DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY SABBAVARAM,

VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE

CASE ANALYSIS – OLGA TELLIS VS BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

SUBJECT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-1

NAME OF THE FACULTY

MR. A. NAGESHWARA RAO

NAME OF THE STUDENT

UMA SHANKAR MISHRA

ROLL NO.
18LLB091

SEMESTER

3
 ACKN0WLEDGEMENT

I w0uld like t0 express my special thanks 0f gratitude t0 0ur lecturer Mr. A. Nageshwar Ra0 Sir wh0 has
given me the g0lden 0pp0rtunity t0 d0 this w0nderful pr0ject 0n the t0pic “CASE STUDY: OLGATELLIS
VS BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION which als0 helped me in d0ing a l0t 0f research and thr0ugh
which I came t0 kn0w s0 many new things. I am really thankful t0 him.
INTRODUCTION
The case of Olga Tellis Vs Union Of India has been one of the Landmark case under Article 21
where Hon’ble Supreme Court has expanded the meaning of Right to life in Context Of Right to
livelihood. In the History of Constitution various cases have Come to Supreme Court of India
where Article 21 has been interpreted in a wide manner to Include Right to live with Dignity
( Maneka Gandhi Vs Union of India) Right to privacy ( KS puttaswamy Vs Union Of India) and
many others.. One of those Interpretations is Right to livelihood.as given in this case . In a United
Nations Report on Human Rights prepared by MR. EL HADJI GUISSE, it has been said:
“Individual economic, social and cultural rights are essentially the right to work and the right to
adequate food, health, housing and education. There is no doubt that those rights rest on the most
significant right of all, namely, the right to life. They all revolve around and centre on this right, if
by “life” is everything that contributes to the continued existence and improvement of the humans’
condition. In the view of some people, these rights constitute an idea to be achieved i.e., they are
not immediately claimable. This view is incorrect since these rights have a strong legal foundation
and can be claimed at any moment and their violation punished”1
Originally it was held that the question of livelihood is included only in the freedoms enumerated
in Article 19 particularly Cl. (g) or even in Article 16 in a limited sense; but the word “life” in
Article 21 does not include livelihood2. But this view has been changed by subsequent decisions. It
has now been held in a series of cases that right to livelihood is included in the right to life
“because no person can live without the means of living, i.e., the means of livelihood”. Right to
livelihood is an integral part of right to life under Article 21 although it has not been incorporated
by specific language in Pt III by the framers of the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution, in
the Preamble to the Constitution, guaranteed to secure to its citizens justice, social, economic and
political as well as equality of status and opportunity. While interpreting the scope of National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, the court said that the Act has clearly placed the “right to
livelihood” at a higher pedestal than a mere legal right 3. While considering the scope of Building
and other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996,
the court said that the enabling provision which empowers the Central & State Governments to
constitute Welfare Boards to provide and monitor social security schemes and welfare measures for
the benefit of building and other construction workers recognises the right to live with basic human
dignity enshrined in the Indian Constitution. The Act regulates the employment and conditions of
service. While reiterating the right to livelihood as an integral facet of right to life, the court said
that when an employee is afflicted with an unfortunate disease due to which he is unable to perform
the duties of the post he is holding, the employer must make every endeavour to adjust him in a
post in which the employee would be suitable to discharge the duties. The right to wages of
seamen, as right to wages of any employee is an integral part of the right to livelihood and is
entitled to protection of Article214.. In M. Paul Anthony v Bihar Gold Mines Ltd.5, the court
insisted that when a government servant or one in public undertaking is suspended pending the
holding of a departmental inquiry against him, subsistence allowance must be paid to him. Court
emphasised that a government servant does not surrender his right to life under Article 21 or other
basic human rights. Non-payment of subsistence allowance is an inhuman act which has an
unpropitious effect on the life of an employee. If the right to livelihood is not treated as part and
parcel of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life

1 See Justice Fazal Karim (Retd. Judge of Pakistan Supreme Court), Judicial Review of Public Actions, p 587 (notes).
2 Sant Ram, Re., AIR 1960 SC 932 : (1960) 3 SCR 499
3 Centre for Environment & Food Security v UOI, (2011) 5 SCC 676
4 O. Konavalov v Commander, Coast Guard Region, (2006) 4 SCC 620
5 AIR 1999 SC 1416
 would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Any person who is
deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law,
can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21.

