EVIDENCE

G.R. No. 175842

NILO MACAYAN, JR. y MALANA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
LEONEN, J.:

Annie Uy Jao (Jao) is the owner of Lanero Garments Ext (Lanero). In 1995, she hired Macayan as a sample cutter and to undertake materials
purchasing for her garments business.6

Jao acknowledged that in 2000, when her business was doing poorly, she allowed her employees to accept engagements elsewhere to
augment their income, provided they prioritize their work at Lanero. It came to her attention that Macayan and his wife (also an employee
at Lanero) accepted work for a rival company. Thus, Jao confronted Macayan to impress upon him the need to prioritize work at Lanero.
Macayan still took his work at Lanero for granted, so Jao confronted him again. In this confrontation, Macayan allegedly responded, "Kung
gusto mo, bayaran mo na lang ako at aalis ako." Macayan then stopped reporting for work.7

Following this, Jao was surprised to find out that Macayan had filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against her. Macayan allegedly
threatened Jao that her family would be harmed and/or kidnapped if she did not give him 200,000.00. Jao claimed that she was sure it was
Macayan speaking to her, as the person on the phone addressed her as "Madam," which was how he customarily called her.8

Fearing for her family’s safety, Jao sought assistance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). She asked that an entrapment
operation be set up. The NBI operatives asked her to prepare bills totalling 4,000.00 to be marked and used in the operation. 9

Macayan, testifying for himself, emphasized that he enjoyed a relatively trouble-free employment with Lanero. However after his wife gave
birth to their first child, he discovered that Jao had not been remitting required premiums to the Social Security System. 12This displeased
Jao. The following day, she prevented him from performing his tasks at work. Construing this as harassment, he stopped reporting for
work.13

Thereafter, Macayan filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Jao. As evidenced by these conferences’ minutes or constancias, at no
instance did Jao ever attend, as it was either her legal counsel or Angel who did so. Macayan recalled that in one of these conferences, he
expressed to Angel his willingness to settle the case for 40,000.00.14

Angel called Macayan. She told him that Jao was ready to settle the illegal dismissal case.

Macayan arrived at the agreed venue. He approached Angel, who then accompanied him inside. He was surprised to see Jao present. Jao
then brought out of her bag a piece of paper indicating that Macayan received the settlement amount for the illegal dismissal case.
Macayan signed this as he was of the understanding that this was necessary to the settlement. Jao then pulled out a white envelope,
handed it to Macayan, and told him to count its contents. While counting the contents, a flash bulb went on somewhere to his right. Then,
a man who claimed to be an NBI operative struck a blow on the right side of Macayan’s face and told him, "Tatanga-tanga ka. Pupunta ka
rito ng walang kasama, ikaw ngayon ang me [sic] kaso."16

ISSUE: whether Macayan’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt has been established.

RULING: NO.

Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the requisite quantum of evidence in criminal cases:

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not
banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process
clause35 of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved."36 "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution."37 Should the
prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted. As explained in Basilio v.
People of the Philippines:38

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Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the
strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his
innocence.

Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code provides for who are guilty of robbery. Accordingly, the following elements must be established to
sustain a conviction for robbery:

1)there is a taking of personal property [i.e., unlawful taking]; 2) the personal property belongs to another; 3) the taking is with animus
lucrandi [i.e., intent to gain]; and 4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things. 46

there is serious doubt on the existence of the fourth requisite for robbery

The prosecution should have offered more convincing proof of the identity of the supposed caller. Even if it were true that Macayan
customarily addressed Jao as "Madam," merely being called this way by a caller does not ascertain that he is the alleged caller.

Jurisprudence has established the standard for appreciating the credibility of a witness’ claim:

[F]or evidence to be believed, however, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as
the common experience and observation of mankind can approve under the circumstances. The test to determine the value of the
testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind. Whatever is
repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance.

the prosecution failed to establish the elements of unlawful taking and of violence against or intimidation of a person. Reasonable doubt
persists.1âwphi1 As is settled in jurisprudence, where the basis of conviction is flawed, this court must acquit an accused:

It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Where there is no moral certainty as to their guilt, they must be
acquitted even though their innocence may be questionable. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be
overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

With the prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of establishing Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, this court is
constrained, as is its bounden duty when reasonable doubt persists, to acquit him.

JUDICIAL NOTICE
G.R. No. 184398 February 25, 2010
SILKAIR (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Petitioner, a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Singapore with a Philippine representative office in Cebu City, is an online
international carrier.

On June 24, 2002, petitioner filed with the BIR an administrative claim for the refund of in excise taxes which it allegedly erroneously paid
on its purchases of aviation jet fuel from Petron Corporation (Petron) from June to December 2000. Petitioner used as basis therefor BIR
Ruling No. 339-92 dated December 1, 1992, which declared that the petitioner’s Singapore-Cebu-Singapore route is an international flight
by an international carrier and that the petroleum products purchased by the petitioner should not be subject to excise taxes under Section
135 of Republic Act No. 8424 or the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

Since the BIR took no action on petitioner’s claim for refund, petitioner sought judicial recourse and filed on June 27, 2002, a petition for
review with the CTA, to prevent the lapse of the two-year prescriptive period within which to judicially claim a refund under Section 229 4 of
the NIRC. Petitioner invoked its exemption from payment of excise taxes in accordance with the provisions of Section 135(b) of the NIRC,
which exempts from excise taxes the entities covered by tax treaties, conventions and other international agreements; provided that the
country of said carrier or exempt entity likewise exempts from similar taxes the petroleum products sold to Philippine carriers or entities. In
this regard, petitioner relied on the reciprocity clause under Article 4(2) of the Air Transport Agreement entered between the Republic of
the Philippines and the Republic of Singapore.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has substantially proven its authority to operate in the Philippines.

RULING: NO.

Page 2 of 40
Petitioner’s assertion that the CTA may take judicial notice of its SEC Registration, previously offered and admitted in evidence in similar
cases before the CTA, is untenable.

The cases cited by petitioner concerned similar parties before the same court but do not cover the same claim. A court is not compelled to
take judicial notice of pieces of evidence offered and admitted in a previous case unless the same are properly offered or have accordingly
complied with the requirements on the rules of evidence. In other words, the evidence presented in the previous cases cannot be
considered in this instant case without being offered in evidence.

Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that hearing is necessary before judicial notice may be taken by the
courts. To quote said section:

Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

It is an elementary rule in law that documents shall not be admissible in evidence unless and until the original copies itself are offered or
presented for verification in cases where mere copies are offered, save for the exceptions provided for by law. Petitioner thus cannot hide
behind the veil of judicial notice so as to evade its responsibility of properly complying with the rules of evidence. For failure of herein
petitioner to compare the subject documents with its originals, the same may not be admitted."

Evidently, said documents cannot be admitted in evidence by the court as the original copies were neither offered nor presented for
comparison and verification during the trial. Mere identification of the documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any
evidentiary weight on them as said documents have not been formally offered by petitioner and have been denied admission in evidence
by the CTA.

Furthermore, the documents are not among the matters which the law mandatorily requires the Court to take judicial notice of, without
any introduction of evidence, as petitioner would have the CTA do. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

Moreover, Section 3 of the same Rule16 provides that a hearing is necessary before judicial notice of any matter may be taken by the court.
This requirement of a hearing is needed so that the parties can be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

Given the above rules, it is clear that the CTA En Banc correctly did not admit petitioner’s SEC Registration and operating permits from the
CAB which were merely photocopies, without the presentation of the original copies for comparison and verification. As aptly held by the
CTA En Banc, petitioner cannot rely on the principle of judicial notice so as to evade its responsibility of properly complying with the rules of
evidence. Indeed, petitioner’s contention that the said documents were previously marked in other cases before the CTA tended to confirm
that the originals of these documents were readily available and their non-presentation in these proceedings was unjustified.
Consequently, petitioner’s failure to compare the photocopied documents with their original renders the subject exhibits inadmissible in
evidence.

G.R. No. 181036 July 6, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ADRIANO LEONARDO y DANTES
PEREZ, J.:

Appellant Adriano Leonardo y Dantes was charged in 13 separate Informations 5 with the crime of rape, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610,
committed against AAA

The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: AAA, the private complainant; BBB, the biological mother of AAA; Police Senior
Inspector Pierre Paul F. Carpio (P/Sr. Insp. Carpio), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, who examined AAA; and CCC, the aunt of AAA who allegedly had an illicit relationship with the appellant, as rebuttal
witness.

Page 3 of 40
For its part, the defense presented the following witnesses, to wit: the appellant, who interposed the defense of denial and alibi; Candida
Urbina (Candida), neighbor and cousin of the appellant; Lea Mae Leonardo (Lea Mae), niece of the appellant; and Ma. Victoria Leonardo
(Ma. Victoria), wife of the appellant.

The appellant, however, denied all the rape charges against him and claimed that they were all lies and that he was just framed up. He
argued that these cases were only filed against him by AAA upon the initiative of her aunt, CCC, with whom he had an illicit affair.

ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the court who allegedly relied solely on aaa’s
declarations

RULING: YES.

In this case, the records reveal that the prosecution was able to prove appellant’s carnal knowledge of AAA through threat or intimidation.
The records support his conviction of six counts of rape. During her testimony before the trial court, AAA clearly, candidly, straightforwardly
and explicitly narrated before the trial court how the appellant took advantage of her. AAA repeatedly pointed out the horrendous part of
her ordeal when the appellant would command her to undress, would place himself on top of her, would insert his penis into her vagina
and would make push and pull movements.

It is a fundamental rule that the trial court’s factual findings, especially its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great
weight and respect and binding upon this Court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.51 This Court has repeatedly recognized
that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique position of having
observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is
denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or
sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. 52 These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth.53 The appellate courts will generally not disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 54 In this case, none of these circumstances are
present.

Credible witness and credible testimony are the two essential elements for the determination of the weight of a particular testimony. This
principle could not ring any truer where the prosecution relies mainly on the testimony of the complainant, corroborated by the medico-
legal findings of a physician. Be that as it may, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape
victim, provided that her testimony is clear, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature.

While it is true that aside from AAA herself, the prosecution did not present any other witness who actually saw that the appellant raped
and sexually abused AAA, such fact was not fatal to the prosecution’s cause. There is no claim that other witnesses saw or could have seen
the crime but were not presented in court. Indeed, credibility does not go with numbers. The testimony of a single witness, if categorical
and candid, suffices. It is of judicial notice that the crime of rape is usually committed in a private place where only the aggressor and the
rape victim are present.59Further, AAA has positively identified the appellant as the person who raped and sexually abused her and this
negates the theory proffered by the appellant that the laceration found on AAA’s vagina could have been caused by AAA’s sexual
intercourse with either of her two boyfriends.

It is time once more to stress that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and subject
herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. It is a
settled jurisprudence that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed. A woman would think twice before she concocts a story of rape unless she is motivated by a patent desire to seek justice for
the wrong committed against her.60 When her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof.
This is because from the nature of the crime, the only evidence that can be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s
testimony.61

Similarly, the delay on the part of AAA in reporting the rape incidents cannot cast doubt on her credibility. It must be emphasized that
people may react differently to the same set of circumstances. There is no standard reaction of a victim in a rape incident. Not every victim
of rape can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind placed
under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently. Some may shout, some may faint, while others may be shocked into
insensibility.66 The delay on the part of AAA in disclosing the sexual defilement to her aunt, CCC, and to her mother is understandable.

G.R. No. 165168 July 9, 2010

SPS. NONILON (MANOY) and IRENE MONTECALVO vs. HEIRS (Substitutes) OF EUGENIA T. PRIMERO, represented by their Attorney-in-
Fact, ALFREDO T. PRIMERO, JR.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Page 4 of 40
FACTS: Eugenia leased the lot to petitioner Irene Montecalvo (Irene) for a monthly rental of ₱500.00. On January 13, 1985, Eugenia entered
into an un-notarized Agreement3 with Irene, where the former offered to sell the property to the latter for ₱1,000.00 per square meter.

Irene failed to pay the full down payment within the stipulated 30-45-day negotiation period. Nonetheless, she continued to stay on the
disputed property, and still made several payments with an aggregate amount of ₱293,000.00. On the other hand, Eugenia did not return
the ₱40,000.00 deposit to Irene, and refused to accept further payments only in 1992.

Thereafter, Irene caused a survey of Lot No. 263 and the segregation of a portion equivalent to 293 square meters in her favor. However,
Eugenia opposed her claim and asked her to vacate the property. Then on May 13, 1996, Eugenia and the heirs of her deceased husband
Alfredo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Irene and her husband, herein petitioner Nonilon Montecalvo (Nonilon) before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Iligan City.

Irene testified that after their Agreement for the purpose of negotiating the sale of Lot No. 263 failed to materialize, she and Eugenia
entered into an oral contract of sale and agreed that the amount of ₱40,000.00 she earlier paid shall be considered as down payment. Irene
claimed that she made several payments which prompted Eugenia's daughters to conduct a segregation survey on the subject property.
Thereafter, Irene requested Eugenia to execute the deed of sale, but the latter refused to do so because her son, Atty. Alfredo Primero, Jr.
(Atty. Primero), would not agree.

Respondents, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Atty. Primero to establish that Eugenia could not have sold the disputed
portion of Lot No. 263 to the petitioners. According to Atty. Primero, at the time of the signing of the Agreement on January 13, 1985,
Eugenia's husband, Alfredo, was already dead. Eugenia merely managed or administered the subject property and had no authority to
dispose of the same since it was a conjugal property. In addition, respondents asserted that the deposit of ₱40,000.00 was retained as
rental for the subject property.

Another sister of Atty. Primero, Corazon, testified that petitioners were their tenants in subject land, which she co-owns with her mother
Eugenia.9 She denied having sold the purported 293-square meter portion of Lot No. 263 to the petitioners.10

Petitioners argue that the courts below erred in imposing a ₱2,500.00 monthly rental from 1985 onwards, since said amount is far greater
than the last agreed monthly rental (December 1984) of ₱500.00.

ISSUE: WON trial court can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real estate especially of business establishments

RULING: YES. The courts below correctly modified the rental award to ₱2,500.00 per month.

In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC "that the trial court had authority to fix a reasonable value for the continued use and
occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease contract, and that it was not bound by the stipulated rental in the
contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon termination or expiration of the contract of lease, the rental stipulated therein may no
longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result of the change or rise in values. Moreover, the trial
court can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real estate especially of business establishments". 49 The appellate court
likewise held that the petitioners failed to discharge their burden to show that the said price was exorbitant or unconscionable.50 Hence,
the CA found no reason to disturb the trial court's decision ordering the petitioners to pay ₱2,500.00 as monthly rentals. 51 The appellate
court further held that "to deprive Eugenia of the rentals due her as the owner-lessor of the subject property would result to unjust
enrichment on the part of Irene."52

The courts below correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the leased property subject of the case at bench based on its location and
commercial viability. As described in the Agreement, the property is immediately in front of St. Peter's College. 53 More significantly, it is
stated in the Declaration of Real Property submitted by the petitioners as evidence in the trial court, that the property is used
predominantly for commercial purposes.54 The assessment by the trial court of the area where the property is located is therefore fairly
grounded.

Furthermore, the trial court also had factual basis in arriving at the said conclusion, the same being based on the un-rebutted testimony of
a witness who is a real estate broker.

