CLASS MOOT 2020

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

IN THE MATTER OF

Secretary, Association of Petty Traders …Petitioner

v.

Meethapuram Municipal Corporation …Respondent

WRIT PETITION NO. 001 /2020

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMAPANION

JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)

COUNSELS FOR THE RESPONDENTS-





MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

S.No CONTENTS PAGE NUMBER

1. List of Abbreviations 3

2. Index of Authorities 4-5

3. Statement of Jurisdiction 6

4. Statement of facts 7

5. Issues raised 8

6. Summary of pleadings 9

7. Written Pleadings 10-18

8. Prayer 19

2
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And

¶ Paragraph

AIR All India Reporter

Anr. Another

Cr. LJ Criminal Law Journal

CRC Convention of the Rights of the Child

F.I.R First Information Report

Govt. Government

Hon‟ble Honourable

i.e. That is

JJ Juvenile Justice

LR Law Report

Ltd. Limited

N.C.T National Capital Territory

3
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES

 Constitution of India

CASES

1. Romesh Thapar v Union of India, AIR 1950 SC 124

2. Govt. of A.P v. A.P Jaiswal Appeal (civil) 4799-4844 of 1997
3. Directorate Of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Ors, Appeal (civil) 1892 of 2007
4. Academy of Nutrition Improvement v. Union of India, WP(C) 80 of 2006, 4 July 2011
5. Association of Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, Manufacturers, A.P. v. A.P. Health, Medical,
Housing and Infrastructure Development Corporation, Hyd. and Anr., 2002 (2) ALD 609
6. BALCO Employees Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, 2001 AIR SCW 5135
7. State of M.P. and Others vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Other, (1986) 4 SCC 566
8. Sushila Devi v. Ramnandan Prasad, AIR 1976 SC 177;
9. Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Sm. Deorajin, AIR 1960 SC 941;
10. Daryao v. State of U.P, AIR 1961 SC 1457;
11. Deena Dayal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1155;
12. Yaro Khan v. Union of India, WP(C) 2599 of 2007
13. L. Chandrakumar V. Union of India AIR1997SC1125 ¶ 94
14. A.V. Venkateshwaran v. R.S.Wadhwani AIR 1961 SC 1906
15. Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery AIR 1979 SC 1889
16. AK Gopalan vs The State Of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 27
17. Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others1985 SCC (3) 545
18. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and others(1997) 10 SCC 549
19. D.T.C. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101
20. M. Paul Anthony v. Bihar Gold Mines Ltd AIR 1999 SC 1416 : (1999) 3 SCC 679
21. Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh Air 1996 SC 1051 : (1996) 2 SCC 549
22. M. J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka & Ors AIR 1995 SC 1770, JT 1995 (4) SC 141, (1995)
2 MLJ 38 SC
23. Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee AIR 1989 SC 1988
24. Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1: AIR 2006 SC 1806.
4
 25. Luxmi Khandsari .v . State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 873
26. Bombay Hawkers Union v Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1985 SC 1206
27. State of Kerala v. Joseph Antony, the State of Kerala AIR 1994 SC 721

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

 D. D. Basu Commentary on The Constitution of India, (8th ed., Lexis Nexis Butterworth
Wadhwa Publications, Nagpur, 2008)
 Granville Austin, Cornerstone of a Nation (Indian Constitution) 75 Oxford India (1999)
 H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, (4th ed., Universal Law Publishing, New
Delhi, 2010)
 Halsbury’s Laws of India, Vol. 35, (2nd ed.Lexis-Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa, Nagpur,
2007)
 M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (7th ed., Lexis-Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa
Publications, Nagpur, 2016).

 GV Malvankar, “The office of speaker”, Journal of parliamentary information, April 1956,

Vol.2, No.1, P33
 MN Kaul and Shakdhar in “Practice and procedure of parliament” 4th edition P104
 I.P.MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, EASTERN BOOK COMPANY 25 (7thed,
2008).
 H.W.R.WADE & C.F.FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, OXFORD
PUBLICATIONS, 293 - 294 (10thed, 2009)

LEGAL DATABASE

 Manupatra
 SCC Online
 Indian Kanoon

5
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 32 of the constitution of India for the
violation of fundamental rights enumerated in Part III of the constitution. The respondent
maintains that no violation of rights has taken place. therefore, this hon’ble court need not
entertain its jurisdiction in this writ petition.

