Artifacts and Intentionality

- Toward a Phenomenology of Technique and Technology -

Kohji Ishihara
(Hokkaido University, JAPAN)
ishihara@let.hokudai.ac.jp

Preface
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the “technological intentionality,” and at the
same time examine ontological difference between tools and machines. Arguing these
issues would contribute to a phenomenological theory of technique and technology.
In this paper ‘technique’ refers to the acquired ability of humans to adjust their body
movements or to use tools for certain purposes. In this sense, ‘technique’ may overlap
with ‘skillful action.’ ‘Technology,’ on the other hand, refers to the collective human
activity to produce artifacts based on scientific knowledge. While technique can be
developed individually and transmitted implicitly, technology needs systematic and
explicit collaboration.
As for the difference between tools and machines, we may think of this difference as
that of the degree of the dependence; tools stop working as soon as they leave human
hands while machines can work autonomously with external or internal power sources.
While this explanation is correct, it is not sufficient. The ontological status of machines
should be elucidated in terms of the intentionality directed at technological artifacts. I
would like to call this intentionality “technological intentionality.” Here this term refers
not only to the intentions of designers or engineers to produce machines, but also the
intentions of users, managers, and regulators to use machines, to manage the process of
production, and to regulate technology. Moreover this intentionality refers not only to
the explicit “intentions” but also other mental states and attitudes toward technological
artifacts. In this paper I would like to give an outline of this technological intentionality,
drawing on phenomenological theories of tools and machines.
This paper is divided into four sections: In the first section, “Umwelt. Network of
tools,” I will examine Heidegger’s theory of tools. In the second section, “Arendt and
modern Technology,” Arendt’s theory of technology will be examined to characterize
contemporary technology and technological intentionality. The third section,
“Human-Computer-Interaction Studies,” will try to deepen our understanding of the
difference between tools and machines as well as the relation between designers and
users. The last section, “Technological Artifacts and Intentionality: Materiality,
Structure and Function,” will try to specify the technological intentionality from the

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perspective of designers and users..

1. Umwelt. Network of tools

Max Scheler deserves credit for being the first person to analyze the characteristics of
the human environment as distinct from the animal environment. Scheler
characterized Umwelt as “The totality, or the uniform whole, of the world which is
effectively experienced by a living being.” 1 In such an Umwelt we treat a “milieu-
thing,” which is a value-laden cultural thing contrary to the scientific value-free objects.
In criticizing Scheler’s tendency toward theorization, Heidegger did well to learn from
Scheler. 2 However, we may point out the characteristics of Heidegger’s theory of
environment distinguished from Scheler in two points.
Firstly, Heidegger showed that our Umwelt is a referential totality of tools and must
withdraw so that tools can be used. Concerning this point, to quote Heidegger, “The
peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that in its readiness-to-hand, it must,
as it were, withdraw [zurückzuziehen] in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically.
That with which our everyday dealing proximally dwells is not the tools themselves
[Werkzeuge selbst]. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is
the work—that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly
ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality within which the
equipment is encountered.”3
In this passage Heidegger insists that in coping with environment our intentionality
is not directed toward tools themselves, but toward the work which must be produced,
and that tools must not stand out in order for work to be done smoothly. In this sense,
though Heidegger did not deal with body thematically, we could think of tools as an
expansion of the human body. United with the body, tools are used in the rhythm of the
human body.
Secondly, Heidegger insists that Others are met from Werk and Arbeit. For him
Umwelt is the network of tool-things from which we encounter ourselves as well as
Others. To quote Heidegger again, “The structure of the world’s worldhood is such that
Others are not proximally present-at-hand as free-floating subjects along with other
Things, but show themselves in the world in their special environmental Being, and do
so in terms of what is ready-to-hand in that world.”4
In Heidegger’s Umwelt, typically in the workplace, one shares the world with

1 Scheler (1913/16):168; Translation by Frings and Funk: 154.

2 Cf. Michalski (1997): 158.
3 Heidegger (1927): 69-70; Translation by Macquarrie and Edward Robinson: 99.
4 123; Translation: 160.

