CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY.
SALVADOR)
* DISCLAIMER: This is a simplified digest of all of the assigned cases. I will not
write the whole facts of the case, just those that are relevant to the Rules. The
parties to the case are referred to as M and N only.
Jurisdiction
Proton Pilipinas v. Banque Nacional de Paris
FACTS: M Bank filed a complaint against N Corp. for collection of a sum of money. N
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that M failed to pay the correct docket fees
as the Admin Circular No. 11-94 provides that in the assessment thereof, interest
claimed should be included. There being an underpayment of the docket fees, N
conclude that RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. (M applied the wrong
exchange rate in this case.)
HELD: The clerk of court should have assessed the filing fee by taking into
consideration “the total sum claimed, inclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the
property in litigation.” The failure to state the rate of interest demanded was not
fatal not only because it is the Courts which ultimately fix the same, but also
because Rule 141, Section 5(a) speaks of “the sum claimed, exclusive of interest.”
This clearly implies that the specification of the interest rate is not that
indispensable.
Manchester v. CA
The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees.
Sun Insurance v. Asuncion
In Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held
that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the
amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original
complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the
rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Rules:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 2A 2011
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, of
id specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Far East bank v. Shemberg
FACTS: When M failed to pay the loans, N sought to foreclose the mortgages
extrajudicially. M filed a complaint for Declaratory relief, Injunction, Damages,
Annulment of Promissory Notes, Documents and Contracts against N. N’s employees
filled the blanks of the bank forms with “false and inaccurate entries.” N filed a
motion to dismiss based on affirmative defenses that RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case for non-payment of proper docket fees. M counters that
the suit primarily involves cancellation of mortgages, an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
HELD: If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction
would depend upon the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is only incidental or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Where the issue involves the validity of a
mortgage, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since M paid the
docket fees, as computed by the clerk of court, RTC acquired jurisdiction.
Mijares v. Ranada
FACTS: A complaint was filed with the US District Court against the Estate of former
President M. The action was brought forth by 10 Filipino citizens (N) who each
alleged having suffered HR abuses. The Court awarded compensatory and
exemplary damages in favor of N. It rendered final judgment awarding N more than
1 billion dollars. N filed a complaint for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. M
filed a motion to dismiss raising the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It
alleged that N had only paid P400 as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the
fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of
over $2.25 billion.
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HELD: The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of
pecuniary estimation. It is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus
placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. It is covered by Section
7(b)(3), involving as it does, “other actions not involving property.”
*Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
FACTS: Barely 1 month after the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948, Spouses M
a complaint for collection of sum of money against Spouses N. A writ of attachment
was issued by the court against N, but was dissolved upon the filing of a
counterbond by O Surety. CFI rendered judgment in favor of M. From the time O
became a quasi-party, it never questioned the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI but
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative reliefs. It was only after
an adverse decision was rendered by the CA that it questioned the jurisdiction. The
action (for collection of a sum of money) was commenced almost 15 years before O
filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first
time.
HELD: The rules is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the
courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. However, a party may be barred by laches from invoking this plea
for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case
with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. A party can not invoke
the court’s jurisdiction and then deny it to escape a penalty.
Rule 1
Republic v. CA
FACTS: Since negotiations for the settlement of M Corp.’s obligation with N entity
proved futile, N filed with the Ex-Officio Sheriff a Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of M’s mortgaged properties. The property was sold to N in the public
auction. M filed a complaint for Annulment of Sheriff’s Sale. N filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that M failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees,
claiming that M paid only the amount representing the docket fees based on the
original complaint.
HELD: This matter has been settled by M to the Clerk of Court of an additional sum
needed to complete the amount due as docket fees. Judgment awards which may
be proved during trial would still be subject to additional filing fees which shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It is the responsibility of the clerk of court to
enforce the lien and assess and collect the additional fees.
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CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
Benguet v. CA
FACTS: Widow of M filed a complaint against N Cooperative for a sum of money and
damages arising from the electrocution of M. RTC ruled in favor of M and ordered N
to pay them damages. N contends that exemplary damages should not be awarded
as the amount claimed was not specified in the body nor in the prayer of the
complaint.
HELD: Amount of exemplary damages need not be pleaded in the complaint
because the same cannot be predetermined. The amount of exemplary damages
need not be proved because its determination is contingent upon or incidental to
the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the complainant.
SMC v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: M bank filed a complaint against N Corp. for confirmation of rescission of
sale with damages. The court ordered the dismissal of the rescission case filed in
the RTC without prejudice to the ventilation of the parties’ claims before the
Sandiganbayan. M and N entered into a Compromise Agreement and filed a Joint
Petition for Approval of the Compromise Agreement in the Sandiganbayan. O
Federation filed an Omnibus Class Action for Leave to Intervene alleging that they
are the ultimate beneficial owners of N shares subject of the Compromise
Agreement. M and N opposed the intervention. Sandiganbayan allowed the
intervention. N insists that O should pay a docket fee for their counter-petition and
counterclaim for damages.
HELD: It was Sandiganbayan itself that ordered O to giver their comment to the
Joint Petition for Approval of the Compromise Agreement. A party alleging a
compulsory counterclaim need not pay any docket fee therefor.
Gochan v. Gochan
FACTS: M filed a complaint against N for specific performance and damages. N
contend that the complaint is in the nature of a real action which affects title to
real properties; hence, M should have alleged therein the value of the real
properties which shall be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket fees.
The caption of the complaint was denominated as one for “specific performance
and damages.” The relief sought is the conveyance of real property.
HELD: Where a complaint is entitled as one for specific performance but
nonetheless prays for the issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary
objective and nature is one to recover the parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed
a real action. The complaint filed with the RTC was in the nature of a real action.
The basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the
property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant.
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De Leon v. CA
FACTS: M filed a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of 2
parcels of land against N. Upon filing of the complaint, the clerk of court required
M to pay docket and legal fees in the total amount of P610. N moved for dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case by reason of M’s nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees. N claims
that M should have paid docket fees in the amount of P21, 640, based on the
alleged value of the 2 parcels of land.
HELD: An action for the rescission of contract is one which cannot be estimated and
therefore the docket fee for its filing should be the flat amount of P200. Although
eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it is the nature of the action as
one for rescission of contract which is controlling.
Rule 2
Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Gaston
FACTS: Spouses M filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction and
TRO against N Association. RTC denied N’s motion to dismiss. N submitted a MR,
adding lack of cause of action as ground for the dismissal of the case. N claims that
there as no allegation in the complaint that M were actually prevented from
entering the subdivision and from having access to their residential abode.
HELD: A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of
action is regarded as hypothetically admitted all the factual averments in the
complaint. The test of the sufficiency of the allegations constituting the cause of
action is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment on the prayers. The records sufficiently establish a cause of action.
Centeno v. Centeno
FACTS: M is the owner of 2 parcels of Riceland which were the subject of an earlier
case filed by M against N before DAR for cancellation of certificates of land
transfer. It was established that N, through fraud and misrepresentation, obtained
CLTs in their names. DAR Secretary ordered the recall and cancellation of N’s CLT.
M alleged that despite the DAR decision, N have interfered with and prevented M
from exercising acts of possession over the land. N allege that the complaint states
no cause of action since M cannot claim maintenance of peaceful possession when
she does not in fact have actual possession of the subject property.
