior
written authority or approval of the City Prosecutor. In this regard, the CA opined that such
Certification enjoys the presumption of regularity accorded to a public officer's performance of
official functions, in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary. 19
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,20 but was denied in a Resolution21 dated
January 30, 2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held that the R TC
did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner's motion to quash.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a
complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers
therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts, viz.:
SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating
prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and
information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted
against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise,
he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial
or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of
offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall
act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform
the parties of such action.1âwphi1
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without
the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior
written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and,
therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 11 7 of the same Rules, to wit:
SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
the following grounds:
xxxx
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this relation, People v. Garfin22 firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer
without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot
be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.23
In the case at bar, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to quash on the grounds
that: (a) the City Prosecutor ofMakati may delegate its authority to approve the filing of
the Pabatid Sakdal pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071, as well as OCP-Makati Office Order No.
32; and (b) the Pabatid Sakdal contained a Certification stating that its filing before the RTC was
with the prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor.
The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071, which gave the City
Prosecutor the power to "[i]nvestigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective
jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made and
filed against the persons accused,"24 he may indeed delegate his power to his subordinates as
he may deem necessary in the interest of the prosecution service. The CA also correctly
stressed that it is under the auspice of this provision that the City Prosecutor of Makati issued
OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which gave division chiefs or review prosecutors "authority to
approve or act on any resolution, order, issuance, other action, and any information
recommended by any prosecutor for approval,"25 without necessarily diminishing the City
Prosecutor's authority to act directly in appropriate cases. 26 By virtue of the foregoing issuances,
the City Prosecutor validly designated SACP Hirang, Deputy City Prosecutor Emmanuel D.
Medina, and Senior Assistant City Prosecutor William Celestino T. Uy as review prosecutors for
the OCP-Makati.27
In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime
charged, was validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors
for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein.
Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before the
RTC, as there was no showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or
any of the OCPMakati' s division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification
from ACP De La Cruz which stated, among others, that "DAGDAG KO PANG
PINATUTUNAYAN na ang paghahain ng sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot
o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig"28 - which translates to "and that the filing of the
Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City Prosecutor."
In the cases of People v. Garfin,29 Turingan v. Garfin,30 and Tolentino v. Paqueo,31 the Court had
already rejected similarly-worded certifications, uniformly holding that despite such certifications,
the Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either
lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior written authority from any
of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz
was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are
bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do
so by giving him prior written authority or by designating him as a division chief or review
prosecutor of OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz
sought the approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to OCP-
Makati Office Order No. 32 in filing the Pabatid Sakdal. Quite frankly, it is simply baffling how
ACP De La Cruz was able to have the Pasiya approved by designated review prosecutor SACP
Hirang but failed to have the Pabatid Sakdal approved by the same person or any other
authorized officer in the OCP-Makati.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions solely on the basis of the
Certification made by ACP De La Cruz considering the absence of any evidence on record
clearly showing that ACP De La Cruz: (a) had any authority to file the same on his own;
or (b) did seek the prior written approval from those authorized to do so before filing the
Information before the RTC.
In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as
the Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed
the same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be
quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.
As a final note, it must be stressed that "[t]he Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts of the Philippines. For the orderly administration of justice, the provisions
contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the
Govemment."32
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10, 2014 and the
Resolution dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information against petitioner Girlie M.
Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal case against her is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-36342 April 27, 1983
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH XI and FRANCISCO GAPAY y
MALLARES, respondents.
Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mario F. Estayan for respondents.
RESOLUTION
RELOVA, J:
This is a petition to review the order, dated November 17, 1972, of the City Court of Manila,
Branch XI, dismissing the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against private
respondent, Francisco Gapay y Mallares, in Criminal Case No. E-505633 on the ground of
double jeopardy. Respondent court held that the private respondent having been previously tried
and convicted of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for the resulting death of the
victim would place the accused in double jeopardy.
The question presented in this case is whether a person who has been prosecuted for serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted
subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the
same injuries he had suffered.
In Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766, this Court held that "where after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense
and, together with the facts existing at a time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the
accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the second offense." However,
the trial court held that the doctrine of Melo vs. People does not apply in the case at bar in view
of this Court's ruling in People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, that Article 365 of the Penal Code
punishes the negligent state of mind and not the resulting injury. The trial court concluded that
once prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot again be prosecuted for
the same negligence although for a different resulting injury.
In the case at bar, the incident occurred on October 17, 1971. The following day, October 18, an
information for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against private
respondent driver of the truck. On the same day, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died.
On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to one (1) month and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence.
On October 24, 1972, an information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against
private respondent.
On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila, upon motion of private respondent, issued an
order dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double jeopardy.
Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charge again
with the same or Identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former.
However, as held in the case of Melo vs. People, supra, the rule of Identity does not apply when
the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the reason that in
such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for
an offense that was then inexistent. "Thus, where the accused was charged with physical
injuries and after conviction, the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same
accused does not put him twice in jeopardy." Stated differently, where after the first prosecution
a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of
the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct
offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
As stated above, the victim Diolito dela Cruz died on the day the information was filed, and the
accused was arraigned two (2) days after, or on October 20, 1972. When the information for
homicide thru reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on October 24, 1972, the accused-
private respondent was already in jeopardy.
In his memorandum, the Solicitor General made mention of the fact that on October 21, 1972,
the City Fiscal filed an Urgent Motion asking that the "hearing and arraignment of this case be
held in abeyance for there is information that the victim, Diolito dela Cruz died, and the
information would have to be amended." Be that as it may, the fact remains that the victim
Diolito dela Cruz died on October 18 "one (1) day after the accident and the arrest of the
respondent Gapay" (P. 103, Rollo) and that on October 20, 1972, the accused was arraigned,
pleaded guilty and sentenced accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact
supervened after the arraignment and conviction of the accused.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of the lower court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera and Plana, JJ., concur.
Teehankee (Chairman), J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:
I am constrained to concur because the records are inadequate to show that the arraignment,
while hasty and surrounded by seemingly suspicious circumstances, was tainted by fraud,
collusion, or other form of chicanery sufficient to sustain a finding that the State was denied due
process (Cf. Silvestre v. Military Commission No. 21, 82 SCRA 10).
The incident happened on October 17, 1972. The information for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence was filed on October 18, 1972. The victim of the accident died on
the same day.
Knowing the volume of the case load in the City Court of Manila and the inevitably slow pace of
work even when urgency is dictated by the nature of cases with the Fiscal or before the various
salas, it is most surprising that the accused could have been arraigned on October 20, 1972 for
the charge of serious physical injuries only three days after the incident, two days after the filing
of the information, and two days after the death of the victim. The accused does not appear to
have been a detention prisoner necessitating his immediate arraingment right after the filing of
the information. The only sensible conclusion to draw from the above circumstances is that the
accused was hastily made to plead guilty to serious physical injuries to foreclose a charge for
homicide even before it could be filed. In such a case, there would be a trifling with the
processes of justice and a collusive effort amounting to fraud or deceit to deprive the State of its
authority to prosecute an accused for the correct offense. While this conclusion is most likely, it
remains speculative, however, because we have a criminal case before us. The records fail to
show what were the results of an investigation, if any was conducted to ascertain why the
assistant city fiscal's suspicions were not aroused when the case was hurriedly set for
arraignment, contrary to the usual procedures in the Manila City Court. Either the assistant city
fiscal was naively new to the job, or he was hopelessly negligent, or he connived with the
accused, in which case remedial measures are called for. At any rate, I concur in the affirmance
of the order of dismissal in line with the many protections that the Constitution and the laws give
to the accused in criminal prosecutions.
Vasquez, J., I join the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:
I am constrained to concur because the records are inadequate to show that the arraignment,
while hasty and surrounded by seemingly suspicious circumstances, was tainted by fraud,
collusion, or other form of chicanery sufficient to sustain a finding that the State was denied due
process (Cf. Silvestre v. Military Commission No. 21, 82 SCRA 10).
The incident happened on October 17, 1972. The information for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence was filed on October 18, 1972. The victim of the accident died on
the same day.
Knowing the volume of the case load in the City Court of Manila and the inevitably slow pace of
work even when urgency is dictated by the nature of cases with the Fiscal or before the various
salas, it is most surprising that the accused could have been arraigned on October 20, 1972 for
the charge of serious physical injuries only three days after the incident, two days after the filing
of the information, and two days after the death of the victim. The accused does not appear to
have been a detention prisoner necessitating his immediate arraingment right after the filing of
the information. The only sensible conclusion to draw from the above circumstances is that the
accused was hastily made to plead guilty to serious physical injuries to foreclose a charge for
homicide even before it could be filed. In such a case, there would be a trifling with the
processes of justice and a collusive effort amounting to fraud or deceit to deprive the State of its
authority to prosecute an accused for the correct offense. While this conclusion is most likely, it
remains speculative, however, because we have a criminal case before us. The records fail to
show what were the results of an investigation, if any was conducted to ascertain why the
assistant city fiscal's suspicions were not aroused when the case was hurriedly set for
arraignment, contrary to the usual procedures in the Manila City Court. Either the assistant city
fiscal was naively new to the job, or he was hopelessly negligent, or he connived with the
accused, in which case remedial measures are called for. At any rate, I concur in the affirmance
of the order of dismissal in line with the many protections that the Constitution and the laws give
to the accused in criminal prosecutions.
Vasquez, J., I join the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming
sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a
second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.
This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash
the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile,
petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366,
including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because
of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC
issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its
ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s
order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. 6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to
forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his
case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants
because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a
post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such
crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting
petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to
file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and
private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek
relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did
not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection
afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms
of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in relation to
Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the
Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance
on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an
accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped
bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the
mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8
of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to
cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant
retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be
convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the
accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend
the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment,
petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light
of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer
arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest),
petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense"13protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who,
by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first
two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to
give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2)
a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a
generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize
"the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal
act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of
intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As
early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting
in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not
a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" 17 on three points of analysis: (1) the
object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent
to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is
not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of
criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious
mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification
or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence,
what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce
the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13,
specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed.
Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in
proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But
instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave
felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor
to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence
bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of
crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying
charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element
of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and
since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but]
simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon
rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365
are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found
expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising
from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing
of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly,
rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-
crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a
prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the
same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, 25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless
driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been
dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court,
that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution
for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court
unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in
1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported,
per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.),
People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People
v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano
v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v.
City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases
uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan,
where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property
thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: 34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority.
Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, 36 decided by the pre-
war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple
physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the
second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of
jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to
rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for
"damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the
second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the
strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of
People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan,
22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva,
joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December
12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining
petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28,
1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through
reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy
exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same
consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to
property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a
vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle
arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend
in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court
initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed
the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue
following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the
case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy
enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were
charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by
them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise
disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in
connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence
(Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and
another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by
the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose
Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case
No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending
that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just
been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted,
whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for
damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles
involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose
Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of
the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the
Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following
language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby
causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that
court ῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed
an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to
property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50.
Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we
affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests
of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113,
Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to
say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support
the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have
been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged
to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney
is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. 43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz)
"for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of
double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical
Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General,
admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon
which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however,
urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or
clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the
ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case,
will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would
warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the
other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of
Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed,
stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive
and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses
and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a
procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in
lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious
crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the
mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x
x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-
offense not falling under either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple
non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less
grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a
quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-
offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light
offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single
charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized
separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the
issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were
split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and
filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to
light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts. 49 Expectedly, this is the approach
the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic
Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious
penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies
because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy
arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized
as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act
penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less
grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the
effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount
fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be
an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical
injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-
crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-
conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its
conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a
quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan
code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi- Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and
severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct
concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double
jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to
make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes
under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected
the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that
offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing
of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court
in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which
the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x
x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second
jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under
Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of
constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will
do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be
imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave
or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of
culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO,
STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY
CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[1] of the Resolution[2] dated May
28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for
the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the said court. In the aforesaid
criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the
shooting and killing of eleven male persons identified as Manuel Montero, a former Corporal of
the Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who was 16 years old, Ray Abalora, who
was 19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren Sorronda, who was 14 years
old,[3] Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel,
SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the Zamboanga PNP, and Alex Neri, former Corporal of the 44th
Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, bandied as members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration.[4]
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express consent of the
respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also held
therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be
given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its
application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the following:
... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2)
whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; (3) whether the 2-year
period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the
cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to the offended parties were given before
the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were
affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7) whether the
multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year
bar.