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anonymous others and makes products for anonymous others, using tools made by
anonymous others. While one usually cannot know who will use the products nor who
made the tools, s/he knows well the functions of tools and can foresee how his/her
products will be used by users. In short, s/he makes end-products with familiar tools.
While working, s/he is usually absorbed and concerned exclusively with the work that is
to be produced. However, once the tools malfunction and the process of production
breaks down, tools and the situation move into the foreground, so that s/he can examine
the function of the tools and grasp the whole situation of the workplace. Thus Heidegger
analyzed our Umwelt composed of tools.
However, our everyday environment has become quite different from what Heidegger
described as Umwelt. It is indeed a workplace of the good old days, where even the
Ford-assembly-line-system has not been introduced. In such a workplace, humans could
work purposefully and autonomously. Nowadays, our workplaces are usually
surrounded by computers, which we are not situated to look inside and examine their
function when they break down. These machines turn into silent black boxes, instead of
being investigated in order to be repaired. For such a technologically conditioned world,
Heidegger’s theory of Umwelt seems to be inappropriate5. In this respect, Arendt’s
theory of modernity might explain structural changes in our environment. Now let me
examine Arendt’s theory on technology.

2. Arendt and modern Technology

In The Human Condition, Arendt characterized Heidegger’s Umwelt as a world made
by homo faber. 6 According to her, as opposed to homo laborans, who is “subject to and
constantly occupied with the devouring processes of life,” 7 homo faber makes
end-products which constitute a stable and durable world. However, Arendt insists,
technology in the modern age has shattered the world of homo faber twofold. Firstly,
technology introduced machines to replace tools. Through this introduction, humans
came to labor purposelessly according to the mechanical rhythm, instead of making end
products and a stable world with tools. Secondly, technology channeled natural forces
into the world of human artifice. From the viewpoint of homo faber, nature is what
invades the human artifice and threatens the durability of the world.8 Through the
introduction of machines and natural forces into the world, technology blurred the
boundary between nature and the world, which homo faber struggled to establish and

5 In this paper I will not take up Heidegger’s late thinking of technology.

6 Cf. Arendt (1958): 136ff.
7 Arendt (1958): 144
8 Ibid., 100.

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maintain. Thus technology shattered the purposefulness of production and the stability
of the world. To quote her, “[animal laborans] has lived literally in a world of machines
ever since the industrial revolution and the emancipation of labor replaced almost all
hand tools with machines which in one way or another supplanted human labor power
with the superior power of natural forces.”9
Moreover, Arendt points out that modern science and technology make much of
processes, but not end-products, and that this tendency coincides with the discovery of
introspection in modern philosophy.10 Modern scientists suppose that they can know
only what they make.11 This is why they prefer processes to products, for it is necessary
for them to know processes in order to make what they want to examine in experiments.
Likewise, modern philosophy assumes that the mind can only know what it has itself
produced and retains in some sense within itself.12 Arendt insists, while modern science
and technology made laboring easier, they make modern humans lose contact with
reality. To quote her again, “[T]he world of the experiment seems always capable of
becoming a man-made reality, and this, while it may increase man’s power of making
and acting[…], unfortunately puts man back once more— and now even more
forcefully—into the prison of his own mind, into the limitations of patterns he himself
created.”13
Thus Arendt’s theory of technology would boil down to the following three points:
1) Technology introduces machines and natural forces which make humans unable to
produce end-products and thus shatters the stable and durable world.
2) Technology makes the boundary between nature and the world blurry, and deprives
man of the faculty to distinguish clearly between means and ends.
3) Technology is based on the modern notion that man knows only what s/he makes
and thus technology deprives her/him of contact with reality.
Contemporary technology seems to be realizing more and more what Arendt predicted
in 1958. I would like to illustrate this in the following three fields of contemporary
technology.
First of all, biotechnology and advanced life science, including genetic engineering
and embryonic stem cell research, are blurring the boundary between nature and the
world through making biological organs, tissues, cells and adults into artificial products.
These organic products can even be patented. For example, Chakrabarty’s genetically