G.R. No. 165153 August 25, 2010

CARLOS DE CASTRO vs. LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. and EDGARDO QUIOGUE
BRION, J.:

Page 5 of 40
FACTS: The petitioner, Carlos C. de Castro, worked as a chief building administrator at LBNI. On May 31, 1996, LBNI dismissed de Castro on
the grounds of serious misconduct, fraud, and willful breach of the trust reposed in him as a managerial employee.

Aggrieved, de Castro filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against LBNI with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Arbitration
Branch, National Capital Region, praying for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages, and attorney’s fees.

On April 30, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision 9 in de Castro’s favor, holding LBNI liable for illegal dismissal.

LBNI appealed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling to the NLRC. Initially, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision but on de Castro’s motion for
reconsideration, the NLRC reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

LBNI again appealed the NLRC’s adverse decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). On May 25, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC’s decision and
held that de Castro’s dismissal was based on valid grounds.

In our September 23, 2008 Decision, we found that de Castro’s dismissal was based on unsubstantiated charges.

Thus, we ruled that the grounds that LBNI invoked for de Castro’s dismissal were, at best, doubtful, based on the evidence presented.

ISSUE: WON the court can take judicial notice of proceedings in the various courts of justice in the Philippines

RULING: NO. LBNI’s motion was denied in our Resolution of December 12, 2005 for being premature, as de Castro then had yet to file his
reply to LBNI’s comment on the petition.30 Thereafter, nothing was heard from LBNI regarding the Stay Order or the rehabilitation
proceedings it instituted before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138. Even the memorandum, dated May 4, 2006, that LBNI filed with the Court
contained no reference to the rehabilitation proceedings.31

The filing of a memorandum before the Court is not an empty requirement, devoid of legal significance. In A.M. No. 99-2-04-SC, the Court
declared that issues raised in previous pleadings but not included in the memorandum shall be deemed waived or abandoned. Being a
summation of the parties’ previous pleadings, the memoranda alone may be considered by the Court in deciding or resolving the petition.
Thus, on account of LBNI’s omission, only the issues raised in the parties’ memoranda – principally, the validity of de Castro’s dismissal from
LBNI – were considered by the Court in resolving the case.

"The Court does not take judicial notice of proceedings in the various courts of justice in the Philippines." 32 At the time we decided the
present case, we were thus not bound to take note of and consider the pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings, as the matter had not
been properly brought to our attention. In Social Justice Society v. Atienza, 33 we said that:

In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded by the parties.1âwphi1 Courts, as well as magistrates presiding
over them are not omniscient. They can only act on the facts and issues presented before them in appropriate pleadings. They may not
even substitute their own personal knowledge for evidence. Nor may they take notice of matters except those expressly provided as
subjects of mandatory judicial notice.

xxxx

The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules the party desires it to have
notice of.

G.R. No. 185708 September 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUANITO CABIGQUEZ y ALASTRA
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: A criminal complaint were filed against JUANITO CABIGQUEZ y ALASTRA, alias "DODOY", and ROMULO GRONDIANO y SOCO, alias
"Molok" for allegedly robbing the sari-sari of AAA, in which she was sleeping together with her three minor children- BBB, CCC, and DDD.
Dodoy who first robbed the store while Molok was acting as a look-out and thereafter after looting, Dodoy went out the store and Molok
immediately proceeded inside and raped AAA.

ISSUE: WON THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THEM TO PAY THE COMPLAINANT P10,000.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS COMMITTED ROBBERY.

Page 6 of 40
RULING: NO. On the matter of actual damages awarded by the trial court, appellant questions the amount thereof, insisting there was no
basis for the actual cost of the items taken from the store.

We find no reversible error committed by the CA in sustaining such award. In People v. Martinez, 47 this Court ruled that the trial court has
the power to take judicial notice of the value of stolen goods because these are matters of public knowledge or capable of unquestionable
demonstration. Judicial cognizance, which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being
equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve. Surely, matters like the value of the appliances, canned
goods and perfume are undeniably within public knowledge and easily capable of unquestionable demonstration. 48 Here, what is involved
are common goods for everyday use and ordinary stocks found in small sari-sari stores like private complainant’s store, i.e., milk, soap,
coffee, sugar, liquor and cigarettes. The RTC was thus correct in granting the reasonable amount of ₱10,000.00 as computed by the private
complainant representing the value of stolen merchandise from her store.

Further, the Court deems it proper to adjust the sums awarded as civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages. Applying prevailing
jurisprudence, the private complainant is entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

1. MAQUILING VS. COMELEC 700 SCRA 367

JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., vs BPI/MS Insurance Corporation
G.R. No. 182864, January 12, 2015

FACTS: A complaint for actual damages amounting to US$17,560.48 was filed by herein respondents against Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.,
(ESLI) covering steel subject to its shipment. Petitioner insisted that it was through the management of the stevedore where the damages
have been incurred. For failure to reach settlement on the legal issues it was submitted to trial and during the pre-trial several stipulations
of facts were admitted. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. ESLI appealed disputing its liability as to the damaged goods and
invoking further the validity of the contents of the bill of lading.

ISSUE: Whether or not admissions made during the pre-trial as to the validity of the bills of lading are binding.

RULING: YES. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the
instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of
the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. In Bayas v.
Sandiganbayan, this Court emphasized that:

Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made
them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be
allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.

Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan, this Court declared that:

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is
dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions
contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with
what was pleaded. (Citations omitted)

The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section
4, of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.

DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN, ET. AL V. FBLINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 191710, January 14, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of the requisites for availment of
the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal. Facts: De Guzman, et. al were co-owners in fee simple of a parcel of land. One of its
adjoining properties is Filinvest Home Subdivision Phase IV-A, a subdivision owned and developed by respondent Filinvest Development
Corporation which, coming from petitioners' property, has a potential direct access to Marcos highway either by foot or vehicle. As such,
Page 7 of 40
petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against respondent before the RTC, which rendered a decision granting
petitioners the right of way. Upon respondent's appeal, the CA affirmed petitioners' entitlement to legal easement of right of way. As
none of the parties appealed the said CA Decision, the same became final and executory. In resolving as to what property it covers, the RTC
deduced that the right of way granted pertains only to Road Lot 15. The CA agreed with respondent and granted the appeal. Hence, the
petition. The Petition is denominated as a petition for certiorari. However, under the subheading "IV. BRIEF STATEMENT OF MATTERS
INVOLVED" of the Petition. Yet, in petitioners' Prefatory Statement, they anchor their Petition on the alleged grave abuse of discretion
committed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 65 is the proper remedy in the case herein.

RULING:

NO. Sifting through the issues and other matters raised in the present petition, it becomes apparent that the crucial question calling for
this Court's Resolution pertains to the CA's appreciation of the issue and evidence presented by the parties, and not the alleged grave
abuse of discretion committed by the appellate court in rendering its Decision. Therefore, the issue in the present controversy clearly falls
under the classification of errors of fact and law - questions which may be passed upon by this Court only viaa petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Albeit it must be made clear that questions of fact may only be reviewed by this Court under exceptional
circumstances like when the findings of facts of the CA are at variance with those of the trial court, as in this case.

People of the Philippines vs. Carolina Boquecosa

GR No. 202181, August 19, 2015; First Division, Perez, J.

FACTS: Boquecosa, the vault custodian and Sales Clerk of Gemmary Pawnshop had access to the things inside the vault. She stole and
carried away therefrom cash, assorted jewellery items and cell cards all in all valued at P400, 658.80.

ISSUE: Was she guilty of qualified theft?

RULING: Yes, for the prosecution of theft: there is taking of personal property; the property belongs to another; the taking was without the
consent of the owner; the taking was done with intent to gain; and the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against
the person or force upon things. To qualify the crime of simple theft to qualified theft, the crime of theft must be committed with grave
abuse of confidence. As such custodian, Boquecosa was entrusted with the vault combination. She abused that trust and confidence, which
her employer reposed upon her. Further, she admitted pawning the jewelleries presupposing a previous taking.

ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
HOMAR VS PEOPLE

Facts:
PO1 Tan and Civilian agent Tangcoy were ordered by their superior to man the South Wing of Roxas Boulevard one August evening in 2002
when they saw Homar jaywalking. He was immediately accosted and was told to use the pedestrian crossing. Homar picked up something
from the ground prompting Tan and Tangcoy to frisk him. They found a knife and soon enough, a plastic sachet which they suspected
contained shabu. RTC convicted Homar due to presumption of regularity in the arrest and straightforward testimony of the arresting
officers.

Issue:
WON the prosecution was able to prove a lawful warrantless arrest precede the search on Homar’s person

Ruling:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, the exercise of this power and the
implementation of the law should not violate the constitutional rights of the citizens. To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in
evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.

LORENZO SHIPPING VS NPC

Facts:
Lorenzo Shipping is the owner and operator of the commercial vessel MV Lorcon Luzon. National Power Corporation is the owner of Power
Barge 104, "a non-propelled power plant barge.” On March 20, 1993, Power Barge 104 was berthed and stationed at the Makar Wharf in
General Santos City when the MV Lorcon Luzon "hit and rammed Power Barge 104.” Following this incident, Nelson Homena, Plant
Manager of Power Barge 104, filed a Marine Protest before the Board of Marine Inquiry. Captain Villarias also filed his own Marine Protest.
For his part, Captain Yape filed a Marine Accident Report. The Board of Marine Inquiry... conducted joint hearings on the Marine Protests
and Captain Yape's report. To forestall the prescription of its cause of action for damages, National Power Corporation filed before the

Page 8 of 40
Quezon City Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Damages against Lorenzo Shipping.[19] In this Complaint, National Power Corporation
recalled the... damage resulting from the ramming. The Regional Trial Court issued the Decision[27] dated February 18, 2002 absolving
Lorenzo Shipping of liability.
Nevertheless, as Lorenzo Shipping supposedly exercised due diligence in its selection and supervision of Captain Villarias, no liability could
be attributed to it. The Court of Appeals rendered the Decision[29] dated September 14, 2007 reversing and setting aside the February 18,
2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court and entering another judgment ordering Lorenzo Shipping to pay National Power Corporatio
Issue:
Regarding the "Total Incidental Cost for Drydock and Repair," which was National Power Corporation's Exhibit "F" before the Regional Trial
Court, Lorenzo Shipping underscored that when the Regional Trial Court ruled on National Power Corporation's Formal Offer of Evidence,
it... denied the admission of Exhibit "F" for not having been identified nor authenticated.
It emphasized that no witness came forward to attest to its authenticity and due execution, let alone allowed himself or herself to be cross-
examined on these points.

Ruling:
It is basic that any material presented as evidence will not be considered unless duly admitted by the court before which it is presented.
Just as basic is that a private document offered as authentic evidence shall not be admitted unless its due execution and authenticity are...
established in the manner specified by Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
Exhibit "F" was ruled to have been inadmissible for failing to comply with Rule 132, Section 20 thus, it failed the standard of competency.
Consistent with this, reliance on National Power Corporation's Exhibit "F" and its contents, so as to establish the extent of National Power
Corporation's pecuniary loss, is misplaced. Not having been admitted, Exhibit "F" does not form part of the body of evidence worthy of
judicial consideration.

PEOPLE VS ESTRADA

Facts:
On April 4, 2001, an information for plunder was filed with the Sandoganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A
separate information for illegal use of alias, was likewise filed against him. In the information, it was alleged that on Feb. 4, 2000, then
president Estrada without having been duly authorized, taking advantaged of his position in order to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he
acquired during his tenure and his true identity as the president of the Philippines, did then unlawfully represent himself as “Jose Velarde”
in several transactions and use and employ the said alias which is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and other corporate entities. Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis if a warrant of arrest that
the Sandiganbayan issued. At the trial, people presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the
informations for plunder, illegal use of alias and perjury.

Issue:
Whether the court a quo gravely erred in dismissing the criminal case

Ruling:
No. The presence of Lacquian and Cha when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened trust account does not necessarily indicate his
intention to be publicly known as Jose Velarde. Thus, Estrada could not e said to have intended his signing to be for public consumption by
the fact alone that Lacquian and Cha were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with
Ortaliza and Dechavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible.

PEOPLE VS HIPONA
Facts:
Michael A. Hipona (appellant) was convicted by Decision of September 10, 2002 of the RTC of CdO City, Branch 18 with "Rape with
Homicide (and Robbery)”. His conviction was affirmed by the CA by Decision of January 28, 2008. On June 12, 2000 at 1:00 o’clock dawn at
District 3, Isla Copa, Consolation, Cagayan de Oro City the above-named accused, have carnal knowledge with the offended party (AAA)
who is the Aunt of accused Michael A. Hipona, she being the younger sister of the accused’s mother and against her will, that on occasion
of the said rape, accused, choked and strangulated said AAA in her house which strangulation resulted to the victim’s untimely death. That
on the said occasion the victim’s brown bag worth P3,800.00; cash money in the amount of no less than P5,000.00; and gold necklace were
stolen by all accused but the gold necklace was later on recovered and confiscated in the person of accused Michael A. Hipona.

Issue:
WON the circumstantial evidence is enough to establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:
For circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The confluence of the following established facts and circumstances sustains the appellate court’s
affirmance of appellant’s conviction: First, appellant was frequently visiting AAA prior to her death, hence, his familiarity with the layout of

Page 9 of 40
the house; second, appellant admitted to his relatives and the media that he was present during commission of the crime, albeit only as a
look-out; third, appellant was in possession of AAA’s necklace at the time he was arrested; and fourth, appellant extrajudicially confessed to
the radio reporter that he committed the crime due to his peers and because of poverty.

PEOPLE VS SUAN
Facts:
On August 12, 2003, an Information was filed with the RTC of Lanao del Norte, Branch 6 against appellant for violation of Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10315. Subsequent to his arraignment on September 6, 2003 wherein he pleaded
not guilty and before the pre-trial, appellant filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Investigation which the trial court granted on September 19,
2003. As a result of the re-investigation, an Amended Information was filed charging appellant with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA
9165.

Issue:
Whether the testimonies of the police operatives contained material inconsistencies and contradictions

Ruling:
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police operatives as regards prior surveillance and use of marked money are immaterial.

While it may be conceded that there are a number of inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's principal witnesses as alluded
to above, they are not, in our view, substantial enough to impair the veracity of the prosecution's evidence that a buy-bust operation
resulting in the arrest of appellant, was indeed conducted. The maxim falsus in unus, falsus in omnibus does not lay down a categorical test
of credibility. While witnesses may differ in their recollection of an incident, it does not necessarily follow from their disagreements that
both or all of them are not credible and their testimonies completely discarded as worthless.
LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
G.R. No. 182555, 7 September 2010
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
These cases were consolidated. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting Lumanog, Santos, Fortuna and
De Jesus of the crime of murder for the death of Col. Rolando Abadilla. Lumanog and Santos separately filed their motions for
reconsideration seeking the reversal of their conviction. They assailed the weight and credence accorded to the identification of the
accused by the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution, security guard Freddie Alejo.

Fortuna submitted an Affidavit executed by a certain Orencio Jurado, Jr. who claimed to be one of the police officers initially assigned to
investigate the case. Fortuna contended that said belated statement would certainly cast doubt on the procedures undertaken by the
police authorities in the apprehension of the likely perpetrators.

ISSUE:
Whether or not introduction of additional evidence after the trial is valid to justify new trial

HELD:
No. Introduction of additional evidence after the trial is not valid to justify new trial.