OLGA TELLIS VS ;/.;. BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (AIR 1986 SC

180)

Case No : W.Ps. Nos. 4610-4612 and 5068-5079 of 1981 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India)
Bench : Y.V. Chandrachud, A. Varadarajan, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, V.D. Tulzapurkar, O. Chinnappa
Reddy

FACTS OF THE CASE

In this case the Bombay Municipal Corporation decided to evict the pavement dwellers and those who
were residing in slums in Bombay. These Writ Petitions portray the plight of lakhs of persons who live
on pavements and in slums in the city of Bombay. They constitute nearly half the population of the city.
The first group of petitions relates to pavement dwellers while the second group relates to both
pavement and Basti or Slum dwellers.
 The three petitioners in the group of Writ Petitions 4610 4612 of 1981 are a journalist and two
pavement dwellers. One of these two pavement dwellers, P. Angamuthu, migrated from Salem,
Tamil Nadu, to Bombay in the year 1961 in search of employment. He was a landless labourer
in his home town but he was rendered Jobless because of drought. He found a Job in a
Chemical Company at Dahisar, Bombay, on a daily wage of Rs-23 per day. A slum-lord
extorted a sum of Rs.2,50 from him in exchange of a shelter of plastic sheets and canvas on a
pavement on the Western Express Highway, Bombay. He lives in it with his wife and three
daughters who are 16, 13 and 5 years of age. The second of the two pavement dwellers came to
Bombay in 1969 from Sangamner, District Ahmednagar, Maharashtra. He was a cobbler
earning 7 to 8 rupees a day, but his so-called house in the village fell down. He got employment
in Bombay as a Badli Kamgar for Rs. 350 per month. He was lucky in being able to obtain a
"dwelling house" on a pavement at Tulsiwadi by paying Rs. 300 to a goonda of the locality. The
bamboos and the plastic sheets cost him Rs. 700.
 On July 13, 1981 the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Shri A.R. Antulay, made an
announcementwhich was given wide publicity by the newspapers that all pavement dwellers in
the city of Bombay will be evicted forcibly and deported to their respective places of origin or
removed to places outside the city of Bombay. The Chief Minister directed the Commissioner
of Police to provide the necessary assistance to respondent 1, the Bombay Municipal
Corporation, to demolish the pavement dwellings and deport the pavement dwellers. The
apparent justification which the Chief Minister gave to his announcement was : "It is a very
inhuman existence. These structures are flimsy and open to the elements. During the monsoon
there is no way these people can live comfortably.
 On July 23, 1981 the pavement dwelling of P. Angamuthu was demolished by the officers of the
Bombay Municipal Corporation. He and the members of his family were put in a bus for Salem.
His wife and daughters stayed back in Salem but he returned to Bombay in search of a job and
got into a pavement house once again. The dwelling of the other petitioner was demolished
 even earlier, in January 1980 but he rebuilt it. It is like a game of hide and seek. The
Corporation removes the ramshackle shelters on the pavements with the aid of police, the
pavement dwellers flee to less conspicuous pavements in by-lanes and, when the officials are
gone, they return to their old habitats. Their main attachment to those places is that they are
near to their place of work.
 In the other batch of writ petitions Nos. 5068-79 of 1981, which was heard along with the
petitions relating to pavement dwellers, there are 12 petitioners. The first five of these are
residents of Kamraj Nagar, a habitation which is alleged to have come into existence in about
1960-61, near the Western Express Highway, Bombay. The next four petitioners were residing
in structures constructed off the Tulsi Pipe Road, Mahim, Bombay. Petitioner No. 10 is the
Peoples' Union of Civil Liberties, petitioner No. 11 is the Committee for the Protection of
Democratic Rights while petitioner No. 12 is a journalist.
 The case of the petitioners in the KamraJ Nagar group of cases is that there are over 500
hutments in this particular basti which was built in about 1960 by persons who were employed
by a Construction company engaged in laying water pipes along the Western Express Highway.
The residents of Kamraj Nagar are municipal employees, factory or hotel workers, construction
supervisors and so on. The residents of the TulsiPipe Road hutments claim that they have been
living there for 10 to 15 years and that, they are engaged in various small trades. On hearing
about the Chief Minister's announcement, they filed a writ petition in the High Court of
Bombay for an order of injunction restraining the officers of the State Government and the
Bombay Municipal Corporation from implementing the directive of the Chief Minister. The
High Court granted an ad-interim injunction to be in force until July 21, 1981. On that date,
respondents agreed that the huts will not be demolished until October 15, 1981. However, it is
alleged, on July 23, 1981, the petitioners were huddled into State Transport buses for being
deported out of Bombay. Two infants were born during the deportation but that was set off by
the death of two others

The petitioners file this case stating that the actions of State Government as well as Bombay
Municipal Corporation are violative Of Indian Constitution and Bombay Municipal Corporation
Act,1888.
.
The Pavment dwellers filed a writ petition in the High Court of Bombay for an order of injunction
restraining the officers of the State Government and the Bombay Municipal Corporations from
implementing the directive of the Chief Minister.

1. The High Court of Bombay granted an ad interim injunction to be in force until July 21, 1981.
Contrary to agreement, on July 23, 1981, petitioners were huddled into State Transport buses
for being deported out of Bombay.