6
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Kanarancheri, a colony situated in Meethapuram district which is the capital of Vanchinad State.
The most of the people in the colony are illiterate and unemployed. They are carrying small pan
shop business in the nearby areas of colony. But that not helped the people to meet their basic
needs. So the people formed an Association representing petty traders and erected temporary
wooden structures near to the compound wall of Pearl prince palace building adjacent to the
public road. They are doing the business of auto-electrical repairs of vulcanizing. Municipal
corporation allowed to run shops after collecting encroachment fee. The permission was to be
renewed year to year basis. There is no obstruction to the vehicle traffic or pedestrians on
account of the existence of these bunks. But after 2009, no encroachment fee was collected and n
permission was granted to the aforesaid Association by the Meethapuram Municipal
Corporation. The reason behind this is that the existing old compound wall of Pearl Prince Palace
is being affected by the road, widening process that was approved by road development plan.
The workers are conducting their works in the shops situated in the streets in a peaceful manner.
They are ready to do business in another place but the place to have such qualities as to promote
the business.

The corporation took the site after getting permission from concerned owners including state
government. They are of the opinion that in order to carry out the widening process smoothly,
they want to clear the pavement, that is in some peak time by allowing scooters and other
vehicles in front of the bunks, lot of traffic problems are created on this important road. As a part
of beautification of the city road widening is an urgent process. So the Meethapuram Municipal
corporation by exercising the power under Meethapuram Corporation Act without giving
reasonable notice to the traders of Association removed their bunks from the street.

Aggrieved by the Act of the Corporation the Secretary of Association representing petty traders
filed a writ under Article 32 of Constitution to the Supreme Court on the ground of violation of
their fundamental rights under Article 21, 19(1)(g) and also give directions to the Meethapuram
Municipal Corporation to adopt a proper scheme of rehabilitation and compensation to them for
the damages caused on destruction of their bunks.

7
 ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE- I

WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

ISSUE II

WHETHER THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD UNDER ARTICLE HAS

BEEN INFRINGED OR NOT?

ISSUE III

WHETHER THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO TRADE HAS BEEN INFRINGED OR

NOT?

8
 SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

I- WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

The respondents contend that there has been no violation of fundamental right in the present
case. Moreover, the petition has been filed prematurely. A petition can be filed under Art. 32 of
the constitution only when the fundamental right is violated. Also, the alternative remedy has not
been exhausted. Thus, the writ petition is not maintainable.

II- WHETHER THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD UNDER ARTICLE

HAS BEEN INFRINGED OR NOT?

The policy decision has a sound reason behind it. Also, it is not violative of the fundamental
rights enshrined in the part III of the Constitution. The previous implementation of similar
projects speaks to the merit of this decision. The concept of development has been adhered to.
Thus, they are not violative of the rights of the people

III - WHETHER THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO TRADE HAS BEEN INFRINGED

OR NOT?

It is humbly submitted that no violation of fundamental rights of the petty traders has occurred
since; there is no special right has been conferred to the petty traders. No violation of the
fundamental rights has taken place because there will never be a situation of forced assimilation.
It is further submitted that there has been no restraint imposed on petty traders i.e., against their
fundamental rights and that the establishment and development of the roads is based on strict
reason.

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 WRITTEN PLEADINGS

I- WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

In the present case, there has been no violation of the fundamental rights since, the action taken
by the State was in furtherance of the principle of economic and social justice and thus cannot be
termed as arbitrary or as one which was without the application of the mind.

The respondent submits that the Court has held that only if there is a violation of Fundamental
Rights can it step in under the Jurisdiction of Article 321. The petitioner is raising a mere
scholarly objection, without any locus standi. No one has been displaced, there has been no
forceful assimilation and nothing has been done to the traders. Their bunks have been removed
only for the time being.

The respondent maintains the applicability of the maxim, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.
This fundamental maxim is the basis for the conception of Res judicata, as also the principle of
Judicial Infallibility. In addition, Res judicata pro veritate occipitur, or a judicial decision must
be accepted as correct.2 In Govt. of A.P v. A.P Jaiswal, the court observed the importance of
consistency in judicial decisions.3 A bench of justices GS Sistani and Vinod Goel made it clear
that if the scheme of the Street Vendors Act, 2014, was not allowed to work, the court will
remove all protections granted by it. Hence, there is no violation of fundamental rights.