Evidently, Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence to support the defense argument that there was no positive identification
of Abadilla’s killers. To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown that
the evidence was “newly discovered” pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Evidence, to
be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the
court below.

Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or other
persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly
executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify re-opening of the trial and/or vacating the
judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw that may have initially attended the out-of-court identification of the accused, the
same was cured when all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial.

OBJECT EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 212635
THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES vs. CHARLIE SORINy TAGAYLO
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Page 10 of 40
FACTS: Sorin was charged before the RTC for violating Sections 5 and 15, Article II of RA 9165, viz.:

A test-buy was conducted by the PNP where Sorin sold illegal drugs to a civilian asset. As a result, Police Chief Inspector Rolindo Soguillon
(PCI Soguillon) formed a buy-bust team

The buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. They asked if they could buy shabu, and Sorin responded that each sachet costs 200.00.
PO2 Dador offered to purchase two (2) sachets. After examining said sachets, each containing white crystalline substance, PO2 Dador gave
Sorin the 400.00 marked money. PO2 Dador then tapped Sorin on the shoulder, brought him outside the house where he and the rest of
the buy-bust team introduced themselves as police officers, and arrested Sorin.

At the police station, PO2 Dador turned over the seized items and the marked money to SPO1 Mugot, who marked the same, prepared the
inventory and request for laboratory examination, and sent the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory.

For his part, Sorin claimed that the sachets of shabu were planted by the police officers, and that no buy-bust operation occurred. Sorin
maintained that on the alleged date of the buy-bust operation, while he was resting at his residence with his wife and three (3) children, he
heard someone calling from outside but ignored it. Afterwards, PO2 Dador and PO1 Cambangay barged in by forcibly opening the door to
his house, handcuffed him, and then searched his house without a warrant. Thereafter, he was brought to the police station where he was
photographed with the shabu supposedly seized from his residence. He was also compelled to sign a document which turned out to be a
waiver consenting to the test on his urine for traces of drugs. Sorin further stated that PCI Soguillon promised to release him after taking his
picture, but he was brought instead to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office where he was charged of selling shabu.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sorin’s conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.

RULING: NO. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following elements must
concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. As
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of
the corpus delicti.

The chain of custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if not
altogether removed."31 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Note that while the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 916533 as well as jurisprudence, nevertheless provides that non-compliance with the requirements of this rule
will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-
compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence, any deviation from the prescribed procedure
must be justified, but, at all times, should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items. 34

In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from Sorin due to
unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus warranting his acquittal.

Records bear out that PO2 Dador, i.e., the apprehending officer who seized the sachets from Sorin during the buy-bust operation conducted
on November 2, 2005, failed to mark the same and, instead, turned them over unmarked to SPO1 Mugot35 who was the one who
conducted the marking; prepared the request for laboratory examination of the seized sachets, Sorin’s urine, and the marked money;
delivered the said request, together with the seized sachets and marked money, to the PNP Crime Laboratory; and later received the
examination results.

It is well-settled that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the
crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items.46 The lack of conclusive identification of
the illegal drugs allegedly seized from the accused strongly militates against a finding of guilt,47 as in this case. Therefore, as reasonable
doubt persists on the identity of the drugs allegedly seized from the accused, the latter’s acquittal should come as a matter of course.

G.R. No. 184606 September 5, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CALEXTO DUQUE FUNDALES, JR.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Page 11 of 40
FACTS: On Decen1ber 8, 2003, appellant was charged with violations of Section 5 (illegal sale of dangerous drugs), Section 11 (illegal
possession of dangerous drugs), and Section 12 in relation to Section 14 (illegal possession of drug paraphernalia) of Article II, RA No. 9165.

Version of the Prosecution

The Chief of the Intelligence Unit of the Station Anti-Illegal Drug Special Task Force of Parañaque City Police, Police Superintendent Alfredo
Valdez (P/Supt. Valdez), received an information from a confidential informant about the illegal drug trade operations conducted by the
Fundales brothers. P/Supt. Valdez thus formed a buy-bust team The group then proceeded to 008 Jordan Street, Sitio Nazareth, Barangay
San Isidro, Parañaque City for the buy-bust operation.

The group arrived in the vicinity of the target area at around 9:00 p.m. 8 PO1 Soquiña, who was designated as the poseur-buyer, and the
informant proceeded to the house of the appellant.

After PO1 Soquiña handed the ₱ 500.00 marked money to the appellant,11 the latter then went inside his house and when he reappeared,
he handed to PO1 Soquiña five plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. 12 PO1 Soquiña then lit a cigarette which was the pre-
arranged signal to inform the rest of the team that the buy-bust operation had been consummated. Hence, the team of back-up police
officers proceeded to appellant's house to apprehend him.14 Inside the house, the police officers saw Jerico, Ricardo, Chulo, and Joel who
appeared to be engaged in a pot session hence they were also arrested along with the appellant.

Version of the Defense

On December 2, 2003, appellant was at home with Ricardo, Chulo, Joel, and Jerico repairing a washing machine.18At around 4:30 p.m., eight
persons suddenly entered his house without warning and permission. 19 Aside from their weapons and handcuffs, there was no indication
that the men were police officers since they were all in civilian clothing.20 Once inside, the men shouted, "Walang gagalaw, sumama kayo sa
amin".21 They were then brought to the Coastal Police Station and detained there for two days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165.

RULING: YES.

"Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of dangerous drugs if the following elements are present: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereto." 28

This Court is convinced that the prosecution sufficiently discharged the burden of establishing the elements of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs and in proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

The identity of the buyer and the seller were both established by the prosecution, appellant being the seller and PO1 Soquiña as the
poseur-buyer. The object of the transaction was the five sachets of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu and the consideration was
the ₱ 500.00 marked money. Both such object and consideration have also been sufficiently established by testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution. As to the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor, PO1 Soquiña caught appellant in
flagrante delicto selling and delivering the prohibited substance during a buy-bust operation. He also personally handed to appellant the
marked money as payment for the same. Clearly, the above-mentioned elements are present in this case.

Appellant next claims that the pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution were obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86(a) of RA No.
9165 regarding the proper custody and disposition of seized narcotic substances and dangerous drugs. He also avers that the prosecution
failed to prove that the police officers coordinated and reported the buy-bust operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA).

The appellant here did not question during trial the alleged improper handling of the items seized from him, it being the proper time for
him to raise such objections. We cannot thus accept such belated argument of the appellant especially so when the integrity of the items
seized from him was shown to have been preserved. Evidence on record shows that the seized drugs were inventoried. "Slight infractions
or nominal deviations by the police from the prescribed method of handling the corpus delicti should not exculpate an otherwise guilty
defendant."

G.R. No. 183566 May 8, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BONIFACIO BADRIAGO
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Page 12 of 40
FACTS: Adrian testified that on the morning of September 13, 2002, he was asked by his mother to bring a letter to one Berting Bello at
Barangay Guindapunan, Leyte. He drove a tricycle to deliver the letter along with his younger brother, Oliver. After finishing the errand they
headed back to the town plaza where their mother was waiting for them. Before they could reach their destination, however, they were
approached by accused-appellant at Sitio Mombon in Carigara. Accused-appellant then suddenly hacked him with a sundang or long bolo
on his lumbar area.2 Accused-appellant aimed a second time but Adrian was able to somehow shield himself. His lower left arm suffered a
hack wound as a result. Struck with panic, he jumped off the tricycle but could not run away. He was able to push Oliver off the tricycle so
he could run away and call for help. He could no longer testify on what happened thereafter as he lost consciousness and only woke up
while confined at Carigara District Hospital. His mother later informed him that Oliver was also attacked and did not survive.

Dr. Asanza’s testimony showed that Adrian suffered from two wounds that could have been fatal. Dr. Profetana told the court that her
post-mortem examination of Oliver showed that eight of the 11 wounds inflicted on him were fatal.

In his defense, accused-appellant stated under oath that on the morning of September 13, 2002, he was on his pedicab looking for
passengers. While he was on his way to the bus terminal in Carigara, Leyte, he was accosted by Adrian and Oliver, who carried stones with
them. Adrian called out to him, "Now Boning, let us fight." He tried to speed away but the two chased him, with Adrian driving his pedicab
and Oliver standing on the cargo compartment. They bumped accused-appellant’s pedicab, causing him to swerve to the middle of the
road.6 When accused-appellant looked back, Adrian got out of his pedicab and approached him with a knife about 10 inches long. Seeing
Adrian was about to stab him, he grabbed a bolo from his pedicab’s passenger seat and used it to strike at Adrian, injuring his left hand.
Adrian’s knife fell and when he bent to pick it up, accused-appellant again hacked at him with his bolo. Adrian then managed to run away
from accused-appellant and head towards Barangay Guindapunan. Accused-appellant, meanwhile, ran towards the municipal building to
inform the police that he had injured someone. He denied killing Oliver as while he was fighting with Adrian he did not even see Oliver. +

When cross-examined accused-appellant admitted that he did not suffer any injury following the confrontation with Adrian. He claimed not
to know what happened to Oliver.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of frustrated homicide and murder
despite the fact that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING: NO.

Frustrated Homicide

From the evidence presented to the trial court, it is very much clear that accused-appellant was able to perform all the acts that would
necessarily result in Adrian’s death. His intention to kill can be presumed from the lethal hacking blows Adrian received. His attack on
Adrian with a bolo was not justified. His claim of self-defense was not given credence by both the trial and appellate courts. Neither are
there any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide, and infanticide. The circumstances, thus, make out a case for frustrated
homicide as accused-appellant performed all the acts necessary to kill Adrian; Adrian only survived due to timely medical intervention as
testified to by his examining physician.

Murder Qualified by Treachery

The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to
escape.16 There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or
defend themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend
themselves or to retaliate.

Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence

Accused-appellant speculates that if the incident happened in broad daylight and near a bus terminal, there should have been independent
eyewitnesses identifying accused-appellant as Oliver’s killer. Much is made of the fact that not even Adrian was able to identify accused-
appellant as Oliver’s assailant.

The failure by the prosecution to present the weapon allegedly used in the attack is, in accused-appellant’s mind, yet another obstacle to
the State’s obligation to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We hold that the circumstantial evidence available was enough to convict accused-appellant. Circumstantial evidence may be competent to
establish guilt as long as it is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused, and not someone else, was responsible for
the killing.19 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction as long as there is (1) more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which

Page 13 of 40
the inferences are derived are proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.20

We go back to accused-appellant’s own admission that he indeed injured Adrian, causing him near-fatal injuries. From this admission the
rest of the evidence, albeit circumstantial, made out a clear case for Oliver’s murder. First, the victims were together in Adrian’s pedicab
when the attack took place; second, accused-appellant hacked Adrian with a bolo; third, Adrian’s injuries were caused by a bolo; fourth,
Adrian tried to push Oliver to safety before he lost unconsciousness; fifth, Oliver’s wounds were found to have been caused by a weapon
that made similar hacking wounds as the one made by accused-appellant when he assaulted Adrian; and sixth, Oliver died on the same day
Adrian sustained stab wounds. Although there is no direct evidence of Oliver’s actual wounding, the circumstantial evidence presented
sufficiently established that it was accused-appellant who perpetrated the twin attacks on the brothers.

G.R. No. 177164 June 30, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMON FRONDOZO y DALIDA
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: On March 27, 2003, acting on information from a police asset about the drug activities of Frondozo, a team was organized by Major
Mario M. Dapilloza, composed of PO2 Hector Ortencio, PO2 Michael Conrad Martin Miranda, PO1 Roderick Medrano and PO1 Abner Butay
to conduct surveillance and buy-bust operation to entrap Frondozo.

Guided by the informant’s sketch of Frondozo’s house and a tip that he is the only male residing there,7 the team proceeded to the site of
operation before midnight of the same day. They positioned themselves strategically in different positions where they could see PO1 Butay.
Thereafter, PO1 Butay approached Frondozo’s house and knocked at the door several times. When a man came out, PO1 Butay told him
"pakuha." The man asked, "magkano?" and he replied "piso lang." The man said, "sandali lang" then went back inside the house. Moments
later, the man returned and handed a plastic sachet to PO1 Butay. PO1 Butay examined its content and was satisfied that the plastic sachet
contained shabu. PO1 Butay then handed the man the ₱100 buy-bust money and put the plastic sachet of shabu inside his pocket. PO1
Butay then removed his baseball cap as pre-arranged to signal to his teammates that the sale was already consummated. He introduced
himself to the man and stated "pulis ako pare" and showed him his badge. He frisked the man’s body and found two arrows with sling, one
fan knife (balisong) and the ₱100 buy-bust money from the man’s hand. PO1 Butay testified that his teammates never went inside the
house.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of section 5,
article ii, R.A. No. 9165.

RULING: YES.

Frondozo assails the credibility of PO1 Butay (poseur-buyer). He contends that the following details cast doubt on the veracity of the
alleged buy-bust operation: (1) PO1 Butay claimed to have no knowledge whether the buy-bust money had been dusted with fluorescent
powder;22 (2) he cannot recall whether the plastic sachet of shabu was properly marked; 23 and (3) he cannot recall the serial number of the
buy-bust money.24 Frondozo also asserts that the prosecution not only failed to present as evidence the dispatch book where the serial
number of the buy-bust money was supposedly entered,25 the prosecution also failed to present evidence showing that the police officers
previously coordinated with PDEA regarding the buy-bust operation launched against him.26 Further, he doubts the identity of
the shabu because it was marked only after it was turned over to P/Insp. Ang and not immediately after seizure as a standard procedure in
anti-narcotics operation.27

Given these circumstances, Frondozo insists that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, by itself, could not
sustain his conviction, let alone prevail over the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence in his favor.

What is material in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.32 Prosecutions for illegal sale of prohibited drugs necessitate that the elemental act
of possession of prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law.
The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.
Therefore, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt.

In this case, the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous
drugs as prescribed by Rep. Act No. 9165. The arresting officers did not mark the shabu immediately after they arrested Frondozo. Further,
while there was testimony regarding the marking of the shabu after it was turned over to the police investigator, no evidence was
presented to prove that the marking thereof was done in the presence of Frondozo.

Page 14 of 40
Also, fatal in the prosecution’s case is the failure of the arresting officers to take a photograph and make an inventory of the confiscated
materials in the presence of Frondozo. Likewise, there was no mention that any representative from the media, DOJ or any elected public
official had been present during the inventory or that any of these persons had been required to sign the copies of the inventory.

Nevertheless, while the seized drugs may be admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily follow that the same should be given evidentiary
weight if the procedures provided by Rep. Act No. 9165 were not complied with. The admissibility of the seized dangerous drugs in
evidence should not be equated with its probative value in proving the corpus delicti. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance
and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. 341avvphi1

All told, the corpus delicti in this case does not exist.

G.R. No. 179154 July 31, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER PEREZ and DANILO PEREZ
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: That on or about the 29th day of January 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating [with]
another person whose true name, identity and whereabouts [have] not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and treachery, taking advantage of
superior strength, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one FULGENCIO MAGLENTE CUYSONA by then and
there stabbing him with the use of a bladed weapon, hitting him on his trunk, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Fulgencio Maglente y Cuysona.

The defense, for its part, presented SPO1 Resty San Pedro of PNP CPD, Station 5 Police Station, Fairview, Quezon City; Francisco Dayola, Jr.;
and appellants Roger Perez and Danilo Perez.