HELD: The allegations regarding N’s action with regard to the subject land, if true,
violate M’s rights as adjudicated by the DARAB. A cause of action is an act or
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CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another. The
elements of a cause of action:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right
3. An act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligations of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
City Trust Corp. v. Villanueva
FACTS: Failing to obtain from M Bank a favorable action on his demand for
indemnification, N filed a complaint for damages based on breach of contract. N
alleged that M breached its contractual obligation to him as depositor because of its
repeated dishonor of his valid and well-funded check. M alleged that N suffered no
actionable injury.
HELD: Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where there
is no sufficient showing of bad faith in the parties’ persistence of a case other than
an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. If any damage had been
suffered at all, it could be equivalent to damnum absque injuria, i.e., damage
without injury or damage/injury inflicted without injustice, or loss/damage without
violation of a legal right, or a wrong done to a man for which the law provide no
remedy.
Bernardo v. CA
FACTS: M filed a complaint for annulment of certificates of title. N Inc. filed a
motion to dismiss alleging that M did not have a cause of action. The motion was
denied. N filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition claiming that the denial of
their motion to dismiss in a way validated M’s reconstituted title and hence. Can CA
entertain and render a decision in a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition
with a 2-pronged purpose: 1) annulment of an order reconstituting title, and 2)
questioning the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint for nullification of titles
covering lost that overlap the area covered by the reconstituted title?
HELD: There is a unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and
fact involved between the prayer of annulment of the judgment reconstituting TCT
and that questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint for the
annulment of titles. The joinder of the two causes of action is mandated by the
need to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote an efficient administration of
justice. There should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a
common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction
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thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is
not authorized.
Rule 3
Korea Exchange Bank v. Filkor
FACTS: As M Inc. failed to make good on their obligations, N Bank filed a complaint
for 27 causes of action and foreclosure of the mortgaged property. RTC rendered
judgment in favor of N. It, however, failed to order that the property mortgaged by
M be foreclosed and sold at public auction. N filed a motion for partial
reconsideration. RTC ruled that “N, in opting to file a civil action for the collection
of M obligations, has abandoned its mortgage lien on the property subject of the
real estate mortgage.
HELD: What determines the nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought. The court found no indication whatsoever that N had waived its rights
under the real estate mortgaged executed in its favor. M’s allegations in its
complaint indicate that M’s action was one for foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
Bernabe v. Alejo
FACTS: The Fiscal allegedly fathered a son with his secretary. M, in behalf of N her
son, filed a complaint praying that N be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son
and be given his share of the estate. RTC dismissed the complaint holding that the
death of the putative father barred the action.
HELD: Article 285 of the CC is a substantive law, as it gives N the right to file his
petition for recognition within 4 years from attaining majority age. The FC cannot
impair or take N’s right to file an action for recognition, because that right had
already vested prior to its enactment.
Relucio v. Lopez
FACTS: M filed a petition for Appointment as Sole Administratix of Conjugal
Partnership of Properties, etc. against her husband N and his paramour O. O filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that M has no cause of action against her. RTC
denied the motion on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or
indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered in her
name and N, or solely in her name.
HELD: In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a
claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
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CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against N. M’s causes
of action were all against he husband. N is not an indispensable nor necessary party
in Special Proceedings.
Uy v. CA
FACTS: M, agents authorized to sell 8 parcels of land by the owners thereof, filed a
complaint for damages against N for the canceling the sale over the 3 parcels of
land. RTC declared the cancellation of the contract to be justified. CA reversed the
decision noting that M were mere attorneys-in-fact and not the real parties-in-
interest in the action before the RTC.
HELD: AS M are not parties, heirs, assignees, or beneficiaries of a stipulation pour
autrui under the contracts of sale, they do not possess the right they seek to
enforce. They are not the real parties-in-interest in this case.
Borlongan v. Madrideo
FACTS: M filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against N. N denied being
possessors of the subject lot by mere tolerance on the part of M. They offered in
evidence an affidavit execute by O, the owner of the land, who declared M and N
were her tenants alike.
HELD: One who has no right or interest to protect cannot inboke the jurisdiction of
the court as pary-plaintiff in action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. M
is not a real party in interest inasmuch as she failed to establish her claim of being
the sole lessee of the disputed property of the sublessor of N.
International Express Travel v. CA
FACTS: M sued N in his personal capacity and as President of O Federation and
impleaded O as an alternative defendant. M sought to hold N liable for the unpaid
balance for the tickets purchased by O on the ground that N allegedly guaranteed
the said obligation. N averred that M has no cause of action against him.
HELD: Any person acting or purporting to act on behalf of a corporation which has
no valid existence assumes such privileges and obligations and becomes personally
liable for contracts entered into or for other acts performed as such agent. As
President of O, N is presumed to have known about the corporate existence or non-
existence of O. N should be held liable for the unpaid obligations of the
unincorporated O.
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Rule 4
Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction
FACTS: An action for specific performance with damages was filed by M before RTC
Pasiig. N filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. N claims that M
should have filed the case in the RTC Paranaque which has jurisdiction over the
property. M maintains that the action is in personam, not in rem.
HELD: A case for specific performance with damages is a personal action which may
be filed in a court where any of the parties reside. Even if there were prayers for
the execution of a deed of sale, the actions filed in the said cases were not for
specific performance. Breach of a contract gives rise to a cause of action for
specific performance or for rescission.
Gumabon v. Larin
FACTS: M filed a complainst against N seeking the return of the certificate of title
from N who refused to hand over the certificate despite the fill payment, nearly 7
times the original amount, of their loan. Judge Salvador C dismissed the complaint
on the ground that, being a real action, the case should have been filed before the
RTC of Pamapanga (where the property is located), not RTC of QC. It was issued
motu proprio.
HELD: A court may motu proprio dismiss a case upon the grounds of no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata and prescription. Outside of
these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right
of the plaintiff to be heard. Improper venue not being included in the enumeration,
it should follow that motu proprio dismissal on said ground would not be allowed.
Improper venue not having been raised by N as a ground to dismiss, he must be
deemed to have waived the same.
Rule 5
Tala Realty v. Banco Filipinas
FACTS: M Corp. and N Bank entered into separate lease contracts over nine parcels
of land. The first contract provided for 20-year lease periods while the second
contract executed later that same day provided for 11-year lease periods. Later on,
M Corp. filed complaints for ejectment and/or unlawful detainer against N Bank in
the MTC of Malolos. The lower courts ruled that “declaring one contract spurious
which resultantly declares the other valid is not within the jurisdiction of the MTC”
since the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
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CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
HELD: MTC has jurisdiction. All ejectment cases are covered by the rules on
summary procedure and are within the jurisdiction of the said inferior courts
regardless of whether they involve questions of ownership. The courts in ejectment
cases may determine questions of ownership when necessary to decide the question
of possession.
Pascual v. Jovellanos
FACTS: M filed a complaint for forcible entry against N. The complaint was
dismissed without prejudice, and M filed a corrected complaint. N filed a Motion to
Strike Out. After period to answer lapsed, M filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Motion to Strike Out was granted by Judge O without conducting any hearing.
Motion for Summary Judgment remained unacted upon.
HELD: Judgment should have been rendered based on the allegations of the
complaint and the evidence presented therein, inasmuch as N failed to file his
answer after the lapse of the 10 days from service of summons. Judge O failed to
apply the basic rules of Summary Procedure when he granted N’s Motion to Strike
Out which was in reality a motion to dismiss, a prohibited pleading. All cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer are governed by this Rule.
