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CASE DOCTRINES

CRIMINAL LAW 2

SUBMITTED TO:

LABOR ARBITER ABDUL AZIS METMUG

SUBMITTED BY:

CRIMINAL LAW 2 CLASS

SCHOOL YEAR 2019-2020

CASE #1: BENITO ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G. R. No. 154130 October 1, 2003
Arbitrary Detention Defined

Arbitrary Detention as defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal
Code, based on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures and, worse,
notwithstanding the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5) complaining witnesses
wherein the latter categorically declared petitioners innocence of the crime charged.

Elements of Arbitrary Detention

Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal
grounds, detains a person. The elements of the crime are:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.


2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.1

Detained Person Defined

In the case of People v. Acosta,2 which involved the illegal detention of a child, we found
the accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to show
that any physical restraint was employed upon the victim. However, because the victim
was a boy of tender age and he was warned not to leave until his godmother, the accused-
appellant, had returned, he was practically a captive in the sense that he could not leave
because of his fear to violate such instruction.

Intent to deprive the victim of his liberty

In the case of People v. Cortez,3 we held that, in establishing the intent to deprive the
victim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure
to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended party in said
case was found outside talking to the owner of the house where she had been taken. She
explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the kidnappers would
make good their threats to kill her should she do so. We ruled therein that her fear was
not baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and they had earlier announced
that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded
that fear has been known to render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an
individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual
force or violence.4

1II Reyes, The Revised Penal Code 43 (14th ed. 1998); citing U.S. v. Braganza, 10 Phil. 79 [1908] and Milo v. Salanga, G.R. No.
37007, 20 July 1987, 152 SCRA 113 (emphasis in the original).

2 107 Phil. 360 [1960].

3 381 Phil. 345 [2000]; citing People v. Dela Cruz, 342 Phil. 854 [1997] and People v. Ramos, 358 Phil. 261 [1998].

4 Id.; citing People v. Hope, 177 N.E. 402, 257 N.Y. 147.
CASE #2: FELICIANO GALVANTE v. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO
GR No. 162808 Apr 22, 2008
Grave Abuse of Discretion

Is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or


to act in contemplation of laws as when judgment rendered is not based on law and
evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.5 This does not obtain in the present case.

Grave Threats

The Solicitor General aptly pointed out that the same is based merely on petitioner's
bare allegation that private respondents aimed their firearms at him. 6 Such bare
allegations stands no chance against the well-entrenched rule applicable in this, that
public officers enjoy a presumption of regularity in the performance of their official
function.7 The IAS itself observed that private respondents may have been carried away
by their "enthusiasm in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty".8 Petitioner express the
same view when, in his Affidavit of Desistance, he accepted that private respondents may
have been merely following orders when they pointed their long firearms at him.
Arbitrary Detention

The criminal complaint for arbitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by
public respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be shown
that: (a) the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender detained the
complainant, and (c) the detention is without legal grounds.9

The second element was not alleged by petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As


pointed out by private respondent Conde in his Comment and Memorandum, i petitioner
himself identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police Chief Rocacorba who
caused his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner allege that private
respondents effected his detention, or were in any other may involve in it. 10 There was,
therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary detention
against private respondent.

Warrantless Search

The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of
a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of
searches:

5 Baviera v. Zoleta, G.R. No. 169098, October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA 281, 303; Soria v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 153524-25, January 31,
2005, 450 SCRA 339, 345.
6 Rollo, p. 146.
7 Salma v. Miro, supra note 32, at 735, citing Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m); Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147762,

October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA 321.


8 Rollo, p. 30.
9 Astorga v. People of the Philippines, 459 Phil. 140, 151 (2003).
10 Id. at 180-181.
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained. - In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission
of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 pesos shall be
imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant without
just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use
unnecessary severity in executing the same.

Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor
in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee
who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other
belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in
their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.

Illegal Search

Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which
petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against private respondents was therefore proper,
although the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are rather off
the mark because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted
by private respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner
executed cast doubt on the veracity of his complaint.11 Public respondents completely
overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was not cognizable by the Ombudsman as
illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the
dismissal of a groundless criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an offense
under the RPC. Thus, the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not public
respondents erred in their finding on the validity of the search for that issue is completely
hypothetical under the circumstance.