2. The respondent’s action was challenged by the petitioner on the grounds that it is violative
of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. They also asked for a declaration that Section 312,
313 and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 is violative of Articles
14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

Issues involved and Question of law

The issues which were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme court, in this case, were as follows:
  Whether the Actions of respondents of demolishing Huts are Violative of Articles 19 and 21 of
Indian Constitution,1950 and what is the Scope of right to life under Article 21 of the
Constitution?
 Whether section Section 312, 313 and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 is
violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.?

Arguments of Petititioners -

Advocates For Plaintiffs- Ms. Indira Jaisingh, Mr. V.M. Tarkunde and Mr. Ram Jethmalani

Petitioner’s plea is that the right to life is illusory without a right to the protection of the means by
which
alone life can be lived. And, the right to life can only be taken away or abridged by a procedure
established by law, which has to be fair and reasonable, not fanciful or arbitrary such- as is prescribed
by the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act or the Bombay Police Act. They also rely upon their right to
reside and settle in any part of the country which is guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(e).

1st Contention
 Whether the Actions of respondents of demolishing Huts are Violative of Articles 19 and
21 of Indian Constitution,1950 and what is the Scope of right to life under Article 21 of
the Constitution?
Petitioners have stressed on the argument that the right to life which is guaranteed by Art. 21 includes
the right to livelihood and since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their
slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence
unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the premise that
if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that
assumption, the question which we have to consider is whether the right to life includes the right to
livelihood. We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life
conferred by Art. 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished
or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according
to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life.

2nd Contention
The object of Ss. 312 to 314 is to keep the pavements and foot-paths free from encroachment so that
the pedestrians do not have to make use of the streets on which there is heavy vehicular traffic. The
pavement dwellers answer the nature's call, bathe, cook and wash their clothes and utensils on the
foot-paths and on parts of public streets adjoining the foot- paths. Their encroachment creates serious
impediments in repairing the roads, foot-paths and drains. The refusal to allow the petitioners and other
persons similarly situated to use foot-paths as their abodes is, therefore, not unreasonable, unfair, or
unlawful. The basic civic amenities, such as drainage, water and sanitation, cannot possibly be
provided to the pavement dwellers. Since the pavements are encroached upon, pedestrians are
compelled to walk on the streets, thereby increasing the risk of traffic accidents and impeding the free
flow of vehicular movement. petitioner no. 12. Prafulla chandra Bidwaiwho is a journalist, has filed a
rejoinder asserting that Kamraj Nagar is not located on a foot-path or a pavement. According to him,
Kamraj Nagar is a basti off the Highway, in which the huts are numbered, the record in relation to
which is maintained by the Road Development Department and the Bombay Municipal Corporation.
Contending that petitioners 1 to 5 have been residing in the said basti for over 20 years, he reiterates
that the public has no right of way in or over the Kamraj Nagar. He also disputes that the huts on the
foot-paths cause any obstruction to the pedestrians or to the vehicular traffic or that those huts are a
source of nuisance or danger to public health and safety. His case in paragraph 21 of his reply-affidavit
seems to be that since, the foot-paths are in the occupation of pavement dwellers for a long time, foot-
paths have ceased to be foot-paths. He says that the pavement dwellers and the slum or basti dwellers,
who number about 47.7 lakhs, constitute about 50 per cent of the total population of Greater Bombay,
that they supply the major work force for Bombay from menial Jobs to the most highly skilled jobs,
that they have been living in the hutments for generations, that they have been making a significant
contribution to the economic life of the city and that, therefore, it is unfair and unreasonable on the part
of the State Government and the Municipal Corporation to destroy their homes and deport them A
home is a home wherever it is. The main theme of the reply-affidavit is that" The slum dwellers are the
sine qua non of the city. They are entitled to a quid pro quo. "It is conceded expressly that the
petitioners do not claim any fundamental right to live on the pavements. The right claimed by them is
the right to live, at least to exist. The only other pleading which deserves to be noticed is the affidavit
of the journalist petitioner,

Ms. Olga Tellis has stated that one of the important reasons of the emergence and growth of squatter-
settlements in the Metropolitan cities in India is, that the Development and Master Plans of most of the
cities have not been adhered to. The density of population in the Bombay Metropolitan Region is not
high according to the Town Planning standards. Difficulties are caused by the fact that the population is
not evenly distributed over the region, in a planned manner.. Unless economic and leisure activity is
decentralised, it would be mpossible to find a solution to the problems arising out of the growth of
squatter colonies. Even if squatters are evicted, they come back to the city because, it is there that Job
opportunities are available.
Arguments of Respondent

