MALAYAN INSURANCE vs PHILIPPINE FIRST Malayan is not solidarily liable with Republic because

INSURANCE they have different sources from which their

liability arose. Republic arose due to a contract of
FACTS carriage, while Malayan is that of contract.
Wyeth contracted a contract of carriage with Republic, Solidarity exist only by express stipulation of the
a common carrier for the transport of its parties or those provided by law, none of which is
goods and product. applicable in the present case.
Wyeth insured the goods with Philippine First , while
Republic insured the same goods with
Malayan insurance
During transit, certain goods were lost due to
hijacking of 10 armed men.
Philippine first paid the proceeds to Wyeth,
subrogating the rights of wyeth to Philippine first
which filed a claim against Republic and Malayan as a
3rd party defendant.
Republic and Malayan refused the claim of Philippine
first. Malayan contended that there was
double insurance and that the first insurer, Philippine
First, should bear all the loss.

ISSUE
W/N Malayan is liable? - YES
W/N there is double insurance? - NO
W/N Malayan is solidarily liable with Republic? - NO

HELD
Malayan is liable because of the insurance contract it
executed with Republic for the idemnity
for the loss. The cause of the loss not within the
purview of an excepted peril, having been
determined in the lower courts is conclusive upon the
SC making Malayan liable for the
idemnity.
There is double insurance when:
1] The person insured is the same
2] 2 or more insurers insuring separately
3] There is identity of subject matter
4] There is identity of interest insured
5] There is identity of the risk or peril insured against
In the case at bar though the 2 insurance policy, one
by Philippine first and one by Malayan
were issued over the same subject matter covering
the same peril, it was issued to 2
different persons and to 2 different interest.
Philippine first insured wyeth over its own goods
Malayan insured republic over the latters insurable
interest over the safety of the
goods which could become the basis for liability in
case of loss or damage.
Pacific v CA ​G.R. No. L-41014 November 28, 1988
J. Paras
Facts:
An open fire insurance policy, was issued to
Paramount Shirt Manufacturing by Oriental Assurance
Corporation to indemnify P61,000.00, caused by fire
to the factory’s stocks, materials and supplies.
The insured was a debtor of Pacific Banking in the
amount of (P800,000.00) and the goods described in
the policy were held in trust by the insured for Pacific
Banking under trust receipts.
The policy was endorsed to Pacific Banking as
mortgagee/ trustor of the properties insured, with the
knowledge and consent of private respondent to the
effect that "loss if any under this policy is payable to
the Pacific Banking Corporation".
A fire broke out on the premises destroying the goods
contained in the building.
The bank sent a letter of demand to Oriental for
indemnity.
The company wasn’t ready to give since it was
awaiting the adjuster’s report.
The company then made an excuse that the insured
had not filed any claim with it, nor submitted proof of
loss which is a clear violation of Policy Condition
No.11, as a result, determination of the liability of
private respondent could not be made.
Pacific Banking filed in the trial court an action for a
sum of money for P61,000.00 against Oriental
Assurance.
At the trial, petitioner presented communications of
the insurance adjuster to Asian Surety revealing
undeclared co-insurances with the following: P30,000
with Wellington Insurance; P25,000 with Empire
Surety and P250,000 with Asian Surety undertaken
by insured Paramount on the same property covered
by its policy with Oriental whereas the only
co-insurances declared in the subject policy are those
of P30,000.00 with Malayan P50,000.00 with South
Sea and P25.000.00 with Victory.
The defense of fraud, in the form of non-declaration of
co-insurances which was not pleaded in the answer,
was also not pleaded in the Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court denied the respondent’s motion.
Oriental filed another motion to include additional
evidence of the co-insurance which could amount to
fraud.
The trial court still made Oriental liable for P 61,000.
The CA reversed the trial court decision. Pacific
Banking filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, but this
was denied for lack of merit.
Issues:
1. WON unrevealed co-insurances Violated policy
conditions No. 3
2. WON the insured failed to file the required proof of
loss prior to court action.
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Policy Condition No. 3 explicitly provides:
3. The Insured shall give notice to the Company of
any insurance already effected, or which may
subsequently be effected, covering any of the
property hereby insured, and unless such notice be
given and the particulars of such insurance or
