B.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

1. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs.COMELEC

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

"The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." – Article II, Section 1, Constitution

All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of the fundamental and preferred right to expression
of the electorate during political contests no matter how seemingly benign will be tolerated.
This case defines the extent that our people may shape the debates during elections. It is significant and of first impression. We are asked
to decide whether the COMELEC has the competence to limit expressions made by the citizens — who are not candidates — during
elections.

II.B.4 . Theory on "deliberative democracy" submit that "substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue isa critical, and indeed defining, feature
of a good polity."159 This theory may be considered broad, but it definitely "includes [a] collective decision making with the participation of
all who will beaffected by the decision."160

It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of every democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people. 161 To ensure order in
running the state’s affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would be elected or nominated in key government
positions to represent the people. On this note, the theory on deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make
government accountable. Necessarily, this includes the right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to governmental functions.
In the language of the declaration of principles of our Constitution, "The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them" (Section 1, Article II).

Translating this declaration into actuality, the Philippines is a republic because and solely because the people in it can be governed
only by officials whom they themselves have placed in office by their votes.

And that when the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to suffrage
or as a means to enjoy the inalienable right of the qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless.

2. G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012

JAMAR M. KULAYAN vs.GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void,
for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.20 Additionally, petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces
under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army.
On the substantive issues, respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires, as Governor Tan allegedly acted pursuant
to Sections 16 and 465 of the Local Government Code, which empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures
during calamities and disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot,
lawless violence, rebellion or sedition.22 Furthermore, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu authorized the declaration of a
state of emergency as evidenced by Resolution No. 4.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code authorizes the respondent governor to
declare a state of emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct of general searches
and seizures.
Subsumed herein is the secondary question of whether or not the provincial governor is similarly clothed with authority to convene the
CEF under the said provisions.

RULING:We grant the petition.

I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic
i. One executive, one commander-in-chief

Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article
VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one president
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very
nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-
in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion.
Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 39 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II,
Section 3, when read with Article VII,Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of
the armed forces.
The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-
Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to
delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. 40 As Commander-in-Chief,
he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in
the manner he may deem most effectual.41
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the
factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call
out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together
the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. 44

That the power to call upon the armed forces is discretionary on the president.
A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police, 50 and may exercise
control only in day-to-day operations, meaning, the usual duties being performed by the ordinary policemen, will be under the
supervision of the local executives.

In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never intended
for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their
authority over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day
situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the
NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control. 53

iii. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President
Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In
issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the
Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive
to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the
invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code, as will be discussed subsequently.

III. Section 465 of the Local Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09
Respondent governor characterized the kidnapping of the three ICRC workers as a terroristic act, and used this incident to justify the
exercise of the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09.56 He invokes Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government
Code, which purportedly allows the governor to carry out emergency measures and call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies for assistance. But a closer look at the said proclamation shows that there is no provision in the Local Government Code nor in
any law on which the broad and unwarranted powers granted to the Governor may be based.

3. RESTITUTO YNOT vs IAC G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me first!" It is this cry that the
petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process.
The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare.
By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive
Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions.

Purpose:Present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on
them for energy needs."

Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another."
The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court
after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual
requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and
the urgency of the need to correct it.
To sum up then, the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to
the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons,
we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable
in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it
was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of
the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even
the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the
order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have reached
us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become a faitaccompli despite its invalidity.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored
or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must
be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright
and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them. WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared
unconstitutional.
4. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS

RULING: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious,
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation.
It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and
duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is
a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered.

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws
and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

The prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than
non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as
a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by
the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy
for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that
it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right
and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not,
by itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and
third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.
The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage
the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate
and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic,
the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which
are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights
— are simply not in point.
Sec. 10,2nd., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explains —
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to
the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only
our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony,
it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which
is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —
Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." This embodies the so-
called "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and
rights covering the national patrimony.
"Par.2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy.
... This provision was never found in previous Constitutions.
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the
common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment
to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive
and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a "qualified foreigner" and
a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former."

