Reviewer

Political Law Review 1
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
COURSE OUTLINE:
INTRODUCTION
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES
A. Politics, Government, Administration, Power, Authority: definitions, concepts, distinctions
Government:
1. denotes the activity or process of governing (of exercising a measure of control over others).
2. denoting the state of affairs in which the activity or process is to be found – a condition of ordered rule.
3. denoting those people charged with the duty of governing.
4. denotes the manner, method or system by which a particular society is governed.
Two elements:
1. choosing a course of action (politics)
2. and carrying it out (administration; performance of executive duties).
Politics:
1. choosing a course of action
2. exercise of power
3. social form of human behavior
Power – the capacity to achieve desired results; ranges from the love that an individual evokes on others to the fear of
death.
Authority:
1. A claim to be obeyed;
2. A recognition that this claim is morally right.
B. Scope of Political Law Review
Political Law – is that branch of public law that deals with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of
the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto).
1. Constitutional Law – the branch of science of law which treats of the nature of constitutions, their
establishment, construction and interpretation, and of the validity of the legal enactments as tested by the criterion of
conformity to the fundamental law.
2. Administrative Law – the branch of public law which fixes the organization of government, determines the
competence of the administrative authorities who execute the law, and indicates to the individual remedies for the
violation of his rights.
3. Law on Public Officers

4. Election Laws
5. Local Government
6. Public International Law
II. THE STATE
A. Concept and Definition
State:
(1) a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, independent
of external control, and possessing a government to which a great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience
(Nachura, 2016).
(2) a politically organized sovereign community, independent of outside control, bound by ties of nationhood, legally
supreme within its territory, and acting through a government functioning under a regime of law (Magsalin, 2007).
- Distinguished from nation
State is a legal or juristic concept, while nation is an ethnic or racial concept.
- Origin, Theories
B. Territory
1. Definition
Includes not only the land over which its jurisdiction extends, but also the rivers, lakes, bays and airspace above
it. The domain of a State therefore may be described as terrestrial, fluvial or maritime.
2. Components
a. Terrestrial;
b. Fluvial;
c. Maritime;
d. Aerial
3. The Philippine Archipelago, Article 1
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago; regardless of their breadth and dimension, form part of
the internal waters of the Philippines.
a. Article III, Treaty of Paris, Dec 10, 1898 (Spain ceded the P.I. to the U.S.)
b. US-Spain Treaty, Nov 7, 1900 (Cagayan, Sulu, and Sibutu)
c. US-Great Britain Treaty, Jan 2, 1930 (Turtle and Mangsee Islands)
d. 1935 Constitution (Batanes)
e. 1973 Constitution (territories by historic right or legal title)
f. RA 3046, Jun 17, 1961 – This law recognized the straight baseline method in determining Philippine
territory. The appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago are connected with straight lines until all
islands are surrounded or enclosed by the imaginary straight line. All landmasses within the baselines are part of the
national territory.
g. RA 5446, Sep 8, 1968 (Sabah claim) – expanded RA 5446, specifically declaring Sabah is part of the
Philippine territory
h. PD 1596, Jun 11, 1978 (other territories, claim over KIG)
i. PD 1599, Jun 11, 1978 (200 miles EEZ) – recognized the 200 mile EEZ within which states have
sovereign rights for exploration of natural resources, utilization of artificial islands, offshore terminals, preservation of
marine environment, pollution control and scientific research.
j. UNCLOS I, II and III (1994) (Archipelagic principle, right of innocent passage,
right to sea lane passage)
UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982, at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was
ratified by the Philippines in August 1984 but came to force on November 16, 1994.
Archipelagic Doctrine – an archipelago, which consists of a number of islands separated by bodies of water, should be
treated as one integral unit, and the waters inside the baselines are considered internal waters.
Archipelago – group of islands including parts of islands, interconnecting waters, and other natural features which are
closely interrelated in such islands, waters and other natural features, form an intrinsic geographical, economic and
political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such (Article 46, UNCLOS).
Right of Innocent passage – the Archipelagic State enjoys sovereign rights over all waters enclosed by the baselines,
described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth and distance from the coast. However, in order to preserve
international navigation, especially through waters that were formerly high seas, all States enjoy the right of innocent
passage through archipelagic waters.
Sealanes and air routes – the Archipelagic State may designate sealanes and air routes suitable for the safe, continuous
and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial
sea.
Maritime Zones under UNCLOS:

1. Internal Waters – consist of waters around, between and connecting the islands of the Philippine Archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, including the waters in bays, rivers and lakes. No right of innocent
passage for foreign vessels exists in the case of internal waters. (Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 1998)
2. Territorial Sea – extends up to 12 nautical miles outward from the baselines.
3. Contiguous Zone – the zone contiguous to the territorial sea and extends up to 12 nautical miles from the territorial
sea and over which the coastal state may exercise control necessary to prevent the infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within the territory or territorial sea. (Art. 33, UNCLOS)
4. Exclusive Economic Zone – the zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines of a State over which the
Costal State has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing its natural
resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters super adjacent to the seabed and the of the seabed and subsoil
and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone. (Arts. 56-57, UNCLOS)
k. RA 9522 (demarcation of maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS

III)
Cases:
- Province of North Cotabato v GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 568 SCRA 402 (2008)
Issue: The constitutionality of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domains (MOA-AD) between the MILF and
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel.
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and
alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-
Palawan geographic region. More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the
ARMM thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan,
and Marawi City.Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in
the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within
its internal waters, defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; that the BJE shall also
have territorial waters, which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the
Central Government (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all
natural resources. Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as joint.
The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized
by shared authority and responsibility. In International Law, [a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the
other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground
between integration and independence. In international practice, the associated state arrangement has usually been used as
a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of
an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an associative relationship
with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does
it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a
state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and
a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic.
- Magalona v Ermita, 655 SCRA 476 (2011)
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State. In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The
change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes
the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for
the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one
baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones.
Arguments against the constitutionality of RA 9522:

(1) RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national territory because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of
Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national
territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
(2) RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the
applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that area. KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals)
exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial
waters, prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
(3) RA 9522 failed to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo.
(4) RA 9522 converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and
sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III.
Held:
(1) UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among
others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous
zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among
United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along
their coasts. On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic
starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the
extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community
of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely,
the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim,
diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use
rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial
claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.
(2) The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of
basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length
of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn
around the Philippine archipelago.
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal
effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First,
Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that the length of the baselines
shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125
nautical miles.
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several
decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim
over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of
Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG,
qualifies under the category of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
(3) RA 9522 did not repeal Section 2 of RA 5446 (Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.)
(4) Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under
UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines,
including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude
the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if
not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the
international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine
government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.
C. People
1. Definition
Refers to the inhabitants of the territory; aggregate of individuals of both sexes who live together as a community despite
racial or cultural differences; should be sufficient in number to maintain and perpetuate themselves.
As inhabitants, Article III, Sections 1 &2; Article II, Sections 15 & 16

Include citizens and all persons who dwell or sojourn in the Philippines, regardless or whether they are
aliens of transients.
As electors, Article VII, Section 4; Article XVI, Section 2
Refer to the group of citizens lawfully authorized to exercise the right to suffrage.
As citizens. Article II, Sections 1 & 4; Article III, Section 7
Refer to those who possess the citizenship requirement under the Constitution.
D. Government
1. Definition
It is the agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed and realized.
- Government of the Republic of the Philippines defined, Sec 2 (1) Administrative Code
is the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the
Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority
is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.
2. Constituent vs Ministrant functions

a. Constituent (governmental) – mandatory for the Government to perform because they constitute the very bonds of
society, such as the maintenance of peace and order, regulation of property and property rights, the administration of
justice, etc. These functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty.
b. Ministrant (proprietary) – are functions intended to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people, and
which are merely optional for Government to perform.
3. Parens Patriae (parent of the people)

The government may act as guardian of the rights of people who may be disadvantaged or are suffering from some
disability of misfortune.
Case: Government v Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil 728 (1916)

Certain contributions and donations were made for the relief victims of an earthquake during the Spanish regime. Some
of the amounts were never distributed but were deposited with the Monte de Piedad bank. The government then filed an
action for recovery of said amounts but this was opposed on the ground that the government is not the real-party in
interest to institute the proceedings and that it amounted to taking of property without due process of law. It was also
contended that the obligation of Monte de Piedad to return the money was wiped out by the change of sovereignty.
Held:
(1) The government has the right to institute the suit for the State as parens patriae. This prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has
no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the
people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be
exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
(2) That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That
all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted
sovereign, lose their force, is also plain. But it is equally settled in the same public law that the great body of municipal
law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. If the
above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the new
sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if
they are among "that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force
and are still in force unless they have been repealed by the present Government. That they fall within the latter class is
clear from their very nature and character. They are laws which are not political in any sense of the word. They conferred
upon the Spanish Government the right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and
charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting "provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are
in the nature of charitable institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are
concerned, under the general supervision of the Insular Treasurer
4. De Jure government, Criteria for legitimacy

De jure government – one organized and existing in accordance with the actual laws operative in the state.
Criteria:
1. It is in effective control of the administrative machinery of the state.
2. It enjoys popular acceptance or acquiescence.
3. It is able to comply with its international obligations.
4. It is recognized by a great number of states.
5. De facto government, kinds and characteristics
De facto government – one that exists upon a basis of fact, partly or entirely, because it is organized not in accordance
with but in defiance of the existing legal processes of the state.
Kinds of de facto government:

1. The government established by persons who have overthrown through force the regularly constituted authorities.
2. The government formed by the people of a territory who have separated themselves from the Parent State.
3. That established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of
war, and which is dominated as government of paramount force.
6. Classifications, Forms of governments
a. based on number of rulers

i. monarchy (one)
ii. aristocracy (few)
iii. democracy (many)
b. based on accountability to the people

i. democracy
ii. dictatorial
iii. authoritarian
iv. totalitarian
c. based on the economic system
i. capitalist
ii. communism (command)
d. based on legislative-executive relations

i. presidential
ii. parliamentary
republican – representative government
Legislative: unicameral; bicameral
e. based on divisions of the State

i. unitary
ii. federal
E. Sovereignty
1. Definition
(1) It is the supreme power of the state to command and enforce obedience, the power to which all interests are practically
subjected and all will subordinate. It is also defined as freedom from outside control in the conduct of internal and
external affairs.
(2) The supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that State is governed.
2. Dual Aspect, Kinds and Characteristics

Dual Aspect:
(1) Internal sovereignty – supremacy of a person or body of persons in a state over the individuals or association of
individuals within the area of its jurisdiction.
(2) External sovereignty – the absolute independence of one state as a whole with reference to other states.
Kinds:
(1) Legal sovereignty – the possession of unlimited power or authority that by law involves the power to issue final
commands.
(2) Political sovereignty - the sum total of all the influences in a state which lie behind the law. It is also described as the
power of the people.
Characteristics:
1. Permanence – sovereignty continues to exist without interruption as long as the state itself exists.
2. Exclusiveness – there can be but one supreme power in the state legally entitled to the obedience of the inhabitants.
3. Comprehensiveness – sovereign power extends over all persons, associations and things within territorial limits.
4. Inalienability – the state cannot cede away any of its essential elements without self-destruction.
5. Imprescriptibility – the powers of the state cannot be lost as a consequence of its non-assertion or non-exercise through
a period of time.
6. Unity – the power cannot be divided without producing another state.
Nachura: Permanence, exclusiveness, comprehensiveness, absoluteness, indivisibility, inalienability, imprescriptibility.
3. Dominium & Imperium

(1) Dominium - refers to the independent proprietary right of possession, use, exploration, disposition or sale and control
by the State over its territorial lands.
(2) Imperium - includes the state’s right to enact its own laws and employ the same to secure obedience thereto, maintain
peace and order, defend the state against foreign invasion and any other act of government over its own territory.
Dominium refers to the capacity to own and acquire property, including lands held by the State in its proprietary
capacity, while Imperium is the authority possessed by the State embraced in the concept of sovereignty (Nachura, 2016).
4. Effects of Change in Sovereignty

Upon the transfer of territory, either by conquest or otherwise, the political laws of the conquered territory immediately
cease to have effect, except in so far as they are continued in force by express consent of the new sovereign. Municipal
laws of the transferred territory, however, not in conflict with the laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the
express consent of the new sovereign.
5. Effects of military occupation

Sovereignty always resides in and remains with the State as a juristic person, while its exercise is delegated, as a rule, to
the government or its organs, electorate or to certain officials.
Sovereignty itself is not transferred or suspended, what was merely suspended was the exercise of the rights of the
sovereign.
Laws of non-political nature remained in force unless repealed by the belligerent occupant. Laws of political nature were
suspended, except the law on treason, subject to the revival after the occupation under the doctrine of jus postliminium.
6. Territorial, personal and extraterritorial jurisdiction
(1) Territorial jurisdiction – authority of the state to have all persons and things within the territorial limits to be
completely subject to its control and protection.
(2) Personal jurisdiction – authority of the state over its nationals, their persons, property and acts, whether within or
outside its territory.
(3) Extraterritorial jurisdiction - authority of the state over persons, things and acts, outside its territorial limits by reason
of their effects to its territory.
7. Acts of State
It is an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. An example of an act of state is deportation.
III. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
A. Constitution: definition, nature and concepts

Constitution – a social contract that binds, by its terms and conditions, the people and their government in a civil society.
It pertains to the body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised.
Functions of a Constitution:
1. Prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government;
2. Assigns to the several departments of government their responsibilities, powers and duties; and
3. Establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded.
Classification:
1. Written or unwritten
2. Enacted (Conventional) or Evolved (Cumulative)
3. Rigid (Inelastic) or Flexible (Elastic)
The Philippine Constitution is written, enacted/conventional and rigid or inelastic.
Qualities of a good written constitution:

1. Broad
2. Brief
3. Definite
B. Parts
Parts of a Constitution:
1. Constitution of Liberty – series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens
and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights.
2. Constitution of Government – series of provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its
powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration, and defining the electorate.
3. Constitution of Sovereignty – the provisions pointing out the mode or procedure by which formal changes in the
fundamental law may be brought about (Art. XVII).
C. History and Background

The Philippine Revolution and the Malolos Constitution
Organic Laws under the American Period
McKinley’s Instructions (Apr 7, 1900)
Spooner Amendment (1901)
Philippine Bill of 1902
Philippine Autonomy Act or Jones Law (1916)
Japanese Occupation
1935 Constitution
1973 Constitution
1986 (EDSA) Revolution and the Freedom Constitution
1987 Constitution
D. Amendments and Revisions, Article XVII, Sections 1, 2 & 3
Amendments or Revisions
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every
five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
SECTION 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a
majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days
after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on
Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
Amendment vs. Revision

Amendment – refers to any alteration in the Constitution; a piecemeal or isolated change in the Constitution involving a
particular provision or certain provisions thereof.
Revision – total change involving a re-writing of the entire instrument.
BY PROPOSAL RATIFICATION
AMENDMENTS Congress (as Constituent By a vote of ¾ of ALL its Ratified by a MAJORITY of the
Assembly) members votes cast in a plebiscite, which
Constitutional Convention (1) By a vote of 2/3 of ALL of shall be held not earlier than 60
its (Congress) members; or days nor later than 90 days
AFTER the approval of such
(2) By a MAJORITY vote of amendment.
ALL of its members, submit to
the electorate the question of
calling such a convention.
Peoples’ Initiative A Petition of at least 12% of Ratified by MAJORITY of the
the total number of registered votes cast in a plebiscite which
voters, of which every shall be held not earlier than 60
legislative district must be days nor later than 90 days
represented by at least 3% of AFTER the certification by the
the registered voters therein. Commission on Elections of
the sufficiency of the petition.
REVISIONS Congress (as Constituent By a vote of ¾ of ALL its Ratified by a MAJORITY of the
Assembly) members votes cast in a plebiscite, which
Constitutional Convention By a vote of 2/3 of ALL of its shall be held not earlier than 60
members or by a MAJORITY days nor later the 90 days
vote of ALL of its members, AFTER the approval of such
submit to the electorate the revision.
question of calling such a
convention.
Only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. A People’s Initiative may
propose only amendments to the Constitution.
Doctrine of Proper Submission – the plebiscite must be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the approval of the proposal by Congress or the Constitutional Convention, or after the certification by the COMELEC of
the sufficiency of the petition.
Purpose: To give the people sufficient and reasonable time to study and discuss the proposed amendments.
The plebiscite may be held on the same day as the regular elections. Piecemeal amendments are not allowed.
Cases:
Santiago v Comelec, 270 SCRA 106 (1997)
Lambino v Comelec, 505 SCRA 160 (2006)
Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient and adequate for purposes of amending the Constitution by way of People’s Initiative?
Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (1997): No.
Lambino vs. COMELEC (MR, 2006): Yes.
E. Self-executing and non-executing provisions
In case of doubt, the provisions of the Constitution are self-executing, mandatory rather than directory, prospective rather
than retroactive.
G.R.: Constitutional provisions are self-executing.

XPN: Article II
XPN to the XPN: Article II, Section 16 (right to a balanced and healthful ecology)
G.R. Mandatory.
XPN: if expressly stated that it is merely directory; or by necessary implication; or if it will do more harm than good.
Example: Section 15, Article VIII
F. Supremacy of the Constitution

Case: Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997)
Doctrine of Supremacy of the Constitution: If a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution, that law or
contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes, is null and void, and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount
and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute or contract.
G. Rules on interpretation of the Constitution
Interpretation of the Constitution:

1. Verba legis – the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed.
2. Ratio legis est anima – when there is ambiguity. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers.
The Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the
evils, if any sought to be prevented or remedied.
3. Ut magis valeat quam pereat – the Constitution should be construed as a whole. Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one
section is not allowed to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
The proper interpretation depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’
understanding thereof.
IV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. State Immunity (Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty)
Reason:
1. Public service would be hindered and the public safety endangered if the supreme authority could be subjected to suits
at the instance of every citizen, and consequently, controlled in its use and disposition of the means and wherewithal
required for the proper administration of government.
2. There can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
1. Basis: Article XVI, Section 3
The State may not be sued without its consent.
2. When is a suit against a State?
3. Express Consent
a. Money Claims arising from contract
All money claims against the government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit before suit is instituted in
court.
- Act 3083
- CA 327, as amended by PD 1445
Section 26. General jurisdiction. - The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend all
matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the
preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books,
records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting
funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement
of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations, including their
subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed,
including non- governmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations through the government,
those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has put up a counterpart fund or
those partly funded by the government.
Case: UP v Dizon, 679 SCRA 54 (2012)
Facts:
UP entered into a General Construction Agreement with Stern Builders for the construction of the extension building and
the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los
Baños. In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted three progress billings corresponding
to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the billings. The third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due
to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to pay the
billing, prompting Stern Builders to sue the UP to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages. After trial,
the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Stern Builders. UP filed a Notice of Appeal but it was denied for being belatedly
filed. Thereafter, the RTC issued a writ of execution. The sheriff served notices of garnishment on the UP’s depository
banks, namely: Land Bank of the Philippines (Buendia Branch) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP),
Commonwealth Branch. Stern Builders then sought the release of the garnished funds. Despite the UP’s opposition, the
RTC granted the motion to release the garnished funds.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC may issue writs of execution and garnishment against UP funds?
Held:
No.
Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality
and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and
income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to
achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into
the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution,
constitute a “special trust fund,” the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UP’s mission and purpose,
and should always be subject to auditing by the COA.
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of
real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds
subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse
judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by
execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable
if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued.
When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the
defendant is liable.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it
may limit claimant’s action “only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution” and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and actual
damages (including attorney’s fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary liabilities were not covered by the
“appropriations earmarked for the said project.” The Constitution strictly mandated that “(n)o money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
It is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of State liability, the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof
must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in P.D. No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. All money claims against the Government must first be filed with the
Commission on Audit which must act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect, sue the State thereby (P.D. 1445, Sections 49-50).
b. Torts committed by special agents

- NCC, Article 2180
State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
This refers to quasi-delicts committed by the government acting through a special agents or those performing non-regular
functions. If the tortious act was committed by a regular employee, the injured party could only bring a suit for damages
against the employee in his personal capacity.
c. Incorporated Government Agencies (Note: Unincorporated government agencies

exercising proprietary functions may be sued)
i. An incorporated government agency possesses a juridical personality independent of the State. If its charter provides
that the agency can sue and be sued, the suit will lie, including one for tort. The provision in the charter constitutes
express consent on the part of the State to be sued.
ii. An unincorporated agency has no juridical personality independent of the Government. To determine its suability, one
has to inquire into principal functions of the agency.
If governmental: NO suit without consent. Note: Even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its primarily
governmental functions, an unincorporated agency still cannot be sued without its consent.
If proprietary: suit will lie. When the State engages in principally proprietary functions, then it descends to the level of a
private individual, and may therefore, be vulnerable to suit.
4. Implied Consent
a. Government submits itself to court’s jurisdiction

The State itself files a complaint
Cases:
- RP v Sandiganbayan, GR 85384, Feb 28, 1990
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, through its governmental instrumentality the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al. for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 0025 (PCGG No. 26). Before the case
could be set for hearing, Simplicio Palanca in his own behalf as a stockholder of Bacolod Real Estate Development
Corporation (BREDCO) and other stockholders similarly situated, filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a "Motion
For Leave To Intervene" attaching thereto their "Answer in Intervention." The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and
admitted the answer-in-intervention. The OSG assails such order on the ground that the Republic, being the sovereign
state, cannot be sued without its consent, and the Intervention is, in legal effect, a suit or counter suit against the
sovereign state, the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the intervention should be disallowed for violating the policy that the state may not be sued without its
consent?
Held:
No. The private respondents intervened in Civil Case No. 0025 merely to unite with the defendants therein in resisting the
claims of the Republic, as plaintiff, and for that reason asked for no affirmative relief against any party in their answer in
intervention. In other words, this is not a case where the private respondents take the initiative in an action against the
government by filing a complaint in intervention or a complaint.
In intervening, Palanca and his costockholders have for their purpose to exclude the BREDCO lots and stocks or, at least,
their 35% interest in the BREDCO project from any possible judgment directing reconveyance of the alleged illgotten
wealth to the plaintiff. They do not pray for damages against the latter. In effect, they occupy a defensive position as
regards those shares of stock or interest.
Private respondents' action for intervention in Civil Case No. 0025 is not, therefore, a suit or counter suit against petitioner
Republic of the Philippines.
b. Government entering into business contracts

c. When inequitable for government to claim immunity
- Santiago v GRP, GR L- 48214, (87 SCRA 294), Dec 19, 1978
Facts:
Ildefonso Santiago filed an action to revoke the donation he and his spouse executed in favor of the Bureau of Plant
Industry. As alleged in such complaint, such Bureau, contrary to the terms of the donation, failed to "install lighting
facilities and water system on the property donated and to build an office building and parking [lot] thereon which
should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on or before December 7, 1974.
The government filed a Motion to Dismiss and invoke state immunity. The RTC granted the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the government may validly invoked state immunity?
Held:
No. It would be manifestly unfair for the Republic, as donee, alleged to have violated the conditions under which it
received gratuitously certain property, thereafter to put as a barrier the concept of nonsuitability. That would be a purely
onesided arrangement offensive to one's sense of justice. Such conduct, whether proceeding from an individual or
governmental agency, is to be condemned. As a matter of fact, in case it is the latter that is culpable, the affront to decency
is even more manifest. The government, to paraphrase Justice Brandeis, should set the example. If it is susceptible to the
charge of having acted dishonorably, then it forfeits public trustand rightly so.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen.
A donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of
the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non -
suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is
the negation of arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its
adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people,
the repository of the sovereign power.
- DOTC v Sps. Abecina, GR 206484, Jan 29, 2016
Facts:
Respondent spouses Vicente and Maria Cleofe Abecina (respondents/spouses Abecina) are the registered owners of five
parcels of land in Sitio Paltik, Barrio Sta. Rosa, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. Later on, the municipality of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, donated a one thousand two hundred (1,200) squaremeter parcel of land to the DOTC for
the implementation of the Regional Telecommunications Development Project (the DOTC and Digitel entered into FLA
for the latter to manage, operate and develop RTDP) in the municipality. However, the municipality erroneously included
portions of the respondents' property in the donation. Pursuant to the FLAs, Digitel constructed a telephone exchange on
the property which encroached on the properties of the respondent spouses. The spouses Abecina discovered Digitel's
occupation over portions of their properties. They required Digitel to vacate their properties and pay damages, but the
latter refused, insisting that it was occupying the property of the DOTC pursuant to their FLA. Respondent spouses filed
an accion publiciana complaint against the DOTC and Digitel for recovery of possession and damages. In its answer, the
DOTC claimed immunity from suit. Both the RTC and CA brushed aside DOTC’s claim for state immunity and ruled in
favor of the spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not DOTC may claim state immunity?
Held:
No.
The State may not be sued without its consent. This fundamental doctrine stems from the principle that there can be no
legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. This generally accepted principle of
law has been explicitly expressed in both the 1973 and the present Constitutions.
But as the principle itself implies, the doctrine of state immunity is not absolute. The State may waive its cloak of
immunity and the waiver may be made expressly or by implication.
Over the years, the State's participation in economic and commercial activities gradually expanded beyond its sovereign
function as regulator and governor. The evolution of the State's activities and degree of participation in commerce
demanded a parallel evolution in the traditional rule of state immunity. Thus, it became necessary to distinguish between
the State's sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and its private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). Presently, state immunity restrictively extends only to acts jure imperii while acts jure gestionis are considered
as a waiver of immunity.
The DOTC encroached on the respondents' properties when it constructed the local telephone exchange in Daet,
Camarines Norte. The exchange was part of the RTDP pursuant to the National Telephone Program. When the DOTC
constructed the encroaching structures and subsequently entered into the FLA with Digitel for their maintenance, it was
carrying out a sovereign function. Therefore, the Court agrees with the DOTC's contention that these are acts jure imperii
that fall within the cloak of state immunity.
However, the doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The
Constitution identifies the limitations to the awesome and nearlimitless powers of the State. Chief among these limitations
are the principles that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law and that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Consequently, our laws require that the State's
power of eminent domain shall be exercised through expropriation proceedings in court. Whenever private property is
taken for public use, it becomes the ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to initiate expropriation
proceedings. By necessary implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is a waiver of State immunity.
If the DOTC had correctly followed the regular procedure upon discovering that it had encroached on the respondents'
property, it would have initiated expropriation proceedings instead of insisting on its immunity from suit. The petitioners
would not have had to resort to filing its complaint for reconveyance.
It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would
stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the
rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use,
which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it
submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be
appropriately invoked.
5. Suits against municipal corporations