Advocates - Mr. KK Singhvi and Mr. Shankarnarayan

The advocates submit to Hon’ble supreme court counter- affidavit filed by V.S.Munje, Secretary in
the Department of .K.Singhvi and Mr. Shankaranarayanan who appear for
the respondents, no one has a fundamental right, whatever, Government Of Maharashtra and it states
that no person has any legal right to encroach upon or to construct any structure on a footpath, public
street or on any place over which the public has a right of way. Numerous hazards of health and safety
arise if action is not taken to remove such encroachments. Since, no civic amenities can be provided on
the pavements, the pavement dwellers use pavements or adjoining streets for easing themselves. Apart
from this, some of the pavement dwellers indulge in anti-social acts like chain-snatching, illicit
distillation of liquor and prostitution. The lack of proper environment leads to increased criminal
tendencies, resulting in more crime in the cities. It is, therefore, in public interest that public places like
pavements and paths are not encroached upon. The problem of poverty and rural to Urban migration is
a major problem in the Country and Maharashtra government has launched many schemes for poverty
allevation

Contention 1 Whether section Section 312, 313 and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act
1888 is violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.?

It is denied in the counter-affidavit that the provisions of sections 312, 313 and 314 of the Bombay
Municipal Corporation Act violate the Constitution. Those provisions are conceived in public interest
and great care is taken by the authorities to ensure that no harassment is caused to any pavement
dweller while enforcing the provisions of those sections. The decision to remove such encroachments
was taken by the Government with specific instructions that every reasonable precaution ought to be
taken to cause the least possible inconvenience to the pavement dwellers. What is more important, so
the counter- affidavit says, the Government of Maharashtra had decided that, on the basis of the census
carried out in 1976, pavement dwellers who would be uprooted should be offered alternate developed
pitches at Malvani where they could construct their own hutments. According to that census, about
2,500 pavement hutments only were then in existence.
The object of Ss. 312 to 314 is to keep the pavements and foot-paths free from encroachment so that
the pedestrians do not have to make use of the streets on which there is heavy vehicular traffic. The
pavement dwellers answer the nature's call, bathe, cook and wash their clothes and utensils on the foot-
paths and on parts of public streets adjoining the foot- paths. Their encroachment creates serious
impediments in repairing the roads, foot-paths and drains. The refusal to allow the petitioners and other
persons similarly situated to use foot-paths as their abodes is, therefore, not unreasonable, unfair, or
unlawful. The basic civic amenities, such as drainage, water and sanitation, cannot possibly be
provided to the pavementdwellers. Since the pavements are encroached upon, pedestrians are
compelled to walk on the streets, thereby increasing the risk of traffic accidents and impeding the free
flow of vehicular movement.
The Municipal Commissioner disputes in his counter-affidavit that any fundamental right of the
petitioners is infringed by removal of the encroachment committed by them on public property,
especially the pavements.
Defence counsel stated that the pavement residents had admitted to the High Court that they did not
claim any basic right to install cabins on sidewalks or public roads and that they would not prevent
their demolition after the scheduled date.

Observations of the Court

There can be no depreciation of the Constitution or renunciation of fundamental rights.

Court held
The Constitution does not provide for an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal
liberty. Under Article 21, such deprivation must be in accordance with the procedure established by
law. Section 314 has the character of an enabling provision and not of a compulsive nature. It gives the
Commissioner the discretion to remove an encroachment with or without notice. It is designed to
exclude the principles of natural justice by exception and not as a general rule. Sections 312(1), 313(1)
(a), and 314 empower the Commissioner of Municipalities to stop encroachment on trails where the
public has the right to pass, can not be considered unreasonable, unjust or unjust. The right to life
conferred by section 21 is vast and far-reaching Depriving a person of his right to life as means of
subsistence and you will have deprived him of his life. In light of Article 39(a) and 41, it would be
pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life

Chinnappa Reddy, J. Said:

In our view, the principles of natural justice do not have a rule of exclusion depending on whether it
would have made a difference if natural justice had been respected. Failure to respect natural justice is
in itself prejudice to any man and proof of harm, regardless of the evidence of a denial of natural
justice, is unnecessary. It will come from a person who has denied justice that the person denied justice
is not harmed.