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified
bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner
has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires
implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision — by the government itself — is only
too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of
the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a
judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing
or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts — provided
that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action.
When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive
would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional
command. That is not how constitutional government operates.
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC
could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization.
As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a
"state action."
In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution
(1) when the activity it engages in is a "public function;"
(2) when the government is so-significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and,
(3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories
of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State
and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government.
It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the
bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose
their reason for being.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the
Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution.
For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing
into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware
from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited
to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the
highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because
of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or
personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the
apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner’s matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To
insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays
down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left
with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS will clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution
will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It
is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign
investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for
Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more
appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive
about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions
perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court’s First
Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in a major daily to
the effect that that injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here."

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set
itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution
or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never
shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character
of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued
at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will
always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy
as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.

Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the
Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the
goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept.
Protection of foreign investments, while laudable, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has
hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of
states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official
visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth
century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of grandeur;
a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country.
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand Old
Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands
cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation’s soul for some pieces of
foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if
Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage
is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept
in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy
provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being
the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51%
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter
to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for the purpose. SO ORDERED

5. CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN vs. HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995
These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734),
authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of
the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the Reorganization
of Administrative Regions in Mindanao."
The facts are as follows:
Pursuant to Art. X, §18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao,
Petitioners contend that Art. XIX, §13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the
President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the
exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
In addition, petitioner challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by Art. XIX, §13 to the President is
only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to t ransfer the
regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
RULING: The purpose for their creation was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government." 4
As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments." The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are
"mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." 7
The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries 8 which has been described in Pelaez
v. Auditor General9 or as "administrative in nature."
There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative
regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the
exercise of the power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the
title of the law.
The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions
for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery
of essential services.
There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like
Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which
all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be
overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political
representation.
Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities which voted for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region are located, can be "merged" by the President.

6. LAO H. ICHONG, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not
citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
 a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by
Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

c. The, equal protection clause. —
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

The conflict, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than
real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy.
So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into
classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's target in the enactment of
the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien
dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the Convention
that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ."
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing
feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest.
We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized
and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They
owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds
his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility,
prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized
representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of
police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal
protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and
the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for
personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit.
These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing
violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or den ied by the
equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures
its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law
is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with
whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and
that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the
aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time
comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does
not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the
law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.

7. IBP vs.HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA

An action seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the
Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police in visibility patrols around the metropolis.

(3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

The petition has no merit.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the
civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.
The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency
or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers
in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. xxx21
Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the President’s power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar result.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally
bereft of factual basis.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no
justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian
supremacy over the military.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion
to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the President’s exercise of judgment deserves
to be accorded respect from this Court.
The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other
public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President
has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the
police force.
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the
deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is "militarized" in violation of Section 3, Article II 36 of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in
the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of
the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are
the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the
overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.37
What we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.
x x xWhen this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean that military involvement, even when not expressly
authorized by the Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it actually regulates, forbids or compels
some conduct on the part of those claiming relief. A mere threat of some future injury would be insufficient. (emphasis supplied)
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is permissible use of the military
in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed.
On this point, the Court agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General:
3. The designation of tasks in Annex A65 does not constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First,
the soldiers do not control or direct the operation. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d) 69 of
Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply no coercive
force. The materials or equipment issued to them, are all low impact and defensive in character. The conclusion is that there being no
exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines constitutes no
impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement. 71

7. MAXIMO CALALANG v. A. D. WILLIAMS,

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, --that as a consequence of such enforcement, all
animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their
owners but of the riding public as well.

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and
traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention
is untenable.
The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’ may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact.
The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the ’necessity’ of the case."

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any
or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest."
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts
and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed
to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot
be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend.
The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi
est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and
of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN,
JR
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue
of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
RULING: We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal
right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights
to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand
to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the
different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true
value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty —
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause
of action.

G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, vs.SECRETARY ANGELO REYES
ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins,
porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait.
II. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to
enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain
a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in
the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in
the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their
cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule
on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.
In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned." 56 Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. 57
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow
any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are
joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-
Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine
Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.

