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D
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES
(DERs) are unlocking new opportunities,
and the grid is undergoing a dramatic trans-
formation with unprecedented change. Yet as
DERs continue to grow in North America and
around the world, it is apparent that the aggre-
gate amount of them is having an impact on
bulk power system (BPS) planning and oper-
ation. The effects of DERs can be attributed
to the uncertainty, variability, and lack of
visibility of these resources at the BPS level.
From a BPS perspective, the key grid plan-
ning impacts generally include the following: ©ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/IPOPBA
✔ transmission-distribution coordination
and data exchange The industry is learning from prior experience and tak-
✔ visibility, dispatchability, and controllability ing actions in anticipation of future DER penetration levels.
✔ DER ride-through capability Waiting for the effect of DERs to manifest before developing
✔ impacts to load-shedding programs solutions may be extremely costly and even risk BPS reli-
✔ aggregate DER modeling and changing reliability ability. However, the proactive development and coordina-
study approaches. tion of requirements can ensure reliable operation of the BPS
Transformation
of the Grid
By Ryan Quint, Lisa Dangelmaier, Irina Green,
David Edelson, Vijaya Ganugula, Robert Kaneshiro,
James Pigeon, Bill Quaintance, Jenny Riesz,
and Naomi Stringer
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MPE.2019.2933071
Date of current version: 18 October 2019
moving forward. The electric industry needs to address these by the requirements in IEEE Standards 1547-2003 and
challenges with innovative solutions earlier rather than later. 1547a-2014. Hawai‘i’s DER interconnection standard (Rule
14 H) eventually deviated from IEEE Standard 1547 to sup-
DER Impacts on Hawai‘i’s port the continued integration of DERs. However, the new
Grid Operation IEEE Standard 1547-2018 includes requirements that are
The islands of Hawai‘i, Oahu, and Maui have among the beyond Rule 14 H and under consideration for inclusion in
highest penetration levels of DERs in the United States, in a revised Hawai‘i standard. Based on Hawai‘i’s experience,
terms of installed capacity relative to system size. Under robust interconnection requirements need to be in place
favorable policies and the right economic circumstances, the well in advance of high penetration levels to support BPS
rapid deployment of DERs can occur in an extremely short reliability. It is extremely challenging and expensive to meet
period of time. In only six years, the average distributed solar changing BPS needs by retroactively enhancing equipment
photovoltaic (D-PVs) contribution to meeting the gross peak that was installed with minimal performance requirements
daytime demand (net peak plus D-PVs) increased from 12 and capabilities.
to 37% on Hawai‘i island (see Figure 1). The instantaneous For the Hawai‘i grid, the following aspects of DER inte-
D-PVs penetration can exceed 71% of the daytime demand gration are top priorities:
today, and it provides approximately 11% of the annual ✔✔ balancing solar PV variability with flexible energy re-
energy supply. With increasing DER penetration levels come sources that are capable of fast ramping and cycling
rapidly rising levels of variability and uncertainty. Hawai‘i is and ensuring that regulation resources do not fall be-
now seeing more D-PVs systems with battery energy storage low minimum allowable dispatch levels
systems (BESSs), and it is anticipating the effect that these ✔✔ managing frequency stability with sufficient frequen-
combined systems will have on the islanded grid. Needless cy-responsive reserves and checking that newly installed
to say, the long-term planning studies performed 10 years DERs have active power-frequency controls enabled to
ago never anticipated such a major change. assist the primary frequency r esponse
The performance requirements needed for high DER pen- ✔✔ improving DER estimation techniques since nearly
etration levels on the island grids were not initially supported all DERs are behind-the-meter (BTM), with no vis-
ibility or control by the system operator; D-PVs out-
put is estimated using field irradiance measurements
provided to the operator via supervisory control and
160 data acquisition
140 ✔✔ ensuring effective system restoration with variable DER
120
auto-reconnection and possibly adjusting reconnection
Active Power (MW)
of D-PVs is determined by the standard requirements at the ✔✔ The size of the storage necessary to mitigate reli-
time of interconnection, with different possible aggregate ability issues depends on the number of legacy
losses during these frequency and voltage excursions. The DERs installed.
largest contingency concern for Hawai‘i island is the loss of ✔✔ Increased numbers of spinning reserves could reduce
legacy DERs tripping at 60.5 Hz, as a large majority of the the size of the necessary storage but not eliminate the
existing D-PVs is subject to trip at or near that frequency. need for it. Increasing reserves also exacerbates ex-
The second-largest vulnerability is the loss of DERs dur- cess-energy concerns. D-PVs protection systems are
ing large-voltage excursions. On an island system like not consistently implemented, and performing sensi-
Hawai‘i’s, 60.5 Hz is possible after delayed fault clearing tivity studies around the uncertainty of this DER be-
(due to transient swings following fault clearing) and major havior is critical.