Rule 6
Huerta Alba Resort v. CA
FACTS: M Inc. sought the judicial foreclosure of 4 parcels of land mortgaged by N
Resort to O Inc. In its answer, N questioned the assignment by O of its mortgage
right to M. RTC ruled in favor of M. M filed for a writ of execution 5 months after
MR was denied. N filed several motions asking the court to clarify of the period of
redemption for ordinary execution. Later on, CA ruled that N only had equity of
redemption since it did not question M’s status as a credit/bank institution. Under
RA 337, mortgagor of a bank/credit institution is given a 1-year redemption period.
HELD: When it submitted its answer to the complaint for judicial foreclosure, N
should have alleged that it was entitled to the beneficial provisions of RA 337. The
claim is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim. The rules of counterclaim are
designed to enable the disposition of a whole controversy of interested parties’
conflicting claims, at one time and in one action, provided all parties be brought
before the court and the matter decided without prejudicing the rights of any
party. Estoppel may be successfully invoked if the party fails to raise the question
in early stages of the proceedings.
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Financial Building Corp. v. Forbes Park
FACTS: M filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages against N. N filed a motion
to dismiss which was later on granted by the CA. N, in turn, filed a complaint for
Damages against M.
HELD: N’s claim should have been filed initially as a counterclaim. A compulsory
counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate action but it should instead be
asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence, which gave
rise to it. Since N filed a motion to dismiss in the first case, its existing compulsory
counterclaim at that time is now barred. A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to
the proceeding in the original suit and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom.
The filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a compulsory counterclaim
are incompatible remedies.
Arenas v. CA
FACTS: M filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against N. MTC ruled
in favor of M. Before N receives a copy of the decision, N filed with the RTC an
action for “Damages, Certiorari with a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order” against M. N argues that the acts complained of arose after the
filing of the complaint and the answer in the Unlawful Detainer case.
HELD: Where the issues of the case extend beyond those commonly involved in
unlawful detainer suits, the case is converted from a mere detainer suit to one
‘incapable of pecuniary estimation’ thereby placing it under the exclusive
jurisdiction of RTC. An action for damages arising from a quasi-delict incapable of
pecuniary estimation can not be pleaded as counterclaims in a case for unlawful
detainer and damages.
Rule 7
GMC v. NLRC
FACTS: M filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against N Corp. NLRC and Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of M. N appealed to CA but the petition was denied for failure
to attach the board resolution to prove that the person who signed the Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping was duly authorized by the board of directors of N. The
corresponding board resolution was attached only to its MR before the CA.
HELD: There was at least substantial compliance with, and that there was not
attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural requirements.
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CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
Mendigorin v. Cabantog
FACTS: M filed a complaint for ejectment against N. MTC dismissed the complaint,
RTC reversed the decision, CA reversed again the decision. M contends that CA
erred in failing to dismiss the petition of N on the found that she failed to
personally sign the certification of non-forum shopping. N’s lawyer signed for her.
HELD: The certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or
any of the principal parties and not only the legal counsel. The attestation
contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge
by the party who executed the same. To merit the Court’s consideration,
petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification.
Zulueta v. Asia Brewery
FACTS: M filed a complaint against N Inc. for breach of contract, specific
performance and damages in Iloilo. During the pendency of the case, N filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money in Makati. M moved for consolidation of
the cases which was granted. N appealed to CA. M assails the validity of the sworn
certification against non-forum shopping, arguing that the same was signed by
counsel and not by N.
HELD: The requirement that the petitioner should sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping apples even to corporations. The Certification should have been signed by
a duly authorized director or officer of the corporation, who has knowledge of the
matter being certified. The signatory in the Certification of the Petition before the
CA should not have been N’s retained counsel, who would not know whether there
were other similar cases of the corporation.
Heirs of Kiomisola v. Heirs of Dacut
FACTS: M filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles, reconveyance and
damages against N. The complaint was accompanied by a verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping which states: “That we have not filed any case in
court or bodies affecting the same subject matter.”
HELD: While this manner of formulating the certification is indeed deplorable, its
presence in the complaint nonetheless shows the intention of M to comply with the
standard form. There was substantial compliance with the rules.
Spouses Hontiveros v. RTC of Iloilo
FACTS: Spouses M filed a complaint for damages against N. M later on filed an
amended complaint to insert therein that “earnest efforts towards a compromised
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have been made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful.” RTC
dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by
Art. 151 of the Family Code.
HELD: The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the complaint. The verification
is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which
are alleged are true and correct. The court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order
that the ends of justice may be served.
Five Star Bus Co. v. CA
FACTS: M filed a civil action for damages against N Company. RTC dismissed the
case for failure of N to appear several times during their presentation of evidence.
N appealed to CA. CA summarily dismissed their petition on the ground that the
affidavit of non-forum shopping was signed and executed by counsel for N.
HELD: The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the
Court’s consideration, petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification. The certification must convince the court that the
outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.
Counsel for N gave a rather frail excuse for his non-compliance.
Digital Microwave Corp v. CA
FACTS: M Corp. filed a complaint against N Corp. for a sum of money and damages.
N moved for dismissal of the complaint but it was denied by the RTC. N appealed to
CA, but CA dismissed the petition since N’s certification against non-forum shopping
was signed by counsel. N filed an MR and submitted a sworn certification against
forum shopping duly signed by one of its senior officers.
HELD: That N did not in the first instance comply with the requirement of Revised
Circular No. 28-91 by having the certification against forum shopping signed by one
of its officers, as it did after its petition before the CA had been dismissed, is
beyond comprehension. N has not adequately explained its failure to have the
certification against forum shopping signed by one of its officers. Neither has it
shown any compelling reason for the court to disregard compliance with the rules.
Eslaban v. Vda. De Onorio
FACTS: M filed a complaint against N Administration for collection of sum of money.
RTC ruled in favor of M. CA affirmed the decision. N filed a petition for review to
the SC. The petition for review was filed by the Project Manager of N, but the
GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 2A 2011
CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
verification and certification against non-forum shopping were signed by the
administrator of the agency.
HELD: The requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping applies to the filing
of petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the CA. Without being duly
authorized by resolution of the board of the corporation, neither the Project
Manager nor the administrator could sign the certification against forum shopping
accompanying the petition for review.
Santos v. CA
FACTS: M filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against N Inc. The verification and
certification against non-forum shopping were executed by M’s counsel. M
maintains that they executed a SPA specifically to authorize their counsel to
execute the certification on their behalf.
HELD: Insofar as verification is concerned, there is substantial compliance if the
same is executed by an attorney, it being presumed that facts alleged by him are
true to his knowledge and belief. However, the same does not apply as regards the
requirement of a certificate against forum shopping. The certification must be
made by petitioner himself and not by counsel. M are all natural persons and there
is no showing of any reasonable cause to justify their failure to personally sign the
certification.
Rule 8
Kalilid Wood Industries Corp. v. IAC
FACTS: M Bank filed a complaint for collection against N Corp. M alleged that N
should be held solidarily liable under the promissory notes. N alleged that it “had
no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
material allegations of the complaint.” N’s answer was not verified.
HELD: N, due to its failure to verify its answer, is deemed to have admitted by
implication the authenticity and due execution of the promissory notes. Defenses
relating to the genuineness and due execution of the notes are effectively cut off,
placing N in estoppel from disclaiming liability under those promissory notes.