11 Rollo, p. 26.
CASE #3: VICENTE P. LADLAD, et. al. vs SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, et. Al
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed –

By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic
of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government;
and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either –
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of
their powers and prerogatives.

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd
action done in furtherance of a political end. 12

Rebellion is distinct from participation or membership in an organization


committed to overthrow the duly constituted government.13

Probable Cause

Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."14

To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of
practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of
probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the
prosecutor’s findings in such investigations. 15

However, in the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor abused his discretion by
ignoring a clear insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause, thus
denying the accused his right to substantive and procedural due process, we have not
hesitated to intervene and exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the

12 People v. Lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481.


13 People vs. Hernandez, 120 Phil. 191, 220.
14 Cruz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 110436, 27 June 1994, 233 SCRA 439.)

15 Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 144692, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 232.)
prosecutor’s findings.16

WARANTLESS ARREST

Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.' Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was
not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:

a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;


b) note down the disposition on the referral document;
c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and
d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial
Prosecutor for appropriate action.

Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by
the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a
regular preliminary investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer having
custody of said detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the
subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together with the copies of the charge
sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses
and other supporting evidence.

Section 7, Rule 112 provides: "When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.-
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires
a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor
without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance
with existing Rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the
complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper
court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.17

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his

16 Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 192; Salonga v. Cruz-Paño, No. L-59524, 18 February 1985, 134 SCRA
438.
17 Rules of Court, Rule 112 Sec 7.
counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.18
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing,
ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense
as provided in this Rule.19 In

Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without
warrant.20

Case #4: EUGENE GONZALES VS. GEN. NARCISO ABAYA


G.R. NO. 164007 AUGUST 10, 2006
The Crime of Coup d’état

ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection. - How committed. - The crime of rebellion or


insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory
of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of
any of their powers or prerogatives.21

ART. 134-A. Coup d’état - How committed. - The crime of coup d’état is a swift
attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against

18Beltran also claims that on the night of his arrest, his jailors showed him a warrant of arrest, dated 7 October 1985, issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, in connection with Criminal Case No. Q-21905 for "inciting to rebellion" which
had been archived in October 1985.
19 Id.

20Section 7, Rule 112 provides: "When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.— When a person is lawfully arrested without
a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing Rules. In the
absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly
with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance
with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the
presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within
five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce
evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule." (Emphasis supplied)

21 Revised Penal Code, Art 134. Coup d’etat, how committed,


duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or
installation, communications networks, public utilities or facilities needed for the exercise
and continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the
Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any
public office or employment, with or without civilian support or participation, for the
purpose of seizing or diminishing state power.22

Doctrine of Absorption

Doctrine of absorption of common crimes. Also called Hernandez doctrine. The


rule enunciated in People v. Hernandez that the ingredients of a crime form part and
parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either
separately therefrom or by the application of Art. 48 of the Rev. Penal Code. It held that
the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines is charged as a
single offense, and that it cannot be made into complex crime.23

Those charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should not be charged before the
military tribunal for violation of Articles of War.24 The doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is
peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25
unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if
the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses.
Navales v. Abaya
The court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held: We agree with the
respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the
dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-
martial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance
of the crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was made
without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity. 26

Double Jeopardy

“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by law or an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.”27

Doctrine of condonation in relation to the crime of coup d etat

The doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more
precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral
victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did
so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the

22 Revised Penal Code, Art 134-A, Coup d’etat, how committed.


23 People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. Rep 515 (1956) , see Art. 48 of the Rev. Penal Code

24 Id., pp. 370-380


25 Entitled "An Act for Making Further and More Effectual Provision for the National Defense by Establishing a System of Military
Justice for Persons Subject to Military Law."
26 Decision. 1Lt Julius R. Navales vs. General Narciso Abaya, G.R. No. 162318, October 25, 2004
27 Section 21, Article III, Philippine Constitution
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison."28

Articles of War – Presidential Decree No. 1822 – A

Whereas amending Presidential Decree No. 1822, providing for trial by courts -
martial of members of the Armed Forces charged with offenses related to the
performance of their duties.