The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first determined
whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or
from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of
the new rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the two-year bar, the
State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar. It
emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in
prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State is not precluded from presenting
compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not
applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential
requirements for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of
March 29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners maintain that the
respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr., of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed
with the Court of Appeals and during the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to
dismiss said cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the
victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge Agnir,
Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondents express consent to the provisional dismissal of
the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing
thereon are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of
the new rule.
The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be remanded to the RTC to
determine whether private complainants were notified of the March 22, 1999 hearing on the
respondents motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause. The records
allegedly indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was furnished a copy of the
notice of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence that private prosecutor Atty.
Godwin Valdez was properly retained and authorized by all the private complainants to
represent them at said hearing. It is their contention that Atty. Valdez merely identified the
purported affidavits of desistance and that he did not confirm the truth of the allegations therein.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its Resolution and
Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved for the provisional dismissal of
the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and the
other accused filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases should
the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them.
The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the public and private
prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the hearing thereof. He contends that it was
sufficient that the public prosecutor was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the
motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause because criminal actions are
always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private complainants merely prosecute
the civil aspect thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the petitioners meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of
Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph
thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move
for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent
of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently
asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same
offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.[5]
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the
provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one
year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution[6] without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive,
direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. [7] Where
the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No
objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of the case.[8] The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case[9] or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal [10] does not
amount to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such
provisional dismissal.[11] If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of
the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the
other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the
accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled
even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on
the ground of double jeopardy[12] or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of
limitations.[13]
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information
or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included
therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation.[14] However, in a case
wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the
prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no
longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary
investigation[15] must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is
filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other
persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily
included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or
if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an
accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-
affidavits and evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush;
the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to
assist the court in dispensing that justice.[16]
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first
paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses
alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this Court
in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a
personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for its
examination. The respondent contended therein that until after the trial court shall have
personally determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued
against the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be recalled by
the trial court. He then prayed therein that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the
prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled
therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the
meantime until the resolution of this incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.[18]
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere
provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in his reply filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent
emphasized that:
... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for
Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other co-accused in the
said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the case. On
the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a judicial determination of
probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and (2) that warrants for the
arrest of the accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of the
motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the dismissal of the case was made with the consent of
the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto attached and made integral part hereof
as Annex A.[19]
During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the respondent, through counsel,
categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared that he did not file any motion to dismiss the
criminal cases nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof, thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was
simply a judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then
Judge Agnir, upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had
withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in
probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify
proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except when it is with the express conformity of the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement,
which would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including
other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught
me that a judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the
accused to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a
provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge
Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional
dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination of
probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what
should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I
have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said:
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant
to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued
directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at the
scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be
withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer for
just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a situation
where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is we
did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any assent to
the provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any motion for reconsideration of
the order of Judge Agnir that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already
been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the
dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not
take any further step in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further
because it probably could prejudice the interest of my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.[20]
In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the respondent
declared in no uncertain terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without
jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case
was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be
issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent
OSGs claim.[21]
The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions absent
evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions.[22]
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to or
make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included therein. This
the Court cannot and should not do.[23]
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing
thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as
mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes
involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of
the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of
the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim
through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must
relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him
before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such service must be
shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become
illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to
seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a)
the collusion between the prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses
unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the
accused from detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other
prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction
or loss of the prosecutions physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended
party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his
property or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of probable cause and
examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims
were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be
stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on
March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was
served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were separately
given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them,
including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or
Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.[24] There is as well no proof in the records that
the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on
March 22, 1999.Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private prosecutor,[25] he did
so only for some but not all the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda
Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora
Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon)[26] executed their respective affidavits of
desistance.[27]There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and
Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims were served
with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never
was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor
to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon and of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of their
right to be heard on the respondents motion and to protect their interests either in the trial court
or in the appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when
Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the
second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new
Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to
a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of
the victims were notified of the respondents motion before the hearing thereon and were served
with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied
prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the
criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People
to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States substantive right to
prosecute the accused for multiple murder. They posit that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the criminal complaints against the
accused. However, under the new rule, the State only had two years from notice of the public
prosecutor of the order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within
which to revive the said cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State
only had one year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the
Informations. The period for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90
of the Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. They submit that in case of
conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former should prevail. They also
insist that the State had consistently relied on the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred beyond
the two-year period by a retroactive application of the new rule.[28] Petitioners thus pray to the
Court to set aside its Resolution of May 28, 2002.
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive
right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question since
[t]he States witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the prosecution
failed to act on these cases until it became politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do
so.[29] According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or substantive, may be
retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused.[30] He asserts that the two-year period
commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than
reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict him.[31] In any event, the State is given the
right under the Courts assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
does not broaden the substantive right of double jeopardy to the prejudice of the State because
the prohibition against the revival of the cases within the one-year or two-year periods provided
therein is a legal concept distinct from the prohibition against the revival of a provisionally
dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover, he claims that the
effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do not modify or negate the operation of the
prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised
Penal Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the application of Section 8, Rule 117 because a
complaint or information has already been filed against the accused, which filing tolls the running
of the prescriptive period under Article 90.[32]
The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of limitations. Statutes of
limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the sovereign of its right to
prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes are considered as equivalent
to acts of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to
ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after witnesses and proofs
necessary for the protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond
availability.[33] The periods fixed under such statutes are jurisdictional and are essential elements
of the offenses covered.[34]
On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the
given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish
the right of the State to prosecute the accused.[35]
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code, a substantive law.[36] It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal
case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline under the
new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to
revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. He
can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or another crime necessarily included
therein.[37] He is spared from the anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses in any new
indictments.[38] The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year periods
provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the delay.[39] By the same token, if a criminal case
is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded within the period
therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not thereby
diminished.[40] But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute of
limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the effect is basically the same. As
the State Supreme Court of Illinois held:
This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of the state to
prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be punishedto be deprived of his
libertyshall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action which the state had acquired
by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the crime had created in the offenders title to
liberty.In this respect, its language goes deeper than statutes barring civil remedies usually
do. They expressly take away only the remedy by suit, and that inferentially is held to abate the
right which such remedy would enforce, and perfect the title which such remedy would invade;
but this statute is aimed directly at the very right which the state has against the offenderthe right
to punish, as the only liability which the offender has incurred, and declares that this right and
this liability are at an end. [41]
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As
applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has
committed a crime is to be punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court held that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and
a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any
other than the existing rules of procedure.
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would
work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of
the Court. In a per curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma,[43] the United States Supreme
Court ruled that where a decision of the court would produce substantial inequitable results if
applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding the injustice of hardship by a holding of
nonretroactivity.[44] A construction of which a statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will
avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, and injurious consequences. [45] This
Court should not adopt an interpretation of a statute which produces absurd, unreasonable,
unjust, or oppressive results if such interpretation could be avoided. [46] Time and again, this
Court has decreed that statutes are to be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evils sought to be remedied. In construing a statute, the reason for the enactment should be
kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose.[47]
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and
implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively
or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its purpose
and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular
conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of
criminal laws in particular.[48] In a per curiam decision in Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States
Supreme Court catalogued the factors in determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated
by the High Court should be given retrospective or prospective effect:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of
a retroactive application of the new standards.
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new
rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or
two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of
the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the
accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the
State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the
accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the
State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the
offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the
period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. [50] The
petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved
by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and
the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of
trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the
accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite
period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases
were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or
because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the
prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial
judges to expedite criminal proceedings.[51]
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his
favor,[52] especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant
to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.[53]
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity
of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical
evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have
faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. [54] The accused may become a wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the
fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime. In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within the two-year period.
terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners meritorious.
or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is
subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28, 2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision of
normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those the Court of Appeals, dated August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The
penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence.[55] He may also lose Petition of the Respondent with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is
his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81,
diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with
system.[56] deliberate dispatch.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for
the accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year
period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of
the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the
intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally
dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule
took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State
would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these
criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other
hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1,
2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the
intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid
absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of
the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State
could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State
waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not
reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United States Supreme
Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People:[57]
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and,
therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights .
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It
should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar
therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of hardship
to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in
particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a
case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date
of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new
rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period
of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case
without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the
effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and
fairness, so is the State. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of Massachussetts,[58] the concept of fairness must not be strained
till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[59] this
Court emphasized that the judges action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused
nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. This Court further said:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must
be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an
acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO,
STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY
CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus Motion;[1] (b)
Motion for Reconsideration;[2] (c) Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration;[3](d) Motion To Set
for Oral Arguments.[4]
The Omnibus Motion
The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003 Resolution of this Court which
granted the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The respondent thereafter prays to allow
Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Conchita C. Morales, Romeo
J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna to voluntary inhibit themselves or, absent their consent, rule
that such inhibition is in order and to recuse them from further deliberating, discussing or, in any
manner, participating in the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement to
Motion for Reconsideration. The respondent points out that the aforenamed members of the
Court were appointed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after the February 19, 2002 oral
arguments and after the case at bar was submitted for the decision of the Court. He asserts that
although A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC[5] specifically provides that it applies only to the divisions of the
Court, it should likewise apply to this case, in light of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of this Court
which set aside its Resolution dated May 28, 2002, apart from the constitutional issues raised by
the respondent in his motion for reconsideration and its supplement. As such, according to the
respondent, the instant case should be unloaded by Justice Callejo, Sr. and re-raffled to any
other member of the Court.
The Court resolves to deny the respondents motion for lack of merit.
The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent filed an urgent motion for the
recusation of Justices Renato C. Corona and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez for the reason that they
were appointed to the Court after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and did not participate
in the integral portions of the proceedings. Justices Corona and Austria-Martinez refused to
inhibit themselves and decided to participate in the deliberation on the petition. [6] On March 18,
2003, the respondent filed a motion with the Court for the recusation of Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr. on account of his voluntary inhibition when the case was pending before the Court of
Appeals.
On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the respondents Motion dated March
18, 2003. The respondent thereafter filed his motion for reconsideration of the April 1, 2003
Resolution of the Court in which he prayed, inter alia, for the inhibition of Justice Callejo, Sr.
under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC and that the case be re-raffled to another member of the Court who
had actually participated in the deliberation and the rendition of its May 28, 2002 Resolution. The
respondent likewise sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna,
again for the reason that they were appointed to the Court after the oral arguments on February
19, 2002 and after the case had already been submitted for decision.
On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the aforesaid motions of the
respondent.[7] The Court ruled that A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC is applicable only to cases assigned to
the divisions of the Court:
The respondents reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99-8-09 is misplaced. As admitted by
the respondent, the said circular is applicable only to motions for reconsideration in cases
assigned to the Divisions of the Court. For cases assigned to the Court En Banc, the policy of
the Court had always been and still is, if the ponente is no longer with the Court, his replacement
will act upon the motion for reconsideration of a party and participate in the deliberations
thereof. This is the reason why Justice Callejo, Sr. who had replaced retired Justice De Leon,
prepared the draft of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court. [8]
The Court also ruled that there was no need for its newest members to inhibit themselves from
participating in the deliberation of the respondents Motion for Reconsideration:
Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna were
not yet members of the Court during the February 18, 2002[9] oral arguments before the Court,
nonetheless they were not disqualified to participate in the deliberations on the petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the May 28, 2002 Resolution of the Court or of the instant motion
for reconsideration. Neither is Justice Callejo, Sr. disqualified to prepare the resolution of the
Court on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent. When the Court deliberated on
petitioners motion for reconsideration, Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
and Adolfo S. Azcuna were already members of the Court.
It bears stressing that transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the February 18, 2002
hearing and oral arguments of the parties are parts of the records of this case. Said transcripts
are available to the parties or to any member of the Court. Likewise, Attys. Rene A.V. Saguisag
and Felix Carao, Jr. may not yet have been the counsel of the respondent on February 18, 2002
but by reading the said transcripts and the records of this case they are informed of what
transpired during the hearing and oral arguments of the parties.[10]
It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the respondent in his omnibus motion had already been
passed upon and resolved by this Court. The respondent did not make any new substantial
arguments in his motion to warrant a reconsideration of the aforesaid resolutions.
Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S.