insurances be stated in or endorsed on this Policy by
or on behalf of the Company before the occurrence of
any loss or damage, all benefit under this policy shall
be forfeited.
The insured failed to reveal before the loss three
other insurances. Had the insurer known that there
were many co-insurances, it could have hesitated or
plainly desisted from entering into such contract.
Hence, the insured was guilty of clear fraud.
Concrete evidence of fraud or false declaration by the
insured was furnished by the petitioner itself when the
facts alleged in the policy under clauses
"Co-Insurances Declared" and "Other Insurance
Clause" are materially different from the actual
number of co-insurances taken over the subject
property.
As the insurance policy against fire expressly required
that notice should be given by the insured of other
insurance upon the same property, the total absence
of such notice nullifies the policy.
Petitioner points out that Condition No. 3 in the policy
in relation to the "other insurance clause" supposedly
to have been violated, cannot certainly defeat the
right of the petitioner to recover the insurance as
mortgagee/assignee. Hence, they claimed that the
purpose for which the endorsement or assignment
was made was to protect the mortgagee/assignee
against any untoward act or omission of the insured. It
would be absurd to hold that petitioner is barred from
recovering the insurance on account of the alleged
violation committed by the insured.
It is obvious that petitioner has missed all together the notice of loss. It didn’t even furnish other documents.
import of subject mortgage clause which specifically Instead, petitioner shifted upon private respondent the
provides: burden of fishing out the necessary information to
“Loss, if any, under this policy, shall be payable to the ascertain the particular account of the articles
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION Manila destroyed by fire as well as the amount of loss. Since
mortgagee/trustor as its interest may appear, it being the required claim by insured, together with the
hereby understood and agreed that this insurance as preliminary submittal of relevant documents had not
to the interest of the mortgagee/trustor only herein, been complied with, it follows that private respondent
shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect—except could not be deemed to have finally rejected
fraud or misrepresentation, or arson—of the petitioner's claim and therefore there was no cause of
mortgagor or owner/trustee of the property insured; action.
provided, that in case the mortgagor or owner/ trustee It appearing that insured has violated or failed to
neglects or refuses to pay any premium, the perform the conditions under No. 3 and 11 of the
mortgagee/ trustor shall, on demand pay the same.” contract, and such violation or want of performance
The paragraph clearly states the exceptions to the has not been waived by the insurer, the insured
general rule that insurance as to the interest of the cannot recover, much less the herein petitioner.
mortgagee, cannot be invalidated; namely: fraud, or
misrepresentation or arson. Concealment of the
aforecited co-insurances can easily be fraud, or in the
very least, misrepresentation.
Undoubtedly, it is but fair and just that where the
insured who is primarily entitled to receive the
proceeds of the policy has by its fraud and/or
misrepresentation, forfeited said right.
Petitioner further stressed that fraud which was not
pleaded as a defense in private respondent's answer
or motion to dismiss, should be deemed to have been
waived. It will be noted that the fact of fraud was tried
by express or at least implied consent of the parties.
Petitioner did not only object to the introduction of
evidence but on the contrary, presented the very
evidence that proved its existence.
2. Generally, the cause of action on the policy
accrues when the loss occurs, But when the policy
provides that no action shall be brought unless the
claim is first presented extrajudicially in the manner
provided in the policy, the cause of action will accrue
from the time the insurer finally rejects the claim for
payment
In the case at bar, policy condition No. 11 specifically
provides that the insured shall on the happening of
any loss or damage give notice to the company and
shall within fifteen (15) days after such loss or
damage deliver to the private respondent (a) a claim
in writing giving particular account as to the articles or
goods destroyed and the amount of the loss or
damage and (b) particulars of all other insurances, if
any.
Twenty-four days after the fire did petitioner merely
wrote letters to private respondent to serve as a
Republic Bank v. Phil. Guaranty Co., Inc. (Santa Ana vs. Commercial Union Ass. Co., 55 Phil.
G.R. No. L-27932, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 271 128).