loss-of-load events, which can occur with transmission out- Based on the studies, a BESS with 18 MW of capacity
ages (both N-1 and N-1-1). The potential aggregate loss and a 30-min duration was able to arrest frequency excur-
of D-PVs during high solar-production periods is roughly sions and provide sufficient time to bring standby genera-
double the largest single-generator contingency, resulting in tion online. Increasing the duration to 1 h enabled the BESS
severe underfrequency conditions and the possible risk of to respond to over-frequency conditions. Studies showed
system failure. that two BESSs geographically and electrically separated
The loss of D-PVs also exacerbates other loss-of-generation from one another provided the best performance and
events, with some additional D-PVs loss during the underfre- grid resilience.
quency situation. To address this concern, a battery energy
storage study was conducted to analyze the effect of legacy Underfrequency Load Shedding
DER tripping for low voltage during transmission faults, The reliable operation of the Hawai‘i island systems heavily
low frequency following generating-unit trips, and high fre- relies on underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) that trips
quency following a transmission line fault. The study found distribution circuits at preestablished frequency thresholds.
that retrofitting legacy DERs to full ride-through capability However, as the penetration of DERs rapidly increases,
was the most effective solution but that it was too costly and variability in net loading on any given feeder poses signifi-
impractical. The study also found the following: cant challenges to the conventional UFLS design, which
✔✔ Storage can replace DER energy lost during transient means that static UFLS arming is no longer effective. An
voltage and frequency conditions, preventing exces- adaptive UFLS program has been implemented to address
sive underfrequency protection and reducing the risk this variability. Figure 2 is a dashboard of the adaptive pro-
of system failure for disturbances during high solar gram, including six instantaneous stages of UFLS arming
PV production. between 59.1 and 57.6 Hz and two kicker stages that operate
UFLS STAGE DATA Change to Monitor Mode: Active System Load: 151.629
Total Target: 120.559
Total Available: 127.133
Reset and Calculate
with time delays at 59.3 and 59.5 Hz. The target megawatt Rooftop Solar PV Deployment
value is calculated based on system net loading at the time, California has a state mandate that 33% of its annual energy
and available distribution circuits are automatically armed must come from renewable sources by 2020, with a target of
every 15 min to achieve the target net load level. An arming 60% by 2030, established by a bill, SB100, that took effect in
tolerance percentage and value are depicted as well as the September 2018. However, on some days, instantaneous out-
difference between the available megawatt arming and the put from the renewable sources already exceeds 50% of the
target megawatt value. Stages 1–2 sum to 15% and stages total generation output. A large portion of that penetration
1–4 sum to 40% of the system net load based on the maxi- consists of BTM D-PVs, and the rapid deployment of D-PVs
mum allowable load shedding for N-1 and N-1-1 unit trips, is forcing changes in transmission planning, forecasting, and
respectively. Each stage operates with an eight-cycle relay grid operations at the California Independent System Opera-
time plus breaker operation time. A rate-of-change-of-fre- tor (CAISO).