- RA 7160, Sections 22 & 24
Local subdivisions like provinces, cities and municipalities being possessed with a juridical personality, may be sued.
Section 22. Corporate Powers. -

(a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers:
(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name;
(2) To sue and be sued;
(3) To have and use a corporate seal;
(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property;
(5) To enter into contracts; and
(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other
laws.
Section 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or
injury to persons or damage to property.
6. Suits against foreign states, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunity

Suits against foreign states: Under the principle of sovereign equality of states, one cannot assert jurisdiction over the
other under the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
over one another) as this would unduly vex the peace of nations.
Two Concepts:
1. Classical/Absolute Theory – a sovereign cannot be sued by another state unless it gives its consent;
2. Restrictive Theory – immunity applies only for acts jure imperii, but not jure gestionis
Tests:
1. Look at the contract entered into by the government; does it involve private property? If yes, then it is jure
gestionis.
2. If you cannot determine, look at the activity if it’s in the regular course of business. If it is, then jure gestionis.
3. Look at the nature of transaction – if proprietary, then jure gestionis.
- Rep. of Indonesia v Vinzon, GR 154705, Jun 26, 2003
Facts:
Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement with James
Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a
consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma
Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement
are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated
therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled
by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. When a new Chief of Administration
was appointed, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the Maintenance Agreement. Thus, Vinzon filed a Complaint against
the Republic of Indonesia. The latter filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign
sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a partydefendant in the Philippines. Both the
RTC and the CA denied the Motion to Dismiss.
Issue:
Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia may claim immunity from suit in a case arising from breach of a contract of
service?
Held:
Yes.
International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States
which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The rule that a State
may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.
As enunciated in Sanders v. Veridiano II, the practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can
be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the
rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary attitude would
unduly vex the peace of nations.
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing need of
sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental
functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private
acts or acts jure gestionis.
The mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it
is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a
business? If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to
be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.
There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not merely
establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance
and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and
equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of
Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or
maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the
Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunity

A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy
immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on
behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
(b) An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as
a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
(c) An action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State
outside his official functions (Art. 31).
If a diplomatic agent passes through or is in the territory of a third State, which has granted him a passport visa if such
visa was necessary, while proceeding to take up or to return to his post, or when returning to his own country, the third
State shall accord him inviolability and such other immunities as may be required to ensure his transit or return . The
same shall apply in the case of any members of his family enjoying privileges or immunities who are accompanying the
diplomatic agent, or travelling separately to join him or to return to their country (Art. 40).
The members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the
receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in articles 29 to 36. Members of the administrative and
technical staff of the mission, together with members of their families forming part of their respective households,
shall, if they are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities
specified in articles 29 to 35, except that the immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving State
specified in paragraph 1 of article 31 shall not extend to acts performed outside the course of their duties.
Diplomatic agent’s staff – technical, administrative, service staff of the ambassadors (diplomatic suite/retinue): they are also immune
for criminal acts in the receiving state. With regard to civil and administrative liability, they are only immune for official acts.
Members of the service staff of the mission who are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State shall
enjoy immunity in respect of acts performed in the course of their duties, exemption from dues and taxes on the
emoluments they receive by reason of their employment and the exemption contained in article 33. [they are not immune
from suit unless accorded by the receiving state of such privilege]
A diplomatic agent shall with respect to services rendered for the sending State be exempt from social security provisions
which may be in force in the receiving State. The exemption provided for in paragraph 1 of this article shall also apply to
private servants who are in the sole employ of a diplomatic agent, on condition:
(a) That they are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State; and
(b) That they are covered by the social security provisions which may be in force in the sending State or a third State (Art.
33).
Consuls:
(1) Regarding commerce and navigation;
(2) Issuing passports and visas;
(3) Protecting nationals in the receiving state.
They are not immune from suit but they have certain privileges, including the members of the consular posts.
(1) Right to official communication (cannot be subject to search and seizure);
(2) Inviolability of archives;
(3) Exempt from criminal jurisdiction in the discharge of their official functions;
(4) Exempt from civil suits but only in the discharge of their official functions;
(5) Exempt from payment of tax, customs duties, social security laws, and service in the military;
(6) Can display their national flag and insignia in the consulate.
Consular officers and consular employees shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative
authorities of the receiving State in respect of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions.
XPNs:
(a) arising out of a contract concluded by a consular officer or a consular employee in which he did not contract expressly
or impliedly as an agent of the sending State; or
(b) by a third party for damage arising from an accident in the receiving State caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft.
Cases: Minucher v CA, GR 142396, Feb 11,2003
Facts:
An action for damages was filed against Arthur Calzo in relation to the criminal charges filed against Khosrow Minucher.
The criminal charge followed a buybust operation conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic
agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution. Calzo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that being a special agent of the United
States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Scalzo can claim diplomatic immunity?
(2) Whether or not Scalzo can claim state immunity?
Held:
(1) Inconclusive.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuriesold customary law and, by the time of its
ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable. The Convention lists the classes of heads of
diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or
internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs.
Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and
service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the
administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so,
nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of
the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines
"diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same
privileges from all others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of
commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and
visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic
immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of
representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat
entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.
In this case, the diplomatic status of Scalzo remains contentious because:

(1) he claims to be an Assistant Attach of the United States diplomatic mission but attaches are not generally regarded as
members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank.
(2) But he was accredited diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines in a document issued by the Office of
Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary.
(2) Yes. It was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was
tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it
should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts
alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity
from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a longstanding rule of customary international
law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of
democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the
state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign
agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred
by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be,
in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose
service he is, under the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.
While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties.
In this case, Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine
government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense
of state immunity from suit.
- Arigo v Swift, 735 SCRA 102 (2014)

Facts:
The US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for USS Guardian (an Avengerclass mine
countermeasures ship of the US Navy) "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port
of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 17, 2013 at 2:20
a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles eastsoutheast of Palawan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO against Scott H. Swift in his capacity as
Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen.
Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises CoDirector ("US respondents") and
certain Philippine public officers (Philippine respondents).
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067 ("Tubbataha
Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009"): unauthorized entry (Section 19); nonpayment of conservation fees (Section 21);
obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing
resources (Section 26[g]).
Only the Philippine respondents filed their Answer.
Issue:
Whether or not the court is prevented from exercising jurisdiction over US respondents based on state immunity?
Held:
Yes. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non suability of the State is
expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that
''there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." There are other
practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local
jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case,
"unduly vex the peace of nations."
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if
the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the
state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the
former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts
(Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State
immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate
grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties.
Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of
funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore
bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
HOWEVER, the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No.
10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships
from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to
leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable
for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for noncommercial purposes under
Article 31.
- ATCI v Echin, GR 178551, Oct 11, 2010
Facts:
Josefina Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principalco petitioner, the Ministry of
Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist under a two year contract covered by a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Under the MOA, all newlyhired employees undergo a probationary period of one
(1) year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not
having allegedly passed the probationary period. When respondent returned to the Philippines, she filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local
recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of Echin. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision. On a petition for review before the CA, petitioners
contended that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the
immunity extended to them.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait’s immunity from suit extended to the local recruiter, ATCI?
Held:
No. ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers
(OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency
clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal’s liability must first be established before it, as agent, can
be held jointly and solidarily liable. In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with
their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate
and sufficient payment of what is due them.
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the
working class. Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for
the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint
and solidary liability inutile.
7. Suits Against International Agencies, Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized
Agencies of the United Nations
Example: WHO, ADB
8. Suits against public officers; exceptions
While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties.
On the assumption that a decision is rendered against the public officer or agency impleaded, will the enforcement
thereof require an affirmative act from the State, such as the appropriation of the needed amount to satisfy the judgment?
If so, then it is a suit against the State.
However, it is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to
law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers
by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in
equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State,
he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his
private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the
public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.
Instances when suits against public officers are not suits against the state:
1. A suit against a public officer to compel the performance of a ministerial function or a duty required by law
(mandamus);
2. An action for prohibition against an agency or a public officer to prevent the enforcement of an act claimed as
illegal or unconstitutional;
3. An action filed against an officer in his private or personal capacity;
4. A suit against a public officer claimed to have committed an ultra vires act, or where there is a showing of bad
faith, malice or gross negligence.
Presidential Immunity
Is the president immune from suit? Yes. Unlike state immunity which is expressly stated in the Constitution, the
Constitution is silent on presidential immunity. But the president is the head of state, he represents the state. If you cannot
sue the state, then you cannot sue the head of state. He is immune from all acts, whether official or unofficial acts, during
his term. But once his term ends, he is only immune from official acts during his term, not for unofficial acts. Presidential
immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency.
Whether or not the President can be a respondent in an amparo proceeding? Yes. It does not violate immunity from suit
because amparo does not impose liability; it is to determine responsibility and accountability.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator
of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish
the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that
qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
Under E.O. 226 (Institutionalization of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility in all Government Offices, particularly at all Levels
of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies), a government official may be held liable for
neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be
committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility
and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after
its commission.[89] Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are
widespread within the government officials area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed
within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved.
B. Delegation of powers
1. Rule, Maxim
Generally, legislative power may only be exercised by the legislative branch, and may not be delegated to the other
branches of government.
Potesta delegata non potest delegari (no delegated powers can further be delegated) based on the ethical principle that delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own
judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
2. Exceptions
a. By direct constitutional grant (permissible delegation)

- Tariff powers to the President, Article VI, Section 28 (2)
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
- Emergency powers to the President, Article VI, Section 23 (2); Article XII, Section 17
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest (Sec. 17, Art. XII) [This refers to Congress, not the President. Whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.]
- Rule making power to the Supreme Court, Article VIII, Section 5 (5)
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplifed and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
- Delegation to local government units, Article X, Section 5
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
This recognizes the fact that local legislatures are more knowledgeable than the national lawmaking body on matters of
purely local concern, and are in a better position to enact appropriate legislative measures thereon.
- Rule making powers of the Constitutional Commissions, Article IX-A,

Section 6; Article IX-C, Section 3; Article IX-D, Section 2 (2)
Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its
offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.
The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit
and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
- Delegation to Commission on Human Rights, Article XIII, Section 18
The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court.
The function of the CHR is merely investigative in nature.
b. By legislative grant
- Delegation to administrative bodies (rule-making power)
Subordinate legislation – this involves the power of administrative agencies, granted by an enabling law, to make
implementing rules and regulations. They are tested by their conformity to the standards set by, and their ability to carry
out the legislative intent contained in the primary law.
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details
which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations.
Administrative bodies exercise quasi-legislative powers (rule-making power). This is the exercise of delegated legislative
power, involving no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or
enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.
Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations:

1. Supplementary or detailed legislation – rules and regulations to fix the details in the execution and enforcement
of a policy set out in the law. They are in the nature of subordinate legislation, and designed to implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof. Example: Labor Code IRR
2. Interpretative Legislation – rules and regulations construing or interpreting the provisions of a statute to be
enforced; they are intended to clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the administrative
body operates. Example: BSP Circulars
3. Contingent Legislation - rules and regulations made by an administrative authority on the existence of certain
facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
Requisites for validity:

1. Authorized by the legislative (issued under authority of law) – there must be a valid law which delegates
legislative powers to the administrative agency.
2. Must be within the scope of authority provided by Congress (within the scope and purview of the law) – the
IRR of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage. However, administrative bodies are allowed, under
their power of subordinate legislation, to implement the broad policies laid down in the statute by “filling in” the
details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law; that the
regulation does not contradict but conforms with the standards prescribed by law.
3. Must be within the prescribed procedure provided by the law
4. Must be reasonable
If these four requisites are met, then the rules and regulations have the force and effect of a law (as a subordinate
legislation).
The rules and regulations need to be published. They should also be registered with the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR) at the UP Law Center.
Case: NPC Drivers and Mechanical Association v Napocor, 503 SCRA 138 (2006)
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law) was signed into
law. Under the EPIRA Law, a new National Power Board of Directors (NPB) was constituted composed of the Secretary of
Finance as Chairman, with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Budget and Management, the Secretary of
Agriculture, the DirectorGeneral of the National Economic and Development Authority, the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, the Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry, and the President of the National Power Corporation as members.
NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002124 which provided for the Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and
the Selection and Placement of Personnel in the NPC Table of Organization. Under said Resolution, all NPC personnel
shall be legally terminated on 31 January 2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits. On the same day, the NPB
approved NPB Resolution No. 2002125, whereby a Transition Team was constituted to manage and implement the NPCs
Separation Program.
Petitioners assail the NPB Resolutions contending that they were not passed and issued by a majority of the members of
the duly constituted Board of Directors since only three of its members, as provided under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law,
were present, namely: DOE Secretary Vincent S. Perez, Jr.; Department of Budget and Management Secretary Emilia T.
Boncodin; and NPC OICPresident Rolando S. Quilala. According to petitioners, the other four members who were present
at the meeting and signed the Resolutions were not the secretaries of their respective departments but were merely
representatives or designated alternates of the officials who were named under the EPIRA Law to sit as members of the
NPB. Petitioners claim that the acts of these representatives are violative of the wellsettled principle that delegated power
cannot be further delegated. Thus, petitioners conclude that the questioned Resolutions have been illegally issued as it
were not issued by a duly constituted board since no quorum existed because only three of the nine members, as
provided under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law, were present and qualified to sit and vote.
Respondents, on the other hand, uphold the validity of the assailed Resolutions by arguing that while it is true that four
members of the National Power Board of Directors, particularly the respective Secretaries of the Department of Interior
and Local Government, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the Department of Finance, as well as the Director -
General of the National Economic and Development Authority, were not the actual signatories in NPB Resolutions No.
2002124 and No. 2002125, they were, however, ably represented by their respective alternates.
Issue:
Whether or not the NPB Resolution was properly enacted?
Held:
No. In enumerating under Section 48 those who shall compose the National Power Board of Directors, the legislature has
vested upon these persons the power to exercise their judgment and discretion in running the affairs of the NPC. It is to
be presumed that in naming the respective department heads as members of the board of directors, the legislature chose
these secretaries of the various executive departments on the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen which
made them eligible to occupy their present positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot
delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions, because it is
their personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such responsibility.
There is no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions involves the exercise of discretion and not merely a
ministerial act that could be validly performed by a delegate.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen
because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute
another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. In those cases in which the proper
execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that
he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to
substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
- Delegation to local government units (ordinances as subordinate legislation)
Requisites of a valid ordinance:

1. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2. Must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. Must not be unreasonable;
6. Must be general in application and consistent with public policy.
Case: Sema v Comelec, 558 SCRA 700 (2008)
Facts:
By virtue of the power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly enacted
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the
eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional for granting the ARMM the power to create
provinces, and in turn, legislative districts?
Held:
Yes.
The creation of any of the four local government units: province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary
legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted
by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to
create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation
of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House of
Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall
be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or
a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a
city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s
population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or
city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the
power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The
power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.
Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local
legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative
districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical.
Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through
the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be
anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like
Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the
superior legislative body.
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the
House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM
Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of
a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a
self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create
local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office.
Moreover, to allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate
outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits
the coverage of the Regional Assembly’s legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.
- Police Power: Two Branches of General Welfare Clause: General Legislative Power and Police Power Proper
Two Branches of General Welfare Clause:

1. General Legislative Power – the local government unit acts as agent of the state; to implement existing laws and the
Constitution; requires a law
2. Police Power Proper – the local government unit acts as agent of its inhabitants; does not require a law
The general welfare clause has two branches. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and
relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific
functions of the council which are enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances "as shall seem necessary and proper
to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." (US vs. Salaveria)
"The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make
regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
upon the municipal council by law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact
ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property." (Fernando v St. Scholastica’s
College)
Cases:
- US v Salaveria, 39 Phil 102
Facts:
The Municipal Council of Orion, Bataan enacted an ordinance which, among other things, prohibited the playing of
panguingue on days not Sundays or legal holidays and penalized the violation thereof. The justice of peace of Orion,
Prudencio Salaveria, with his wife and seven other persons were surprised by the police while indulging in a game of
panguingue in the house of the justice of the peace.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance is valid?
Held:
Yes. Authority for the State or a municipality to take action to control gambling in this larger sense can be found in an
analysis of what is called the police power. The police power is based on the maxim "solus populi est suprema lex" the
welfare of the people is the first law. Not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police
power but the municipality does also. Like the State, the police power of a municipal corporation extends to all matters
affecting the peace, order, health, morals, convenience, comfort, and safety of its citizens the security of social order the
best and highest interests of the municipality.
The best considered decisions have tended to broaden the scope of action of the municipality if dealing with police
offenses. Within the general police powers of a municipal corporation is the suppression of gambling. Ordinances aimed
in a reasonable way at the accomplishment of this purpose are undoubtedly valid.
The general welfare clause delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. The general welfare clause has
two branches. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and
regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal
council by law. With this class we are not here directly concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more
independent of the specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances "as shall
seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein."
The ordinance of the municipality of Orion does not seem in itself to be pernicious, or unreasonable or discriminatory. Its
purposes evidently are to improve the morals and stimulate the industry of the people. A person is to be compelled to
refrain from private acts injurious both to himself and his neighbors. These objects, to be attained by limiting the pastime
to definite days, do not infringe any law of the general government.
- Fernando v St. Scholastica’s College, GR 161107 (2013)

Facts:
The City Government of Marikina and Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled
"Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina." The City Government of Marikina
sent a letter to St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) and St. Scholastica’s AcademyMarikina, Inc. (SSAMarikina) ordering them
to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% seethru, and, at the same time, to move it
back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park. Consequently, St. Scholastica’s College assailed
the validity of the Ordinance contending that the implementation of the ordinance on their property would be
tantamount to an appropriation of property without due process of law; and that the petitioners could only appropriate a
portion of their property through eminent domain.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 192 is a valid ordinance (valid exercise of police power by the city government)?
Held:
No.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people." The State, through the legislature, has
delegated the exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State. This delegation of police power
is embodied in Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the General Welfare Clause,
which has two branches. "The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to enact
ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the
municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property."
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the City’s
purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
The real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the public, considering that it
would no longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the general public.
Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and "unneighborliness," it is obvious that providing
for a parking area has no logical connection to, and is not reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment of these goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not, under the
guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the
aesthetic appearance of the community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will
substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes.
- Eminent Domain: Genuine Necessity of Taking
Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking
of the property.
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain; they can exercise the power only when expressly
authorized by the Legislature. Sec. 19 of the LGC confers such power to local governments, but the power is not absolute;
it is subject to statutory requirements.
Requisites:
1. (Genuine) Necessity – when the power is exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is generally a
political question. But when exercised by a delegate, the determination of whether there is a genuine necessity for
the exercise is a justiciable question.
2. Private property;
3. Taking;
4. Public use;
5. Just compensation.
- Taxation: Expressly granted by law
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. - Local government units shall have the power and authority to
establish an organization that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation of their development
plans, program objectives and priorities; to create their own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be retained by them; to have a just share
in national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released to them without need of any further action; to
have an equitable share in the proceeds from the utilization and development of the national wealth and resources
within their respective territorial jurisdictions including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct
benefits; to acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of real or personal property held by them
in their proprietary capacity and to apply their resources and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare
purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions and thereby ensure
their development into self-reliant communities and active participants in the attainment of national goals.
3. Tests for due delegation of power; Case: Pelaez v Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965)
Facts:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty -
three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as
taxpayer, instituted a special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said
executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No.
2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 68 of the RAC authorizing the President to create new municipalities constitutes undue delegation
of power?
Held:
Yes.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to
make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
The creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in
character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is
"purely a legislative question”.
a. Completeness Test
A law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislature that nothing is left to the judgment of
the delegate. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them;
the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of its authority.
b. Sufficient Standard Test
The law must offer a sufficient standard to specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy,
and specify conditions under which it is to be implemented.
A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
Accepted sufficient standards: public interest, simplicity, economy and efficiency, public welfare.
C. Separation of powers / Checks and Balance
Rationale: It aims to prevent a concentration of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to an
irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions. It is intended to secure action,
forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and to obtain efficiency.
Checks and balances: The Constitution gives each department certain powers by which it may definitely restrain the others
from improvident action, thereby maintaining the balance among them and preserving the will of the sovereign
expressed in the Constitution. The President’s veto power, the power of Congress to override the veto, the power of
impeachment, and the court’s power to declare legislative and executive acts unconstitutional are examples of checks and
balances under the Constitution.
Cases:
- Belgica v Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 (2013)
Issue: Whether or not the Pork Barrel System is constitutional?
Held: No.
(1) Separation of Powers
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, it means that the "Constitution
has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government." To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make
laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial
branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws.
The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the
powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is
hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To achieve this
purpose, the divided power must be wielded by coequal branches of government that are equally capable of independent
action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of
government to check the arbitrary or selfinterest assertions of another or others.
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may
be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its
constitutionally assigned function"; and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function
that more properly is entrusted to another." In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is
impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. The Legislative branch of
government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since
the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law making role
necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to
blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by
the Executive."
The Congress may, however, exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the
Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post -
enactmentmeasure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence,
tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.
Any postenactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with
it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining
to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Application:
The defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the
postenactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program menus – have been consistently
accorded postenactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork
Barrel allocations. Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post enactment
authority in the areas of fund release and realignment.
Clearly, these postenactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have
been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of
the separation of powers principle.
(2) Nondelegability of Legislative Power
The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers postenactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the
principle of nondelegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a
personal lumpsum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform
the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.
(3) Checks and Balances
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment."
For the President to exercise his itemveto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the
object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct
and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill."
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lumpsum allocations
and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these
intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it
necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lumpsum/postenactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a
budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item
veto.
(4) Accountability
An accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of
congressional oversight. Certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013
PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given postenactment roles
in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight
would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of postenactment
authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution (prohibition to intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for pecuniary benefit or where they may be called upon to act on account of their office).
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another office
of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
(5) Local Autonomy
The concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the
direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their
programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national
officers that have no lawmaking authority except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy
caused by the postenactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and even
take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personalitydriven project identification has not only contributed little
to the overall development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and
coordination efforts of the government."
-Mendoza v People, 659 SCRA 681 (2011)