Azcuna only after they had already concurred in the Courts Resolution dated April 1, 2003. Case
law has it that a motion for disqualification must be denied when filed after a member of the
Court has already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale being that a litigant
cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court, only to raise an objection of this
sort after a decision has been rendered.[11]
The Motion to Set the Case for
Oral Arguments
The Court denies the motion of the respondent. The parties have already extensively discussed
the issues involved in the case. The respondents motion for reconsideration consists of no less
than a hundred pages, excluding the supplement to his motion for reconsideration and his reply
to the petitioners comment on his motion. There is no longer a need to set the instant case for
oral arguments.
The Issue as to the Application of
the Time-bar under Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure Whether
Prospective or Retroactive
The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court and
thereafter reinstate its Resolution of May 28, 2002.
He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in
applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP)
should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the
basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive
application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of
criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new
provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. It
is primarily a check on the State to prosecute criminal cases diligently and continuously, lest it
loses its right to prosecute the accused anew. The respondent argues that since Section 8 is
indubitably a rule of procedure, there can be no other conclusion: the rule should have
retroactive application, absent any provision therein that it should be applied
prospectively. Accordingly, prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners
more than two years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus
violating the respondents right to due process and equal protection of the law.
The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the
accused. In this case, the State had been given more than sufficient opportunity to prosecute the
respondent anew after the March 29, 1999 dismissal of the cases by then Judge Wenceslao
Agnir, Jr. and even before the RRCP took effect on December 1, 2000. According to the
respondent, the petitioners filed the Informations with the RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation of his right to a speedy trial, and that
such filing was designed to derail his bid for the Senate.
In their comment on the respondents motions, the petitioners assert that the prospective
application of Section 8 is in keeping with Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides in part that the rules of procedure which the Court may promulgate shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantial rights. While Section 8 secures the rights of the
accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public
justice. If such right to public justice is taken away, then Section 8 can no longer be said to be a
procedural rule. According to the petitioners, if a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would
work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application. They contend that the
right of the accused to a speedy trial or disposition of the criminal cases applies only to
outstanding and pending cases and not to cases already dismissed. The petitioners assert that
the refiling of the cases under Section 8 should be taken to mean as the filing of the criminal
complaint with the appropriate office for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation,
and not the actual filing of the criminal complaint or information in court for trial. Furthermore,
according to the petitioners, the offended parties must be given notices of the motion for
provisional dismissal of the cases under Section 8 since the provision so expressly states. Thus,
if the requisite notices to the heirs of the deceased would be taken into consideration, the two-
year period had not yet even commenced to run.
In his consolidated reply to the comment of the petitioners, the respondent asserts that the State
is proscribed from refiling a criminal case if it can be shown that the delay resulted in a violation
of the right of the accused to due process. In this case, there was an inordinate delay in the
revival of the cases, considering that the witnesses in the criminal cases for the State in March
1999 are the same witnesses in 2001. The State had reasonable opportunity to refile the cases
before the two-year bar but failed to do so because of negligence; and perhaps institutional
indolence. Contrary to the petitioners contention, the respondent posits that the revival of the
cases contemplated in Section 8 refers to the filing of the Informations or complaints in court for
trial. The operational act then is the refiling of the Informations with the RTC, which was done
only on June 6, 2001, clearly beyond the two-year bar.
The Court finds the respondents contentions to be without merit.
First. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5,
paragraph 5 of the Constitution which reads:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the
accused. It must be noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to reinforce the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case. The time-bar under the
new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the
criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused
only. The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or
two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of
the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the
accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the
State and the accused.It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the
accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the
State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the
offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the
period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice.[12]
In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court, in the interest of justice,
may make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation make the rule
prospective. The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a rule is not automatically determined by the
provision of the Constitution on which the dictate is based. Each constitutional rule of criminal
procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background or precedent, and its own impact on
the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary
with the dictate involved.[13]
Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute. [14] To
paraphrase the United States Supreme Court per Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court in
defining the limits of adherence may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward
operation and that of relating forward.[15]
The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of
the Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia,
to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, under
Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending before it if
in its opinion their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the
former procedure shall apply.[16]
The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective application only does not proscribe
the prospective application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to be
given retroactive and prospective effect. If the statutory purpose is clear, the provisions of the
law should be construed as is conducive to fairness and justice, and in harmony with the general
spirit and policy of the rule. It should be construed so as not to defeat but to carry out such end
or purpose.[17] A statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved. To construe
it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the
law.[18] In Cometa v. Court of Appeals,[19] this Court ruled that the spirit rather than the letter of
the statute determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent.[20] While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have
the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the letter that
killeth but to the spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmakers will. [21]
In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied
prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would
defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two
years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the
accused. It would be a denial of the States right to due process and a travesty of justice for the
Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists,
considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March
29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive application of the
time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the
victims of crimes and their heirs.
Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC) provisionally dismissed a criminal case with the
express consent of the accused in 1997. The prosecution had the right to revive the case within
the prescriptive period, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On December
1, 2000, the time-bar rule under Section 8 took effect, the prosecution was unable to revive the
criminal case before then.
If the time-bar fixed in Section 8 were to be applied retroactively, this would mean that the State
would be barred from reviving the case for failure to comply with the said time-bar, which was
yet to be approved by the Court three years after the provisional dismissal of the criminal
case. In contrast, if the same case was dismissed provisionally in December 2000, the State had
the right to revive the same within the time-bar. In fine, to so hold would imply that the State was
presumed to foresee and anticipate that three years after 1997, the Court would approve and
amend the RRCP. The State would thus be sanctioned for its failure to comply with a rule yet to
be approved by the Court. It must be stressed that the institution and prosecution of criminal
cases are governed by existing rules and not by rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of
injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or ideal existence before it was approved by the
Court. The past cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application of the new rule.
In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the criminal
cases provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, this Court explained, thus:
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year
period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of
the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the
intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally
dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule
took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State
would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these
criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other
hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1,
2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the
intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid
absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999[22] should be excluded in the computation of
the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State
could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State
waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not
reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United States Supreme
Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People, 351 US 12 (1956):
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and,
therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It
should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar
therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of hardship
to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in
particular.[23]
Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurters opinion in Griffin v. People,[24] he said, it is much more
conducive to laws self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective
content to a new pronouncement of law. That this is consonant with the spirit of our law and
justified by those considerations of reason which should dominate the law has been luminously
expounded by Mr. Justice Cardozo shortly before he came here and in an opinion which he
wrote for the Court.
Parenthetically, the respondent himself admitted in his motion for reconsideration that Judge
Agnir, Jr. could not have been expected to comply with the notice requirement under the new
rule when it yet had to exist:
99. Respondent submits that the records are still in the same state of inadequacy and
incompletion. This however is not strange considering that Section 8, Rule 117 had not existed
on March 29, 1999, when the criminal cases were dismissed, and then Judge Agnir did not have
its text to guide his actions. How could the good judge have complied with the mandate of
Section 8, Rule 117 when it yet had to exist?[25]
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent,
procedural laws are retroactive.[26] Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long
been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. When
the petitioners filed the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6,
2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated. The
two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but from December 1, 2000 when the new rule
took effect. While it is true that the Court applied Section 8 of Rule 110[27] of the RRCP
retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court and not to cases already
terminated with finality.
The records show that after the requisite preliminary investigation conducted by the petitioners in
accordance with existing rules, eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112 were filed with the RTC on June 6, 2001, very well within the time-bar therefor. The
respondent cannot argue that his right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases
as enshrined in the Constitution had been violated.[28]
The respondents plaint that he was being singled out by the prospective application of the new
rule simply because before the Court issued its April 1, 2003 Resolution, he announced his
candidacy for the presidency of the Republic for the 2004 elections has no factual basis
whatsoever.[29] The bare and irrefutable fact is that it was in this case where the issue of the
retroactive/prospective application of the new rule was first raised before the Court. The ruling of
the Court in its April 1, 2003 Resolution and its ruling today would be the same, regardless of
who the party or parties involved are, whether a senator of the Republic or an ordinary citizen.
The respondents contention that the prospective application of the new rule would deny him due
process and would violate the equal protection of laws is barren of merit. It proceeds from an
erroneous assumption that the new rule was approved by the Court solely for his benefit, in
derogation of the right of the State to due process. The new rule was approved by the Court to
enhance the right of due process of both the State and the accused. The State is entitled to due
process in criminal cases as much as the accused.
Due process has never been and perhaps can never be precisely defined. It is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. The phrase
expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness, a requisite whose meaning can be as
opaque as its importance is lofty.[30] In determining what fundamental fairness consists of in a
particular situation, relevant precedents must be considered and the interests that are at stake;
private interests, as well as the interests of the government must be assessed. In this case, in
holding that the new rule has prospective and not retroactive application, the Court took into
consideration not only the interests of the respondent but all other accused, whatever their
station in life may be. The interest of the State in the speedy, impartial and inexpensive
disposition of criminal cases was likewise considered.
The Respondent Failed to Comply
with the Essential Prerequisites of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure
The respondent argues that the issue involved in the Court of Appeals is entirely different from
the issue involved in the present recourse; hence, any admissions he made in the court below
are not judicial admissions in this case. He asserts that the issue involved in the CA was
whether or not he was placed in double jeopardy when he was charged with murder in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 despite the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689; whereas the issue in this Court is whether the prosecution of Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 was barred by Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP. The respondent
avers that the proceedings in the appellate court are different from those in this Court.
The respondent posits that this Court erred in giving considerable weight to the admissions he
made in his pleadings and during the proceedings in the CA. He stresses that judicial
admissions may only be used against a party if such admissions are (a) made in the course of
the proceedings in the same case; and (b) made regarding a relevant fact, pursuant to Section
4, Rule 129 and Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence. He contends that contrary to the
ruling of the Court, when he filed his motion for the judicial determination of probable cause in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, he thereby prayed for the dismissal of the said
cases. His motion carried with it, at the very least, the prayer for the dismissal of the criminal
cases. Absent a finding of probable cause, Judge Agnir, Jr. had no recourse but to dismiss the
criminal cases. Moreover, the respondent avers that his motion included the general prayer for
such other reliefs as may be equitable in the premises. The respondent also points out that the
public prosecutor agreed to the averments in his motion as the latter did not even file any motion
for the reconsideration of Judge Agnir, Jr.s order dismissing the cases.
The respondent further contends that the Court is not a trier of facts. It has no means to
ascertain or verify as true the contrasting claims of the parties on the factual issues, a function
best left to the trial court as the trier of facts. He posits that there is a need for the case to be
remanded to the RTC to enable him to present evidence on whether or not Judge Agnir, Jr.
complied with the notice requirements of Section 8. Echoing the May 28, 2002 ruling of this
Court, the respondent contends that it is not fair to expect the element of notice under Section 8
to be litigated before Judge Agnir, Jr., for the said rule was not yet in existence at the time he
filed his motion for a determination of probable cause.
The respondent avers that the requirement for notices to the offended parties under Section 8 is
a formal and not an essential requisite. In criminal cases, the offended party is the State and the
role of the private complainant is limited to the determination of the civil liability of the
accused. According to the respondent, notice to the prosecution provides sufficient safeguard for
the private complainant to recover on the civil liability of the accused based on the delicts; after
all, the prosecution of the offense is under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.
The contentions of the respondent have no merit.
First. The issue posed by the respondent in the CA and in this Court are the same. To recall, in
Civil Case No. 01-100933,[31] the respondent[32] sought injunctive relief from the RTC of Manila
on his claim that in conducting a preliminary investigation in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to
01-101112, the petitioners thereby placed him in double jeopardy under Section 7, Rule 117 of
the RRCP.[33] When the RTC denied his plea for injunctive relief, the respondent filed his petition No, I am not talking of the effects, I am asking about the application, you are not asking the
for certiorari in the CA, again invoking his right against double jeopardy, praying that: Court to apply the doctrine of double jeopardy to prevent a prosecution of Mr. Lacson?
13. Inasmuch as the case subject of the preliminary investigation was dismissed for the reasons ATTY. FORTUN:
mentioned, there currently exists no complaint upon which a valid investigation can be had in Because the element of double jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117.
light of the clear provisions of Rule 110 which requires the existence of a sworn written JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
statement charging a person with an offense as basis for the commencement of a preliminary So, the answer is yes?
investigation under Rule 112. ATTY. FORTUN:
For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly the same offenses over which he had been duly No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a permanent dismissal vests the rights of double
arraigned and a plea validly entered before the Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 jeopardy upon the accused who invokes it.
to 57) before its remand to the QC RTC. Hence, to proceed therewith on similar charges will put JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
him in jeopardy of being twice punished therefor (Article III, 21, Constitution).[34] What you are saying is the effects, I am not asking about the effects, I will ask that later.