The respondent most humbly submits that the Supreme Court has long held that interference into
policy actions is not within the jurisdiction4 as reiterated in the recent Iodine Salt Case5. It has
been held that a writ petition cannot be maintainable if its sole purpose is to question a policy
decision of the Government6. The position of law on the matter of policy decisions is quite clear,

1
Romesh Thapar v Union of India, AIR 1950 SC 124
2
Mulla, Code Of Civil Procedure 69 (14thed, 2004
3
Govt. of A.P v. A.P Jaiswal Appeal (civil) 4799-4844 of 1997
4
Directorate Of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Ors, Appeal (civil) 1892 of 2007
5
Academy of Nutrition Improvement v. Union of India, WP(C) 80 of 2006, 4 July 2011
6
Association of Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, Manufacturers, A.P. v.A.P. Health, Medical, Housing and
Infrastructure Development Corporation, Hyd. and Anr., 2002 (2) ALD 609

10
from decisions such as BALCO Employees Union7, and a host of other cases. The list is truly
extensive14, as the underlying principle is sound in law. Unless there is prima facie evidence to
prove that exercise of discretion has been arbitrary, unreasonable or mala fide, the Court cannot
step into the shoes of the Government to decide the validity of a policy. 8 It is a matter of public
policy that the Court not permit litigations on the same issue be raised in perpetuity9, as no public
undertaking will ever succeed if such a practice is encouraged. Thus, the policy decision of the
Government regarding the uranium project cannot be questioned before the court of law.

The tribunals are competent enough to hear this particular case by the virtue of L. Chandrakumar
V. Union of India.10 Alternative remedy is a bar unless there was complete lack of jurisdiction in
the officer or authority to take action impugned,11 however, the existence of a competent body to
hear this particular case questions the maintainability of the writ petition filed. It was held this
Hon’ble apex court in Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery12 where there is
alternative statutory remedy court should not interfere unless the alternative remedy is too
dilatory or cannot grant quick relief. Thus, the respondents humbly submit that the present writ
petition is not maintainable on the ground that alternative remedy has not been exhausted. Thus,
the respondents submit that the present writ petition in not maintainable for the aforesaid
reasons.

Hence, this writ petition is not maintainable.

7
BALCO Employees Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, 2001 AIR SCW 5135
8
State of M.P. and Others vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Other, (1986) 4 SCC 566
9
Sushila Devi v. Ramnandan Prasad, AIR 1976 SC 177; Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Sm. Deorajin, AIR 1960 SC 941;
Daryao v. State of U.P, AIR 1961 SC 1457; Deena Dayal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1155; Yaro Khan v.
Union of India, WP(C) 2599 of 2007
10
L. Chandrakumar V. Union of India AIR1997SC1125 ¶ 94
11
A.V. Venkateshwaran v. R.S.Wadhwani AIR 1961 SC 1906
12
Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery AIR 1979 SC 1889

11
II- WHETHER THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD UNDER ARTICLE 21
HAS BEEN INFRINGED OR NOT?

It is submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the petitioner’s right to livelihood under Article 21
has not been infringed in this case.

No person except according to procedure established by law shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty. Fundamental right under Article 21 of the object personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law is to prevent encroachment on and loss of life.
Deprivation of personal liberty or to intrude on another person's life is an act of private
individual amounts. Such violations would not fall under Article 21 for the set parameters.

The scope of Article 21 was a bit narrow till 50s as it was held by the Apex Court
in A.K.Gopalan vs State of Madras13 that the contents and subject matter of Article 21 and 19 (1)
(d) are not identical and they proceed on total principles. In this case the word deprivation was
construed in a narrow sense and it was held that the deprivation does not restrict upon the right to
move freely which came under Article 19 (1) (d). at that time Gopalans case was the leading case
in respect of Article 21 along with some other Articles of the Constitution, but post Gopalan case
the scenario in respect of scope of Article 21 has been expanded or modified gradually through
different decisions of the Apex Court and it was held that interference with the freedom of a
person at home or restriction imposed on a person while in jail would require authority of law.
Whether the reasonableness of a penal law can be examined with reference to Article 19, was the
point in issue after Gopalans case in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India , the Apex
Court opened up a new dimension and laid down that the procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or
unreasonable one. Article 21 imposed a restriction upon the state where it prescribed a procedure
for depriving a person of his life or personal liberty. This view has been further relied upon in a
case of Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others as
follows:
Article 21 requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by
procedure established by law and this procedure must be reasonable, fair and just and not
arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful. The law of preventive detention has therefore now to pass the

13
AK Gopalan vs The State Of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 27

12
test not only for Article 22, but also of Article 21 and if the constitutional validity of any such
law is challenged, the court would have to decide whether the procedure laid down by such law
for depriving a person of his personal liberty is reasonable, fair and just. In another case of Olga
Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others14 , it was further observed : Just
as a mala fide act has no existence in the eye of law, even so, unreasonableness
vitiates law and procedure alike. It is therefore essential that the procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of his fundamental right must conform the norms of justice and fair play.
Procedure, which is just or unfair in the circumstances of a case, attracts the vice of
unreasonableness, thereby vitiating the law which prescribes that procedure and consequently,
the action taken under it.As stated earlier, the protection of Article 21 is wide enough and it was
further widened in the case of Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and others15 in respect
of bonded labour and weaker section of the society.

