Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:

ABN # 65 648 097 123

Vietnam to Host ADMM and
Related Meetings in 2020
Carlyle A. Thayer
February 14, 2020

In just a few days’ time Vietnam will host the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Retreat. The
Ministry of National Defense plans to carry out security and health drills in the Melia
hotel (Hanoi) where the meeting will take place. We request your assessment of the
following issues:
Question 1: What do you think about the importance attached to such drills,
particularly amidst growing concerns over the novel coronavirus outbreak?
ANSWER: Since the ADMM was founded it has always given priority to addressing non-
traditional security threats. Vietnam’s planned security and health drills at the Melia
Hotel in Hanoi will showcase the capacity and expertise of specialists from the
Vietnam People’s Army. The drills also will provide reassurance to senior defence and
military personnel from ASEAN countries that will attend the Retreat at a time when
the novel coronavirus is a regional public health threat.
An after-action report on the security and health drills should be presented to the
ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Military Medicine and the ASEAN Center for
Military Medicine to review and to identify the lessons learned.
Question 2: Vietnam last hosted ASEAN defense meetings in 2010. In your assessment,
to what extent has the global and regional security environment changed since then?
ANSWER: Over the last ten years the global security environment has been altered by
China’s rise as an economic power and consequent growth of its military power. China
has proposed new multilateral institutions with Beijing at is core in response to the
U.S.-dominated institutions established after the Second World War.
After Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the United States imposed sanctions
on Russia. Russia then turned to China to form a cooperative relationship to oppose
the United States on various issues (Syria, Iran and North Korea).
China’s economic rise has been accompanied by anti-globalisation forces in Europe
and the United States. These forces pose a serious challenge to China’s economic
growth as well as the world economy. The tariff wars with the United States have
slowed global growth and this in turn has depressed China’s economic growth.
The regional security environment has been shaped by increasing competition and
rivalry between the United States and China. In January 2009, after Barack Obama was
elected President of the United States, he initiated the Rebalance to Asia-Pacific
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Strategy and stepped up U.S. engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-centric multilateral
institutions including the East Asia Summit.
In November 2012, Xi Jin-ping was elected General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party and in March 2013 he also became President of the People’s
Republic of China. In 2013 Xi launched his One Belt, One Road and the Maritime Silk
Road initiatives. Thus the U.S. rebalance and China’s Belt and Road Initiative are
competitive in nature.
In 2009, China tabled its nine-dash line with the United Nations Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf. From that time China has markedly stepped up its
assertiveness against littoral states with maritime claims in the South China Sea.
Chinese assertiveness quickly evolved into intimidation with the deployment of the
Hai Yang Shi You 981 and an armada of ships into Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone
in 2014 and the deployment of Hai Yang Dizhi 8 in the waters near Vanguard Bank in
2019. No Chinese act was more egregious than the construction and militarisation of
seven forward operating bases on artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago.
The Trump Administration has openly declared that China is a strategic competitor of
the United States. This will play out in confrontations in East Asia, especially over
Taiwan, and the South China Sea. But Trump’s commitment to ASEAN centrality and
military engagement in the region are a cause of strategic uncertainty due to his
transactional approach to security issues.
Question 3: Against such a backdrop, what is your expectation of ASEAN defense
meetings in 2020?
ANSWER: After the ADMM Retreat the following defence meetings will be hosted by
Vietnam this year: ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting, ASEAN Multilateral Naval Exercise 2,
ASEAN International Fleet Review, Maritime Security Conference, ASEAN Chefs of
Defence Forces Meeting in Nha Trang (2-9 May); ASEAN Air Chiefs Conference in Da
Nang (16-19 June); ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting and ASEAN Defence
Senior Officials Defence Meeting-Plus in Ho Chi Minh City (18-22 August); and ADMM
and ADMM-Plus (1-4 November).
The agenda for these ASEAN defence meetings has been set mainly by legacy issues
left over from the previous year when Thailand was ASEAN Chair. For example, the
13th ADMM that met in July 2019 adopted six Concept Papers that must be
implemented and monitored in 2020. The six Concept Papers touched on a wide
number of topics: guidelines for the assessment of ADMM initiatives, role of the
ASEAN defence establishments on border management, work plan for the ASEAN
Military Medicine Conference, guidelines for maritime interaction to avoid incidents
at sea, extending the ASEAN Direct Communication Infrastructure to the Plus
countries, and implementing the terms of references for ASEAN Our Eyes strategic
information exchange system.
Question 4: “Defense cooperation for a Cohesive and Responsive ASEAN” is the theme
for ASEAN defense meetings in 2020. How relevant do you think this theme is to the
contemporary security environment?
ANSWER: Defence cooperation for a Cohesive and Responsive ASEAN reflects
Vietnam’s official theme as ASEAN Chair, Cohesive and Responsive ASEAN. This theme
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has five major objectives: strengthening of ASEAN unity and solidarity, intensifying
ASEAN’s economic integration and connectivity, promoting ASEAN identity and
awareness, enhancing ASEAN’s global partnership for peace, stability and sustainable
development, and increasing ASEAN’s institutional capacity and effectiveness.
These five objectives can be shaped by practical defence cooperation and activities by
ADMM defence establishments. For example, Vietnam will host ASEAN’s second
Maritime Exercise. This will promote ASEAN unity and solidarity. Intensifying ASEAN’s
connectivity will be advanced by including ADMM-Plus members in ASEAN Direct
Communication Infrastructure (hotlines).
Enhancing ASEAN’s global partnership for peace and stability can be attained by
practical activities with ADMM-Plus military establishments. While increasing ASEAN’s
institutional capacity and effectiveness can be achieved by practical activities