Y. V. Chandrachud, J.
1. These Writ Petitions portray the plight of lakhs of persons who live on pavements and in slums in the
city of Bombay. They constitute nearly half the population of the city. The first group of petitions
relates to pavement dwellers while the second group relates to both pavement and Basti or Slum
dwellers. Those who have made pavements their homes exist in the midst of filth and squalor, which
has to be seen to believed. Rabid dogs in search of stinking meat and cats in search of hungry rats keep
them company. They cook and sleep where they ease, for no conveniences are available to them. Their
daughters, come of age, bathe under the nosy gaze of passers-by, unmindful of the feminine sense of
bashfulness. The cooking and washing over, women pick lice from each other's hair. The boys beg.
Menfolk, without occupation, snatch chains with the connivance of the defenders of law and order;
when caught, if at all, they say:

To summarise, we hold that no person has the right to encroach, by erecting a structure or otherwise, on
footpaths, pavements or any other place reserved or ear- marked for a public purpose like, for example,
a garden or a playground; that the provision contained in section 314 of the Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act is not unreasonable in the circumstances of the case;; The slum dwellers who were
given identity cards and whose dwellings were numbered in the 1976 census must be given alternate
sites for their resettlement On the question of natural justice, was it argued that this possibility of hearing
should be given to whom? To the intruder who has encroached on public property? Or to people who commit a
crime?

Decision

Although the Court refused to conclude that the expelled inhabitants were entitled to an alternative site,
it ordered that:

1. No one has the right to encroach on trails, sidewalks or any other place reserved for public
purposes. The provision of section 314 of the Bombay Municipality Act is not unreasonable in
the circumstances of this case. Sites must be provided to censored residents in 1976.

2. Slums existing for 20 years or more should not be removed unless the land is required for
public purposes and, in this case, alternate sites must be provided.

3. High priority should be given to resettlement.

Outcomes
The inhabitants of the causeway were expelled without relocation. Since 1985, the principles, in this
case, have been affirmed in many subsequent decisions, often leading to large-scale evictions without
resettlement. For example, in considering the extent to which their judgment was executed. Similarly,
there have been many cases where these principles have been applied.
RELATED CASES

D.K. Yadav Vs J.M.A. Industries Ltd.

Facts - In this case respondent, by its letter dated December 12, 1980 which was received by the
appellant on December 19, 1980, intimated that the appellant wilfully absented from duty continuously
for more than 8 days from December 3, 1980 without leave or prior information or intimation or
previous permission from the management and, therefore, "deemed to have left the service of the
company on your own account and lost your lien and the appointment with effect from December 3,
1980." In support thereof reliance was placed on clause 13 (2) (iv) of its Certified Standing Order. The
appellant averred that despite his reporting to duty on December 3, 1980 and everyday continuously
thereafter he was prevented entry at the gate and he was not allowed to sign the attendance register. He
pleaded that he was not permitted to join duty without assigning any reasons. His letter of December 3,
1980 was marked herein as Annexure 'A' wherein he explained the circumstances in which he was
prevented to join duty. The Tribunal found that the appellant had failed to prove his case. the Action of
the respondent is in accordance with the standing Orders and it is not a termination nor retrenchment
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for short 'the Act'. The appellant in terms of standing orders lost
his lien on his appointment and so is not entitled to reinstatement. Clause 13 (2) (iv) standing order
reads thus:

If a workman remains absent without sanctioned leave or beyond the period of leave originally granted
or subsequently extended, he shall lose his lien on his appointment unless.
(a) he returns within 3 calander days of the commencement of the absence of the expiry of leave
originally granted or subsequently extended as the case may be; and
(b) explains to the satisfaction of the manager/management the reason of his absence o r his inability
to return on the expiry of the leave, as the case may. The workman not reporting for duty within 8
calander days as mentioned above, shall be deemed to have automatically abandoned the services and
lost his lien on his appointment. His name shall be struck off from the Muster Rolls in such an
eventuality."

This action of the management was based on clause 13 (2) (iv) of the Certified Standing Orders of the
Industrial Concern which stipulates that if a workman remains absent without sanction of leave or
beyond the period of leave originally granted or subsequently extended, the employee loses his lien
on employment unless he returns to duty within eight calender days of the commencement of the
absence or the expiry of leave. At this stage it would be pertinent to examine the legal status of these
Certificate Standing Orders. A statutory mandate has been imposed on the owners of industrial
establishments employing 100 or more workmen to formulate standing orders in compliance with the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. This law was enacted with the objective of
Introducing Certainity in service Conditions

ISSUE

Whether the Impunged decision of the management i.e. removal of the employee from the job under
Clause 13 (2) (iv) of the standing order is violative of principal of Natural justice?

JUDGEMENT - It was held that the right to life enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution would
include the right to livelihood. The order of termination visits with civil consequence of jeopardising
not only the worker's livelihood but also the career and livelihood of the dependants. Therefore, before
taking any action of putting an end to the tenure of an employee, fair play requires that a reasonable
opportunity to put forth his case is given and domestic enquiry conducted complying with the
principles of natural justice. The procedure prescribed for depriving person Right to livelihood must
meet the requirement of Article 14 and follow its requirements