FACTS: If the insured has violated or failed to perform the

On January 12, 1962, Union Manufacturing Co., Inc.
(UMC) obtain certain loans from Republic Bank in the
total sum of 415,000.00. To secure the payment
thereof, UMC executed real and chattel mortgage on
certain properties. The Republic Bank procured from
the defendant Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc. an
insurance coverage on loss against fire for
500,000.00over the properties of UMC, as described
in defendant’s cover note dated September 25, 1962,
with the annotation that loss or damage, if any, under
said cover note is payable to Republic Bank as its
interest may appear, subject however to the printed
conditions of said defendant’s Fire Insurance Policy
form.
On September 6, 1964, a fire occurred in the
premises of UMC and onOctober 6, 1964, UMC filed
its fire claim with the PGC Inc., thru itsadjuster, H.H.
Bayne Adjustment Co.,
which was denied by saiddefendant in its letter dated
November 26, 1964 on the following ground: “Policy
Condition No. 3 and/or the ‘Other Insurance Clause’
of the policy was violated because you did not give
notice to us of the other insurance which you had
taken from New India for 80,000.00,
SincereInsurancefor 25,000.00 and Manila Insurance
for 200,000.00 with the result that these insurances of
which we became aware of only after the fire, were
not endorsed on our policy.
conditions of thecontract, and such a violation or want
of performance has not beenwaived by the insurer,
then the insured cannot recover. Courts are
notpermitted to make contracts for the parties. The
functions and duty of thecourts consist simply in
enforcing and carrying out the contracts
actuallymade.While it is true, as a general rule, that
contracts of insurance areconstrued most favorably to
the insured, yet contracts of insurance, likeother
contracts, are to be construed according to the sense
and meaningof the terms which the parties
themselves have used. If such terms areclear and
unambiguous they must be taken and understood in
their plain,ordinary and popular sense.The annotation
then, must be deemed to be a warranty that the
propertywas not insured by any other policy. Violation
thereof entitles the insurer to rescind. The materiality
of non-disclosure of other insurance policies isnot
open to doubt.The insurance contract may be rather
onerous, but that in itself does not justify the
abrogation of its express terms, terms which the
insured accepted or adhered to and which is the law
between the contracting parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Bank can recover.

RULING:

No. Republic Bank cannot recover.

Without deciding- whether notice of other insurance

upon the sameproperty must be given in writing, or
whether a verbal notice is sufficientto render an
insurance valid which requires such notice, whether
oral or written, we hold that in the absolute absence of
such notice when it isone of the conditions specified
in the fire insurance policy, the policy isnull and void.
Insurance Case Digest: ​Cha V. CA​ (1997)
G.R. No. 124520 August 18, 1997
Lessons Applicable: Effect of Lack of Insurable
Interest (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: Sec. 17, Sec. 18, Sec. 25 of the
Insurance Code
FACTS:
Spouses Nilo Cha and Stella Uy-Cha and CKS
Development Corporation entered a 1 year lease
contract with a stipulation not to insure against fire the
chattels, merchandise, textiles, goods and effects
placed at any stall or store or space in the leased
premises without first obtaining the written consent
and approval of the lessor. But it insured against loss
by fire their merchandise inside the leased premises
for P500,000 with the United Insurance Co., Inc.
without the written consent of CKS
On the day the lease contract was to expire, fire broke
out inside the leased premises and CKS learning that
the spouses procured an insurance wrote to United to
have the proceeds be paid directly to them. But
United refused so CKS filed against Spouses Cha
and United.
RTC: United to pay CKS the amount of P335,063.11
and Spouses Cha to pay P50,000 as exemplary
damages, P20,000 as attorney’s fees and costs of
suit
CA: deleted exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
ISSUE: W/N the CKS has insurable interest because
the spouses Cha violated the stipulation
insurable interest in property insured is based on
sound public policy: to prevent a person from taking
out an insurance policy on property upon which he
has no insurable interest and collecting the proceeds
of said policy in case of loss of the property. In such
a case, the contract of insurance is a mere wager
which is void under Section 25 of the Insurance Code.
SECTION 25. Every stipulation in a policy of
Insurance for the payment of loss, whether the person
insured has or has not any interest in the property
insured, or that the policy shall be received as proof of
such interest, and every policy executed by way of
gaming or wagering, is void
Section 17. The measure of an insurable interest in
property is the extent to which the insured might be
damnified by loss of injury thereof
The automatic assignment of the policy to CKS under
the provision of the lease contract previously quoted
is void for being contrary to law and/or public policy.
The proceeds of the fire insurance policy thus
rightfully belong to the spouses. The liability of the
Cha spouses to CKS for violating their lease contract
in that Cha spouses obtained a fire insurance policy
over their own merchandise, without the consent of
CKS, is a separate and distinct issue which we do not
resolve in this case.