The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99- ATTY. FORTUN:
81679 to Q-99-81689 by Judge Agnir, Jr. amounted to a judgment of acquittal; hence, he could They are two different (interrupted)
no longer be charged and prosecuted anew for the same offense without violating his right JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
against double jeopardy. However, the respondent filed a second amended petition wherein he Later, I am asking about doctrines. Since you are not invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy
invoked for the first time Section 8 of Rule 117 of the RRCP: you are resting your case win or lose, sink or sail on the application of 8,117?
(e) the new criminal cases for Murder filed by respondents against petitioner and the other ATTY. FORTUN:
accused on June 6, 2001 (docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112) and On the constitutional right of the accused under Section 16 of Article 3 which is speedy
pending before respondent Judge Yadao (Annex B) is dismissible on its face as they involve disposition of cases which implemented 8,817, that is our arguments in this bar.
exactly the same accused, facts, and offenses which had previously been dismissed by the QC JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on March 29, 1999, hence, can no longer be Are you not resting on 8,117?
revived two (2) years after such dismissal in accordance with the clear provisions of Section 8, ATTY. FORTUN:
Rule 117.[35] That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor.
Indeed, the CA granted the respondents petition based on Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP. In JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
this case, the respondent invoked the same rule and the Constitution. Thus, during the oral So, you are resting on 8,117?
arguments in this Court, the respondent, through counsel, admitted that he was indeed invoking ATTY. FORTUN:
Section 8 anew and the provisions of the Constitution on double jeopardy: Not exclusive, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You are saying that Sen. Lacson can no longer be prosecuted forever for that crime, for the And the Constitution?
killing of the 11 in 1995? ATTY. FORTUN:
ATTY. FORTUN: The Constitution which gave life to 8,117.
That is my submission, Your Honor. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: To speedy disposition?
Let us see your reason for it? ATTY. FORTUN:
ATTY. FORTUN:[36] Yes, Your Honor.
First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not? JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:[37] Can a Court, let us see your theory then your theory rest on two provisions: first, the Rules of
Allow me to qualify the effects of double jeopardy occur with permanent dismissal that is my Court 8,117 and Second, the Constitution on speedy disposition?
submission. ATTY. FORTUN:
ATTY. FORTUN:[38] Yes, Your Honor.[39]
No, no, I am not talking of the effects, I am talking of the doctrine, you are not invoking the Second. The respondents answers to the questions of Madame Justice Josefina Salonga during
doctrine of double jeopardy? the hearing in the CA where he admitted, through counsel, that he gave no express conformity
ATTY. FORTUN: to the dismissal of the cases by Judge Agnir, Jr., were in relation to Section 8 of Rule 117 and
Your Honor, double jeopardy does not apply Section 8, 117 they are (interrupted) not to Section 7 of Rule 117 on double jeopardy, thus:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: JUSTICE SALONGA:
That is right. Do we get it from you that it is your stand that this is applicable to the case at bar?
ATTY. FORTUN: ATTY. FORTUN:
They are two different claims. It is my submission, that it is, Your Honor. In addition, of course, to my proposition that Mr.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Lacson is covered by the rule on double jeopardy as well, because he had already been
That is what I am trying to rule out so that we do not have to discuss it. arraigned before the Sandiganbayan prior to the case being remanded to the RTC.
ATTY. FORTUN: JUSTICE SALONGA:
Very well, Your Honor. You are referring to those cases which were dismissed by the RTC of Quezon City.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: ATTY. FORTUN:
You are not invoking double jeopardy? Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. FORTUN: JUSTICE SALONGA:
As I mentioned we are saying that the effects of a permanent dismissal vest the effects And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?
(interrupted) ATTY. FORTUN:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
It was in that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a judicial
determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, [Jr.] upon the
presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their
affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for
purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except [if] it is with the express conformity of the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement which
would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including other
provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that
a judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact, they ask the accused
to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a provisional
dismissal.[40]
The respondent, through counsel, even admitted that despite his plea for equitable relief in his
motion for a judicial determination of probable cause in the RTC, he did not agree to a
provisional dismissal of the cases. The respondent insisted that the only relief he prayed for
before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that warrants for his arrest be withheld pending a finding of probable
cause. He asserted that the judge did not even require him to agree to a provisional dismissal of
the cases:
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge
Agnir, [Jr.] who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional
dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination of
probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what
should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I
have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said:
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant
to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued
directing the prosecution to present private complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled
hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if
issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your
prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a
situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is we
did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any assent to
the provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal, did you not file any motion for reconsideration of
the order of Judge Agnir, [Jr.] that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already
been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the
dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not
take any further step in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further
because it probably could prejudice the interest of my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.[41]
In his memorandum, in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the respondent
declared in no uncertain terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without
jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC. Upon raffle, the case
was assigned to Branch 91. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be
issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs
claim.[42]
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only
by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her attorney, in the
course of judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. It is a
voluntary concession of fact by a party or a partys attorney during such judicial proceedings,
including admissions in pleadings made by a party.[43] It may occur at any point during the
litigation process. An admission in open court is a judicial admission.[44] A judicial admission
binds the client even if made by his counsel.[45] As declared by this Court:
... [I]n fact, judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of attorney of record, who is, for
the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made ... for the
purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, ... they bind the client, whether made during, or
even after the trial.[46]
When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that he
did not give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact
admitted that one of the essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent.
The respondents contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during the hearing in
the CA cannot be used in the present case as they were made in the course of a different
proceeding does not hold water. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings before the
Court was by way of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, from the
proceedings in the CA; as such, the present recourse is but a mere continuation of the
proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a new trial, but a review of proceedings which
commenced from the trial court, which later passed through the CA. The respondent is bound by
the judicial admissions he made in the CA, and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings
before this Court. As categorically stated in Habecker v. Clark Equipment Company:[47]
... [J]udicial admissions on issues of fact, including those made by counsel on behalf of a client
during a trial, are binding for the purpose of the case ... including appeals.
While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it finds no
probable cause, absent the express consent of the accused to such provisional dismissal, the
latter cannot thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar a revival thereof. Neither may the accused do so
simply because the public prosecutor did not object to a motion of the accused for a judicial
determination of probable cause or file a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal
of the case. Even a cursory reading of the respondents motion for a judicial determination of
probable cause will show that it contained no allegation that there was no probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant for the respondents arrest as a prayer for the dismissal of the cases. The
respondent was only asking the court to determine whether or not there was probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and in the meantime, to hold in abeyance the issuance of
the said warrant. Case law has it that a prayer for equitable relief is of no avail, unless the
petition states facts which will authorize the court to grant such relief. [48] A court cannot set itself
in motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their
pleadings.Anything that is resolved or decided beyond them is coram non judice and void.[49]
Third. There is no need for the Court to remand the instant case to the trial court to enable the
respondent to adduce post facto evidence that the requisite notices under Section 8 had been
complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court has thoroughly examined the voluminous records
from the Sandiganbayan and the RTC[50] and found no proof that the requisite notices were even
served on all the heirs of the victims. The respondent himself admitted that, as held by this
Court, in its May 28, 2002 Resolution, Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with the
mandate under Section 8 because said rule had yet to exist.[51]
One final matter. The records show that Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were
assigned, through the customary raffle of cases, to Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City, the
same branch which dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 99-81679 to 99-81689.[52] In the April 1,
2003 Resolution of the Court, the Presiding Judge of Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City was
directed to try and decide Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with reasonable
dispatch. The Court notes, however, that in Administrative Order No. 104-96, it designated six
branches of the RTC of Quezon City[53] as special courts, exclusively to try and decide heinous
crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659. Since the accused in the said cases are charged with murder,
which under Rep. Act No. 7659, is classified as a heinous crime, the above cases should be
consolidated and re-raffled by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City to a branch
thereof designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panfilo M. Lacsons Omnibus Motion and
Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondents Motion for Reconsideration and
its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous
crimes.
[G.R. No. 149453. May 28, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., vs. PANFILO M. LACSON.
RESOLUTION
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated August 24, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034.[2] The said Decision of
the appellate court granted respondent Lacsons Second Amended Petition for Prohibition with
application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, (1) assailing the Order issued by
Judge Herminia Pasamba of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, that allowed
the continuation of the re-investigation of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or the
Kuratong Baleleng cases; and (2) praying for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-101102
to Q-01-101112 entitled People of the Philippines v. Panfilo Lacson, et al. pending before
Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City.
The following appear in the records of this case:
(1) On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press
conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a
shootout with police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at
about 4:00 A.M. that day.[3]
(2) On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had
claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a rub-out or summary execution
and not a shootout.[4]
(3) In an affidavit he executed the following day, delos Reyes stated, among others, that he was
part of a composite police team called the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Force Group
(ABRITFG) composed of elements of the National Capital Region Command (NCRC) and
headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffic Management Command, headed by
Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC),
headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed
by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed
by Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. Delos Reyes claimed that the police team arrested the
eleven (11) gang members in early morning of May 18, 1995 at the gangs safe house in
Superville Subdivision, Paraaque; that after their arrest, the gang members were made to board
two vans, their hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame where a
decision to summarily execute them was made, and later to Commonwealth Avenue where they
were shot to death by elements of ABRITFG.[5]
(4) On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an affidavit
corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes. Dela Cruz claimed that she was with delos
Reyes from the time the eleven (11) KBG members were arrested up to the time they were killed
in Commonwealth Avenue.[6]
(5) On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed an affidavit stating that he
was present when the KBG members were arrested in Superville Subdivision. [7]
(6) On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed
murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and
personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges
against the same officers and personnel.[8]
(7) Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then created a panel of investigators to conduct a preliminary
investigation of the murder charges. The panel was headed by Deputy Ombudsman for Military
Affairs Bienvenido Blancaflor. On October 20, 1995, the panel issued a resolution
recommending the dismissal of the charges for lack of probable cause.
(8) Ombudsman Desierto referred the resolution for review by a panel composed of Over-all
Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa as head, and Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo and
Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera as members. On November 20, 1995, the review
panel reversed the Blancaflor resolution and found probable cause for the prosecution of
multiple murder charges against twenty-six (26) officers and personnel of ABRITFG.[9]
(9) On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eleven (11)
Informations for MURDER, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, against
respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them
were charged as principals.[10] The following appear to be the victims: Meleubren Sorronda in
Crim. Case No. 23047; Welbor Elcamel in Crim. Case No. 23048; Carlito Alap-ap in Crim. Case
No. 23049; Jevy Redillas in Crim. Case No. 23050; Ray Abalora in Crim. Case No. 23051; Joel
Amora in Crim. Case No. 23052; Alex Neri in Crim. Case No. 23053; Rolando Siplon in Crim.
Case No. 23054; Manuel Montero in Crim. Case No. 23055; Sherwin Abalora in Crim. Case No.
23056; and Pacifico Montero in Crim. Case No. 23057.
(10) Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for
reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended Informations were filed against the same twenty-
six (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was downgraded from principal to
accessory. Arraignment then followed and respondent entered a plea of not guilty. [11]
(11) With the downgrading of charges against him, respondent Lacson questioned the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear the criminal cases as none of the principal accused in
the Amended Informations was a government official with a Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher,
citing Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975 then prevailing. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court.[12]
(12) The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the transfer.
Pending resolution of the motion, R. A. No. 8249 took effect on February 23, 1997, amending R.
A. No. 7975. In particular, the amendatory law deleted the word principal in Section 2 of R. A.
No. 7975, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include all cases where at
least one of the accused, whether principal, accomplice or accessory, is a government official of
Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher. The amendment is made applicable to all cases pending in any
court in which trial has not yet begun as of the date of its approval.[13]
(13) In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,[14] respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of
the amendment and contended that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the criminal
cases. This Court, while dismissing the constitutional challenge, nonetheless ordered the
transfer of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the Amended
Informations for murder failed to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in
relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No.
8249.
(14) Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 were raffled off to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., and re-docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
(15) Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes,
Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted their affidavits which implicated
respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members.
On the other hand, private complainants Myrna Abalora,[15] Leonora Amora,[16] Nenita Alap-
ap,[17] Imelda Montero,[18] Margarita Redillas,[19] Carmelita Elcamel[20] and Rolando Siplon[21]also
executed their respective affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no longer interested to
prosecute these cases.[22]
(16) Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent Lacson, filed
five separate but identical motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the
warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause.
(17) The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended parties were
notified of the hearing on March 22, 1999[23] held by Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by
respondent Lacson and the other accused.
