1 Cayetano v.
COMELEC - Cayetano erred when he alleged that the revision of ballots yielded to a total of
GR NO. 166388
January 23, 2006
SPV
Topic: Election Automation Law
Petitioners: Alan Peter S. Cayetano, DDS
Respondents: COMELEC, Ma. Salvacion Buac, Antonio Bautista
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez
FACTS
- On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig on the conversion
of this municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by RA 8487.
o The residents were asked this question: Do you approve the conversion of
the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila into a highly urbanized city to be
known as the City of Taguig, as provided for in Republic Act No. 8487?
- The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers, without completing the canvas of 64 election
returns, declared that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig into a city.
- However, upon order of the COMELEC, the PBOC reconvened and completed the
canvass of the plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still
prevailed.
- Buac and Bautusta then filed a petition seeking the annulment of the results with a
prayer for revision and recount for ballots.
o They allege that there is fraud which attended the counting of votes.
o Such action was treated by the COMELEC as an election protest.
- Cayetano filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that COMELEC has no jurisdiction
since a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest.
o COMELEC granted, dismissing the action filed by Buac and Bautista.
- Buac and Bautista then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Supreme Court in 2004.
o SC held that the plebiscite is a matter falling under the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC since it involves the enforcement and administration of a law
relative to a plebiscite, as mandated under the Constitution.
o SC directed the COMELEC to reinstate Buac and Bautista’s petition to annul
the results.
- The COMELEC en banc declared and confirmed the conversion of the Municipality of
Taguig into a highly urbanized city.
- Cayetano now contends that although he is for the cityhood of Taguig, the revision
of the plebiscite ballots cannot be relied upon for the determination of the will of
the electorate because the revision is incomplete.
o The revision only canvassed a total of 28,404 ballots (with 15,802 voting
for yes, 12,602 voting for no).
o He also argues that many irregularities, anomalies and frauds attended the
revision proceedings.
ISSUE: W/N the plebiscite conducted was tainted with fraud and irregularities – NO
HELD:
15,802 votes for Yes and a total of 12,602 votes for No.
- The COMELEC considered not only the total number of votes reflected in the Final
Canvassing Report of the Taguig Plebiscite Board Of Canvassers, but also the voting
results based on (1) the physical count of the ballots; (2) the returns of the
uncontested precincts; and (3) the appreciation of the contested ballots.
- The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by evidence, are accorded,
not only respect, but finality.
o The conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been
the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts.
o Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the
COMELEC.
- As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has
the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws.
o Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
2. Manzala v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176211
DATE: May 8, 2007
By: EAY3
Topic:
Petitioners: MANZALA
Respondents: COMELEC and MONTON
Ponente: AZCUNA J.
FACTS:
· Petitioner Ibarra R. Manzala and private respondent Julie R. Monton were mayoralty
candidates in the Municipality of Magdiwang, Romblon, during the May 10, 2004 National
and Local Elections.
· On May 13, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent
Monton as the duly elected Municipal Mayor with 2,579 votes, or a margin of 13 votes,
over petitioner Manzala’s 2,566 votes.
· On May 19, 2004, petitioner 􏰃led an election protest with theRTC Romblon, seeking
recount in the 10 precincts of Magdiwang on the grounds of fraud, serious irregularities,
 and willful violation of the Omnibus Election Code and other pertinent COMELEC rules
allegedly committed by the voters and the Chairman and members of the Board of
Election Inspectors during the election.
· Private respondent 􏰃led an Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim, averring
that the election was held peacefully with no irregularity whatsoever.
· A revision of ballots was later conducted.
· In its decision of December 8, 2005, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner. Protestant IBARRA R. MANZALA is hereby proclaimed as the duly-elected
Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon
· Upon appeal, the Former Second Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution which
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. The Commission (Former Second
Division) hereby DECLARES protestee-appellant JULIE E. MONTON, the duly-elected
Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon
· Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc
· Petitioner 􏰃led this petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: W/N the Comelec May review, modify or reverse the decision of the trial court - YES
HELD/RATIO:
· Clearly, from the decision of the trial court, the COMELEC exercises appellate
jurisdiction to review, revise, modify, or even reverse and set aside the decision of the
former and substitute it with its own decision. In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers, the Constitution also mandates the COMELEC to hear and decide cases
􏰃rst by division and upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. Election
cases cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal cases where, upon appeal from a
conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown open for review and the appellate
court can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the pleadings. In the present case,
the COMELEC en banc had thoroughly reviewed the decision of its Former Second Division
and a􏰃rmed the 􏰃ndings thereof with modi􏰃cation as to the number of votes obtained by
both parties after re-appreciation, that is, private respondent obtained 2,535 votes, or a
margin of 60 votes, over petitioner's 2,475 votes.
· Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution provides the COMELEC with quasi-
judicial power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and quali􏰃cations of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials,
and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal o􏰃cials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay o􏰃cials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, 􏰃nal orders, or rulings of the Commission on
Elections contests involving elective municipal and barangay o􏰃ces shall be 􏰃nal,
executory, and not appealable. Section 3 thereof states the administrative power of the
COMELEC, either en banc or in two divisions, to promulgate its rules of procedure in order
to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
· Moreover, the appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents
involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized
agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. To reiterate, the
COMELEC is the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction
over election contests involving regional, provincial and city o􏰃cials, as well as appellate
jurisdiction over election protests involving elective municipal and barangay o􏰃cials.
Consequently, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional in􏰃rmity
or error of law, the factual 􏰃ndings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the
said Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by
this Court. 6
· Finally, to justify the issuance of an injunctive relief, petitioner claims that there had
been a "misinterpretation and misapplication of the law" by the COMELEC and that
"should the facts and circumstances presented in this petition be su􏰃ciently persuasive, .
. . a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order be issued to prevent
the public respondent COMELEC from disrupting the stability of governance in the
Municipality of Magdiwang, Province of Romblon, in the meantime that the petition is
being reviewed."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of showing that the Commission on
Elections committed any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution,
dated August 24, 2006, by the Former Second Division and the Resolution, dated
January 24, 2007, by the Commissionen banc, which declared private respondent Julie
R. Monton to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon in the May
10, 2004 National and Local Elections.
Accordingly, the Commission on Elections en banc is DIRECTED to forthwith cause the
full implementation of the Writ of Execution it issued on February 28, 2007 and the
Order of March 1, 2007.
In view of the proximity of the next National and Local Elections on May 14, 2007, this
Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
3. Dibaratun v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 170365 / Feb. 2, 2010
By: Sarah Zurita
Topic: Election Automation Law
Petitioners: ABDUL GAFFAR P.M. DIBARATUN
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUL CARIM MALA ABUBAKAR
Ponente: Peralta
FACTS:
● Respondent Abubakar, a re-electionist candidate for the position of Punong
Barangay, filed a petition to declare a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A and
to annul the proclamation of petitioner Dibaratun as the duly elected Punong
Barangay of Barangay
● July 15, 2002: at around 10:30 am, the casting of votes in Precinct No. 6A/7A was
commenced at its designated Cayagan Elementary School
● While only 10 voters had actually voted, GAFFAR, son of candidate DIBARATUN got
inside the precinct and was caught in possession of 3 filled up ballots where
candidate DIBARATUN were voted which he wanted to insert inside the ballot box
● GAFFAR was confronted by the watchers, he got mad and flared up and committed
violence which disrupted and stopped the casting of votes
 ● The chairman left the ballot box which was held by the companions of Gaffar and
destroyed the said ballot box, took the official ballot and inserted, placed therein a
bundle of substituted ballots.
● The casting of votes was stopped and it was never resumed nor continued.
● The Election Officer knowing fully that there was really a failure of election in the
said precinct recommended that a special election be called for the said precinct.