Facts:
Romarico Mendoza was convicted by the RTC and CA, and affirmed by the Supreme Court for violation of Section 22(a)
and (d), in relation to Section 28 of RA No. 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997. In his MR, Mendoza contended that
during the pendency of his case in 2010, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo signed RA No. 9903 into law. RA No. 9903
mandates the effective withdrawal of all pending cases against employers who would remit their delinquent
contributions to the SSS within a specified period, viz., within six months after the law’s effectivity. He claims that in
view of RA No. 9903 and its implementing rules, the settlement of his delinquent contributions in 2007 entitles him to an
acquittal under the equal protection clause.
Issue:
Whether or not RA No. 9903 should be applied to Mendoza?
Held:
No. The Court cannot amplify the scope of RA No. 9903 on the ground of equal protection, and acquit the petitioner and
other delinquent employers like him; it would in essence be an amendment of RA No. 9903, an act of judicial legislation
abjured by the trias politica principle [refers to the principle of separation of powers among the three branches of the
government].
V. STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, Article II
A. Preamble (preambulare, to walk before)

1. Nature, purpose and aims
The preamble cannot be regarded as a source of any substantive power. The true office of the preamble is to expound the
nature, extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the constitution.
Purpose: It indicates the source of authority adopting the constitution. It also sets forth the basic aims and ends sought to
be achieved with the adoption of the fundamental law and it is referred to in ascertaining the meaning and correct
interpretation of the provisions of the constitution.
Is it part of the Constitution? Yes. But it is not an essential part of the Constitution. It serves as an introduction.
B. Principles
1. Democratic and Republican State, Article II, Section 1
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
The people are the possessors of sovereign power and the source of all government authority. This does not connote,
however, that the new constitution allows direct or pure democracy where the people directly manage their affairs. The
essence of our system is republican or representative meaning that the people should not exercise the powers of
government directly. They can do it only through the medium of the duly elected and appointed public officials.
a. Manifestations of Democracy and Republicanism

- Rule of the majority
- Rule of law
- Elections through popular will
- Existence of bill of rights
Other: no irrepealable laws; separation of powers; separation of church and state; checks and balances
2. Adoption of International Law, Article II, Section 2
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.
a. Renunciation of war
This is based on the Kellogg-Brian Pact of 1928 which is a solemn undertaking of 61 nations renouncing war as an
instrument of national policy and agreeing to settle their disputes by pacific means.
Who can declare war in the Philippines? No one; because we renounce war as an instrument of national policy.
Who can declare the existence of a state of war? Congress by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in joint session assembled,
voting separately. (Art. VI, Sec. 23)
b. Incorporation Clause
International Law, two kinds:

1. International Customary Law (binding on all states)
Elements:
a. Objective element – acts amounting to settled practice of States (practices which are widespread,
established and consistent)
b. Subjective element – opinion juris sive necessitates: the belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
These are generally accepted principles of international law which we adopt under Art. II, Sec. 2 ( incorporation
doctrine).
2. International Agreement (applicable only to signatories)

The signatory may enact a law to implement or embody the international agreement (transformation doctrine)
Jus cogens – unique class of customary laws that occupy the highest echelon in Human Rights Law hierarchy; peremptory
norm which are non-derogable and imprescriptible.
Elements:
1. It is a peremptory norm of general international law;
2. It is accepted and recognized by the international community;
3. There can be no derogation therefrom;
4. It can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
Obligatio erga omnes – obligations that are owed by States to all, regardless of the presence or absence of their assent to be
bound thereby.
Actio popularis – rule of procedure in bringing a suit on another’s behalf. NGOs of good standing in the international
community may be allowed to sue for and on behalf of victims who do not have the means to do so.
Universal jurisdiction
The principles of jus cogens and obligation erga omnes transcend boundaries.
Under this principle, a State may prosecute a crime committed elsewhere if such crime is a jus cogens crime.
Jus dispositivum – lower class of norms, lower than jus cogens. They can be set aside or modified by the agreement of the
states.
Pacta sunt servanda – agreement must be kept; every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith. (Art. 26, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)
XPN: rebus sic stantibus - a fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the
time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties. (Art. 62, Vienna Convention on the Law on
Treaties)
In the Philippines, we follow the doctrine of incorporation whereby the generally accepted principles of international law
become part of the law of the land without need of a law to be passed by Congress. This is to be distinguished from states
that follow the doctrine of transformation where their legislative body may have to pass a statute adopting, for example,
a treaty before it becomes part of their body of laws.
Case: Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v CIR, 704 SCRA 216 (2013)
Facts:
Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch remitted to CIR the amount of PHP 67,688,553.51, which represented the fifteen percent
(15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank
Germany (DB Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years. Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner
filed with the BIR. an administrative claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate in the total amount of PHP
22,562,851.17. On the same date, petitioner requested from the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of
its entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RPGermany Tax Treaty. Alleging the inaction of the BIR on its
administrative claim, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA.
The CTA Second Division denied petitioner’s claim for refund because the application for a tax treaty relief was not filed
with ITAD prior to the payment by the former of its BPRT and actual remittance of its branch profits to DB Germany, or
prior to its availment of the preferential rate of ten percent (10%) under the RPGermany Tax Treaty provision. It held that
petitioner violated the fifteen (15) day period mandated under Section III paragraph (2) of Revenue Memorandum Order
(RMO) No. 12000. The CTA En Banc affirmed the ruling of the CTA Second Division.
Issue:
Whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 12000 will deprive persons or corporations of the benefit of a tax
treaty?
Held:
No.
By virtue of the RPGermany Tax Treaty, we are bound to extend to a branch in the Philippines, remitting to its head office
in Germany, the benefit of a preferential rate equivalent to 10% BPRT. On the other hand, the BIR issued RMO No. 1 2000,
which requires that any availment of the tax treaty relief must be preceded by an application with ITAD at least 15 days
before the transaction. The Order was issued to streamline the processing of the application of tax treaty relief in order to
improve efficiency and service to the taxpayers. Further, it also aims to prevent the consequences of an erroneous
interpretation and/or application of the treaty provisions (i.e., filing a claim for a tax refund/credit for the overpayment
of taxes or for deficiency tax liabilities for underpayment).
The Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The
timehonored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith of treaty obligations
on the part of the states that enter into the agreement. Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties, and obligations
under the treaty must be performed by them in good faith. More importantly, treaties have the force and effect of law in
this jurisdiction.
Tax treaties are entered into "to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties and, in turn, help the
taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations in two different jurisdictions." Simply put, tax treaties are entered into to
minimize, if not eliminate the harshness of international juridical double taxation, which is why they are also known as
double tax treaty or double tax agreements.
"A state that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations those modifications that
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." Thus, laws and issuances must ensure that the
reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional
requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements. More so, when
the RPGermany Tax Treaty does not provide for any prerequisite for the availment of the benefits under said agreement.
Likewise, it must be stressed that there is nothing in RMO No. 12000 which would indicate a deprivation of entitlement to
a tax treaty relief for failure to comply with the 15day period. We recognize the clear intention of the BIR in implementing
RMO No. 12000, but the CTA’s outright denial of a tax treaty relief for failure to strictly comply with the prescribed
period is not in harmony with the objectives of the contracting state to ensure that the benefits granted under tax treaties
are enjoyed by duly entitled persons or corporations.
The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO No. 12000. Logically,
noncompliance with tax treaties has negative implications on international relations, and unduly discourages foreign
investors. While the consequences sought to be prevented by RMO No. 12000 involve an administrative procedure, these
may be remedied through other system management processes, e.g., the imposition of a fine or penalty. But we cannot
totally deprive those who are entitled to the benefit of a treaty for failure to strictly comply with an administrative
issuance requiring prior application for tax treaty relief.
c. Adherence to peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, amity with nations
3. Civilian supremacy; Role of the military, Article II, Section 3
Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the
people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
c. Commander-in-chief clause, Article VII, Section 18
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
b. AFP in active service, Article XVI, Section 5 (4)

No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a
civilian position in the Government including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
c. Respect for people’s rights Article XVI, Section 5 (2)
The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people’s rights
in the performance of their duty.
4. Duty and Role of Government, Article II, Sections 4 and 5
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend
the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal military or civil service.
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
5. Separation of Church and State, Article II, Section 6
The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
a. Freedom of Religion, Article III, Section 5
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Lemon Test: The Supreme Court, citing Lemon vs. Kurtzman (403 U.S. 602 [1971]), said that a regulation is constitutional
when (a) it has a secular legislative purpose; (b) it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (c) it does not foster an
excessive entanglement with religion.
Case: Republic v Manalo, GR 221029, Apr 4, 2018
Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan City by
virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese Court. The RTC denied the petition. It opined that, based on
Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they
are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in
the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their
condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s. It held that Article 26 of the Family is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed
for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry.
The Supreme Court discussed that the Constitution does not prohibit divorce. And through the years, there has been
constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. However, a good number
of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce,
viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution
and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity.
Issue:
Whether or not our policy on marriage (specifically divorce) should depend on the views of a religious sect?
Held:
No. None of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church
and State will be violated.
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion.
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor
can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country. While
marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. It is in
this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
b. Political party ban on sects, Article IX-C, 2 (5)
The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered.
c. No sectoral representative from religious sector, Article VI, Section 5 (2)
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.
d. Tax exemption of churches, Article VI, Section 28 (3)
Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
e. No appropriations for sects; exemptions, Article VI, Section 29 (2)
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
f. Optional religious instruction, Article XIV, Section 3 (3)
At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or
wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the
religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.
g. Filipino ownership for schools; exceptions, Article XIV, Section 4 (2)
Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by
citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational institutions.
C. Policies
1. Independent foreign policy and nuclear free Philippines, Article II, Sections 7-8
The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall
be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.
The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in
its territory.
Foreign policy – conduct of the government in dealing with other countries.

The power to formulate foreign policy belongs to Congress and the President.
The conduct of relations with foreign states is vested in the President (diplomatic power).
a. Foreign military bases, Article XVIII, Sections 4 and 25
All existing treaties or international agreements which have not been ratified shall not be renewed or extended without
the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. [Sec. 4]
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under
a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. [Sec. 25]
2. Just and dynamic social order
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation
and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all [Sec. 9].
a. Social justice, Article II, Section 10, Article XII, Sections 1 (2)
The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. [Sec 10]
Social justice is neither communism or despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of the social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated.
The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained
increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian
reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity
to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be
encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership. [Sec. 1]
b. Respect for human dignity and human rights, Article XIII, Sections 1, 17-19
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people
to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
Sec. 17-19: Commission on Human Rights
c. Role of women; Fundamental equality of women and men, Article II, Section 14;
Article XIII, Section 14
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men. [Sec. 14]
The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their
maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their
full potential in the service of the nation. [Sec. 14]
- RA 9262 – Anti Violence Against Women and their Children (2004)

Case: Garcia v Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 (2013)
Facts:
Rosalie JaypeGarcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a petition before the RTC of Bacolod for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus Garcia pursuant to RA 9262. She claimed to
be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part
of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. The RTC issued a TPO. A
second TPO was issued and this was continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until
further orders. Jesus Garcia then filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses. The CA dismissed his
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9262 violates the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and
abuse?
Held:
No. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
(1) R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims
of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law.
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is
a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over
and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence
against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions,
compared with men."
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were
seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies,
women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women.
Addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against
men.
(2) The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The distinction between men and women is germane to the
purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981.
Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. This
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law and shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations on the basis of equality of men and women. The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and its two protocols. It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.
d. Independent people’s organization, Article II, Section 23; Article XIII, Sections 15-16
The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the
nation. [Sec. 23]
The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within
the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.
People’s organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest
and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure. [Sec. 15]
The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and
economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms. [Sec. 16]
e. Priority of education, science, technology, arts, culture and sports, Article II, Section 23; Article XIII,
Sections 15-16; Article XIV, Sections 1-19
f. Urban land reform and housing, Article XIII, Sections 9-10

- RA 7279 – Urban Development and Housing Act
The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the public sector, a continuing program
of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlements areas. It shall also promote adequate
employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of
small property owners. [Sec. 9]
Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a
just and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the
communities where they are to be relocated. [Sec. 10]
g. Reform in agriculture and other natural resources, Article II, Section 21, Article XIII, Sections 4-8
- PD 27 – Land Reform Act
- RA 6657 -Comprehensive and Agrarian Reform Law (1998)
The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform. [Sec. 21]
Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Sec. 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other
independent farmers’ organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and
shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial, production,
marketing, and other support services.
Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with
law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or
concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous
communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them
in the manner provided by law.
Sec. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of
local marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through
appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The
State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of
marine and fishing resources.
Sec. 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote
industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as
payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.
h. Protection to labor, Article II, Section 18; Article XIII, Section 3

- PD 442 – Labor Code of the Philippines
The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
[Sec. 18]
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of
voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster
industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the
fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.
i. Promotion of health and ecology, Article II, Sections 15 and 16; Article XIII, Section 11
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the
needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free
medical care to paupers. [Sec. 11]
Case: Oposa v Factoran, GR 101083 (1993)

Facts:
The petitioners, all minors and duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a complaint before the RTC
of Makati against Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The complaint is a class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
They prayed that the defendant and/or his representatives be ordered to cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. They averred that the Philippines is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare
and unique species of flora and fauna may be found, among others, and that deforestation in the country resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known
as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion
therein of salt water, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, etc.
Factoran filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the
issue raised is a political question. The RTC granted the MTD. Hence, this petition. The petitioners contend that they have
a cause of action concerning their right to a sound environment based on Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi?

(2) Whether or not the petitioners alleged violation of their right to a balanced and healthful ecology constitutes a cause of
action?
Held:
(1) Yes. Petitioners minors can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations.
(2) Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. While the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not
under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in
the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self preservation
and selfperpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the wellfounded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
- RA 7277 – Magna Carta for Disabled Persons

j. Self-reliant and independent economic order, Article II, Sections 19-20
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. [Sec. 19]
k. Role of the private sector, Article II, Section 20

The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to
needed investments. [Sec. 20]
l. Role of People’s Organizations, Article II, Section 23; Article XIII, Sections 15-16
The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the
nation. [Sec. 23]
The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within
the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.
People’s organizations are bona de associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and
with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure. [Sec. 15]
The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and
economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms. [Sec. 16]
3. The family and role of the youth, Article II, Sections 12 and 13, Article XV, Sections 1-4
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government. [Sec. 12]
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs. [Sec. 13]
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Sec. 3. The State shall defend:

(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them.
Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so through just programs of social
security.
a. Family as a basic autonomous social institution

- EO 209 – Family Code of the Philippines
- Republic v Albios, 707 SCRA 584 (2013)
Facts:
Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen, and Liberty Albios contracted a marriage. Consequently, Albios filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore,
null and void ab initio. The RTC granted the petition. The OSG filed an appeal. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision
which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. Hence, this petition.
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is valid despite the real motive of parties not to be bound by it but only for Albios to acquire
American citizenship?
Held:
Yes. The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is,
however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that
the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may,
thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void
if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that
a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and
would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their
marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another
or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love,
though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be
declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in
the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no
further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed
to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
- PD 603 – Child and Youth Welfare Code

- RA 7610 - Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act
- RA 9262 – Anti Violence Against Women and their Children (2004)
b. Protection of the mother and the unborn
- RA 10354 – Reproductive Health and Responsible Parenthood Act (2012)
Case: Imbong v Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146 (2014)
Issue: Whether or not RA 10354 (Reproductive Health and Responsible Parenthood Act of 2012) is unconstitutional?
Contentions:
(1) The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. The implementation of the RH Law would authorize the
purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section
12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception.
Held: No. The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn
from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. A reading of the RH Law
would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded
from the moment of fertilization. The RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to
the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.
The RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that
induces abortion. The Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not
sanction abortion.
Note: A provision in the RH-IRR which defines abortifacient as any drug or device that “primarily” induces abortion was
declared unconstitutional. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval
of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RHIRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only
be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the
implantation of the fertilized ovum.
(2) The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners
posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes
cancer and other health problems
Held: No. The RH Law did not repeal the provisions of RA 4729 [allows contraceptive drugs and devices but they could
not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner]. It is still a good law and its
requirements are still in to be complied with. The the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still
require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure
the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.
(3) The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
(a) The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes
the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes
that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.
Held: No. In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also
limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of
any one religion.
(b) Duty to Refer: while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a
conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the
conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical
practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the
conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.
Held: Unconstitutional. The obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt out clause, it is,
however, a false compromise because it makes prolife health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they
find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not
be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual
to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. While the RH Law seeks to provide
freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and
prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the
State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods
to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong
view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly,
a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled
to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of noncoercion" enshrined in
the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
The same holds true with respect to nonmaternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should
they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be
struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance
of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
Violation of equal protection clause:
The RH-IRR provides that “skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of
hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the
duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.”
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally
protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be
considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally
apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off
even if one acquires employment in the government.
EXCEPTION:
While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it
would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in lifethreatening cases that require the performance
of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a
referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a
mother in grave danger.
(c) On Mandatory Family Planning Seminars:
Held: No. It is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares
that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for wouldbe spouses to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family
planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG,
those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the
information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
(4) The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH
Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program,
they are compelled to provide fortyeight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.
Held: No. The practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the
State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of
medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people.
Also, other than nonaccreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and
nongovernment reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service
they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion,
force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden,
but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Note: Conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not
allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
(5) The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against
the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The
petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.
Held: No. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which
recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor
to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above,
sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is
incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples
with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions
shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government
programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
(6) The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that
the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise
their children in accordance with their beliefs. It is claimed that, (a) by giving absolute authority to the person who
will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes
the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall wellbeing of their family. (b) In the same
breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority
to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.
Held: (a) Unconstitutional. Reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very
nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately
related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of
the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the
same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them "
is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decisionmaking. By giving absolute authority to the spouse
who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the
sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution.
Decisionmaking involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of
them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of
their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and
shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private
right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart
their destiny together as one family.
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention
would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution.
(b) Unconstitutional. When a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the
decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental
authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents.
The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that
their consent is no longer relevant is clearly antifamily. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government.”
EXCEPTIONS:
(1) Access to Information:
There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to
the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor
referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own
body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both
the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed
decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to
reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is
unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her
in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
(2) Life Threatening Cases:

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in lifethreatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and
that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person
should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "nonsurgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and
in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of
their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
(7) The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of nondelegation of legislative authority. The petitioners
question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non abortifacient and
to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).
Held: No. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services
and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should
be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as "health products."
(8) The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the
local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local
Government Code and R.A. No. 9054.
Held: No. The essence of the express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A complete relinquishment of central government powers on
the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against
it.
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities,
the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health workers, it will be the national government
that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has
the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH
Law. Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LGUs are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is
nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the
LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
(9) The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may
be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion
further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."
Held: No. In determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n)
of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider.” Further, the use of the term "private health care
institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for
the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
(10) RH Law violates natural law.
Held: No. The Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is
the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not
obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an
acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by
theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction,
rather than in the actual law of the past or present. Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it
cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law.
(11) RH Law violates academic freedom. It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof,
mandating the teaching of Ageand-DevelopmentAppropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine
and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom. According to the petitioners, these provisions
effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is
not suitable to be taught to their students.
Held: Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on ageappropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on
the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will
contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature
of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity. At any rate, Section 12, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution
and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents
in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in
upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.
c. Natural and primary right and duty of parents
3. Communication and information in nation building, Section 24; Article XVI, Sections 1—11; Article XVIII,
Section 23; EO 02 (2016)
The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building. [Sec. 24]
Article XVI, Sec. 11.