identified and approved by the ASEAN Defence Ministers, ASEAN Chiefs of Defence
Forces and the ASEAN Chiefs of Army, Navy, Air Force, Intelligence meetings.
In sum, the “Defence cooperation for a Cohesive and Responsive ASEAN” is highly
relevant to the contemporary security environment with respect to non-traditional
security issues. This theme does not address traditional security threats by state
actors, including an arms race by the major powers in the region.
Question 5: What is your assessment of defense cooperation within ASEAN as well as
between ASEAN and its dialogue partners?
ANSWER: The ADMM was founded in 2006 and has achieved success mainly in
promoting dialogue and cooperation to address non-traditional security threats,
particularly humanitarian assistance (HA) and disaster relief (DR). For example, one
ADMM initiative resulted in a framework for cooperation between ASEAN defence
establishments and civil society organisations on non-traditional security in the use of
ASEAN military assets and capabilities in HA and disaster management.
The ADMM also stood up the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HA/DR, the ASEAN
Military Operations Meeting, and the ASEAN Center of Military Medicine. Most
recently the ADMM adopted the Guidelines for Maritime Interaction. These initiatives
need to be operationalized.
The ADMM also conducted the first ASEAN Multilateral Naval Exercise (AMNEX) and
first International Fleet Review in 2017. Vietnam will host the second AMNEX and
International Fleet Review in May this year.
The ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting approved practical measures to promote good order
at sea through the ASEAN Maritime Security Information Sharing Exercise.
However, the prospect for increased practical cooperation among ASEAN navies has
not met expectations. At the 4th ADMM in May 2010, for example, it was agreed that
ASEAN navies would cooperate to patrol their maritime boundaries but little has been
done to implement this agreement.
As for the ADMM-Plus, since it was founded in 2010. The ADMM-Plus, through its
Expert Working Groups, has conducted twelve exercises in each of the seven areas of
agreed cooperation: counterterrorism, cyber security, humanitarian assistance and
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disaster relief, humanitarian mine action, maritime security, military medicine and
peacekeeping.
Most notably, ASEAN conducted its first maritime exercises with dialogue partners
China and the United states in 2018 and 2019, respectively.
Question 6: How much do you think defense cooperation has contributed to the
building of the ASEAN Political-Security Community?
ANSWER: The ASEAN Political-Security Committee was the last sectoral body to be
created under ASEAN’s three pillars that also included the ASEAN Economic
Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.
The ADMM’s main accomplishment has been to promote dialogue, but as ASEAN
foreign ministers admitted in July 2019, “stronger coordination and greater synergy
among ASEAN-cross-sectoral bodies and other relevant ASEAN mechanisms in
enhancing maritime cooperation in the region” is needed.
Looking back four main conclusions can be reached: maritime security initially had no
forum within ASEAN, since 2010 it has been institutionalized in several multilateral
institutions; discussions on maritime security have moved beyond general to specific
proposals and activities; maritime security was once conceived as state security it is
now viewed as integral to regional security; and maritime security is formally on the
ASEAN agenda at the highest level.
Question 7: What should be done to make ASEAN defense cooperation more
substantive? In which areas should ASEAN defense cooperation be focused?
ANSWER: Vietnam has identified increasing ASEAN’s institutional capacity and
effectiveness as one of its five main objectives as ASEAN Chair. In order to meet this
objective ASEAN leaders must give direction to ASEAN/ASEAN-Plus bodies and
establish a structure so that policy recommendations can be transmitted to ministerial
and head of state level.
The ASEAN Defence Ministers need to be more proactive in giving practical guidance
to their subordinates to address maritime security issues as a priority. At present
ASEAN mechanisms dealing with maritime security overlap and are uncoordinated.
ASEAN needs to continue concentrating on the basics including: carrying out
confidence building measures, sharing and exchanging information and best practices,
and training and capacity building involving dialogue partners.
In addition, ASEAN leaders need to address the overlap between the ADMM-Plus
Expert Working Group on Maritime Security and the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Inter-
Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security. Priorities should be established for each
group.
Finally, ASEAN defence establishments should address four key priorities for 2020:
• enhance cooperation with regional maritime law enforcement agencies;
• better coordination of regional and/or sub-regional capacity-building exercises
and training related to maritime security;
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• initiate discussions on protocols and guidelines to be appended to the Single Draft

South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text to address the prevention,
management and resolution of maritime incidents by military forces; and
• initiate discussion within the ADMM and ADMM-Plus on steps to be taken to
address the militarisation and arms build-up in the South China Sea.
Q8. What is your assessment of Vietnam's participation in the ADMM and ASEAN
defense cooperation?
ANSWER: From the beginning Vietnam has always been an independent and
constructive member of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus process. Vietnam hosted the first
ADMM-Plus meeting. At this meeting China objected to including to any wording in
the joint statement on the South China Sea. Vietnam’s Defence Minister, as Chair, took
the bold step to summarize the views of those who spoke, including those critical of
China. Vietnam has also been active in tabling constructive proposals for practical
cooperation, this especially the case when it hosted the then ASEAN Navy Chiefs
Informal Meeting.
In addition, since 2013 Vietnam has given priority to negotiating strategic partnerships
with ASEAN members, including the Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and
Thailand. Each of these agreements includes cooperation in defence and security
including annual dialogues. Vietnam has also been active in conducting coordinated
naval patrols and friendly port visits to neighbouring states.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam to Host ADMM and Related Meeting
in 2020,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, February 14, 2020. All background
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