PEOPLE VS GALIT MARCH 20, 1985

FACTS:
The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been
detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently
maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously,
something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating
officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his
innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to
maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl
full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the
pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted
what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared.
Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a
reenactment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.

RULING:
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of
the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead
there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a
dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there
is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was
not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other
relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only
about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him.
His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the
investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not
assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
FACTS:
The records show that on 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a young girl was found
among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was later
identified as Shirley Victore, fifteen (15) years old, a resident of Barangay Guesset, Poblacion,
Santol, La Union, who three (3) days before was reported missing. Post-mortem examination
conducted by Dr. Arturo Llavore, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, revealed that the victim
wasraped and strangled to death. Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio
Medina as the authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the police thereupon invited the two
(2) suspects and brought them to the police station for questioning. However, for lack of
evidence then directly linking them to the crime, they were allowed to go home. On 10 August
1994 the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina returned to the police station one after
another and acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime. Acting on their
admission, the police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions in
writing. The investigators however could not at once get the services of a lawyerto assist the
two (2) accused in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in
the Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. Be that as it may, the
statements of the two (2) accused where nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused
were apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted
by a competent counsel of their choice. Upon their acquiescence and assurance that they
understood their rights and did not require the services of counsel, the investigation was
conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police
officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary
statements of the two (2) suspects who admitted their participation in the crime. But in
arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not their confession is inadmissible in evidence mainly the lack of counsel toassist
them during custodial investigation.

RULING:
Under the Constitution and the rules laid down pursuant to law and jurisprudence, a confession
to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements: (a) the confession
must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and, (d) the confession must be in
writing. Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused's
right to counsel to adequately protect him in his ignorance and shieldhim from the otherwise
condemning nature of a custodial investigation. The person being interrogated must be assisted
by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the
offense. Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any statement
elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. This exclusionary rule is
premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and
runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. In the instant case, custodial investigation
began when the accused Ordoo and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to
confess and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information and/or
confession from them. At such point, the right of the accused to counsel automatically attached
to them. Concededly, after informing the accused of their rights the police sought to provide
them with counsel. However, none could be furnished them due to the non-availability
of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of the town to the next adjoining
town of Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage, the police
should have already desisted from continuing gwith the interrogation but they persisted and
gained the consent of the accused to proceed with the investigation. To the credit of the police,
they requested the presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as
the relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary
execution by the accused of their statements before the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in
any way the absence of a lawyer during the investigation.
People vs. Lugod
[GR 136253, 21 February 2001]