● Unknown to Abubakar, the Board of Election Inspectors, in conspiracy and
connivance with Dibaratun, surreptitiously and clandestinely canvassed the election
returns and then illegally proclaimed Dibaratun and issued Certificate of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates dated July 16, 2002 which was
antedated
● Dibaratun argues: as 10 voters had actually voted, there was no failure of elections
in the aforementioned precinct and that the petition was filed out of time.
● COMELEC en banc granted the petition: due course -- special elections granted
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A and in
annulling the proclamation of Dibaratun as the elected Punong Barangay.
RULING: NO. COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT GADALEJ.
● The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC the broad power to enforce all the laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, as well as the plenary authority
to decide all questions affecting elections except as to the right to vote.
○ In Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC: 3 instances when a failure of elections may be
declared by the Commission: (AS IN SEC. 6 OF OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE)
■ the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes;
■ the election in any polling place had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
or
■ after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
● The COMELEC en banc based its decision on the 2nd instance: the election in any
polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes.
○ it was undisputed that after only 10 registered voters cast their votes, the
voting was suspended before the hour fixed by law by reason of violence.
○ This was supported by the affidavits submitted by both petitioner and
private respondent, who only disagreed as to the perpetrator
● The grounds for failure of election involve questions of fact, which can only be
determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice to and hearing of the parties.
An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined to instances
of GADALEJ.
○ The COMELEC, as the administrative agency and specialized constitutional
body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall, has the expertise in its field so that its findings and
conclusions are generally respected by and conclusive on the Court.
● Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
elections, two conditions must concur:
○ (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by
law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect
○ (2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the elections.
● the Court agrees with the COMELEC that the elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A were
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting due to violence.
Only 10 voters were able to cast their votes out of 151 registered voters; hence, the
votes not cast would have affected the result of the elections.
○ The concurrence of these 3 conditions caused the COMELEC en banc to
declare a failure of elections.
OTHER ISSUE/S:
W/N the petition for the declaration of failure of elections and to annul the proclamation
was in the nature of a pre-proclamation controversy under OEC Sec. 241? NO
● Abubakars petition for declaration of failure of elections falls under OEC Sec. 6.
● The allegations in Abubakar’s petition constitute one of the instances for the
declaration by the COMELEC of failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A.
● Hence, the COMELEC en banc took cognizance of the petition pursuant to Sec. 4 of
Republic Act No. 7166:
○ SEC. 4. Postponement, Failure of Elections and Special Elections.The
postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special
elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code
shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of
its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may
occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.
● A petition to declare a failure of elections is neither a pre-proclamation controversy
as classified under Sec. 5 (h), Rule 1 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure, nor
an election case.
W/N the petition was filed out of time? NO
● The petition filed by Abubakar was not for an election contest under OEC Sec. 252,
but for the declaration of failure of elections under Sec. 6.
● The Court notes that the provisions on failure of elections in Sec. 6 and Sec. 2, Rule
26 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure do not provide for a prescriptive period for
the filing of a petition for declaration of failure of elections.
● In this case, the petition was filed 11 days after the scheduled election
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
4. Panlilio V. COMELEC
G.R. 181478
July 15, 2009
Topic: Primary Powers of COMELEC
Petitioners: Eddie T. Panlilio
Respondents: COMELEC
Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro
DOCTRINE:
● Interlocutory Order - A temporary order issued during the course of litigation // An order
that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating
the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other,
but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court,
● Interlocutory orders before the COMELEC can’t be assailed through a Rule 65 or a motion
for reconsideration since there’s still something left to be done with the case
FACTS
● The parties herein were two of the contending gubernatorial candidates in
the province of Pampanga during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections.
● On May 18, 2007, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga proclaimed
petitioner as the duly elected governor of Pampanga having garnered the highest
number of votes of Two Hundred Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Six (219,706)
vote with a winning margin of One Thousand One Hundred Forty-Seven (1,147) votes
over the 218,559 votes of private respondent.
● On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed an election protest against
petitioner based on the allegations that fraud transpired during the election:
(DAMI NITO)
o Votes in the ballots lawfully and validly cast in favor of protestant were
deliberately misread and/or mis-appreciated by the various chairmen of
the different boards of election inspectors;
o Thousands of votes of protestant such as "NANAY BABY", her registered
nickname were intentionally and/or erroneously not counted or tallied in
the election returns as votes validly cast for the protestant
o Valid votes legally cast in favor of protestant were considered stray;
o Ballots containing valid votes for protestant were intentionally and
erroneously mis-appreciated or considered as marked and declared as null
and void;
o Ballots with blank spaces in the line for governor were just thesame read
and counted in favor of protestee;
o Ballots prepared by persons other than the voters themselves and fake or
unoEcial ballots wherein the name of protestee was written illegally, read
and counted in favor of the latter;
o Groups of ballots prepared by one (1) person and/or individual ballots
prepared by two (2) persons were purposely considered as valid ballots
and counted in favor of protestee;
o Votes that are void because the ballots containing them were pasted with
stickers or because of pattern markings appearing in them or because of
other fraud and election anomalies, were unlawfully read and counted in
favor of the protestee; and
o Votes reported in numerous election returns were unlawfully increased in
favor of the protestee, while votes in said election returns for the
protestant were unlawfully decreased ("dagdag-bawas"), such that the
protestee appeared to have obtained more votes than those actually cast
in his favor, while the protestant appeared to have obtained less votes
than the actually cast in her (protestant's) favor; and
o Moreover, buying of votes and other forms of vote-buying were resorted
to by protestee in order to pressure voters to vote for him or not to cast
their votes for the protestant herein
● COMELEC, Second Division, issued the first assailed order giving due course to
private respondents election protest and directed among others, the revision of
ballots pertaining to the protested precincts of the Province of Pampanga.
● Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the same was
denied by the same Division, in the second challenged Order dated August 1, 2007.
● On August 8, 2007, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion
o (1) to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration at the COMELEC En
Banc; and
o (2) to stay the COMELECs order directing the collection of ballot boxes.
Thereafter, on August 16, 2007, petitioner filed an urgent motion to hold
in abeyance the retrieval and collection of ballot boxes.
● COMELEC En Banc denied such petition
● COMELEC En Banc ratiocinated that the assailed orders of the COMELEC Second
Division were interlocutory orders, which are not one of the orders required by
Section 5 (C) Rule 3 and Section 5 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure to be
certified to the Commission en banc for resolution
● Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court alleging that COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the
petitioner’s omnibus motion
ISSUE
● Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying the petitioner’s omnibus motion
HELD
No!
RATIO
● This issue has been squarely addressed in Repol v. COMELEC, where the Court has
declared that the remedy to assail an interlocutory order of the COMELEC in Division,
which allegedly was issued with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of
jurisdiction, is provided in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
● Such case provides that since the COMELECs Division issued the interlocutory Order, the
same COMELEC Division should resolve the motion for reconsideration of the Order.
● The remedy of the aggrieved party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for
certification to the COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
● The acts of a Division that are subject of a motion for reconsideration must have a
character of finality before the same can be elevated to the COMELEC en banc.
● The elementary rule is that an order is final in nature if it completely disposes of the
entire case.
 o But if there is something more to be done in the case after its issuance, that
order is interlocutory.
● It is clear from the foregoing constitutional provision that the COMELEC En Banc shall
decide motions for reconsideration only of decisions of a Division, meaning those acts
having a final character.
● Here, the assailed Second Division order did not completely dispose of the case, as there
was something more to be done, which was to decide the election protest.
● Being interlocutory, the assailed Second Division orders may not be resolved by the
COMELEC En Banc
● Furthermore, the present controversy does not fall under any of the instances of which
the COMELEC En Banc can take cognizance. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure provides:
o “SEC. 2. The Commission En Banc. The Commission shall sit en banc in cases
hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a
majority of the members of the Commission, or in all other cases where a
division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the
Members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or
proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the Commission en banc.”