(18) During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do not appear to have
been presented on the witness stand. In their stead, Atty. Godwin Valdez testified that he
assisted them in preparing their affidavits of desistance and that he signed said affidavits as
witness. On the other hand, Atty. Aurora Bautista of the Philippine Lawyers League presented
the affidavits of recantation of prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Armando Capili and
Jane Gomez. Only prosecution witness Corazon de la Cruz testified to affirm her affidavit.[24]
(19) On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution[25] dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689, as follows:
As already seen, the documents attached to the Informations in support thereof have been
rendered meaningless, if not absurd, with the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses
and the desistance of the private complainants. There is no more evidence to show that a crime
has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. Following the doctrine
above-cited, there is no more reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose them to an
open and public accusation. It is time to write finis to these cases and lay to rest the ghost of the
incident of May 18, 1995 so that all those involved--- the accused, the prosecution witnesses
and the private complainants alike--- may get on with their lives.
The Court is not unmindful of the admonition in the recent case of People vs. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999) where the Supreme Court said that the general rule is that
if the Information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of
discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want
of evidence, because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial, and
that the ruling in Allado vs. Diokno is an exception to the general rule and may be invoked only if
similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist.
This Court holds that the circumstances in the case at bench clearly make an exception to the
general rule.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds no probable cause for the issuance of
the warrants of arrest against the accused or to hold them for trial. Accordingly, the Informations
in the above-numbered cases are hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[26]
(20) On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of
Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding
the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement,
Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. On April 17,
2001, the respondent was subpoenaed to attend the investigation of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689.[27]
(21) On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional
right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. The
petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-100933 and raffled to Branch 40, presided by Judge
Herminia V. Pasamba.[28]
(22) The plea for temporary restraining order was denied by Judge Pasamba in an
Order[29] dated June 5, 2001, viz:
After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 is not one on the merits and without any recorded arraignment and entered plea on the
part of the herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct consequence of the finding of the
Quezon City RTC that no probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners herein and to hold them for trial. The arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan does
not put the case in a different perspective since the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without
any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the People of the Philippines who is the complainant in the
Kuratong Baleleng case and remains to be the complainant in the present investigation initiated
thru a letter of PNP Chief Mendoza dated March 27, 2001 (Exhibit B) together with the sworn
statements of witnesses Ramos and Yu (Exhibits 2 and 3 - supportive of the refiling of the case
(Exhibit 9).
xxx xxx xxx
Above considered, this Court finds petitioners have not preliminarily established that they have a
right to be preserved pending hearing on the injunctive relief.
WHEREFORE, the prayer for temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[30]
(23) On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. The new Informations
charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five
(25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The criminal cases
were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.
(24) On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari[31] against Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of Justice, the PNP Chief, State Prosecutors
Ong and Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin, and the People of the Philippines.
The said petition was amended to implead as additional party-respondents State Prosecutor
Claro Arellano and the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 81 in which the Informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed.[32]
(25) The Second Amended Petition[33] dated June 14, 2001 and admitted by the Court of
Appeals on June 26, 2001, alleged:
The reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and injunction against the questioned Order (Annex A) and
the new Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 pending before
respondent Yadao (Annex B) are founded upon the grave abuse of discretion by respondent
Judge Pasamba of her discretion in its issuance, the illegality of the proceedings of the
respondent State Prosecutors as they cannot revive complaints which had been dismissed over
two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued, and the invalidity of the new
Informations for Murder filed against petitioners and others, all in defiance of law and
jurisprudence as shown by the following:
(a) Respondent judge had ruled on the merits of the main prohibition action a quo rendering the
same moot and academic by concluding that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-
Q-99-81689 by the QC RTC was not final and executory, hence [i] the complaints therein can be
reinvestigated, and [ii] petitioners arraignment while the case had not yet been remanded to the
QC RTC and while the Sandiganbayan had valid jurisdiction thereover [Criminal Cases No.
23047-2048] was void, notwithstanding that the only issue in the TRO application was the
existence or lack of a valid complaint as defined in S1 and S3, Rule 110.
(b) Respondent Judge ruled that respondent State Prosecutors could proceed to re-investigate
and thereafter file new Informations on June 6, 2001 covering those offenses subject of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 on the basis of affidavits filed after said cases were
dismissed on March 29, 1999, despite the fact that under Section 8, Rule 117, cases similar to
those filed against the petitioner and others (where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of six
(6) years or more) cannot be revived after two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was
issued.
(c) Respondent Judge held that the petitioner had not shown a right to be preserved despite
evidence showing the short cuts taken by respondent State prosecutors in re-investigating a
dismissed case, in not complying with Rules in respect of its re-opening, and in insisting that a
valid complaint was filed in clear violation of the Rules and case law thereon, and despite the
fact that the petitioner had shown that an inextendible deadline of June 5, 2001 was given him to
file his counter-affidavit without which his indictment for a non-bailable offense is assured
because of DOJ Secretary Hernando Perezs political schemes.[34]
(26) In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also filed with the RTC-QC Branch
81 (presided by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause and in the absence thereof, to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent Lacson, however,
filed a Manifestation and Motion dated June 13, 2001 seeking the suspension of the
proceedings before the trial court.[35]
(27) The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Yadao from
issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112.[36]
(28) On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), rendered the now
assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 as provisional dismissal, and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
as mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the respondent, viz:
In sum, this Court is of the considered view that the subject dismissal of [the] criminal cases was
provisional in nature and that the cases presently sought to be prosecuted by the respondents
are mere revival or re-opening of the dismissed cases. The present controversy, being one
involving provisional dismissal and revival of criminal cases, falls within the purview of the
prescriptive period provided under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The second paragraph of the said provision is couched in clear, simple and
categorical words. It mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, as the subject criminal cases, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2)
years after the issuance of the order without the case having been revived. It should be noted
that the revival of the subject criminal cases, even if reckoned from the DOJs issuance of
subpoenas to petitioner, was commenced only on April 19, 2001, that is, more than two (2) years
after the issuance, on March 29, 1999, of RTC-Quezon Citys Resolution, provisionally
dismissing the criminal cases now sought to be revived. Applying the clear and categorical
mandate of Section 8, Rule 117, supra, such efforts to revive the criminal cases are now
definitely barred by the two-year prescriptive period provided therein.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Temporary Restraining Order
earlier issued against the conduct of further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to
01-101112, including the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioner, PANFILO M.
LACSON, is hereby made PERMANENT. Accordingly, with respect to said accused, the
proceedings conducted by respondent State Prosecutors in respect of the said criminal cases
are declared NULL AND VOID and the corresponding Informations, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Panfilo M. Lacson, et
al. and filed before respondent Judge Maria Theresa L. Yadao of Branch 81 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, are hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[37]
The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against
the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang.
This rule which took effect on December 1, 2000 provides:
SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.- A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However,
this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there
is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had
the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the
offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there
is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.
There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against
respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to
dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is
beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent.
The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether
notices to the offended parties were given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were
dismissed by then Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that the
relatives of the victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm their affidavits.
Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty. Godwin Valdez who testified that he
assisted the private complainants in preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a witness. It
also appears that only seven (7) persons submitted their affidavits of desistance, namely:
a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalora
b. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;
c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora;
d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap;
e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;
f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and
g. Rolando Siplon.
From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of
desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3)[38] other victims, namely: Meleubren
Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show whether they were
notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element
of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that
time.
The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with
application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent
Lacson in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from
reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is whether
the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the
issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by
the litigants.
Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11)
informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of
Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case
for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court
challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived informations for
multiple murder against him.
This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in
the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time
the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him.
But even then, the appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of
whether notices were given to the offended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of
the cases against respondent Lacson and company. To be sure, there is a statement in the
Decision of the appellate court to the effect that records show that the prosecution and the
private offended parties were notified of the hearing x x x.[39] It is doubtful whether this finding is
supported by the records of the case. It appears to be contrary to Judge Agnirs finding that only
seven (7) of the complainants submitted affidavits of desistance.
Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple
murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The
reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - - whether it is from the date of the
Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by
the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule.
If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to
justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State
for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present
compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar.
In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the
applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re-
filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined.
Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be
afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the
predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts
and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be
done in this Court but before the trial court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the case at bar is remanded to the RTC - Quezon City, Branch
81 so that the State prosecutors and the respondent Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard
on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on the basis of the
evidence of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the Informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or not. Pending the ruling, the trial
court is restrained from issuing any warrant of arrest against the respondent Lacson. Melo and
Carpio, JJ., take no part.
EN BANC The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for violating the election gun
G.R. No. 173588 ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his residence or place of business without any authority
ARIEL M. LOS BAOS, on behalf of P/Supt. Victor Arevalo, from the Comelec. After an inquest, the Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed the above
SPO2 Marcial Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene and PO1 Present: Information against Pedro with the Marinduque Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of the
Raul Adlawan, and in his personal capacity, PUNO, C.J., Codes Article XXII, Section 261 (q),[5] in relation to Section 264.[6]
Petitioner, QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted. [7] The preliminary
CARPIO, investigation, however, did not materialize. Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, arguing that the Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
CORONA, justification[8] and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. [9] Pedro attached to his
CARPIO MORALES, motion a Comelec Certification dated September 24, 2001 that he was exempted from the gun
TINGA, ban. The provincial prosecutor opposed the motion.
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors to return the
NACHURA, seized articles to Pedro.[10]
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baos (Los Baos), representing the checkpoint team,
PERALTA, and moved to reopen the case, as Pedros Comelec Certification was a falsification, and the
BERSAMIN, JJ. prosecution was deprived of due process when the judge quashed the information without a
hearing. Attached to Los Baos motion were two Comelec certifications stating that: (1) Pedro
JOEL R. PEDRO, Respondent. Promulgated: was not exempted from the firearm ban; and (2) the signatures in the
April 22, 2009 Comelec Certification of September 24, 2001 were forged.
DECISION
BRION, J. The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not object to Los Baos
motion.[11] Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTCs order primarily based on Section 8
We review in this petition for review on certiorari[1] the September 19, 2005 decision[2] and of Rule 117,[12] arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. He likewise cited the public
the July 6, 2006 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80223. The petition prosecutors lack of express approval of the motion to reopen the case.
seeks to revive the case against respondent Joel R. Pedro (Pedro) for election gun ban violation
after the CA declared the case permanently dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the The public prosecutor, however, manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen
Rules of Court. the case. The trial court, for its part, rejected the position that Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and
THE ANTECEDENTS explained that this provision refers to situations where both the prosecution and the accused
mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party
Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without the required written failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was
authorization from the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a day before the May 14, quashed upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus,
2001 national and local elections. The Information reads: set Pedros arraignment date.

That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, in [S]itio
Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of Boac, Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry a Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum Ruger 100 loaded with
six (6) ammunitions, with Serial No. 173-56836 outside his residence during the election period,
without authorization in writing from the Commission on Election[s].
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The accusation was based on Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code
(Code) after the Marinduque Philippine National Police (PNP) caught Pedro illegally carrying his
firearm at a checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque. The Boac checkpoint team was composed of
Police Senior Inspector Victor V. Arevalo, SPO2 Marshal Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene, and
PO1 Raul Adlawan. The team stopped a silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace with plate number WHT-371
on the national highway, coming from the Boac town proper. When Pedro (who was seated at
the rear portion) opened the window, Arevalo saw a gun carry case beside him. Pedro could not
show any COMELEC authority to carry a firearm when the checkpoint team asked for one, but
he opened the case when asked to do so. The checkpoint team saw the following when the case
was opened: 1) one Revolver 357 Magnum Ruger GP100, serial number 173-56836, loaded
with six ammunitions; 2) one ammunition box containing 100 bullets; 3) two pieces speed loader
with six ammunitions each; and 4) one set ear protector. Pedro was with three other men. The
checkpoint team brought all of them to the Boac police station for investigation.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTCs mandated
reopening.[13] He argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the dismissal contemplated under Section 8, Rule 117 refers
to situations where either the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to, or where the
prosecution alone moved for, the provisional dismissal of the case; in rejecting his argument that
the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code[14] or Act No. 3326[15] find no
application to his case as the filing of the Information against him stopped the running of the
prescriptive periods so that the prescription mandated by these laws became irrelevant; and, in
setting the case for arraignment and pre-trial conference, despite being barred under Section 8
of Rule 117.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The CA initially denied Pedros petition. For accuracy, we quote the
material portions of its ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
The trial court erred in ruling that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to provisional dismissals on
motion of the accused. The Rule merely provides that a case shall not be provisionally
dismissed, except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended
party. Nothing in the said rule proscribes its application to dismissal on motion of the accused.