True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature,"89 Congress enacted the NIP AS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native plants
and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas. These areas possess common
ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses outstandingly
remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals,
biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine.90 It classifies and administers all the designated
protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable
use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible.

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM,

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal
protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for
violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not
conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
I. Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are challenged as
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.
The decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for
the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and
disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the
farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy
of living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now
at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised
in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A.
No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA vs.SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law
applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the
due process clause of the Constitution.4

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely
gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to
the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However,
the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the
right to alienate the same.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, vs.PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations
with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks
to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.

The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of
public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well
as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the
exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever
citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential
to hold public officials "at all times x x x accountable to the people," 29 for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold
public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper
functioning of any democracy.

AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal
their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials
will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their discussions, putting
them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the
constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own
and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include the size, location,
technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid,
the minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition
process, long before the consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to
make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is
not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises
a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can
access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition.
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right to
information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."Certainly, a consummated
contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract
is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.1âwphi1.nêt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in
the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither
an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) doc uments and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first
category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. The second category
refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts,
transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or
processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and
expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the
JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation
of the JVA.34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them.
One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to
reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying. 35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers.36 The
right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as
confidential.37 The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The
information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress,38 are
recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. 39 This is not the situation in
the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions
like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. 40 Congress has
also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations. 41

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA vs.CONTE MANGELIN

In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the
Autonomous Regions ..."
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and
in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress."
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to
be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event,
the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 28
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to
decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government
unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case,
since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of
the Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree
of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy."
On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government
acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government).
If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this
Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that
"[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."

The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and
the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34

AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY ("AKBAYAN"), v. THOMAS G. AQUINO