“Whereas, such officers, soldiers and personnel of the Armed Forces including the
Philippine Constabulary charged with any crime or offense related to the Performance of
their duties shall be exclusively tried and punished as a court martial may direct pursuant
to Articles of War as provided for in said presidential decree;29

CASE #5: NESTOR GUELOS, RODRIGO GUELOS, GIL CARANDANG


AND SPO2 ALFREDO CARANDANG Y PRESCILLA vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 177000, June 19, 2017

Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide

Art. 148. Direct assaults.— Any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purpose enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. When the assault is
committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when
the offender lays hands upon a person in authority qualifies the crime.30

Art. 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in
the next preceding article.31

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the

28 People vs. Jalosjos, supra at 706


29 Enrile v. Amin, GR 93335, September 13, 1990, 4. In the case of People of The Philippines V. Daniel Quijada Y Circulado, G.R.
Nos. 115008-09. July 24, 1996 Judge Agustin P. Montesa cited the Theory of Absorption,
Philippine Statutes and Code by Chan Robles “Articles of War “
30 Revised Penal Code, Art. 148.
31 Revised Penal Code, Art. 249.
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in
its maximum period.32

While the elements constituting the crime of Homicide were properly alleged in the two
informations and were duly established in the trial

The said informations, however, failed to allege all the elements constitutive of the
applicable form of direct assault. To be more specific, the informations do not allege that
the offenders/petitioners knew that the ones they were assaulting were agents of a person
in authority, in the exercise of their duty.33

Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by "any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for
the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition"; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, "shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance."34

Indubitably, the instant case falls under the second form of direct assault. The following
elements must be present, to wit:

1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance;
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent;
3. That at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in
the actual performance of official duties, or (b) is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties;
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his
agent in the exercise of his duties; and
5. That there is no public uprising.

Nevertheless, the establishment of the fact that the petitioners came to know that the
victims were agents of a person in authority cannot cure the lack of allegation in the
informations that such fact was known to the accused which renders the same defective.
In addition, neither can this fact be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance
under paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the RPC for acts committed with insult or in disregard
of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank to justify the imposition of an
increased penalty against the petitioners.

32Revised Penal Code, Art. 48.


33NESTOR GUELOS, RODRIGO GUELOS, GIL CARANDANG AND SPO2 ALFREDO CARANDANG Y PRESCILLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES; G.R. No. 177000, June 19, 2017

34 People v. Recto, 419 Phil. 674, 689-690 (2001).


As the Court held in People v. Rodil35:

While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the
victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority,
he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of
a person in authority, for the simple reason that the information does not allege the fact
that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an
agent of a person in authority.

Such an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to


justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the graver offense. Like a qualifying
circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the
information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a
qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack on the victim, who was
known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating, being
"in contempt of/or with insult to public authorities"36, or as an "insult or in disregard of the
respect due the offended party on account of his rank,..."37

It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was
a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must
have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority
or agent of a person in authority.38

Corollarily, qualifying circumstances or generic aggravating circumstances will not be


appreciated by the Court unless alleged in the Information

In other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged, the accused being presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.39 People v.
Flores, Jr., supra note 48, at 569-570. Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, an accused's failure to raise an objection to the
insufficiency or defect in the information would not amount to a waiver of any objection
based on said ground or irregularity.

Therefore, the petitioners can only be convicted of the crime of Homicide instead
of the complex crime of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with
Homicide due to the simple reason that the Informations do not sufficiently charge the
latter.

35 196 Phil. 79 (1981).


36
Par. 2, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code.
37
Par. 3, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code.
38
Id. at 99-100.
39
Id. at 572.
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information . . . it is not the technical name given by the Fiscal appearing in
the title of the information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged
in the body of the Information.40

CASE #6: EDMUND SYDECO Y SIONZON, PETITIONER vs. PEOPLE OF


THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 202692 November 12, 2014
DRUNK DRIVING

Republic Act 4136, Section 53(f):


Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug, a fine
of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than five hundred pesos, or imprisonment
of not more than three months, or both, at the discretion of the Court.41

The MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical certificate
Dr. Balucating issued on June 12, 2006 as to petitioner’s intoxicated state, as the former
was not able to testify as to its contents, but on the testimony of SPO4 Bodino, on the
assumption that he and his fellow police officers were acting in the regular performance
of their duties. It cannot be emphasized enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be
under the influence of liquor are differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to determine
with legally acceptable certainty whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f)
of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the influence of alcohol. The legal situation
has of course changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged
Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUIA),42 a term defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the "act of operating a motor vehicle while
the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath
analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the [DOH], the
NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a
private motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has
BAC [blood alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said
driver is driving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from the prism of RA 10586,
petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for this
obvious reason: he had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively,

40
Velasco v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 704 Phil. 302, 314 (2013), citing Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan,
293 Phil. 368, 378 (1993).

