Rule 33

G.R. No. 138739 July 6, 2000

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
Spouses VICENTE and MA. SUMILANG DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

FACTS:

On July 4, 1994, the trial court issued an Order terminating the presentation of evidence for the
petitioner.9 Thus, the latter formally offered its evidence and exhibits and rested its case on July 5,
1994.

Respondents filed on July 29, 1994 a Demurrer to Evidence10 for alleged lack of cause of action. On
November 4, 1994, the trial court dismissed11 the complaint for failure of petitioner to substantiate its
claims, the evidence it had presented being merely hearsay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings.

Hence, this recourse

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings?

HELD:

No. The Court of Appeals should have rendered judgment solely on the basis of plaintiff's evidence as
required by Rule 33, Section 1. A remand is not allowed by the Rules.

Rule 34

[G.R. No. L-9316. October 31, 1956.]

TRINIDAD L. AURELIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MAXIMO BAQUIRAN, Defendant
FACTS:

In this verified complaint the Plaintiff alleges that from 1 June to 30 September 1950
the Defendant borrowed from him various sums of money which after liquidation was ascertained to be
P6,288 as acknowledged by the Defendant (Exhibit A); that the latter paid the sum of P50 on account
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and failed to pay the balance thereof despite repeated demands; and that as the Defendant had chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

removed or disposed of his property, or was about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors, he prayed
for a writ of attachment. As prayed for the writ was granted.
In his answer the Defendant specifically denies under oath the genuineness and due execution of Exhibit
A attached to the complaint and made part thereof; that he borrowed any sum of money from
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the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff answered the counterclaim alleging that the amount sought to be collected was money
borrowed by the Defendant from him and the salary and bonus earned by him from 1 June to 30
September 1950 as supervising engineer in the Defendants’ construction business.
On 12 September 1952, the Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings and dismissal of
the Plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action
ISSUE:

Whether the defending party can move for judgement of the pleadings?

HELD:

No. Only the plaintiff can move for judgment on the pleadings. The defending party cannot move for
judgment on the pleadings.

Rule 35

G.R. No. 143188 February 14, 2007

FLORENTINO PINEDA, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF ELISEO GUEVARA, represented by ERNESTO E. GUEVARA and ISAGANI S.
GUEVARA, namely: ELISEO GUEVARA, JR., ZENAIDA G. SAPALICIO, DANTE G. GUEVARA,
DANILO C. GUEVARA, and ISAGANI S. GUEVARA, Respondents.

FACTS :

The Guevara heirs alleged in the complaint that they were the co-owners of a property originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 386 issued on 7 December 1910 in favor of the
spouses Emiliano Guevara and Matilde Crimen. The couple’s son, and the Guevara heirs’
predecessor-in-interest, Eliseo Guevara, allegedly purchased the property on 1 January 1932 and
had exercised ownership over the property since then by selling and donating portions thereof to
third persons. The Guevara heirs averred that the sale of the property to Eliseo Guevara was
annotated at the back of OCT No. 386.

Defendant Pineda filed an answer with counterclaim, raising the defenses of lack of cause of action,
prescription, laches and estoppel. He averred that he was a buyer in good faith and had been in
actual possession of the land since 1970 initially as a lessor and subsequently as an owner. He
registered the property in his name and was issued TCT No. 257272

On 4 December 1995, the RTC set the case for hearing as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
During the hearing, the parties presented oral arguments and were directed to file their memoranda.

After submission of memoranda, the RTC issued an Order dated 7 May 1996, dismissing the action
on the ground of laches. The Guevara heirs appealed the order of dismissal, claiming the denial of
their right to due process.

ISSUE:
Whether the Trial Court motu proprio render a summary judgment in a civil action?

HELD:

No. The trial court cannot motu proprio decide that summary judgment on an action is in order.
Under the applicable provisions of Rule 35, the defending party or the claimant, as the case may be,
must invoke the rule on summary judgment by filing a motion.19 The adverse party must be notified
of the motion for summary judgment20 and furnished with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions before hearing is conducted.21 More importantly, a summary judgment is permitted only if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.

Rule 36

G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004

Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.

FACTS:

On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the RTC-
Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought
the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,8 specifically on the separation of church and
state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a
candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a
specified candidate.

After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition,
because "in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are
violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of
law."10 It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition – the separation of
church and state – even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through
its discourse, the court a quo opined at some point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in
an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause."11

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its
assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as
mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.

ISSUE:

What is the effect if the judgment does not state the facts and the law upon which it is based.