Petitioners seek via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all
pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
Petitioners Congressmen Lorenzo R. Tañada III and Mario Joyo Aguja filed on January 25, 2005 House Resolution No. 551 calling for
an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being negotiated by the Philippine government, particularly the JPEPA. The Resolution
became the basis of an inquiry subsequently conducted by the House Special Committee on Globalization (the House Committee) into
the negotiations of the JPEPA.
Standing
Respondents deny that petitioners have such standing to sue. "[I]n the interest of a speedy and definitive resolution of the substantive
issues raised," however, respondents consider it sufficient to cite a portion of the ruling in Pimentel v. Office of Executive Secretary8 which
emphasizes the need for a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" on questions of standing.
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature,
petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and,
therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. 9 As the present petition is anchored on the right to information and
petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives
who additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.
The JPEPA is a matter of public concern
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern.
Apropos is the teaching of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. 'Public concern' like
'public interest' is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.
In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it
relates to or affects the public.16 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during
the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic
negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy
of full public disclosure.
Respondents' claim of privilege
It is well-established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor the policy of full public disclosure is absolute, there being
matters which, albeit of public concern or public interest, are recognized as privileged in nature. The types of information which may be
considered privileged have been elucidated in Almonte v. Vasquez,17 Chavez v. PCGG,18 Chavez v. Public Estate's Authority,19 and most
recently in Senate v. Ermita20where the Court reaffirmed the validity of the doctrine of executive privilege in this jurisdiction and dwelt on
its scope.
Whether a claim of executive privilege is valid depends on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.21 In the
present case, the ground for respondents' claim of privilege is set forth in their Comment, viz:
x x x The categories of information that may be considered privileged includes matters of diplomatic character and under negotiation and
review. In this case, the privileged character of the diplomatic negotiations has been categorically invoked and clearly explained by
respondents particularly respondent DTI Senior Undersecretary.
The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject to negotiations and legal review by the parties fall under the
exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of public concern and policy of public disclosure. They come within the coverage
of executive privilege. At the time when the Committee was requesting for copies of such documents, the negotiations were ongoing as
they are still now and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change. Considering the status and nature of such
documents then and now, these are evidently covered by executive privilege consistent with existing legal provisions and settled
jurisprudence.
Practical and strategic considerations likewise counsel against the disclosure of the "rolling texts" which may undergo radical change or
portions of which may be totally abandoned. Furthermore, the negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well as of
Japan must be allowed to explore alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the same manner as judicial deliberations
and working drafts of opinions are accorded strict confidentiality.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The ground relied upon by respondents is thus not simply that the information sought involves a diplomatic matter, but that it pertains
to diplomatic negotiations then in progress.
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
In Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements
may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest."
In PMPF v. Manglapus, "secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of
speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information."
The Resolution went on to state, thus:
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are inherent in executive
action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. Although much has been said about "open" and
"secret" diplomacy, with disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes and Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the
practice.
x x x
There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation with foreign powers on nearly all subjects is concerned. This, it
is claimed, is incompatible with the substance of democracy.
In PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential - since there should be
"ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved" - the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to
be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers
with the understanding that "historic confidentiality"27 would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.
Indeed, by hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we may be jeopardizing higher national goals for the sake of
securing less critical ones.
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It
bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as
privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim
is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome
its traditionally privileged status.
Whether petitioners have established the presence of such a public interest shall be discussed later. For now, the Court shall first pass
upon the arguments raised by petitioners against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus to the present case.
Arguments proffered by petitioners against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus
Petitioners argue that PMPF v. Manglapus cannot be applied in toto to the present case, there being substantial factual distinctions
between the two.
To petitioners, the first and most fundamental distinction lies in the nature of the treaty involved. They stress that PMPF v.
Manglapus involved the Military Bases Agreement which necessarily pertained to matters affecting national security; whereas the present
case involves an economic treaty that seeks to regulate trade and commerce between the Philippines and Japan, matters which, unlike
those covered by the Military Bases Agreement, are not so vital to national security to disallow their disclosure.
Petitioners' argument betrays a faulty assumption that information, to be considered privileged, must involve national security. The
recognition in Senate v. Ermita29 that executive privilege has encompassed claims of varying kinds, such that it may even be more
accurate to speak of "executive privileges," cautions against such generalization.
While there certainly are privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such as those involving military secrets,
not all are founded thereon. One example is the "informer's privilege," or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a
person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law.30 The suspect involved
need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national security for this privilege to apply in any given instance. Otherwise, the privilege
would be inapplicable in all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It
would also be highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general.
Also illustrative is the privilege accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged without distinguishing between
those which involve matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that
x x x [a] frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is
essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. x x
x31 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case deliberated upon, so presidential
communications are privileged whether they involve matters of national security.
It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being
that "the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials
and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing." 32 This qualification applies
whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.
The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential communications privilege.
It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential
communications is similar, if not identical.
The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus36 shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage a frank
exchange of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from public view. Similar to the privilege for
presidential communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through the same means, to protect the independence in
decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity as "the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations." And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations
arises, not on account of the content of the information per se, but because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in
pursuit of the public interest, must be presumed confidential.

In this jurisdiction, however, there is no counterpart of the FOIA, nor is there any statutory requirement similar to FOIA Exemption 5 in
particular. Hence, Philippine courts, when assessing a claim of privilege for diplomatic negotiations, are more free to focus directly on the
issue of whether the privilege being claimed is indeed supported by public policy, without having to consider - as the CIEL court did - if
these negotiations fulfill a formal requirement of being "inter-agency." Important though that requirement may be in the context of domestic
negotiations, it need not be accorded the same significance when dealing with international negotiations.
There being a public policy supporting a privilege for diplomatic negotiations for the reasons explained above, the Court sees no reason
to modify, much less abandon, the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus.
A second point petitioners proffer in their attempt to differentiate PMPF v. Manglapus from the present case is the fact that the petitioners
therein consisted entirely of members of the mass media, while petitioners in the present case include members of the House of
Representatives who invoke their right to information not just as citizens but as members of Congress.
While indeed the petitioners in PMPF v. Manglapus consisted only of members of the mass media, it would be incorrect to claim that the
doctrine laid down therein has no bearing on a controversy such as the present, where the demand for information has come from
members of Congress, not only from private citizens.
The privileged character accorded to diplomatic negotiations does not ipso facto lose all force and effect simply because the
same privilege is now being claimed under different circumstances. The probability of the claim succeeding in the new context might
differ, but to say that the privilege, as such, has no validity at all in that context is another matter altogether.
Clearly, the privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens' demands for information, but also in the context
of legislative investigations.
Hence, the recognition granted in PMPF v. Manglapus to the privileged character of diplomatic negotiations cannot be considered
irrelevant in resolving the present case, the contextual differences between the two cases notwithstanding.
Whether the privilege applies only at certain stages of the negotiation process
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order. x x x46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
It follows from this ruling that even definite propositions of the government may not be disclosed if they fall under "recognized exceptions."
The privilege for diplomatic negotiations is clearly among the recognized exceptions, for the footnote to the immediately quoted ruling
cites PMPF v. Manglapus itself as an authority.
Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege
It being established that diplomatic negotiations enjoy a presumptive privilege against disclosure, even against the demands of members
of Congress for information, the Court shall now determine whether petitioners have shown the existence of a public interest sufficient to
overcome the privilege in this instance.
To clarify, there are at least two kinds of public interest that must be taken into account. One is the presumed public interest in favor of
keeping the subject information confidential, which is the reason for the privilege in the first place, and the other is the public interest in
favor of disclosure, the existence of which must be shown by the party asking for information. 47
Petitioners have failed to present the strong and "sufficient showing of need" referred to in the immediately cited cases. The arguments
they proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of this standard.
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject
only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the members of the Senate.