41Republic Act 4136, Section 56(f).


42Sec. 5. Punishable Act. - It shall be unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,
dangerous drugs and/or similar substances.
for reaching during the period material the threshold level of intoxication set under the law
for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over.

RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF PENAL LAWS

Under Art. 22 of the RPC,43 penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar as they
are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of
RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586
alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence
of alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.

RECKLESS DRIVING

Republic Act 4136, Section 48:


No person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without
reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility
and other conditions of the highway and the conditions of the atmosphere and weather,
or so as to endanger the property or the safety or rights of any person or so as to cause
excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway. 44

SWERVING

As ordinarily understood, refers to a movement wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane


to another or to turn aside from a direct course of action or movement. The act may
become punishable when there is a sign indicating that swerving is prohibited or where
swerving partakes the nature of reckless driving.
It is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of
reckless driving. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something
more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle and a willful and wanton
disregard of the consequences is required.

RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR THE AGENTS


OF SUCH PERSON

Article 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of


such personi. – The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed upon any person who not being included in
the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey may person in
authority or the agents of such person while engaged in the performance of official duties.
When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious
nature, the penalty of arresto menor or a fine ranging from Two thousand pesos (P2,000)
to Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) shall be imposed upon the offender. (As amended
by R.A. No. 10951, August 29, 2017)45

43 Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
44 Republic Act 4136, Section 48.
45 Revised Penal Code, Article 151.
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational
stand-off between the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the
latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his
insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be
considered as resisting a lawful order.46 He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely
at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the
petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act
warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road
block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements
of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That
a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives
a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such
person or his agent.47

There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are
persons in authority or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But
surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches 48 to be
conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let
alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been
said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of
democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert
and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed.49

OPINION OF ORDINARY WITNESSES

The RTC affirmed the conviction of the petitioner, addressing the first issue thus
raised in the appeal in the following wise: Dr. Balucating’s failure to testify relative to
petitioner’s alcoholic breath, as indicated in the medical certificate, is not fatal as such
testimony would only serve to corroborate the testimony on the matter of SPO4 Bodino,
noting that under the Rules of Court,50 observations of the police officers regarding the
petitioner’s behavior would suffice to support the conclusion of the latter’s drunken state
on the day he was apprehended.

46 Abenes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 690.
47 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 18th ed., 2008, p. 154.
48 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article III, Section 2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
49 Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659.
50 Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence

regarding —
(a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason.51 It is thus required
that every circumstance favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into account.52 Given the
deviation of the police officers from the standard and usual procedure in dealing with
traffic violation by perceived drivers under the influence of alcohol and executing an
arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by the trial court and the CA on the
presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. As stressed
in People v. Ambrosio,53 the presumption of regularity is merely just that, a presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be
regarded as binding truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot preponderate
over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overcome by proof that obliterates
all doubts as to the offender’s culpability. In the present case, the absence of conclusive
proof being under the influence of liquor while driving coupled with the forceful manner
the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast doubt on the
finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.

In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of
innocence or at least in favor of the milder form of criminal liability. This is as it should be.
For, it is basic, almost elementary, that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies
on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense.

CASE #7: ANUNCIO C. BUSTILLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN


G.R. NO. 146217 : April 7, 2006
Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister

Article 171 of the RPC.