(1) The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations,
cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such citizens.
The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass media when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed.
(2) The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be regulated by law for the protection of
consumers and the promotion of the general welfare.
Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least seventy per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such industry shall be limited to their
proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the executive and managing officers of such entities must be citizens of
the Philippines.
Article XVIII, Section 23: Advertising entities affected by paragraph (2), Section 11 of Article XVI of this Constitution shall
have five years from its ratification to comply on a graduated and proportionate basis with the minimum Filipino
ownership requirement therein.
5. Rights of indigenous cultural communities, Article II, Section 22; Article VI, Section 5 (2); Article XII,
Section 5; Article XIII, Section 6; Article XIV, Section 17; Article XVI, Sec 12;
- RA 8371 - Indigenous People’s Rights Act (1997)
The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity
and development. [Sec. 22]
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector. [Art. VI, 5(2)]
The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-
being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of ancestral domain. [Article XII, Sec. 5]
The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the
disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession
suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous
communities to their ancestral lands. [Article XIII, Sec. 6]
The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their
cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.
[Article XIV, Sec. 17]
The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural
communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such communities. [Article XVI, Sec. 12]
6. Honest public service, Article II, Sections 27-28
The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft
and corruption.
a. Ombudsman, Article XI, Sections 4-6

Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as
now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Sec. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for
the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
Sec. 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the
Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law.
d. Full public disclosure, Article II, Section 28
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest.
c. SALN, Article XI, Sections 17

A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the
manner provided by law.
- RA 3019 – Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

d. President’s health, Article VII, Section 12
In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The Members of the
Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
shall not be denied access to the President during such illness.
e. Publication of loan applications, Article VII, Section 20
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board
shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of
its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and
controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may
be provided by law.
f. Public foreign loans, Article XII, Section 21
Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on
foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public.
g. Contracts with foreign groups, Article XII, Section 2 (5)
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.
h. Conflict of Interest, books of account, Article VII, Sections 12 and 20
i. COA annual report, Article IX-D, Section 4
The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual report covering
the financial condition and operation of the Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend
measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as may be required by
law.
j. Right to information, Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
k. Equality of opportunity; political dynasty, Article II, Section 26
The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law.
Case: Ang Ladlad v Comelec, 618 SCRA 32 (2010)
Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
transgendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership
base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC. The COMELEC Second Division
denied the petition on moral grounds (1) the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs; in contrary to the bible and the Koran; (2) Ang Ladlad advocates immoral doctrines. The
COMELEC En Banc affirmed the decision of the COMELEC Second Division. Hence, this petition. Ang Ladlad contends
that the denial of its accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion. It also claims that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional
rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the
Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Issue:
Whether or not the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition for accreditation violated the equal protection clause?
Held:
Yes. The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or
parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes
it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that
is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation,
furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the partylist system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in
this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the partylist system on the same basis as other marginalized and under represented sectors.
On violation of the non-establishment clause:

Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. It was grave
violation of the nonestablishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of
Ang Ladlad. Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on
whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.
On violation of other fundamental rights (free speech and association):
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity
of its position through normal democratic means.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not
only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights
tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a
change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it
proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the
existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression
through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or
the majority of the population. A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate
controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.
Therefore, to the extent that Ang Ladlad has been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its
views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equallyqualified partylist
candidates, indeed, there has been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.
- RA 6713 – Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials

and Employees (1989)
7. Autonomy of local governments, Article II, Section 25; Article X; RA 7160 (LGC)
The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. [Sec. 25]
a. Kinds of Autonomy: Administrative Autonomy v Political Autonomy

Case: Limbona v Conte Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786
Facts:
Sultan Limbona was the then Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly). Limbona sent out a telegram to all Assemblyman that there would be no session in November because their
presence is required in the house committee hearing in Congress. However, the Assembly held session on November 2,
1987 in defiance of Limbona’s instruction. In that session, the seat of the Speaker was declared vacant. Now, Limoba seeks
to declare the proceedings on November 2, 1987 as null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the socalled autonomous governments of Mindanao are subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts?
Held:
Yes.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of

administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable,"
"and ensure their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision"
over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in
the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of
power amounts to "selfimmolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category is subject alone to the decree of the organic act
creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government).
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act
of selfimmolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their
legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services. Thus, national courts can assume jurisdiction.
Control vs. Supervision

Control – the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Supervision – means overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to
make them perform these duties.
e. Devolution, Section 17, RA 7160, Local Government Code of 1991
Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
f. Deconcentration of powers, Section 528, RA 7160
The National Government shall, six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code, effect the deconcentration of requisite
authority and power to the appropriate regional offices or field offices of national agencies or offices whose major
functions are not devolved to local government units.
VI. CITIZENSHIP, Article IV
A. Definition, importance, distinguished from nationality
Citizenship – membership in a political community which is personal and more or less permanent in character.
Citizen – one who, as a member of the body politic of a state, owes allegiance to, and may claim reciprocal protection
from its government.
Nationality – membership in any class or form of political community.
Importance: the citizen is entitled to certain rights like the right to receive protection from the government, the right to
vote, to run for public office, to own land, exploit natural resources, operate public utilities, administer educational
institutions and manage mass media.
B. Rights and duties of a citizen

C. Modes of acquiring citizenship Article IV, Section 3

1. Involuntary: by birth (natural born citizen); Principles governing them
a. jus soli
b. jus sanguini, Article IV, Section 2
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
2. Voluntary: by naturalization (naturalized citizen)
Naturalization is the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with
the privileges of a citizen.
a. Direct naturalization
- Judicial naturalization; CA 63, CA 473, RA 530
- Substantive requirements: Qualifications & Disqualifications
CA 473 (Revised Naturalization Law) (1939)

Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become a
citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and
must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must
have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine languages; and
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized
by the Office of Private Education 1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of continuous residence required under the second condition of the last
preceding section shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner having any of the following
qualifications:
1. Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of the provinces,
cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof;
2. Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines;
3. Being married to a Filipino woman;
4. Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not established for
the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race, in any of the branches of
education or industry for a period of not less than two years;
5. Having been born in the Philippines.
Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
a. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and
teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
b. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the
success and predominance of their ideas;
c. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
d. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
e. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
f. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos,
or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
g. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of
such war;
h. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right
to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
- Procedural requirements
1. Declaration of Intention
Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the
applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the OSG a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth name, age, occupation, personal description, place of
birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he came
to the Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration. No declaration shall
be valid until lawful entry for permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place, and
manner of his arrival has been issued. The declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any
of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine
history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Each declarant must furnish two photographs of himself.
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in the Philippines and have
received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited
to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more
before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon complying
with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the applicant has
given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools recognized by the
Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable with respect to the
widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies
before he is actually naturalized.
2. Venue
The petition for naturalization is filed with the RTC of the province in which the applicant has been a resident for at least
one year.
Section 8. Competent court.—The Court of First Instance of the province in which the petitioner has resided at least one
year immediately preceding the filing of the petition shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the petition.
3. Publication of the petition
Section 9. Notification and appearance.—Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the
court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in
one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said
petition and a general notice of the hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where
said office is located, setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date and place of
his arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce in support of his
petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held within ninety days from the date of
the last publication of the notice.
4. Hearing of the petition
The State is represented by the Solicitor General or the Prosecutor on his behalf. At least two witnesses should testify on
the good moral character of the petitioner.
5. Promulgation of the decision

The decision becomes final, but not executory, 30 days after notice of the decision is received by parties. A certificate of
naturalization will then be issued to the petitioner.
6. Summary hearing after two years (RA No. 530)
Section 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine citizenship shall be heard by the
courts until after six months from the publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the
application become executory until after two years from its promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing, with
the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the intervening time
the applicant has:
(1) not left the Philippines,
(2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession,
(3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules,
(4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
7. Oath taking before the RTC
Section. 2. After the finding mentioned in section one, the order of the court granting citizenship shall be registered and
the oath provided by existing laws shall be taken by the applicant, whereupon, and not before, he will be entitled to all
the privileges of a Filipino citizen.
Case: So v RP, 513 SCRA 267 (2007)
Edison So vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007
Facts:
Edison So applied for naturalization under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended. The RTC granted the petition. The OSG filed an appeal. The CA revised the decision of
the RTC and ruled that So failed to comply with the requirement of the law that the applicant must not be less than 21
years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002, petitioner was only
twenty (20) years, nine (9) months, and twenty five (25) days old, falling short of the requirement. So went to the Supreme
Court and contended that he requirements for naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI 270, were relaxed
when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 was signed into law.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be naturalized applying the less stringent requirement provided by R.A. No. 3019 even
if he applied for judicial naturalization under C.A. No. 473?
Held:
No.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her
with the privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a
citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant
to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien.
The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of
C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of
an applicant for naturalization by administrative act.
Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine
citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who,
by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting brain gain for the
Philippines. These however, do not justify petitioner’s contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to
applications for naturalization by judicial act.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws the former covers all aliens regardless of class while
the latter covers nativeborn aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and
all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the
customs and traditions.] To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than
judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the
Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by
R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship
which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for
judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time of the filing of his petition,
administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available. Consequently, his application should be
governed by C.A. No. 473.
Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial naturalization, the
coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not native born. It must be
stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been residing here.
Petitioner’s witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts; they did not elaborate on his traits.
Their testimonies do not convince the Court that they personally know petitioner well and are therefore in a position to
vouch for his qualifications. As correctly found by the CA, the witnesses’ testimonies consisted mainly of general
statements in answer to the leading questions propounded by his counsel. What they conveniently did was to enumerate
the qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific details.
- Administrative naturalization; RA 9139 (2001)

- Substantive requirements: Qualifications & Disqualifications
Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the succeeding section, any person desiring to avail of the benefits of
this Act must meet the following qualifications:
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of his/her petition;
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles of the Constitution, and must
have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as well as with the community in which he/she is living;
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public school or private
educational institution dully recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to
any race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them
in similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she derives income
sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided,
however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders but are unable to practice their profession
because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
Section 4. Disqualifications, - The following are not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under this Act:
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association of group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success
or predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with Filipinos, or who
have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war; and
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to be naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof.
- Procedural requirements
1. Petition
Section 5. Petition for Citizenship. - (1) Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall file with
the Special Committee on Naturalization…
Section 7. Powers/Functions of the Special Committee on Naturalization. - An alien who believes that he has all the
qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, may file an application for naturalization with the secretariat of the
Special Committee on Naturalization, and a processing fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00). Thereafter, the petition
shall be stamped to indicate the date of filing and a corresponding docket number.
2. Initial Determination
Within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the petition, the Committee shall determine whether the petition is complete in
substance and in form.
3. Publication
If such petition is complete, the Committee shall immediately publish pertinent portions of the petition indicating the
name, qualifications and other personal circumstances of the applicant, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation, and have copies of the petition posted in any public or conspicuous area. The
Committee shall immediately furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Bureau of Immigration (BI), the civil
registrar of the petitioner's place of residence and tile National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) copies of the petition and its
supporting documents. These agencies shall have copies of the petition posted in any public or conspicuous area in their
buildings, offices and premises, and shall, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the petition, submit to the Committee
a report stating whether or not petitioner has any derogatory record on file or any such relevant and material information
which might be adverse to petitioner's application for citizenship.
If the petition is found by the Committee to be wanting in substance and form, the petition shall be dismissed without
prejudice.
4. Approval or Disapproval
Section 8. Approval or Disapproval of the Petition. - Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the report of the agencies which
were furnished a copy of the petition or the date of the last publication of the petition, whichever comes in later, the
Committee shall consider and review all relevant and material information it has received pertaining to the petition, and
may, for the purpose call the petitioner for interview to ascertain his/her identity, the authenticity of the petition and its
annexes, and to determine the truthfulness of the statements and declarations made in the petition and its annexes.
If the Committee shall have received any information adverse to the petition, the Committee shall allow the petitioner to
answer, explain or refute the information.
Thereafter, if the Committee believes, in view of the facts before it, that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications required for Philippine citizenship under this Act, it shall approve the petition and henceforth, notify
the petitioner of the fact of such approval. Otherwise, the Committee shall disapprove the same.
5. Decree of Naturalization
Section 9. Decree of Naturalization and Naturalization Processing Fee. -Within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the notice of
the approval of his/her petition, the applicant shall pay to the Committee a naturalization fee of One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) payable as follows: Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, forthwith, a
certificate of naturalization shall be issued. Within sixty (60) days from the issuance of the certificate, the petitioner shall
take an oath of allegiance in the proper forum upon proof of payment of the required naturalization processing fee and
certificate of naturalization. Should the applicant fail to take the abovementioned oath of allegiance within said period of
time, the approval of the petition shall be deemed abandoned.
- Legislative naturalization
- Special naturalization laws
- Mass naturalization law; Philippine Bill of 1902
All inhabitants of the islands who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, and residing in the islands who did not declare
their intention of preserving Spanish nationality between said date and October 11, 1900 were declared citizens of the
Philippines.
- General law of naturalization; LOI 270 (1978)
b. Derivative naturalization
- wife, minor children. Alien woman upon marrying a Filipino
Under CA 473:
On the wife: An alien wife who is legally married to a naturalized husband and does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications found in Section 4 of CA No. 473 may herself be declared a citizen. What is required is only an
administrative proceeding before the Commission on Immigration and Deportation for the cancellation of her Alien
Certificate of Registration on the ground that her husband has been naturalized (Moya Lim Yao vs. Commission of
Immigration).
On the Children:
1. If the child is of age, there is no effect.
2. If the child is minor and:
a. Born in the Philippines, he automatically becomes a citizen upon the naturalization of the father.
b. Born abroad before the naturalization of the father and residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization, he
automatically becomes a citizen.
c. Born abroad before the naturalization of the father but not residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization, he is
considered a Filipino only during his minority unless he takes permanent residency in the Philippines before reaching the
majority age.
d. Born abroad after the naturalization of the father, he is considered a citizen on condition that upon reaching the age of
majority, he takes an oath of allegiance to the Philippine consulate of the place where he might be. If he fails to register his
intent to continue as Filipino within one year upon reaching 21 years, he ceases to be a Filipino citizen.
Under RA 3139:
Section 11. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children. - After the approval of the petition for administrative naturalization in
cancellation of applicant's alien certificate of registration, applicant's alien lawful wife and minor children may file a
petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the Committee subject to the payment of the filing
fee of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and naturalization fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) payable as follows:
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the
taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 12. Status of Alien Husband and Minor Children. - If the applicant is a married woman, the approval of her petition
for administrative naturalization will not benefit her alien husband but her minor children may file a petition for
cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the BI subject to the requirements of existing laws.
D. Modes of losing citizenship, Article IV, Section 3

Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
1. Involuntary
a. by denaturalization (cancellation of certificate of naturalization)
Grounds:
1. Naturalization certificate is obtained fraudulently or illegally.
2. If within 5 years, he returns to his native country or to some foreign country and establishes residence there; provided,
that 1-year stay in native country, or 2-year stay in a foreign country shall be prima facie evidence of intent to take up
residence in the same.
3. Petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention.
4. Minor children failed to graduate through the fault of the parents either by neglecting to support them or by
transferring them to another school.
5. Applicant is guilty of violating naturalization laws and the anti-dummy law in availing privileges available only to
Filipinos.
b. found by final judgment to be a deserter of war
2. Voluntary
a. by expatriation
- by naturalization in a foreign country
- by express renunciation of Philippine citizenship, Article Iv, Section 4
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
- by taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign country; exception: Doctrine of Indelible
Allegiance
Doctrine of Indelible Allegiance: An individual may be compelled by municipal law to retain his original nationality even if
he has already renounced or forfeited it under the laws of the second State whose nationality he has acquired.
E. Modes of reacquiring citizenship

1. by naturalization
Naturalization as a mode of reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by CA No. 63.
1. The applicant must have lost his original Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country or by express
renunciation of his citizenship;
2. That the applicant be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months
before he applies for naturalization;
3. That he shall have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence
in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living;
and
4. That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to
the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject.
He must not likewise possess the disqualifications mentioned in Sec. 4 of CA No. 473.
2. by repatriation
a. Commonwealth Act 63 (deserted AFP)
Section 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry.
b. RA 965 (1963) (served Allied Forces in World War II)
Any person who, being a citizen of the Philippines on December eight, nineteen hundred forty-one, had lost said
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied foreign country, and taking
an oath of allegiance incident thereto, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in
the Philippines within one year from the date of the approval of this Act. The said oath of allegiance shall contain, in
addition, a renunciation of any other citizenship.
c. RA 2630 (1960) (deserted US Armed Forces)
Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
d. PD 725 (natural born Filipinos who lost citizenship)
Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and natural born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship may require Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
e. RA 8171 (1995) (lost citizenship due to marriage, politics or economics)

- how is repatriation accomplished?
Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who
have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63,
as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and
teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or associatEon for the
predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau or Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon
cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
f. RA 9225 (Sep 17, 2003) (Citizenship Retention and Acquisition Act of 2003)
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
- Effect of acquisition of foreign citizenship before RA 9225
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines;
and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."
- Effect of acquisition of foreign citizenship under RA 9225

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Cases:
- Mercado v Manzano, 307 SCRA 630 (1999)
Facts:
Ernesto S. Mercado and Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. Manzano garnered the highest number of votes but his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that Manzano was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code which states that those holding
dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position. Manzano admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a
Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Issue:
Being a dual citizen, whether or not Manzano is disqualified to run as Vice Mayor?
Held:
No. Manzano was indeed a dual citizen being born of Filipino parents in the United States which follow the principle of
jus soli. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy, he elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship. The filing of his certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, Manzano has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, Manzano’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
Discussion:
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children
are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of
another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
The phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
- Maquiling v Comelec, 696 SCRA 420 (2013) & 700 SCRA 367 (2013)
Decision (April 16, 2013)
Facts:
Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen
of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Another
mayoralty candidate, Balua, sought to disqualify Arnado and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. Balua contended that
Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued
by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USAAmerican." To further
bolster his claim of Arnado's US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer generated travel record
dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing
the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and
again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Issue:
What is the effect of the use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship?
Held:
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as
to one's nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath
of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for
public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic,
Arnado reacquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado
had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office. By renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of
the foreign country.
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time
he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC,
he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring
before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil
and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position.
Such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation.
However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status
as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport.
Resolution (July 2, 2013)
Arnado cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of
expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims
that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, he was divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the
fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States “providing that a person who is
divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will reacquire such American citizenship by using a
US Passport issued prior to expatriation.”
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code calls for
application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a
Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any
foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnado’s disqualification to run for any local elective position.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship from
running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country which
issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its
national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American
citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnado’s renunciation of his American citizenship when he
subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The
requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath
of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is
convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to
a mere ceremonial formality.
- David v Agbay, GR 1991113, Mar 18, 2015

Facts:
Renato David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, he and
his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600 square meter lot along the beach in
Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to
know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. In 2007, he filed a
Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said
application, David indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that
David, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 086463) against him.
Meanwhile, David reacquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as
evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 2661007 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on
October 11, 2007. In his defense, David averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino.
David contends that he is a naturalborn Filipino citizen, and that by reacquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he
was by legal fiction “deemed not to have lost” it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he
was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.
Issue:
Whether or not David may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
Application despite his subsequent reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225?
Held:
Yes. Since David was naturalized before the effectivity of RA 9225, the provision in Section 2 that “they shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship…” does not apply to him. That provision only applies to Filipinos who
become naturalized after the effectivity of RA 9225.
Discussion:
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by
President Gloria MacapagalArroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, naturalborn citizens of
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
“I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines;
and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.”
Naturalborn citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed
“not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3
lays down such conditions for two categories of naturalborn Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs.
Under the first paragraph are those naturalborn Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
country who shall reacquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. The second paragraph covers those naturalborn Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took
effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required
for both categories of naturalborn Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is
different, “reacquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those naturalborn Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of the law
intentionally employed the terms “reacquire” and “retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both reacquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re acquired their Philippine
citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by
which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision
in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from naturalborn Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of
other countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for reacquiring and retaining
Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain
Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the
new law.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the
first category of naturalborn Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, R.A. 9225 itself treats those of
his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those naturalborn Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who
became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
2. By law (direct act of Congress)
F. Who are citizens of the Philippines? Article IV, Section 1
The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
1. Filipino citizens before the 1987 Constitution

a. citizens under the 1973 Constitution

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-
five.
b. citizens under the 1935 Constitution

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected
to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
c. citizens under the Philippine Bill of 1902
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
2. those born with Filipino father or mother

3. those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the 1935 Constitution
a. elect Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution
b. elect Philippine citizenship under the 1973 Constitution
c. elect Philippine citizenship under the 1987 Constitution
d. Procedure in electing Philippine citizenship; CA 625
Case: Republic v Sagun, 666 SCRA 321 (2012)
Facts:
Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She
was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In
1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City. Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine
passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth
certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of
Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her
birth certificate.
Issue:
Whether or not Sagun timely elected Filipino citizenship and in accordance with the procedures laid down by law?
Held:
No.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as
citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and
an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided
that [t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirtyfive are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that [t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on
any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person
was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age
of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the
father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. An
illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens
of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a
Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the
Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under
oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement
of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party
exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words,
he should first be required to register as an alien. Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file
a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his
alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide,
based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the same is elevated to the
Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.
In this case, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only
documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance,
executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. Even assuming arguendo that
respondent’s oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age
of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase
reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years from
reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and
the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid
and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically
lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the
place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court
to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent’s petition before the trial
court must be denied.
4. naturalized Filipino citizens under the 1987 Constitution

a. direct naturalization
G. Dual / Multiple citizenship; effects; RA 9225 (2003)
a. how acquired: by birth, by naturalization
b. dual citizenship distinguished from dual allegiance, Article IV, Section 5
VII. SUFFRAGE, Article V; ELECTION LAWS
A. Definition, nature
Suffrage – the right to vote in the election of officers chosen by the people and in the determination of questions
submitted to the people. It includes within its scope election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum.
B. Scope
1. Election – means by which the people choose their officials for a definite and fixed period and to whom they
entrust for the time being the exercise of the powers of government.
- Batas Pambansa 881, Omnibus Election Code (1985)
2. Plebiscite, Article X, Sections 10, 11, 18
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in
Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their
own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will hereby be created
shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
3. Initiative, Article XVII, Section 2;
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
- RA 6735, Initiative and Referendum Act
Sec. 3. (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative
body for action.
- RA 7160, Local Government Code of 1991, Sections 120-126
Section 120. Local Initiative Defined. - Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.
Section 121. Who May Exercise. - The power of local initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of
the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
Section 122. Procedure in Local Initiative. -
(a) Not less than one thousand (1,000) registered voters in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of
municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the sanggunian concerned proposing the
adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment of an ordinance.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the
proponents, through their duly authorized and registered representatives, may invoke their power of initiative, giving
notice thereof to the sanggunian concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from Roman numeral I. The COMELEC or its designated
representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
(d) Two (2) or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
(e) Proponents shall have ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and
thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of
signatures. (f) The petition shall be signed before the election registrar. or his designated representatives, in the presence
of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the sanggunian concerned in a public place in the local
government unit, as the case may be. Stations for collecting signatures may be established in as many places as may be
warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the COMELEC, through its office in the local government unit
concerned, shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the
required number defeats the proposition.
(h) If the required number of signatures is obtained, the COMELEC shall then set a date for the initiative during which
the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval
within sixty (60) days from the date of certification by the COMELEC, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of
provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative
shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the COMELEC.
Section 123. Effectivity of Local Propositions. - If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the COMELEC as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the
sanggunian and local chief executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered
defeated.
- Limitations on local initiative, Section 124
Section 124. Limitations on Local Initiative. -

(a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the sanggunian to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the sanggunian concerned adopts in toto the proposition presented and the
local chief executive approves the same, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they
so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.
- Limitations upon the Sanggunian , Section 125

Section 125. Limitations upon Sanggunians. - Any proposition or ordinance approved through the system of initiative and
referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the sanggunian concerned within six (6)
months from the date of the approval thereof, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the sanggunian within three
(3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, That in case of barangays, the period
shall be eighteen (18) months after the approval thereof.
4. Referendum, Article VI, Section 32; RA 7160 Section 126
Section. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters thereof.
Section 126. Local Referendum Defined. - Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local
government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.
The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the COMELEC within sixty (60) days in case of
provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The COMELEC shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
5. Recall, Article X, Section 3; RA 7160, Section 69-75

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Section 69. By Whom Exercised. - The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters of a
local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
(Amended by RA 9244 wherein recall initiated through a preparatory assembly has been removed; now, only the
registered voters can initiate recall)
Section 71. Election on Recall. - Upon the filing of a valid petition for recall with the appropriate local office of the
COMELEC, the Commission or its duly authorized representative shall set the date of the election on recall, which shall
not be later than thirty (30) days upon the completion of the procedure outline in the preceding article, in the case of the
barangay, city, or municipal officials. and forty-five (45) days in the case of provincial officials. The official sought to be
recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions and, like
other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
Section 72. Effectivity of Recall. - The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and
proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election
on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby
affirmed, and he shall continue in office.
- Prohibition from resignation, Section 73

Section 73. Prohibition from Resignation. - The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while
the recall process is in progress.
- Limitations on Recall, Section 74

Section 74. Limitations on Recall. -
(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.
C. Qualifications and disqualifications of voters, Article V, Section 1
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen
years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to
vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement
shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
- RA 8189 – Voter’s Registration Act (1996)
Continuing Registration – the personal filing of applications of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the
office of the Election Officer during regular office hours.
XPN: No registration shall be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a
special election.
Election Period: Shall commence 90 days before the day of the election and shall end 30 days thereafter.
Campaign period:
1. Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election (other National Positions) - 90 days;
2. Election of Members of the House of Representatives and Local Election - 45 days; and
3. Barangay Election - 15 days.
The campaign periods shall not include the day before and the day of the election.
Special elections: the campaign period shall be forty-five days.
Section 9. Who may Register. All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who are at least eighteen (18)
years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein they propose
to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election, may register as a voter.
Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation,
profession, employment in private or public service, educational activities, work in the military or naval reservations
within the Philippines, service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Police Forces, or confinement or
detention in government institutions in accordance with law, shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.
Any person, who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or period of residence but, who, on
the day of the election shall possess such qualifications, may register as a voter.
Section 11. Disqualification. The following shall be disqualified from registering:
a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, such
disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to
vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of
sentence;
b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having committed any crime
involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the firearms laws or any
crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law: Provided, That
he shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; and
c) Insane or incompetent persons declared as such by competent authority unless subsequently declared by proper
authority that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.
D. Secrecy and sanctity of the ballot, Article V, Section 2

The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
- RA 9369 – Election Automation Law

Automated election system (AES)- a system using appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the voting,
counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and other electoral process.
E. System of Absentee voting, Article V, Section 2;