However, both Statement of Accounts were prepared exclusively by M. N, not
having been privy thereto, did not admit the genuineness and dues execution of the
Statement in spite of its failure to verify its answer to the complaint, and that N is
not conclusively bound by the charges nor by the computations of amounts.
7

Rule 9
Rudolf Lietz Holdings v. ROD of Paranaque
FACTS: M Inc. sought the amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real
properties located in Pasay City. The petition impleaded ROD of Pasay City because
the titles sought to be amended all state that they were issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City. Subsequently, M learned that the subject titles are in the
custody of ROD of Paranaque City. M filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Petition. RTC dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground of improper venue.
HELD: The court may only dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata and prescription.
RTC should have waited for a motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading from ROD,
raising the objection or affirmative defense of improper venue, before dismissing
the petition.
Spouses Diaz v. Diaz
FACTS: M filed an action for sum of money against his brother N. N filed a motion to
dismiss but was denied by the RTC. N filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with CA. During the pendency of the petition, M filed with RTC a motion to declare
N in default for failure to file an answer.
HELD: The mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in
relation to a case pending before a lower court does not interrupt the course of the
latter when there is not writ of injunction restraining it. Proceedings in the court of
origin are not automatically suspended by filing of a petition for certiorari, much
less by a mere intent to file the same.
Vlason Enterprises Corp v. CA
FACTS: To enforce its preferred salvor’s lien, M Services filed a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the actions of the Commissioner and
District Collector in decreeing the forfeiture and the sale of the cargo on board M/V
Star Ace. M failed to include any allegation pertaining to N Corp., or any prayer for
relief against it. Summons was served to N’s secretary. RTC denied Motion of M to
declare all the defendants in default, but it never acted on the latter’s subsequent
Motion to declare N likewise. Later on, RTC declared in default some of N’s co-
defendants. Since N did not appear in the next pretrial hearing, RTC also declared
them in default and allowed M to present evidence against them.
HELD: RTC admitted that it never declared N in default. Hence, there could not
have been any valid default-judgment rendered against it. It is a legal impossibility
to declare a party-defendant to be in default before it was validly served summons.
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The order which allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte against the
defaulting defendants could not have included N because the RTC granted M’s
motion praying for declaration of only the foreign defendants in default. A default
judgment against several defendants cannot affect the rights of one who was never
declared in default.
Mediserv v. China Bank
FACTS: M Corp. filed a complaint for a sum of money to recover deficiency
judgment in foreclosure proceedings against N Inc. N filed a motion for extension of
time to file motion to dismiss and/or answer thrice. N filed a motion to dismiss
beyond the extended period granted by the court to do so. M filed a Motion to
declare N in default and Motion to Strike Out the Motion to dismiss which was
granted by the RTC. 2 months after they were declared in default, N filed an
Omnibus Motion to lift the order of default but was denied by the judge.
HELD: Omnibus Motion was not under oath and the Affidavit of Merit is defective in
that it failed to aver any fact which constitutes movant’s good and substantial
defense nor allege circumstances constituting N’s mistake or excusable negligence.
To obtain relief from an order of default, the said party may at any time after
notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside order of
default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. If not
accompanied by an affidavit of merit, the trial court has no authority to consider
the same. N failed to set aside the order of default and must suffer the
consequences thereof.
Raymundo v. CA
FACTS: M filed a complaint against N for collection of a sum of money. As N’s
motion to admit amended answer was not yet resolved, N did not attend the pre-
trial conference. RTC declared him in default and allowed M to present his
evidence ex-parte. Despite N’s urgent motion to set aside default order, RTC
proceeded to receive M’s evidence ex parte. Without resolving N’s motion, RTC
ruled in favor of M. M filed a special civil action of certiorari with CA but it was
dismissed.
HELD: An ordinary appeal is the proper remedy in questioning a judgment by
default; appeal is also the proper remedy from an order denying a petition for
relief of judgment. However, in the exceptional circumstances presented in this
case, appeal seems inadequate; certiorari lies to correct such a despotic exercise of
discretion. The RTC acted despotically in allowing M to present evidence ex-parte
even if petitioner could not be lawfully declared in default for non-appearance due
to the RTC’s own failure to rule on the admission of his amended answer.
8

Rule 10
Siasoco v. CA
FACTS: M filed a civil suit for specific performance and damages against N and O. N
filed a Motion to Dismiss. Pending its resolution, M negotiated with O which
culminated in the purchase of the subject properties by M. M filed an amended
complaint and dropped O as one of the defendants. N filed a Motion to Strike Out
Amended Complaint.
HELD: Notwithstanding the filing of a responsive pleading by one defendant, the
complaint may still be amended once, as a matter of right, by the plaintiff in
respect to claims against the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims
asserted against the other defendants. N failed to proved that they were prejudice
by M’s amended complaint.
Versoza v. CA
FACTS: M filed a complaint against N for annulment of mortgage and the issuance of
an injunctive writ to prevent the foreclosure of the property and the subsequent
transfer of ownership. N filed a motion to dismiss and it was granted on the found
that it was not personally verified by M. M filed an MR which was also granted. M
amended her complaint which bears the proper verification. However, N
proceeded with the foreclosure before the filing of the amended complaint and
sold N sold the property to O one week later.
HELD: When the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causes of
action, or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original
complaint was filed, not on the date of the filing of the amended complaint. The
original action is deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint
only if the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause of action or
demand. The original complaint was amended only to rectify the lack of
verification and thereafter to implead O.
Chua v. CA
FACTS: M filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against N. During the pre-trial,
counsel for N did not object to the statement of issues (“defendants are in arrears
for the rentals”) made by M’s counsel. Evidence on this question was presented
without any objection from N
HELD: Any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time
such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility
becomes apparent, otherwise the objection will be deemed waived and such
evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible
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CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
evidence. Rule 10, Section 5 allows the amendment of the pleadings in order to
make them conform to the evidence in the record.
Zarate v. RTC
FACTS: When the 1 year period of redemption was about to expire, Spouses M filed
a case for annulment of the execution sale with damages and a prayer for issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction against Spouses N. Despite the presence of a
TRO and during the pendency of the case, O Bank foreclosed the mortgage of M. M
filed a motion to amend their complaint in order to allege that aside from the fact
that the execution sale was invalid since the property subject of the sale was
exempt from execution, the sale was invalid also because O failed to comply with
all the notice requirements. RTC denied the motion to amend.
HELD: An order granting or denying a motion to amend the complaint on substantial
matters is discretionary with the court.
ARB Construction v. CA
FACTS: M Agency filed a complaint for preliminary injunction against N Co. M filed a
Motion for Leave to File Attached Amended and Supplemental Complaint. M
submitted that it now desired to pursue a case for Sum of Money and Damages
instead. It also alleged that N illegally deducted from the payroll.
HELD: An amendment will not be considered as stating a new cause of action if the
facts alleged in the amended complaint show substantially the same wrong with
respect to the same transaction, or if what are alleged refer to the same matter
but are more fully and differently stated, or where averments which were implied
are made in expressed terms, and the subject of the controversy or the liability
sought to be enforced remains the same. The allegation on the withholding of the
payroll in the Amended and Supplemental Complaint was only an amplification of
an issue that was already included and discussed in the original complaint.