ELEMENTS:
a.) That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.

b.) That he takes advantage of his official position.

c.) That he falsifies a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;


2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate;

51 People v. Castro, G.R. No. L-42478 October 4, 1989., People v. Bania, 134 SCRA 347 [1985]., People v. Tempongko, Jr., 144 SCRA
483 [1986].
52 People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59.
53 G.R. No. 135378, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 312.
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements
other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning;
7. Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol,
registry, or official book.54

Falsification of Public, Official, or Commercial document by a private individual

The Information alleges that petitioner, a public officer, conspiring with a private
individual (Rowena Bustillo), "feloniously made it appear in official documents that
municipal funds were expended for the purchase of lumber from Estigoy Lumber when,
in truth and in fact, as both accused well knew, said lumber were actually purchased from
Rowena Woodcraft, a single proprietorship owned by accused Rowena G. Bustillo." This
falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171 which makes it punishable for anyone to " cause it
to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate,"

ELEMENTS:
a.) That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did
not take advantage of his official position.

b.) That he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in ART. 171.

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.


2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participated.
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements
other than those in fact made by them.
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates.
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning.

c.) That the falsification was committed in any public or official or commercial
document.55

54 Revised Penal Code, Article 171


55 Revised Penal Code, Article 172
Effect of Filing of Information Charging an Incumbent Officer of a Crime

Suspension from office is mandatory whenever a valid Information charges an


incumbent public officer with (1) Violation of RA 3019; (2) violation of Title 7, Book II of
the RPC; (3) any offense involving fraud upon government; or (4) any offense involving
fraud upon public funds or property.56 While petitioner correctly contends that the charge filed
against him and his co-accused does not fall under Title 7, Book II but under Title 4, Book II of the RPC, it
nevertheless involves "fraud upon government or public funds or property."57

On the Validity of the Information in Criminal Case

Petitioner contends that the Information filed against him and his co-accused is invalid
because it failed to allege the element of gain, the party benefited or prejudiced by the falsification,
or that the "integrity of the [falsified] document was tarnished." Petitioner also invokes the findings
of Special Prosecutor II Francis Ilustre, Jr. ("Ilustre") of the OSP who recommended the dismissal
of the complaint against the accused.58

At any rate, the allegation of intent to gain, the party benefited or prejudiced by the falsification,
or tarnishing of a document's integrity, is not essential to maintain a charge for falsification of official
documents. Such charge stands if the facts alleged in the Information fall under any of the modes of
committing falsification under Article 17159 of the RPC.

56 Bustillo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 146217, 07 April 2006, 486 SCRA 545
57 Pimentel v. Garchitorena, G.R. NOS. 98340-42, 10 April 1992, 208 SCRA 122.
58 Id. at 9-10, 13-16

59 "Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the
preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its falsification may affect
the civil status of persons." (Emphasis supplied)
CASE #8: CARLOS L. TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE
GR No. 179448 June 26, 2013
ESTAFA DEFINED

Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse
of confidence, or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.60

FORGERY DEFINED

Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the signing of another's


name with intent to defraud.61

EXPERT’S WITNESS IN FORGERY

A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of government


handwriting experts whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial judge is
not precluded but is even authorized by law 62to conduct an independent examination of
the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity.

ELEMENTS OF FALSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS

The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the


RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who
did not take advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC;63 and, (3) that the falsification was
committed in a public, official or commercial document.

60 Eugenio v. People, G.R. No. 168163, March 26, 2008, 549 SCRA 433, 447.
61 Ocampo v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164968, July 3, 2009, 591 SCRA 562, 570.

62 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Section 22.

63 ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical minister. – The penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by
them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;


FALSIFICATION AS A NECESSARY MEANS TO COMMIT ESTAFA

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of


committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already
existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud
another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or
commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.64

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement


authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is
guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to
remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above.65

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,66 we declared that the right to counsel


"applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation."

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.67

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original
exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.

64 Domingo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. NO. 186101 October 12, 2009.
65 People v. Bandula, G.R. No. 89223, May 27, 1994, 232 SCRA 566, 574
66 414 Phil. 590, 599 (2001).
67 Id. at 207.
CONFESSION

It is settled that a confession [or admission] is presumed voluntary until the contrary
is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary." 68

INDICIA OF VOLUNTARINESS

In People v. Muit,69 it was held that "[o]ne of the indicia of voluntariness in the
execution of [petitioner's] extrajudicial [statement] is that [it] contains many details and
facts which the investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied
without the knowledge and information given by [him]."

VOLUNTARY EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT

It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion,
where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed
intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial
statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed.70

Case #9: GAUDENCIO E. FERNANDO and RUDY ESTORNINOS vs.


COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 159751 December 6, 2006
IMMORAL DOCTRINES, OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND EXHIBITIONS, AND
INDECENT SHOWS

ART. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent
shows.
– The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand
pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the
editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling
the same;

68 People v. Rapeza, 549 Phil. 378, 404 (2007).

69 G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 251, 268.


70People v. Del Rosario, 411 Phil. 676, 690-691 (2001), citing People v. Santalani, 181 Phil. 481, 490 (1979), People v. Balane, 208
Phil. 537, 556 (1983) and People v. Villanueva, 213 Phil. 440, 453-454 (1984).
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs, or any other place, exhibit, indecent or
immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are
prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone
crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or
pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited
drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established
policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts;
3. Those who shall sell, give away, or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculptures, or
literature which are offensive to morals.71

DEFINITION OF OBSCENITY

There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v.
California which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person,
applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.72 But, it would
be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled
discretion in determining what is "patently offensive." 73 No one will be subject to
prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict
or describe patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct.74 Examples included (a)
patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated; and (b) patently offensive representations or descriptions
of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.75 What remains
clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated
on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion.

TEST TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF OBSCENITY

The test to determine the existence of obscenity is, whether the tendency of the
matter
charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall.76

71 Revised Penal Code, Art. 201


72 Id. at 371.
73 Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
74 Id.
75 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
76 People of the Philippine Islands v. J. J. Kottinger, G.R. No. L-20569, October 29, 1923.
TEST OF LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 201 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give


them away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the purpose of the law is to
prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the
forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The law does not require
that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials
to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited
to the public.77

No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct. 78

OBSCENITY AS GROUND FOR THE STATE TO EXERCISE ITS POLICE POWER

Obscenity is an unprotected speech and the Court upheld that is something which
is offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy, which the State has the right to regulate. The
State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene,
immoral and indecent materials may justify the regulation or limitation.

EXPIRATION OF BUSINESS PERMIT AS A BAR FROM PROSECUTION OF A CRIME

The expiration of the mayor’s permit does not negate the fact that petitioner owned
and operated the establishment. It would be absurd to make his failure to renew his
business permit and illegal operation a shield from prosecution of an unlawful act.
Furthermore, when he preferred not to present contrary evidence, the things which he
possessed were presumptively his.79

CASE #10: HENRY T. GO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN


G.R. No. 172602 April 13, 2007
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public


officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will
profit thereby.80

77 L. . Reyes, Revised Penal Code Book II 347 (1998)


78 Id at 56.
79 People v. Agcaoili, G.R. No. 92143, February 26, 1992, 206 SCRA 606, 613.

80 REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019 ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT


GRAFT DEFINED

Graft is the personal gain or advantage earned by an individual at the expense of


others as a result of theexploitation of the singular status of, or an influential relationshi
p with, another who has a position of public trust or confidence. The advantage or gain i
s accrued without any exchange of legitimate compensatory services.

Behavior that leads to graft includes Bribery and dishonest dealings in the
performance of public official acts. Graft usually implies the existence of theft, corruption,
fraud and lack of integrity that is expected in any transaction involving a public official.81

CORRUPTION DEFINED

An act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty
and the rights of others. It includes bribery, but is more comprehensive; because
an act may be corruptly done, though the advantage to be derived from it be not offered
by another.82

PUBLIC OFFICER DEFINED

Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees,


permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the
preceding subparagraph.83
ELEMENTS OF GRAFT AND CORRUPTION

The elements of the offense defined in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are:


(1) That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy
with them;
(2) That the said public officers committed the prohibited acts during the
performance of official duties in relation to their public positions;
(3) That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the government or a
private party;
(4) That such injury was caused by giving unwarranted benefits, preference or
advantage to such parties; and
(5) That the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.84

CRIME AS MALUM PROHIBITUM

It is the commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or effect thereof,
that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction
would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was

81 Legal Dictionary, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Bribery


82 Legal Dictionary, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Corruption
83 Id. At 63.
84 Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144823, December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 242
enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.85

INDICTMENT OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS

Private persons, when conspiring with public officers, may be indicted and, if found
guilty, held liable for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.86

ESTABLISHING ELEMENTS AS EVIDENCE

It is well established that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits.87