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA vs.HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA

"Experience is the oracle of truth."1-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork
Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings
before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Court‘s resolution:
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that
they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines"
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues
as prompted by the present cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.

B. Matters of Policy: THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude
into areas committed to the other branches of government."

The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.

A POLITICAL QUESTION refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." 141
The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of
government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the
system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an
exercise of judicial power.
In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question
doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the
exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly,
the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action.151
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 152 of the Civil Code,
evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow
if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of government to
accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political
largesse."156
They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations
process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended;
(c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded
are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official
by yielding rich patronage benefits.157
They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or
Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF; 158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the
Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993. 159
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as
the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local
projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.
The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various
post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective
power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President
to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, 161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.
B. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON THE CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government.
To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, 164belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government,
through the President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, 166 belongs the
power to interpret laws.
Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." 167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to
execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or
execute the law."168
The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government
must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from
lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. 169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence
would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the
domain of another.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and
properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague 173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that
the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the
budget execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a
grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively
exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any
other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the
Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress,
"in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law."
Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of
implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it
self with details for implementation by the Executive." 176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional." 177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction
only pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a
mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to
mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and
hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the assignment
of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should
have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators
to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 – have been consistently accorded
post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations.
These post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere
of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as
Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle.
The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates
the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191
That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to
repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in
Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices,
through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal
practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here.
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into the law or informal
practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its
own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the
Constitution has conferred the same.
Only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield
legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized
exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate
on purely local matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, 197or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. 198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing
agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining
facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making
were explained in the case of People v. Maceren 200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception
to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest
are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or
to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201
That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by
law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate
(a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article,
as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.203
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the
veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the
appropriation or of the bill."
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision
of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item
veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning
an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only
allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly
veto the same.
Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which
state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to
item veto.
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped
as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual
amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the
law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without a proper line-
item which the President may veto.
As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of
its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it
may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would
still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing
determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising
legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification
of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that
the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a
mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet the demands of
a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen
when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed
and textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be
further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after
the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system
forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of
the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed
since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. This setup connotes that the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of
similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future
contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that
unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.218
c. Accountability.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate
funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution 225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by
law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be
defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy
on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated
how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local government units (LGUs)
to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy.
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy
since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit
for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of
the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the
2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues involving the Presidential
Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide
for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and
specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not
an appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8
thereof only created a Special Fund incidental thereto. 237
In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential
Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers
of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of
law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable 240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These
two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign,
set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate
exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be
"detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same.

Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution
does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right
to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
(Emphases supplied)

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether
it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments
and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1)
the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2)
whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive
issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987
Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara
v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain
the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks
and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments
in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of
its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that
respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a
judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of
judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the
application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago
v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition
raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words,
in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.99(Italics in the original)