LAGANAPAN v.

ASEDILLO

FACTS: The petitioner Solano Laganapan was appointed chief of police of the municipality of Kalayaan,
Laguna on 4 January 1960, with a compensation of P660.00 per annum, by the respondent Mayor
Asedillo. On 1 July 1960, his salary was increased, and he was extended an appointment which was
approved as provisional under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service.

On 1 April 1962, the petitioner was given another increase in salary and a corresponding appointment
was made which the Commissioner of Civil Service "approved under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260,
to continue until replaced by an eligible but not beyond thirty (30) days from receipt of certification of
eligibles by the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna."

However, on 16 February 1967, the petitioner was summarily dismissed from his position by respondent
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, on the ground that his appointment was provisional and that he has no civil
service eligibility. The petitioner was told to surrender his firearm and other office equipment to the
Municipal Treasurer of Kalayaan, Laguna who was also informed of petitioner's dismissal on the same
day.

Subsequently, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan, Laguna abolished the appropriation for the salary of the
chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna.

Hence, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus, quo warranto with preliminary mandatory injunction
against respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, the Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, and Epifanio Ragotero,
seeking his reinstatement to the position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries and
damages.

In answer, respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero claimed that the appointment of the
petitioner, being merely temporary in character, and the petitioner having no civil service eligibility, his
services could be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure of the appointing power; and that the
petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

The respondent Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, for its part, alleged that the petitioner has no cause of
action against it; and that, if the acts of the respondent mayor are patently irregular, the said mayor
should be held solely liable therefor.

After due hearing, judgement was rendered in favor of petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents should be held liable for the illegal dismissal of petitioner

HELD: Yes.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that, in terminating the services of the appellee, the appellant
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo acted summarily without any semblance of compliance or even an attempt to
comply with the elementary rules of due process. No charges were filed; nor was a hearing conducted in
order to give the appellee an opportunity to defend himself, despite the provisions of Sec. 14 of Republic
Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966, which took effect on 8 September 1966, that
"Members of the local police agency shall not be suspended or removed except upon written complaint
filed under oath with the Board of Investigators herein provided for misconduct or incompetence,
dishonesty, disloyalty to the Government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and
violation of law." Following the rule, there was no need for exhaustion of administrative remedies before
appellee could come to court for the protection of his rights.

We, likewise, find no merit in the contention of the respondent Municipality of Kalayaan,
Laguna that Mayor Elpidio Asedillo alone should be held liable for the back salaries of the
petitioner, because the records show that the action was instituted against Mayor Asedillo,
not personally, but in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Kalayaan, Laguna, and he appeared
and defended the action in such capacity.

Furthermore, it is of record that, after the summary dismissal of the petitioner by respondent
Mayor Asedillo on 16 February 1967, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan instead of opposing
or at least protesting the petitioner's summary dismissal from his position, even abolished
the appropriation for the salary of the Chief of Police of Kalayaan, Laguna, We consider this
act of the Municipal Council of Kalayaan as an approval or confirmation of the act of
respondent Mayor in summarily dismissing the petitioner. as to make said municipality
equally liable, as held by the trial court, as respondent Mayor for the reinstatement of
petitioner and for the payment of his back salaries.

A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held liable for back
salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality, are NOT
applicable in this instance.

In Salcedo vs. Court of Appeals, for instance, the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of
the Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the
mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to reinstate.

In Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, the municipal mayor was held personally liable for dismissing a police corporal
who possessed the necessary civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable cause
and without any administrative investigation.

In Rama vs. Court of Appeals, the governor, vice- governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
provincial auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial
engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their individual and personal capacity damages to
some 200 employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions because of their
party affiliations.

MADERAZO v. PEOPLE

FACTS: Medaria Verutiao testified that she had been the lessee of a stall in the Biliran public market.
She averred that Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, provides that, to facilitate the development
of the public market, in the absence of adequate government finance, construction by private parties of
buildings and other structures for commercial purposes may be allowed and the expenses thereof shall
be reimbursed to the builder by applying 50% to monthly rentals when occupied for business.
She spent P24,267.00 for the construction of the market stall. She was not, however,
reimbursed by the Municipality of her expenses. The Municipality partially paid her P10,000.00 of her
total expenses in the construction of the market stall. However, considering that she had not been
fully reimbursed for her expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not pay her rent.