- RA 9189 – Overseas Absentee Voting Act (2003)
Sec. 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18)
years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
Sec. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
1. Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
2. Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign
country;
3. Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as
defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or
amnesty; Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the
right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take
cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the
formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;
4. An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration
under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to
return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry
of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
5. Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority in the
Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments concerned,
unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.
- RA 7166 – (Synchronized Elections), Section 12 – Absentee Voting for AFP, PNP and
government employees assigned to places where they are not registered voters
Section 12. Absentee Voting. - Absentee voting as provided for in Executive Order No. 157 dated March 30, 1987 shall
apply to the elections for President, Vice-President and Senators only and shall be limited to members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police and other government officers and employees who are duly
registered voters and who, on election day, may temporarily be assigned in connection with the performance of election
duties to place where they are not registered voters.
R.A. 10637 – Mandatory Biometric Voter’s Registration
Kabataan Partylist vs. COMELEC (2015)
RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in order to
establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology. It
likewise directs that "[r]egistered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit themselves for validation."
"Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of
the May 2016 [E]lections shall be deactivated. The COMELEC launched the NoBio-NoBoto public information
campaign which ran concurrently with the period of continuing registration.
Petitions were filed to question the constitutionality of RA 10367 and related COMELEC Resolutions contending that: (a)
biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is penalty of deactivation; (b)
biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated by the 1987 Constitution; (c) biometrics validation
gravely violates the Constitution, considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling
reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage; (d) voters to be deactivated are
not afforded due process; and (e) poor experience with biometrics should serve as warning against exacting adherence to
the system.
Held:
Biometrics validation requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the
limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996.
Discussion:
As early as the 1936 case of The People of the Philippine Islands v. Corral, it has been recognized that "[t]he right to vote is not
a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are
most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the evolution of the representative system of
government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of
democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the audit classes of
persons are excluded from the franchise.”
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current parameters for the exercise of suffrage:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at
least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the right of suffrage: first, he
must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by law; and third, he must have resided in the Philippines
for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
election.
The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of suffrage. The State may therefore regulate
said right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the same do not amount to, as per
the second sentence of the provision, a "literacy, property or other substantive requirement." Based on its genesis, it may
be gleaned that the limitation is geared towards the elimination of irrelevant standards that are purely based on socio-
economic considerations that have no bearing on the right of a citizen to intelligently cast his vote and to further the
public good.
To contextualize, the first Philippine Election Law, Act No. 1582, which took effect on January 15, 1907, mandated that
only men who were at least twenty-three (23) years old and "comprised within one of the following three classes" were
allowed to vote: (a) those who prior to the 13 th of August, 1898, held the office of municipal captain, governadorcillo, alcalde,
lieutenant, cabeza de barangay, or member of any ayuntamiento; (b) those who own real property to the value of P500.00, or
who annually pay P30.00 or more of the established taxes; and (c) those, who speak, read, and write English or Spanish.
When the 1935 Constitution was adopted, the minimum voting age was lowered to twenty-one (21) and the foregoing
class qualification and property requirements were removed. However, the literacy requirement was retained and only
men who were able to read and write were given the right to vote. It also made women's right to vote dependent on a
plebiscite held for such purpose.
During the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the delegates decided to remove the literacy and property requirements to
broaden the political base and discontinue the exclusion of millions of citizens from the political systems.
The phrase "other substantive requirement" carries the same tack as the other standards alienating particular classes
based on socio-economic considerations irrelevant to suffrage, such as the payment of taxes. The phrase did not
contemplate any restriction on procedural requirements, such as that of registration.
The concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the discourse on suffrage is concerned, should be distinguished from
the concept of "registration", which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which a person's qualifications to
vote is determined. Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
Validation refers to the process of taking the biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured.
Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an individual such as voice,
photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features.
Biometrics validation requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the
limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996.
Office Qualifications Term of Office

President No person may be elected President unless he is a natural- 6 years; no reelection
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election,
and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
Vice President Same as president 6 years;
No Vice-President shall serve for more

than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of
the service for the full term for which
he was elected.
Senators No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born 6 years;
citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at
least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a No Senator shall serve for more than
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less two consecutive terms. Voluntary
than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. renunciation of the office for any
as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
House of No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives 3 years;
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on
the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able No member of the House of
to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a Representatives shall serve for more
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, than three consecutive terms.
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year Voluntary renunciation of the office
immediately preceding the day of the election. for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Local elective Section 39. Qualifications. - 3 years;
officials
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a No local elective official shall serve for
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or more than three (3) consecutive terms
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident in the same position. Voluntary
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
renunciation of the office for any
and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the as an interruption in the continuity of
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the service for the full term for which the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-
elective official concerned was elected.
one (21) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent
component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-
one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or

sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the

sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election
day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years
of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from

running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral

turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to
the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the
right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Term Limit:
There are two conditions for the application of the disqualification:
1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Situations:
1. X, mayor, died and was succeeded by Y, the vice mayor for the rest of the term. On the two next elections, Y was
elected and served as mayor. Is he eligible to run in the next election?
Yes. Because at his “first” term, he was not elected, he merely succeeded X.
2. X mayor won as mayor and in the next two elections. In his third term, he resigned in the middle of his term. Is he
qualified to run in the next election?
No. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
3. X mayor won as mayor and in the next two elections. In this third term, COMELEC disqualified him. Is he eligible to
run in the next election?
Yes. Because X was not able to complete his third term; and it is not a voluntary renunciation.
4. X mayor won as mayor and in the next two elections. In his third term, he was recalled and another person won in the
recall. Is he qualified to run in the next election?
Yes. Because X was not able to complete his third term.
5. X mayor won as mayor and in the next two elections. In his third term, he was charged with violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and he was preventively suspended for 90 days. Is he qualified to run in the next election?
No. A preventive suspension is not a penalty. X remained the mayor during this period. There was no interruption of his
term.
Note: If the official was not able to complete his term, not because of voluntary renunciation, then he is qualified to run in
the “fourth” election.
In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the conversion of a municipality into a city. The then municipal mayor attempted to
evade the application upon him of the threeterm limit rule by arguing that the position of a city mayor was not the same
as the one he previously held. The Court was not convinced and, thus, declared that there was no interruption of the
incumbent mayor’s continuity of service.
In Lonzanida, a candidate ran for the mayoralty post and won in three consecutive elections. While serving his third term,
his opponent filed an election protest. Months before the expiration of the mayor’s third term, he was ousted from office.
He ran again for the same post in the immediately succeeding election. A petition was thereafter filed assailing his
eligibility to run as mayor on the ground of violation of the threeterm limit rule. The Court ruled that the mayor could not
beconsidered as having served a full third term. An interruption for any length of time, if due to an involuntary cause, is
enough to break the elected official’s continuity of service.
In Borja, the mayor of Pateros died and was succeeded in office by the vice mayor. In the two immediately succeeding
elections, the latter vied for and won the mayoralty post. When he ran for the same position for the third time, his
disqualification was sought for alleged violation of the threeterm limit rule. The Court ruled that when he assumed the
position of mayor by virtue of succession, his service should not be treated as one full term. For the disqualification to
apply, the candidate should have been thrice elected for and had served the same post consecutively. In Aldovino,
preventive suspension was imposed upon an elected municipal councilor. The Court ruled that the said suspension did
not interrupt the elective official’s term. Although he was barred from exercising the functions of the position during the
period of suspension, his continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected.
In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC, Gainza and Milaor were added to five of the ten towns, which used to
comprise Camarines Sur’s old First District, to form the new Second District. The COMELEC declined to apply the three-
term limit rule against the elected Provincial Board member on the ground that the addition of Gainza and Milaor
distinctively created a new district, with an altered territory and constituency.
THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
VIII. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT, Article VI
A. Who may exercise legislative power, Article VI, Section 1
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
1. Congress
2. Regional / local legislative power
Section 48 [LGC]. Local legislative power shall be exercised by the sangguniang panlalawigan for the province; the
sangguniang panlungsod for the city; the sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for the
barangay.
3. People’s Initiative on Statutes

a. Initiative and Referendum
Sect. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or
local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
Sec. 3. (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative
body for action.
"Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It
may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by
regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
4. The President under a martial law rule or in a revolutionary government
B. Houses of Congress: Composition, Qualification and Term of Office
1.Senate, Article VI, Sections 2-4
Composition:
The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, as may be provided by law.
Qualification:
No person shall be a Senator unless he is a
(1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and,
(2) on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age,
(3) able to read and write,
(4) a registered voter, and
(5) a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
Term of Office:
The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon
on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
2. House of Representatives, Article VI, Sections 5-8
Composition:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Qualifications:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless:
(1) he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
(2) on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
(3) able to read and write, and,
(4) except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
(5) a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Term of Office:
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
a. District Representatives and Questions of Apportionment

Cases:
- Aquino III v Comelec, 617 SCRA 623 (2010)
Facts:
R.A. No. 9176 entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment” was
enacted by Congress. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 9176 on the ground that the reapportionment
introduced by RA 9176 runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first
district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province?
Held:
No. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum
population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.
Mariano v COMELEC: limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial
legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be
entitled to an additional district.
- Alaba v Comelec, 611 SCRA 147 (2010)
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591) was passed creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan. At the time the
legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No.
3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009
is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional
Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of RA 9591 for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population requirement?
Held:
Yes. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010. The
Certification states that the population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291. The Certification of Regional
Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has
no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own
growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal
demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. First, certifications on demographic projections can be
issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second,
certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and
credible source.
More importantly, a city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the
immediately following election. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the
immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case
that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May
2010 elections.
- Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014)
Facts:
From (1st term) 2004 to 2007 and (2 nd term) 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the
Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. RA No. 9176 reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines
Sur wherein 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District. From (3 rd term)
2010 to 2013, Naval served as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District. In 2013, Naval ran anewand was reelected as
Member of the Sanggunian, Third District. Nelson Julia, also a Sanggunian Member candidate in the Third District, filed a
Petition to Cancel Naval’s COC invoking the three-term limit rule. COMELEC Second Division cancelled Naval’s COC.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the three-term limit rule applies?
Held:
Yes. RA No. 9176 created a new Second District but merely renamed the other four, including the Third District. A
complete reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical conclusion other than that the lawmakers intended the old Second
District to be merely renamed as the current Third District. The actual difference in the population of the old Second
District from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This numerical fact
renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the same as the old Second District. Therefore, the
district which elected Naval for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007.
- Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)
Facts:
RA No. 9371 was enacted which increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. The COMELEC en Banc
promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371. Rogelio Bagabuyo assails the constitutionality of RA 9371
and Resolution No. 7837. He argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules,
regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local
government unit. The OSG countered that there is no need for a plebiscite because such requirement only applies when
there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or
barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit
took place. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and
Sangguniang Panglungsod.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not a plebiscite is required for the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment?
(2) Whether or not the reapportionment violates the principle of equality of representation?
Held:
(1) No.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives
which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body
in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among
the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the local government
units (historically and generically referred to as "municipal corporations") that the Constitution itself classified into
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The
Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit because it is the basis
for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It is not, however,
a political subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as
a representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a
corporate unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the district; it
merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their national affairs. Unlike a
province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay, which has a punong barangay,
a district does not have its own chief executive. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the
people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit
also signifies that it has no legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is
no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. As a political subdivision, a local
government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions of government." As a corporate entity
with a distinct and separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises special functions for the sole benefit of its
constituents. It acts as "an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs" and the mediums through
which the people act in their corporate capacity on local concerns. In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to
expressly secure the consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries
of local government units through a plebiscite.
(2) No. [The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has only 93,719
registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while District 2 is composed
mostly of urban barangays.]
The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the
number of registered voters therein. The Court took judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National Statistics
Office which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oro's first district have a total population of 254,644, while the
second district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts.
The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging
equality of representation. In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand
shall have one representative," while ensuring representation for every province regardless of the size of its population. To
ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local government units as they are found
and does not require their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are
satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as practicable.
- Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013)
Decision:
Facts:
Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the
COMELEC a petition to cancel the COC of Regina Reyes on the ground that she is not a Filipino citizen and she did not
meet the minimum residency requirement, among others.
Issue:
Whether or not Reyes is eligible as a district representative?
Held:
No. There is no showing whatsoever that petitioner had already reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225
so as to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the Philippines. There being no proof that petitioner had
renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
Resolution:
Facts:
Four days before the May 18, 2013 proclamation, the COMELEC En Banc had already denied Regina Reyes’ MR on its
decision cancelling her COC. Despite such decision, Reyes did not seek relief from the Supreme Court but she was able to
secure her proclamation as the respresentative of Marinduque. Her proclamation, she argues, ousted the COMELEC of
jurisdiction to determine her eligibility for office and it is the HRET which has jurisdiction to do so.
Issue:
Whether or not Reyes’ proclamation was valid and that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction to determine her
qualifications for office?
Held:
No. It is error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a
Member of the House of Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision. It is, however
unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at present.
The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such membership. Indeed, the
action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the
right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the
COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the
COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's
ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation.
The bar remained when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days from 14
May 2013.
Discussion:
On Jurisdiction of HRET:
HRET’s jurisdiction as the the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
When is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives?

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
b. Party-list System, RA 7941
The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Political Party – refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions.
It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes
or characteristics, employment, interest or concerns. [see above to qualify as national organization and/or regional
organization]
Sections 4-6, 8-9.

Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition already registered with the
Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with the Commission, not
later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system
Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-
list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not
later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list
representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in
the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office
in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after
the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his
nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not
be considered resigned.
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on
the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Cases:
- BANAT v Comelec, 586 SCRA 210 (2009) and 592 SCRA 294 (2009)
Facts:
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the partylist representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900
votes cast for 93 parties under the PartyList System. BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of PartyList
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT brought the
following:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for partylist representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the threeseat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the partylist representatives be allocated?
Discussion:
The Philippinestyle partylist election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans:
First, the twenty percent allocation: the combined number of all partylist congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of
the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold: only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the partylist system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the threeseat limit: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes.
Number of PartyList Representatives: The Formula Mandated by the Constitution:

In determining the allocation of seats for partylist representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
The percentage of votes garnered by each partylist candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by
each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for partylist candidates. There are two steps in the second round
of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between
the 55 maximum seats reserved under the PartyList System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the twopercenters. The whole
integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one partylist seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats
are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we
apply the threeseat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified partylist candidate is entitled.
Participation of Major Political Parties in PartyList Elections

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the partylist system. On
the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party list elections
through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19 22, any permanent
sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the partylist system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that
participates in partylist elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the partylist elections. Excluding the major political parties in partylist elections
is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.
- Atong Paglaum, Inc. v Comelec, 694 SCRA 477 (2013)
54 petitions were filed by different organizations whose application for registration as party-list organization were denied
by the COMELEC mainly because they are not from marginalized sectors.
Parameters laid down for party-list system:

1. Three different groups may participate in the partylist system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties
or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in partylist elections provided they register under the partylist system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the
partylist system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well defined
political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "welldefined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "welldefined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "welldefined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must
have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bonafide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
- Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. v Comelec, 201 SCRA 786 (2013)
Facts:
In May 2010 elections, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (Senior Citizens) participated in the
party-list elections. On May 5, 2010, the nominees of Senior Citizens executed a term-sharing agreement as follows:
If only one (1) seat is won: No. 1 nominee = 2 years; No. 2 nominee = 1 year
If two (2) seats are won: No. 1 nominee = 3 years; No. 2 nominee = 1 1⁄2 years; No. 3 nominee = 1 1⁄2 years
If three (3) seats are won: No. 1 nominee = 3 years; No. 2 nominee = 2 years; No. 3 nominee = 2 years; No. 4 nominee = 1
year; No. 5 nominee = 1 year
After the elections, Senior Citizens ranked second among all the partylist candidates and was allocated two seats in the
House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its
second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho). Afterwards, there came the splits among the ranks of Senior Citizens (Arquiza
Group and Datol Group). Datol [the supposed third nominee] was expelled by the Board of Trustees that were allied with
Rep. Arquiza.
Rep. Kho tendered his resignation. Rep. Arquiza informed the COMELEC of the resignation and asked for the
confirmation of 4th nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, as replacement.
In the interim, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 was promulgated which provided that filling of vacancy as a result of
term sharing agreement among nominees of winning partylist groups/organizations shall not be allowed.
When the COMELEC conducted a hearing, the counsel for Senior Citizens admitted that Rep. Kho’s tender of resignation
was made pursuant to the agreement entered into by the organization’s nominees. However, said counsel also stated that
the Board of Trustees of the organization reconsidered the acceptance of Rep. Kho’s resignation and the latter was,
instead, to complete his term.
Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the
Partylist System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name of Senior Citizens. However, the
COMELEC ordered the cancellation of the registration of Senior Citizens based on the previous term-sharing agreement
which according to the COMELEC was violation of laws, rules or regulations relating to elections.
Issue:
Whether or not it was proper for the COMELEC to cancel Senior Citizens’ registration on the ground of its purported
violation of the prohibition against termsharing?
Held:
No. The termsharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto. Verily, how can there be
disobedience on the part of Senior Citizens when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence,
there was no violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of.
- Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015
Facts:
This involves two rival factions of the same partylist organization, the Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating
Koop). One group is headed by petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the Lico Group), who represents the organization in the
House of Representatives, and the other group by Amparo T. Rimas (respondents herein, or the Rimas Group). Wanting
to participate in the May 2010 party-list elections, Ating Koop filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with
petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee. Ating Koop won a seat and Lico subsequently
took his oath of office and thereafter assumed office. Almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim
Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and
corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the termsharing agreement as factual basis for
disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and Bylaws. The Rimas Group then
filed a petition with the COMELEC and prayed that Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating Koop's representative in the
House. The COMELEC Second Division upheld the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop and declared Mascarina
as the duly qualified nominee of the partylist group. The Second Division characterized the issue of the validity of the
expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop as an intraparty leadership dispute, which it could resolve as an incident of
its power to register political parties. The COMELEC En Banc upheld the expulsion of Lico from Ating Koop but
dismissed the petition to expel him from the House of Representatives for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC En Banc
held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion
from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it was the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition. At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of
petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop, explaining that when the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating
Koop, the said Committee's members remained in holdover capacity even after their terms had expired; and that the
COMELEC was not in a position to substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the
expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC can rule on the validity of Lico’s expulsion from Ating Koop?
Held:
No.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the
qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of partylist representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning partylist group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as
member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party list
group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not
the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
The action of COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop was without legal
basis [despite its own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue]. These findings already touch
upon the qualification requiring a partylist nominee to be a bona fide member of the partylist group sought to be
represented.
In the present case, the Petition for Lico's expulsion from the House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from
Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A partylist nominee must have been, among
others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election.
Needless to say, bona fide membership in the partylist group is a continuing qualification. Consequently, the COMELEC
failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his
qualifications to sit in Congress. Thus, the question on the validity of Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is a genuine issue
that falls within the jurisdiction of the HRET, as it unmistakably affects his qualifications as partylist representative.
- Abang Lingkod v Comelec, 708 SCRA 133 (2013)
Facts:
The COMELEC cancelled Abang Lingkod’s registration in the party-list system on the ground that it declared untruthful
statement in its bid for accreditation as a partylist group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately
submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially, Abang Lingkod’s registration was cancelled on the ground that it failed
to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Abang Lingkod is required to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented?
(2) Whether or not the submission of digitally altered photographs amounts to declaring untruthful statement (material
misrepresentation), a ground for cancellation of its registration?
Held:
(1) No. Sectoral parties or organizations, such as Abang Lingkod, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing
their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent.
Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise
stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent.
If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only required
from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not
factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization.
(2) No. Misrepresentation to be considered material should refer to the qualification for elective office and affect the
candidate’s eligibility. Considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a group’s misrepresentation as to its track
record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its registration it is no longer material to its qualification under the
partylist system.
- Abayon v HRET, 612 SCRA 375 (2010)

Facts:
[First case] Daryl Grace Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the HoR
during the 2007 elections. Respondents, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with HRET against Aangat
Tayo and its nominee, Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible because it did not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Also, Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House since she did not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative. Abayon countered that the HRET has no jurisdiction over the petition since the action is a collateral attack
on the registration of Aangat Tayo as partylist, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat
Tayo that was taking a seat in the HoR, and not Abayon. Moreover, all questions involving her eligibility as first nominee
were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo. The HRET dismissed the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upheld its
jurisdiction over the qualifications of Abayon.
[Second case] Jovito Palparan is the first nominee of the Bantay partylist group that won a seat in the 2007 elections.
Respondents filed with HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, Palparan, alleging that
Palparan is ineligible to sit as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized sectors that Bantay
represented. Palparan countered that the HRET has no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list
Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed the membership in the HoR. The HRET dismissed the petition as against
Bantay but upheld its jurisdiction over the qualifications of Palparan.
Issue:
Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the qualifications of party-list nominees who took the seats at the HoR?
Held:
Yes. Although it is the partylist organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and
becomes a member of the HoR. The members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: members x x x who shall
be elected from legislative districts and those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. This means that, from the Constitutions point of view, it is the
party-list representatives who are elected into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are
elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law
established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives
belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. They have the
same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit
their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of
three consecutive terms.
Those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a
nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent.
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for him or her to be a
bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners
Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented
interests that they presumably embody.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list
nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness
of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization
that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a
disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes
with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as
pointed out above, party-list nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
3. Election:
a. Regular election, Article VI, Section 8
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives
shall be held on the second Monday of May.
b. Special election, Article VI, Section 9
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in
the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only
for the unexpired term.
Under RA 6445, no special election shall be conducted if the vacancy occurs 18 months before the election (for Senate) and
one year before the election (for HoR).
4. Organization and Sessions
a. Election of officers, Article VI, Section 16 (1)
The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
b Rules of proceedings, Article VI, Section 16 (3) and 21

Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
not exceed sixty days. [Sec 16(3)]
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected. [Sec. 21]
c. Journal and Record, Article VI, Section, 16 (4)

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may,
in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal.
- Journal v Enrolled Bill
Enrolled Bill Theory – an enrolled bill is one introduced and finally passed by both Houses, authenticated by the proper
officers of each, and approved by the President.
When there is conflict between the enrolled bill and the journal:
Enrolled bill prevails, except as to matters which, under the Constitution, must be entered in the Journal.
Matters required to be entered in the Journal:

1. Yeas and nays on the third and final reading of a bill;
2. Veto message of the President;
3. Yeas and nays on the re-passing of a bill vetoed by the President;
4. Yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of members present.
- Congressional Record, Article VI, Section 16 (4) par. 2
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
d. Regular, Special and Joint Sessions
The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is
fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special
session at any time.
Special Sessions without need of a call:

1. To pass a bill calling for the holding of a special election when there is a vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice
President. The bill shall be deemed certified and shall become a law upon approval on third reading by Congress. [Art.
VII, Section 10]
2. To determine by 2/3 vote whether the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. This occurs
after the Cabinet sends a written declaration to the Senate President and Speaker notifying them of the President’s
disability, a matter disputed by the President, and the Cabinet stands by its findings. [Art. VII, Sec. 11]
3. To extend or revoke the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
[Art. VII, Sec. 18 (2)]
Joint Sessions: When both Houses meet jointly, they vote separately.
XPN: when they convene to revoke or extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Instances when the Congress meets jointly and votes separately:

1. When Congress, acting as Board of Canvassers, breaks the tie between two or more candidates for President and Vice
President;
2. When Congress decides on the question of the President’s inability to discharge the powers and functions of his office;
3. When Congress declares the existence of a state of war;
4. When there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President, and Congress has to confirm the nomination made by the
President.
e. Salaries, Article VI, Section 10, Article XVIII, Section 17
The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. [Article VI, Section 10]
Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the
Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four
thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
[Article XVIII, Section 17]
C. Qualifications, Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications
1. Age, Citizenship, Residence, Literacy and other Qualifications