Facts: On 15 September 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep in her house
together with her husband (Danilo Ramos) and children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube, the victim.
Nairube slept close to her "on the upper part" of her body. At around 12:30 a.m., her husband
woke her up because he sensed someone going down the stairs of their house. She noticed
that Nairube was no longer in the place where she was sleeping but she assumed that Nairube
merely answered the call of nature. Nairube's blanket was also no longer at the place she slept
but that her slippers were still there. After three minutes of waiting for Nairube's return, she
stood up and began calling out for Nairube but there was no answer. Thereafter, she went
downstairs and saw that the backdoor of their house was open. She went outside through the
backdoor to see if Nairube was there but she was not. She found a pair of rubber slippers on top
of a wooden bench outside of her backdoor. The sole of the slippers was red while the strap
was a combination of yellow and white; said slippers did not belong to any member of her
family. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her for help. Then, in the
morning of 16 September 1997, she went to the police station to report the loss of her child. She
also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers to SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She then went
home while the police began their search for Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz
requested her to go with the searching team. During the search, Alma Diaz found a panty which
she recognized as that of her daughter. After seeing the panty, she cried. She was thereafter
ordered to go home while the others continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the
search and found a black collared T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the end of the
sleeve hanging on a guava twig. Alma Diaz gave the shirt to SP02 Gallardo. Loreto Veloria
informed him that the two items were worn by Clemente John Lugod when he went to the house
of Violeta Cabuhat. At around 7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended Lugod on the basis of the
pair of slippers and the black T-shirt. He then brought Lugod to the police station where he was
temporarily incarcerated. At first, the accused denied that he did anything to Nairube but after
he told him what happened to the girl. Later, although he admitted to having raped and killed
Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement regarding the same. After having been informed
that the body of Nairube was in the grassy area, Gallardo together with other members of the
PNP, the Crime Watch and the townspeople continued the search but they were still not able to
find the body of Nairube. It was only when they brought Lugod to Villa Anastacia to point out the
location of the cadaver, on 18 September 1997, that they found the body of Nairube. On 19
September 1997, at around 3:30 p.m., Floro Esguerra, the Vice-Mayor of Cavinti attended the
funeral of Nairube. After the funeral, he visited the accused in his cell. In the course of his
conversation with Lugod, Lugod allegedly confessed to the commission of the offense. On 10
October 1997, Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. Upon arraignment, Lugod with the
assistance of counsel entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On 8 October 1998,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna found Lugod guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, sentenced him to death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Nairube
Ramos the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P37,200.00 as actual
damages. Hence, the automatic review
Issue: Whether Lugod’s alleged confession to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Cavanti can be
used against him.
Held: The records do not support the confession allegedly made by Lugod to the Mayor and
Vice-Mayor of Cavinti. Records show that the Mayor of Cavinti did not testify in the criminal trial.
Moreover, the testimony of the Vice-Mayor with respect to the alleged confession made by
Lugod is not conclusive. From the testimony of the Vice-Mayor, Lugod merely responded to the
ambiguous questions that the Vice-Mayor propounded to him. He did not state in certain and
categorical terms that he raped and killed Nairube. In fact, the Vice-Mayor admitted that Lugod
did not tell him that he raped and killed Nairube. In addition, the Court notes the contradiction
between the testimony of the Vice-Mayor who stated that he was alone when he spoke to Lugod
and that of SPO2 Gallardo who claimed that he was present when Lugod confessed to the
Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Considering that the confession of Lugod cannot be used against him,
the only remaining evidence which was established by the prosecution are circumstantial in
nature. The circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses,
merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening and places Lugod at the scene of
the crime and nothing more. The evidence of the prosecution does not provide a link which
would enable the Court to conclude that he in fact killed and raped Nairube.
People of the Philippines vs Edralin Taboga, G.R. Nos. 144086-87, February 6, 2002

Facts:
Francisca Tubon was robbed, stabbed and burned beyond recognition when her house was set
on fire. Evidence pointed out to Edralin Taboga as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, Taboga
was brought to the police station for investigation where he was asked by SPO1 Panod whether
he was the one who did it or not to which he answered in the affirmative. SPO1 Panod prepared
a written extra-judicial confession for Taboga. However, during the inquest, Taboga refused to
sign the confession upon the advice of his lawyer. On April 2, 1998, Mr. Mario Contaoi, a radio
announcer interviewed the suspect where, again, Taboga admitted killing the deceased and
setting her and her house on fire. Accused-appellant Edralin Taboga raised the defense of
denial and alibi. Accused-appellant also claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and
forced to admit the crime. Regarding his admission to radio announcer Mario Contaoi, he
narrated that the interview was held inside the investigation room of the police station where
policemen were present. Thus, he had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of the
policemen. Moreover, relatives of the deceased beat him up by kicking him, hitting him with a
chair, slapping him and punching him on the head and face. Subsequently, Taboga was
charged with the case of special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide as well as Arson.
Both cases were then tried jointly. The Regional Trial Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur rendered
judgment finding Taboga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide and Destructive Arson.

Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by the accused to a radio reporter who was
acting as an agent for the prosecution is in violation of the procedural safeguards enshrine in
the Constitution and admissible as evidence.

Ruling:
There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police
authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there anything on
record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed by the police to
extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter even asked
permission from the officerin-charge to interview accused-appellant. Nor was the information
obtained under duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very much aware of what was going on.
He was informed at the outset by the radio announcer that he was a reporter who will be
interviewing him to get his side of the incident: The records also show that accused-appellant
not only confessed to the radio reporter but to several others, among them his live-in partner,
Barangay Captain William Pagao, and SPO1Tiburcio Panod. The defense maintained that the
confessions were obtained through compulsion. Accusedappellant claimed that the policemen
maltreated him by hitting him four (4) times on the head with a chair and forced him to admit the
crimes. However, accused-appellant failed to present convincing evidence to substantiate his
claim, other than his bare self-serving assertion.
People of the Philippines vs. Juanito Baloloy, G.R. No. 140740, April 12, 2002

Facts:
On August 3, 1996, the body of Genelyn Camacho was found at the waterfalls of Barangay
Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. The body was discovered by Juanito Baloloy.
Barangay Captain Ceniza testified that during Genelyn’s wake Juanito voluntarily told her the
circumstances surrounding the incident and how he raped Genelyn which led to the latter’s
death. Ceniza then turned over Juanito to a policeman who brought him to the police station,
and took the affidavits of the witnesses. The following day, a complaint was filed against
Juanito.