She went to the Municipal Treasurer to request for the reimbursement. She was told by then Treasurer
Lee and his successor, Lorenzo Dadizon, that the Municipality had no money and she had to wait for
another budget hearing. Thus, Verutiao closed her stall and proceeded to Mindanao where she spent
the Christmas holidays. She and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo,
directing her to vacate the stall within 24hrs because of her failure to pay the rentals for the stall.

Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises. The locks were opened on the authority of the
Mayor on January 27, 1997. The contents of the market stall were inventoried by Victor Maderazo and
taken to the police station for safekeeping.

An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging the defendants with grave coercion.
Sandiganbayan rendered judgment convicting the accused of the crime of unjust vexation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the People adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of petitioners’ guilt for unjust
vexation

HELD: Yes.
Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the
stall and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the
crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the crime was committed by
said petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or
disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners.

Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners

evicted Verutiao from her stall and prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the
business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from January 21, 1997. Petitioners Mayor
Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan member Victor Maderazo, Jr., had no right, without judicial
intervention, to oust Verutiao from the stall, and had her merchandise transported to the police station,
thereby preventing her from doing business therein and selling her merchandize. Petitioner Mayor
Maderazo had no right to take the law into his own hands and deprive Verutiao of her possession of the
stall and her means of livelihood.

Petitioner had to file an action for unlawful detainer against Verutiao to recover possession of her stall
and cause her eviction from said premises. Verutiao insisted on her right to remain as lessee of her stall
and to do business thereat. Such action is designed to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal
disorder and prevent those believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property resort to force
to gain possession rather than to secure appropriate action in the court to assert their claims. It was
incumbent upon petitioner Mayor to institute an action for the eviction of Verutiao. He cannot be
permitted to invade the property and oust the lessee who is entitled to the actual possession and to place
the burden upon the latter of instituting an action to try the property right. An action for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings established for the purpose of providing expeditious
means of protecting actual possession, which is presumed to be lawful until the contrary is proven.
Ordinances.

Undeniably, petitioner Mayor is tasked to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the Municipality and to implement all approved programs, projects, services and activities of the
Municipality and to ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the Municipality are collected. He is
obliged to institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for the
recovery of funds and property. However, in the performance of his duties, petitioner Mayor
should act within the confines of the law and not resort to the commission of a felony. A
public officer is proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the enforcement of laws and
ordinances. He must exercise his power and perform his duties in accordance with law, with
strict observance of the rights of the people, and never whimsically, arbitrarily and
despotically.

JAYME v. APOSTOL

FACTS: On February 5, 1989, Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the
Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up
truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto
Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General
Santos City to catch his Manila flight.

The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National Highway
in South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of
impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Marvin
sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.

Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for
damages with the RTC against respondents. RTC ruled in favor of sps Jayme stating that: “the defendant
Municipality of Koronadal cannot be held liable for the damages incurred by other defendant being an
agency of the State performing a governmental functions.” However, defendants Lozano, Apostol, and
Mayor Miguel were ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff.

CA reversed and stated that Mayor Miguel should not be liable as he was not the employer of Lozano.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a municipal mayor can be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the
driver assigned to him; and
(2) Whether or not an LGU may be held liable for the tortious act of a govt employee

HELD:
(1) Spouses Jayme contend, inter alia, that vicarious liability attaches to Mayor Miguel. According to
them, he was not a mere passenger, but instead one who had direct control and supervision over Lozano
during the time of the accident.
It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was
subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. The
Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s employer notwithstanding Lozano’s
assignment to Mayor Miguel. Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to
give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell,
the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not
establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the
employer of the driver.

Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s registered owner. There existed no causal
relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin’s
death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident.

(2) The CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of
Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the
municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no
moment. This Court has, on several occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship still exists
even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over the
employee subsists. In the case under review, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s
employer notwithstanding Lozano’s assignment to Mayor Miguel.

Unfortunately, the municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State
engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held that municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can only
be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting
such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was
not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. Settled is the rule
that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred
by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said
vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the
operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences incident to its operation.

SOLICITOR GENERAL v. MMA

FACTS: On July 13, 1990, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for
traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission
under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled
vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to
be imposed by the Commission. No motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted.

In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was
stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de
los Reyes in Quezon City. Likewise, several letter-complaints were received regarding removal of front
license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and the
confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western
Police District. On May 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991,
authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor
vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution stating that the authority to detach plate/tow
and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of
traffic in Metro Manila by the MMA appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case
abovementioned where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except
only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43.

MMA defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred
upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the
responsibility among others of:
(1) Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or consolidation for
the Authority; and
(2) Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a
code of basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rulemaking powers.