quency (ROCOF) load shedding element was also included Figure 4 provides an example of the effect that D-PVs is
in stages 1 and 2, with a 0.5 Hz/s set point and nine-cycle having on the Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) net load pro-
relay time plus breaker operation time. file, driving the need for different study times and net load
More than 40 substations were modified, including relay levels from the CAISO’s 2018–2019 transmission-planning
and communications upgrades, and 78% of customer circuits process. The blue curves show the net load after subtracting
(up to 70% of peak load) are participating. The adaptive the D-PVs output, which is called the managed load. The fig-
UFLS program has performed well during N-1 and N-1-1 ure clearly displays a shift in the peak net load time, which,
events at various times of day and is an effective reliabil- in many parts of the state, is shifted outside the times when
ity improvement. Figure 3 provides an example of a severe solar PV is available. D-PVs penetration levels are also caus-
N-1-1 generator-loss disturbance where stages 1–4 operated ing a drastic change in minimum net load levels, which need
successfully to arrest the frequency and mitigate a potential to be carefully studied. Sensitivity analysis is also needed
large-scale outage. to operate through and plan for ramping periods. All these
60.290 60.24 Hz
Steam Unit Trip
43:33.7
60.00 Hz
60.090 43:09.4
59.890
One Train of Dual
59.690 Train Combine
59.50 Hz Cycle Unit Trip
59.490 43:10.9 59.34 Hz
59.30 Hz 43:19.3
59.290 43:11.8
59.085 Hz
59.090 59.13 Hz 43:29.8
43:14.2 Kicker 1 and 2
58.890
58.76 Hz
58.690 Stage 1 and 2 43:23.0
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Load (MW)
dinates its load forecasts with and relies upon long-term 15,000
forecasts produced by the California Energy Commission 10,000
(CEC). The CEC’s energy-demand forecast includes an
hourly estimate of the consumption load and load modifiers 5,000
to develop the managed outlook by which the transmission -
system is planned. 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Since D-PVs is shifting net peak load periods, the selection Hour Ending
of critical study conditions needs to change. Planning standards (a)
require an assessment of peak and off-peak conditions; how- PG and E Area 2028 Peak Day Load Profile
ever, with large numbers of DERs, critical system conditions 25,000
Peak
may not occur during either of those periods. This requires Shift of 2 h
even greater numbers of sensitivity studies of varying dispatch 20,000
Load (MW)
and load scenarios, including peak gross load, peak net load (at 15,000
the transmission-distribution interface), and minimum net load
conditions (for example, a spring weekend during off-peak load 10,000
conditions). Tables 1 and 2 show how DERs were incorporated
5,000
into the CAISO study scenarios during the 2018–2019 trans-
mission planning process. In addition to these sensitivities, con- -
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
sideration for BPS-connected generation dispatch and assump-
Hour Ending
tions for neighboring planning areas are critical as they impact
(b)
local or wide-area reliability issues. This leads to the need for
wider coordination between planning administrators. Consumption Load Managed Load
With the increasing penetration of DERs, CAISO has
explicitly incorporated the forecast resources in power flow figure 4. The PG&E net load impacts from DERs.
1
netted with load and would lead to erroneous conclusions.
DG Modeled Retail-scale BTM DERs are modeled in the power flow and
0.9 dynamic stability studies as part of a composite load model,
and utility-scale DERs are modeled as aggregated genera-
tors on the transmission buses. Figure 5 illustrates these
0.8 impacts on transient voltage response following a simulated
BPS fault event. The results are different because modeling
the DER characteristics explicitly (including DER tripping
0.7 of legacy equipment) allows the simulation to differentiate
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
between DERs’ response and gross load response. This is
Bus Voltage (pu)
critical as penetration levels of DERs increase, although
DER prevalence has a study impact in all cases, even at low
figure 5. The 230-kV bus voltage close to a three-phase
fault, with and without DER modeled. pu: per unit; DG:
penetration levels.
distributed generation. CAISO currently uses parameter values for the DER models
based on the Western Electricity Coordinating Council and
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
Net Load and DERs guidelines and performs multiple sensitivity studies to deter-
70 mine the impact that variations in the DER parameters have
60 on BPS performance. The most sensitive parameters DER
Net Load undervoltage trip settings, the fraction of DERs that recover
50
when voltage returns, and whether DERs provide voltage reg-
40 ulation (and the characteristics of that regulation). Figure 6
(MW)
0.8
New York’s DER Management
New York State is on the cusp of a transformation as it expects
a significant penetration of DERs. New York’s Reforming
0.6 the Energy Vision and Clean Energy Standard initiatives,
combined with efforts to expand transfer capability on the
0.4 BPS, offer a comprehensive energy strategy to achieve its
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 goal of 50% of its electricity delivered by renewable
Time (s)
energy sources by 2030. New York has also established a
(b) policy to achieve 1,500 MW of energy storage by 2025
No Model California Rule 21 IEEE 2018
and 3,000 MW by 2030.
The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO)
figure 6. The sensitivities of net load, DER output, and expects DERs to play a significant role in achieving the
BPS bus voltage to DER modeling settings. state’s goals. Due to the expected growth of DERs in the near
Wholesale Retail
Services Services
DERs
figure 7. The concept of the NYISO wholesale and retail market designs incorporating DERs.
40 Transition
35
Post-2016 Managing DERs in Australia
30
The installed capacity of DERs, particularly D-PVs, is rapidly
25 growing in Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM),
20 with more than 6,000 MW installed and a projected increase
15 to 10–17 GW by 2030 (with peak demand of roughly 35 GW).