9 Ibid., 147
10 Cf. Ibid., 116
11 Ibid., 295
12 Ibid., 283
13 Ibid., 288

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engineered bacterium, which is capable of breaking down multiple components of crude
oil, was patented in 1980 by the U.S., and the so-called Harvard mouse, a mouse that
has been genetically altered to make it susceptible to cancer, was patented in 1988 by
the U.S. and in 1992 by the EU14.
Secondly, research in neuroscience and research in artificial intelligence are now
increasingly blending to make intelligent robots. Some researchers in the former believe
that only when they have succeeded in reproducing ability of human brain in machines
will they will have understood human brain. Their catch phrase is, “Knowing the brain
by creating brains”. 15 Now they have succeeded in making a robot which can imitate
human motion—“juggling a single ball by paddling it on a racket, learning folk dance by
observing a human perform it”16 and so on—based on computational theory of brain and
artificial intelligence. As for robotics, Japanese companies such as HONDA, SONY, and
NEC have begun to bring autonomous robots to the market which, they say, can identify
humans, express their feelings, communicate with humans, and understand human
orders. Yew while the robots work in a limited number of places – for example as
symbolic guides at various events –, they will eventually be introduced into the home
and the workplace.
Thirdly, information technology tries to realize ubiquitous computing, which turns all
electric appliances into intelligent machines that communicate each other via their
allocated addressees. The idea of ubiquitous computing is now partially realized and
intelligent appliances go to the market. However, to make electric machines into
intelligent appliances is not their goal. Their goal is to allocate ID numbers to the users
in order for computers to discern individual users.17 Eventually humans will also be
built into the information network via the ubiquitous computing network.
Thus recent developments in advanced technology seem to support Arendt’s
prediction. In fact, more and more technology is introducing natural forces into the
world of artifacts, and more and more researchers seem to be tempted to study their
subjects by reproducing them. For example, developments of computational research in
brain made it possible to create robots capable of imitating human behaviors as
previously mentioned. And developments of embryogeny and cloning technology dispose
researchers to think that they can elucidate the process of the genesis of organs by
reproducing them. In the meantime, information technology is trying to build humans
into the computing network. The mechanization of nature on one hand and the

14 Cf. Nawa (2002); Sagoff (2002): 424.

15 Kawato (2003)
16 Akteson et al.(2000): 46.
17 Cf. Sakamura (2002): 29-31.

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naturalization of technology on the other hand are underway. The boundary between
humans and technology is being blurred.
Is there no room for human autonomy in such a technologically conditioned modern
world? Taking the world as it is, should we obey technological systems? Or rather
should we think we can expect a relief when a danger culminates, as Heidegger
thought? 18

Such an essentialism or fatalism in technology seems to be illegitimate. We should

explore the technological intentionality to secure the dimension of human autonomy. In
exploring this intentionality we should take into consideration the following three
points.
1) The technological intentionality should have distinct character different from the
intentionality concerning natural things, animals, tools, and Others.
2) The technological intentionality should be analyzed from various dimensions:
materiality, structure, mechanism, and function.
3) The technological intentionality should be analyzed from various perspectives:
designer’s perspective, user’s perspective, manager’s perspective, and regulator’s
perspective.
It is necessary to conduct this full scope analysis of the technological intentionality to
argue human autonomy in a technological society.