MMA argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was
meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the
confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why
Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. MMA sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific
authority conferred upon it by EO 392, and while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis
of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code.

Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an
invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing
law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates
and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991 is valid

HELD: No.
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it
appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. (1) the completeness
of the statute making the delegation; and (2) the presence of a sufficient standard. Under the first
requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all
the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. As a second requirement, the
enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot."
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national
legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal.

To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular
requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal
corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: (1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must not be
unreasonable; and (6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do
not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is
PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of
driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila.

The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself.
Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their
own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are
mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of
the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the
will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely
local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission
(and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions. In fact, the above provisions
prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose
fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are
herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed
by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission.

Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall
not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other
local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. It is
for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions,
either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments
in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the
confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of
driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
ROBLE ARRASTRE, INC. v. VILLAFLOR

FACTS: Roble Arrastre, Inc. is a cargo handling service operator, authorized by the Philippine Ports
Authority. For the years 1992 and 1993, petitioner was granted Business Permits No. 349 and No. 276,
respectively, by respondent Altagracia Villaflor as Municipal Mayor of Hilongos, Leyte. PPA issued a 90-
day hold-over authority to petitioner. Stated therein was the proviso that notwithstanding the 90-day
period aforementioned, the authority shall be deemed ipso facto revoked if an earlier permit/contract for
cargo handling services is granted or sooner withdrawn or cancelled for cause pursuant to PPA
Administrative Order No. 10-81.

On 27 January 1994, while the 90-day hold-over authority was in effect, petitioner filed with respondent
mayor an application for the renewal of its Business Permit No. 276. However, the same was denied.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioner filed with the RTC, a Petition for Mandamus with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction.

Petitioner stated that the source of the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is Section 444
Local Government Code of 1991, which is merely for the purpose of revenue generation and not
regulation, hence, the municipal mayor has no discretion to refuse the issuance of a business license
following the applicant’s payment or satisfaction of the proper license fees. Respondent mayor averred,
inter alia, that the remedy of mandamus does not lie as the issuance of the permit sought is not a
ministerial function, but one that requires the exercise of sound judgment and discretion.

The RTC opined that the PPA has the sole authority to grant permits in the operation of cargo handling
services in all Philippine ports, whether public or private. CA reversed, stating that the pursuit of the duty
of respondent mayor under Section 444 of the Local Government Code necessarily entails the exercise of
official discretion. Hence, it held that mandamus will not lie to control or review the exercise of her
discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA validly interpreted Section 444, (3) (iv), R.A. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991 (as a grant of police power and full discretion to the respondent
mayor to refuse the issuance of the permit despite due compliance of all documentary requirements and
full payment of the required permit fees by the petitioner)

HELD:
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local
governments. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to
issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which
said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. On this matter, petitioner
maintains that under the Local Government Code of 1991, a suspension or revocation of permits shall be
premised on a finding of violation of the conditions upon which the permits were issued pursuant to a law
or ordinance, which is independent of the Code itself. Petitioner asseverates further that there was no
law or ordinance that conferred upon the respondent mayor the power to refuse the issuance of the
permit despite compliance of petitioner with all documentary requirements and payment of all the fees.
While we agree with petitioner that there is no ordinance conferring upon the respondent mayor the
power to refuse the issuance of the permit for the operation of an arrastre service, we are, as yet,
unprepared to declare that the power of the municipal mayor as enunciated under Section 444(b)(3)(iv)
is ministerial. What can be deduced from the aforesaid section is that the limits in the exercise of the
power of a municipal mayor to issue licenses, and permits and suspend or revoke the same can be
contained in a law or an ordinance. Otherwise stated, a law or an ordinance can provide the conditions
upon which the power of the municipal mayor under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) can be exercised. Section
444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 takes its cue from Section 16 thereof, which is
largely an exercise of delegated police power.

Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the respondent
mayor to issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police power of a
municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial.

It may be true, as argued by petitioner, that Resolution No. 93-27, which was enacted by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos, is not an ordinance but merely a resolution. A municipal ordinance is
different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a
general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the
two are enacted differently—a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

However, the fact that Resolution No. 93-27 is a “mere” resolution can do nil to support petitioner’s
cause. Thus: “Discretion,” when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon
them by law or acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience
of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a discretional act is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when
the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set
of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. A discretionary act, on the other hand, is a faculty conferred
upon a court or official by which he may decide the question either way and still be right.