HELD:

It renders the judgment void, a patent nullity. The dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the
statement quoted by SJS and embedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of the assailed 14-page
Decision. If at all, that statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part
of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the
parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the
circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate
are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.

Rule 37

G.R. No. 159746 July 18, 2012

SPOUSES RAMON MENDIOLA and ARACELI N. MENDIOLA, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, and
TABANGAO REALTY, INC., Respondents.

FACTS:

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation entered into an agreement for the

distribution of Shell petroleum products by Pacific Management & Development,
a single proprietorship belonging to petitioner Ramon G. Mendiola. To secure
Pacific’s performance of its obligations under the agreement, petitioners
executed on August 1, 1985 a real estate mortgage in favor of Shell covering their
real estate and its improvements, located in the then Municipality of Parañaque,
Rizal.

Pacific ultimately defaulted on its obligations, impelling Shell to commence

extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings in April 1987. After application of the
proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific, a deficiency of P170,228.00
remained. The deficiency was not paid by Ramon. Thus, Shell sued in RTC Manila
to recover the deficiency. Mendiola answered that the foreclosure and the filing
of the action were made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and
wanton violation of his rights.

Petitioners commenced in the RTC in Makati an action to annul the extrajudicial

foreclosure. Shell and Tabangao separately moved for dismissal, stating similar
grounds, namely: (a) that the Makati RTC had no jurisdiction due to the pendency
of the Manila case; (b) that the complaint stated no cause of action, the Makati
case having been filed more than a year after the registration of the certificate of
sale; (c) that another action (Manila case) involving the same subject matter was
pending; (d) that the venue was improperly laid; and (e) that the Makati case was
already barred by petitioners’ failure to raise its cause of action as a compulsory
counterclaim in the Manila case.

Manila RTC then rendered its decision favoring Shell. Ramon appealed, but his
appeal was decided adversely to him with the CA affirming the Manila RTC’s
decision and finding that he was guilty of forum shopping for instituting the
Makati case.

Makati RTC then resolved the case favoring Mendiola voiding the foreclosure
sale, finding that there had been no auction actually conducted on the scheduled
date; that had such auction taken place, petitioners could have actively
participated and enabled to raise their objections against the amount of their
supposed obligation; and that they had been consequently deprived of notice
and hearing as to their liability.

Shell and Tabangao filed their motions for reconsideration, however, Makati RTC
denied said motions. They then filed a joint notice of appeal to the CA

ISSUE:

Whether an appeal be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration.

HELD:

The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not an
interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or
settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other than
to execute the order.

Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint is effectively an

Rule 38

G.R. No. 146845 July 2, 2002

SPOUSES MICHAELANGELO and GRACE MESINA, petitioners,

vs.
HUMBERTO D. MEER, respondent

FACTS :
Respondent Humberto Meer is a registered owner of a parcel of land located at Lot 15, Block 5,
Pandacan, Manila evidenced by TCT No. 158886. Sometime in June 1993, he applied for a loan to
construct a house thereon. However, he discovered that his certificate of title has been cancelled
and a new one, TCT No. 166074, was issued in the name of spouses Sergio and Lerma Bunquin.
The latter acquired said property by virtue of a deed of sale dated June 3, 1985 purportedly
executed by respondent in their favor.4

On January 12, 1994, respondent sought the cancellation of TCT No. 166074 with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 10. On the same day, a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the
back of TCT No. 166074

On June 15, 1994, while the case was pending, TCT No. 166074 was cancelled and replaced by
TCT No. 216518 issued in the name of the petitioners, spouses Michaelangelo and Grace Mesina. It
appears that the subject property has been conveyed to the petitioners on September 28, 1993,
even prior to the annotation of lis pendens. The Absolute Deed of Sale evidencing the conveyance
was notarized on the same day, including the payment of taxes appurtenant thereto. The transfer of
the title from Lerma Bunquin to petitioners was effected only on June 15, 1994 because of some
requirements imposed by the National Housing Authority.6

Due to the foregoing developments, Meer impleaded petitioners as additional party defendants.7

Defendant-spouses Bunquin never appeared during the hearings, leading the court to declare them
in default. Petitioners, however, participated actively in defense of their position.8

In its Decision dated February 16, 1998, the trial court ruled that the alleged sale between Meer and
Banquin was fraudulent. However, petitioners were adjudged buyers in good faith and thus were
entitled to the possession of the subject property.

Respondent Meer filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the said Decision but the trial court
denied the same. Respondent thereafter filed an Appeal with the Regional Trial Court.