● This case is not among those specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
in which the COMELEC may sit en banc.
● Neither is it one where a Division is not authorized to act nor one where the members of
the Second Division have unanimously voted to refer the issue to the COMELEC En Banc.
● Thus, the COMELEC En Banc is not the proper forum where petitioner may bring the
assailed interlocutory Orders for resolution.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, and
the status quo ante order issued by this Court on February 19, 2008 is lifted. SO ORDERED.
5. BAUTISTA v. COMELEC
GR NO. 154796-97
October 23, 2003
BDC
Topic: Election
Petitioners: RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA @ OCA
Respondents: HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSEFINA P. JAREO, HON. MAYOR
RAYMUND M. APACIBLE, FRANCISCA C. RODRIGUEZ, AGRIPINA B. ANTIG, MARIA G. CANOVAS,
and DIVINA ALCOREZA
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
FACTS
● On June 10, 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in
Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay elections.
● Election Officer Josefina P. Jareo (Election Officer Jareo) refused to accept Bautista’s
certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan.
● lack of jurisdiction when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584;
11 June 2002 - Bautista filed an action for mandamus against Election
Officer Jareo with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 14 (trial court).
● Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584; and
1 July 2002 - the trial court ordered Election Officer Jareo to accept Bautista’s
certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of candidates
for Punong Barangay, in accordance with Section 7 (g) of COMELEC Resolution No.
4801 which mandates Election Officer Jareo to include the name of Bautista in the
certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs otherwise.
●
In compliance with the trial courts order, Election Officer Jareo included Bautista in
the certified list of candidates for Punong Baranga and at the same time, referred
the matter with the COMELEC Law Department on 5 July 2002.
● 11 July 2002 - the COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of
Bautista’s certificate of candidacy since he was not registered as a voter in
Lumbangan.
● The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law Departments
recommendation before the barangay elections on 15 July 2002.
During the election, Bautista obtained the highest number of votes (719) while Alcoreza, the
other candidate, came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197 votes. Thus, the
Lumbangan Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay.
8 August 2002 - Bautista took his oath of office as Punong Barangay before Congresswoman
Eileen Ermita-Buhain of the First District of Batangas, and on 16 August 2002, Bautista again
took his oath of office during a mass oath-taking ceremony administered
by Nasugbu Municipal Mayor.
10 August 2002 - COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404 and Resolution No. 5584, the former
provided that the COMELEC en banc resolved to cancel Bautista’s certificate of candidacy and
directed the Election Officer to delete Bautista’s name from the official list of candidates, while
the latter expressed COMELECs policy regarding proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible
for not being registered voters in the place of their election.
In a letter dated 19 August 2002,COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco directed
Election Officer Jareo to (1) delete the name of Bautista from the official list of candidates for
Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan; (2) order the Board of Canvassers of Lumbangan to
reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming the elected Punong Barangay with due notice to all
candidates concerned; and (3) direct the proclaimed disqualified candidate Bautista to cease
and desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the position which he won in the
elections, citing both Resolutions.
Consequently, Election Officer Jareo issued on 20 August 2002 an Order deleting the name
of Bautista from the list of candidates for Punong Barangay and also prohibited Bautista from
assuming the position and discharging its functions. The Board of Canvassers reconvened and
after making the necessary corrections in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes, proclaimed
Alcoreza as the winning Punong Barangay, who thus assumed the post
of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan.
26 August 2002 - Bautista wrote a letter to COMELEC requesting the latter for reconsideration
of the COMELEC Resolutions.
9 September 2002 - while his letter for reconsideration was still pending with the COMELEC,
Bautista filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.
ISSUE
1. WON the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
2. WON the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due process when the COMELEC en banc issued
3. WON it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of the alleged
disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista.

HELD/RATIO
1.
Petitioner’s contention - Without any disqualification case formally filed against him, the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of his case. The COMELEC cannot motu
proprio act on the issue of his alleged lack of qualification. Even assuming that there was a
disqualification case filed against him, it is the COMELEC sitting in division which has
jurisdiction and not the COMELEC en banc.
Respondent’s contention - the Constitution vests the COMELEC with the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. The Constitution thus
empowers the COMELEC to pass upon the qualification of candidates for elective office.
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of
candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may
only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a
decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division and only motions to
reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by
the COMELEC en banc. In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any
of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order.
Thus, in this case, a division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en
banc can only act on the case if there is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
COMELEC division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered
the cancellation of Bautista’s certificate of candidacy without first referring the case to a
division for summary hearing.
2.
Petitioner’s contention - Bautista alleges that the COMELEC denied him due process because
there was no notice and hearing prior to the issuance of Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584. He
became aware of the issuance of the COMELEC Resolutions only when he received a copy of
Election Officer Jareo’s Order to cease and desist from assuming the position of Punong
Barangay.
Respondent’s contention - the COMELEC did not deprive Bautista of due process. Bautista had
the chance to be heard and to present his side when he filed a letter to the COMELEC en
banc requesting reconsideration of the Resolutions.
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not
at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing.
The COMELEC did not give Bautista such opportunity to explain his side. The COMELEC en
banc issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing. Severe
consequences attach to the COMELEC Resolutions which not only ordered the cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy of Bautista but also the annulment of his proclamation as Punong
Barangay. What is involved here is not just the right to be voted for public office but the right
to hold public office.
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office
is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot
acquire a vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in
proceedings before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice
and hearing, among others.
3.
It is clear that the law requires a candidate for Punong Barangay to be a registered voter of the
barangay where he intends to run for office.
Bautista admitted in his affidavit dated 24 August 2002 that he was not a registered voter of
Barangay Lumbangan, because he did not know of such qualification since he was out of the
country when it became effective and operative. He was aware when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the office and therefore made a misrepresentation of a material fact when he
made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a registered voter in
Barangay Lumbangan. An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office
should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself. The
importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process.
Indeed, the electorate cannot amend or waive the qualifications prescribed by law for
elective office. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility. The fact that Bautista, a non-registered voter, was elected to the office of
Punong Barangay does not erase the fact that he lacks one of the qualifications for
Punong Barangay.
Although the COMELEC Law Department recommended to deny due course or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Bautista on 11 July 2002, the COMELEC en banc failed to act on it
before the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. It was only on 23 July 2002 that the COMELEC en
banc issued Resolution No. 5404. Thus, when the electorate voted for Bautista as Punong
Barangay on 15 July 2002, it was under the belief that he was qualified. A subsequent finding
by the COMELEC en banc that Bautista is ineligible cannot retroact to the date of elections so
as to invalidate the votes cast for him.
Therefore, Since Bautista failed to qualify for the position of Punong Barangay, the highest
ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second
highest ranking sangguniang member, shall become the Punong Barangay.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. Petitioner Raymundo A. Bautista is ineligible for the
position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan for not being a registered voter of
Barangay Lumbangan. The proclamation of the second placer Divina Alcoreza as winner in lieu
of Bautista is void. Instead, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member of Barangay
Lumbangan shall assume the office of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan for the unexpired
portion of the term.
SO ORDERED.

6.) CAGAS vs. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 194139 / 24 JAN 2012 / DEINLA
TOPIC: Primary Powers of COMELEC
PETITIONER: Douglas R. Cagas
RESPONDENT: COMELEC and Claude P. Bautista
PONENTE: Bersamin
FACTS:
● Cagas and Bautista Bautista contested the position of Governor of the Province of Davao del
Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. The petitioner was
proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering 159,527 votes.
● Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules
and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest.
● In his answer, petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not
make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained of.
● The COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order denying the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner.
○ Protestant paid the cash deposit of P100,000.00 on time as evidenced by O.R. No.
1118105; and
○ Paragraph nos. 9 to 28 of the initiatory petition filed by the Protestant set forth the
specific details of the acts and omissions complained of against the Protestee.