Vlason Enterprises Corp v. CA
FACTS: (same facts as Rule 9) N claims that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over it because the former had not been served summons anew for the Second
Amended Petition or for the Second Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition.
HELD: Where the defendants have already appeared before the trial court by virtue
of a summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint may be served
upon them without need of another summons, even if new causes of action are
alleged. When defendants have not yet appeared in court and no summons has been
validly served, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on them.
It is not the change of cause of action that gives rise to the need to serve another
9

summons for the amended complaint, but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the persons of the defendants.
Spouses Mercader v. DBP
FACTS: M filed a complaint for specific performance against N Bank. After the
termination of the pre-trial, M filed a Supplemental Pleading insisting the
consummation of the lease-purchase option with the payment of the earnest
money. RTC ruled in favor of M. CA found that RTC erred in treating the lease-
purchase option as a controversial issue considering that it was “outside the
parties’ pleadings.”
HELD: As a supplemental pleading, it served to aver supervening facts which were
not ripe for judicial relief when the original pleading was filed. It was meant to
supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading, and not to dispense with the
latter.
Rule 12
Aruelo v. CA
FACTS: M filed with the COMELEC seeking to annul N’s proclamation on the ground
of “fraudulent alteration and tampering” of votes in the tally sheets and the
election returns. N filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Bill of Particulars, which
were both denied. RTC denied the BOP on 5 August, N received a copy on 6 August,
and N submitted his Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim on 11 August.
HELD: The Answer was filed timely. Under Section 1(b), Rule 12, a party has at
least 5 days to file answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of
particulars.
Tantuico v. Republic
FACTS: M filed with Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages against N et al. After his motion for production
and inspection of documents were denied, N filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars
alleging that he is sued in a complaint couched in too general terms. Sandiganbayan
denied the motion on the ground that the particulars sought by N are evidentiary in
nature.
HELD: The allegations in the complaint pertaining to N are deficient in that they
merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by factual
premises. Without the particulars prayed for in N’s motion for bill of particulars, it
can be said that N can not intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for
trial. In a motion for a bill of particulars, the only question to be resolved is
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whether or not the allegations of the complaint are averred with sufficient
definiteness or particularity to enable the movant properly to prepare his
responsive pleading and to prepare for trial.
Rule 13
Commissioner of Customs v. CTA
FACTS: M issued a warrant for the seizure of imported articles in N Corp. After
hearing, M ordered its forfeiture. N appealed, Commissioner of Customs affirmed,
CTA reversed. M was represented by the OSG and Bureau of Customes in the CTA.
Lawyers in both offices were served copies of the CTA decision, BuC on 30 May and
OSG on 5 June.
HELD: Although the OSG may have deputized the lawyers in a government agency
represented by it, the OSG continues to be the principal counsel, and therefore,
service on it of legal processes, and not that on deputized lawyers, is decisive.
Copies of orders and decisions served on the deputized counsel, acting as agent or
representative of OSG, are not binding until they are actually received by the latter
Spouses Aquino v. CA
FACTS: Spouses M filed against N a complaint for specific performance, damages
and annulment with prayer for preliminary injunction. RTC dismissed the case.
Appeal in the CA was dismissed for failure to file an appellants’ brief within the
reglementary period. O, M’s attorney in the CA, was incapacitated to notify M of
their obligation as he was in a coma when said notice was served on him. (M had a
different lawyer in the proceedings before the lower court.)
HELD: It is irrelevant that O did not receive the copy of the resolution of the CA
since he was not the counsel of record and had never entered his appearance as
counsel of M. There was an effective service upon M for as far as the CA was
concerned, M’s lawyer in the lower court continued to be their counsel of record. In
cases of substitution of attorneys the following requisites must be complied with: 1)
written application for substitution; 2) written consent of the client; and 3) written
consent of the attorney to be substituted. In case the consent of the attorney to be
substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof that notice of the
motion for substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed by law.
Requierme v. Judge Yuipco
FACTS: On the scheduled hearing, Atty. M manifested in open court that he was no
longer appearing as counsel of N since the latter engaged the services of another
lawyer. During pre-trial conference, M again appeared as counsel of N, twice. M
again verbally manifested that he was no longer counsel of N.
10

HELD: Verbal substitution is not allowed. Written consent of the client should be
filed in court and the adverse party should be given written notice of the
substitution. If her intention was to obviate delay, then she should have ordered
the counsel of record, Atty. N, who was present during the hearing, to file the
required comment or opposition.
Oriental Assurance Corp v. Solidbank Corp
FACTS: M instituted a case against N over Fire Insurance policies. RTC ruled in favor
of M. M appealed to CA. Appeal had been pending for over 3 years and counsel had
not received any notice to pay the required docket and other lawful fees.
HELD: As the new counsel for petitioners, it was incumbent upon him to inquire
either from the trial court or the appellate court about the statues of the appeal
since he had not received any notice to pay the docketing and other fees despite
the lapse of several months from the time he entered his appearance,
Justice Cuevas v. Munoz
FACTS: HK Court issued an arrest warrant of M for 7 counts of accepting an
advantage as an agent and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud. The Philippine DOJ
received a request for the provisional arrest and the accompanying documents of M
by fax machine. M contends that the request for provisional arrest and its
accompanying documents are invalid for lack of authentication.
HELD: It is an accepted prcatice for the requesting state to rush its request in the
form of a telex or diplomatic cable. PD 1069 and the RP-HK Extradition Agreement
do not prohibit the transmission of a request for provisional arrest by means of a
fax machine.
Abrajano v. CA
FACTS: Charged with bigamy before the RTC, M attempted to dispel the theory that
she and CG are the same person. (M is married to Atty. N) M claimed that CG is her
half-sister. RTC found M guilty. Apparently unaware of the resolution denying her
petition and of the subsequent entry of judgment in the SC, M filed a motion for
leave to admit the supplemental petition attached therewith. The Court issued a
resolution noting without action said motion since entry of judgment was already
made. M prayed to vacate the entry of judgment. All that appears in the Rollo is an
envelope that contained the resolution and addressed to N. At the back thereof are
notations “Return to Sender”, “Unclaimed” and “Always Nobody Home.”
HELD: Mere exhibition in court of the envelope containing the unclaimed mail is not
sufficient proof that a first notice was sent. No certification from the postmaster
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CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
that first notice was sent by him, and actually received by M, appears on record. As
there is no conclusive proof of service of the Resolution denying the petition, said
resolution cannot be deemed final and executory.
Aguilar v. CA
FACTS: Spouses M filed a Motion for Extension of Time seeking 30 days from 26 July
1995 to file a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision. M alleged
that they received a copy of the 2 February 1995 Resolution only on 11 July 1995.
“upon follow ups.” A copy of the resolution was sent on 7 February 1995 to M’s
counsel of record through registered mail. The envelope containing the unclaimed
mail merely bore the notation “return to sender: unclaimed” on its face. N opposed
the motion alleging that the decision already attained finality.
HELD: Mere exhibit in court of the envelope containing the unclaimed mail is not
sufficient proof that a first notice was sent. However, even absent proof of
completeness of service upon the counsel of M, service upon M himself was
complete. When a party is represented by counsel, notice should be made upon the
counsel of record at his given address to which notices of all kinds emanating from
the court should be sent in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the
court of a change of address, unless service upon the party himself is by court
order.