HELD: NO. CA set aside. Awarding the proceeds to

spouses Cha.

Sec. 18. No contract or policy of insurance on

property shall be enforceable except for the benefit of
some person having an insurable interest in the
property insured
A non-life insurance policy such as the fire insurance
policy taken by petitioner-spouses over their
merchandise is primarily a contract of indemnity.
Insurable interest in the property insured must exist a
t the time the insurance takes effect and at the time
the loss occurs. The basis of such requirement of
IVOR ROBERT DAYTON GIBSON, petitioner, vs.
HON. PEDRO A. REVILLA​, in his official
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch XII, Court of
First Instance of Rizal, and LEPANTO
CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, respondents
G.R. No. L-41432 1979 Jul 30
Topic: Reinsurance
Facts:
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed a
complaint against Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc.The civil suit thus instituted by Lepanto
against Malayan was founded on the
fact that Malayan issued a Marine Open Policy
covering all shipments of copper, gold and
silver concentrates in bulk from Poro, San Fernando,
La Union to Tacoma, Washington or to
other places in the United States.
Thereafter, Malayan obtained reinsurance abroad
through Sedgwick, Collins & Co., Limited,
a London insurance brokerage. The Memorandum of
Insurance issued by Sedgwick to
Malayan listed three groups of underwriters or
reinsurers – Lloyds 62.808%, Companies
(I.L.U.) 34.705%, Other Companies 2.487%.
At the top of the list of underwriting members of
Lloyds is Syndicate No. 448, assuming
2.48% of the risk assumed by the reinsurer, which
syndicate number petitioner Ivor Robert
Dayton Gibson claims to be himself.
Petitioner Ivor Robert Dayton Gibson filed a motion to
intervene as defendant, which motion
was denied by the lower court.
Issue: whether the lower court committed, reversible
error in refusing the intervention of
petitioner Ivor Robert Dayton Gibson in the suit
between Lepanto and Malayan
Ruling:
We rule that the respondent Judge committed no
error of law in denying petitioner's Motion
to Intervene. And neither has he abused his discretion
in his denial of petitioner's Motion for
Intervention.
We agree with the holding of the respondent Court
that since movant Ivor Robert Dayton
Gibson appears to be only one of several re-insurers
of the risks and liabilities assumed by
Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., it is highly
probable that other re-insurers may likewise
intervene. If petitioner is allowed to intervene, We
hold that there is good and sufficient
basis for the Court a quo to declare that the trial
between Lepanto and Malayan would be
definitely disrupted and would certainly unduly delay
the proceedings between the parties
especially at the stage where Lepanto had already
rested its case and that the issues would
also be compounded as more parties and more
matters will have to be litigated. In other
words, the Court's discretion is justified and
reasonable.
We also hold that respondent Judge committed no
reversible error in further sustaining the
fourth ground of Lepanto's Opposition to the Motion to
Intervene that the rights, if any, of
2
petitioner are not prejudiced by the present suit and
will be fully protected in a separate
action against him and his co-insurers by Malayan.
Petitioner's contention that he has to pay once
Malayan is finally adjudged to pay Lepanto
because of the very nature of a contract of
reinsurance and considering that the re-insurer
is obliged 'to pay as may be paid thereon' (referring to
the original policies), although this is
subject to other stipulations and conditions of the
reinsurance contract, is without merit.
The general rule in the law of reinsurance is that the
re-insurer is entitled to avail itself of
every defense which the re-insured (which is
Malayan) might urge in an action by the
person originally insured (which is Lepanto).
Specifically, the rule is stated thus
"Sec. 1238. In an action on a contract of reinsurance,
as a general rule the reinsurer is
entitled to avail itself of every defense which the
reinsured might urge in an action by the
person originally insured; . . ."
The same rule is stated otherwise in 44 Am. Jur. 2d,
Sec. 1862, p. 793, as follows:
"Moreover, where an action is brought against the
reinsurer by the reinsured, the former
may assert any defense that the latter might have
made in an action on the policy of
original insurance." (Eagle Ins. Co. vs. Lafayette Ins.
Co., 91 Ind. 443)
As to the effect of the clause "to pay as may be paid
thereon" contained in petitioner's reinsurance
contract, Arnould, on the Law of Marine Insurance
and Average, 13th Ed., Vol. 1,