SPO1 Resty San Pedro’s testimony on direct examination was dispensed with when the prosecution and the defense stipulated that: (1) at
about 10:30 in the evening of November 4, 2000, appellants Roger Perez and Danilo Perez voluntarily surrendered at Fairview Police Station
5 accompanied by their lawyer, Atty. Gaspar Tagalo; (2) both appellants were interviewed by SPO1 San Pedro who was on duty at the time;
(3) appellant Danilo Perez admitted to SPO1 San Pedro during the interview that he stabbed to death Fulgencio Cuysona and SPO1 San
Pedro reduced the oral admission of Danilo Perez in typewritten (question and answer) form; and (4) SPO1 San Pedro gave the typewritten
confession to appellant Danilo Perez who read the same and voluntarily signed the written admission in the presence of his counsel. The
defense marked in evidence the following exhibits: Exhibit 8-a, signature of appellant Danilo Perez; Exhibit 8-b, signature of Atty. Gaspar
Tagalo; Exhibit 8-c, signature of the Administering Officer; and Exhibit 8-d, Tanong at Sagot No. 8 where he admitted and claimed sole
responsibility for killing Fulgencio.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in not holding that the prosecution’s evidence is so weak to the effect that both the
testimonial and documentary exhibits offered by the prosecution miserably failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence of the accused-appellant.

RULING: NO.

After a meticulous review of the records, we affirm appellants’ conviction.

First, the trial court did not err in appreciating the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses. The legal aphorism is that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its assessment of the probative weight thereof as well as its conclusions
anchored on the said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect by the appellate courts. The raison d’ être for this principle
is that the trial court is able to observe and monitor, at close range, the conduct, behavior and deportment of the witnesses as they
testify.21 In fact, the rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. 22

Applying these guidelines, we find no reason to disturb the trial court’s assessment of the prosecution eyewitnesses’ credibility. Close
review of the records reveal that Baque and Gangca’s testimonies are positive, clear and straightforward, without any tinge of falsehood or
sign of fabrication. They were subjected to lengthy and rigorous cross-examinations, yet they stuck to their testimonies. Also, not only were
the appellants identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses, the latter also testified as to appellants’ roles and their specific deeds in the
killing. Further, no evidence on record was presented to prove that the prosecution eyewitnesses had any ill motive to prevaricate and
falsely pinpoint appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.

Moreover, it is well-settled that a bare alibi and denial, being merely self-serving, is itself hardly given credence. Alibi and denial cannot
prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification by an eyewitness. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevail over the twin defenses of denial and alibi.23 Here,
Page 15 of 40
prosecution eyewitness Baque positively identified that Roger was present when the stabbing incident occurred. In fact, he was only four
arm’s length away from the crime scene when he saw Roger stabbing the victim.

G.R. No. 185710 January 19, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMULO TUNIACO, JEFFREY DATULAYTA and ALEX ALEMAN, Accused.
ALEX ALEMAN, Appellant.
ABAD, J.:

FACTS: The accused Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman were charged with murder. Police Officer Jaime Tabucon, on his
arrival on the sub-station, noted the presence of Atty. Ruperto Besinga, Jr. of PAO who was conversing with those taken in custody for the
offense. Tabucon took the statement of accused Aleman after informing him of his constitutional rights. Since accused Aleman said he had
no lawyer, Tabucon pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that he was assisting all the suspects in the case. Based on Aleman‟s statement,
the victim/deceased Dondon Cortez threatened to report his (Aleman) drinking companions‟ illegal activities to the police unless they gave
him money. Since Datulayta and Tuniaco had already planned to kill Cortez, they finally decided to do it. They got Cortez drunk and led him
to a dumpsite where Aleman stabbed him on the stomach, Datulayta shot him on the head using his single shot homemade M16 pistol, and
Tuniaco used the same gun on Cortez‟s body. They covered the body with rice husks. Accused Tuniaco filed a demurrer to evidence which
resulted in the dismissal of the case against him. On being re-arraigned at his request, accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide and he was sentenced by the trial court to imprisonment (6 years, 1 day). RTC found accused Aleman guilty of the
crime charged.

ISSUES:

(a) What is the doctrine of “interlocking confessions”?

(b) Did the accused Aleman correctly invoke the Galit doctrine?

RULING:

(a) Under the doctrine of “interlocking confessions,” the corroboration of confessions is Circumstantial evidence against the person
implicated in it. Thus, in the case at bar, accused Datulayta’s confession corroborates that of Aleman in important details. Hence, the
contention of Aleman that his confession was fabricated and that the police forced him to sign it is improbable. More importantly, the
confession has details that only the person who committed the crime could have possibly known.

(b) No. The accused Aleman incorrectly invoked the Galit doctrine. The doctrine laid down in People v. Galit states that: long questions
followed by monosyllabic answers do not satisfy the requirement that the accused is amply informed of his rights. The court held that this
doctrine does not apply in the case at bar. Police Officer Tabucon testified that he spoke to Aleman clearly in the language he knew.
Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed a certification that the investigator sufficiently explained to him his constitutional rights and
that he was still willing to give his statement.

DNA EVIDENCE

G.R. No. 221697 March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Iloilo on Sept.
3, 1968. After passing the parental care and custody over petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and his wife, she has been
reported and registered as a foundling and issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was given the name, Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar.

When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley (aka Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka
Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption. The trial court granted their petition and ordered that her name be changed to Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe.

Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in 1986; in 1988, she applied and was issued Philippine Passport by the
DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she renewed her passport. She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after enrolling and
pursuing a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines. She graduated in 1991 from Boston College where she
earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.

Page 16 of 40
She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., in San Juan City and decided to flew back
to the U.S. after their wedding. She gave birth to her eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two daughters in the Philippines.

She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for president in the
May 2004 elections and gave birth to her youngest daughter. They then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but after few months, she rushed back
to the Philippines to attend to her ailing father. After her father’s death, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines in 2005 and immediately secured a TIN, then her children followed suit; acquired property where she and
her children resided.

In 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three children which was granted. She registered as a voter; secured Philippine passport; appointed and took her oath as
Chairperson of the MTRCB after executing an affidavit of Renunciation of American citizenship before the Vice Consul of the USA and was
issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the USA in 2011.

In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years
and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner obtained the highest number of
votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.

On October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny
or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she
cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground
that she was in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

ISSUE: WON DNA Evidence is essential in filiation or paternity cases. (NO)

HELD: In SERENO’s Concurring Opinion, physical or scientific proof of a blood relationship to a putative parent is not required by law to
establish filiation or any status arising therefrom such as citizenship. DNA evidence is not absolutely essential so long as paternity or
filiation may be established by other proof. There is, therefore, no reason to impose this undue burden on petitioner, particularly in light of
her situation as a foundling. Instead of requiring foundlings to produce evidence of their filiation, administrative agencies, the courts and
even congress have instead proceeded on the assumption that these children are citizens of the Philippines.

Additionally in JARDALEZA’s Concurring Opinion, considering these unusual circumstances common to all foundlings, DNA or other
definitive evidence would, more often than not, not be available. A presumption disputable only by an impossible, even cruel, condition is,
in reality, a conclusive presumption.

That Poe’s parents are unknown does not automatically discount the possibility that either her father or mother is a citizen of the
Philippines. Indeed, the verba legis interpretation of the constitutional provision on citizenship as applied to foundlings is that they may be
born of a Filipino father or mother. There is no presumption for or against them.

G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner, vs. Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C.
Diaz, respondent.

FACTS: Jinky Diaz got acquainted and fell in love with Rogelio Ong when was already married to Hasegawa Katsuo, a Japanese national.
Despite this, the two cohabited for more than four years and bore a child, herein respondent Joanne Rodjin Diaz. Rogelio paid all the
hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joanne’s needs, recognizing the child as his own. However, Rogelio
subsequently abandoned them and stopped giving support, alleging that the child is not his.

Due to continued refusal to support the child, minor Joanne Diaz represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky Diaz filed a complaint for
compulsory recognition with prayer for support against Rogelio before the RTC.

RTC held that the minor respondent is the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz. Although the law presumes that Joanne is a
legitimate child of the Jinky and his Japanese national husband. It was turned down by the RTC because the legitimacy of a child may be
impugned by the ground provided in Art. 166 of the Family Code, i.e. that husband and wife were living separately in such way that sexual
intercourse is not possible. Defendant admitting to shouldering the hospital bills representing the expenses in connection with the birth of
plaintiff is an evidence of admission that he is the real father of Joanne.

Rogelio appealed to the CA but died during its pendency. CA granted the appeal and remanded the case to RTC for the issuance of an order
directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of Joanne. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied hence, this petition for Review on Certiorari.

Page 17 of 40
ISSUE: WON the death of Rogelio bars the conduct of DNA Analysis. (NO)

HELD: A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. The presumption is grounded on the policy to
protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of
the physical impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child. Such physical impossibility may be caused: 1) By the impotence of the husband; 2) By the fact that
husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; 3) By the serious illness of the husband.

DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of
the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s DNA profile can determine his identity. DNA analysis is a procedure in which
DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA
profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.

Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an individual (except in the rare
occurrence of identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in
the human body, the DNA of an individual’s blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal
swabs, saliva, or other body parts.

This Court opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, the analysis based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are
analyzed to establish parentage. In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long
dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity.

The New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation. It can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing
for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate
objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. Thus, even if Rogelio
already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner
has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 144656 EN BANC May 9, 2002

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO alias PUKE, accused-appellant.

FACTS: On July 10, 1999, 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbor’s house to seek help in an assignment at about 1pm. Accused-
appellant Gerrico Vallejo, the victim’s neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Ma. Nida Diolola, Daisy’s mom,
noticed that her child wasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t there. Still having no word of Daisy’s whereabouts,
she attempted to locate Daisy with no result. The next morning, Daisy’s body was found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she
was raped and thereafter strangled to death.

In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to accused-appellant’s house to question the latter as he was one of the last persons with the
victim. Prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The
police requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for
processing.

The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took
buccal swabs (mouth/cheek swabs) from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were
bloodstains in Vallejo’s clothing, Blood Type A, which is similar to that of the victim, while Vallejo’s Blood Type is O. Additionally; Buan also
found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile.

Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. However when trial commenced, Vallejo insisted that the
sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the
clothing of Daisy were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Nonetheless, Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to
death by the trial court hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence. (YES)

Page 18 of 40
HELD: An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.

Under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if: "(a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt."

The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely
circumstantial, it can still convict the accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay
case.

DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA
profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s body for
the suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect
and the victim.

The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The
samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results:

1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires
no further analysis or discussion;

2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur
for a variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might
then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or

3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a case, the samples are found to be similar,
the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the Similarity.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the following data: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.

In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime
charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the
accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect
upon the court.

PARAFFIN TEST
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BUENAFE AZUGUE y AMADOR, accused-appellant.

FACTS: I t w a s o n O c t o b e r 2 7 , 1 9 9 0 a r o u n d 4 o ’ c l o c k i n t h e a f t e r n o o n , t h a t t h e v i c t i m J o e b e Arrobang, a
conductor of a public utility jeepney, alighted from the jeep heading towards the direction of Punta Cogon to recover
the tire that got stuck in the mud. Thereupon, the accused Buenafe Azugue came and held the victim on both forearms while
in face to face with the victim. Then, Morito Salvador stabbed the victim from behind hitting him on his right hip. Porferio Deness
to the crime because he was only two arm’s length from where the victim was s t a b b ed . T h e a s s a ila n ts w er e ch a r g ed o f th e
cr i m e o f mu r d er wi th th e p en a lt y o f R e clu s io n Perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether there was conspiracy between the two accused.

HELD: Jurisprudence teaches that to appreciate treachery "two (2) conditions must be present, to wit: (1) the employment of
means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted." These conditions are amply present in the instant case. Azugue and Salvador's
previously discussed cooperative actions, where one immobilized the victim Arrobang while the other did the stabbing, coupled with
their swift surprise attack on the victim, left the latter with no opportunity to put up a defense against such an unexpected, vicious
and fatal assault on his person. In fact, the victim Arrobang "was defenseless during the attack as his hands were restrained by the
accused-appellant to facilitate the stabbing.”In conspiracy, what is important is that all performed specific acts, with such closeness and
coordination, indicate a common purpose or design. Although Azugue’s participation was limited and merely held the victim, it
was in connection with the stabbing by Salvador and that they acted together with a common purpose and design. Azugue is liable by
legislative and judicial fiat, as if he himself dealt the final blow.

Page 19 of 40
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ,Respondents.

LEONEN, J.:

FACTS: The Republic, through PCGG, instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the
Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan. "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth . . . acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses]
as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]"

The Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of
75 days from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of
Evidence.

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence. He argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no
evidence to support its cause of action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to prosecute.

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.

The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the formal offer of evidence fail to persuade this Court.

SANDIGANBAYAN: denied the plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence. Granted the Motion
to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence. Dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to Admit Formal Offer of Evidence on the basis of
mere technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right to due process. YES

HELD: The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.

Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays petitioner incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of
Evidence and the state’s policy on recovering ill-gotten wealth, this court is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed and
petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be reversed.

G.R. No. 190846 February 3, 2016

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G. HOSANA, Respondent.

BRION,J.:

FACTS: Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) and bought a house and lot which lot was covered by TCT.

Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself
and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of an SPA executed by Jose in her favor.
Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the
Register of Deeds. In the complaint, Jose averred that Milagros, without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute
the SPA by forging Jose’s signature.

Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value. Before he paid the full consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he
sought advice from his lawyer-friend who told him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in order.

With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial payment of P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00
upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the consideration written by Milagros on the
Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he inquired why the written consideration was lower than the actual consideration paid.
Milagros explained that it was done to save on taxes.

RTC: decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to Tomas.

Page 20 of 40
 CA: affirmed the RTC's decision and directed Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00, with
interest, under the principle of unjust enrichment.
ISSUE: WON the CA correctly ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00, which is the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale. YES

HELD: While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the
admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each party has
given in the execution of the contract.

There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence
is relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility.

In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property
without the spouse’s consent. It does not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein.

G.R. No. 204056, June 01, 2016

GIL MACALINO, JR., Petitioner, v. ARTEMIO PIS-AN, Respondent.

DELCASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: Emeterio Jumento (Emeterio) was the owner of the half portion, and his children Hospicio Jumento (Hospicio) and Severina
Jumento (Severina) of the other half in equal shares, of Lot 3154. When Hospicio and Severina died, Emeterio inherited the portions and
thus became the owner of the whole lot. Subsequently, Emeterio also passed away. The lot was divided into three portions (A, B, and C).

Artemio and the other heirs of Emeterio executed an Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate and Absolute Sale adjudicating among themselves
Lot 3154 and selling a 207-square meter portion of the same to the spouses Wilfredo and Judith Sillero (spouses Sillero). The document, did
not, however, identify the portion being sold as Lot No. 3154-A but simply stated as "a portion of Lot 3154 which is 207 square meters.

The spouses Sillero sold Lot 3154-A to petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr. (Gil) by virtue of a Deed of Sale.

Intending to have Lot 3154-A registered in his name, Gil caused the survey of the same by Engr. Dorado) sometime in 1998.14 Engr.
Dorado, however, discovered that the portion occupied by Gil consists of 140 square meters only and not 207.