AFP Mutual Benefit Association v. CA
FACTS: M Inc. filed an action for specific performance and damages against N Inc. N
filed with the ROD of Marikina a notice of lis pendens. The notice was recorded in
the Primary Entry Book but it was not actually annotated on the titles in the name
of M. RTC rendered judgment in favor of M. M offered to sell the property to O Inc.
O verified the titles with the ROD and noted that there were no liens or
encumbrances annotated on the tile. M executed a Deed of Absolute Sale to O and
warranted that it “has good and valid title over the properties.” N commenced
action against ROD, O and M for “annotation of lis pendens and damages” with TRO.
HELD: There is no such action as one for “annotation of lis pendens.” A notice of lis
pendens is not and can not be sought as a principal action for relief. The notice is
but an incident to an action. The notice of lis pendens is ordinarily recorded
without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. Notice of lis
pendens may be annotated only where there is an action or proceeding in court
which affects title to or possession of real property. The case was an action for
collection of unpaid installments on the purchase price of subject real property.
The annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the titles of the property was not
proper as the action was in personam.
11

Fernandez v. CA
FACTS: M filed a civil case for reconveyance of the land upon threat by N of
ejectment. M claimed that he already paid the purchase price for which N signed a
receipt. N died and was substituted by the heirs. RTC dismissed the case. N
appealed. RTC reversed and ordered the cancellation of the new title issued in
favor of the heirs of M. N moved for execution and the RTC granted the motion ex-
parte. TCT of the heirs were cancelled.
HELD: The peculiar circumstances of the case, as in rendering 2 conflicting
decisions by the same judge, indubitably manifest that the annotation was not
merely to molest the other party but was needed to protect the heirs’ interest from
any hasty transfer, making recovery extremely complicated. The inherent power to
cancel is exercised only under exceptional circumstances. The cancellation of the
notations should not have been ordered since there had been no final judgment
yet, the decision being timely appealed. Also, a notice of lis pendens cannot be
ordered cancelled on an ex-parte motion. There should be notice to the party who
caused the annotation.
Spouses Po Lam v. CA
FACTS: M filed a complaint against his brother and N Company to annul the deeds of
sale covering 2 prime commercial lots on the ground that the sale included 3/14
pro-indiviso portion of the lots which M inherited from his foster parents. RTC
declared N to be the absolute owner. M appealed the case. During the pendency of
the appeal, N sold the two lots to Spouses O. O had the notice of lis pendens
cancelled.
HELD: The purchaser pendent elite is affected, not by notice, but because the law
foes not allow litigating parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to
the property in dispute as to prejudice the opposite party. The doctrine rests upon
public policy, not notice. Upon the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, O
cannot then be considered as having constructive notice of any defect in the title of
N as to make them transferees pendente lite and purchasers in bad faith. While the
notice of lis pendens is duly recorded and as long as it remained uncancelled, the
litigant can rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it during
litigation. Conversely, cancellation of the notice of pendency terminates the
effects of such notice.
Rule 14
Spouses Miranda v. CA
FACTS: M Company filed suit against the Spouses N over the recovery of one
“Thames” jeep and a sum of money. M moved to declare N in default for failure to
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file their answer within the reglementary period. In the Sheriff’s Return Service,
the summons was served on N by substituted service through O who at that time
was not living in the same house as his parents-in-law.
HELD: Impossibility of prompt, personal service should be shown by stating in the
proof of service that efforts were made to find the defendant personally and that’s
said efforts failed, hence the resort to substituted service. Summons must be left
with a person of suitable age residing in the same dwelling house or residence as
the defendant. No such explanation was made in the Sheriff’s Return and O
admitted that he was not residing with N. Hence, the substituted service is
ineffective.
Spouses Madrigal v. CA
FACTS: Spouses M brought a complaint for recovery of possession with damages
against N and O Inc. Summons and complaint were duly served on O but not on N.
Since N was not in his residence despite several attempts to look for him, the
summons and complaint were left to his wife. (N alleged that he was separated
from his wife at the time of service of summons.)
HELD: As between the Sheriff’s Return on the substituted service and N’s self-
serving assertion that he only came to know of the case against him when his sister-
in-law delivered to him the decision of the lower court, the Sheriff’s return is
undoubtedly more deserving of faith and credit. The Sheriff’s certificate of service
of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out. While the Sheriff’s
Return is silent on the facts and circumstances engendering the impossibility of
personal service of summons upon N, within a reasonable time, it can be deduced
therefrom that alias summons had to be issued.
Talsan Enterprises v. Baliwag Transit
FACTS: As a result of a bus-van collision, M instituted a civil complaint damages
against N Inc. Summons and copy of the complaint were served upon N’s cashier at
N’s bus station who received the court process but refused to sign the original
summons.
HELD: Service of summons is proper. The Sheriff’s Return is prima facie evidence of
the fact that the person on whom the summons was served was in fact the cashier
of the company. The affidavit of the cashier cannot overcome the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed. The cashier is considered an agent of
the company authorized to receive court processes.
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E.B. Villarosa & Partner v. Hon. Benito
FACTS: As M Co. Ltd. failed to comply with its contractual obligation, N initiated a
suit for breach of contract and damages at the RTC of Makati. Summons was served
upon M through its branch manager.
HELD: There was no valid service of summons on M as service was made through a
person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14. The enumeration
under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive.
Millenium Industrial Corp v. Tan
FACTS: M filed against N a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage. Summons and a
copy of the complaint were served upon N Corp. through O, described in the
sheriff’s return as a “Draftsman, a person of sufficient age and discretion working
therein, he is the highest ranking officer or Officer-in-charge of N Corporations, to
receive processes of the Court.
HELD: Service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation
sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and
know what he should do with any legal papers received by him. There is no direct
proof that O actually turned over the summons to any of the officers of the
corporation. Except for the sheriff’s return, there is nothing to show that O was
really a draftsman employed by the corporation.
Valmonte v. CA
FACTS: M filed a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of rentals
against her sister N and N’s husband who were both nonresidents. Service of
summons was made upon N’s husband, who has a law office in the Philippines. N’s
husband accepted the summons, insofar as he was concerned, but refused to accept
the summons for his wife.
HELD: As N is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons
on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, Section 17. The service of summons
upon N was not done by means of any of the first two modes. Service on N’s
husband was not made upon the order of court and was not a mode deemed
sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid. In
addition, service in the attempted manner on N was not made upon prior leave of
court.
Arcenas v. CA
FACTS: 5 years from the time of entry of judgment in the action for annulment of
the foreclosure sale of a barge, M filed a complaint for revival of judgment and sum
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CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
of money against N. Deputy sheriff served a copy of the alias summons together
with the complaint upon N through his mother who refused to receive and
acknowledge the same. (N posits that he was already living in the US when the
summons was served and that it was served at the wrong address.)
HELD: Since the complaint filed against him is one in personam and does not involve
the personal status of M, nor any property in the Philippines in which N has or claim
or an interest, or which M has attached, summons should be served on him
personally. The deputy service can not serve the summons by substituted service.
Asiavest Limited v. CA
FACTS: M Ltd. filed a complaint against N praying that N be ordered to pay to M the
amounts awarded by the HK Court Judgment. Under HK law, the substituted service
of summons upon N effected in the Philippines by clerk of a law firm would be valid
provided that it was in accordance with Philippine laws. A lawyer of the law firm
served summons on N’s son-in-law. Summons was also served on the security guard
in his residence. (N alleges that HK Court did not acquire jurisdiction over him.)