Reversing the ruling of the MeTC, the Regional Trial Court10 ruled that petitioners were not
purchasers in good faith, reasoning that it is the registration of the Deed of Sale, and not the date of
its consummation that will confer title to the property. Since the Deed of Sale was registered
subsequent to the annotation of the lis pendens, petitioners were bound by the outcome of the case.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court in
a Resolution dated May 10, 2000.12

On July 17, 2000 and after reglementary period for appeal has lapsed, petitioners filed a Petition for
Relief from Judgment and prayed that the Court of Appeals set aside its Resolution dated May 10,
2000 for the following reasons: (a) extrinsic fraud was committed which prevented petitioners from
presenting his case to the court and/or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of
the controversy; (b) mistake and excusable negligence has prevented the petitioner from taking an
appeal within the prescribed period; and (c) petitioner has good and substantial defense in his
action.

ISSUE:
Whether a petition for relief can be granted.

HELD:

No.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners’ allegation of extrinsic fraud should
have been brought at issue in the Metropolitan Trial Court. If they truly believe that the default of the
spouses Mesina prejudiced their rights, they should have questioned this from the beginning. Yet,
they chose to participate in the proceedings and actively presented their defense. And their efforts
were rewarded as the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in their favor.

When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court, they never raised this issue.
Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed the finding of the MeTC, and the Court of Appeals
sustained this reversal, petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for consideration. This Court will
not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence.

The same is true with regard to the defenses forwarded by the petitioners in support of their petition.
These contentions should have been raised in the MeTC, as they have been available to them since
the beginning.

Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or a
mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right
of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken
mode of procedure by counsel.27 Petitioners, however, place the blame on their counsel and invoke
honest mistake of law. They contend that they lack legal education, hence, were not aware of the
required period for filing an appeal.28

In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross
negligence, this Court affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity
is unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioners have squandered the various
opportunities available to them at the different stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to
every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no
purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.

Rule 39

G.R. No. 138305 September 22, 2004

MANILA MIDTOWN HOTEL, Petitioner,

vs.
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR DR. REY A. BORROMEO, THE MANILA MIDTOWN HOTEL
EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION, RAFAEL QUILILAN, NINO VAMTA, LEO POTENCION, EDUARDO
MUNOZ, JERRY SULA, EDGAR MAGDALUYO, RANDY TALENTO, RENEL MANALO, ROWENA
CAO, JESUS VIRAY, RENATO MANAOIS, ANGELITA IGNACIO, CARLITO TALOSIG, AND THE
SHERIFF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMP

FACTS:
The controversy at bar arose from a complaint filed with the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator,
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) by the Manila Midtown Hotel Employees Labor
Union (MMHELU-NUWHRAIN), respondent union, against the Manila Midtown
Hotel, petitioner, docketed as VA Case No. 026. The complainant prayed for the reinstatement of
respondent union members concerned3 or payment of their separation pay, plus their full backwages
and other privileges and benefits, or their monetary equivalent, considering that they were illegally
dismissed from the service.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Labor Arbiter, not the Office of the
Voluntary Arbitrator, has jurisdiction over the case of illegal dismissal. Upon its denial, petitioner, on
November 27, 1996, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 42591. On October, 27, 1997, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.
From this decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Petitioner then
filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 132757. In a Resolution
dated May 5, 1998, we denied the same. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
with finality in a Resolution dated July 1, 1998. Subsequently or on August 17, 1998, the Resolution
dated May 5, 1998, being final and executory, was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.

Going back to VA Case No. 026, in due course, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a Decision4 dated
January 15, 1998 holding that respondent union members Rowena Cao, Angelita Ignacio, Jesus
Viray and Renato Manaois were illegally dismissed from the service.

From the said Decision, petitioner Manila Midtown Hotel, on August 5, 1998, filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, instead of an appeal via a petition for review.

Meantime, respondent union filed a motion for execution of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Decision. In an
Order dated June 17, 1998, the Voluntary Arbitrator issued a writ of execution.

On January 18, 1999, the Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the assailed Decision
of the Voluntary Arbitrator.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent court erred in affirming the writ of execution of the voluntary arbitrator.

HELD:

No. Once a decision or resolution becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court
or tribunal to order its execution. Such order, we repeat, is not appealable.

One final note. Even if we consider petitioner’s petition for certiorari as an ordinary appeal (petition
for review) , still the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Decision of
January 18, 1999 which declared that respondent union members were illegally dismissed from the
service. In fact, records show that petitioner has not questioned the Appellate Court’s finding that the
termination of respondent union members is illegal.