Art. 21 does not place an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal liberty and for
that matter on right to livelihood. What Art. 21 insists is that such deprivation ought to be
according to procedure established by law which must be fair, just and reasonable. Therefore
anyone who is deprived of the right to livelihood without a just and fair procedure established by
law can challenge such deprivation as being against Art. 21 and get it declared void.

In D.T.C. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress16, a regulation conferring power on the authority to

terminate the services of a permanent and confirm employee by issuing a noticing without
assigning him any reasons and without giving him a hearing has been held to be a wholly
arbitrary and violative of Art. 21.

In M. Paul Anthony v. Bihar Gold Mines Ltd17., it was held that when a government servant or
one in a public undertaking is suspended pending a departmental disciplinary inquiry against
him, subsistence allowance must be paid to him. The Court has emphasized that a government
servant does not his right to life and other fundamental rights.

14
Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others1985 SCC (3) 545
15
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and others(1997) 10 SCC 549
16
D.T.C. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101
17
M. Paul Anthony v. Bihar Gold Mines Ltd AIR 1999 SC 1416 : (1999) 3 SCC 679

13
However, if a person is deprived of such a right according to procedure established by law which
must be fair, just and reasonable and which is in the larger interest of people, the plea of
deprivation of the right to livelihood under Art. 21 is unsustainable. In, Chameli Singh v. State
of Uttar Pradesh18, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that when the land of a landowner
was acquired by state in accordance with the procedure laid down in the relevant law of
acquisition the right to livelihood of such a landowner even though adversely affected, his right
to livelihood is not violated.

The Court opined that the state acquires land in exercise of its power of eminent domain for a
public purpose. The landowner is paid compensation in lieu of land, and therefore, the plea of
deprivation of the right to livelihood under Art. 21 is unsustainable.

In M. J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka & Ors19., the Supreme Court held that right to life under
Article 21 does protect livelihood but added a rider that its deprivation cannot be extended too
far or projected or stretched to the avocation, business or trade injurious to public interest or has
insidious effect on public moral or public order. It was, therefore, held that regulation of video
games or prohibition of some video games of pure chance or mixed chance and skill are not
violative of Article 21 nor is the procedure unreasonable, unfair, or unjust.

Right to Work Not a Fundamental Right under Art.21

In Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee20, the five-judge bench of the Supreme
Court distinguished the concept of life and liberty within Art.21 from the right to carry on any
trade or business, a fundamental right conferred by Art. 19(1)(g) and held the right to carry on
trade or business is not included in the concept of life and personal liberty. Article 21 is not
attracted in the case of trade and business.

The petitioners, hawkers doing business off the paved roads in Delhi, had claimed that the
refusal by the Municipal authorities to them to carry on the business of their livelihood amounted
to the violation of their right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The court opined that while
hawkers have a fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) to carry on trade or business of their
18
Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh Air 1996 SC 1051 : (1996) 2 SCC 549
19
M. J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka & Ors AIR 1995 SC 1770, JT 1995 (4) SC 141, (1995) 2 MLJ 38 SC
20
Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee AIR 1989 SC 1988

14
choice; they have no right to do so in a particular place. They cannot be permitted to carry on
their trade on every road in the city. If the road is not wide enough to be conveniently
accommodating the traffic on it, no hawking may be permitted at all or may be permitted once a
week.

Footpaths, streets or roads are public property and are intended to several general public and are
not meant for private use. However, the court said that the affected persons could apply for
relocation and the concerned authorities were to consider the representation and pass orders
thereon. The two rights were too remote to be connected together.

The court distinguished the ruling in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation21 and held
that “in that case the petitioners were very poor persons who had made pavements their homes
existing in the midst of filth and squalor and that they had to stay on the pavements so that they
could get odd jobs in the city. It was not the case of a business of selling articles after investing
some capital.”

In Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi22, the Court rejected that right to employment at
the present point of time can be included as a fundamental right under Right to Life under Art.
21.

Hence, it is submitted that the bunks were removed on account of road beautification process
which plays a major role in the economic and social status of a country and that the petty traders
right to work is not a fundamental right, thus it is just a directive principle for the state and
cannot be enforceable.

21
Ibid
22
Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1: AIR 2006 SC 1806.

15
III- WHETHER THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO TRADE HAS BEEN INFRINGED OR
NOT?

It is being submitted that in the instant case, the petitioners right to trade is being limited upon
by the Article 19 (6) that impose reasonable restrictions upon the freedom of trade, business,
occupation or profession in the interest of the general public.