● The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss whether
the protest specified the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections, in violation of
Section 2, paragraph 2, Rule 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, requiring all decisions to
clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which they were based; and that it
also contravened Section 7(g), Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 requiring a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained of.
● The petitioner insisted that:
○ COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 had introduced the requirement for the detailed
specification to prevent shotgun fishing expeditions by losing candidates;
○ Above requirement contrasted with Rule 6, Section 1 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, under which the protest needed only to contain a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the cause or causes of action;
○ Bautistas protest did not meet such requirement; and
○ That in Pea v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the Court upheld the dismissal
of a protest by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) for not specifically
alleging the electoral anomalies and irregularities in the May 8, 1995 elections.
● Bautista countered:
○ The assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC
en banc;
○ The rules of the COMELEC required the initiatory petition to specify the acts or omissions
constituting the electoral frauds, anomalies and election irregularities, and to contain the
ultimate facts upon which the cause of action was based; and
○ Pea v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal did not apply because, Pea had totally
different factual antecedents than this case, and, the omission of material facts from Peas
protest prevented the protestee from being apprised of the issues that he must meet and
made it eventually impossible for the HRET to determine which ballot boxes had to be
collected.
● The COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order, denying the petitioners motion
for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was contrary to law, to wit:
● Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action directly in this Court.
MAIN ISSUE: Whether election protests assailing the system and procedure of counting and
canvassing of votes cast in an automated system of elections should be immediately dismissed.
NO.
RULING:
● Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections does not preclude the filing of an election protest to
challenge the outcome of an election undertaken in an automated system of elections.
● Instead, the Court only ruled there that the system and procedure implemented by the
COMELEC in evaluating the PCOS machines and CCS computers met the minimum system
requirements prescribed in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8436. The Court did not guarantee
the efficiency and integrity of the automated system of elections, as can be gleaned from
the following pronouncement:
○ The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing would go wrong,
that a successful automation election unmarred by fraud, violence, and like irregularities
would be the order of the moment on May 10, 2010. Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot
guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and the integrity of the counting and
consolidation software embedded in them.
○ That task belongs at the first instance to Comelec, as part of its mandate to ensure clean
and peaceful elections. This independent constitutional commission, it is true, possesses
extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions.
The road, however, towards successful 2010 automation elections would certainly be
rough and bumpy.
○ The Comelec is laboring under very tight timelines. It would accordingly need the help of
all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all men and women of goodwill, to
smoothen the way and assist Comelec personnel address the fears expressed about the
integrity of the system. Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated
elections to succeed, credibly.
DISPOSITION
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
JUST IN CASE
Whether the Court can take cognizance of the petition. NO.
● The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution:
○ Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or
by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
● This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC
en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
● To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is
prescribed in the Constitution:
○ Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by
the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
● We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This decision
must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not
an interlocutory order of a division.
● The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to
the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
○ Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion
for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by
this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
● In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed
by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The prerequisite filing of a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory.
Whether the COMELEC en banc should hear the case. NO.
● No less than the Constitution requires that election cases must be heard and decided first
in division and any motion for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
● Apparently, the orders dated July 26, 1995, November 15, 1995 and February 28, 1996 and
the other orders relating to the admission of the answer with counter-protest are issuances
of a Commission in division and are all interlocutory orders because they merely rule upon
an incidental issue regarding the admission of Espinosa's answer with counter-protest and
do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave something to be done before it
is finally decided on the merits.
● In such a situation, the rule is clear that the authority to resolve incidental matters of a case
pending in a division, like the questioned interlocutory orders, falls on the division itself, and
not on the Commission en banc.
● Section 2. The Commission en banc. The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter
specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members
of a Commission, or in all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where,
upon a unanimous vote of all the members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue
relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the Commission en
banc.
● In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy is one of the cases
specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the Commission may
sit en banc.
● In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed grave abuse of
discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative
to an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the instances
mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not
permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
7. DE GUZMAN V. COMELEC
GR NO. 129118
JULY 19, 2000
By: CLAIRE
Topic: PRIMARY POWERS OF COMELEC
Petitioners: SUPER DAMI
Respondents: COMELEC
Ponente: PURISIMA
FACTS:
· This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition w/ urgent prayer for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and TRO, assailing the validity of Sec 44 of RA 8189 otherwise
known as The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.
· "SECTION 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. — No Election Officer shall hold office
in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who,
either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least
four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the
Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district."
· By virtue of the said provision, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution Nos. 97-0002
and 97-0610 for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, COMELEC issued several
directives reassigning the petitioners, who are wither City of Municipal Election Officers.
· Aggrieved by the issuance of said directives & resolutions, petitioners assailed the
validity of Sec 44 of RA 8189, contending that:
1. It violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution
2. Violates constitutional guarantee on security of tenure of civil servants
3. Constituted a deprivation of property w/o due process
4. Contravenes the basic constitutional precept that every bill passed by
Congress shall embrace only 1 subject w/c must be expressed in the
title thereof
5. Undermines the constitutional independence of COMELEC and
COMELEC’s constitutional authority to name, designate, and appoint
and then reassign and transfer its very own officials & employees (I
think this is the one related sa topic)
6. Void for failure to comply w/ the constitutional requirement of 3
readings on separate days and distribution of printed copies in its final
form 3 days before its passage (Art VI, Sec 26(2) of the 1987
Constitution)

ISSUE: WON Sec 44 is valid and constitutional - YES
RULING:
1. The petition is barren of merit. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of
validity, and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it.
2. The Court is not persuaded by petitioners' arguments. The "equal protection clause"
of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1.
The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification must be
germane to the purpose of the law; 3. The classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same
class. the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section 44 of RA 8189
satisfies the aforestated requirements.
3. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election
officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
4. It can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would
be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by
breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election
officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or
municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large scale
anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out. Moreover, to require the
COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the registration of voters) who have
served at least four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of administrative
burden on the part of the COMELEC.
5. Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of tenure of petitioners nor
unduly deprive them of due process of law. As held in Sta. Maria vs. Lopez. ". . . the rule
that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an
officer who is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station. Such a rule does
not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of
an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the
service of the agency. . . ."
6. The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of
perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or
transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due
process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the
power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the
ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for
so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of
the law.
7. Untenable is petitioners' contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the
authority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed upon by
the Solicitor General, Sec 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said
section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election
officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its
authority over its officials and employees. As a matter of fact, the questioned COMELEC
resolutions and directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the power to
reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But as a government agency tasked
with the implementation and enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound
to comply with the laws passed by Congress. The independence of the COMELEC is not
at issue here. There is no impairment or emasculation of its power to appoint its own
officials and employees. In fact, Section 44 even strengthens the COMELEC’s power of
appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
domain.
8. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voter's Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter
enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION,
PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF
FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of election officers,
is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the
registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the
reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to
the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters.
9. As regards the issue raised by petitioners — whether Section 44 of RA 8189 was
enacted in accordance with Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners
have not convincingly shown grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress. Respect
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com due to co-equal departments of the
government in matters entrusted to them by the Constitution, and the absence of a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED; and the constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of
RA 8189 UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
8. SULIGUIN v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 166046
MARCH 23, 2006
Topic: PRIMARY POWERS OF COMELEC
Petitioner: MARGARITO C. SULIGUIN
Respondents: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, and ECELSON C. SUMAGUE
Ponente: CALLEJO, SR., J.
DOCTRINE: Election contests involve public interest and technicalities and procedural barriers
should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true
will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials.
FACTS:
● Suliguin was one of the candidates for the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna
during the May 10, 2004 elections.
● Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) convened to canvass the votes for all the
candidates.
o Suliguin received 6,605 votes while Sumague received 6,647 votes.
o However, in the Statement of Votes (SOV) covering Precincts 1A to 19A,
Sumague appears to have received only 644 votes when, in fact, he
received 844 votes.