The Land Management Bureau issued an approved Subdivision Plan wherein Lot 3154 was subdivided into four sub-lots, to wit: Notably,
the Subdivision Plan which was based on the survey conducted by Engr. Dorado refers not only to Lot 3154-A as Gil's property but also to
Lot 3154-C.

RTC: rendered a judgement in favor of Gil Macalino against Artemio, declaring Gil Macalino the rightful owner of Lot 3154-A and Lot 3154-
C.

CA: concluded that the sale between the spouses Sillero and Gil involved Lot 3154-A only and not Lot 3154-C. Defendant-appellant Artemio
Pis-an is declared as the true and legal owner of Lot 1354-C.

ISSUE: WON the admitted contents of the said documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties.

HELD: It has been held that "[w]hen the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these documents
adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and
into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to determine such intent." In view of this and since the Parol
Evidence Rule is inapplicable in this case, an examination of the parties' respective parol evidence is in order. Indeed, examination of
evidence is necessarily factual and not within the province of a petition for review on certiorari which only allows questions of law to be
raised. However, this case falls under one of the recognized exceptions to such rule, i.e., when the CA's findings are contrary to that of the
trial court.

G.R. No. 204700 November 24, 2014

EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN,Petitioners, vs.
CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:

FACTS: For resolution is respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.'s motion for reconsideration of our April 10, 2013
decision, which reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals' resolutions and ordered respondent to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase

Page 21 of 40
Agreement (LSPA) dated April 7, 2006, including its annexes and/or attachments, if any, in order that petitioners may inspect or photocopy
the same.

The motion for reconsideration raises that the production of the LSPA would violate the parol evidence rule.

ISSUE: WON the production of the LSPA would violate the parol evidence rule. NO

HELD: The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of assignment and do not base a claim on it.
Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of assignment.

Even assuming that Rule 130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under the second paragraph is when the party puts in issue
the validity of the written agreement, as in the case a quo.

Besides, what is forbidden under the parol evidence rule is the presentation of oral or extrinsic evidence, not those expressly referred to in
the written agreement. "[D]ocuments can be read together when one refers to the other." By the express terms of the deed of assignment,
it is clear that the deed of assignment was meant to be read in conjunction with the LSPA.

As we have stated in our decision, Rule 132, Section 1761 of the Rules of Court allows a party to inquire into the whole of the writing or
record when a part of it is given in evidence by the other party. Since the deed of assignment was produced in court by respondent and
marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its
understanding may also be inquired into by petitioners.

G.R. No. 207264/708 SCRA 197 June 25, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Reyes filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
Respondent Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s
marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed on February
8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.

The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines
because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225. Not agreeing with the resolution, petitioner Reyes
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013.

The COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution on May 14, 2013 denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took
cognizance of Respondent Tan’s alleged "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted
in evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of the case without giving the petitioner the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s right to due process of law.

RULING: No. It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of
the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly
discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case before the
COMELEC. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

G.R. No. 203322 February 24, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. REMAN, Appellant.

Page 22 of 40
FACTS: On December 15, 2000, AAA, herein appellant’s daughter, was ordered by her father, herein accused-appellant Reman Sariego, to
undress and, upon refusal, proceeded to remove her pants and forced himself on her.

The same incident happened on February 20, 2001. AAA pleaded that appellant stop what he was doing to her because she might get
pregnant, which would make her mother discover the horrific events, but to no avail. AAA refrained from seeking help in fear of physical
retribution from her father. She, however, could not keep the secret from her mother any longer because she became pregnant.

According to the testifying physician, the medical certificate states that the examination conducted on AAA's anus and genital area revealed
that there was a 50% previous laceration thereon. It also revealed that she was pregnant, which was later confirmed by an ultrasound
report. Moreover, she was found positive of being a victim of child abuse.

Appellant simply denied the charges against him. While admitting that AAA was, indeed, his daughter, appellant refuted any allegation of
involvement in her pregnancy.

The R TC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) counts of rape. AAA testified in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, evincing her credibility. As to the presence of the element of force and intimidation, the RTC firmly ruled in
the positive considering appellant's moral ascendancy over AAA, being the father thereof, as well as his threats to kill her and the whole
family, not to mention his admitted acts of physical abuse.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having carnal knowledge of his own
daughter. It found AAA's testimony to be credible and corroborated by the results of the medical examination. The CA, however, deemed it
necessary to point out that AAA's minority was not duly established by the evidence on record. It ruled that while the Informations
specifically alleged minority and relationship as qualifying circumstances, the birth certificate was not formally offered in evidence but, was
rather an ultrasound report. Thus, the CA held that the qualifying circumstance of minority cannot be appreciated. It, however, deemed the
circumstance of relationship sufficient to qualify the offense. Consequently, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE: WON the qualifying circumstance of minority was duly established by evidence. (NO)

HELD: Since rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation, usually leaving only the victims to testify on the commission of the
crime, for as long as the victim's testimony is logical, credible, consistent and convincing, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
thereof. Unless there appears certain facts or circumstances of weight and value which the lower court overlooked or misappreciated and
which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case, the trial court's conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are
generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times even fina1ity. The Court notes, however, that appellant cannot be held guilty of
the crime of rape in its qualified form.

In a conviction for qualified rape, the prosecution must prove that (1) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and
(2) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. If, at trial, both the age of the victim and her
relationship with the offender are not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the death penalty cannot be imposed. In this case, while it is
undisputed that AAA is the daughter of appellant, her minority was not conclusively established.

The best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or certified true copy thereof, and in their absence, similar
authentic documents may be presented such as baptismal certificates and school records. If the original or certified true copy of the birth
certificate is not available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may be sufficient under certain
circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic documents and the testimonies of the victim's mother or other
qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted
by the accused.

The Court finds that not only did the prosecution fail to adduce competent documentary evidence to prove AAA's minority such as her
original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal certificate, school records, or any other authentic documents as required by Pruna, it
likewise failed to establish that said documents were lost, destroyed, unavailable, or otherwise totally absent. There is also nothing in the
records to show that AAA's mother or any member of her family, by affinity or consanguinity, testified on her age or date of birth. In like
manner, while AAA may have testified as to her age during the trial, it was not clearly shown that the same was expressly admitted by
appellant. Thus, AAA' s minority cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against appellant herein.

Indeed, qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like the crime itself. In view of the prosecution's failure to
establish AAA's minority with absolute certainty and clearness, the Court cannot sustain appellant's conviction for the crime of rape in its
qualified form. Consequently, appellant should only be convicted of the crime of simple rape, the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. 202514 July 25, 2016

ANNA MARIE L. GUMABON, Petitioner vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent

Page 23 of 40
FACTS: Anna Marie Gumabon has eight savings accounts with her mother and siblings with respondent PNB. The petitioner called Salvoro,
the employee of PNB who handle their accounts, and requested for its consolidation. When Gumabon went to the bank to withdraw the
money, she was denied access because her records were missing and Salvoro was nowhere to be found. Afterwards, PNB resolved the issue
and consolidated the accounts and issued a passbook. Petitioner then filed for damages.

The RTC ruled in Anna Marie’s favour. It held that Anna Marie’s Statement of Account (SOA), which the PNB relied upon is a mere
photocopy and does not satisfy the best evidence rule.

Subsequently, the PNB appealed before the CA which reversed the RTC’s ruling. It held that the PNB had paid the actual amounts claimed
by Anna Marie in her complaint. The CA also considered Anna Marie’s SOA as proof that the PNB had paid the remaining balance. It held
that the PNB verified the SOA and it was corroborated by the affidavit of the PNB Branch Operations Officer in New York.

Anna Marie moved but failed to obtain reconsideration of the CA’s decision; hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: WON the excluded evidence is admissible as secondary evidence falling under the exceptions of the best evidence rule. (NO)

HELD: The Best Evidence Rule provides that the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the content of the document is
under inquiry. However, there are instances when the Court may allow the presentation of secondary evidence in the absence of the
original document. While the RTC cannot consider the excluded evidence to resolve the issues, such evidence may still be admitted on
appeal provided there has been tender of the excluded evidence under Section 40 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The PNB cannot simply substitute the mere photocopies of the subject documents for the original copies without showing the court that
any of the exceptions under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies. The PNB’s failure to give a justifiable reason for the absence
of the original documents and to maintain a record of Anna Marie’s transactions only shows the PNB’s dismal failure to fulfill its fiduciary
duty to Anna Marie. The Court expects the PNB to "treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the
fiduciary nature of their relationship." The business of banking is imbued with public interest. The stability of banks largely depends on the
confidence of the people in the honesty and efficiency of banks.

Consequently, the CA should not have admitted the subject documents even if the PNB tendered the excluded evidence. WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170604 September 2, 2013

HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, PETITIONERS, vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE, REPRESENTED BY REV.
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, JR., RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Respondents, who are heirs of Spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, claimed that they could not locate the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797 pertaining to the land they inherited from their parents, that the entry of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase on the original TCT did not exist, and that the entry had been maliciously done by Margarita Prodon.

Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed the deed of sale with right to repurchase on September 9, 1975; and this
had been registered with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title. She had then become the absolute owner of the property
due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period. The custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed
of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Prodon. It opined that the contents of the deed of sale could be proved by secondary evidence in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its execution or existence and of the cause of its unavailability
being without bad faith when defendant Prodon swore that she purchased the land and her testimony has been confirmed by the Notarial
Register of Notary Public Eliseo Razon and by the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

CA reversed. It held that “a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary
evidence. It found circumstances that put doubt on the existence of the alleged deed of sale.

The heirs of Margarita Prodon, who meanwhile died on March 3, 2002, filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of Defendant and for
Reconsideration of the Decision. The CA allowed the substitution of the heirs of Margarita Prodon but denied their motion for
reconsideration for its lack of merit hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence under the best evidence rule had been complied with. (NO)

HELD: The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns
external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be
invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original.

Page 24 of 40
This case involves an action for quieting of title, a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to
real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth
and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (a) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (b) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the
writing may or may not be material to an action for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. It is not denied that
this action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue raised by the
respondents as the plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged head on, was whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly
executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed.

Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the
issue, the CA did not have to address and determine whether the existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of
secondary evidence, had been established by Prodon’s evidence. It should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the
"existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA that the respondents preponderantly, proved that the deed of sale with
right to repurchase executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.

RATIO: The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting
of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore,
the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document.

MOTIVE

People of the Philippines vs Ending

GR No. 183827 November 12, 2012

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: In three separate Information, appellant was indicted for raping his own daughter, “AAA.” In several occasions, respondent
allegedly raped her minor daughter which was duly supported by a medico legal report showing that the victim have old lacerations. On the
other hand, respondent denied said allegation and countered the same with an alibi saying that the victim does not live with him but with
her grandparents and that the laceration was due to an incident where another person, GGG raped her.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime charged.

RULING: YES. The defense of appellant is anchored on denial and alibi which do not impress belief. As often stressed, “[m]ere
denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value
than the positive testimony of a rape victim.” In this case, appellant’s testimony, particularly his denial, was not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Also, for his alibi to prosper, appellant must establish that he was not at the locus
delicti at the time the offense was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission. Appellant failed to establish these elements. The fact that “AAA” was living with her
grandparents did not preclude the possibility that appellant was present at the crime scenes during their commission. Appellant
himself admitted that the distance between his residence and that of “AAA’s” grandparents is only approximately
7½ kilometers and which can be traversed by riding a pedicab in less than 30 minutes. In other words, it was not physically
impossible for appellant to have been at the situs of the crimes during the dates when the separate
acts of rape were committed. Moreover, it has been invariably ruled that alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused. Here, appellant was positively identified by “AAA” as the perpetrator of the crimes without showing any dubious
reason or fiendish motive on her part to falsely charge him. The contention of appellant that “AAA” was motivated by
hatred because he prevented her from having a boyfriend is unconvincing. There is nothing novel in
such a contrived defense. “Motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving
full credence to the testimony of a rape victim.” It is a jurisprudentially conceded rule that “it is against human nature for
a young girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge
could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her own father.”

The Court, like the courts below, finds that “AAA” was without doubt
telling the truth when she declared that her father raped her on three separate occasions. She was consistent in her narration on
Page 25 of 40
how she was abused by her father in their own house, in the copra drier, and even in a nearby pasture land. After
she was forced to lie down, appellant removed her clothes, went on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina and threatened
her with death if she would report the incidents. Hence, appellant’s attempt to discredit the testimony of
“AAA” deserves no merit. “When credibility is in issue, the court generally defers to the findings of the trial court considering
that it was in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment during trial.” Here, there is nothing from the records that would impel this Court to deviate from the findings and
conclusions of the trial court as affirmed by the CA.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLIAM MANGUNE y DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 186463 November 14, 2012

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: An Information was filed before the RTC, charging Mangune with the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, in relation to
Article 266-B, paragraph 2, no. 1, of the Revised Penal Code. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 7th day of May, 2003, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being a man and the biological father of one AAA, 5 a 17-year-old girl, and by means of force, threat or intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of said child, AAA, against her will and consent.6

ISSUE: Whether or not Mangune was guilty of the crime as charged in the Information, the RTC proceeded with the trial on the merits.

RULING: YES.

Mangune asseverates that the lower courts should have acquitted him based on reasonable doubt as AAA’s testimony is not worthy of
belief for having been fabricated. He supports such assertion by making much of the fact that AAA did not sustain any external physical
marks, as shown by the medico-legal findings, despite her testimony that he slapped her many times on the face. This, Mangune insists,
makes AAA’s testimony incredible.

This Court, in a long line of cases,31 has ruled that "the absence of external signs of physical injuries does not negate rape." 32 The doctrine is
thus well-entrenched in our jurisprudence, and the Court of Appeals correctly applied it.

Furthermore, Mangune could not impute any ill motive on AAA or his wife that would explain why he was charged with such a heinous
crime. We have ruled that "[a]bsent evidence showing any reason or motive for a witness to falsely testify against the accused, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and the testimony should be accorded full faith and credit." 39

It is also worthy to note that Mangune proffered no other defense than that of denial

It is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law.
Denial cannot prevail over the positive, candid and categorical testimony of the complainant and as between the positive declaration of the
complainant and the negative statement of the appellant, the former deserves more credence. (Citations omitted.)

CHAIN OF CUSTODY
PEOPLE VS POSADA

Facts:
Accused-appellants Roger Posada and Emily Posada were convicted by the RTC Branch 43, Virac, Catanduanes, in Criminal Case No. 3490
for selling 12 pieces of transparent sealed plastic sachet, containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu with a total weight of
0.4578 grams, in violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Roger was also convicted by the same RTC in Criminal Case No. 3489 for possession of one piece of torn plastic sachet, containing residue
of a crystalline substance (allegedly shabu), a piece of small aluminum foil, a pair of small scissors, and 15 pieces of used lighter all of which
are intended to be used for smoking or introducing dangerous drugs into the body of a person, in violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellants notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to establish the
chain of custody and integrity of the alleged seized illegal items.

Page 26 of 40
Held:
On the first factual issue, the Court found that the records of the case and the testimonies of witnesses belie the accused-appellants'
contention.