\On August 4, 1996, several people came to the courtroom of Presiding Judge Celestino V.
Dicon to swear to their affidavits before him. Judge Dicon asked Juanito several questions
where the latter spontaneously narrated how he killed Genelyn and dropped her body into the
precipice.

During his investigation by the police officers and by Judge Dicon, Juanito was never assisted
by a lawyer. Juanito was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. Subsequently, the trial
court convicted Juanito of rape with homicide and imposed on him the penalty of death.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the alleged confession of the accused Juanito
Baloloy to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon and its admissibility.

Ruling:
It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it
apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he
is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza, in a spontaneous answer and freely
and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner, that he raped Genelyn. It was given before he was
arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the
offense.

However, as far as the custodial investigation of Judge Dicon is concerned, the conduct of such
was in violation of the constitutional rights of Juanito. It is settled that at the moment the
accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial
investigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his
complicity in the offense without the assistance of counsel. Judge Dicon’s claim that no
complaint has yet been filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation
deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time, Juanito was already under the
custody of the police authorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses who
were then before Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements.
At any rate, while it is true that Juanito’s extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon was made
without the advice and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in evidence, it could
however be treated as a verbal admission of the accused, which could be established through
the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused.
GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS PURGANAN
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002

Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the
extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to
post bail for his provisional liberty.

Issue:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled
to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.

Ruling:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of
the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of
taking it, he ran away.
JOSELITO V. NARCISO V. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ
Facts: An information for parricide was filed against Joselito Narciso for the death of his
wife Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso. After his review asked and motion for reconsideration was
both denied, he asked for reinvestigation of his warrant of arrest. Prosecutor found no reason to
disturb and the case was remand for arraignment and trial. Thereafter, he filed an ‗Urgent Ex-
Parte‘ to allow him to Post Bail‘. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion
was granted on the same day. It was opposed by respondents herein, then they moved for the
postponement of the hearings because no witness was available, Not obtaining any resolution
on her Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail‘ private complainant (respondent
herein) filed this petition before the CA. CA granted the petition. Hence this case. Petitioner
averred that CA erred when it reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right to bail, considering the absence
of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more especially when the public prosecutors, who
have direct control of the proceedings and after assessment of the evidence, have themselves
recommended the grant of bail.
Issue: Whether the bail granted was valid and CA should not have reversed RTC.
Ruling: No. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
also provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no
hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The
appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion
by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed
sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA.
Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to determine whether the
evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held:"Consequently, in the application for bail of a
person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must
actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required
hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The
absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for
the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of
familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of
exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial
discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be
decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the
prosecutor. "Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several case that emphasized the mandatory
character of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties of
the trial judge in such petition: "(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail
or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended; "(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra); "(3)
Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra); "(4) If the guilt of the accused is not
strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra).
Otherwise, petition should be denied." The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure
should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail
applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of
bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary
to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof." Additionally, the court‘s grant or refusal of bail
must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be
formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate
the guilt of the accused.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Conrado M. Vasquez
GR Nos. 99289-90, 27 January 1993

FACTS:
Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. An
order of arrest was issued against her with bail for her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution authorizing the Santiago to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of
P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but she asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and
that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred the
arraignment. Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure order against Santiago by reason of the
announcement she made, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that
she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard University. She directly filed
a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" with the SC.
She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired
jurisdiction over her person as she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered. The hold departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing.
She likewise argued that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to
travel and freedom of speech.

ISSUE:
Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?

Ruling:
By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of
the court, thus, he may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the
case.

Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable
at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving
the country during the pendency of the case. Parties with pending cases should apply for
permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the
best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor
since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications
thereof.