3. Human-Computer-Interaction Studies
3-1. Concept of Information Appliance
Hereinafter I would like to take up two studies of Human-Computer interaction to
put forth a problem with the technological intentionality from the perspective of the
designer-user relation.
In our everyday life, personal computers are the most familiar machines that replace
human rhythm with machinery rhythm. So far, many efforts have been dedicated to
improve the usability of computers. We could take, for instance, the development of
pointing devices, Graphic User Interface, voice input systems, and so on. However, in
spite of the success of these efforts, computers will continue to disturb human rhythm.
As long as they remain multifunctional universal machines, computers cannot become
tools.
Regarding this, cognitive scientist Donald Norman’s concept of “information
appliance” is worthy of attention. Norman defines information appliances as digital
tools created to answer our specific needs, distinct from personal computers, which

18 Cf. Heidegger (1962b): 40-41

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flexibly answer our needs. To quote Norman, “The personal computer is perhaps the
most frustrating technology ever.”19 It is true that the personal computer is powerful,
flexible and universal, but it does not fit the rhythm of human working. Therefore,
Norman proposes as a solution information appliance, the utility of which is limited and
suitable for use as a “tool” for human tasks. Computers will also be built within
information appliances, but they will be “invisible” and will not obstruct human
working. Norman’s goal is to design intelligent machines to fit human tasks so well that
the machines are perceived to be a natural extension of the person.
However, is it at all possible that we could replace personal computers with specific
information appliances? Is it possible that we turn computers into tools? To answer this
question, we should consider the fact that word processor appliances were gradually
replaced by personal computers. In Japan, word processor appliances were first sold in
1979 by Toshiba, and the industry achieved remarkable sales figures in the 1980’s and
the 1990’s. Word processor appliances found such a large market that the spread of
word processor appliances changed Japanese writing style and working style. 20
However in 2000 and 2001 most of Japanese makers announced one after another to
complete sales of word processor appliances. Word processor appliances were digital
tools created to answer a specific need, i.e., the need to make documents. While it was
obvious at the time that they were more suitable for making documents than personal
computers, they were driven away by personal computers, in which word processing
software was installed. While word processor appliances excelled for the specific need,
they were beaten by universal personal computers.
Therefore, the ideal of information appliances seems to be unpromising. Moreover, it
is noteworthy that Norman’s concept of the information appliance leads directly to the
concept of ubiquitous computing. Norman regards information appliances as tools
which can communicate with each other in the network supported by the invisible
computers. In fact, an advocator of ubiquitous networking refers to the concept of
“intelligent objects,” which is similar to that of information appliances.21 Therefore, if
the ideal of information appliances were to be realized, we would be even more involved
in the rhythm of computers.

3-2. Plans and Situated Actions

From different viewpoint than Norman, Lucy Suchman tried to give a theory for

19 Norman (1998): viii.

20 Cf. Tanaka (1991).
21 Sakamura (2002): 19

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improving Human-Computer interaction. Here I would like to introduce her theory and
make clear its implication for the dimension of human autonomy in a technological
society.
Suchman’s famous book Plans and Situated Actions (1987) represents the new
approach in cognitive science and computer science. Her theory is characterized by a
criticism of the “planning model.” Contrary to the planning model in artificial
intelligence, which supposes that plans and explicit procedures guide our behavior, she
insists that plans are only resources for situated actions. According to her, situated
action is usually “transparent,” and only “when situated action becomes in some way
problematic, rules and procedures are explicated for purposes of deliberation and the
action.” 22 “[P]lans are efficient formulations of situated actions. By abstracting
uniformities across situations, plans allow us to bring past experience and projected
outcomes to bear on our present actions.”23 In the Human-Machine- Interaction, plans
reflect the designer’s intention and are limited to their ability to anticipate the situation.
The breakdown in using machines occurs when plans (designer’s intention and
anticipation) do not fit the interaction in the local situation. Therefore, in order to avoid
the malfunction of machines in interaction with humans, we should improve the process
of designing, and for this purpose, we should study human situated actions and the
Human-Human interaction. Conversely speaking, we could deepen our understanding
about Human-Human interaction by studying the Human-Computer interaction.
Suchman writes: “[U]nderstanding the limits of machine behavior challenges our
understanding of the resources of human action. Just as the project of building
intelligent artifacts has been enlisted in the service of a theory of mind, the attempt to
build interactive artifacts, taken seriously, could contribute much to an account of
situated action and shared understanding.” 24
What does Suchman’s theory of Human-Computer interaction teach us concerning
human autonomy and technological intentionality? Her theory tried to improve Human-
Computer-Interaction through reducing it to that of Human-Human-Interaction. It is
significant in freeing us from “Verdinglichung” of machines and securing the dimension
of the human autonomy against machines through tracing back of the autonomy of
machines into the designer’s intentionality. However, as we can see from the citation
above from Suchman, she shares the opinion with modern scientists that we can