● Saliguin was proclaimed as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna
 ● Thereafter, Sumague requested for a recomputation of the votes in a Letter
o appearing that there was a mistake in adding the figures in the Certificate
of Canvass of votes
● Upon review, the MBOC discovered that it had, indeed, failed to credit Sumague his
200 votes from Precincts 1A to 19A
o with his 6,647 votes, he should have been proclaimed as the 8th
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, instead of Suliguin
● On May 26, 2004, the MBOC filed before the Comelec a "Petition to Correct Entries
Made in the Statement of Votes" for Councilor.
o error was attributed to extreme physical and mental fatigue which the
members of the board experienced during the election
● In the meantime, on June 9, 2004, Saliguin took his oath
● On July 21, 2004, the Comelec (First Division) issued a Resolution granting the
petition of the MBOC.
o The Commission nullified the proclamation of Suliguin as the 8th
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan "for being based on an
erroneous computation of votes."
o It then ordered the MBOC of Nagcarlan, Laguna to reconvene and effect
the necessary corrections in the SOV, and proclaim Sumague as the 8th
duly elected Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna.
● Saliguin moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but the Comelec En Banc
denied the motion.
● Hence, this petition. He alleges that:
o The MBOC itself filed the "Petition to Correct Entries Made in the
Statement of Votes" before the Comelec only on May 26, 2004, 13 days
after the canvassing of votes was terminated.
o Comelec should have denied the petition, since according to the Revised
Comelec Rules, it should have been filed not later than five (5) days
following the date of the proclamation.
ISSUE:
W/N Comelec erred in granting the petition of the MBOC to nullify Saliguin's proclamation as
the 8th member of the Sangguniang Bayan in Nagcarlan, Laguna – NO.
RULING:
The Comelec was correct in annulling the proclamation of Saliguin for being based on an
erroneous computation of votes. In Espidol v. Commission on Elections, where the
proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive
the Commission the power to declare such proclamation a nullity.
● In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to ascertain by all means within its
command who the real candidate elected by the electorate is.
o In the case at bar, the simple mathematical procedure of adding the total
number of votes garnered by Sumague as appearing in the SOV submitted
to the Comelec would readily reveal the result that he has forty-two (42)
votes more than Saliguin.
o Such result would, in effect, dislodge Saliguin from said post, and entitle
Sumague to occupy the 8th seat of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan,
Laguna.
● Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure explicitly provide that
such rules may be "liberally construed" in the interest of justice.
o as such, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to
stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of
the people in the choice of public officials
● "a proclamation based on faulty tabulation of votes is flawed, and a petition to
correct errors in tabulation under Section 7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, even if filed out of time, may be considered, so as not to thwart the
proper determination and resolution of the case on substantial grounds and to
prevent a stamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation based on an erroneous
tabulation of votes."
o The contention of Saliguin that the instant petition should be dismissed for
being filed out of time cannot be given merit because his proclamation was
flawed.
● Furthermore, "where the proclamation is flawed because it was based on a clerical
error or mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and not through the
legitimate will of the electorate, there can be no valid proclamation to speak of and
the same can be challenged even after the candidate has assumed office."
● "The COMELEC exercises immediate supervision and control over the members of
the Boards of Election Inspectors and Canvassers. Its statutory power of supervision
and control includes the power to revise, reverse or set aside the action of the
boards, as well as to do what boards should have done, even if questions relative
thereto have not been elevated to it by an aggrieved party, for such power includes
the authority to initiate motu proprio or by itself steps or actions that may be
required pursuant to law."
o In Tatlonghari v. Commission on Elections, the fact that a candidate
proclaimed has assumed office is no bar to the exercise of such power.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in SPC No.
04-209 dated July 21, 2004 and November 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Order
issued by the Court dated January 11, 2005 is LIFTED.
9. Bedol v. COMELEC
GR NO. 179830
December 3, 2009
By: RM
Topic: Primary powers of COMELEC
Petitioners: LINTANG BEDOL
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Ponente:
FACTS:
· During the 2017 National and Local Elections, petitioner was the Provincial Elections
Supervisor for the Province of sheriff Kabunsuan, a neighboring province of Maguindanao.
· Petitioner failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of
Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao.
o He was informed of the resetting of the canvassing, but also failed to
appear.
· Celia B. Romero, Director II, ERSD & Concurrent Chief of the Records and Statistics
Division of the COMELEC issued a certification that as of even date, the canvassing
 documents for all municipalities of the province of Maguindanao in connection with the
May 14, 2007 elections were not transmitted by the Provincial Election Supervisor of said
province nor the respective Board of Canvassers.
· The Commission and not just the NBOC, in the exercise of its investigatory powers to
determine existing controversies created the Task Force Maguindanao tasked to conduct
a fact- finding investigation on the conduct of elections and certificates of canvass from
the city and municipalities in Maguindanao.
· Petitioner appeared before the Task Force where he explained that while in his
custody and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on May 29,
2007, or some 15 days after the elections.
o This was the first time such an excuse was given by the him an nd no
written report was ever filed with the Commission regarding the
alleged loss.
· Petitioner was duly informed to be present in the next scheduled investigative
proceedings
o However, despite actual notice in open session, Atty. Bedol failed to
appear, giving the impression that Bedol does not give importance to
this whole exercise and ignores the negative impact his attitude has
on this Commission.
· Petitioner came out on national newspapers, in an exclusive interview with the
'Inquirer' and GMA-7, with a gleaming 45 caliber pistol strapped to his side, and in clear
defiance of the Commission posted the challenge by saying that 'those that are saying
that there was cheating in Maguindanao, file a case against me tomorrow, the next day.
They should file a case now and I will answer their accusations.'
· A Contempt Charge and Show Cause order was issued.
o Petitioner was arrested by member of the PNB pursuant to an Order of
Arrest issued by the COMELEC and was found guilty of Contempt of
the Commission.
· petitioner questioned the COMELEC's legal basis for issuing the warrant of arrest and
its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to initiate or prosecute the contempt proceedings
against petitioner – YES.
RULING:
· The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws
Article IX-C, Section 2(6) . . .; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
· The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution
and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative,
and quasi-judicial.
o The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to
resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws,
and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of
all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications.
o Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations
to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative
functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress.
o Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws.
· The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law.
o DOCTRINE: In carrying out their quasi- judicial functions the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
· The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi- judicial
power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections
in Maguindanao, conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties
concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their
respective positions.
o to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who
refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a
previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the
COMELEC's investigative power
· Moreover, on the procedure adopted by the COMELEC in proceeding with the indirect
contempt charges against petitioner, Section 52 (e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election
Code pertinently provides:
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. —
(e) Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure and with the
same penalties provided therein. Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or
ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt thereof.
· the above-quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code
explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties provided by the Rules of Court. Under
Section 4, Rule 71, said proceedings may be initiated motu proprio by the COMELEC
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated
motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other
formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
· Hence, the COMELEC properly assumed jurisdiction over the indirect contempt
proceedings which were initiated by its Task Force Maguindanao, through a Contempt
Charge and Show Cause Order, notwithstanding the absence of any complaint filed by a
private party.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
NOTE:
Rule 29, COMELEC’s Rules of Procedure
Sec. 2. Indirect Contempt. — After charge in writing has been filed with the Commission or
Division, as the case may be, and an opportunity given to the respondent to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of the responsible officer of the Commission in the performance of his official
duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the
Commission or any of its Divisions, or injunction or restraining order granted by it;
(c) Any abuse of or any inlawful interference with the process or proceedings of the
Commission or any of its Divisions not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this
Rules;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice by the Commission or any of its Divisions;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority; and
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served.