Section 327, p. 315, states the rule, thus:
"It has been decided that this clause does not
preclude the reinsurer from insisting upon
proper proof that a loss strictly within the terms of the
original policy has taken place."
"This clause does not enable the original underwriter
to recover from his re-insurer to an
extent beyond the subscription of the latter."
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Fieldmen's Insurance vs. Asian Surety​ (1970)
FIELDMEN'S INSURANCE CO., INC.,vs. ASIAN
SURETY & INSURANCE, CO., INC. and CA (1970)
MAKALINTAL, J.:
· On various dates the Asian Surety & Insurance
and the Fieldmen's insurance entered into 7
reinsurance agreements or treaties under the general
terms of which ASIAN, as the ceding company
undertook to cede to FIELDMEN’S, as the reinsuring
company, a specified portion of the amount of
insurance underwritten by ASIAN upon payment to
FIELDMEN'S of a proportionate share of the gross
rate of the premium applicable with respect to each
cession after deducting a commission.
o agreements were take effect from certain specific
dates and were to be in force until cancelled by either
party upon previous notice of at least 3 months by
registered mail to the other party, the cancellation to
take effect as of the 31st of December of the year in
which notice was given.
· Sept and Dec 1961 à FIELDMEN’S sent letters
to ASIAN expressing its desire to cancel all
agreements between them as of DEC 31, 1961
alleging that ASIAN had already incurred numerous
violations àASIAN received but did not reply
· Feb 1962 à FIELDMEN’S sent another letter to
ASIAn repeating the fact of cancellation and now
requesting ASIAN to submit its final accounting of all
cessions made to the former for the preceding months
when the reinsurance agreements were in force.
· Meanwhile one of the risks reinsured by
FIELDMENS issued in favor of the GSIS became a
liability when the insured property was burned on Feb
1962 à The next day ASIAN sent letter to
FIELDMEN’S notifiying them of the loss and stating…
o ... we beg to reiterate that your letter of December
7, 1961, terminating said treaties by December 31,
1961, is not in accordance with the terms thereof,
since there was no prior three months' notice.
However, considering the attitude express (sic) in
your aforesaid letter of December 7, 1961, we are
willing to waive provision that said treaties may be
cancelled on December 31st of any year, and will
consider them cancelled at the end of three (3)
months from December 7, 1961, by which time we
shall be able to render the final accounting you desire.
· FIELDMEN’S filed a petition for declaratory
relief with CFI Manila alleging its first letter of
notification on SEPT 19, 1961 was sufficient to meet
the 3 month period before cancellation and to obtain
an order directing ASIAN to render final accounting of
the transactions between them with respect to said
reinsurance treaties as of the cut-off date.
· CFI DECISION à 6 of 7 agreements are
cancelled as of DEC 1961 but agreed with ASIAN that
FIELDMEN’S is still liable for as long the previously
contracted policies are still valid. It also ordered
FIELDMEN'S to make an accounting with ASIAN
within 30 days.
· CA à Affirmed with modification à the order for
accounting was eliminated
ISSUE: WON cancellation had the effect of
terminating also the liability of FIELDMEN'S as
reinsurer with respect to policies or cessions issued
prior to the termination of the principal reinsurance
contracts or treaties?
· Only the cancelled agreements are being
considered here à 2 of which contain provisions,
which clearly and expressly recognize the continuing
effectivity of policies ceded under them for
reinsurance notwithstanding the cancellation of the
contracts themselves.
o Article 10 of the Facultative Obligatory
Reinsurance Treaty Fire provides "that in the event of
termination of this Agreement ..., the liability of the
Fieldmen's under current cessions shall continue in
full force and effect until their natural expiry ...;" and
the 4th paragraph of Article VI of the Personal
Accident Reinsurance Treaty states:
o 4. On the termination of this Agreement from any
cause whatever, the liability of the REINSURER
(Fieldmen's) under any current cession including any
amounts due to be ceded under the terms of this
Agreement and which are not cancelled in the
ordinary course of business shall continue in full force
until their expiry unless the COMPANY (Asian) shall,
prior to the thirty-first December next following such
notice, elect to withdraw the existing cessions ....
· It is therefore clear that FIELDMEN’S is still
liable despite the cancellation àSuch cessions
continued to be in force until their respective dates of
expiration à GSIS policy still valid and subsisting at