Based on the records, the buy-bust operation, the arrest of the accused-appellants and the confiscation of the illegal items happened at
around 12 noon of August 3, 2005. PO1 Area received from Emily one sachet of shabu and after PO1 Area introduced himself and arrested
Emily, 12 more sachets of shabu were found in the possession of Emily. The said 12 sachets of shabu were inside a coin purse, with a
bundle of money. Nothing in it would show that P/CI Tria submitted the alleged illegal drugs beyond the 24-hour reglementary period. In
fact, even the Laboratory Examination Request dated August 4, 2005 does not indicate violation of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Clearly,
from the foregoing, the accused-appellants failed to adduce any evidence to prove their contention.

PEOPLE VS BAUTISTA

Facts:
On April 28, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the RTC two separate informations charging Cesar Bautista y
Santos with a violation of Section 5 and a violation of Section 11 (3) of RA 9165. That on or about the 25th day of April 2003 in Caloocan City,
Metro Manila, the above-named accused without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to
PO2 AMADEO TAYAG who posed, as buyer METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU). In the police station, the team recorded the
buy-bust bill in the police blotter and turned over the plastic sachets to PO2 Hector Castillo, the investigator on duty. PO2 Castillo marked
the sachet handed by Bautista to PO2 Tayag as CBS (Bautista) Buy-bust, and the other six sachets recovered by SPO1 Ybaez from appellants
possession.

Issue:
Whether the plastic sachets were not immediately marked after their seizure from Bautista

Ruling:
The rule on chain of custody under the foregoing enactments expressly demands the identification of the persons who handle the
confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the
time they are seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court.

Here, the buy-bust team did not mark the sachets until after reaching the police station. Even so, the omission did not destroy the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items. We are satisfied that PO2 Tayag and SPO1 Ybaez brought the confiscated sachets of
shabu to the police station immediately after the buy-bust operation, and turned them over to the duty investigator, PO2 Castillo, for
marking; that in their presence, PO2 Castillo marked the sachet of shabu sold by Bautista to PO2 Tayag as CBS (Bautistas initials) Buy-bust,
and the six sachets of shabu recovered by SPO1 Ybaez from Bautistas possession.

PEOPLE VS. REMEGIO

Facts:
on 17 April 2003, PO2 Ramos and Colonel Bagtas conducted a buy-bust operation in the corner of General Ricarte Street and Ortigas
Avenue, Cainta, Rizal. PO2 Ramos prepared the One Hundred Peso bill (P100.00) to be used as marked money in the operation. He put his
initials, RDR, on the face of the bill. Having told the informant Angel that they will conduct a buy-bust operation, the policeman and Angel
proceeded to the store in General Ricarte Street where Alyas Footer was.The name of the accused would later be clarified by the
prosecution through PO2 Ramos as referring to the same person as the accused Ricardo Zapanta Remigio (Remigio). The plastic sachets
taken from Remigio were brought by PO2 Ramos to Camp Crame for laboratory examination. He testified that he personally transmitted
the request for actual testing of the contents of the sachets to the chemist.

Issue:
Whether the sachets allegedly confiscated from him were the same ones delivered to the forensic laboratory for examination

Ruling:
Jurisprudence consistently pronounces that the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its
existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. As such, the presentation in court of the corpus delicti the body or substance of the crime
establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In this case, no illegal drug was presented as evidence before the trial court.
As pointed out by appellant, what were presented were pictures of the supposedly confiscated items. But, in the current course of drugs
case decisions, a picture is not worth a thousand words. The image without the thing even prevents the telling of a story. It is indispensable
for the prosecution to present the drug itself in court.

PEOPLE VS LLANITA

Facts:

Page 27 of 40
Appellants were convicted for violation of Sec. 5, Art 11 of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 for illegal sale of Dangerous drugs. The prosecution presented PO2 Catuday as a witness a member of the PNP- Anti- Illegal Drugs
Special Operations Task Force with functions to conduct buy-bust and surveillance operations. He was on duty when a female informant
alias Inday went to the station to give info about the illegal drug activities of one Alias Reyna. A team was the immediately formed by Lt.
Bartolazo to conduct a buy bust operation against Reyna. Buy bust ensued, from there PO2 Catuday introduced himself as a police officer.
Llanita and Buar tried to escape but they were immediately apprehended, and were apprised of their constitutional rights. Specimens were
forwarded to crime laboratory for examination, and the result yielded to a positive result for shabu.

Issue:
Whether there is failure to establish a cautious and unbroken chain of custody of evidence

Ruling:
No. Because what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence
of the corpus delicti. He commission of illegal sale merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the
moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. As long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was
accepted by appellant followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former, then the crime is already consummated.
Examinations of the testimony of PO2 Catuday reveals that the elements of illegal sale are present to attain the conviction of Llanati and
Buar. In this case the prosecution has amply proven all the elements of the drug sale with moral certainty. And for the proper chain of
custody it was also clearly proven that there was a cautious chain of it.

PEOPLE VS MUSA
Facts: On December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian, Zamboanga City,
instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received
from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. Finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is sentenced to life imprisonment and
to pay the fine of P20,000.00.

Issue:
Whether his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses

Ruling:
If an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of
the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object.47 Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. In the instant case, the appellant was
arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents
searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they
arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure.

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

G.R. No. 146586 January 26, 2005

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE and SPORTS vs. JULIA DEL ROSARIO, MARIA DEL ROSARIO, PACENCIA DEL ROSARIO, and HEIRS
OF SANTOS DEL ROSARIO

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

On 14 February 1992, respondents Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario, Pacencia Del Rosario and the Heirs of Santos Del Rosario
("respondents") filed before the trial court a complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioner Department of Education, Culture and
Sports ("DECS").

Respondents alleged that they own a parcel of land which the Kaypombo Primary School Annex is occupying and that the same refuses to
vacate despite demand.

In its Answer, DECS countered that KPPS’s occupation of a portion of the Property was with the express consent and approval of
respondents’ father. DECS claimed that some time in 1959 Isaias donated a portion ("Donated Site") of the Property to the Municipality of
Sta. Maria ("Municipality") for school site purposes. Atty. Ely Natividad, now a regional trial court judge ("Judge Natividad"), prepared the
deed of donation and the acceptance.

During the pre-trial conference held on 3 September 1992, DECS admitted the existence and execution of TCT No. T-222432 (Exhibit "A"),
Tax Declaration No. 6310 (Exhibit "B"), and the tax receipts in respondents’ names for the years 1991 and 1992 (Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2").
Page 28 of 40
On the other hand, respondents admitted the existence of Judge Natividad’s affidavit that he prepared the deed of donation (Exhibit "1")
and the tax declaration for 1985 in the Municipality’s name (Exhibit "2"). Since there was no dispute that the Property was registered in
respondents’ names, the parties agreed to a reverse trial with DECS presenting its evidence first to prove that there was a valid donation to
the Municipality.

On 7 July 1993, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession.

The trial court explained that the defense was able to prove the due execution of the deed of donation and its acceptance, as well as the
loss of the same, in accordance with Rule 130[,] Sec. 4. It is recalled that Judge Eli Natividad, then a municipal councilor of Sta. Maria,
testified that he was the person who prepared the deed of donation and later notarized the same, and that said deed was duly executed
and signed before him and in his presence. Likewise, he affirmed that the municipal board of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, passed a resolution
accepting the deed of donation in favor of the said municipality. Since the loss of the deed subject matter of this case was likewise duly
proved by the defense, exerting the best possible efforts to locate or secure a copy of the same and without bad faith on its part, this Court
is bent to give a greater weight to the secondary evidence adduced by the defense.

However, said decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THE DUE
EXECUTION OR EXISTENCE OF THE DEED OF DONATION AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ACCEPTING THE DONATION,
AS WELL AS THE LOSS OF THE DOCUMENTS AS THE CAUSE OF THEIR UNAVAILABILITY.11

RULING:

No.

What mainly militates against DECS’ claim is, as the Court of Appeals found, inadequate proof that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent
search in the places where the deed of donation may likely be found and that the search was unsuccessful. Prior to the introduction of
secondary evidence, a party must establish the existence and due execution of the instrument. After a party establishes the existence and
due execution of the document, he must prove that the document was lost or destroyed. 18 The destruction of the instrument —

may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by any one who had
made, on the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place [or] places where the document or papers of similar character are
usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.19

Here, DECS allegedly made a search in the municipal building and in the DECS Division Office in Bulacan. The copies of the deed of donation
furnished these offices were purportedly "lost" when these offices transferred to new locations. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly
pointed out, Judge Natividad who claimed to have notarized the deed of donation failed to account for other copies of the deed, which the
law strictly enjoins him to record, and furnish to other designated government offices.

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. The law requires him to keep a notarial register where he shall
record all his official acts as notary public. The law specifies the information that the notary public must enter in the notarial register.
Failure to perform this duty results in the revocation of his commission as notary public. We quote the provisions of the Notarial Law
pertinent to the case:

SECTION 245. Notarial register. - Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the notarial register, wherein record shall be
made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any part thereof, to any person applying for it
and paying the legal fees therefor.1ªvvphi1.nét

Such register shall be kept in books to be furnished by the Attorney-General (Solicitor-General) to any notary public upon request and upon
payment of the actual cost thereof, but officers exercising the functions of notaries public ex officio shall be supplied with the register at
government expense. The register shall be duly paged, and on the first page, the Attorney-General (Solicitor-General) shall certify the
number of pages of which the book consist[s].

SECTION 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, the
witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date of the execution, oath, or acknowledgment or the instrument, the fees collected by him for his
services as notary in connection therewith, and; when the instrument is contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof as part of his
records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof, and shall give to each entry a consecutive
number, beginning with number one in each calendar year. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged

Page 29 of 40
before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on
which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.

xxx

At the end of each week the notary shall certify in his register the number of instruments executed, sworn to, acknowledged, or protested
before him; or if none, such certificate shall show this fact.

A certified copy of each month’s entries as described in this section and a certified copy of any instrument acknowledged before them
shall within the first ten days of the month next following be forwarded by the notaries public to the clerk of the Court of First Instance
of the province and shall be filed under the responsibility of such officer; Provided, that if there is no entry to certify for the month, the
notary shall forward a statement to this effect in lieu of the certified copies herein required. (As amended by C.A. 72, Sec. 1.)

SECTION 247. Disposition of notarial register. - Immediately upon his notarial register being filled, and also within fifteen days after the
expiration of his commission, unless reappointed, the notary public shall forward his notarial register to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of the province or of the City of Manila, as the case may be, wherein he exercises his office, who shall examine the same and
report thereon to the judge of the Court of First Instance. If the judge finds that no irregularity has been committed in the keeping of the
register, he shall forward the same to the chief of the division of archives, patents, copyrights, and trade-marks. In case the judge finds
that irregularities have been committed in the keeping of the register, he shall refer the matter to the fiscal of the province - and in the City
of Manila, to the fiscal of the city - for action and the sending of the register to the chief of the division of archives, patents, copyrights, and
trade-marks shall be deferred until the termination of the case against the notary public. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Notarial Law mandates a notary public to record in his notarial register the necessary information regarding the instrument
acknowledged before him. The Notarial Law also mandates the notary public to retain a copy of the instrument acknowledged before him
when it is a contract.20 The notarial register is a record of the notary public’s official acts. Acknowledged instruments recorded in the
notarial register are public documents.21 If the instrument is not recorded in the notarial register and there is no copy in the notarial
records, the presumption arises that the document was not notarized and is not a public document. 22

DECS should have produced at the trial the notarial register where Judge Natividad as the notary public should have recorded the deed of
donation. Alternatively, DECS should have explained the unavailability of the notarial register. Judge Natividad could have also explained
why he did not retain a copy of the deed of donation as required by law. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, there was no evidence
showing that DECS looked for a copy from the Clerk of Court concerned or from the National Archives. All told, these circumstances
preclude a finding that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search to obtain a copy of the deed of donation.

[G.R. No. 137549. February 11, 2005]

AURELIO P. ALONZO and TERESITA A. SISON, petitioners, vs. JAIME AND PERLITA SAN JUAN, respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: The plaintiffs are the owners of a land at Quezon City. In 1996, they discovered that 125 sq. m. of the left side of their land were
occupied by the defendants for more than a year, without their prior knowledge or consent. They then sent a demand letter requiring them
to leave the land but the defendants did not comply with it. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint for recovery of possession. During the case,
the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement, which provided the five payment instalments and schedule (par.5); that in the event of
non-payment, the defendants shall vacate and surrender the possession of the occupied land (par.11); and that if the defendants refuse to
surrender the said land, the plaintiff is entitled to obtain immediately from the court a writ of execution for ejection of the defendants
(par.12). The defendants subsequently paid with checks issued by Cirila Cruz, which were not in the amounts stated in the Agreement,
accompanied by vouchers indicating that they were for the partial payment of the Compromise Agreement. Thereafter, the plaintiffs
subsequently sent a letter demanding the defendants to vacate the land, alleging that the latter did not comply with the Agreement by not
paying the required amounts on the dates specified on the agreement. The defendants claim otherwise.

ISSUE: 1. WON there was payment by the respondents.

HELD: 1. No. The rule is that one who alleges payment has the burden to prove it. In this case, the respondents failed to do so. The Court
held that a receipt is the best evidence of payment, and that a voucher is not necessarily an evidence of payment. It is merely a way or
method of recording or keeping track of payments made. Moreover, Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides that checks “shall produce the
effect of payment only when they have been cashed.” In this case, it was not shown that the checks were encashed by the petitioners. The
court further held that, even assuming that payments were made, the difference in the dates, amounts and the person issuing the checks
as compared to those stated in the Agreement fail to convince the court that the payments were really for the respondents’ obligation in
the said Agreement. Also, the checks were all issued by a certain Cirila Cruz whose identity and relation to them the respondents never
explained and the stated amount in those checks was greater than what was due in the Agreement.

[G.R. No. 157683. February 11, 2005]

Page 30 of 40
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPS.NAPOLEON & EMILIA HUBILLA
PUNO, J.:
Facts:

On March 5, 1999, respondents filed an application for registration of title to a lot situated in Alaminos, Laguna. They presented the ff: a)
blueprint copy; b) technical description; c) certification from DENR and CENRO; d) report from the Land Management Bureau; and e) tax
declarations.

Petitioner argued that application should not be granted because the original tracing cloth plan was not submitted. Petitioner expressed
that the original tracing cloth plan is a mandatory requirement.

Issue:

WON application for registration to land should not be granted because of the non-inclusion of original tracing cloth plan n the pieces of
evidence submitted.

Held:

The Supreme Court has recognized instances of substantial compliance with the rule that the submission in evidence of the original tracing
cloth plan duly approved is a mandatory requirement; blueprint copies of the original tracing cloth plan and other evidence could also
provide sufficient identification to identify a piece of land for registration purposes.

Application for registration may be granted.

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 209227, March 25, 2015, THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHARLIE OROSCO
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: Appellant, along with Astor, was charged with Robbery with Homicide. The witness of the prosecution, Arca, testified in court that
he saw the two accused hold the arms of the victim and stab her on the chest. However, despite several opportunities, Arca refused to
point to the accused appellant as the one who held the hands of the victim. In this petition, appellant claims that the lower courts erred in
giving credit to the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of Arca who could not point to him during the trial.

ISSUE: WON appellant is guilty of the crime charged?