Case; David vs Poe-Llamanzares, GR 221538, Sep 20, 2016
Facts:
Senator Mary Grace PoeLlamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an infant,
she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on September 3,
1968 at about 9:30 a.m. He later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. She was given the name Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar. Subsequently, she was adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces). The Decision also ordered the change
in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
Rizalito David filed a Petition for Quo Warranto before the Senate Electoral Tribunal against Senator Poe on the ground
that she is not eligible to be a Senator because she is not a natural-born citizen. The SET dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Senator Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore qualifies to be a Senator?
Held:
Yes.
Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being
foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities where
parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains unknown. Resolving this controversy hinges on
constitutional interpretation.
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for an express statement in
the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the
Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the
deliberations of its framers and the implications of international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from several
levels.
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which principally governs: the
Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of "naturalborn citizens." This definition must be harmonized with
Section 1's enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to
the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and
uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent's Filipino parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are naturalborn unless there is substantial evidence to the
contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on
citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the wellbeing of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law,
equal access to opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring natural-
born status for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by contemporaneous construction that considers
related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.
Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino citizenship may be sustained by evidence adduced
in a proper proceeding, which substantially proves that either or both of one's parents is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968. In 1968,
Iloilo, as did most—if not all—Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino population. Private respondent is
described as having "brown almondshaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an ovalshaped face." She
stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall. Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.
These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her biological parents were Filipino. Her
abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly
religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved. The absence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes
the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro,
Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features
nonetheless attest to it. Also, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns
were foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8% probability that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen.
The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino
mother (and are thus naturalborn, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a
whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole purpose."
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional provisions
on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-
being of children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for public service, and to
respect human rights. They must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for requiring naturalborn
status for select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction that considers
related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.
Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution require the state to enhance children's well being
and to protect them from conditions prejudicial to or that may undermine their development.
Concluding that foundlings are not naturalborn Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating against our
foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount
to excluding them from certain means such as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of
their aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the present
politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular politician from office.
Concluding that foundlings are not naturalborn citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that
inferiority through no fault of their own.
Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the confines of constitutional text, the presumption that
foundlings are naturalborn citizens of the Philippines (unless substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of both of the
foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a parallel consideration or contemporaneous construction of the
Constitution with acts of Congress, international instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of executive
organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President of the Philippines.
The Philippines likewise ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As with the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, this treaty requires that children be allowed immediate registration after birth and to acquire a
nationality.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object of discrimination. They are vested with
the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and
render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate them, and undermine their development.
2. Freedom from arrest, Article VI, Section 11; Privileged Speech and Debate Clauses, Section 11
Freedom from arrest:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.
Privileged Speech and Debate Clauses:

No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
3. Incompatible and Prohibited Offices, Article VI, Sections 13, 14
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. [Incompatible office]
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the
term for which he was elected. [Forbidden office]
Other restrictions:
1. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
2. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
3. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
Case: Liban v Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011)
Facts:
A petition was filed to declare Richard Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the senate. Petitioners are officers of the
Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter. During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of
the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of
Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased
to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioners claim that PNRC is a
governmentowned or controlled corporation.
Issue:
Whether or not by being the Chairman of PNRC, Senator Gordon has forfeited his seat in the senate?
Held:
No. The PNRC is a nonprofit, donorfunded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely,
effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race,
religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva
Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention
of 27 July 1929. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental
Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous
and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during
international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed
conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be
seen as governmentowned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or
as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies
when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent in order to conduct
its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency
that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission
as a National Red Cross Society. It is imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation
to the State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the
government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets
and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.
It cannot also be under the Executive Branch because the President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither
does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman
is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads
us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not
being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or
employment.
In sum, the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
[The Resolution only reversed the decision declaring some of the provisions of the Charter of the Philippine Red Cross as void. They
are now valid.]
4. Duty to disclose, Article XI, Section 17, Article VI, Sections 12, 20
A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the
manner provided by law. [Article XI, Sec. 17]
All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of
their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may
arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. [Sec. 12]
The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law,
and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts
paid to and expenses incurred for each Member. [Sec. 20]
D. Quorum and voting majorities, Article VI, Section 16 (2)
A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
Note: The majority refers only to members who are in the country.
E. Discipline of members, Article VI, Section 16 (3)
Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
not exceed sixty days.
Case: Pobre v Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1 (2009)
Facts:
Antero Pobre filed a disbarment case against Senator Miriam Santiago following a speech delivered by the latter on the
Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I
am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if
I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
Senator Santiago explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
Issue:
Whether or not the speech made by Senator Santiago was covered by parliamentary immunity?
Held:
Yes. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity,
parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from
deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good.
The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial
upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the
motives. Indeed, Senator Santiago’s privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the
Rules of Court.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using,
under any circumstance, offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution. But as
to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone
referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
F. Powers of Congress
1. Legislative
a. Legislative Inquiry and Oversight Functions, Article VI, Sections 21 & 22
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected. [Sec. 21]
The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either
House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. [Sec. 22]
Cases:
- Makalintal v Comelec, GR 157013, Jul 10, 2003
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) is unconstitutional on the following
grounds:
A. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1,
Article IX-A of the Constitution?
No. The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional
provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IXA of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC shall be independent.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate
of independence of the COMELEC.
Justice Puno’s Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of
and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation
of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest
Categories of congressional oversight functions:

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its primary
purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative
scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.
Legislative scrutiny is based primarily on the power of appropriation of Congress. Under the Constitution, the power
of the purse belongs to Congress. The President may propose the budget, but still, Congress has the final say on
appropriations. Consequently, administrative officials appear every year before the appropriation committees of
Congress to report and submit a budget estimate and a program of administration for the succeeding fiscal year. During
budget hearings, administrative officials defend their budget proposals. Also, Congress can ask the heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either House of Congress on any matter pertaining to their
departments.
Likewise, Congress exercises legislative scrutiny thru its power of confirmation.
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily
available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts.
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision.
Supervision connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive
operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past
executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows
Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that
delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions
when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These
provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a right to
approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a
proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not
affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed
regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.
Other issues:
B. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
No. The intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to Congress the responsibility of devising a system of
absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as stated in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This
is in fact the reason why the Constitutional Commission opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to the
system of absentee voting that Congress should draw up. It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission
provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication
in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2
indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with
respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in
the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution.
Second, residency has been interpreted as synonymous with domicile.
Lastly, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The
affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and
resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d)
violates the Constitution that proscribes provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be
qualified to vote in a political exercise.
C. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national
offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall
be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said
Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the
positions of president and vicepresident.
In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:
18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit
via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and
the Statements of Votes to the Commission, . . .
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the returns of every election for
President and VicePresident shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and partylist representatives but not as to the power to
canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and VicePresident which is lodged with Congress
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
- Abakada group Party List v Purisima, GR 166715, Aug 14, 2008

Facts:
The Congress enacted Republic Act 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005). RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue
the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose. Petitioners assails the constitutionality of RA 9335. One of their contentions is that the creation
of a congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional
oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law. On the other
hand, the OSG argues that the creation of the congressional oversight committee enhances, rather than violates,
separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over accumulation of
power on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.
Issue:
Whether or not the creation of a Joint Congressional Committee to approve the IRR of RA 9335 violates the doctrine of
separation of powers?
Held:
Yes.
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding
of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns postenactment
measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive
usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.
Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers
as it prevents the overaccumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes
two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws
and presentment.
Thus, any postenactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with
it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining
to their departments and its power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative
vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a
"right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the
form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inwardturning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts
to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
Scrutiny (Question Hour) Investigation (Inquiries in aid of legislation)

Nature Looks backward Looks forward
Basis Checks and balance Congress’ plenary powers (to make laws)
Scope Limited to heads of departments Everyone
b. Bicameral Conference Committee
If there are two versions of a bill on the same subject, a Conference Committee is organized composed of equal number of
members from the Senate and the House to make recommendations to the respective chambers on how to reconcile the
two versions of the bill. At the end of the process, the committee comes up with a Conference Committee Report which is
then submitted to the respective chambers for approval.
c. Limitations on legislative power
Bill of Rights:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. [Sec. 4]
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. [Sec.5]
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. [Sec. 10]
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. [Sec. 22]
Others:
No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence. [Sec. 30]
No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted. [Sec. 31]
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. [Sec. 28]
- Limitation on Revenue, Appropriations and Tariff Measures
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments. [Sec. 24, Art. VI]
- Presidential Veto and Congressional Override
[Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)]. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where
it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or
nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate
his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.
- Prohibition against passage of irrepealable laws

d. Passage of laws
- Requirement as to bills
- As to titles of bills, Article VI, Section 26 (1)
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Purpose: To avoid hodge-podge or log rolling legislations.
Case: Imbong v Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146 (2014)
Facts:
The petitioners question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, prescribing the one subjectone title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent to act as a population control measure.
Issue:
Whether or not the RH Law violates the one subject-one title rule?
Held:
No. While the central idea of RH Law is contraception, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
It is wellsettled that the "one titleone subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so
as not to cripple or impede legislation."
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or
in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason
to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
- How does a bill become a law?
[Sec. 26] No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when
the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
First Reading: Only the title of the bill or resolution is read before the House. The presiding officer then refers the bill to
the proper committee for appropriate action. After due consideration of the bill or resolution, the latter is returned to the
body together with the committee’s amendments, objections or recommendations. If the report is favorable, the bill is
calendared for second reading. If the report is unfavorable, the matter shall be laid on the table, unless the body as a
whole decides otherwise.
Second Reading: The bill or resolution is read in full before the floor, with such amendments as proposed by the
committee. A period of debate, discussion and amendment will ensue. Thereafter, a motion to close the debate is made
and a vote is taken on whether or not to pass the bill on the basis of the amendments and discussion. The bill as amended
and approved is printed in final form and copies are distributed to the membership three days before its passage.
Third Reading: The bill or resolution is announced by its name and title on the floor and a vote is taken right away, with
the yeas and nays entered into the journal. Amendments are no longer allowed.
Three ways for a bill to become a law:

1. Upon approval by the President;
2. When the veto of the President is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of both Houses;
3. Upon failure of the President to vote on the bill and to return it with his objections, to the House where it originated,
within 30 days after the date of receipt. [Presidential inaction]
- Effectivity of laws, NCC, Article 2
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
2. Non-legislative
a. National Board of Canvassers, Article VII, Section 4 (4)
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province
or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
b. Calling for special election, Article VII, Section 10
The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-
President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for
a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty
days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section
26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.
Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be
suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen
months before the date of the next presidential election.
c. Decide temporary disability of the President, Article VI, Section 11
To determine by 2/3 vote whether the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. This occurs
after the Cabinet sends a written declaration to the Senate President and Speaker notifying them of the President’s
disability, a matter disputed by the President, and the Cabinet stands by its findings. [Art. VII, Sec. 11]
For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules
and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it
is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as the President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
d. Veto or extension of habeas corpus and martial law, Article VII, Section 18
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
e. Approval of amnesty, Article VII, Section 19
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
h. Senate concurrence in treaties, Article VII, Section 21
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
i. Declaring a state of war or national emergency, Article VI, Section 23
(1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole
power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
j. Utilization of natural resources, Article XII, Section 2
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.
k. Constituent assembly to amend or revise the Constitution, Article XVII, Sections 2-4 [See
Discussion on Amendments and Revisions]
l. Initiate impeachment, Article XI, Section 3
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to arm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Impeachable public officers:

1. President;
2. Vice President;
3. Members of the Supreme Court;
4. Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
5. Ombudsman.
Grounds:
1. culpable violation of the Constitution;
2. treason;
3. bribery;
4. graft and corruption;
5. other high crimes; or
6. betrayal of public trust.
m. HRET and SET, Article VI, Section 17
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
n. Commission on Appointments, Article VI, Section 18
There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve
Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
o. Approve national budget Article VI, Section 25
p. JBC (one seat)

A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as
ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative
of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(1)]
r. Informing power
Cases:
- Belgica v Ochoa, Jr. 710 SCRA 1 (2013)
Issue: Whether or not the Pork Barrel System violates the doctrine of separation of powers?
Held:
Yes. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation
or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and
balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere
oversight. Any postenactmentmeasure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional
basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.
From its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators
to participate in the postenactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program menus – have been consistently
accorded postenactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork
Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects postGAA may be
construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To
elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows
individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general program listed in
the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the
GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by
implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators
to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing.
Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators" and
thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2
of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that
legislators have been accorded postenactment authority to identify PDAF projects.
Clearly, these postenactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have
been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of
budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release
of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada,
cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any
of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law.
- Abakada Guro Party List v Purisima, 562 SCRA 251 (2008) [see above]
Voting majorities required in Congress under the 1987 Constitution
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
REQUIRED VOTE
Concurrence in a treaty or international 2/3 of ALL the Members of the Senate (Sec.
agreements 21, Art. VII)
Senate
2/3 of ALL the Members of the Senate (Sec.
Conviction in impeachment cases
3[6], Art. XI)
House of 1/3 of ALL the Members of the House of

Affirm/Override a Resolution to impeach
Representatives Representatives (Sec. 3[3], Art. XI)
Common to both Election of President or Speaker of the House, as MAJORITY of ALL of its respective
Houses the case may be Members (Sec. 16[1], Art. VI)
MAJORITY of each House (Sec. 16[2], Art.

Quorum to do business VI)
2/3 of ALL of its Members (Sec. 16[3], Art.

Discipline Members for disorderly behavior
VI)
[suspend or expel]
1/5 of the Members present (Sec. 16[4], Art.

Request of matters to be entered in the Journal
VI)
2/3 of both Houses in joint session

Declaration of the existence of a State of War assembled, voting separately (Sec. 23[1], Art.
VI)
2/3 of ALL the Members of such House

Overriding the President’s Veto (Sec. 27[1], Art. VI)
MAJORITY of ALL the Members of the

Grant of tax exemption Congress (Sec. 28[4], Art. VI)
Breaking a tie in cases of President and Vice MAJORITY of ALL the Members of both
President elections Houses, voting separately (Sec. 4, Art VII)
MAJORITY vote of ALL the Members of

Confirmation of a new Vice President nominated both Houses of Congress, voting separately
by the President (Sec. 9, Art. VII)
Determination whether or not the President is
2/3 of both Houses, voting separately (Sec.
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
11, Art. VII)
office
Revocation of the proclamation of Martial Law or

MAJORITY of ALL its Members, voting
suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
jointly (Sec. 18, Art. VII)
Corpus
Extension of the proclamation of Martial Law or

MAJORITY of ALL its members, voting
suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
jointly (Sec. 18, Art. VII)
Corpus
Concurrence with President’s grant of amnesty

MAJORITY of ALL the Members of the
Congress (Sec. 19, Art. VII)
Amendment/Revision of the 1987 Constitution (as

a Constituent Assembly) 3⁄4 of ALL the Members of the Congress
(Sec. 1[1], Art. XVII)
Calling of Constitutional Convention

2/3 of ALL of the Members of the Congress
(Sec. 3, Art. XVII)
Submitting to the electorate the question of calling MAJORITY vote of ALL its Members (Sec. 3,
a Constitutional Convention Art. XVII)
MAJORITY vote of ALL the Members (Sec.

Commission on Approval/Rejection of Appointment
Appointments 18, Art. VI)
IX. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, Article VII
A. The President
1. Qualifications, election, term and oath, Article VII, Sections 1, 4 & 5
Sec. 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Qualifications:
Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless he is
(1) a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
(2) a registered voter,
(3) able to read and write,
(4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and
(5) a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Case: Macalintal v PET, 635 SCRA 783 (2010), 651 SCRA 239 (2011)
Facts:
Romulo Macalintal questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized
progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the
creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and
confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate. Also, the constitution of the PET, with the designation of the
Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law to any agency
performing quasijudicial or administrative functions.
Issue:
Whether or not the constitution of PET is unconstitutional?
Held:
No. On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET. But neither does it
preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should be
read with other related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests
involving our country’s highest public officials, and its rulemaking authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it
includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.
The establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en
banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme
Court’s method of deciding presidential and vicepresidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in
the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal.
It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully
complies – not unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the
nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively,
was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.
When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vicepresidential election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power. With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the
plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution
draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by
the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the
Supreme Court.
2. Privileges, Prohibition, Inhibitions and Disqualifications, Article VII, Sections 6, 13
[Sec. 6.] The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be
determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during
their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.
[Sec. 13.] The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his
tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
Case: Pormento v Estrada, 629 SCRA 530 (2010)
Facts:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11,
1998. He was removed from office in 2001. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010.
Petitioner Atty. Evillo Pormento opposed Estrada’s candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification. Because his petition
was denied by the COMELEC, Estrada was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10,
2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes. Estrada was not elected President the second time
he ran.
Issue:
Whether or not Estrada was covered by the ban on the President from any reelection?
Held:
The case has been rendered moot and academic. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection
will be premised on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to
be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial
controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the
essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely
lacking in this case.
3. Presidential immunity
B. Powers and Functions
1. Executive and administrative powers in general

2. Power of appointment and removal, Article VII, Sections 13-16
a. In general
Cases:
- Funa v Ermita, 612 SCRA 308 (2010)
Facts:
Maria Elena Bautista was appointed as Undersecretary of DOTC. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport of the department. Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente Suazo, Jr., Bautista was
designated as OfficerinCharge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary. Dennis Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition
challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the
President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or
employment.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA concurrently as Undersecretary of DOTC violates Sec. 13,
Art. VII of the Constitution?
Held:
Yes. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President, VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
These sweeping, allembracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not
similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in
general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his
official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In
other words, Section 7, Article IXB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public
officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the
VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The phrase unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself,
to wit: the VicePresident being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as
President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX B
where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC
of MARINA in an exofficio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the Authority, it cannot be considered that Bautista’s
designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a
member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator
as ViceChairman, and the following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority
General Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager,
and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary.
- Funa v Agra, 691 SCRA 196 (2013)
Facts:
Alberto Agra was appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST
Devanadera. Subsequently, he was designated as Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity. Dennis Funa
challenged the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet
and their deputies and assistants?
Held:
Yes. Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General,
therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly
indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the
Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in government owned or
government controlledcorporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office,
or to be in possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the
functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference
to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official
must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without
question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants.
To underscore the obvious, it is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was "allowed by law or
the primary functions of his position." To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, he needed to establish herein that his concurrent designation was expressly
allowed by the Constitution. But, alas, he did not do so.
To be sure, Agra’s concurrent designations as Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General did not come within
the definition of an ex officio capacity. The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority
derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the
official position." Ex officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a board is
one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.
Even assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General, was not covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, he
nonetheless remained covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra.
The general rule contained in Article IXB of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold more than one
office only if "allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position." In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court
ruled that, "[t]here is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the
functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility." The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists
between two offices was laid out in People v. Green whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one
office has the right to interfere with the other.
[I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two; x x x Where one office is not
subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that
incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the
word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not
to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to
faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. X x x The offices must
subordinate, one [over] the other, and they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one with the other, before they are
incompatible at common law.
Clearly, the primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary to the primary functions of
the Department of Justice. Considering that the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper,
from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further
warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as
the Acting Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the Constitution.
De facto officer doctrine:

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer,
who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to
the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached
to the office.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an
appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is
discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as
valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.
b. Commission on Appointments confirmation

- permanent or temporary
Permanent appointments are those extended to persons possessing the requisite eligibility and are thus protected by the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and without the necessity of just
cause or a valid investigation; made on the understanding that the appointing power has not yet decided on a permanent
appointee and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a permanent choice is made.
An acting appointment is a temporary appointment and revocable in character.
Steps in the appointing process:

1. For regular appointment:
a. Nomination by the President;
b. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;
c. Issuance of the commission;
d. Acceptance by the appointee.
2. For appointments which do not require confirmation:

a. appointment by appointing authority;
b. issuance of the commission;
c. acceptance by the appointee.
Classes of Service
1. Career Service – characterized by entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable by
competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications, opportunity for advancement to higher
career positions, and security of tenure.
a. Open career positions – prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;
b. Closed career positions – scientific or highly technical in nature;
c. Career Executive Service – undersecretaries, bureau directors, etc., where the appointee is required to possess
the appropriate Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) eligibility;
d. Career Officers (other than those belong to the Career Executive Service) who are appointed by the President;
e. Positions in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, although governed by a separate merit system;
f. Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter;
g. Permanent laborers.
2. Non-career Service - characterized by entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests utilized for the career
service, tenure limited to a period specified by law, or which is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority
or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the
employment was made.
a. Elective officials and their personal and confidential staff;
b. Department Heads and officials of Cabinet rank who hold office at the pleasure of the President, and their
personal and confidential staff;
c. Chairmen and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office, and their personal and
confidential staff.
d. Contractual personnel or those whose employment in government is on accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period not exceeding one year, under their own responsibility, with the minimum
direction and supervision; and
e. Emergency and seasonal personnel.
Exceptions from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service:
1. Policy determining – in which the officer lays down principal or fundamental guidelines or rules; or formulates a
method of action for government or any of its subdivisions, e.g. a department head.
2. Primarily confidential – denoting not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office
but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings or betrayals on confidential matters of state; or one declared to be so by the President of the
Philippines upon recommendation of the Civil Service Commission.
3. Highly technical – which requires possession of technical skill or training in a supreme or superior degree.
Definition of terms:
1. Appointment – the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to perform the
functions of a given office.
2. Commission – the written evidence of the appointment.
3. Designation – the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a person already in public service.
4. Promotion – a movement from one position to another with increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized
by law and usually accompanied by an increase in pay.
5. Transfer – movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in
service.
6. Reinstatement – any person who has been permanently appointed to a position in the career service and who has,
through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same
level for which he is qualified.
7. Detail – the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment, and
shall be allowed only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific
positions.
8. Reassignment – movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or
agency, which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.
9. Reemployment – names of persons who have been appointed permanently to positions in the career service and
who have been separated as a result of reduction in force and/or reorganization, shall be entered in a list from
which selection for reemployment shall be made.
- regular or ad interim
A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session, takes effect only after confirmation by
the COA, and once approved, continues until the end of the term of the appointee.
An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in session, takes effect immediately, but
ceases to be valid if disapproved by the COA or upon the next adjournment of Congress.
g. Midnight appointments
[Sec. 15.] Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Cases:
- De Castro v JBC, 615 SCRA 666 (2010)
Facts:
Chief Justice Renato Puno was set to retire on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section
4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a
list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
In January 2010, the JBC has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance
with its rules, however, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position
due to the present controversy on the seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitutions:
Section 15, Art. VII provides:

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Section 4 (1), Article VIII provides:

The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary?
Held:
No.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the
Constitution. The 90day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and
cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because
it was couched in stronger negative language.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, the Court concluded that the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did
not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their
subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process
of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in
the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of
his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, the appointments
to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBCs
prior processing of candidates. Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary
can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations.
The experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at any level
backed by people influential with the President could not always be assured of being recommended for the consideration
of the President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the
JBC was precisely intended to depoliticize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on
Appointments.
Moreover, Section 14 and Section 16 of Art. VII refer only to appointments within the Executive Department means that
that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If
that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
- Velicaria-Garafil v O.P. GR 203372, Jun 16, 2015
Facts:
Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued more than 800
appointments to various positions in several government offices. The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, March 10, 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day,
March 11, 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments.
When President Benigno Aquino assumed office as President, he issued Executive Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing,
and revoking appointments issued by President MacapagalArroyo which violated the constitutional ban on midnight
appointments. Consequently, the following petitions were filed when the said EO was enforced by different executive
agencies. Petitioners’ schedule of appointments are detailed in the table below:
Date of Receipt by
Date of Appointment Date of Transmittal Date of Oath of
G.R. No. Malacañang Records Assumption of Office
Letter Letter Office
Office (MRO)
203372 (Atty. Velicaria

5 March 2010 8 March 2010 13 May 2010 22 March 2010 6 April 2010
Garafil)
206290 (Atty.
23 February 2010 9 March 2010 12 March 2010 15 March 2010 15 March 2010
Venturanza)
209138 (Villanueva) 3 March 2010 4 May 2010 13 April 2010
209138 (Rosquita) 5 March 2010 13 May 2010 18 March 2010