SEC. 3. Penalty for Indirect Contempt. — If adjudged guilty, the accused may be punished by a
fine not exceeding one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or imprisonment for not more than six (6)
months, or both, at the discretion of the Commission or Division.
10 CAPALLA v COMELEC
GR NO. 201112
JUNE 13, 2012
TS
Topic: ELECTION AUTOMATION LAW
Petitioner: ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, OMAR SOLITARIO ALI and MARY ANNE L.
SUSANO
Respondents: COMELEC
Ponente: PERALTA, J.
FACTS:
● PETITION for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, Prohibition, Mandamus
and to Declare Comelec Resolution Nos. 9376, 9377 and 9378.
● July 10, 2009: COMELEC and Smartmatic entered into a Contract for the Provision of
an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local
Elections (AES Contract).
o The contract was one of “lease of the AES with option to purchase (OTP)
the goods listed in the contract.”
o In the contract, COMELEC was given until December 31, 2010 to exercise
the option.
● September 23, 2010: COMELEC partially exercised its OTP 920 units of PCOS
machines for the special elections in certain areas in Basilan, Lanao del Sur and
Bulacan.
● Smartmatic through its Chairman Cesar Flores proposed a temporary extension of
the option period on the remaining 81,280 PCOS machines until March 31, 2011,
waiving the storage costs and covering the maintenance costs.
o COMELEC didn’t exercise the option within the extended period.
● Several extensions were given for the COMELEC to exercise the OTP until its final
extension on March 31, 2012.
● The COMELEC resolved to seriously consider exercising the OTP subject to certain
conditions.
● The COMELEC issued a resolution resolving to accept Smartmatic’s offer to extend
the period to exercise the OTP until March 31, 2012 and to authorize Chairman
Brillantes to sign for and on behalf of the COMELEC the Agreement on the Extension
of the OTP Under the AES Contract (Extension Agreement). The Extension
Agreement was signed on March 30, 2012.
● Finally, the COMELEC issued a resolution resolving to approve the Deed of Sale
between COMELEC and Smartmatic to purchase the latter’s PCOS machines
(hardware and software) to be used in the upcoming May 2013 elections, and to
authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the
Comelec. The Deed of Sale was executed.
● Claiming that the foregoing issuances + transactions of the COMELEC are illegal and
unconstitutional, petitioners come before the Court in 4 separate Petitions for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus imputing GADALEJ on the part of the
COLEMEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions and in executing the assailed Extension
Agreement and Deed.
ISSUE: W/N the assailed resolutions and transactions entered are valid. – YES.
RULING:
● A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the parties
are given the right to amend the contract, which may include the period within which
to exercise the option.
o There is no prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that the
contract is still effective.
● COMELEC still retains P50M of the amount due Smartmatic as performance security,
which indicates that the AES contract is still effective and not yet terminated.
● Pursuant to Article 19 of the contract, the provisions may still be amended by mutual
agreement of the parties provided said amendment is in writing and signed by the
parties.
● Considering, however, that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves
procurement by a government agency, the rights and obligations of the parties are
governed not only by the Civil Code but also by RA 9184.
● A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions of
the contract bidded upon.
● However, such changes must not constitute substantial or material amendments
that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would constitute a denial
to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms.
● The conclusions held by the Court in PSALM v. Pozzolanic Philippines Inc. and Agan,
Jr. v. PIATCO cannot be applied in the present case.
 ● First, Smartmatic was not granted an additional right that was not previously
available to the other bidders.
o The bidders were apprised that aside from the lease of goods and purchase
of services, their proposals should include an OTP the subject goods.
Second, the amendment of the AES contract is not substantial.
● The approved budget for the contract was P11,223,618,400.00 charged against the
supplemental appropriations for election modernization.
● Bids were accepted provided that they did not exceed said amount.
● The competitive public bidding conducted for the AES contract was sufficient.
o A new public bidding would be a superfluity.
● Lastly, the amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous to the COMELEC
and the public because the P7,191,484,739.48 rentals paid for the lease of goods and
purchase of services under the AES contract was considered part of the purchase
price.
● For the COMELEC to own the subject goods, it was required to pay only
P2,130,635,048.15.
● If the Comelec did not exercise the option, the rentals already paid would just be
one of the government expenses for the past election and would be of no use to
future elections.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on April 24, 2012 is LIFTED.
11. People v Corral
GR NO. 42300
January 13, 1936
By: Richie Rich
Topic: Suffrage
Petitioners: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Amadeo Corral
Ponente:
DOCTRINE: The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government.
The right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege
granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public
good.
FACTS:
● Amadeo Corral was charged with having voted illegally at the general elections held
on June 5, 1934. After due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted
while laboring under a legal disqualification.
● In 1910, he was convicted of a crime and was sentenced to suffer eight years and
one day of presidio mayor. There was no evidence that he had been granted plenary
pardon prior to the election.
● Section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code disqualified from voting any person
who, since August 13, 1898, had been sentenced to prison for at least 18 months
ISSUE: W/N the disqualification is valid - YES
HELD/RATIO:
● The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government.
The right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law. Suffrage is a
privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise
it for the public good.
● In the early stages of government, the right to vote was restricted to a small portion
of the population. But with the spread of democratic ideas over time, the right to
vote embraces other parts of the population (at that time, “the mass of male
population)
● For reasons of public policy, certain classes of persons are excluded from the
franchise. Among the generally excluded classes are minors, idiots, paupers, and
convicts.
● "The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity
of elections. The presumption is that one convicted of a felony, or those base
offenses indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or
to hold office.
● The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for
protection and in not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the
denial of a personal right."
● Upon the facts established in this case, it seems clear that the appellant was not
entitled to vote on June 5, 1934.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
12. Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC
GR NO. 162759
August 4, 2006
SPV
Topic: The Overseas Absentee Voting Act
Petitioners: LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO,
ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ,
JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D.
NATIVIDAD
Respondents: COMELEC
Ponente: Garcia
FACTS
- Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others.
- Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought
registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter".
- But they are advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a
COMELEC letter to the DFA, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing
to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.
o The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not
to discontinue their campaign for voters’ registration, as the residence
restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals
who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
 o As Filipino who have merely reacquired their citizenship, they are
considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency
under Sec 1, Art 5 of the Constitution.
o Duals must first establish their domicile/residence in the Philippines to be
granted non-resident absentee voting rights.
- Petitioners now filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in lieu of COMELEC’s
refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired
Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189 - YES
HELD:
- Sec 1, Art V of the Constitution prescribes residency requirement as a general
eligibility factor for the right to vote.
o On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system
wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an
exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be
allowed to vote.
- Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent
resident who is recognized as such in the host country because immigration or
permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in
his country of origin.
o However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident
abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to
show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile
o Otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there
is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to
establish a system for absentee voting.
- After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political
rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
- There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they
can exercise their right to vote.
- By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, , the strategic
location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified
Filipinos abroad.
o The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who
are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not
satisfy the residency requirement
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that
those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under
the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003.
NOTES
Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad
exercise their right to vote;
Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and
vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;
SEC. 4 of RA 9225. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate
or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship
upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
- It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eight
een (18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines.
- If the next generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy
full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme
nor reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A.
9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter.
13. Makalintal v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013
DATE: July 10, 2003
By: EAY3
Topic:
Petitioners: MAKALINTAL
Respondents: OMELEC
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ J.
FACTS:
● This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Macalintal, a member of the
Philippine Bar.
● He seeks to declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity.
● Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this
case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated,
petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
● Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote
for at least 6 months immediately preceding an election.
● Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his
claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder immigrant to the United
States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
● Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified
to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to
circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing
 a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence
requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote.
● He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the
date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N Sec 5(d) of RA 9189 is constitutional - Yes (but other parts declared
unconstitutional)
HELD/RATIO:
● Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution,
Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that
Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the
“qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country.