Nevertheless, we find no basis for issuing the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, as
there is no showing that the error was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.Grave abuse of
discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Before the petitioner may invoke the time-bar in Section 8, he must establish the following:
1. the prosecution, with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move
for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served, with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
Although the second paragraph of Section 8 states that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance thereof, without the case having been revived, such
provision should be construed to mean that the dismissal shall become permanent one year
after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor, as the public prosecutor cannot
be expected to comply with the timeliness requirement unless he is served with a copy of the
order of dismissal.
In the instant, case, the records are bereft of proof as to when the public prosecutor was served
the order of dismissal dated 22 November 2001. Absent such proof, we cannot declare that the
State is barred from reviving the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
In his motion for reconsideration, Pedro manifested the exact date and time of the Marinduque
provincial prosecutors receipt of the quashal order to be 2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001, and
argued that based on this date, the provisional dismissal of the case became permanent on
December 10, 2002. Based on this information, the CA reversed itself, ruling as follows:
On 9 September 2005, we ruled that Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to a dismissal on motion
of the accused. However, we did not issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition, because it was
shown that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reopening of the
case. Moreover, we stated that we cannot rule on the issue of whether or not the State is barred
from reopening the case because it was not shown when the public prosecutor was served the
order of dismissal.
xxx
The arguments raised in the respondents motion for modification were duly passed upon in
arriving at the decision dated 9 September 2005, and no new matters were raised which would
warrant a reconsideration thereof.
On the other hand, the petitioner was able to prove that the motion to reopen the case was filed
after the lapse of more than one year from the time the public prosecutor was served the notice
of dismissal. Therefore, the state is barred from reopening the case.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Joel Pedros motion for partial reconsideration is hereby GRANTED,
and respondent Ariel Los Banos motion for modification of judgment is, accordingly, DENIED.
To summarize this ruling, the appellate court, while initially saying that there was an error of law
but no grave abuse of discretion that would call for the issuance of a writ, reversed itself on
motion for reconsideration; it then ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
because it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar under this provision.
THE PETITION
Los Baos prays in his petition that the case be remanded to the RTC for arraignment and trial, or
that a new charge sheet be filed against Pedro, or that the old information be re-filed with the
RTC. He contends that under Section 6 of Rule 117, an order sustaining a motion to quash does
not bar another prosecution for the same offense, unless the motion was based on the grounds
specified in Section 3(g)[16] and (i)[17] of Rule 117. Los Baos argues that the dismissal under
Section 8 of Rule 117 covers only situations where both the prosecution and the accused either
mutually consented or agreed to, or where the prosecution alone moved for the provisional
dismissal of the case; it can also apply to instances of failure on the part of the prosecution or
the offended party to object, after having been forewarned or cautioned that its case will be
dismissed. It does not apply where the information was quashed. He adds that although the trial
court granted the motion to quash, it did not categorically dismiss the case, either provisionally
or permanently, as the judge simply ordered the return of the confiscated arms and ammunition
to Pedro. The order was open-ended, and did not have the effect of provisionally dismissing the
case under Section 8 of Rule 117.
Los Baos also contends that the CA gravely erred when: (1) it ruled in effect that the Order dated
November 22, 2001 granting the motion to quash is considered a provisional dismissal, which
became permanent one year from the prosecutors receipt of the order; the order to quash the
Information was based on Section 3 of Rule 117, not on Section 8 of this Rule; (2) it granted
Pedros motion for reconsideration and denied Los Baos motion for modification of judgment,
when Section 6 of Rule 117 clearly provides that an order granting a motion to quash is not a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense.
He notes that the grounds Pedro relied upon in his motion to quash are not subsections (g) or (i)
of Rule 117, but its subsections (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and (h)
that it contains averments which if true would constitute a legal justification. Pedros cited
grounds are not the exceptions that would bar another prosecution for the same offense. [18] The
dismissal of a criminal case upon the express application of the accused (under subsections [a]
and [h]) is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, because his application is a
waiver of his constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy.
In response to all these, respondent Pedro insists and fully relies on the application of Section 8
of Rule 117 to support his position that the RTC should not have granted Los Banos motion to
reopen the case.
THE ISSUES
The issue is ultimately reduced to whether Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case, as the
CA found. If it applies, then the CA ruling effectively lays the matter to rest. If it does not, then
the revised RTC decision reopening the case should prevail.
OUR RULING
We find the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be remanded to the trial
court for arraignment and trial.
Quashal v. Provisional Dismissal
a. Motion to Quash
A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea, the validity
of the criminal complaint or the criminal information filed against him for insufficiency on its face
in point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of the Information. [19] The motion, as a rule,
hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled out in the complaint or information. The rules
governing a motion to quash are found under Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 3
of this Rule enumerates the
grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
b. Provisional Dismissal
On the other hand, Section 8, Rule 117 that is at the center of the dispute states that:
SEC.8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur:
1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a
provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move
for its provisional dismissal;
2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and
4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.[20]
In People v. Lacson,[21] we ruled that there are sine quanon requirements in the application of
the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the
time-bar under the foregoing provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the
State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part
thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to
prosecute the accused.
c. Their Comparison
An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a
provisional dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in their features, and legal
consequences. While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled
Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to
which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly state what a provisional
dismissal is. The modifier provisional directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8
essentially refers to are those that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without
prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that
bar the re-filing of the case). Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals
are those barred by the principle of
double jeopardy,[22] by the previous extinction of criminal liability,[23] by the rule on speedy
trial,[24] and the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the accused.[25] Section 8, by
its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional
dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under
Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion
to quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely-defined characteristics under the Rules of
Court. A necessary consequence is that where the grounds cited are those listed under Section
3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely,
where a ground does not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a proper
remedy.A motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the conditions required by Section 8
obtain.
A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the consequences of a meritorious
motion to quash. This feature also answers the question of whether the quashal of an
information can be treated as a provisional dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117
unmistakably provide for the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. Section 4 speaks
of an amendment of the complaint or information, if the motion to quash relates to a defect
curable by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the effect of sustaining the motion to quash - the
complaint or information may be re-filed, except for the instances mentioned under Section
6. The latter section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of the re-filing that Section 5 allows it
cannot be done where the dismissal is based on extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and complements the ground provided under
Section 3(i) and the exception stated in Section 6.
Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be
made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the offended party is given notice. The
consent of the accused to a dismissal relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7
provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately
suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 i.e., one with the express consent of the accused is
not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a
bar to further prosecution under the special terms of Section 8.
This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of sustaining a motion to
quash the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the basis for
the dismissal is the extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read
in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the consequences of Section 8, carry
unavoidable implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a quashal and a
provisional dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what
has been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is
meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a
Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the framers did not
intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused with
one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely
provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section
3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and
its time-bar does not apply.
Other than the above, we note also the following differences stressing that a motion to quash
and its resulting dismissal is a unique class that should not be confused with other dismissals:
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the efficacy of the
complaint or information filed against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case
may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the prosecution or the accused, or both,
subject to the conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117.[26]
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117;
these requirements do not apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information
for defects or defenses apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may be
grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the information.
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may be
a provisional dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway
provided that the required consents are present.[27]
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies, at
which time it becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays
quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of
impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case,
what is important is the question of whether the action can still be brought, i.e., whether the
prescription of action or of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-
filing after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration.
80223 respectively MODIFIED and REVERSED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial
Court of Boac, Marinduque for the arraignment and trial of respondent Joel R. Pedro, after
reflecting in the Information the amendment introduced on Section 261(q) of the Code by
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166.

To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules
refer to different situations that should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates
to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the
remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for
seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the
circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal.

Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to the reopening of the case that the
RTC ordered and which the CA reversed; the reversal of the CAs order is legally proper.

Pedros Motion to Quash

The merits of the grant of the motion to quash that the RTC initially ordered is not a matter that
has been ruled upon in the subsequent proceedings in the courts below, including the CA. We
feel obliged to refer back to this ruling, however, to determine the exact terms of the remand of
the case to the RTC that we shall order.

The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information contains averments
which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our
examination of the records that the Information duly charged a specific offense and provides the
details on how the offense was committed.[28] Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no
merit. On the other hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the Information
any legal excuse or justification. The cited basis, in fact, for Pedros motion to quash was a
ComelecCertification (dated September 24, 2001, issued by Director Jose P. Balbuena, Sr. of
the Law Department, Committee on Firearms and Security Personnel of the Comelec, granting
him an exemption from the ban and a permit to carry firearms during the election period)[29] that
Pedro attached to his motion to quash. This COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is
not an appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash grounded on legal
excuse or justification found on the face of the Information. Significantly, no hearing
was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the COMELEC
certification.[30]

Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the Information was in
order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated the true nature, function, and utility of a
motion to quash. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro
should now be arraigned and stand trial.

One final observation: the Information was not rendered defective by the fact that Pedro was
charged of violating Section 261(q) of the Code, instead of Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which
amended Section 261(q); these two sections aim to penalize among others, the carrying of
firearms (or other deadly weapons) in public places during the election period without the
authority of the Comelec. The established rule is that the character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of the information or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital
of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information [31] Further, in Abenes v.
Court of Appeals,[32] we specifically recognized that the amendment under Section 32 of R.A.
No. 7166 does not affect the prosecution of the accused who was charged under Section 261(q)
of the Code.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and accordingly declare the assailed September
19, 2005 decision and the July 6, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
[G.R. Nos. 140546-47. January 20, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY
TEE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the consolidated judgment[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
City, Branch 6, dated September 17, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R,
involving violations of Section 8, Article II, of the Dangerous Drugs Law. [2] Since appellant was
acquitted in the second case, we focus on the first case, where appellant has been found guilty
and sentenced to death and fined one million pesos.
The decretal portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 15800-R, the Court finds the accused Modesto Tee guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of marijuana of about 591.81 kilos in
violation of Section 8, Article II of RA 6425 as amended by Section 13 of RA 7659 as charged in
the Information, seized by virtue of a search warrant and sentences him to the supreme penalty
of death and to pay a fine of 1 million pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
The 591.81 kilos of marijuana contained in 26 boxes and one yellow sack (Exhibits U-1 to U-27)
are ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law.
2. In Crim. Case No. 15822-R, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
accused Modesto Tee beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of the charge of illegal
possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Art. 2 of RA 6425 as amended by Section 13
of RA 7659 as charged in the Information since the marijuana confiscated have to be excluded
in evidence as a product of unreasonable search and seizure.
The 336.93 kilos of marijuana contained in 13 sacks and four boxes (Exh. B to S and their
component parts) although excluded in evidence as the product(s) of unreasonable search and
seizure, are nevertheless ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in
accordance with law considering that they are prohibited articles.
The City Jail Warden is, therefore, directed to release the accused Modesto Tee in connection
with Crim. Case No. 15822-R unless held on other charges.
COST(S) DE OFFICIO.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A
raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine
National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant
and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
On July 20, 1998, appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too
general and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid
search warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate
charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, docketed as Criminal Case No.
15800-R, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal
possession of marijuana, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession the following, to wit:
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in four (4) boxes; and
2. One hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of
dried flowering tops separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a total weight of 336.93
kilograms; and
3 Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in twenty-six (boxes)
and a yellow sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms,
all having a grand total weight of 928.74 kilograms, a prohibited drug, without the authority of law
to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On August 7, 1998, the prosecution moved to amend the foregoing charge sheet considering
that subject marijuana were seized in two (2) different places. [5]
As a result, the information in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was amended to read as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession the following, to wit:
- Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in twenty-six (26)
boxes and a yellow sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision
of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
A separate amended information docketed as Criminal Case No. 15822-R was likewise filed, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession the following, to wit:
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in four (4) boxes; and
2. hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of dried
flowering tops separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a total weight of 336.93
kilograms;
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision
of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
On September 4, 1998, the trial court denied the motion to quash the search warrant and
ordered appellants arraignment.
When arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R, appellant refused to enter a
plea. The trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him.[8] Trial on the merits then ensued.
The facts of this case, as gleaned from the records, are as follows:
Prosecution witness Danilo Abratique, a Baguio-based taxi driver, and the appellant Modesto
Tee are well acquainted with each other, since Abratiques wife is the sister of Tees sister-in-
law.[9]
Sometime in late June 1998, appellant asked Abratique to find him a place for the storage of
smuggled cigarettes.[10] Abratique brought appellant to his friend, Albert Ballesteros, who had a
house for rent in Bakakeng, Baguio City. After negotiating the terms and conditions, Ballesteros
agreed to rent out his place to appellant. Appellant then brought several boxes of purported blue
seal cigarettes to the leased premises.