HELD: YES. The testimony of a sole witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Here, Albert Arca positively identified accused Orosco as one of the two men who robbed and killed the
victim. Arca’s act of constantly looking towards Orosco’s direction whenever he was asked to point out one of the culprits, is a mute but
eloquent manner of identifying Orosco as one of the perpetrators of the crime. As such, Arca’s act is sufficient identification already.

G.R. No. 211199, March 25, 2015, FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RANDY ROLLO Y LAGASCA
PEREZ, J.:

FACTS: Appellant was charged with the violation of R.A. 9165 following a “buy-bust” operation. Appellant asserts that there was no proof
that the alleged sale transaction took place because the witnesses presented did not testify as to the material details of the alleged buy-
bust operation, such as the details of the meeting of the informant, the alleged source of the information on the sale of illegal drugs, the
initial contact made with appellant, the offer to purchase drugs, the payment and delivery of the drugs, and the actual exchange of the
sachets containing shabu.

ISSUE: WON the guilt of appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD: YES. All the elements for illegal sale were duly established with appellant being caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu through a
buy-bust operation. PO3 Verdadero, in the course of his testimony during trial, affirmed his signature appearing on the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest. In said affidavit, the police officers made a detailed account of the preparations made prior to the buy-bust operation such as the
documentation, marking on the boodle money, operational strategy and the like were detailed. PO1 Ayad also categorically stated that he
gave the marked money to appellant in exchange for 1 piece of transparent plastic heat-sealed sachet of shabu. Furthermore,
inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect either the
substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor inconsistencies even enhance their veracity as
the variances erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.

Page 31 of 40
G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015
VIRGINIA OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Virginia Ocampo filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared their marriage null and void and subsequently directed the parties to submit a project of
partition of their inventoried properties. Having failed to do so, a hearing ensued and the RTC declared the properties belong to each one of
them on a 50/50 basis.

ISSUE: WON respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains?

HELD: NO. Only testimonial evidence was presented by the parties respectively, to prove and dispute the claim of the other with regard to
the properties and assets acquired during the marriage. In the absence, therefore, of any documentary evidence to prove the contrary, all
the properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage are presumed conjugal. Further, the testimonial evidence adduced by the
petitioner aimed at establishing that respondent took no part in acquiring said properties failed to convince this Court that the latter be
given only a meager share thereof.

G.R. No. 200942 June 16, 2015 EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JORIE WAHIMAN y RAYOS
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: Buensuceso was on his way back to the company staff house. While he was about to enter the gate, he was gunned down by
persons riding in tandem on a black motorcycle. The guard on duty, Azucena, who was then opening the gate, identified one of the
assailants as thee appellant. During trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken during the
preliminary investigation of the case, admitting to the killing of Buensuceso. However, when it was appellant’s turn to testify, he narrated
that at the time of the killing, he was attending the birthday celebration of his brother-in-law.

ISSUE: WON the appellant is guilty of the crime charged?

HELD: YES. Atty. Dumlao, the lawyer who assisted the appellant, testified that he ably provided legal assistance to appellant all throughout
the proceedings and carefully explained to him the ramifications of his admission. In any event, it must be stressed that appellant’s
conviction was not based solely on his extrajudicial confession. The prosecution likewise presented the eyewitness account of Azucena who
testified that immediately after hearing gunshots, he saw appellant about 5 meters away from the Isuzu pick-up of the victim. Moreover,
appellant was not able to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.

G.R. No. 208686 July 1, 2015 2nd Division

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALELIE TOLENTINO
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment and 5 counts of estafa. Private complainants alleged that appellant made it appear
that she is licensed to recruit workers in Korea. Over the court of several meetings, payments for the assistance fee, medical fee and other
fees to secure their visa were cashed out to the appellant upon her promise that they will be able to legally work abroad.

ISSUE: WON Tolentino is guilty of the crime charged?

HELD: YES. Well-settled is the rule that the trial court, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial,
can best assess the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Appellant’s mere denial cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimonies of the complainants. The trial court’s findings are accorded great respect unless the trial court has overlooked or
misconstrued some substantial facts, which if considered might affect the result of the case.Furthermore, factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are deemed binding and conclusive.

G.R. No. 207098 July 8, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NONIETO GERSAMIO, Accused-Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:

Facts: August 28, 2002: In the afternoon, Gersamio, raped the complainant [AAA], 15 years old, a minor, at the time of the incident against
her will. Evidence was established that: AAA’s first sexual ordeal at the hands of Gersamio happened sometime in 1999, when she was only
13 years old, having been born on 11 April 1986. It was repeated for several times. The last incident of rape occurred on 28 August 2002.
On the said date, AAA was about to enter their house, Gersamio, who was then hiding behind a coconut tree, suddenly grabbed and
dragged her towards the back of their house – a banana plantation. AAA could not do anything but cry as he pointed a knife at her neck. He
commanded AAA to lie down but she resisted, prompting the former to kick the latter in her thigh. When AAA was already lying on the

Page 32 of 40
ground, he removed her t-shirt, short pants and underwear. He also threatened to kill AAA. Defenseless, AAA simply cried. He inserted his
penis inside AAA’s vagina. He warned AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone what happened between them. BBB, AAA’s
grandmother noticed physical changes in the body of AAA and discovered that she is pregnant. When asked about the father of her child, it
was then that AAA disclosed to BBB her harrowing experiences at the hands of Gersamio. RTC convicted the accused and ordered him to
recognize and support the child. CA affirmed but deletes the portion ordering the recognition and support of the child.

Issue: Whether AAA is a credible witness.

Held: YES. A meticulous perusal of the records shows no compelling reason to overturn the findings of both lower courts on the matter of
AAA’s credibility and that, indeed, Gersamio raped her and his guilt was sufficiently proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Settled is the rule that when the issue of credibility of witnesses is concerned, this Court adheres to these jurisprudentially established
guidelines: (1) it gives the highest respect to the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses because of its unique position in
directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand, and from its vantage point, is also in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses; (2) in the absence of any substantial reason that would justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances,
affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded; and (3) the rule is even more stringently applied if
the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court.

G.R. No. 214054, Aug. 5, 2015;

NG MENG TAM, Petitioner, vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Facts: China Bank alleged that it granted Ever a loan. The loan was allegedly backed by two surety agreements executed by Vicente, George
and petitioner in its favor. When Ever defaulted in its payment, China Bank sent demand letters collectively addressed to George, Vicente
and petitioner. The demands were unanswered. China Bank filed the complaint for collection. In his Answer, petitioner alleged that the
surety agreements were null and void since these were executed before the loan was granted. Petitioner posited that the surety
agreements were contracts of adhesion to be construed against the entity which drafted the same. Petitioner also alleged that he did not
receive any demand letter. Petitioner served interrogatories to parties pursuant to Sections 111 and 6,12 Rule 25 of the Rules of Court to
China Bank and required Mr. George C. Yap, Account Officer of the Account Management Group, to answer. George Yap executed his
answers to interrogatories to parties. Petitioner moved for the hearing of his affirmative defenses. Because he found Yap’s answers to the
interrogatories to parties evasive and not responsive, petitioner applied for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum against George Yap pursuant to Section 6,14 Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court.

When the case was called for the presentation of George Yap as a witness, China Bank objected citing Section 5 of the JAR. China Bank said
that Yap cannot be compelled to testify in court because petitioner did not obtain and present George Yap’s judicial affidavit. The RTC
required the parties to submit their motions on the issue of whether the preparation of a judicial affidavit by George Yap as an adverse or
hostile witness is an exception to the judicial affidavit rule. Petitioner contended that Section 5 does not apply to Yap because it specifically
excludes adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses from its application. Petitioner insists that Yap needed to be called to the stand so
that he may be qualified as a hostile witness pursuant to the Rules of Court. China Bank, on the other hand, stated that petitioner’s
characterization of Yap’s answers to the interrogatories to parties as ambiguous and evasive is a declaration of what type of witness Yap is.
It theorizes that the interrogatories to parties answered by Yap serve as the judicial affidavit and there is no need for Yap to be qualified as
a hostile witness.

The RTC ruled that Section 5 did not apply to Yap since he was an adverse witness and he did not unjustifiably decline to execute a judicial
affidavit.

Issue: Whether RTC committed error.

Held: YES. In Afulugencia v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.,27 this Court stated that “in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse
party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter.” In this case, parties, with the
approval of the Court, furnished and answered interrogatories to parties pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. They therefore complied
with Section 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. Before the present controversy arose, the RTC had already issued subpoenas for Yap to
testify and produce documents. He was called to the witness stand when China Bank interposed its objection for non-compliance with
Section 5 of the JAR. Having established that Yap, as an adverse party witness, is not within Section 5 of the JAR’s scope, the rules in
presentation of adverse party witnesses as provided for under the Rules of Court shall apply. In keeping with this Court's decision
in Afulugencia, there is no reason for the RTC not to proceed with the presentation of Yap as a witness. In sum, Section 5 of the JAR
expressly excludes from its application adverse party and hostile witnesses. For the presentation of these types of witnesses, the provisions
on the Rules of Court under the Revised Rules of Evidence and all other correlative rules including the modes of deposition and discovery
rules shall apply.

[GR Nos. 204481-82, Oct 14, 2015 ]

Page 33 of 40
ALBERT G. AMBAGAN v. PEOPLE
VELASCO JR., J.

Facts: A shooting incident between the party of Santos and the party of Ambagan occurred. In holding petitioner Ambagan criminally liable
for double homicide as principal by inducement, the Sandiganbayan gave credence to Ronnel Bawalan’s testimony that it was petitioner
Ambagan’s words (“Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama banatan na ninyo yan.”) which impelled his men to aim and shoot at the
victims.

Issue: Whether petitioner can be held guilty even though there exists inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

Held: NO. The The Sandiganbayan would have been correct if the statement was indeed made by the petitioner immediately before the
shooting incident. However, there are substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of star prosecution witnesses Patam and Ronnel
Bawalan, which refer not only to minor details but even to facts constituting important aspects of the case, seriously eroding the weight of
the evidence of the prosecution, and casting reasonable doubt on the culpability of petitioner. A testimony that an accused made a
statement which allegedly initiated the shootout, such testimony not being entirely credible, cannot sustain the conviction of said accused
as principal by inducement.
Inconsistencies:
1. Only Ronnel Bawalan allegedly heard petitioner make the utterance. Between the two star witnesses, Patam was in closer
proximity to Ambagan and was thus in a better position to know whether the statement was indeed made by the latter. However,
Patam made no such testimony despite the several opportunities he could have done so.
2. The testimony of Ronnel Bawalan is not entirely credible, as (1) Ronnel testified that he saw petitioner engage Santos in a verbal
altercation in the middle of the street, but thereafter claimed he did not see petitioner’s whereabouts when the shooting began,
(2) if the facts were as Ronnel stated, petitioner would have been caught in the middle of the crossfire he himself allegedly
ordered, (3) both petitioner and Patam testify that petitioner wanted to go back (as Patam was taking him into the house of
Javier) during the exchange of gunshots – if Ronnel was correct in saying that petitioner initiated the shootout, it would not make
sense why petitioner would want to go back to the shootout he started, (4) if petitioner wanted to start the shootout, he would
have drawn his own pistol, (5) if it is true that, per Ronnel, only Santos from his group was armed, that meant Santos was able to
shoot down 3 of petitioner’s men before he fell himself, (6) Ronnel first claimed that he personally witnessed the deaths of the
other individuals in the shootout (Causaren and Jamon) but reversed himself during trial and claimed that he learned of such
deaths from other sources, and (7) Ronnel is biased against petitioner, as deceased Santos is his cousin-in-law and deceased
Domingo is his brother.

JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
1. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. BPI/MS INSURANCE
2. DE GUZMAN VS FILINVEST
3. PEOPLE VS BOQUECOSA
EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
G.R. Nos. 120744-46 June 25, 2012
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
The accused-petitioners were Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who
were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan
(Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and
Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David
(David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del
Carmen and Telebastagan. They allegedly received information concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. It
was so unfortunate that the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn to which the accused all
await. Believing that the victims were the armed NPA members, the accused opened fire to the passengers of the said Tamaraw. Such
shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and
injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). The accused were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder.
Issue: WON the theory of mistaken belief is applicable in the present case.
Page 34 of 40
Ruling:
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a
mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the
prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the
crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the
defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that
the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or
the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.

Besides, as held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a
mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused. Thus, Ah Chong further explained that

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible
who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts
were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one
answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged
ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

SECONDARY EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 167147 August 3, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. GENARO CAYABYAB y FERNANDEZ, Appellant.

FACTS: Alpha Jane Bertiz, the eldest child of Conrado and Metchie Bertiz, was six years and nine months old when she was raped was
committed on August 7, 2001. Alpha Jane Bertiz was at home taking care of her younger siblings while her parents were out when, on the
guise of teaching arithmetic, appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez went to the victim's house where he proceeded to force himself unto
her. When Alpha Jane shouted in pain, appellant was startled and subsequently sprayed the victim with tear gas and left.

Her mother, Metchie arrived shortly thereafter and Alpha Jane told her what had happened. She immediately reported the incident to the
barangay officials and brought Alpha Jane to the Philippine Air Force General Hospital, and later PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, for
medical examination which both found hymenal abrasions and lacerations on the victim’s genitalia. She also sought assistance from the
police who, after gathering information, arrested the appellant at his house. ’s medical examination

Appellant was charged with rape before the RTC of Pasay City. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. He raised the
defenses of denial and alibi, testifying that he was plying his normal route inside the Villamor Airbase as a tricycle driver from 6:00 a.m.
until 7:00 p.m. before he went straight home where he went to sleep after eating dinner.

The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found the victim's testimony consistent with the medical
findings of examination conducted on the victim. Moreover, it applied the rule that an unsubstantiated defense of denial and alibi cannot
prevail over a positive and categorical testimony of a minor victim. The court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority and
imposed the penalty of death. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC and submitted it to this court for review.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. (NO)

HELD: There is no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate court. Rape, such as committed against a 'child
below seven (7) years old', is a dastardly and repulsive crime which merit no less than the penalty of death pursuant to Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code. This special qualifying circumstance of age must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information and
proven during the trial; otherwise the penalty of death cannot be imposed.

The best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or certified true copy thereof; in their absence, similar
authentic documents may be presented such as baptismal certificates and school records. If the original or certified true copy of the birth
certificate is not available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may be sufficient under certain
circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic documents and the testimonies of the victim's mother or other
qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted
by the accused.
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The trial court in this case made a categorical finding that Alpha Jane was only 6 years old at the time she was raped, based not only on the
testimonies of the complainant and her mother, but also on the strength of the photocopy of Alpha Jane's birth certificate. It is well to note
that the defense did not object to the presentation of the birth certificate; on the contrary it admitted the same as to fact of birth.

Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer. Clearly, therefore,
the presentation of the photocopy of the birth certificate of Alpha Jane is admissible as secondary evidence to prove its contents.
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case at hand the opponent does not bona
fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.

In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents of the photocopied birth certificate; in fact it admitted the same. Having failed
to raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence, and deemed
admitted and the other party is bound thereby.

In fine, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved that Alpha Jane was only six-years-old, being born on November 26, 1994, when the
rape incident happened on August 7, 2001. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to
damages awarded. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168168 September 14, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant.