● The petition was partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are
declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
● The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “subject
to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”
● The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon review and
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”
● The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: “The Implementing
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;” and
● The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: “It shall review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the Commission” of the same law; for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of
the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as
COMELEC.
● Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law
continues to be in full force and effect.
● Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional in that it violates the
requirement that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election, as provided under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
which reads: “Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.”
● LAW:
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Overseas
Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications.—The following shall be disqualified from voting under this
Act:
xxx xxx xxx
An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country,
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by
the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her
registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied
for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of
the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
● For the resolution of this instant issue, the Court has relied on, among others, the
discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of
absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of
the Constitution, which reads: “Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for
securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting
by qualified Filipinos abroad.” It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the
Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino
citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the
Philippines. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach
voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and
consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
● It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2
immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of
necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing
constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the
Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency
requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same
Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the
Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
● That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency
requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate
when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon
on the Senate floor, further weakening petitioner’s claim on the unconstitutionality
of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are
declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: only upon review and approval of
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: The Implementing Rules
and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
by virtue of this Act for prior approval; and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: It shall review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence
of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the
authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-
list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, ○ Velasco is not eligible to run for office since he is not a qualified voter.
Article VII of the Constitution. ○ Panlaqui asked for the annulment, revocation and cancellation of, or
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD. denial of due course to, Velascos COC that allegedly contained obvious and
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be gross material misrepresentation.
in full force and effect. ● Velasco denied the allegations of Panlaquis petition
SO ORDERED. ● Velasco garnered 7,822 votes [the most number] in the May 14, 2007 election.
● COMELEC failed to resolve Panlaquis petition prior to the election, Velasco was
14. Velasco v. COMELEC proclaimed Mayor of Sasmuan on May 16, 2007.
G.R. No. 180051 / Dec. 24, 2008 ○ Velasco took his oath of office and assumed the powers and functions
By: Sarah Zurita ● COMELEC 2nd div. Issues a Resolution: citing OEC Sec. 138 which declared the
Topic: Inclusion & exclusion proceeding decision of the RTC in the voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings final and executory
Petitioners: NARDO M. VELASCO ○ Velasco guilty of material misrepresentation when he claimed in his COC
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MOZART P. PANLAQUI filed on March 28, 2007 that he is a registered voter.
Ponente: Brion ○ This defect effectively voided Velasco’s COC.
● Velasco filed MR -- Denied
FACTS:
○ COMELEC en banc essentially affirmed the 2nd Division’s ruling.
● Velasco was born in Pampanga. He’s a filipino citizen.
○ Additionally, the COMELEC pointed out that in the absence of a writ or
● 1983: he moved to and worked in the US where he became a citizen.
order issued by the CA (where the appeal from the RTC decision in the
● 2006: Velasco applied for dual citizenship under RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
inclusion/exclusion case was then pending) enjoining the enforcement of
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003)
the RTC decision, it had to apply Section 138 of the OEC.
○ application was approved on July 31 and took the oath on the same day
○ returned to the PH on Sept. 14 and has not left since, except for a 3-day
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling Velasco’s COC
Hong Kong trip
● October 13, 2006: Velasco applied for registration as a voter.
RULING: NO
○ The Election Registration Board (ERB) denied his application
● The well-settled rule is that the Court will not interfere with a COMELEC decision
● Velasco filed a petition for the inclusion of his name in the list of voters with the
unless the COMELEC is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion.
MTC.
● In the present case, the ERB denied Velasco’s registration as a voter, which denial
○ MTC: granted -- Included in the list of voters
the RTC subsequently supported. As already mentioned, this denial by the RTC is, by
● RTC: reversed MTC (THIS IS THE INCLUSION/EXCLUSION PROCEEDING)
law, final and executory. Since Velasco’s knowledge of the RTC decision at the time
○ Velasco lost his domicile of origin when he became a US citizen
he filed his COC is not disputed, the COMELEC concluded that he committed a
○ Velasco failed to comply with the residency requirement under the
material misrepresentation when he stated under oath in his COC that he is a
Constitution, making him ineligible to vote in the May 14, 2007 elections.
registered voter of Sasmuan.
● Velasco appealed to the CA.
● It is a matter of record, appearing in a final RTC judgment no less, that Velasco was
● It was against this factual backdrop that Velasco filed on March 28, 2007 his COC
not a registered voter of Sasmuan at the time he filed his COC.
for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan.
○ His claim in this regard was therefore false and was a material
○ In his COC, he stated the required information that he is a registered voter
misrepresentation. Other than his active misrepresentation, Velasco
of Precinct No. 103-A.
likewise was inexplicably silent about, and thus knowingly omitted any
○ He executed on even date an Affidavit renouncing, abandoning, and
mention of, the denial of his registration.
relinquishing his American citizenship.
● Section 138 of the OEC is clear and categorical in its terms: Decisions of the
● Panlaqui (also a candidate for the same position) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course
Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to
To and/or To Cancel Velascos COC, claiming that:
the Regional Trial Courts within five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof.
○ Velasco is not a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A, as his name is not
Otherwise, said decision shall become final and executory. The regional trial court
included in the list of voters
shall decide the appeal within ten days from the time the appeal was received and
○ RTC has rendered a decision denying Velascos petition for inclusion as
its decision shall be final and executory.
voter
○ We note that when Velasco sought recourse with the Court of Appeals,
○ Velasco does not possess the constitutional requirement of legal residency
he did so by way of appeal under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court a recourse
(i.e., one year residency in the Philippines immediately preceding the
that was not available to him because an RTC ruling in an
election as provided under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution) to
inclusion/exclusion is final and executory.
register as voter; he arrived in the Philippines only last Sept. 14
● There are 2 proceedings in this case:
 ○ The COC Denial/Cancellation (Sec. 74 & Sec. 78)
■ Requires that the facts stated in the COC by the would-be
candidate be true, as any false representation of a material fact
is a ground for the COCs cancellation or the withholding of due
course.
○ The Voters Inclusion/Exclusion ( Secs 138, 139 and 143)
■ Inclusion/exclusion proceedings essentially involve the simple
issue of whether a petitioner shall be included in or excluded
from the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law
and the facts presented to show possession of these
qualifications.
● COMPARISON OF 2 PROCEEDINGS:
COC Denial/Cancellation Voters Inclusion/Exclusion
Residence
● Section 9 of Republic Act 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act
(VRA), requires that voters shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
(1) year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the election.
● On the other hand, OEC Sec. 74: that the would-be candidate state material
facts such as, among others, his residence.
status as a registered voter
Application to be a candidate Application to be registered as a voter to
be eligible to vote
Review by COMELEC En Banc then to Court Appeal to RTC then to CA on certiorari
under Rules 64 of ROC based on GADALEJ
● Under the combined application of Section 65 of the OEC and Section 39 of the LGC,
a local official must among others have the same residency requirement as required
under the VRA.
● In Domino v. COMELEC: this Court faced the contention that the decision of the first
level court in an exclusion proceeding on the issue of residence is final and conclusive
on the COMELEC hearing a COC denial/cancellation proceeding under Section 78 of
the OED
○ we ruled that the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant
conclusions in the inclusion/exclusion proceedings on matters other than
the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not
conclusive on and do not rise to the level of a res judicata ruling with
respect to the COMELEC.
○ The reason is that inclusion/exclusion proceedings, while judicial in
character, are summary proceedings.
○ a decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding does not operate as a bar
to any future action in any other election that a party may take concerning
his right to be registered as a voter
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. The Status Quo Order we issued is
hereby ordered IMMEDIATELY LIFTED. We DECLARE that there is no more legal impediment
or obstacle to the implementation of the assailed COMELEC resolutions. No costs.