REASONING - The Court, speaking through K. Ramaswamy J.. then proceeded to examine all the
leading cases on the issue and stated that the basic principles of natural justice are that in every case the
person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the authority should
act in a fair, just and impartial manner. The Court stated that principles of natural justice apply unless a
particular statute or statutory rules or orders having statutory flavour exclude the application of natural
justice expressly necessary implication. The Court then proceeded to examine the validity of the
impugned action in the light of Art. 21 and observed that the right to life guaranteed by Art. 21
includes, the right to livelihood. The order of termination of service of an employee or workman visits
with civil consequences of jeopardising not only his livelihood but also that of his dependants. Thus the
Court categorically held that before taking any action putting an end to the tenure of an employee. fair-
play requires that a reasonable opportunity to put forth his case be given and a domestic enquiry
conducted in compliance with the principles of natural justice. In this manner the Court stipulated that
principles of natural justice would have to be read Into Clause 13(2) (iv) of the Standing Orders in
order to fulfil the requirement of just and fair procedure prescribed by Arts. 14 and 21.

LIC Of India Vs Consumer Education and Research Centre (1995) 5 SCC 482

Facts - On August 25, 1980 one Prof. Manubhai Shah Executive Trustee of Respondent No.1 and
Mr.D.N.Dalal sought policies under Table 58. Similarly in December, 1978 RespondentNos.2, to 4
sought similar policies for convertible term insurance plans for different amounts. In September, 1980
Respondent Nos.6 and 7 agents of the appellants when presented proposals to the LIC under Table 58
on behalf of individual respondents and promised to cover under Table 58 other 9 crores uninsured
households, the LIC turned them down. Consequently, after issuance of a notice through counsel on
September 14, 1980, the respondents filed the above writ petition. The conditions imposed and denial
to accept policies sought under Table 58 were assailed as arbitrary, discriminatory violating Articles 14,
19(1)(g) and right to life in Article 21 of the Constitution. The High Court while upholding that
prescription of conditions for 1st class lives as eligibility and other criteria laid down in the policy
under Table 58 are neither unjust nor arbitrary, declared a part of the conditions, namely,"Further,
proposals for assurance under the plan will be entertained only from persons in Government or Quasi-
Government organisation or a reputed commercial firm which can furnish details of leave taken during
the preceding year under Table 58" as subversive of equality and, therefore, constitutionally invalid.
Accordingly, it was struck down. The Corporation filed the appeal against the portion that was struck
down and the respondents filed the cross appeal against the findings that went against them.

ISSUE –

Whether the appellant is justified in law in restricting the term policy only to the specified class,
namely, salaried persons in Government, quasi-Government or reputed commercial firms?

Whether the policies Of LIC are Within the Ambit of Right To Life Under Article 21?

Judgement- It was held that Right To livelihood as interpreted In Olga tellis Vs Union of India
includes Right To Life Insurance Policies Of LIC and the policy Premium must be Within the Paying
capacity and means Of Insured.

Reasoning- It was held that right to health, medical aid and to protect the health and the vigour of a
worker while in service or post retirement is a fundamental right under Article 21 read with Articles
39(e), 41, 43, 48-A of the Constitution of India and fundamental human right to make the life of
workmen meaningful and purposeful with dignity of persons". In Regional Director, ESI Corporation v.
Francis De Costa,1992 Indlaw SC 458, the same view was stated. Security against sickness and
disablement is fundamental right under Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Article 7(b) of international Convention of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and under Articles
39(e), 38 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Employees State Insurance Act seeks to provide seccour
to maintain health of an injured workman and the interpretation should be so given as to give effect to
right to medical benefit which is a fundamental right to the workman. In Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar
v. Vishwanath Pandu Barde (C.A.No.952/77) on February 22, 1995 1995 Indlaw SC 596, this Court
held that right to economic empowerment to the poor, disadvantaged tribes and depressed and
oppressed Dalits, is a fundamental right to make their right to life and dignity of person meaningful and
worth living. It was also held that socio-economic democracy is sine qua non to make political
democracy, a truly participatory democracy and a truism for unity and integrity of Bharat. It would thus
be well settled law that the Preamble Chapter of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles accord
right to livelihood as a meaningful life, social security and disablement benefits are integral schemes of
socio-economic justice to the people in particular to the middle class and lower middle class and all
offendable people. Life insurance coverage is against disablement or in the event of death of the
insured economic support for the dependents, social security to livelihood to the insured or the
dependents. The appropriate life insurance policy within the paying capacity and means of the insured
to pay premia is one of the social security measures envisaged under the Constitution to make right to
life meaningful, worth living and right to livelihood a means for sustenance.