Shortly thereafter, however, Ballesteros learned that the boxes stored in his place were not blue
seal cigarettes but marijuana. Fearful of being involved, Ballesteros informed Abratique. Both
later prevailed upon appellant to remove them from the premises.[11]
Appellant then hired Abratiques taxi and transported the boxes of cannabis from the Ballesteros
place to appellants residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City.[12]
On June 30, 1998, appellant hired Abratique to drive him to La Trinidad, Benguet on the pretext
of buying and transporting strawberries. Upon reaching La Trinidad, however, appellant directed
Abratique to proceed to Sablan, Benguet, where appellant proceeded to load several sacks of
marijuana in Abratiques taxi. He then asked Abratique to find him a place where he could store
the contraband.[13]
Abratique brought appellant to his grandmothers house at No. 27 Dr. Cario St., QM Subdivision,
Baguio City, which was being managed by Abratiques aunt, Nazarea Abreau. Nazarea agreed to
rent a room to appellant. Abratique and appellant unloaded and stored there the sacks of
marijuana brought from Sablan.[14] Abratique was aware that they were transporting marijuana
as some of the articles in the sacks became exposed in the process of loading.[15]
Eventually, Abratique and Nazarea were bothered by the nature of the goods stored in the
rented room. She confided to her daughter, Alice Abreau Fianza, about their predicament. As
Alice Fianzas brother-in-law, Edwin Fianza, was an NBI agent, Alice and Abratique phoned him
and disclosed what had transpired.[16]
On the morning of July 1, 1998, alerted by information that appellant would retrieve the sacks of
prohibited drugs that day, Edwin Fianza and other NBI operatives conducted a stake out at No.
27, Dr. Cario St. While the NBI agents were conducting their surveillance, they noticed that
several PNP NARCOM personnel were also watching the place.[17]The NBI then learned that the
PNP NARCOM had received a tip from one of their informers regarding the presence of a huge
amount of drugs in that place. The NBI and PNP NARCOM agreed to have a joint operation.
As the day wore on and appellant did not show up, the NBI agents became apprehensive that
the whole operation could be jeopardized. They sought the permission of Nazarea Abreau to
enter the room rented by appellant. She acceded and allowed them entry. The NBI team then
searched the rented premises and found four (4) boxes and thirteen (13) sacks of marijuana,
totaling 336.93 kilograms.[18]
Later that evening, NBI Special Agent Darwin Lising, with Abratique as his witness, applied for a
search warrant from RTC Judge Antonio Reyes at his residence.[19] Judge Reyes ordered the
NBI agents to fetch the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Delilah Muoz, so the proceedings could be
properly recorded. After Atty. Muoz arrived, Judge Reyes questioned Lising and
Abratique. Thereafter, the judge issued a warrant directing the NBI to search appellants
residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Baguio City for marijuana. [20]
The NBI operatives, with some PNP NARCOM personnel in tow, proceeded to appellants
residence where they served the warrant upon appellant himself. [21] The search was witnessed
by appellant, members of his family, barangay officials, and members of the
media.[22] Photographs were taken during the actual search.[23] The law enforcers found 26
boxes and a sack of dried marijuana[24] in the water tank, garage, and storeroom of appellants
residence.[25] The total weight of the haul was 591.81 kilograms.[26] Appellant was arrested for
illegal possession of marijuana.
The seized items were then submitted to the NBI laboratory for testing. NBI Forensic Chemist
Maria Carina Madrigal conducted the tests. Detailed microscopic and chromatographic
examinations of the items taken from appellants rented room at No. 27, Dr. Cario St., as well as
those from his residence at Green Valley, showed these to be marijuana.[27]
In his defense, appellant contended that the physical evidence of the prosecution was illegally
obtained, being the products of an unlawful search, hence inadmissible. Appellant insisted that
the search warrant was too general and the process by which said warrant was acquired did not
satisfy the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. Moreover,
Abratiques testimony, which was heavily relied upon by the judge who issued the warrant, was
hearsay.
In Criminal Case No. 15822-R, the trial court agreed with appellant that the taking of the 336.93
kilograms of marijuana was the result of an illegal search and hence, inadmissible in evidence
against appellant. Appellant was accordingly acquitted of the charge. However, the trial court
found that the prosecutions evidence was more than ample to prove appellants guilt in Criminal
Case No. 15800-R and as earlier stated, duly convicted him of illegal possession of marijuana
and sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic review.
Before us, appellant submits that the trial court erred in:
1UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT DESPITE LACK OF
COMPLIANCE OF (sic) SEVERAL REQUIREMENTS BEFORE IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ISSUED AND IT BEING A GENERAL WARRANT;
2.GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REOPENING THE CASE AND ALLOWING
ABRITIQUE TO TESTIFY AGAINST APPELLANT;
3GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ABRITIQUE;
4. NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED IN BOTH CASES AND SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH
DESPITE THE ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AS FOUND IN THE FIRST CASE.[28]
We find that the pertinent issues for resolution concern the following: (1) the validity of the
search conducted at the appellants residence; (2) the alleged prejudice caused by the reopening
of the case and absences of the prosecution witness, on appellants right to speedy trial; (3) the
sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to sustain a finding of guilt with moral certainty; and (4)
the propriety of the penalty imposed.
1. On the Validity of the Search Warrant; Its Obtention and Execution
Appellant initially contends that the warrant, which directed the peace officers to search for and
seize an undetermined amount of marijuana, was too general and hence, void for vagueness.
He insists that Abratique could already estimate the amount of marijuana supposed to be found
at appellants residence since Abratique helped to transport the same.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a search warrant is
issued if a judge finds probable cause that the place to be searched contains prohibited drugs,
and not that he believes the place contains a specific amount of it. The OSG points out that, as
the trial court observed, it is impossible beforehand to determine the exact amount of prohibited
drugs that a person has on himself.
Appellant avers that the phrase an undetermined amount of marijuana as used in the search
warrant fails to satisfy the requirement of Article III, Section 2[29] of the Constitution that the
things to be seized must be particularly described. Appellants contention, in our view, has no leg
to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things
to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily
identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; [30] and
(2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus
prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.[31] What the Constitution seeks to avoid are
search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will
authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense.[32] However, it is not required that technical
precision of description be required,[33] particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description
would mean that no warrant could issue.[34]
Thus, it has been held that term narcotics paraphernalia is not so wanting in particularity as to
create a general warrant.[35] Nor is the description any and all narcotics and all implements,
paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining to the use, possession, or sale of
narcotics or dangerous drugs so broad as to be unconstitutional. [36] A search warrant
commanding peace officers to seize a quantity of loose heroin has been held sufficiently
particular.[37]
Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description an undetermined amount of marijuana
must be held to satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy, what is
to be seized in the instant case is property of a specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug.
By reason of its character and the circumstances under which it would be found, said article is
illegal. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such
character, the place, and the circumstances.[38] Thus, this Court has held that the description
illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalia particularizes the things to
be seized.[39]
The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar wording, undetermined amount
of marijuana or Indian hemp, in our view, has satisfied the Constitutions requirements on
particularity of description. The description therein is: (1) as specific as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the peace officers may be
guided in making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to be seized to those which
bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.[40] Said warrant imposes
a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it
prevents exploratory searches, which might be violative of the Bill of Rights.
Appellant next assails the warrant for merely stating that he should be searched, as he could be
guilty of violation of Republic Act No. 6425. Appellant claims that this is a sweeping statement as
said statute lists a number of offenses with respect to illegal drugs. Hence, he contends, said
warrant is a general warrant and is thus unconstitutional.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the warrant clearly states that appellant has in his
possession and control marijuana or Indian hemp, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6425.
We have carefully scrutinized Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98),[41] and we find that it is captioned
For Violation of R.A. 6425, as amended.[42] It is clearly stated in the body of the warrant that
there is probable cause to believe that a case for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by R.A. 7659 has been and is
being committed by one MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE of Km. 6, Dontogan Bgy., Green
Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City by having in his possession and control an UNDETERMINED
AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA or INDIAN HEMP in violation of the aforementioned law. [43] In an
earlier case, we held that though the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Law is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as
a basis for the finding of probable cause.[44] Appellants averment is, therefore, baseless. Search
Warrant No. 415 (7-98) appears clearly issued for one offense, namely, illegal possession of
marijuana.
Appellant next faults the Judge who issued Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) for his failure to
exhaustively examine the applicant and his witness. Appellant points out that said magistrate
should not have swallowed all of Abratiques statements hook, line, and sinker. He points out that
since Abratique consented to assist in the transport of the marijuana, the examining judge
should have elicited from Abratique his participation in the crime and his motive for squealing on
appellant. Appellant further points out that the evidence of the NBI operative who applied for the
warrant is merely hearsay and should not have been given credit at all by Judge Reyes.
Again, the lack of factual basis for appellants contention is apparent. The OSG points out that
Abratique personally assisted appellant in loading and transporting the marijuana to the latters
house and to appellants rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cario St., Baguio City. Definitely, this
indicates personal knowledge on Abratiques part. Law enforcers cannot themselves be
eyewitnesses to every crime; they are allowed to present witnesses before an examining judge.
In this case, witness Abratique personally saw and handled the marijuana. Hence, the NBI did
not rely on hearsay information in applying for a search warrant but on personal knowledge of
the witness, Abratique.
Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the Constitution[45] and the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure[46] require that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses under oath or affirmation. The personal examination must not be merely routinary
or pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive.[47] In the instant case, it is not disputed that
Judge Antonio Reyes personally examined NBI Special Investigator III Darwin A. Lising, the
applicant for the search warrant as well as his witness, Danilo G. Abratique. Notes of the
proceedings were taken by Atty. Delilah Muoz, Clerk of Court, RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61,
whom Judge Reyes had ordered to be summoned. In the letter of transmittal of the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61 to Branch 6 of said court, mention is made of notes
at pages 7-11.[48] We have thoroughly perused the records of Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98)
and nowhere find said notes. The depositions of Lising and Abratique were not attached to
Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) as required by the Rules of Court. We must stress, however, that
the purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining
magistrate as to the existence of probable cause.[49] The Bill of Rights does not make it an
imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the records of an application for a search
warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the
record showing what testimony was presented.[50] In the testimony of witness Abratique, Judge
Reyes required Abratique to confirm the contents of his affidavit;[51] there were instances when
Judge Reyes questioned him extensively.[52] It is presumed that a judicial function has been
regularly performed,[53] absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrates determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing
court,[54] as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.[55] Substantial basis
means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place
sought to be searched.
On record, appellant never raised the want of adequate depositions to support Warrant No. 415
(7-98) in his motion to quash before the trial court. Instead, his motion contained vague
generalities that Judge Reyes failed to ask searching questions of the applicant and his witness.
Belatedly, however, he now claims that Judge Reyes perfunctorily examined said witness. [56] But
it is settled that when a motion to quash a warrant is filed, all grounds and objections then
available, existent or known, should be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant, otherwise they are deemed waived.[57]
In this case, NBI Special Investigator Lisings knowledge of the illicit drugs stored in appellants
house was indeed hearsay. But he had a witness, Danilo Abratique, who had personal
knowledge about said drugs and their particular location. Abratiques statements to the NBI and
to Judge Reyes contained credible and reliable details. As the NBIs witness, Abratique was a
person on whose statements Judge Reyes could rely. His detailed description of appellants
activities with respect to the seized drugs was substantial. In relying on witness Abratique, Judge
Reyes was not depending on casual rumor circulating in the underworld, but on personal
knowledge Abratique possessed.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 44 (1937), we held that:
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant
be held liable for damages caused.[58]
Appellant argues that the address indicated in the search warrant did not clearly indicate the
place to be searched. The OSG points out that the address stated in the warrant is as specific as
can be. The NBI even submitted a detailed sketch of the premises prepared by Abratique, thus
ensuring that there would be no mistake.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended[59] and distinguish it from other places
in the community.[60] A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.
Appellant finally harps on the use of unnecessary force during the execution of the search
warrant. Appellant fails, however, to point to any evidentiary matter in the record to support his
contention. Defense witness Cipriana Tee, appellants mother, testified on the search conducted
but she said nothing that indicated the use of force on the part of the NBI operatives who
conducted the search and seizure.[61] What the record discloses is that the warrant was served
on appellant,[62] who was given time to read it,[63] and the search was witnessed by the barangay
officials, police operatives, members of the media, and appellants kith and kin. [64] No breakage
or other damage to the place searched is shown. No injuries sustained by appellant, or any
witness, appears on record. The execution of the warrant, in our view, has been orderly and
peaceably performed.