10 The South Australia region of the NEM has been a focus for
5 analyzing D-PVs integration. This region is geographically
0 the approximate size of Texas, yet with a demand of 600–
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 3,000 MW, it has already experienced periods where more
(a) than half of its requirement has been supplied by D-PVs. By
2026–2027, the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO)
predicts that the D-PVs capacity may be high enough to peri-
Zone 1 odically supply the region’s entire demand. The region is con-
nected to the rest of the NEM via a single double-circuit ac
interconnector, with the expectation that South Australia will
Zone 2
continue to operate as an island if it is separated from the rest
Zone 3
of the network. This raises challenges and questions about how
to successfully operate when the majority of the load is sup-
plied by D-PVs. To explore these challenges, AEMO launched
a program to identify and implement the actions required to
maintain the security and operability of the system.
(b)
One of the key focus areas in the program is understanding
and managing the behavior of DERs during grid disturbances.
If a large DER capacity disconnects during a disturbance, the
loss exacerbates the disturbance and could lead to instabil-
ity. AEMO has been gathering data on DER responses during
grid disturbances and identified the following:
✔✔ D-PVs are more prone to tripping during grid distur-
bances than end-use loads.
✔✔ Net demand post-fault is higher than predisturbance
levels, indicative of D-PVs disconnection.
✔✔ Data from actual grid disturbances in Victoria, South
(c) Australia, and New South Wales estimated that as
much as 30–40% of the aggregate D-PVs may discon-
figure 8. The geographic distribution of the monitored nect during a disturbance.
D-PVs sites disconnecting in New South Wales during the ✔✔ Laboratory inverter testing showed multiple reasons
25 August 2018 event. for inverter tripping, including voltage phase jumps
1.1 51
pliance newer standard appeared to
have improved voltage disturbance 1.05
ride-through capabilities, especially 1 50.5
in zone 2 where the voltage dip was 0.95
Normalized Power
connected, with sizes ranging from 20 to 80 MW. Very little minimum output represented by the red line and are poten-
solar PV is colocated with customer loads in North Carolina. tially forced off at midday due to solar PV generation. How-
As such, D-PVs in the state is modeled as a stand-alone gen- ever, many regulating resources have start-up and shut-down
erating resource at the distribution level. Location is criti- times of hours or days. The only solutions on some days are
cally important, and some areas of the transmission grid are to sell energy to neighboring balancing areas at a low price,
saturated with generation and need upgrades to accommo- buy peak energy from neighbors at a high cost, and curtail
date additional generation of any type. DER back-feeding solar PV generation.
onto the transmission grid is common, but even without it, Determining the planning conditions for the BPS requires
DERs are having an impact. understanding how the grid operates, which, as discussed,
Traditionally, utilities have understood and been able to has become more complicated. Transmission planners
accurately predict the daily and seasonal fluctuations of cus- examine the worst realistic conditions; in North Carolina,
tomer demand. Unplanned generation or transmission out- that has been the summer and winter peak loads and the
ages have long been incorporated into planning and operat- valley load. With the addition of DERs, new operating hours
ing practices. The significant growth of solar PV generation are becoming the most limiting or worst case. As shown in
has added a new and independent dimension to planning Figure 10, generation output can vary significantly through-
and operating the BPS. Solar output does not follow load out the day. While the annual minimum customer load may
and is generally not dispatchable. Figure 10 presents an occur at night, light load conditions on a mild Sunday after-
example of a daily load curve for generation and customer noon during spring can closely correlate with the maximum
load in a DEP on a mild winter day. The top orange line solar PV output, resulting in the minimum net customer
represents a typical winter customer load shape, with dual load. BPS voltages can be high, and power-flow patterns may
peaks in the morning and evening. Generation resources are occur that have never been observed in operating practice.
separated into baseload nuclear, regulating resources such as During summer, while the customer load may peak at 5 p.m.,
gas and coal generation, and solar PV. Solar is further split high solar PV output earlier in the day may increase flows on
into distribution- and transmission-connected categories. As the transmission system.
the figure shows, the customer load is at a minimum when Worst-case conditions can occur during nontraditional
solar generation is at its maximum on a winter day. Regulat- planning hours, and DEP is frequently reviewing the actual
ing resources that need to be online for the peaks have a operating conditions to ensure that planners are focusing on
the worst realistic conditions for the BPS. DEP is currently
planning for various combinations of customer load and
Load Resource Stack solar output, focusing on the following situations of stressed
9,000
1,519 MW Solar system conditions:
8,000
✔✔ 100% summer peak load, 50% solar output (summer
7,000
peak hour)
6,000
Load (MW)