212030 (Atty. 25 March 2010 and
1 March 2010
Tamondong) 6 July 2010
Issue:
Whether or not the above appointments violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments?
Held:
Yes.
Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post is a process that takes several steps to complete.
Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, must consist of the President signing an appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office, the official
transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee,
and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to
office.
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete
and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the
appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the
appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is
made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should
always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step.
In this case, all of petitioners' appointments are midnight appointments and are void for violation of Section 15, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution. None of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal letters)
have been issued (and released) before the ban." The dates of receipt by the MRO, which in these cases are the only
reliable evidence of actual transmittal of the appointment papers by President MacapagalArroyo, are dates clearly falling
during the appointment ban. Thus, all the appointments in these cases are midnight appointments in violation of Section
15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment process leads us to the very evil which we seek to avoid (i.e.,
antedating of appointments). Excluding the act of acceptance will only provide more occasions to honor the
Constitutional provision in the breach. The inclusion of acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the entire
appointment process prevents the abuse of the Presidential power to appoint. It is relatively easy to antedate appointment
papers and make it appear that they were issued prior to the appointment ban, but it is more difficult to simulate the
entire appointment process up until acceptance by the appointee.
Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with
certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect.
3. Power of control and supervision, Article VII, Section 17
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
a. Doctrine of qualified political agency / alter ego principle
Under this doctrine which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executives and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act
in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries
of such departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are unless disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Cse: Hontiveros-Baraquel v Toll Regulatory Board, GR 181293, Feb 23, 2015
Facts:
The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government, the collection of toll
fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private sector. Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) was
given the right, privilege, and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon
Toll Expressways for a period of 30 years starting 1 May 1977. TRB and PNCC later entered into a Toll Operation
Agreement (TOA).
PNCC entered into an agreement with PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada (CITRA) whereby the latter committed to provide
PNCC with a prefeasibility study on the proposed Metro Manila Expressway (MME) project. As a result of the feasibility
and related studies, PNCC and CITRA submitted, through the TRB, a Joint Investment Proposal (JIP) to the Republic of
the Philippines. The JIP embodied the implementation schedule for the financing, design and construction of the MMS in
three stages: the South Metro Manila Skyway, the North Metro Manila Skyway, and the Central Metro Manila Skyway.
PNCC and CITRA then entered into a Business and Joint Venture Agreement and created the Citra Metro Manila
Tollways Corporation (CMMTC). CMMTC was a joint venture corporation organized under Philippine laws to serve as a
channel through which CITRA shall participate in the construction and development of the project. The Republic of the
Philippines – through the TRB – as Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll
Operation Agreement (STOA) covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway.
Under the STOA, the design and construction of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and
responsibility of CMMTC. The operation and maintenance of the project roads became the primary and exclusive
privilege and responsibility of the PNCC Skyway Corporation (PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC, which
undertook and performed the latter’s obligations under the STOA. CMMTC completed the design and construction of
Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway, which was operated and maintained by PSC. Subsequently, the Republic of
the Philippines, through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed an Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation
Agreement (ASTOA). The ASTOA incorporated the amendments, revisions, and modifications necessary to cover the
design and construction of Stage 2 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Also under the ASTOA, Skyway O & M
Corporation (SOMCO) replaced PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila
Skyway. The DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza approved the ASTOA.
Petitioners now assail the validity of the ASTOA on the ground that the approval by the DOTC Secretary of the ASTOA
could not take the place of the presidential approval required under P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894 concerning the franchise
granted to PNCC, among others.
Respondents countered that there can be no valid objection to the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary,
because he was authorized by the President to do so by virtue of E.O. 497. Also, the phrase “subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines” in P.D. 1112 and 1113 does not in any way mean that the presidential approval must be
obtained prior to the execution of a contract, or that the approval be made personally by the President. The presidential
approval may be obtained under the doctrine of qualified political agency.
Issue:
Whether or not the approval of the DOTC Secretary of the ASTOA was valid?
Held:
Yes. The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or the
circumstances require the President to act personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through
executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the President unless
disapproved by the latter.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, we have ruled that the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources can validly order the transfer of a regional office by virtue of the power of the President to reorganize the
national government. In Constantino v. Cuisia, the Court upheld the authority of the Secretary of Finance to execute debt -
relief contracts. The authority emanates from the power of the President to contract foreign loans under Section 20, Article
VII of the Constitution. In Angeles v. Gaite, the Court ruled that there can be no issue with regard to the President’s act of
limiting his power to review decisions and orders of the Secretary of Justice, especially since the decision or order was
issued by the secretary, the President’s “own alter ego.”
There can be no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President, unless repudiated by the latter. In this
case, approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary had the same effect as approval by the President. The same would
be true even without the issuance of E.O. 497, in which the President, on 24 January 2006, specifically delegated to the
DOTC Secretary the authority to approve contracts entered into by the TRB.
b. Executive departments and offices

c. General supervision over local government units, Article X
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that
the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
- Direct and indirect supervision, RA 7160, Local Government Code of 1991

4. Military powers (Commander-in Chief), Article VII, Section 18; Article II, Section 15;
Article VIII, Section 1 (2)
a. calling out power
b. Habeas Corpus
c. Martial law
Cases:
- Kulayan v Tan, 675 SCRA 482 (2012)
Facts:
Three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped by three armed men who were
later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
In March 2009, Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu, issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of
2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident as a
ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also
invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the
power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the same Proclamation,
respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF [Civilian Emergency Force, a group of armed male civilians coming
from different municipalities], to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including
arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.
Some residents were detained pursuant to the said Proclamation for being suspected as ASG supporters.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines contending that they
were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the
Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not a Provincial Governor has the power to declare a state of national emergency and exercise emergency
powers?
(2) Whether or not the Provincial Governor has power to convene CEF?
Held:
(1) No.
Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed
Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is
exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not
be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code which justifies the acts sanctioned under the said Proclamation. Not even
Section 465 of the said Code, in relation to Section 16.
Tan cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 above, as the said provision expressly refers to
calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly
empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the
case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. He cannot find any legal mooring under this provision to
justify its actions.
Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines does not fall under the category of a “national law enforcement agency,” to which the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong.
Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic against all
enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national territory. Second, there was no
evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces were inadequate to cope with the situation or
apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the provincial governor was to ask the assistance of the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government, or such other authorized officials, for the assistance of national law
enforcement agencies.
(2) No. Pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force, the organization of private citizen armies is
proscribed.
Discussion:
There is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. Corollarily, it is only the President,
as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the
Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts which,
by their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is
the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the “calling-out” powers constitutes a portion.
Moreover, a local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police, and
may exercise control only in day-to-day operations, it is still the President who is authorized to exercise supervision and
control over the police, through the National Police Commission. The framers never intended for local chief executives to
exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations.
- Ampatuan v Puno, 651 SCRA 228 (2011)

Facts:
After the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal -
Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato
under a state of emergency. She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP) to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in the named places.
President Arroyo also issued Administrative Order 273 (AO 273) transferring supervision of the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
But, due to issues raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the President issued Administrative Order 273A (AO 273-
A) amending the former, by delegating instead of transferring supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.
Petitioners subsequently assail the validity of the proclamation and the orders which empowered the DILG Secretary to
take over ARMMs operations and seize the regional governments powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy
under Republic Act 9054 (also known as the Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the DILG
Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since the latter could
suspend ARMM officials and replace them. Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for
declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical
violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of
the Presidents emergency powers.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273A violate the principle of local autonomy under Section 16,
Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act?
(2) Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City ?
Held:
(1) No. The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took
respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-
Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on
succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the
ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner SahaliGenerale, Acting ARMM ViceGovernor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not
take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
(2) No. Such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she
did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out
of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests
in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the CommanderinChief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
It is to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to
prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.
- Fortun v Macapagal-Arroyo 668 SCRA 504 (2012)
Facts:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President
Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of persons that
have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that
province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Two days later (December 6, 2009), President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009 Congress, in
joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the Presidents
action. But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation
1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959.
Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation 1959 is unconstitutional?
Held:
The case is moot and academic. President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which
had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court
has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy
Discussion:
Although the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is specifically vested in
the President, he shares such power with the Congress. Thus:
1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in writing to Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or suspension for
the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or suspension, allow their limited
effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems warranted.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to
proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially,
but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can
maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its
own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend
the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of
the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the
hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. If the Congress procrastinates or
altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the
Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. [note: this
passage will be revisited in Lagman vs. Medialdiea; in that case, the SC said that the Court can simultaneously exercise its
power of review with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or
default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review]
- Lagman v Medialdea, GR 231658, Jul 4, 2017
Facts:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No.
216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. He
cited the series of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack on the military outpost in Butig,
Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August
2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees and that the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a
hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government
and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and started flying the flag of the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas.
Several petitions were filed questioning the validity of Proclamation No. 216 on the following grounds:
(1) the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis;
(2) there is no factual basis for the imposition of martial law in the entire Mindanao.
Main Issue: whether Proclamation No. 216, Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao, lacks sufficient factual basis?
Preliminaries:
The President as the CommanderinChief wields the extraordinary powers of: a) calling out the armed forces; b)
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial law. These powers may be resorted to only
under specified conditions.
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary police action. The
President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being that he acts
within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion. In fact, "the actual
use to which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not subject to judicial review."
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be
exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the
following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by
Congress; [and] (3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court."
What really happens during martial law?
A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power, which is normally a
function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure
public safety and in place of government agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a
locality, which remains under the control of the State. Quoting Justice Mendoza, under a valid declaration of martial law,
the President as CommanderinChief may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x
x" But the abovecited acts that the President may perform do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of
civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does
it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain
in place during its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such
suspension applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.
What is the scope of the power of judicial review on the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus?
The "sufficiency of factual basis test"- The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it
only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases.
As CommanderinChief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these
powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis
for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he
made the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written
Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made
or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President. Past events may be
considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as these are connected or related to the current
situation existing at the time of the declaration.
Thus, the review would be limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the
Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient
for him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
What are parameters for determining the sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
l) actual rebellion or invasion;
2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and
3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
Whether Proclamation No. 216, Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the whole of Mindanao, lacks sufficient factual basis?
No. A review of the facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a
portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached
after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
Inaccuracies in the reports relied upon by the President are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged
false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists. Moreover, the
Court is not concerned about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would unduly tie
the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation.
Whether or not the declaration of martial law in the WHOLE of Mindanao justified?
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
[the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a
part thereof under martial law.
The “gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government;" and that by nature,
"rebellion is x x x a crime of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a priori, within
predetermined bounds." We understand this to mean that the precise extent or range of the rebellion could not be
measured by exact metes and bounds.
In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of actual
rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory
and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could
only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it
granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law.
Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual
rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to
prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply
lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where
there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof
ineffective and useless.
Also, Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City
thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all roads in Mindanao.
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and
strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao.
5. Pardoning powers, Section 19, Article IX-C, Section 5

Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Sec. 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be
granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
a, Nature and limitations

Cases:
- Monsanto v Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 190 (1989)
Facts:
Salvacion Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) was convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents. Monsanto appealed her conviction before the Supreme Court but her conviction was
affirmed, she then filed a motion for reconsideration and while that motion was pending, she was extended by President
Marcos an absolute pardon which she accepted.
By reason of said pardon, Monsanto wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post
as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. His letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance and
the latter ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the
date she was extended the absolute pardon. She sought reconsideration arguing that the full pardon bestowed on her has
wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date
of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is
entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension. The Ministry of Finance referred the matter to the Office of the
President. The OP opined that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him
during the period of his suspension pendente lite. In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a
reappointment before he can reassume his former position.
Issue:
Whether or not Monsanto, after her pardon, may be restored to his former position without need of a new appointment?
Held:
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts
the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the
private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is
not complete without acceptance."
At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power was governed by the 1973 Constitution as
amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The pertinent provision reads:
The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, and with
the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.
The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction, implying
that clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her
appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of
final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the
pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the
pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan
assumed the character of finality.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender
is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon
is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been
suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they
were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the
conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt
and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner
may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her
qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and
taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently,
the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it
cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.
- Risos-Vidal v Comelec, 747 SCRA 210 (2015)
Facts:
Sandiganbayan convicted Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of
plunder. He was sentence to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. Subsequently, former President Gloria Arroyo
extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. Former President Estrada received and
accepted the pardon.
In 2012, Estrada filed his COC for the position of Mayor of Manila. Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
Estrada before the COMELEC arguing that Estrada was disqualified to run because of the disqualification [his prior
conviction] under the Local Government Code and in the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC Second Division
dismissed the petition ruling that Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested
upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. The MR was also denied. Hence, the petition before the SC. Risos-Vidal
argues that the pardon granted to former President Estrada was conditional as evidenced by the latter’s express
acceptance thereof. The "acceptance," she claims, is an indication of the conditional natureof the pardon, with the
condition being embodied in the third Whereas Clause of the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office." She explains that the aforementioned commitment
was what impelled former President Arroyo to pardon former President Estrada, without it, the clemency would not have
been extended. And any breach thereof, that is, whenformer President Estrada filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
President and Mayor of the City of Manila, he breached the condition of the pardon; hence, "he ought to be recommitted
to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence and disqualifies him as a candidate for the mayoralty [position] of
Manila." Also, she avers that it is not enough that a pardon makes a general statement that such pardon carries with it the
restoration of civil and political rights. By virtue of Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring civil and political rights without
categorically making mention what specific civil and political rights are restored "shall not work to restore the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage; nor shall it remit the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual
absolute disqualification for the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal.
Issue:
Whether or not former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon
granted to him by former President Arroyo?
Held:
Yes. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the
pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. This doctrine of nondiminution or non-
impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered
to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out
an exception from the pardoning power of the President in the form of "offenses involving graft and corruption" that
would be enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment of a law.
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive power and
prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes.
The Court cannot subscribe to RisosVidal’s interpretation that the said Articles contain specific textual commands which
must be strictly followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential grace from the disqualifications specifically
prescribed by them. The phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights" substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive
clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The
sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the textof the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In this jurisdiction, the right toseek public elective office is recognized by law as falling under the whole gamut of civil
and political rights.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to RisosVidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada
has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor
militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have
been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified
use of the term "civil and political rights" as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential
part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced
by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the
operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the
pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
b. Forms of executive clemency

6. Diplomatic power (Treaty making), Article XII, Section 21
Cases:
- Saguisag v Ochoa, Jr. GR 212426 and 212444, Jan 12, 2016
Main Issue: Can the President enter into the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between RP and US
without the concurrence of Senate?
Petitioners: EDCA is required to be in a treaty and therefore there is a need for Senate concurrence.
Held:
The President had the choice to enter into EDCA by way of an executive agreement or a treaty. No court can tell the
President to desist from choosing an executive agreement over a treaty to embody an international agreement, unless the
case falls squarely within Article XIII, Section 25.
Does EDCA fall under Section 25? No.
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
Article XIII, Section 25 applies only to a proposed agreement between our government and a foreign government,
whereby military bases, troops, or facilities of such foreign government would be "allowed" or would "gain entry"
Philippine territory.
Note that the provision "shall not be allowed" is a negative injunction. This wording signifies that the President is not
authorized by law to allow foreign military bases, troops, or facilities to enter the Philippines, except under a treaty
concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the constitutionally restricted authority pertains to the entry of the bases, troops, or
facilities, and not to the activities to be done after entry.
It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest
of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty.
The admission and presence of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Philippine territory are already allowed under the
VFA, the treaty supposedly being implemented by EDCA. What EDCA has effectively done, in fact, is merely provide the
mechanism to identify the locations in which U.S. personnel may perform allowed activities pursuant to the VFA. As the
implementing agreement, it regulates and limits the presence of U.S. personnel in the country.
The President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the
instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an
existing law or treaty.
Discussion
History of US Military Base in the Philippines (to explain why the VFA already allowed entry of military troops in the
RP):
(1) 1947 Military Base Agreement - The Senate concurred on the premise of "mutuality of security interest," which
provided for the presence and operation of 23 U.S. military bases in the Philippines for 99 years or until the year 2046.
 Ramos-Rusk Agreement of 1966 – reduced the term of the treaty from 99 years to a total of 44 years or until 1991.
(2) Military Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951 - Concurred in by both the Philippine and the U.S. Senates, the treaty has two
main features: first, it allowed for mutual assistance in maintaining and developing their individual and collective
capacities to resist an armed attack; and second, it provided for their mutual self-defense in the event of an armed attack
against the territory of either party.
(3) 16 September 1991 – The Philippine Senate rejected the renewal of the 1947 MBA.
(4) 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) – revived the military arrangements between RP and US.
 Reaffirmation of the obligations under MDT.

 VFA has laid down the regulatory mechanism for the treatment of U.S. military and civilian personnel visiting the
country. It contains provisions on the entry and departure of U.S. personnel; the purpose, extent, and limitations
of their activities; criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction; the waiver of certain claims; the importation and
exportation of equipment, materials, supplies, and other pieces of property owned by the U.S. government; and
the movement of U.S. military vehicles, vessels, and aircraft into and within the country.
 Philippine Senate concurred in the first VFA on 27 May 1999.
(5) January 2002 - U.S. military and civilian personnel started arriving in Mindanao to take part in joint military exercises
with their Filipino counterparts. Called Balikatan, these exercises involved trainings aimed at simulating joint military
maneuvers pursuant to the MDT.
(6) 2014 EDCA - authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed
Locations" in the country.
 President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014.
I. The role of the President as the executor of the law includes the duty to defend the State, for which purpose he may
use that power in the conduct of foreign relations.
In light of this constitutional duty, it is the President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine
defense interests. It is no coincidence that the constitutional provision on the faithful execution clause was followed by
that on the President's commander-in-chief powers, which are specifically granted during extraordinary events of lawless
violence, invasion, or rebellion. And this duty of defending the country is unceasing, even in times when there is no state
of lawlesss violence, invasion, or rebellion. At such times, the President has full powers to ensure the faithful execution of
the laws.
It would therefore be remiss for the President and repugnant to the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution to do
nothing when the call of the moment requires increasing the military's defensive capabilities, which could include forging
alliances with states that hold a common interest with the Philippines or bringing an international suit against an
offending state.
II. Limitation on the President's dual role as defender of the State and as sole authority in foreign relations.
Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution
expressly limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities. The initial
limitation is found in Section 21 of the provisions on the Executive Department: "No treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The specific
limitation is given by Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions, the full text of which reads as follows:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is
not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to
implement an existing law or treaty.
Article XIII, Section 25 applies only to a proposed agreement between our government and a foreign government,
whereby military bases, troops, or facilities of such foreign government would be "allowed" or would "gain entry"
Philippine territory.
Note that the provision "shall not be allowed" is a negative injunction. This wording signifies that the President is not
authorized by law to allow foreign military bases, troops, or facilities to enter the Philippines, except under a treaty
concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the constitutionally restricted authority pertains to the entry of the bases, troops, or
facilities, and not to the activities to be done after entry.
It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest
of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty.
Executive agreements may cover the matter of foreign military forces if it merely involves detail adjustments (EDCA
merely involves "adjustments in detail" in the implementation of the MDT and the VFA).
III. Treaty vs. Executive Agreement
From the viewpoint of International Law:

The distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes
of determining international rights and obligations.
From the domestic setting:

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the Constitution, statutes,
or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under serious
question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not
to defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international
obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of
the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions. Because of legislative
participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable
conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated differently.
Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of
international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.
IV. Guidelines
1. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, contains stringent requirements that must be fulfilled by the international
agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the Philippines: (a) the agreement must
be in the form of a treaty, and (b) it must be duly concurred in by the Senate.
2. If the agreement is not covered by the above situation, then the President may choose the form of the agreement (i.e.,
either an executive agreement or a treaty), provided that the agreement dealing with foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities is not the principal agreement that first allows their entry or presence in the Philippines.
3. The executive agreement must not go beyond the parameters, limitations, and standards set by the law and/or treaty
that the former purports to implement; and must not unduly expand the international obligation expressly mentioned or
necessarily implied in the law or treaty.
4. The executive agreement must be consistent with the Constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaties.
V. Three legal standards to allow foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the Philippines
1. Independence from foreign control;

2. Sovereignty and applicable law;
3. National security and territorial integrity.
- Bayan v Executive Secretary, GR 138570, Oct 10, 2000

Facts:
The Philippines entered into a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States. The VFA was approved by
President Ramos and subsequently, President Estrada also ratified the VFA. The VFA was transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines. It was concurred in by the Senate by a 2/3 votes of its members. The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and
nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed
Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines
Several petitions were filed to assail the constitutionality of the VFA. One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the
determination of which provision of the Constitution applies, with regard to the exercise by the senate of its constitutional
power to concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has
for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that
Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves
merely the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military exercises.
Petitioners also contend that the phrase recognized as a treaty, embodied in section 25, Article XVIII, means that the VFA
should have the advice and consent of the United States Senate pursuant to its own constitutional process, and that it
should not be considered merely an executive agreement by the United States.
Issue:
(1) Which of the two provisions should apply on VFA?