CONSPIRACY OF PRIVATE PERSONS IN THE CRIME OF GRAFT AND


CORRUPTION

The absence (or presence) of any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits.88

Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted
and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019,
including (g) and (h) thereof. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-
graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting
graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.89

ESTABLISHING CONSPIRACY IN GRAFT AND CORRUPTION

To establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission


of a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. It may be inferred from the acts
of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken
together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of
conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. Once established,
all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of
participation of each of them, for in contemplation of the law the act of one is the act of
all.90

85 Id. at 464-465
86G.R. Nos. 160577-94, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 348.
87 Andres v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 150869, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 38.
88 Singian v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 17.
89 G.R. No. 172602 April 13, 2007
90 Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 18.
CASE #11: DINAH C. BARRIG vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
(4TH DIVISION) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 161784-86 April 26, 2005
Malversation

Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it shall be prima
facie evidence of malversation when a public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any
public funds or property for which he is chargeable on demand by any duly authorized
officer. That presumption of guilt is founded on human experience and is valid.91

In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his
possession public funds, that he could not account for them and did not have them in his
possession and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the
same. An accountable public officer may be convicted even if there is no direct evidence
of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is shortage in his accounts which
he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.92

For the accused to be guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following
essential elements:

(a) The offender is a public officer;


(b) He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable;
and
(d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or
property.93

For the accused to be guilty of illegal use of public funds or property, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the following elements:

(1) The offenders are accountable officers in both crimes.


(2) The offender in illegal use of public funds or property does not derive any personal
gain or profit; in malversation, the offender in certain cases profits from the proceeds of
the crime.
(3) In illegal use, the public fund or property is applied to another public use; in
malversation, the public fund or property is applied to the personal use and benefit of the
offender or of another person.94

91 Albores v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 604

92 De Guzman v. People 119 SCRA 337


93 Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154239-41, 16 February 2005.
94 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 13th ed., p. 378.
We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that based on the allegations of
the Amended Informations and Rep. Act No. 8249, it has original jurisdiction over the
crimes of malversation and illegal use of public funds charged in the Amended
Informations subject of this petition.
It must be stressed that a public officer who is not in charge of public funds or
property by virtue of her official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for
malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if such public officer or private
individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation or illegal
use of public funds or property.95

The Court has also ruled that one who conspires malversation is also a co-principal
in committing those offenses, and that a private person conspiring with an accountable
public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation.96
Indeed, under the said article, an accountable public officer is one who has actual
control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. Even then, it cannot
thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant can never be convicted for
malversation under the Revised Penal Code. The name or relative importance of the
office or employment is not the controlling factor.97The nature of the duties of the public
officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which
he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether
or not malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee.98

Case #12: ROMEO L. DAVALOS, SR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 145229 April 20, 2006

PENALTY OF MALVERSATION

The crime of malversation of public funds defined and penalized under Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code and, taking into account the existence of a mitigating
circumstance, sentencing the said accused to: (a) suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) suffer
all the appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto, including perpetual special
disqualification; (c) pay a fine of Eighteen Thousand (P18,000); and (d) pay the costs. 99

95DINAH C. BARRIG vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH DIVISION) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos.
161784-86. April 26, 2005.

96 People v. Sendaydiego, G.R. NOS. L-33252 to L-33254, 20 January 1978; 81 SCRA 120.
97 Quion v. People, G.R. No. 136462, 19 September 2002; 389 SCRA 412.
98 Id. At 67.

99 Revised Penal Code, Art. 217


Necessary for conviction of malversation

In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof
that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his
possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain
his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly
necessary100 as long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his
accounts.

Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify
any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption
would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated. This Court has
repeatedly said that when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by
the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never
deemed to have existed at all.101

Funds misappropriated after the commission of the crime

In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of


funds misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the criminal
liability of the offender which, at most, can merely affect the accused's civil liability
thereunder and be considered a mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary
surrender.102

Case #13: AMANDO TETANGCO v. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN and


MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.
G.R. No. 156427 January 20, 2006
Technical Malversation

The elements of the offense, also known as Technical Malversation are:


(1) the offender is an accountable public officer;
(2) he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and
(3) the public use for which the public funds or property were applied is different from the
purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.