22 Suchman (1987): 54. She has been influenced by Dreyfus’ interpretation of Heidegger. Interpreting

Heidegger, Dreyfus says that tools are out of our attention and “transparent” for us when our activity goes on without
difficulties. Cf. Dreyfus (1991): 65.
23 Ibid., 186.
24 Ibid., 189.

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understand human behaviors by creating them on machines. While suggesting an
important viewpoint for analyzing the technological intentionality, she herself followed
the traditional thinking of modern science.

4. Technological Artifacts and Intentionality: Materiality, Structure and Function

In this last section I would like to come back to the characteristics of the technological
intentionality. As I have already mentioned, we can analyze machines from four
dimensions: materiality, structure, mechanisms and function.
To illustrate the relation of these dimensions in terms of designers, let me take for
instance the wings of airplanes. The wings of airplanes function to create lift and make
it possible for airplanes to fly. The shape of the surface of a wing, the speed of the airflow,
and the angle of attack are critical to meet this function. Here Newton’s principle of
reaction and Bernoulli’s principle of fluid dynamics should be noted. As long as it is
appropriately designed it does not matter what material is used to make a wing. If a
wing is well designed to make lift which exceeds the total weight of the airplane and
load at certain speed of airflow, the airplane can fly if propulsion is sufficient regardless
of what material is used to make a wing –it could be made of wood, duralumin or
titanium. However, the material of a wing could constrain the structure and the
function of the airplane. For example, early airplanes were made of wooden rims and
fabric. Wood is light and easy to manufacture but not capable of supporting heavy loads.
Then wood was replaced by steel pipe, which is stronger than wood. However, rim-fabric
structure was not appropriate to make big airplanes, which can transport heavy load
and many passengers. At the beginning of the 20th century duralumin was invented.
Duralumin is suitable as a material for making airplanes because of its lightness and
strength. After a process of trial and error, it was applied in 1930’s to airplanes, and it
made it possible to make all-metal, monocoque structured airplanes, which could
transport heavy loads and many passengers.25
This simplified history of development of airplanes shows us: designers construct the
structure to realize functions while the structure is constrained by materiality and
physical laws. In other words, the technological intentionality of designers is directed at
functions and structures based on knowledge of the nature of materials and physical
laws.
Contrary to designers, users usually lack knowledge of mechanisms and physical laws
constraining the structure and function of machines. For them technological artifacts
often –especially in the case of break down-- appear as black boxes which are out of

25 Cf. Anderson Jr. (2002): 165-6, 171-9.

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their control and frustrate them. Usability engineering tries to reduce users’
frustrations by turning machines into tools. However, as I have shown, this attempt is
unpromising, for it fails to take into account the ontological difference between tools and
machines. Then, should users either follow the rhythm of machines or acquire
knowledge of mechanisms and physical laws to master machines? I think neither is the
case. We could specify users’ technological intentionality, which is not necessary same as
designers’. For example, users can use machines by consulting manuals or use
technological systems with the introduction of engineers. In both cases users deal with
machines with the help of designers or engineers and feel that machines have an
intrinsic mechanism and autonomy. However that does not mean that the users are
mastered by machines nor that we can reduce users’ interaction with machines into
Human-Human interaction. In a displaced overlapping with designers’ technological
intentionality, users’ technological intentionality is directed at technological artifacts in
specific ways.
To conduct full scope analysis of the technological intentionality, we have to take into
account the problems of side effects and unintended effects from the perspective of
designers as well as the problem of flexibility of interpretation concerning technological
artifacts from the perspective of users. The social constructionism in technology and the
actor-network-theory should be examined in detail in investigating these issues.
However these issues remain as matters to be examined further.

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