2. On The Alleged Violation of Appellants Substantive Rights
Appellant insists that the prosecutions unjustified and willful delay in presenting witness
Abratique unduly delayed the resolution of his case. He points out that a total of eight (8)
scheduled hearings had to be reset due to the failure or willful refusal of Abratique to testify
against him. Appellant insists that said lapse on the prosecutions part violated Supreme Court
Circular No. 38-98.[65] Appellant now alleges that the prosecution deliberately resorted to
delaying the case to cause him untold miseries.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the two-month delay in the trial is not such a great
length of time as to amount to a violation of appellants right to a speedy trial. A trial is always
subject to reasonable delays or postponements, but absent any showing that these delays are
capricious and oppressive, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity to
prosecute the criminal action.
On record, the trial court found that prosecution witness Danilo G. Abratique failed to appear in
no less than eighteen (18) hearings, namely those set for February 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 24;
March 9, 15, 22, and 23; April 6, 7, 8, 16, and 19, all in 1999.[66] No less than four (4) warrants of
arrest were issued against him to compel him to testify. [67] The NBI agent who supposedly had
him in custody was found guilty of contempt of court for failing to produce Abratique at said
hearings and sanctioned.[68] The prosecution had to write the NBI Regional Director in Baguio
City and NBI Director in Manila regarding the failure of the Bureaus agents to bring Abratique to
court.[69] Nothing on record discloses the reason for Abratiques aforecited absences. On the
scheduled hearing of June 7, 1999, he was again absent thus causing the trial court to again
order his arrest for the fifth time.[70] He also failed to show up at the hearing of June 8, 1999.[71]
Appellant now stresses that the failure of Abratique to appear and testify on twenty (20) hearing
dates violated appellants constitutional[72] and statutory right to a speedy trial.
A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules
and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. [73] In Conde v. Rivera
and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held that where a prosecuting officer, without
good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be
restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right has
been violated involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of the delay, the reason
for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and the efforts exerted by the
defendant to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the accused. [74]
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general shall be
one hundred eighty (180) days.[75] However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy
trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements
of the scheduled hearings of the case.[76] The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only
when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;[77] or
(2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; [78] or (3) when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.[79]
In the present case, although the absences of prosecution witness Abratique totaled twenty (20)
hearing days, there is no showing whatsoever that prosecution capriciously caused Abratiques
absences so as to vex or oppress appellant and deny him his rights. On record, after Abratique
repeatedly failed to show up for the taking of his testimony, the prosecution went to the extent of
praying that the trial court order the arrest of Abratique to compel his attendance at trial. The
prosecution likewise tried to get the NBI to produce Abratique as the latter was in the Bureaus
custody, but to no avail. Eventually, the trial court ordered the prosecution to waive its right to
present Abratique and rest its case on the evidence already offered. [80]
Nor do we find a delay of twenty (20) hearing days to be an unreasonable length of time. Delay
of less than two months has been found, in fact, to be not an unreasonably lengthy period of
time.[81]
Moreover, nothing on record shows that appellant Modesto Tee objected to the inability of the
prosecution to produce its witness. Under the Rules, appellant could have moved the trial court
to require that witness Abratique post bail to ensure that the latter would testify when
required.[82] Appellant could have moved to have Abratique found in contempt and duly
sanctioned. Appellant did neither. It is a bit too late in the day for appellant to invoke now his
right to speedy trial.
No persuasive reason supports appellants claim that his constitutional right to speedy trial was
violated. One must take into account that a trial is always subject to postponements and other
causes of delay. But in the absence of a showing that delays were unreasonable and capricious,
the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity of prosecuting an accused.[83]
Appellant next contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion, and exhibited partiality,
when it allowed the reopening of the case after the prosecution had failed to present Abratique
on several occasions and had been directed to rest its case. Appellant stresses that the lower
courts order to reopen the case to receive Abratiques further testimony is an indication that the
trial court favored the prosecution and unduly prejudiced appellant.
On appellees behalf, the Solicitor General points out that the trial courts order was in the interest
of substantial justice and hence, cannot be termed as an abuse of discretion. The OSG points
out that the prosecution had not formally rested its case and had yet to present its formal offer of
evidence, hence, the submission of additional testimony by the same witness cannot be
prejudicial to the accused, it being but the mere continuation of an uncompleted testimony.
Furthermore, appellant did not properly oppose the prosecutions motion to reopen the case.
At the time Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R were being tried, the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure were in effect. There was no specific provision at that time governing
motions to reopen.[84] Nonetheless, long and established usage has led to the recognition and
acceptance of a motion to reopen. In view of the absence of a specific procedural rule, the only
controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen was the paramount interests of justice. As a
rule, the matter of reopening of a case for reception of further evidence after either prosecution
or defense has rested its case is within the discretion of the trial court. [85] However, a concession
to a reopening must not prejudice the accused or deny him the opportunity to introduce counter
evidence.[86]
Strictly speaking, however, there was no reopening of the cases in the proceedings below. A
motion to reopen may properly be presented only after either or both parties have formally
offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment.[87] In the instant case, the records show
that on April 19, 1999, the prosecution was directed to close its evidence and given 15 days to
make its formal offer of evidence.[88] This order apparently arose from the manifestation of the
prosecution on April 16, 1999 that should they fail to produce witness Abratique on the next
scheduled hearing the prosecution would rest its case. [89] On April 19, 1999, which was the next
scheduled hearing after April 16, 1999, Abratique was absent notwithstanding notices, orders,
and warrants of arrest. However, on April 27, 1999, or before the prosecution had formally
offered its evidence, Abratique was brought to the trial court by the NBI. In its order of said date,
the trial court pointed out that the prosecution could move to reopen the case for the taking of
Abratiques testimony.[90] On May 7, 1999, the prosecution so moved, stressing that it had not yet
formally offered its evidence and that the substantial rights of the accused would not be
prejudiced inasmuch as the latter had yet to present his evidence. Appellant filed no opposition
to the motion. The trial court granted the motion six days later. Plainly, there was nothing to
reopen, as the prosecution had not formally rested its case. Moreover, the taking of Abratiques
testimony was not for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, but more properly for
the completion of his unfinished testimony. In U.S. vs. Base,[91] we held that a trial court is not in
error, if it opts to reopen the proceedings of a case, even after both sides had rested and the
case submitted for decision, by the calling of additional witnesses or recalling of witnesses so as
to satisfy the judges mind with reference to particular facts involved in the case. A judge cannot
be faulted should he require a material witness to complete his testimony, which is what
happened in this case. It is but proper that the judges mind be satisfied on any and all questions
presented during the trial, in order to serve the cause of justice.
Appellants claim that the trial courts concession to reopen the case unduly prejudiced him is not
well taken. We note that appellant had every opportunity to present his evidence to support his
case or to refute the prosecutions evidence point-by-point, after the prosecution had rested its
case. In short, appellant was never deprived of his day in court. A day in court is the touchstone
of the right to due process in criminal justice.[92] Thus, we are unable to hold that a grave abuse
of discretion was committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-called reopening in order to
complete the testimony of a prosecution witness.
3. On the Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence
In bidding for acquittal, appellant assails the credibility of Abratique as a witness. Appellant
insists that Abratiques testimony is profuse with lies, contrary to human nature, hence
incredible. According to appellant, Abratique was evasive from the outset with respect to certain
questions of the trial court. He adds that it appeared the court entertained in particular the
suspicion that witness Abratique had conspired with appellant in committing the crime charged.
Appellant questions Abratiques motive in informing the NBI about his activities related to the
marijuana taking, transfer, and warehousing.
The OSG contends that Abratiques testimony, taken as a whole, is credible. It points out that
Abratique testified in a straightforward manner as to his knowledge of the huge cache of
prohibited drugs stashed by appellant in two different places. His testimony, said the OSG, when
fused with the physical evidence consisting of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana found by law
enforcers at appellants residence, inexorably leads to the inculpation of appellant.
It is the bounden duty of the courts to test the prosecution evidence rigorously, so that no
innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties meted out for drug
offenses.[93] Though we scrutinized minutely the testimony of Abratique, we find no cogent
reason to disbelieve him. From his account, Abratique might appear aware treading the thin line
between innocence and feeling guilty, with certain portions of his story tending to be self-
exculpatory. However, his whole testimony could not be discredited. The established rule is that
testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in other parts, depending on the
corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. But it is accepted,
as a matter of common sense, that if certain parts of a witness testimony are found true, his
testimony cannot be disregarded entirely.[94]
Abratique testified in open court that appellant rented the taxicab he was driving, and he helped
appellant transport huge amounts of marijuana to appellants rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cario St.,
Baguio City and to appellants residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio
City. He also declared on the witness stand that out of fear of being involved, he decided to
divulge his knowledge of appellants possession of large caches of marijuana to the NBI. When
the places referred to by Abratique were searched by the authorities, marijuana in staggering
quantities was found and seized by the law enforcers. Stated plainly, the physical evidence in
this case corroborated Abratiques testimony on material points.
Appellant imputes questionable motives to Abratique in an effort to discredit him. He demands
that Abratique should likewise be prosecuted. However, by no means is the possible guilt of
Abratique a tenable defense for appellant. Nor would Abratiques prosecution mean appellants
absolution.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven the amount of the fine must be sustained. All these sanctions might not remedy all the havoc
with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or wrought by prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of our society, especially the youth. [107] But these
regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely penalties should warn peddlers of prohibited drugs that they cannot ply their trade in our streets
and consciously possessed the said drug.[95] with impunity.
We find the foregoing elements proven in Criminal Case No. 15800-R beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal
In said case, the testimony of Abratique and the recovery of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana from Case No. 15800-R, convicting appellant MODESTO TEE alias ESTOY TEE of violation of
appellants residence served to prove appellants possession of a prohibited drug. Tests Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
conducted by the NBI forensic chemist proved the seized articles to be marijuana. These articles appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fine of ONE
were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant and hence, fully admissible in evidence. MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS imposed on him is sustained. Appellant is likewise directed to
In People v. de los Reyes, 239 SCRA 439 (1994), we held that the Dangerous Drugs Act applies pay the costs of suit
generally to all persons and proscribes the sale of dangerous drugs by any person, and no
person is authorized to sell such drugs. Said doctrine is equally applicable with respect to
possession of prohibited drugs. Republic Act No. 6425, which penalizes the possession of
prohibited drugs, applies equally to all persons in this jurisdiction and no person is authorized to
possess said articles, without authority of law.
Anent the third element, we have held that to warrant conviction, possession of illegal drugs
must be with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed together with the
possession or control of said articles.[96] Nonetheless, this dictum must be read in consonance
with our ruling that possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory
explanation of such possession.[97] In effect, the onus probandi is shifted to accused to explain
the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi[98] in this situation.
Appellant Modesto Tee opted not to testify in his defense. Instead, he presented his mother as
his lone witness, who testified on matters totally irrelevant to his case. We can only conclude
that, failing to discharge the burden of the evidence on the possession of prohibited drug,
appellants guilt in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was established beyond reasonable doubt.
3. On The Proper Penalty
Under Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00)[99] shall be imposed if the quantity of marijuana involved in a
conviction for possession of marijuana or Indian hemp shall be 750 grams or more.[100]
In the present case, the quantity of marijuana involved has been shown by the prosecution to be
far in excess of 750 grams, as stressed by the trial court:
The volume is rather staggering. It is almost one whole house or one whole room. In fact, when
they were first brought to the court, it took hours to load them on the truck and hours also to
unload them prompting the court to direct that the boxes and sack of marijuana be instead kept
at the NBI office in Baguio. And the identification of said marijuana during the trial was made in
the NBI premises itself by the witnesses since it was physically cumbersome and inconvenient to
keep bringing them to the court during every trial.[101]
In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted not only the huge quantity of marijuana
bales involved, but also the acts of accused of hiding them in different placesand transferring
them from place to place and making them appear as boxes of cigarettes to avoid and evade
apprehension and detection. They showed his being a big supplier, said the trial court, [whose]
criminal perversity and craft that deserve the supreme penalty of death.[102]
We are unable to agree, however, with the penalty imposed by the trial court. The legislature
never intended that where the quantity involved exceeds those stated in Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 6425 the maximum penalty of death shall automatically be imposed.[103] The statute
prescribes two indivisible penalties: reclusion perpetua and death. Hence, the penalty to be
imposed must conform with Article 63[104] of the Revised Penal Code. As already held, the death
penalty law, Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. [105] The
rules in Article 63 apply although the prohibited drugs involved are in excess of the quantities
provided for in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425.[106] Thus, finding neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the present case, appellants possession of 591.81 kilograms of
marijuana in Criminal Case No. 15800-R, does not merit capital punishment but only the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court imposed a fine on appellant in the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00),
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The imposition of a fine is mandatory in
cases of conviction of possession of illegal drugs. This being within the limits allowed by the law,