HELD: In view of the absence of proof of the HK law on this particular issue, the
presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption shall
come into play. It will thus be presumed that HK law on the matter is similar to the
Philippine law. In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident
who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal
service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over her person. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction
over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
The stipulated fact that N “is a resident of New Manila, QC, Philippines” refers to
his residence at the time jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the HK
court. Since N was not a resident of HK and the action against him was one in
personam, summons should have been personally served on him in HK. The
extraterritorial service in the Philippines was invalid.
*Agilent Technologies v. Integrated Silicon
FACTS: M (domestic corp, 100% foreign-owned) and N entered into a 5-year Value
Added Assembly Services Agreement (VAASA). N assigned all its rights and obligation
in the VAASA to O (unlicensed foreign corp). M filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against O. O filed a separate complaint against M.
HELD: A foreign corporation without a license is not ipso facto incapacitated from
bringing an action in Philippine courts. A license is necessary only if a foreign
corporation is “transacting” or “doing business” in the country. To constitute
“doing business,” the activity to be undertaken in the Philippines is one that is for
profit-making. O cannot be deemed to be “doing business” in the Philippines.
13

RIGHT OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION TO BRING SUIT IN PHILIPPINE COURTS
1. If a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it
cannot sue before the Philippine courts.
2. If a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no
license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause
of action entirely independent of any business transaction.
3. If a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, a
Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted with said corporation may be
estopped from challenging the foreign corporation’s corporate personality in a
suit brought before Philippine courts.
4. If a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with the required
license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction.
*Gemperle v. Schenker
FACTS: M (nonresident), acting through his wife and attorney-in fact, N, filed a
complaint against O. Alleging that N had caused to be published impertinent,
irrelevant and immaterial allegations and defamatory expressions, O commenced
against M and N an action for damages. Summons addressed to M and N had been
served personally upon N in the Philippines.
HELD: The lower court acquired jurisdiction over the nonresident husband by means
of the said service of summons. As the wife had authority to sue, and had actually
sued in behalf of her nonresident husband, so she was also empowered to represent
him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case which is a consequence of the
action brought by her in his behalf.
*Spouses Mason v. Columbus
FACTS: Because M Corp. failed to comply with the stipulations in the lease
contract, N filed a complaint for rescission of contract with damages against M.
Summons was served upon M through a certain O. While the receiving copy of the
summons described O as a secretary of M, the sheriffs return described O as a
secretary to the corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes.
HELD: Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a
mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings.
The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. It
will deprive M of its right to present its defense in this multi-mullion suit if the
court disregards compliance with the rules on service of summons. (There was
improper service since service was made through a person not included in the
exclusive enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14.)
GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 2A 2011
CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
Rule 15
Gan v. Reyes
FACTS: M instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against N for support
with prayer for support pendent elite. RTC ruled in favor of M and ordered N to
recognize his illegitimate child and support her. M moved for execution of the
judgment of support. Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon a motor vehicle
found within the premises of N’s warehouse. N alleged that he received a copy of
the motion for immediate execution 2 weeks after its scheduled hearing.
HELD: As the records show, in partial fulfillment of the writ of execution, N
surrendered a sedan which apparently was not his as it was later ordered released
to a third party who laid claim over the levied vehicle. Substantial justice would be
better served if N be precluded from interposing another barrier to the immediate
execution of the support judgment. There has been too much temporizing in the
execution of the writ which must not be allowed to thwart the constitutional
mandate for speedy disposition of cases.
Mutilan v. Adiong
FACTS: M claims that Judge N has assumed jurisdiction over the petition
immediately upon its filing without conducting any raffle, and that the judge has
issued an order requiring the provincial government to answer within 10 days from
receipt of the petition without it having been served on M. In an order, Judge N
granted the motion of the petitioners to declare M in default.
HELD: The present rule requires that the motion by the claiming party should be
with notice to the defending party. A perusal of the Motion to Declare Defendants
In Default reveals non-compliance by therein petitioners as there was no proof of
service showing that M were notified or served with a copy of the motion. Notice of
hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to the parties. Without the
proof of service, the rule mandates that the same shall not be acted upon by the
court. Despite the strict requirement, Judge N acted upon and granted the motion.
Proof of service is mandatory. A motion without a notice of hearing is a mere scrap
of paper.
Ala v. Ramos
FACTS: Atty. M filed an administrative complaint against Judge N and Atty. O, the
clerk of court of said branch. M alleges that when she filed a Motion to Set Case for
Hearing, Atty. O failed to include the setting prayed for in the court’s calendar.
The notice of hearing specified therein that the same was submitted for
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appropriate action by the trial court on July 22, 1999 but the Motion shows that
July 30, 1999 was the date requested by M for the hearing of his MR.
HELD: M did not send any notice of hearing for July 30, 1999. It also does not
appear that M’s Motion to Set Case for Hearing was acted upon, considering that it
was submitted for appropriate action by the trial court on a Thursday, which was
not a motion day. There was no reason for O to include the motion in the court
calendar for July 30, 1999. M should not have assumed that there would be a
hearing on July 30, 1999 especially when she was not even served any notice to
that effect.
CMH Agricultural Corp v. CA
FACTS: M filed a complaint for “Disregarding and Piercing the Veil of Corporate
Fiction, Formal Declaration or Recognition of Successional Rights and Recovery of
Title with Damages” against his siblings and N Corp. RTC dismissed the complaint. M
filed an MR which was granted by the RTC despite the lack of notice and time and
place of hearing.
HELD: The requirement of notice and hearing in a party’s pleading is necessary only
to appraise the other party of the actions of the former. Inasmuch as N have timely
filed their Opposition to M’s MR, any defect regarding such notice had been cured.
Rule 16
Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. CA
FACTS: Province M filed a complaint against N Cooperative for “Illegal Collection of
Power Bills and Preliminary Injunction with Restraining Order.” M questions the
charges passed on to its end users as a result of increase in the price of fuel. N filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.
HELD: The regulation and fixing of power rates to be charged by electric
cooperatives remain within the jurisdiction of the National Electrification
Administration, despite the enactment of EO 172, creating the ERB.
PVB v. CA
FACTS: Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land by M Bank and the DARAB, N filed
a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property. The
petition was dismissed on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period for filing of appeals from the orders of the DARAB. N argues
that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the just compensation.
GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 2A 2011
CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
HELD: The power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands is vested
in the courts. Primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency
to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for
the lands taken under the CARP, but such determination is subject to challenge in
the courts. RTC correctly dismissed the case.
Castro v. Gloria
FACTS: M filed with DECS a complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against
Teacher N. DECS declared N guilty of the offense. His MR was denied thrice. N filed
a petition for mandamus with the RTC. N insists that “when the question to be
settled is purely a question of law, he may go directly to the proper court so that
he can have proper redress.”
HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to
the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling
under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice
for review. It is settled that non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of cause
of action, which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the
dismissal of the complaint. But where the case involves only legal questions, the
litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can
be sought.
Sea-land Service v. CA
FACTS: M filed a complaint against N for reimbursement of the value of the cargo
and other charges. N filed a third-party complaint against O, averring that
whatever damages sustained by M were caused by O, which actually received and
transported M’s cargo on its vessels and unloaded them. O filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Third Party Complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action and
lack of jurisdiction, the amount of damages not having been specified therein.
HELD: Arbitration being the mode of settlement between the parties expressly
provided for by their Agreement, the Third Party Complaint should have been
dismissed.