NOTES:
Sec. 138. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases. The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of
voters from the list in their respective cities or municipalities. Decisions of the Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Courts
within five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final
and executory. The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten (10) days from the
time it is received and the decision shall become final and executory. No motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained [As amended by Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA
8189)].
Sec. 139. Petition for inclusion of voters in the list. Any person whose application for
registration has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has been stricken out from the
list may file with the court a petition to include his name in the permanent list of voters in his
precinct at any time except one hundred five (105) days prior to a regular election or seventy-
five (75) days prior to a special election. It shall be supported by a certificate of disapproval of
his application and proof of service of notice of his petition upon the Board. The petition shall
be decided within fifteen (15) days after its filing.
If the decision is for the inclusion of voters in the permanent list of voters, the Board shall place
the application for registration previously disapproved in the corresponding book of voters and
indicate in the application for registration the date of the order of inclusion and the court
which issued the same [As amended by Section 34 of RA 8189].
Section 143. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of inclusion, exclusion
and correction of names of voters.
(a) Petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of voters shall be filed during office
hours;
(b) Notice of the place, date and time of the hearing of the petition shall be served upon the
members of the Board and the challenged voter upon the filing of the petition. Service of such
notice may be made by sending a copy thereof by personal delivery or by leaving it in the
possession of a person of sufficient discretion in the residence of the challenged voter, or by
registered mail. Should the foregoing procedures be not practicable, the notice shall be posted
in the bulletin board of the city or municipal hall and in two (2) other conspicuous places within
the city or municipality;
xxx
(c) A petition shall refer only one to one (1) precinct and implead the Board as respondents;.
(d) No costs shall be assessed against any party in these proceedings. However, if the court
should find that the application has been filed solely to harass the adverse party and cause him
to incur expenses, it shall order the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses.
(e) Any voter, candidate or political party who may be affected by the proceedings may
intervene and present his evidence.
(f) The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no case rendered upon a
stipulation of facts. x x x
(g) The petition shall be heard and decided within ten (10) days from the date of its filing. Cases
appealed to the Regional Trial Court shall be decided within ten (10) days from receipt of the
appeal. In all, cases, the court shall decide these petitions not later than fifteen (15) days
before the election and the decision shall be immediately final and executory. [As amended by
Section 32 of RA 8189
15. ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS Party List v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193256
March 22, 2011
TOPIC: Political Parties – Registration
FACTS:
● Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition with the COMELEC for the cancellation of registration and
accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List on the ground that petitioner is a front for a
religious organization.
● Private respondent contends that ABC is a front for a religious group called the Children
of God International, which is more popularly known as Ang Dating Daan, based on the
following circumstances:
o Although its National Chairman, James Marty Lim, was being publicly bruited as
its first nominee, the real number one nominee of the party is Arnulfo "Noel"
Molero, who is a known top official of Ang Dating Daan;
o ABC was organized, established and is being run by Ang Dating Daan not as a
party-list organization for political purposes [envisioned by R.A. No. 7941 (the
Party-List System Act)], but as a religious sect for religious purposes;
o The resources of Ang Dating Daan are being used to finance the campaign of
ABC on a nationwide scale; and
o The membership of ABC is composed of the members of Ang Dating Daan.
● ABC denied private respondent’s allegations, which were unproven by any material and
convincing evidence.
● It averred that ABC, as a political party, is allowed by law to be registered and run under
the party-list system of representation.
● The COMELEC has approved petitioner’s registration and accreditation as a party-list
group, and petitioner had participated and was voted upon in the 2007 elections.
● On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC, Second Division issued a Resolution dismissing the
petition based on procedural and substantial grounds.
● The COMELEC, Second Division also dismissed the petition based on substantial grounds,
as it found that ABC is not a religious sect, and is, therefore, not disqualified from
registration.
● Upon reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution partially granting private
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Annul Proclamation and
Suspend Its Effects.
● ABC argued that the Commission en banc has no more jurisdiction to entertain the
petition for cancellation of registration and accreditation since ABC was already
proclaimed as winner.
● Petitioner avers that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Senate
and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members."
o Hence, once a candidate for House of Representatives is proclaimed, the
COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction to pass upon its qualification and the same
is vested with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
ISSUE: Whether or not HRET has jurisdiction
RULING: NO
● The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any
political party, organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which states:
o Sec, 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
xxxx
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions
which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those
which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse
to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any
foreign government shall likewise be refused registration…
● Based on the provision above, the Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to
register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the
registration of the same on legal grounds.
● The said authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which
provides:
o Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. -- The Comelec may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
xxx
● It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the instant petition for
cancellation of the registration of the ABC Party-List.
● The jurisdiction of the HRET over contests relating to the qualifications of a party-list
nominee or representative is derived from Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, while
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
● In sum, the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party.
registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List for alleged violation of Section While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs performance of its
6 (1) of R.A. No. 7941. functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue
● Petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit pertaining to Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue
of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited
16. Atienza v COMELEC scope of its power over political parties.
G.R. 188920
February 16, 2010 WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the
BDC Commission on Elections dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001.
Topic:
Petitioners: Jose L. Atienza, Jr., Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G. 17.) ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMELEC
Valencia, Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin Cast- G.R. NO. 190582 / 8 APR 2010 / DEINLA
Abayon, Melvin G. Macusi And Eleazar P. Quinto,
Respondents: Commission On Elections, TOPIC: Political Parties
Manuel A. Roxas II, Franklin M. Drilon And PETITIONER: Ang Ladlad LGBT Party represented herein by its Chair, Danton Remoto
J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, RESPONDENT: COMELEC
Ponente: J. Abad PONENTE: Del Castillo

FACTS:
DOCTRINE: The validity or invalidity of the expulsion of a political party’s officers is purely a
● The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
membership issue that has to be settled within the party. It is an internal party matter over
organization under RA No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
which COMELEC has no jurisdiction. It may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when
● Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions, such as resolving an intra party
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or transgendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
leadership dispute as an incident of its power to register political parties
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial
FACTS
membership base.
Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of
● Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued:
party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right
○ The LGBT community is a marginalized and underrepresented sector that is particularly
to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity;
summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to
○ LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings
societal attitudes,
and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements
○ LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and
○ Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong
ISSUE
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.
Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.s constitutional
■ Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and
right to due process by the latters expulsion from the party.
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
● The COMELEC dismissed the Petition:
HELD No. Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an
○ Citing the Bible and Koran, the definition of the LGBT sector provided by petitioner makes
intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.
instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life,
○ Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or
liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested
accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code
right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The
are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation.
only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party members,
■ ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any
correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their
act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x
charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose rights under their
x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those
■ It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish
rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas election
policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or
 purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are
inexistent and void from the beginning.
■ Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and
indecent shows in Article 201 of the RPC.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for registration should be granted. YES.
RULING:
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
● As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,
the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals). The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
● Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations.
● A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each
province of the Philippines. Ang Ladlad also presented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella
organization with affiliates around the Philippines.
● Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is
no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
● Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Clearly, governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
● Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond
mere conformity to religious doctrine.
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
● Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and
homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally
accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:
○ Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of
LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is
recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in
having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring
down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set
of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.
● We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to
imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the
preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals
themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
● Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual
conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not been
convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.
● The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by
Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC
that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts.
● Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
● We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters
concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government
will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society.
● Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of
intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go
through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is
robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue
from our scrutiny.
Equal Protection
● Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted the
provision as an absolute prohibition on classification.
● Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.
● The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual
conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify
the petitioner.
● Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief.
No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about
homosexual behavior.
● Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the
asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal
protection clause.
● From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have
the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political
parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate
in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and underrepresented
sectors.
● It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other
law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances
would similarly fail.
● We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the
purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as
a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received
sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today.
● Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other
groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.
 Freedom of Expression and Association
● Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
● Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and
promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-
discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR
and the ICCPR.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE.
The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list
accreditation.