Case 3) Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union Vs Delhi Administration, Delhi

Facts- The petitioner-workmen who were employed on daily wages have filed these petitions for their
absorption as regular employees in the Development Department of the Delhi Administration and for
injunction prohibiting the termination of their services and also for the difference in wages paid to them
and those paid to the regular employees. The petitions are resisted on behalf of the respondents
contending that there is no scope for the absorption of the petitioners as they were employed on daily
wages with a clear understanding that the schemes under which they were employed had no provision
for regularisation of any workman. During the 5th Five Year Plan, the Central Government had
formulated various schemes to provide wage- employment to agricultural and landless labourers during
lean periods. One such scheme was "Food for work". Under this scheme, employment was given to the
poorer sections of the population in the rural areas partly for food and partly for cash payment. During
the 6th Five Year Plan, the objective of the programme was enlarged to include alleviation of rural
poverty by distribution of income in favourof the poor and the needy population in the rural areas by
providing employment opportunities to them. With this view, anew programme called the National
Rural Employment Programme was started in October 1980 replacing the "Food for work" programme.
During the period of the same Plan, another scheme called "Rural Landless Employment Guarantee
Programme" was launched on August 15, 1983with the same objective of generating additional
employment in the rural areas particularly for the land less workers. Under these programmes, works in
rural area resulting in durable community assets, social forestry, village roads etc. were taken up.
Pursuant to them, a scheme for plantation of trees was taken up at various sites in the rural areas of
Delhi. The entire said work was done by providing daily wage employment to rural workers including
the present petitioners. The labour was employed at these sites depending upon their availability in
rural areas and without reference to any Employment Exchange either in the Union Territory of Delhi
or anywhere else.

ISSUE- Whether employees of Horticulture department Under Delhi Government could be

regularised?

JUDGEMENT- It was held that Right to life would include the right to livelihood and therefore right
to work. The right to livelihood has not been included as a Fundamental Right in the Constitution
because it was not found feasible as the country has so far not attained the capacity to guarantee right
to livelihood. Therefore, it has been placed in the Chapter on Directive Principles. Thus, even while
giving the direction to the State to ensure the right to work, Constitution makers thought it prudent not
to do so without qualifying it. Art. 41 in the Chapter on Directive Principles enjoins upon the State to
make effective provision for securing the right to livelihood within the limits of its economic capacity
and development. Even then We cannot regularize the employees

REASONING - This country has so far not found it feasible to incorporate the right to livelihood as a
fundamental right in the Constitution. This is because the country has so far not attained the capacity to
guarantee it, and not because it considers it any the less fundamental to life. Advisedly, therefore, it has
been placed in the Chapter on Directive Principles Article 41 of which enjoins upon the State to make
effective provision for securing the same "within the limits of its economic capacity and development".
Thus even while giving the direction to the State to ensure the right to work, the Constitution-makers
thought it prudent not to do so without qualifying it viewed in the context of the facts of the present
case it is apparent that the schemes under which the petitioners were given employment have been
evolved to provide income for those who are below the poverty line and particularly during the periods
when they are without any source of livelihood and, therefore, without any income whatsoever. The
schemes were further meant for the rural poor, for the object of the schemes was to start tackling the
problem of poverty from that end. The object was not to provide the right to work as such even to the
rural poor- much less to the unemployed in general. As has been pointed out by the Union of India in
their additional affidavit, in 1987-88, 33 per cent of the total rural population was below the poverty
line. This meant about 35 million families. To eliminate poverty and to generate full employment 2500-
3000 million mandays of work in a year, was necessary. As against that, the Jawahar Rozgar Yojna
could provide only 870 million man days of employment on intermittent basis in neighborhood
projects. Within the available resources of Rs. 2600 crores, in all 3.10 million people alone could be
provided with permanent employment, if they were to be provided work for 273 days in a year on
minimum wages. However, under the scheme meant for providing work for only 80-90 days work
could be provided to 9.30 million people. The problems of those employed under such schemes with a
view to providing them with full employment and guaranteeing equal pay for equal work. These
concepts, in the context of such schemes are both unwarranted and misplaced. They will do more harm
than good by depriving the many of the little income that they may get to keep them from starvation.
They would benefit a few at the cost of the many starving poor for whom the schemes are meant The
other equally injurious effect of indiscriminate regularization has been that many of the agencies have
stopped undertaking casual or temporary works though they are urgent and essential for fear that if
those who are employed on such works are required to be continued for 240 or more days have to be
absorbed as regular employees although the works are time-bound and there is no need of the workmen
beyond the completion of the works undertaken. The public interests are thus jeopardised on both
counts. In the circumstances, it is not possible to accede to the request of the petitioners that the
respondents be directed to regularise