It is clear that for technical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public funds
or properties has been diverted to any public use other than that provided for by law or

100 Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 533, 554.
101 Agullo v. Sandiganbayan, 414 Phil. 86 (2001).
102 ROMEO L. DAVALOS, SR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; G.R. No. 145229 April 20, 2006
ordinance. 12 To constitute the crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the
purpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law or ordinance.103

Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to be enacted to validly apply
funds, already appropriated for a determined public purpose, to some other purpose.

SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. – Funds shall be available
exclusively for the specific purpose for which they have been appropriated. No ordinance
shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations from one item to another.
However, the local chief executive or the presiding officer of the sanggunian concerned
may, by ordinance, be authorized to augment any item in the approved annual budget for
their respective offices from savings in other items within the same expense class of their
respective appropriations.104

Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation

The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or
ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala
prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal
offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of public
policy, order, and convenience. 13 It is the commission of an act as defined by the law,
and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has
been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.105

In the case at bar, inasmuch as the prosecution had proved that a criminal act was
committed by the accused under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal intent
was presumed. The accused did not present any evidence to prove that no such criminal
intent was present when she committed the unlawful act of technical malversation. Hence,
the presumption that the unlawful act of the accused was done with criminal intent had
been satisfactorily proven by the prosecution.106

Presumption of criminal intent

It will not, however, automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation


because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act . Here,
appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation
of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such
employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws.107

Comparison between Malversation and Technical Malversation

It bears stressing that the elements of Malversation of Public Funds are distinctly
different from those of Technical Malversation. In the crime of Malversation of Public

103 People v. Montemayor and Ducusin, No. L-17449, 30 August 1962, 116 Phil. 78, 81.
104 Ysidoro v. people, g.r. 192330, nov. 14, 2012.
105 Luciano v. Estrella, 145 Phil. 454, 464-465 (1970).
106 G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005, ABDULLA, v. PEOPLE.
107 Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96025, May 15,1991.
Funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows any
other person to take such public funds for the latter’s personal use. On the other hand, in
Technical Malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration
not for his or another’s personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund
was appropriated by law or ordinance. 77 Technical Malversation does not include, or is
not necessarily included in the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.108

In this case, the finding of the Ombudsman falls short of that quantum of proof
necessary to establish the fact that petitioners acted with manifest partiality or there was
a failure to show that there was a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection on
the part of the petitioners to favor one side rather than the other. Contrary to the view of
the Ombudsman, the mere act of using government money to fund a project which is
different from what the law states you have to spend it for does not fall under the definition
of manifest partiality nor gross inexcusable negligence. It must always be remembered
that manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence are not elements in the crime of
Technical Malversation and simply alleging one or both modes would not suffice to
establish probable cause for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, for it is well-settled
that allegation does not amount to proof. Nor can we deduce any or all of the modes from
mere speculation or hypothesis since good faith on the part of petitioners as with any
other person is presumed. [35] The facts themselves must demonstrate evident bad faith
which connotes not only bad judgment, but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will.109

Case #14: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN


(FOURTH DIVISION) and ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO
G.R. NO. 164185 July 23, 2008

Unlawful Appointment

Article 244. Unlawful appointments.–Any public officer who shall knowingly


nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal
qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos.110

A dissection of the above-cited provision [yields] the following elements, to wit:


1. the offender was a public officer;
2. accused nominated or appointed a person to a public office;
3. such person did not have the legal qualifications [therefor;] and,
4. the offender knew that his nominee or appointee did not have the legal
qualifications at the time he made the nomination or appointment.

108 Garcia v. Ombudsman ,G.R. No. 197567 ,November 19, 2014.


109 Parungao v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 221418, January 23, 2019.

110Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. - Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any
person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Double Jeopardy

Although this Court held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan111 that once a
court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that such ruling on the matter shall not be
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.

Grave Abuse of Discretion

Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to


capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.112

Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local Officials; Candidates Who Lost in Election

Under Section 94 of the Local Government Code:

(a) No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or


designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no


elective or appointive local official shall hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in
any election shall, within one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any office in
the government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries.113

111 People v. Sandiganbayan; G.R. No. 140633, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 74.
112 People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128986, June 21, 1999, 308 SCRA 687, 698
113 Section 94, Local Government Code

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