time of loss à FIELDMEN’S IS LIABLE
· No need to go into other arguments (did not
mention what they are) because the cancellation of
the agreements made them moot
· SC NOTES à ASIAN only claims continued
liability of FIELDMEN’s as to the 2 agreements that
had the provision cited above (as compared to the
other 4 cancelled agreements wherein FIELDMEN’S
liability had terminated with the contracts)
· FIELDMEN'S insists on its alternative prayer
that all cessions under the six reinsurance
agreements be declared rescinded by reason of
certain violations thereof, as stated by FIELDMEN'S
in its letter of December 7, 1961 à Court reminds
them that this action is for declaratory relief and not
one for rescission and no grounds found by lower
courts that can justify rescission anyway.
Title:​ Avon Insurance vs CA and the Philippine court has not acquired jurisdiction
Topic: Reinsurance (sections 95-98) over them.
- The reinsurance treaties between the petitioners and
FACTS: Worldwide Surety and
- It all started with Yupangco Cotton Mills engaged to Insurance were made through an international
secure with Worldwide insurance broker and NOT
Security and Insurance Co. Inc., several of its through any entity or means remotely connected with
properties totaling P200 Million the Philippines
- These contracts were covered by reinsurance - Reinsurance company is not doing business in a
treaties between Worldwide certain state even if the
Surety and Insurance, and several foreign property or lives which are insured by the original
reinsurance companies including insurer company are
the petitioners through CJ Boatrwright acting as agent located in that state.
of Worldwide Surety - Reinsurance Contract is generally separate and
and Insurance distinct arrangement from
- A Fire then razed the properties insured on the original contract of insurance.
December 1969 and May 2, 1981 - Doing business in the Philippines – must be judged
- A Deed of Assignment made by Worldwide Surety in the light of its peculiar
and Insurance circumstances upon its peculiar facts and upon the
acknowledged a remaining balance of language of the statute
P19,444,447.75 still due and assigned applicable.
to Yupangco all reinsurance proceeds still collectible o True test: whether the foreign corporation is
from all the foreign continuing the body or
reinsurance companies. substance of the business or enterprise for which it
- Yupangco then filed a collection suit on the above was organized
petitioners - If there exist a domestic agent of the foreign
- The service of summons were made through the corporation it can be served
office of the Insurance with summons through that agent without proving that
Commissioner but since the international reinsurers such corporation is
question the jurisdiction doing business in the phils or not.
the trial court the case has not proceeded to trial on o NO allegation or demonstration of the existence of
the merits petitioners’
- The reinsurer is questioning also the service of domestic agent but avers simply that they are doing
summons through business not only
extraterritorial service under Sect 17 Rule 14 of the abroad but in the Phils
Rules of Court nor o Petitioners had not performed any act which would
through the Insurance Commissioner under Sec 14 give the general
- Yupangco also contends that since the reinsurers public the impression that it had been engaging or
question the jurisdiction of intends to engage
the court they are deemed to have submitted to the in its ordinary and usual business undertaking in the
jurisdiction of the court. country.
- The purpose of the law in requiring that foreign
ISSUE: WON the international reinsurers are “doing corporations doing business
business in the Philippines”. in the country be licensed to do so, is to subject the
- WON the Philippine court has jurisdiction over these foreign corporations
international reinsurers doing business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction of
who are not doing business in the Philippines the courts, 19 otherwise,
a foreign corporation illegally doing business here
RULING: NO, international reinsurers are not “doing because of its refusal or
business in the Philippines”
neglect to obtain the required license and authority to
do business may
successfully though unfairly plead such neglect or
illegal act so as to avoid
service and thereby impugn the jurisdiction of the
local courts.
- Voluntary appearance before the lower court to
question the jurisdiction is
not equivalent to submission to jurisdiction
The SC disposed the case in favor of the international
insurers (petitioners’)
declaring that the lower court has not acquired and
cannot acquire jurisdiction over
them and was ordered to desist from maintaining
further proceeding against them.