O.P. Gupta Vs Union of India and Others

Facts - The appellant who was as Assistant Engineer in the Central Public Works Department was
placed under suspension pending a departmental enquiry under r.12(2) of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 on September 3, 1959. He remained on suspension till
May 25, 1970 when on repeated representations the Chief Engineer, Central Public Works Department
revoked the order of suspension and he was reinstated in service. During the aforesaid period of
suspension, adverse remarks in his confidential reports for the period between April 1, 1957 and
August 31, 1957 and between April 1, 1958 and March 31, 1959 were communicated to him on
December 16, 1959. After a period of nearly five years, the departmental proceedings culminated in an
order of dismissal from service dated March 12, 1964 but the same on appeal by him, was set aside by
the President of India by order dated October 4, 1966 with a direction for the holding of a fresh
departmental inquiry under r. 29(1)(c) of the Rules, with a further direction that he shall continue to
remain under suspension. The order of suspension was revoked by the Chief F Engineer on May 8,
1970 but the departmental proceedings were kept alive. As a result of this, the appellant was reinstated
in service on May 25, 1970. Immediately thereafter, he made representation to the Department to pass
an order under FR 54 for payment of full pay and allowances for the period of suspension i.e. the
period between September 3, 1959 and May 25, 1970 but the same was rejected on the G ground that
departmental inquiry was still pending.
3. There was little or no progress in the departmental inquiry. on April 25, 1972 the Chief Engineer
passed an order of compulsory retirement of the appellant under FR 56(j). The appellanrmade
representations to various authorities, including the President of India, H against his compulsory
retirement but the same was rejected Eventually, on July 20, 1972 the appellant filed a petition under
Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court challenging the validity of the order of compulsory
retirement and prayed for a direction in terms of FR 54 for payment of full pay and allowances for the
period of suspension and also for payment of all increments to which he was entitled. He also prayed
for quashing of the departmental proceedings.

Issues –
1) Was the Union of India justified in passing an order dated September 17, 1982 in terms of FR 25
declaring the appellant to be unfit to cross the efficiency bar as Assistant Engineer, Central Public
Works Department at the stage of Rs.590 in the prerevised scale of pay of Rs.350-590-EB-900 as from
October 5, 1966?

(2) Is the appellant entitled to interest on the delayed payment of his pension?

Judgement It was held that HELD that suspension of Govt. servant pending departmental enquiry is
not by way of punishment, as also the withholding of the increments at the efficiency bar pending such
enquiry. When the High Court quashed the departmental proceedings, which were pending for more
than 20 years as being wholly invalid and unfair, there was no occasion for the department to have
passed an order under F.R. 25 for withholding increments unless it was with a view to penalize the
servant financially. Once a direction is given by the High Court in terms of F.R. 54(2), the servant is
entitled to full pay and allowances as also to his increments etc., but this would be the normal
increments prior to the crossing the efficiency bar for the purposes of F.R. 54(2). In terms of F.R. 25
there should be a specific order before a Govt. servant can be allowed to draw his increments above the
efficiency bar. Pending departmental enquiry, the Govt. is justified in withholding increments under
F.R. 25.

Reasoning - . The appellant would be entitled to interest at 12% per annum on the difference in salary
as well as in pension. We further direct that the Government of India will make the payment to the
appellant within four months from today. there is no presumption that the Government always acts in a
manner which is just and fair. There was no occasion whatever to protract the departmental inquiry for
a period of 20 years and keeping the appellant under suspension for a period of nearly 11 years unless it
was actuated with the mala fide intention of subjecting him to harassment. The charge framed against
the appellant was serious enough to merit his dismissal from service. Apparently, the departmental
authorities were not in a position to substantiate the charge. But that was no reason for keeping the
departmental proceedings alive for a period of 20 years and not to have revoked the order of
suspension for over 11 years. An order of suspension of a government servant does not put an end to
his service under the Government. He continues to be a member of the service in spite of the order of
suspension. It is a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will affect the rights of
any person without first giving him an opportunity of putting forward his case. Both the Privy Council
as well as this Court have in a series of cases required strict adherence to the rules of natural justice
where a public authority or body has to deal with rights. It is extremely doubtful whether in a case like
the present the Director General of Works, Central Public Works Department, as the competent
authority, could at all have taken a decision to enforce the bar under FR 25 against the appellant after
his retirement. That apart, the competent authority acted in flagrant breach of the instructions contained
in the Note beneath Government of India, Ministry of Finance Memorandum dated April 23, 1962, as
amended from time to time. It enjoins that the cases of government servants for crossing of the
efficiency bar in the time- scale of pay should be considered at the appropriate time and in case the
decision is to enforce the bar against the government servant, he should be informed of the decision
which should be in consonance with natural justice.
. The Government must view with concern that a departmental inquiry against the civil servant should
have been kept alive for so long as 20 years or more and that he should have been placed under
suspension without any lawful justification for as many as 11 years, without any progress being made
in the departmental inquiry. It should also view with concern that a decision should have been taken by
the competent authority to enforce the bar under FR 25 against the civil servant long after his
retirement with a view to cause him financial loss. Such a course not only demoralises the services but
virtually ruins the career of the delinquent officer as a government servant apart from subjecting him to
untold hardship and humiliation