FACTS: Complainant Maricar Dimaano was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she was first sexually abused in the
morning of September 1993. Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but she kept the incident to herself as her father might hurt her. A
few days later, appellant again ravished her. As in the first incident, complainant kept the ordeal to herself. It was only in November 1995
that she confided the sexual abuses to her mother.

On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted his daughter, but when the latter’s brother Edwin went out of his room, appellant
immediately asked her to dress up. The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Appellant stopped only when he
heard the arrival of his wife.

On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta, Rizal, who upon learning of the abuses done by the appellant
advised them to go to Camp Crame where they filed a complaint. The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined
complainant and found her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state.

Appellant denied the accusations against him. He contended that he could not have raped complainant in September 1993 because he was
always in the office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched to another assignment overseas. He claimed it was impossible
for him to rape his daughter on December 29, 1995 or January 1, 1996 because there were other people in the house. He also maintained
that the fact that his daughter was in a non-virgin state did not conclusively prove that he was responsible for it because it is also possible
that his daughter had sexual intercourse with another man her age.

The trial court found the appellant guilty of all counts of rape (Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for the crimes of rape committed in
September 1993 and on December 29, 1995) and the crime of attempted rape (Criminal Case No. 96-151). The court found the testimony of
complainant to be spontaneous and credible. It also found the delay in reporting the rape understandable due to the fear complainant had
of her father who had moral ascendancy over her. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court and thus
elevated it to the Supreme Court for review.

ISSUE: WON the sentence of qualified rape in Criminal Case No. 96-150 by reason of special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship shall prosper. (YES)

HELD: In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly sentenced to death as the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship were properly alleged in the information and proved during trial by the testimonies of the complainant, her mother and the
appellant himself; they were also supported by the photocopy of the marriage certificate and birth certificate, respectively.

Indubitably, the marriage and birth certificates are public records in the custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer. The
presentation, therefore of their photocopies is admissible as secondary evidence to prove their contents. It is also well to note that
appellant did not dispute their contents when offered as evidence to prove relationship and minority. Having failed to raise a valid and
timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became primary evidence, and deemed admitted and the
other party is bound thereby.

The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 96-125 as the rape was committed in September
1993 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, on December 31, 1993. Prior to R.A. No. 7659,
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the the crime of rape, when committed against a

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woman who is under 12 years old or is demented. Anent the rape in Criminal Case No. 96-150 which was committed on December 29,
1995, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, thus applies.

PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

G.R. No. 142944. April 15, 2005
EDENBERT MADRIGAL AND VIRGILIO MALLARI, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND JOSE MALLARI, Respondents.

FACTS: Private respondent Jose Mallari and his wife Fermina Mallari are the owners of a 340-square meter residential lot with a 2-storey
residential house erected thereon, situated at Olongapo City. In need of money for his wife’s planned travel to the United
States, Jose thought of mortgaging the above property with a bank. However, his son Virgilio Mallari convinced him not to proceed with
the intended mortgage and to instead assign to him a portion of the same property, assuring his father that the latter could continue in
occupancy of the property and that he will allow his sister Elizabeth who operates a store thereat to continue with the same. Virgilio
assured his father that he will not dispose of the property without his father’s consent and that the latter could redeem the said property
any time he acquires money.

Finding no reason to doubt Virgilio’s words, Jose did not anymore proceed with his original idea of mortgaging the property with a bank.
Instead, he and his wife Fermina executed a document denominated as "Deed of Absolute Sale", whereunder the couple appeared to have
conveyed to their son Virgilio Mallari the house and lot in question for a consideration of ₱50,000.00 although the property easily
commands much more at that time.

Without Jose’s knowledge, his son, Virgilio, sold the same property for the same amount of ₱50,000.00 to Edenbert Madrigal, a longtime
neighbor of the Mallaris in the area. Sometime thereafter, Jose was demanded by Edenbert Madrigal to vacate the subject property. It was
then that Jose came to know for the first time of the sale of his property by his son Virgilio in favor of Edenbert Madrigal thru the
aforementioned Deed of Absolute Sale.

Jose Mallari subsequently filed against his son Virgilio Mallari and Edenbert Madrigal the complaint for annulment, redemption and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order before the RTC in this case. The trial court, rendered judgment
in favor of plaintiff Jose Mallari by ordering defendant Edenbert Madrigal to allow the former to redeem the subject property based on the
same amount it was sold to him by his co-defendant Virgilio Mallari, and for the two (2) defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff Jose
Mallari moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.

Both defendants went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the appealed decision of the trial court. In time, appellants Virgilio
Mallari and Edenbert Madrigal moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the appellate court hence, their present
recourse.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in receiving parol evidence to establish that the instrument in question is actually one of mortgage. (NO)

HELD: This court cannot view the Deed of Absolute Sale in question in isolation of the circumstances under which the same was executed
by Virgilio’s parents, more so in the light of his father’s disavowal of what the document, on its face, purports to state.

Then, too, there is the ruling of this Court in Lustan vs. CA to the effect that even if the document appears to be a sale, parol evidence may
be resorted to if the same does not express the true intent of the parties. "Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the
owner of the property may prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the document does not
express the true intent of the parties. In this case, parol evidence then becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument
was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court
will enforce the agreement or understanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract".

Evidence clearly shows that there was indeed no intent to sell the subject property. Rather, what transpired between the parties, who were
father and son, was only a mortgage involving ₱50,000.00 over a portion of a lot with a house in Olongapo City. The consideration
appearing in the Deed of Sale is grossly inadequate considering the location of the property, the area and the fact that it was a two-storey
building or house. Thus, this court rules and so holds that both courts correctly construed the aforementioned Deed of Absolute Sale as an
equitable mortgage and not a sale, as it purports to be. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 141311 May 26, 2005

BERNICE LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES RITA and FRANCISCO ONG, respondents.

FACTS: Respondent spouses Francisco and Rita Ong were owners of a parcel of land located at 375 Matienza Street, San Miguel, Manila
with an area of 1,010 square meters and a two-storey house. They mortgaged the subject property with the Permanent Savings and Loan
Bank (PSLB) to secure their loan. Upon failure to pay, PSLB foreclosed the mortgage and sold it in a public auction where the bank emerged
as the highest bidder. Respondent spouses failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, thus, the title was consolidated in
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the name of PSLB but respondent spouses continued to occupy the premises. When PSLB was subsequently ordered liquidated by the
Monetary Board of the Central Bank, respondent spouses were given first priority, being the original owners of the subject property, to buy
back their property.

Since respondent spouses had no money then, they approached petitioner Bernice Legaspi’s father, Stephen Hong, and sought his help to
pay and redeem the subject property. They entered into an agreement denominated as a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase.
Immediately after the deed was signed, and since it was the last day to redeem the property, petitioner went to the Central Bank and paid
for and in behalf of respondents.

On September 26, 1989, petitioner reminded respondents that the four-month period to repurchase the subject property will expire and
that failure to pay will force her to take the corresponding action to consolidate title on the property in her name. However, respondent
spouses failed to redeem the subject property from petitioner within the period given them. Despite the expiration of the period to
repurchase, petitioner still granted respondent spouses opportunity to repurchase the subject property.

In October 1990, petitioner filed a petition for consolidation of ownership before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In their answer
with compulsory counterclaim, respondent spouses alleged that the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase did not reflect the true intention
of the parties because the document was actually an equitable mortgage with illegal provision. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of
petitioner, finding the Deed of Absolute Sale with Right to Repurchase clear, unambiguous and unequivocal. Respondent spouses’ motion
for reconsideration was denied.

Aggrieved, respondent spouses appealed to the CA which reversed the RTC decision, finding that the agreement was not sale with right to
repurchase but was one of equitable mortgage. The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration hence the instant petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase is one of equitable mortgage. (YES)

HELD: The nomenclature used by the contracting parties to describe a contract does not determine its nature. Decisive for the proper
determination of the true nature of the transaction between the parties is the intent of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the
terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situations of the parties at that time; the
attitudes, acts, conduct, and declarations of the parties; the negotiations between them leading to the deed; and generally, all pertinent
facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding.

Even if a contract is denominated as a pacto de retro, the owner of the property may still disprove it by means of parol evidence, provided
that the nature of the agreement is placed in issue by the pleadings filed with the trial court.

Art. 1602 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when a contract, regardless of its nomenclature, may be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage. They are as follows: (a) when the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (b) when the vendor remains in
possession as lessee or otherwise; (c) when upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period
of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (d) when the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (e) when the
vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of
the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. Art. 1603 provides that in
case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage. The presence of
even one of the above-mentioned circumstances as enumerated in Article 1602 is sufficient basis to declare a contract of sale with right to
repurchase as one of equitable mortgage.

The CA found the presence of four circumstances in the transaction on which bases it ruled that the transaction was an equitable mortgage,
to wit: (a) respondents remained in possession of the subject property even after the execution of the contract; (b) there was gross
inadequacy of price of P2, 655,000.00 as contract price since the property commands the price of P16 million; (c) extensions of the original
period of redemption; and (d) stipulation of interest.

Thus, this court agrees with the finding of the CA that the transaction between respondents and petitioner was not a sale with right to
repurchase but an equitable mortgage. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 137232 June 29, 2005

ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS CORPORATION and EDILBERTO YUJUICO, petitioners, vs. HOME BANKERS SAVINGS AND TRUST
COMPANY, respondent.

FACTS: Sometime in 1989, Rosario Textile Mills Corporation (RTMC) applied from Home Bankers Savings & Trust Co. for an Omnibus Credit
Line for ₱10 million. The bank approved RTMC’s credit line but for only ₱8 million. On March 3, 1989, herein petitioners, RTMC thru
Edilberto V. Yujuico, signed a Surety Agreement in favor of the bank, in which the latter binds himself jointly and severally with RTMC for
the payment of all RTMC’s indebtedness to the bank from 1989 to 1990. RTMC availed of the credit line by making numerous drawdowns,
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each drawdown being covered by a separate promissory note and trust receipt. RTMC, represented by Yujuico, executed in favor of the
bank a total of eleven (11) promissory notes.

Despite the lapse of the respective due dates under the promissory notes and notwithstanding the bank’s demand letters, RTMC failed to
pay its loans. Hence, the bank filed a complaint for sum of money against RTMC and Yujuico before the RTC.

RTMC and Yujuico contend that they should be absolved from liability, claiming that although the grant of the credit line and the execution
of the suretyship agreement are admitted, the bank gave assurance that the suretyship agreement was merely a formality under which
Yujuico will not be personally liable.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the bank. Herein petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s
judgment. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but were denied by the Appellate Court hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON petitioner Yujuico is personally liable with RTMC for the payment of their obligations to the bank under the suretyship
agreement. (YES)

HELD: There is no record to support petitioner’s allegation that the surety agreement is a "mere formality;" and as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, the Suretyship Agreement signed by petitioner Yujuico binds him. The terms clearly show that he agreed to pay the bank
jointly and severally with RTMC. Under the parole evidence rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced in writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

Under this Rule, the terms of a contract are rendered conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is not admissible to vary or
contradict a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a document. This court has carefully examined the Suretyship Agreement
signed by Yujuico and found no ambiguity therein. Documents must be taken as explaining all the terms of the agreement between the
parties when there appears to be neither ambiguity in the language of said documents nor any failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 151040 October 6, 2005

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. CHENG YONG and LILIA GAW, Respondents.

FACTS: Sometime before 1981, Philippine Pacific Fishing Company, Inc. (Philippine Pacific) obtained from Allied Banking Corporation (Allied
Bank), a packing credit accommodation amounting to (₱1,752,000.00).To secure the obligation, Philippine Pacific and the spouses Cheng
Yong and Lilia Gaw (spouses Cheng, for short), executed a Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety. However, due to business reverses
and alleged misuse of corporate funds by its operating officers, Philippine Pacific defaulted in the payment of said obligation.

A petition for receivership against Philippine Pacific was filed before the SEC following an intra-corporate dispute. Thereafter, spouses
Cheng were elected as its president and treasurer. However, instead of placing Philippine Pacific under receivership under a management
committee, Allied Bank and Philippine Pacific agreed to restructure and convert the packing credit accommodation into a simple loan.
Accordingly, Philippine Pacific executed in favor of Allied Bank a promissory note, dated 12 August 1981, in the same amount as the packing
credit accommodation. Aside from affixing their signatures on the same promissory note in their capacity as officers of Philippine Pacific,
the spouses Cheng also signed the note in their personal capacities and as co-makers thereof.

Philippine Pacific failed to pay according to the schedule of payments set out in the promissory note prompting the spouses Cheng to
secure the note with substantial collateral by executing a deed of chattel mortgage in favor of Allied Bank over a fishing vessel, "Jean III", a
Japanese- manufactured vessel with refrigerated hatches and glass freezers, owned by the spouses and registered in their names.
Philippine Pacific again defaulted payment. Hence, Allied Bank filed an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
constituted on "Jean III".

Subsequently, the spouses Cheng filed an amended complaint praying, among others, that: (a) the promissory note of 12 August 1981 be
declared void and unenforceable; (b) the vessel be declared a total loss; and (c) Allied Bank be ordered to pay them the value of the loss.
The RTC declared both the promissory note dated 12 August 1981 and the deed of chattel mortgage over the vessel "Jean III" invalid and
unenforceable.

Therefrom, Allied Bank went to the Court of Appeals (CA) via ordinary appeal which declared the promissory note as valid and enforceable.
Spouses Cheng then filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration which was denied hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the promissory note is valid and enforceable. (YES)

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HELD: Under the parole evidence rule, the terms of a contract are conclusive upon the parties and evidence which shall vary a complete
and enforceable agreement embodied in a document is inadmissible. The appellate court is correct in declaring that under the parole
evidence rule, when the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, they are deemed to have intended such written agreement to
be the sole repository and memorial of everything that they have agreed upon. All their prior and contemporaneous agreements are
deemed to be merged in the written document so that, as between them and their successors-in-interest, such writing becomes exclusive
evidence of the terms thereof and any verbal agreement which tends to vary, alter or modify the same is not admissible.

The terms of the subject promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage are clear and explicit and devoid of any conditionality upon
which its validity depends. To be sure, Allied Bank was not a party where the management committee was ordered created; hence, it would
not be correct to presume that it had notice of the existence of the management committee which, incidentally, was still to be created
when the subject promissory note was executed on 12 August 1981. The subject promissory note was then outside the realm of authority
of the management committee. Corollarily, the chattel mortgage accessory to it is likewise valid.

We thus declare and so hold that Allied Bank’s foreclosure of the chattel mortgage constituted over the vessel "Jean III" was justified. On
this score, we also rule that the loss of the mortgaged chattel brought about by its sinking must be borne not by Allied Bank but by the
spouses Cheng. As owners of the fishing vessel, it was incumbent upon the spouses to insure it against loss. Thus, when the vessel sank
before the chattel mortgage could be foreclosed, uninsured as it is, its loss must be borne by the spouses Cheng. WHEREFORE, the
consolidated petitions are DENIED and the challenged decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

DISQUALIFICATION OF WITNESS
MENTAL INCAPACITY
4. PEOPLE VS. MACAPAGAL JR.
BY MARRIAGE
5. ALVAREZ VS. RAMIREZ
OFFER OF COMPROMISE
6. PREAGIDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
7. SAN MIGUEL CORP VS. ROLALO
CONFESSION
8. FRONTIERAS VS. PEOPLE
9. PEOPLE VS TUNIACO

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