Tourtist Duty Free Shops v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: M filed with Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages against N. N assailed the sequestration order
via a complaint for injunction and specific performance against M before the
Sandiganbayan. In its answer, M prayed that the case be dismissed on the ground of
litis pendencia. Sandiganbayan dismissed the case motu proprio based on litis
pendentia, a ground N alleges is not enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16.
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HELD: While no motion to dismiss was filed, M has been constantly pleading for the
dismissal of the case in its answer and in the subsequent pleadings submitted to the
Sandiganbayan. A preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense invoking any of
the grounds for dismissal is not even mandatory. Nonetheless, it was erroneous for
the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case on the ground of litis pendencia since the
requisites are absent in this case. Any decision that may be rendered in any of
these two cases cannot constitute res judicata on the other.
Dino v. CA
FACTS: M filed an action for collection of a sum of money against N. RTC ruled in
favor of M. N appealed to CA. CA reversed its initial decision and dismissed the
complaint for having been filed beyond the prescriptive period. M claims that since
N failed to raise the defense of prescription in a motion to dismiss or in its answer,
it is deemed waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal in a MR of
CA’s decision.
HELD: As a rule, the defense of prescription cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the
ground of prescription when the parties’ pleadings or other facts on record show it
to be indeed time-barred. What is essential only is that the facts demonstrating the
lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent
on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff’s complaint, or otherwise
established by the evidence. Even if the defense of prescription was raised for the
first time on appeal in N’s Supplemental MR, this does not militate against the due
process right of N. M had the opportunity to oppose the defense of prescription in
their Opposition to the Supplemental MR and in their Petition for Review.
Uy v. Hon. Evangelista
FACTS: M Inc. filed a complaint for specific performance, reformation and
declaration of nullity of a deed of exchange, as well as for damages, against
Spouses N. N filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of no cause of
action, unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and not the real parties-in-
interest. RTC denied the motion.
HELD: The first to third cause of action manifestly fail to establish any right to
demand specific performance in favor of M or to reform an existing contract where
none exists. If the elements for a complaint to state a cause of action are not
extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action.
GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 2A 2011
CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
Indians Aerospace University v. CHED
FACTS: M ordered N University to desist from using the word ‘University.’ N
appealed the decision but it was rejected. N filed a complaint for damages with
prayer for Write of Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction and TRO against M. M
filed a Special Appearance with Motion to dismiss based on improper venue, lack of
authority of the person instituting the action, and lack of cause of action. RTC
denied the motion and issued the TRO. M filed a Petition for Certiorari in CA which
reversed the RTC’s decision.
HELD: An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper
remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of
certiorari is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. When a motion to dismiss is
grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should be based
only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must pass upon this issue
based solely on such allegations, assuming them to be true.
San Lorenzo Village Association v. CA
FACTS: M Corp. filed an action for the issuance of a TRO directing N Inc. to cease
and desist from making M a member of the O Association and prohibiting M from
constructing a taller building on its lot and O from collecting membership fee and
monthly dues. O filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action
and lack of M’s personality to sue. O alleged that third persons were not bound by
the deed of sale of the property entered into between M and P, as said deed of sale
was not registered.
HELD: A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the
complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. However,
the hypothetical admission is limited to the relevant and material facts well
pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deductible therefrom. The admission
does not extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover
allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice. It is not “lack or
absence of cause of action” that is a ground for dismissal of a complaint, but that
the “complaint states no cause of action.” In this case, the complaint did state a
cause of action. The other two grounds used are not proper grounds for a motion to
dismiss.
China Road and Bridge Corp v. CA
FACTS: M Bank filed a case for collection against N Inc. and O Corp. The complaint
included as cause of action the 4 checks indorsed by N to M and alleging that N and
O conspired to commit fraudulent acts in order to induce M to grant the loans to N.
O filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action. According to O,
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the Deed of Assignment upon which M based its cause of action against O, was
subject to the Sub-Contracting Agreement between O and N. RTC granted the
motion. M appealed to CA, O opposed it. CA denied O’s motion to dismiss appeal.
HELD: In a motion to dismiss based on the lack of cause of action, the issue is
passed upon on the basis of the allegations assuming them to be true. Only the
statements in the complaint may be properly considered, and the court cannot take
cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to ascertain their
existence. Any appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. A decision dismissing a
complaint based on failure to state a cause of action necessarily precludes a review
of the same decision on questions of law.
Pefianco v. Moral
FACTS: M Secretary filed a complaint against Chief Librarian N for dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. M found N
guilty of the offense. N did not appeal the judgment but instead she instituted an
action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against M. M moved
to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action, but the RTC
denied his motion.
HELD: Where the court itself has not stated any basis for its order, to be very strict
in requiring a prior MR before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had,
would be to expect too much. The RTC’s order denying M’s motion to dismiss is not
a mere error of judgment but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
excess of jurisdiction because the Order is a patent nullity for failure to comply
with the provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on a motion to dismiss
should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefore.
California and Hawaiian Sugar Co v. Pioneer Insurance
FACTS: Due to the alleged refusal of M Company to settle their respective
liabilities, N Corp., as insurer, paid the consignee O Association. N filed a complaint
for damages against M. Within the reglementary period to file an answer, M filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that N’s claim is premature. RTC
issued an order deferring the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss until the trial and
directing M to file their answer. M filed a Motion to Defer Pre-Trial and Motion to
Set for Preliminary Hearing the Affirmative Defense for Lack of Cause of Action for
Failure to comply with Arbitration Clause. RTC denied the motion.
HELD: A preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses may be allowed when a motion
to dismiss has not been filed or when, having been filed, it has not been denied
unconditionally. Hence, it its resolution has merely been deferred, the grounds it
GRACE XAVIERE E. ESCOSIA / ATENEO LAW 2A 2011
CASE DOCTRINES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE MIDTERMS (ATTY. SALVADOR)
invokes may still be raised as affirmative defenses, and a preliminary hearing
thereon allowed.
Gochan v. Gochan
FACTS: (same as rule 1) N filed their answer raising the following as affirmative
defenses: lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for non-payment of the correct
docket fees, uneforceability under the Statute of Frauds, extinguishment of the
obligation by payment, waiver etc, and non-joinder of indispensable parties. N filed
a motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses but was denied.
HELD: The trial court has the discretion to conduct a preliminary hearing on
affirmative defenses. However, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied the motion for preliminary hearing. Some of these defenses
appeared to be indubitable, contrary to the pronouncement of the trial court.
Republic v. Carmel Development
FACTS: M Inc. filed a complaint for recovery of possession with preliminary
injunction against N Department and O Board. N filed a Manifestation with Motion
to Dismiss alleging that M is engaged in forum shopping and did not inform the court
that M and N are parties in two other civil cases involving the same issues of
ownership and possession of subject land. RTC denied its motion to dismiss on the
ground of litis pendentia since “M did not attach its Motion to Dismiss and MR the
proper pleadings in said civil cases.”
HELD: Since resolution of the issue requires presentation of proof, the trial court
should not have decided the issue without giving the parties an opportunity to
present proof of their respective stand in a hearing duly held for that purpose. The
charge of forum shopping or litis pendentia requires the presentation of proof and N
should have been given the opportunity to do so. It is not necessary to attach to the
motion to dismiss the evidence required to establish the movant’s cause and failure
to do so is not fatal to his case.
17