Instances of reasonable restrictions

(1) There is no right to carry on business at a particular place. The State has the power to impose
reasonable restrictions for the betterment of the general public. Thus, a competent authority has
the right to fix a proper place be it for a bus stop, a cinema house, or a liquor shop.

(2) In Luxmi Khandsari .v . State of Uttar Pradesh23, a Notification issued under Sugar Cane (
Control) Order stopping crushers from producing khandsari so that production of white sugar
could be increased and thereby making the sugar available to consumers at a reasonable price
was held to be imposing restriction in the interest of the public on the right of persons using
crushers and therefore valid.

(3) In Bombay Hawkers Union v Bombay Municipal Corporation24 which had come for
consideration before the Supreme Court , the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation
Act , 1888, were challenged on the ground that the authorities were conferred arbitrary power to
grant or refuse licenses for hawkers on public streets and for removing unauthorized hawkers
without giving them an opportunity to be heard. Rejecting this contention the Supreme Court
observed that the public streets are by their very definition, meant for the use of the general
public.

No person, has the fundamental right to carry on any business which causes nuisance, annoyance
or inconvenience to the public. It was, therefore, held that the provisions of the B.M.C Act were
in the nature of reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public and not violative of
Art 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.

23
Luxmi Khandsari .v . State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 873
24
Bombay Hawkers Union v Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1985 SC 1206

16
 25
(4) In State of Kerala v. Joseph Antony, the State of Kerala had imposed a ban on the use of
mechanised fishing nets and mid- water trawlers in territorial waters. This was done to protect
the livelihood of other poorer fishermen , and to protect the pelagic fish wealth of the territorial
waters. The Supreme Court held that the restriction was a reasonable restriction, and not
violative of Art 19(6).

In toto, we can conclude that the Constitution has granted this fundamental right under Art
19(1)(g), for the prosperity and well being of everyone in the society. The State ensures that no
individual residing within the territorial boundaries of the country is deprived of this right and if
at all he is , it will take the requisite measures to avail him of an appropriate remedy and make
sure that justice is delivered. Every citizen should utilize this right to the best of his capabilities
and for his moral as well as economic progress. He should make use of this right in a rational
manner so that the State is not compelled to exercise force and also intervene with his business
activities. He should carry out the required functions of his employment, or his own profession in
an ethical and reasonable way, which will not only assist him in earning financial gains but also
in turn make him knowledgeable and powerful enough to face the societal issues. For having
been provided of this right by the Constitution, every citizen has an obligation to abide by certain
etiquettes and proceed following a code of conduct so that the peace and harmony of the society
is not hampered .No citizen should adopt any kind of profession or trade which is forbidden by
law , immoral in its nature and which will incite violence and encourage animosity among the
masses. Law will take the necessary action if any citizen in the process of exercising this right
for his own benefit, if at all is leading to create a situation of an infringement of this legal right of
another individual or is making an attempt to inflict pain and damage on him. The State will
assure that no individual goes scot free if he is found guilty of committing any malicious and
illegal activities in the due course of his employment, trade, or practising any profession.
Immoral and unlawful activities like trafficking, running of brothels etc do not come within the
ambit of this provision and indulging into any of them as well instigating are both serious
offences for which every person will have to face the ill consequences. The law does not approve
nor tolerate of any sort of trade, or occupation, or business which it feels will lead to destruction
of property and life. It will not permit the conducting of any activities which damages the health

25
State of Kerala v. Joseph Antony, the State of Kerala AIR 1994 SC 721

17
and safety of the society. It does not sanction the carrying on of any unscrupulous activities by
which the peace and harmony of the country is endangered. Every citizen is expected to be
honest while utilizing this freedom and also behave in a fair and responsible manner.

In this instant case,

1) State can infringe upon the traders’right to trade as per restrictions mentioned under Article 19
(6) which states
“Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so
far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the
general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub
clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub clause shall affect the operation of any existing
law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,

(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying
on any occupation, trade or business, or

(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any
trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or
otherwise”

In the instant matter the phrase says in interest of general public, the widening of roads leads to
the beautification of the state which would further leads to the economic and social progress of
the country which definitely incorporates general public good and for the welfare of the citizens
and thus, the restriction is reasonable.

18
 PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced, authorities cited,
may this Hon’ble Court be pleased to, by appropriate writ, order and/or direction,

a) Hold and declare this petition to be non- maintainable.

b) The act of municipality to be in line with Article 19 (1) (g)
c) Hold the act not to be violative of Article 21

AND/OR

Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

S/d

Counsel, Respondents

19