(2) Whether or not the VFA should have the advice and consent of the United States Senate?
Held:
(1) Section 25, Article XVIII.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or
international agreements. Section 21, Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:

After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under
a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least
twothirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement, valid
and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treatise or international
agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition
or tax treatise or those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines,
regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to
be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the
requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the
Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the
Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.
It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, actually share some
common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory
in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens with the clause No treaty x x x, and Section 25 contains the
phrase shall not be allowed. Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the
treaty or international agreement valid and effective.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the
United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21,
Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason
that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. On this score, the Constitution
makes no distinction between transient and permanent. Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that
requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
The provision contemplates three different situations a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign
bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25,
Article XVIII.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following
conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate
and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c)
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. The concurrence requirement under Section 25, Article XVIII must be
construed in relation to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular language, the concurrence of the
Senate contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least twothirds of all the members of the Senate
favorably vote to concur with the treatythe VFA in the instant case.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA.
(2) No. The phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a
treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United
States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Moreover, it is
inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international
law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
Discussion:
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an international instrument concluded between
States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments, and whatever its particular designation. There are many other terms used for a treaty or international
agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration,
exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that
the names or titles of international agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no legal significance.
Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little more than mere description.
In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states
concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. International law continues to
make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in
its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed
by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States
agreed that ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification,
or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative,
or was expressed during the negotiation.In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as
commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification.
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and
authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nations foreign
policy; his dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded. Wielding vast powers an influence, his conduct
in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is executive altogether."
- Treaty vs Executive Agreement

7. Powers relative to revenue, appropriation and tariff measures; Limitations Article Vi,
Sections 24 & 25
Case: Araullo v Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1 (2014) and 749 SCRA 284 (2015)
Issue: Whether or not the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) is unconstitutional?
Nature of DAP:
The economic situation prevailing in the middle of 2011 paved the way for the development and implementation of the
DAP as a stimulus package intended to fasttrack public spending and to push economic growth by investing on high-
impact budgetary PAPs to be funded from the "savings" generated during the year as well as from unprogrammed funds.
In that respect, the DAP was the product of "plain executive policymaking" to stimulate the economy by way of
accelerated spending. The Administration would thereby accelerate government spending by: (1) streamlining the
implementation process through the clustering of infrastructure projects of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Education (DepEd), and (2) front loading PPPrelated projects due for
implementation in the following year.
DAP was to be implemented and funded (1) by declaring "savings" coming from the various departments and agencies
derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed
funds; and (3) applying the "savings" and unprogrammed funds to augment existing PAPs or to support other priority
PAPs.
Discussion:
Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3)
Budget Execution; and (4) Accountability. Each phase is distinctly separate from the others but they overlap in the
implementation of the budget during the budget year.
(1) The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM. The Budget Call
contains budget parameters earlier set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) as well as policy
guidelines and procedures to aid government agencies in the preparation and submission of their budget proposals. The
Budget Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget Call, which is addressed to all agencies, including state
universities and colleges; and (2) a Corporate Budget Call, which is addressed to all government owned and controlled
corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs).
Following the issuance of the Budget Call, the various departments and agencies submit their respective Agency Budget
Proposals to the DBM. To boost citizen participation, the current administration has tasked the various departments and
agencies to partner with civil society organizations and other citizenstakeholders in the preparation of the Agency Budget
Proposals, which proposals are then presented before a technical panel of the DBM in scheduled budget hearings wherein
the various departments and agencies are given the opportunity to defend their budget proposals. DBM bureaus
thereafter review the Agency Budget Proposals and come up with recommendations for the Executive Review Board,
comprised by the DBM Secretary and the DBM’s senior officials. The discussions of the Executive Review Board cover the
prioritization of programs and their corresponding support visàvis the priority agenda of the National Government, and
their implementation.
The DBM next consolidates the recommended agency budgets into the National Expenditure Program (NEP)and a
Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF). The NEP provides the details of spending for each department
and agency by program, activity or project (PAP), and is submitted in the form of a proposed GAA. The Details of
Selected Programs and Projects is the more detailed disaggregation of key PAPs in the NEP, especially those in line with
the National Government’s development plan. The Staffing Summary provides the staffing complement of each
department and agency, including the number of positions and amounts allocated.
The NEP and BESF are thereafter presented by the DBM and the DBCC to the President and the Cabinet for further
refinements or reprioritization. Once the NEP and the BESF are approved by the President and the Cabinet, the DBM
prepares the budget documents for submission to Congress. The budget documents consist of: (1) the President’s Budget
Message, through which the President explains the policy framework and budget priorities; (2) the BESF, mandated by
Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, which contains the macroeconomic assumptions, public sector context,
breakdown of the expenditures and funding sources for the fiscal year and the two previous years; and (3) the NEP.
(2) The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the time Congress receives the President’s Budget,
which is inclusive of the NEPand the BESF, up to the President’s approval of the GAA. This phase is also known as the
Budget Authorization Phase, and involves the significant participation of the Legislative through its deliberations.
(3) The Budget Execution Phase is primarily the function of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the following
procedures, namely: (1) to issue the programs and guidelines for the release of funds; (2) to prepare an Allotment and
Cash Release Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement authorities.
The implementation of the GAA is directed by the guidelines issued by the DBM. Prior to this, the various departments
and agencies are required to submit Budget Execution Documents(BED) to outline their plans and performance targets by
laying down the physical and financial plan, the monthly cash program, the estimate of monthly income, and the list of
obligations that are not yet due and demandable.
Thereafter, the DBM prepares an Allotment Release Program (ARP)and a Cash Release Program (CRP). The ARP sets a
limit for allotments issued in general and to a specific agency. The CRP fixes the monthly, quarterly and annual
disbursement levels.
Allotments, which authorize an agency to enter into obligations, are issued by the DBM. Allotments are lesser in scope
than appropriations, in that the latter embrace the general legislative authority to spend. Allotments may be released in
two forms – through a comprehensive Agency Budget Matrix (ABM), or, individually, by SARO.
Armed with either the ABM or the SARO, agencies become authorized to incur obligations on behalf of the Government
in order to implement their PAPs. Obligations may be incurred in various ways, like hiring of personnel, entering into
contracts for the supply of goods and services, and using utilities.
(4) Accountability is a significant phase of the budget cycle because it ensures that the government funds have been
effectively and efficiently utilized to achieve the State’s socioeconomic goals. It also allows the DBM to assess the
performance of agencies during the fiscal year for the purpose of implementing reforms and establishing new policies.
An agency’s accountability may be examined and evaluated through (1) performance targets and outcomes; (2) budget
accountability reports; (3) review of agency performance; and (4) audit conducted by the Commission on Audit(COA).
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the DAP violated the mandate of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "[n]o money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law”?
No. No law was necessary for the adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor an
appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was
by virtue of the authority of the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed.
The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the
context of the DAP’s adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during
the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress
did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to
do during the Budget Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the act by which Congress "designates a particular
fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be applied to some
general object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense."
(2) Whether or not the the unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments under the DAP were not
savings, and the use of such appropriations contravened Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Yes. The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the
following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within
their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.
First Requisite:
Section 25(5), supra, not being a selfexecuting provision of the Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be
operative. That law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should
expressly authorize the transfer of funds.
Did the GAAs expressly authorize the transfer of funds?

In both 2011 and 2012 GAA, this provision was present: Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions
enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
However, this provision was textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the phrase "for their respective
offices" contained in Section 25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase "for their respective offices" was to authorize only
transfers of funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer was to an item of appropriation within
the Executive). The provisions carried a different phrase ("to augment any item in this Act"), and the effect was that the
2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if
the item belonged to an office outside the Executive. To that extent did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the
Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted provisions cannot be used to claim authority to transfer appropriations
from the Executive to another branch, or to a constitutional commission.
In 2013, it was amended as follows: Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy,
and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred
for the current year in any item of their respective appropriations.
Thus, the first requisite was present: that a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to Section 25(5), supra,
existed.
Second Requisite:
Were the funds used in the DAP actually savings?
No. The GAA defines savings as follows:
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are:
(i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to
vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of
measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned
targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
The three instances listed in the GAAs’ aforequoted definition were a sure indication that savings could be generated only
upon the purpose of the appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the appropriation being no longer existent.
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from "pooling of unreleased appropriations such
as unreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of
slow moving projects and discontinued projects per ZeroBased Budgeting findings." The declaration of the DBM by itself
does not state the clear legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or unalloted appropriations as savings.
The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as
unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can be generated.
Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has already been an allotment or authorization to incur
obligations and disbursement authority. This means that the DBM has issued either an ABM (for those not needing
clearance), or a SARO (for those needing clearance), and consequently an NCA, NCAA or CDC, as the case may be.
Appropriations remain unreleased, for instance, because of noncompliance with documentary requirements (like the
Special Budget Request), or simply because of the unavailability of funds. But the appropriations do not actually reach the
agencies to which they were allocated under the GAAs, and have remained with the DBM technically speaking. Ergo,
unreleased appropriations refer to appropriations with allotments but without disbursement authority.
These unreleased appropriations cannot be considered as savings because such appropriations had not even reached and
been used by the agency concerned visàvis the PAPs for which Congress had allocated them. However, if an agency has
unfilled positions in its plantilla and did not receive an allotment and NCA for such vacancies, appropriations for such
positions, although unreleased, may already constitute savings for that agency under the second instance.
Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first part of the definition of "savings" in the GAA,
that is, as "portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance."
But the first part of the definition was further qualified by the three enumerated instances of when savings would be
realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be indiscriminately declared as savings without first determining
whether any of the three instances existed. This signified that the DBM’s withdrawal of unobligated allotments had
disregarded the definition of savings under the GAAs.
NBC No. 541 of the DBM targeted the "withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels of obligations"
"to fund priority and/or fastmoving programs/projects." But the fact that the withdrawn allotments could be "[r]eissued
for the original programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments were withdrawn"
supported the conclusion that the PAPs had not yet been finally discontinued or abandoned. Thus, the purpose for which
the withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet fulfilled, or did not yet cease to exist, rendering the declaration
of the funds as savings impossible.
Congress provided a oneyear period of availability of the funds for all allotment classes. Yet, in his memorandum for the
President dated May 20, 2013, Sec. Abad sought omnibus authority to consolidate savings and unutilized balances to fund
the DAP on a quarterly basis. The validity period of the affected appropriations, already given the brief Life’s pan of one
year, was further shortened to only a quarter of a year under the DBM’s memorandum dated May 20, 2013.
Is the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased appropriations may be considered as
impoundment? They were invalid for being bereft of legal basis but they cannot be considered as impoundment.
Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is
the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type." Impoundment under the GAA is understood to mean the
retention or deduction of appropriations. The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP should not be
regarded as impoundment because it entailed only the transfer of funds, not the retention or deduction of appropriations.
The DBM relies on Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 to justify the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments. But the provision authorized only the suspension or stoppage of further expenditures, not the
withdrawal of unobligated allotments. Moreover, the DBM did not suspend or stop further expenditures in accordance
with Section 38, supra, but instead transferred the funds to other PAPs.
Lastly, the balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal year were to be reverted to the
General Fund. The Executive could not circumvent this by declaring unreleased appropriations and unobligated
allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year.
Third Requisite:
Was the third requisite present? No.
The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.
a. No funds from savings could be transferred under the DAP to augment deficient items not provided in the GAA
The term "augment" means to enlarge or increase in size, amount, or degree. The GAAs set as a condition for
augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be deficient. In other words, an
appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be deficient before it could be augmented from savings.
The SC concluded that the "savings" pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any
appropriations in the pertinent GAAs.
For example, appropriation for the Disaster Risk, Exposure, Assessment and Mitigation (DREAM) project under the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST):
The 2011 GAA showed that Congress had appropriated only ₱537,910,000 for MOOE, but nothing for personnel services
and capital outlays.
Aside from the transfer under the DAP to the DREAM project exceeding by almost 300% the appropriation by Congress
for the program generation of new knowledge and technologies and research capability building in priority areas
identified as strategic to National Development, the Executive allotted funds for personnel services and capital outlays.
The Executive thereby substituted its will to that of Congress. Worse, the Executive had not earlier proposed any amount
for personnel services and capital outlays in the NEP that became the basis of the 2011 GAA.
It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters of appropriations. For this
purpose, appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all
monies received from whatever source by any part of the government are public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of
Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public money without legislative authorization." To conform
with the governing principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a PAP
by resorting to either public or private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting in an
increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms
of both appropriations will thereby be violated.
b. Crossborder augmentations from savings were prohibited by the Constitution
By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the
GAA "for their respective offices," Section 25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their offices, such that funds
appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of augmentation of a
deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds crossborder transfers or cross border augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the
President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the
Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.
Did any crossborder transfers or augmentations transpire?

Yes. The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to ₱143,700,000.00 and ₱250,000,000.00 were transferred under the
DAP respectively to the COA, and the House of Representatives. Those transfers of funds constituted crossborder
augmentations for being from the Executive to the COA and the House of Representatives.
Another issue: Whether or not the release and use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP was valid?
Petitioners: The petitioners point out that a condition for the release of the unprogrammed funds was that the revenue
collections must exceed revenue targets; and that the release of the unprogrammed funds was illegal because such
condition was not met. The petitioners take the phrase to mean that the total revenue collections must exceed the total
revenue target stated in the BESF.
Respondents: The phrase refers only to the collections for each source of revenue as enumerated in the BESF, with the
condition being deemed complied with once the revenue collections from a particular source already exceeded the stated
target.
Held: Petitioners’ view was upheld. The requirement that revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets was to
be construed in light of the purpose for which the unprogrammed funds were incorporated in the GAAs as standby
appropriations to support additional expenditures for certain priority PAPs should the revenue collections exceed the
resource targets assumed in the budget or when additional foreign project loan proceeds were realized. The
unprogrammed funds were included in the GAAs to provide ready cover so as not to delay the implementation of the
PAPs should new or additional revenue sources be realized during the year.
The revenue targets stated in the BESF were intended to address the funding requirements of the proposed programmed
appropriations. In contrast, the unprogrammed funds, as standby appropriations, were to be released only when there
were revenues in excess of what the programmed appropriations required. As such, the revenue targets should be
considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we would be dealing with artificial revenue surpluses. The
requirement that revenue collections must exceed revenue target should be understood to mean that the revenue
collections must exceed the total of the revenue targets stated in the BESF. Moreover, to release the unprogrammed funds
simply because there was an excess revenue as to one source of revenue would be an unsound fiscal management
measure because it would disregard the budget plan and foster budget deficits, in contravention of the Government’s
surplus budget policy.
Other issues:
(1) DAP violated the equal protection clause? No. The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection
Clause, which focuses on the release of funds under the DAP to legislators, lacks factual and legal basis. The allegations
about Senators and Congressmen being unaware of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and about some of
them having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with relevant data. Also, the claim that the Executive
discriminated against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself
warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law should be an
issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators
claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that
only such affected legislators could properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection
occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here. Consequently, the
Court was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal protection. To have the Court do so despite
the inadequacy of the showing of factual and legal support would be to compel it to speculate, and the outcome would
not do justice to those for whose supposed benefit the claim of denial of equal protection has been made.
(2) DAP violated the system of checks and balances? There is no need to discuss whether or not the DAP and its
implementation through the various circulars and memoranda of the DBM transgressed the system of checks and
balances in place in our constitutional system. Our earlier expositions on the DAP and its implementing issuances
infringing the doctrine of separation of powers effectively addressed this particular concern.
(3) DAP violated the principle of public accountability? No. DAP and its implementing issuances were policies and acts
that the Executive could properly adopt and do in the execution of the GAAs to the extent that they sought to implement
strategies to ramp up or accelerate the economy of the country.
Doctrine of Operative Fact on the adoption and implementation of DAP:

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the
general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect
This doctrine is applicable in the adoption and implementation of DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity
and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer
be undone. But the doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose
beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, proponents and
implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals
determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.
8. Borrowing power, Article VII, Section 20
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board
shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of
its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and
controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may
be provided by law.
9. Budgetary power, Article VII, Section, 22
The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of
the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and
proposed revenue measures.
10. Informing power, Article VII, Section 23
The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other
time.
11. Delegated powers [See delegation of powers discussion]
a. Emergency power, Article VI, Section 23 (2)
b. Tariff power, Article VI, Section 28 (2)
12. Veto powers, Article VI, Section 27
13. Residual powers
14. Executive privilege
Executive privilege is the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the
Congress.
Case: Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, 549 SCRA 77
(2008) and 564 SCRA 152 (2008)
Facts:
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the
amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of
China. In connection with this, Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, on Trade and
Commerce and National Defense and Security initiated investigations on the NBN-ZTE deal. The Senate Committees sent
out invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Romulo Neri, the then Director
General of NEDA, was among those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and
October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was out of town during the other
dates. On September 26, Neri testified before the Committees for 11 hours and he disclosed that COMELEC Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege.
In particular, he refused to answer the questions on a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you
dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about
the alleged bribe?
Respondent Committees then issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on
November 20, 2007. However, ES Eduarto Ermita requested the Senate Committees to dispense with Neri’s testimony on
the ground of executive privilege. The questions fall under conversations and correspondence between the President and
public officials which are considered executive privilege.
Because of Neri’s non-appearance, Senate Committees cited him in contempt. Neri then filed for a TRO seeking to restrain
the implementation of the contempt order.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive privilege?
(2) Whether or not the claim is properly invoked by the President?
Held:
(1) Yes. There are three elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and nondelegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in
her executive and policy decisionmaking process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-
delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority
of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President.
Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
As to the third element, a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interest. In other words,
confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the Constitution. Presidential communications are
presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch
seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the
government in the manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch. Here, the record is bereft of any
categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3)
questions in the enactment of a law.
(2) Yes. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged
by the head of the department which has control over the matter. A formal and proper claim of executive privilege
requires a precise and certain reason for preserving their confidentiality.
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim
of privilege. There, he expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive
privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the
Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance.
The second requirement, existence of precise and certain reason, was sufficiently satisfied because the executive privilege
is being invoked on the ground that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were
conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing
the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
Other issue:
The Senate Committees violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance
with the duly published rules of procedure. The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from
the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for onehalf of the Senates membership,
the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as
it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the
14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Discussion:
Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 22.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued,
its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which
Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory. In fine, the
oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit
of legislation.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it
is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules
of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of
executive privilege.
Presidential communications are presumptively privileged. Apparently, the presumption is founded on the President’s
generalized interest in confidentiality. The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential
advisors and to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.
There are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the
deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decisionmaking and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential. The latter
includes advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated.
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-
making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to decisionmaking of executive officials. The first is
rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the Presidents unique constitutional role; the second on
common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to
documents in their entirety, and covers final and postdecisional materials as well as predeliberative ones. As a
consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater
scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution,
the President is the repository of the commanderinchief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.
C. Rules of Succession
1. President, Article VII
a. Before assumption of office
The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have
qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been
chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently
disabled, the Vice-President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or
become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a
President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
b. Upon assumption of office

In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of
the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be
subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.
c. temporary incapacity
Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
2. Vice President, Article VII, Sections 3, 7-9
Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President
shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall
assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
X. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, Article VIII
A. Judicial Power
1. Adjudicatory power
a. Involving rights legally demandable, Article VIII, Section 5 (1)
b. Affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls
c. PET = SC
2. Judicial Review
a. Acts of Judicial Department: lower courts, Article VIII , Section 5 (2)
b. Acts of Executive Department
c. Acts of Legislative Department
d. Requisites for Judicial Review of a constitutional issue
1. Actual case or controversy;
- justiciable question)
- not moot and academic; exceptions
- ripe for judicial action
2. Issue must be raised by proper party (locus standi); exceptions

Cases:
- Resident Mammals v Reyes, GR 180771, Apr 21, 2015; (Epistolary
Jurisdiction)
- Oposa v Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993) (Intergenerational rights)
3. Issue must be raised at the earliest opportunity; exceptions
4. Necessity of deciding the constitutional question (lis mota)
e. Functions of Judicial Review
f. Judicial Restraint; Limitations on the exercise of Judicial Review
3. Incidental powers
B. Rule-Making Powers, Article VIII, Section 6 (5)

1. Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
2. Pleading, practice in all courts
3. Admission to the practice of law
4. IBP: discipline and practice of law
5. Legal assistance to the underprivileged
C. Auxiliary Administrative Powers

1. Detailing of lower court judges, Article VIII , Section 5 (3)
2. Change of venue or place of trial, Article VIII , Section 5 (4)
3. Power of appointment, Article VIII , Section 5 (6)
4. Discipline lower court judges, Article VIII , Section 11
5. Administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, Article VIII , Section 6
6. Fiscal autonomy, Article VIII , Section 3
7. Annual report, Article VIII , Section 16
8. Supervision of JBC, Article VIII , Section 8 (5)
9. Plenary powers over the bar, Article VIII , Section 8 (5)
10. Supervisory power over IBP, Article VIII , Section 8 (5)
D. Concepts, definitions, distinctions

1. Political v Justiciable Question
Case: Ocampo v Enriquez, GR 225973, Nov 8, 2016
2. Ministerial v Discretionary Functions
3. Judgment v Discretion
4. Substantive v Procedural Law
Case: People v Teng Moner y Adam, GR 202206, Mar 5, 2018
5. Substantive v Procedural Rights
6. Facial Challenge v As Applied Challenge
a. Void for Vagueness Doctrine
b. Overbroad Doctrine
Cases:
- Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v Anti-Terrorism Council. 632
SCRA 146 (2010)
- Estrada v Sandigabnayan, GR 148560, Nov 19, 2001
E. Effects of declaration of unconstitutionality of law / act

1. Orthodox v Modern View
2. Operative Fact Doctrine
Case: Araullo v Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1 (2014) and 749 SCRA 284 (2015)
F. Modes of review and other judicial actions
G. Jurisdiction and Organization of courts

1. SC: en banc v division cases
2. General v Limited jurisdiction
3. Original v Appellate jurisdiction
4. Exclusive v Concurrent jurisdiction
5. Criminal v Civil jurisdiction
6. Regular v Special courts; Quasi-judicial bodies
H. Additional functions and powers for the Chief Justice

a. Presiding officer in the Impeachment court, Article XI, Section 3 (6)
b. Chair, Judicial and Bar Council, Article VIII, Section 8
c. Chair, Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Article VII, Section 4
d. Supervisory powers over all Justices and Judges, Article VIII, Section 6
e. Control & supervision over all officials & employees of Judiciary, Article VIII, Section 6
I. Safeguards of Judicial Independence

- Re: COA Opinion on the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased for the retired
Chief/Associate Justices of SC, 678 SCRA 1 (2012)
- Re: Request for Guidance/Clarification on Section 7, Rule 111, RA 10154 requiring
government employees to secure a clearance of pendency/non-pendency of cases
from CSC, 706 SCRA 502 (2013)
- Re: Save the SC Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v Abolition of
Judiciary development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy UDK-15143, Jan 21,
2015
J. Appointments to the Judiciary

Cases”
- Chavez v JBC, 676 SCRA 579 (2012 and 696 SCRA 496 (2013)
- Jardeleza v Sereno, 733 SCRA 279 (2014) and Resolution, GR 213181, Jan 21, 2015
- Villanueva v JBC, GR 211833, Apr 7, 2015
K. Judicial Privilege
Case: Re: Petition for recognition of the exemption of the GSIS from payment of legal fees,
612 SCRA 193 (2010)
XI. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES/AGENCIES
A. CSC, COA, COMELEC, Article IX, A, B, C, D

1. Powers and Functions
2. Qualifications and Disqualifications
3. Jurisdiction
4. Appointment and Terms of Office
5. Prohibited offices and interests
6. Salary
7. Removal
8. Fiscal Autonomy
9. Submission of Reports
10. Rule-Making powers
11. Review of final orders, resolutions and decisions
a. Rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions
b. Rendered in the exercise of administrative functions
Cases:
- Funa v Villar, 670 SCRA 579 (2012)
- Funa v Duque III, 742 SCRA 166
- Dela Llana v Chairman, COA, 665 SCRA 176 (2012)
- Capablanca v CSC, GR 179370, Nov 19, 2009
B. Economic Agencies
1. BSP, Article XII, Sections 20, 21
2. NEDA, Article XII, Sections 9, 10
C. National Commissions
1. Commission on Human Rights (CHR), Article XIII, Sections 17-19
2. National Language Commission (Komisyon ng Wikang Pambansa), Article XIV, Section 9
3. National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Article XVI, Section 6
- RA 6975 – Establishing PNP under DILG
4. National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP), Article XII, Section 5; Article XIV,
Section 17, Article XVI, Section 12
- RA 8371 – Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
D. Anti-Graft Bodies
1. Sandiganbayan, Article XI, Section 4
- PD 1606, Section 4 – Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
2. Ombudsman, PD 1630 (1979); RA 6770 (1989)
Case: Caoibes v Ombudsman, GR 132177, Jul 19, 2001

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Political Law Review 1

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

A. Politics, Government, Administration, Power, Authority: definitions, concepts, distinctions

B. Scope of Political Law Review

3. Law on Public Officers

II. THE STATE

A. Concept and Definition

- Distinguished from nation

State is a legal or juristic concept, while nation is an ethnic or racial concept.

3. The Philippine Archipelago, Article 1

Maritime Zones under UNCLOS:

k. RA 9522 (demarcation of maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS

- Magalona v Ermita, 655 SCRA 476 (2011)

Arguments against the constitutionality of RA 9522:

As inhabitants, Article III, Sections 1 &2; Article II, Sections 15 & 16

2. Constituent vs Ministrant functions

3. Parens Patriae (parent of the people)

Case: Government v Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil 728 (1916)

4. De Jure government, Criteria for legitimacy

Kinds of de facto government:

6. Classifications, Forms of governments

a. based on number of rulers

b. based on accountability to the people

d. based on legislative-executive relations

Legislative: unicameral; bicameral

e. based on divisions of the State

2. Dual Aspect, Kinds and Characteristics

Nachura: Permanence, exclusiveness, comprehensiveness, absoluteness, indivisibility, inalienability, imprescriptibility.

3. Dominium & Imperium

4. Effects of Change in Sovereignty

5. Effects of military occupation

6. Territorial, personal and extraterritorial jurisdiction

III. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

A. Constitution: definition, nature and concepts

The Philippine Constitution is written, enacted/conventional and rigid or inelastic.

Qualities of a good written constitution:

C. History and Background

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

Amendment vs. Revision

Revision – total change involving a re-writing of the entire instrument.

E. Self-executing and non-executing provisions

G.R.: Constitutional provisions are self-executing.

F. Supremacy of the Constitution

G. Rules on interpretation of the Constitution

Interpretation of the Constitution:

A. State Immunity (Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty)

1. Basis: Article XVI, Section 3

The State may not be sued without its consent.

2. When is a suit against a State?

a. Money Claims arising from contract

Case: UP v Dizon, 679 SCRA 54 (2012)

b. Torts committed by special agents

c. Incorporated Government Agencies (Note: Unincorporated government agencies

a. Government submits itself to court’s jurisdiction

b. Government entering into business contracts

Whether or not the government may validly invoked state immunity?

- DOTC v Sps. Abecina, GR 206484, Jan 29, 2016

Whether or not DOTC may claim state immunity?

5. Suits against municipal corporations

Section 22. Corporate Powers. -

6. Suits against foreign states, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunity

- Rep. of Indonesia v Vinzon, GR 154705, Jun 26, 2003